

Distr.: General  
29 November 2024  
Arabic  
Original: English



رسالة مؤرخة 25 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2024 موجهة إلى رئيسة مجلس الأمن من فريق الخبراء المعني بجنوب السودان المنشأ عملاً بقرار مجلس الأمن 2206 (2015)

يتشرف أعضاء فريق الخبراء المنشأ عملاً بقرار مجلس الأمن 2206 (2015)، والذي مَدَّت ولايته عملاً بقرار مجلس الأمن 2731 (2024) بأن يحيلوا طي هذه الرسالة التقرير المؤقت، المقدم وفقاً للفقرة 18 من القرار 2731 (2024).

وقد قدّم التقرير إلى لجنة مجلس الأمن المنشأ عملاً بالقرار 2206 (2015) بشأن جنوب السودان في 1 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2024 ونظرت فيه اللجنة في 14 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2024.

ويرجو الفريق ممثلاً إطلاع أعضاء مجلس الأمن على هذه الرسالة والتقرير المؤقت وإصدارهما باعتبارهما وثيقة من وثائق المجلس.

(توقيع) مايكل غيب

منسق

فريق الخبراء المعني بجنوب السودان

(توقيع) مايانك بوبنا

خبير

(توقيع) توماس دوبا

خبير

(توقيع) يوري فيداكاس

خبير

(توقيع) فاليري يانكي - وين

خبيرة



## التقرير المرحلي لفريق الخبراء المعني بجنوب السودان المقدم عملاً بالقرار 2731 (2024)

### موجز

جنوب السودان هو أحد أكثر البلدان التي تعاني من انعدام الأمن الغذائي في العالم. ويحتاج ما يقرب من ثلاثة أرباع السكان إلى مساعدات غذائية، في حين تلوح المجاعة في الأفق في عدة أجزاء من البلد. وقد أجبر النزاع في السودان أكثر من 830 000 شخص على البحث عن مأوى في جنوب السودان وخفض عائدات الحكومة من النفط بنسبة 70 في المئة تقريباً.

وقد كافح قادة جنوب السودان لإدارة هذه الأزمات المتفاقمة والاستجابة لها، حيث استهلكت العملية السياسية في جوبا إلى حد كبير بسبب التنافس على السلطة والمناصب والسيطرة على الموارد العامة المتناقصة. وقد غمرت الفيضانات غير المسبوقة الآن ما يتراوح من 7 إلى 12 في المائة من مساحة البلد، مما زاد من إعاقة الاستجابة الإنسانية.

وفي 13 أيلول/سبتمبر 2024، وافق قادة جنوب السودان على تمديد الفترة الانتقالية التي حددها الاتفاق المنشط لتسوية النزاع في جمهورية جنوب السودان لعام 2018 (اتفاق السلام) لمدة عامين آخرين. ويعكس قرارهم التوافقي استمرار إفساح المجال للحوار السياسي في جوبا، ولكنه أيضاً اعتراف بأن ما تم تنفيذه من اتفاق السلام لم يكن كافياً لتسهيل إجراء انتخابات حرة ونزيهة، ولتهدئ الطريق للمرحلة المقبلة من تنمية البلاد. وبعبارة أوسع، يعكس ذلك أيضاً حقيقة أن القليل من النخب الأمنية والسياسية المنخرطة في عملية السلام لديها الكثير من المكاسب التي يمكن أن تجنبها من الوصول بالعملية إلى نهايتها.

ومع انحسار احتمالات إجراء انتخابات ديمقراطية لمدة عامين آخرين، تظل سلطة التعيين في كل المناصب في الحكومة وقطاع الأمن تقريباً، وكذلك تخصيص الموارد العامة، في أيدي النخب في جوبا. وقد استخدم رئيس جنوب السودان، سلفا كير ميارديت، وحزب الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان وقوات الدفاع الشعبي لجنوب السودان على وجه الخصوص هذه السيطرة بفعالية لإضعاف خصومهم من خلال تشجيع الانشقاقات ومواصلة إعادة تشكيل كل مؤسسات الدولة تقريباً. وبالنسبة لمن هم خارج هذا النظام، فثمة بدائل تزداد تناقصاً للانضمام إليه.

ففي ولاية وسط الاستوائية، على سبيل المثال، قامت الحكومة بتفتيت جبهة الخلاص الوطني من خلال تشجيع عدة انشقاقات بارزة. غير أن النتيجة كانت احتدام النزاع مع العناصر المتبقية من الجماعة، فضلاً عن زيادة افتراس السكان المدنيين حيث تسعى جماعات متعددة الآن إلى الحفاظ على عملياتها المستقلة.

وتظل المشاركة الإقليمية أمراً بالغ الأهمية لعملية السلام في جنوب السودان، وقد أعطت مبادرة تومابني التي تقودها كينيا بعض الأمل في التوسط من أجل السلام مع عدد من جماعات المعارضة المتبقية. غير أن الموقعين الحاليين على اتفاق السلام لعام 2018 اعترضوا على إبرام أي اتفاقات أو إنشاء مؤسسات إضافية خشية أن يؤدي ذلك إلى تعقيد عملية التنفيذ المتوترة بالفعل.

كما تعرضت حدود البلاد لاختبار عدم الاستقرار الإقليمي، مما استلزم عدة تدخلات سياسية رفيعة المستوى. وقد تم التعرف على عدد كبير من الجنود المسلحين من قوات الدفاع الشعبي الأوغندية في ثلاث ولايات على الأقل من ولايات جنوب السودان، في انتهاك لحظر الأسلحة، في حين عبرت عناصر من قوات الدعم السريع السودانية الحدود الشمالية لجنوب السودان.

وبالنسبة لغالبية السكان الذين يكافحون من أجل البقاء على قيد الحياة في ظل حالة طوارئ إنسانية حادة، لا يزال من غير الواضح ما إذا كان بإمكان قادة جنوب السودان استخدام العاملين المقبلين لتحقيق ما لم يحققوه خلال السنوات الست السابقة.

## المحتويات

## الصفحة

أولا -	معلومات أساسية . . . . .	5
ألف -	الولاية والسفر . . . . .	5
باء -	التعاون مع المنظمات الدولية وغيرها من الجهات صاحبة المصلحة . . . . .	5
جيم -	المنهجية . . . . .	6
ثانيا -	التحديات الإنسانية المعقدة . . . . .	6
ألف -	فيضانات غير مسبوقة . . . . .	6
باء -	أدت محدودية التخطيط والدفاعات ضد الفيضانات إلى تفاقم الأثر . . . . .	8
ثالثا -	مشهد سياسي وأمني يتسم بالتفتت . . . . .	10
ألف -	أدى تفكك جبهة الخلاص الوطني إلى زعزعة الاستقرار في وسط الاستوائية . . . . .	11
باء -	مبادرة توماني التي تقودها كينيا للتوسط مع جماعات المعارضة . . . . .	13
رابعا -	المسائل الإقليمية . . . . .	15
ألف -	الاستجابة الإقليمية لتمديد الفترة الانتقالية . . . . .	15
باء -	التواصل مع دول المنطقة . . . . .	16
خامسا -	الأسلحة . . . . .	17
ألف -	وجود قوات الدفاع الشعبي الأوغندية في أراضي جنوب السودان . . . . .	17
باء -	شراء المركبات العسكرية . . . . .	19
جيم -	شراء جماعات المعارضة للأسلحة . . . . .	20
سادسا -	الشؤون المالية والموارد الطبيعية . . . . .	20
ألف -	استمرار توقف صادرات النفط . . . . .	20
باء -	زيادة التنافس على عائدات النفط في جوبا . . . . .	21
سابعا -	خاتمة . . . . .	23
ثامنا -	التوصيات . . . . .	23
تاسعا -	المرفقات* . . . . .	24

\* تعمم باللغة التي قُدمت بها فقط ودون تحرير رسمي.

## أولاً - معلومات أساسية

### ألف - الولاية والسفر

1 - فرض مجلس الأمن، بموجب قراره 2206 (2015)، نظام جزاءات يستهدف الأفراد والكيانات الذين يشاركون في النزاع الدائر في جنوب السودان، وأنشأ لجنة للجزاءات (لجنة مجلس الأمن المنشأة عملاً بالقرار 2206 (2015) بشأن جنوب السودان). وحددت اللجنة أسماء ستة أفراد لتفرض عليهم جزاءات محددة الأهداف في 1 تموز/يوليه 2015. وفرض مجلس الأمن، باتخاذ القرار 2428 (2018)، على إقليم جنوب السودان حظراً على توريد الأسلحة، وأضاف اسميَ فردين اثنين إلى قائمة الأفراد المشمولين بالجزاءات. في 30 أيار/مايو 2024، جدد المجلس، باتخاذ القرار 2731 (2024)، نظام الجزاءات حتى 31 أيار/مايو 2025.

2 - ومُدد مجلس الأمن بموجب قراره 2731 (2024) أيضاً ولاية فريق الخبراء المعني بجنوب السودان حتى 1 تموز/يوليه 2025 لكي يتسنى له توفير المعلومات والتحليلات اللازمة لدعم عمل اللجنة، بما في ذلك ما يتعلق منها بإمكانية تحديد الجهات من الأفراد والكيانات التي قد تكون ضالعة في الأنشطة المبينة في الفقرة 7 من القرار 2206 (2015).

3 - وفي 10 أيلول/سبتمبر 2024، عيّن الأمين العام، بالتشاور مع اللجنة، أعضاء الفريق الخمسة (انظر S/2024/676).

4 - ولم يتمكن الفريق، بسبب التأخر في تعيين أعضائه، من السفر إلى جنوب السودان قبل صياغة هذا التقرير في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

### باء - التعاون مع المنظمات الدولية وغيرها من الجهات صاحبة المصلحة

5 - رغم أن الفريق يعمل بشكل مستقل عن وكالات الأمم المتحدة ومؤسساتها، فإنه يود أن يعرب عن امتنانه لبعثة الأمم المتحدة في جنوب السودان وللموظفي الأمم المتحدة الآخرين، بمن فيهم العاملون في نيويورك.

6 - وقبل صياغة هذا التقرير، طلب الفريق عقد اجتماعات مع حكومة جنوب السودان وعدة دول أعضاء في المنطقة. وحتى وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، لم يتلق الفريق أي ردود على هذه الطلبات. ومع ذلك، فقد تمكن الفريق، بالاعتماد على شبكاته الواسعة في كل من جنوب السودان والمنطقة، من التحدث إلى العديد من الأعضاء الحاليين والسابقين في حكومة جنوب السودان، وشخصيات رفيعة المستوى في قوات الدفاع الشعبي لجنوب السودان وغيرها من فروع قطاع الأمن، وكبار ممثلي جماعات المعارضة في جنوب السودان، وأعضاء الجمعية التشريعية الوطنية الانتقالية المعاد تنشيطها، والصحفيين ومنظمات المجتمع المدني في جنوب السودان، وكذلك شركات عاملة في جنوب السودان، ومن المدنيين، وممثلي الجماعات المسلحة الأجنبية الموجودة في جنوب السودان.

7 - وشدد مجلس الأمن، في الفقرة 17 من قراره 2731 (2024)، على أهمية إجراء مشاورات منتظمة مع الدول الأعضاء المعنية، والمنظمات الدولية والإقليمية ودون الإقليمية، وبعثة الأمم المتحدة في جنوب السودان. وتمكن الفريق من إجراء مشاورات مستفيضة مع هيئات الأمم المتحدة ووكالاتها في جنوب السودان وأماكن أخرى. وأجرى أيضاً مشاورات مع معظم الآليات الأمنية المنشأة بموجب الاتفاق المنشط لتسوية النزاع

في جمهورية جنوب السودان (اتفاق السلام)، وكذلك مع عدة مؤسسات متعددة الأطراف عاملة في جنوب السودان.

8 - ووجه الفريق 10 رسائل رسمية إلى حكومة جنوب السودان وإلى الدول الأعضاء في المنطقة وأفراد وكيانات آخرين، تلقى عليها رداً موضوعياً واحداً قبل صياغة هذا التقرير. وترد في مرفقات هذا التقرير الردود التي تلقاها الفريق لاحقاً.

## جيم - المنهجية

9 - أعد هذا التقرير، في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، على أساس ما أجره الفريق من بحوث وتحقيقات مستقلة. وأجرى الفريق العديد من المقابلات لجمع مجموعة من المعلومات الموثوقة المستقاة من طائفة واسعة من المصادر. واستعرض الفريق الوثائق التي أتاحها له الأفراد، والكيانات التجارية، والمصادر السرية، وحكومة جنوب السودان. وقد بذل الفريق جهداً دؤوباً لضمان أن تكون تقاريره مستنيرة بمجموعة من وجهات النظر حول عملية السلام في جنوب السودان، بما في ذلك المجموعات المتعددة المشاركة في حكومة الوحدة الوطنية الانتقالية المنشطة وجماعات المعارضة المتبقية. واستند الفريق أيضاً إلى أعماله السابقة، بما في ذلك التقارير السابقة المقدمة إلى مجلس الأمن واللجنة، العلنية منها والسرية.

10 - واتبع الفريق المعايير التي أوصى بها الفريق العامل غير الرسمي التابع لمجلس الأمن والمعني بالمسائل العامة المتعلقة بالجزءات، في تقريره الصادر في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2006 (S/2006/997). وتحقق الفريق من المعلومات الواردة في التقرير مستعيناً في ذلك بمصادر متعددة مستقلة بغية استيفاء معايير الإثبات السليمة.

11 - وأجرى الفريق بحثه بأكبر قدر ممكن من الشفافية، مع إعطاء الأولوية لطابع السرية، عند اللزوم. ولا يوصف المصدر أو الوثيقة بصفة السرية إلا إذا كان من شأن الكشف عنه أن يعرض سلامة المصدر للخطر.

## ثانياً - التحديات الإنسانية المعقدة

12 - لا يزال جنوب السودان يواجه حالة طوارئ إنسانية حادة. وقد تضافرت سنوات من التحديات السياسية والاقتصادية والأمنية المتراكمة مع صدمات خارجية كبيرة لتسفر عن أزمات معقدة ومتجذرة بعمق.

## ألف - فيضانات غير مسبقة

13 - يتأهب قادة جنوب السودان لإعلان حالة طوارئ وطنية بعد أن غمرت الفيضانات الواسعة النطاق ما بين 7 إلى 12 في المائة من مساحة البلد، ونحو 30 في المائة في ولايات من قبيل الوحدة وواراب<sup>(1)</sup>. ومن المتوقع أن يتأثر نحو 3,3 ملايين شخص، موزعين على أكثر من نصف محافظات البلد، بالفيضانات

(1) مقابلة مع خبير في الجغرافيا المكانية، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر أيضاً مركز الأمم المتحدة المعني بالسوائل، صور لفيضانات جنوب السودان في الفترة من 5 إلى 9 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، متاحة عبر الرابط [https://unosat.org/static/unosat\\_files/4002/UNOSAT\\_A3\\_Natural\\_Landscape\\_FL20220424SS.D\\_05Oct\\_09Oct2024\\_SouthSudan\\_Week24.pdf](https://unosat.org/static/unosat_files/4002/UNOSAT_A3_Natural_Landscape_FL20220424SS.D_05Oct_09Oct2024_SouthSudan_Week24.pdf)

في عام 2024<sup>(2)</sup>. وقد غمرت مياه الفيضانات عشرات الآلاف من الأفدنة من الأراضي الزراعية أو ألحقت بها أضراراً، إلى جانب مئات المدارس ونقاط المياه وعشرات المرافق الصحية<sup>(3)</sup>. وقد وصف أحد سكان جوبا، عاد مؤخراً من زيارة دار أسلافه في ولاية جونقلي، المكان الذي كانت فيه غابة كثيفة في السابق بأنه "محيط" من المياه<sup>(4)</sup>.

14 - وقد ضاعفت الفيضانات من تأثير التحديات الإنسانية الأخرى. واستقبل جنوب السودان حتى الآن أكثر من 830 000 شخص من الفارين من النزاع في السودان، ليضافوا إلى 2,2 مليون شخص سبق أن نزحوا داخل حدود البلد<sup>(5)</sup>. وقد وصل العديد منهم إلى ولايات تضررت بشدة أيضاً من الفيضانات. ويحتاج الآن أكثر من 8 ملايين شخص، أي حوالي 70 في المائة من السكان، إلى مساعدات غذائية<sup>(6)</sup> مع ارتفاع أسعار المواد الغذائية وغير الغذائية<sup>(7)</sup>. ولا تزال مستويات انعدام الأمن الغذائي لـ "حالة الطوارئ" (المرحلة 4 من التصنيف المتكامل لمراحل الأمن الغذائي) تنتشر على نطاق واسع في معظم أنحاء البلد<sup>(8)</sup>.

15 - وإضافة إلى ذلك، اعتباراً من تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، توقفت الحركة على زهاء 75 في المائة من طرق جنوب السودان أو تأثرت بالفيضانات أو غيرها من العوائق<sup>(9)</sup>. وقد أدى ذلك إلى تعقيد الاستجابة الإنسانية إلى حد كبير، مما أجبر الجهات الفاعلة الإنسانية على الاعتماد على التحويلات النقدية<sup>(10)</sup>، وعمليات الإيصال بالنقل الجوي المكلفة، وحملات التوعية والرسائل الأقل تأثيراً<sup>(11)</sup>. كما ركز تقديم الخدمات على المناطق التي لدى العاملين في المجال الإنساني فيها أصول موجودة مسبقاً. وقد حذر بعض الخبراء

(2) خطة التأهب والاستجابة للفيضانات في جنوب السودان، من حزيران/يونيه إلى كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2024، أعدتها المنظمات الإنسانية بالتشاور مع حكومة جنوب السودان، متاحة عبر الرابط <https://fsccluster.org/sites/default/files/South%20Sudan%20Floods%20Preparedness%20and%20Response%2022%20Jun.e%202024.pdf>

(3) انظر المرفق 2.

(4) مقابلة مع شخص مدني من جنوب السودان، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(5) المنظمة الدولية للهجرة ومفوضية الأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين، بيانات حول تحركات السكان من السودان إلى جنوب السودان، اطّلع عليه آخر مرة في 22 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، متاحة عبر الرابط <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjojZTMwNTljNWYtYmVhY00ZGI2LTgwYzAtN2UyNDZmZTRlNjBkIiwidCI6IjE1ODgyNjJkLTZmIiwidNDNiNC1iZDZlWJjZTQ5YzhlnjE4NiIsImMiOj9&pageName=ReportSection95.859b8850a76994e6fb&pageName=ReportSection4f5adec6c9d67015bc74>

(6) Famine Early Warning System Network, Food Assistance Outlook Brief, August 2024، متاحة عبر الرابط <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2024-08/FEWSNET-FAOB-August%202024.pdf>

(7) Reach, Joint Market Monitoring Initiative, September 2024، متاحة عبر الرابط [https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/repository/586c51ea/REACH\\_SSD\\_Factsheet\\_JMMI\\_September-2024.pdf](https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/repository/586c51ea/REACH_SSD_Factsheet_JMMI_September-2024.pdf)

(8) Famine Early Warning System Network, "Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes remain widespread as flooding expands", أيلول/سبتمبر 2024، متاحة عبر الرابط <https://fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/key-message-update/september-2024>

(9) انظر، على سبيل المثال، القيود المفروضة على الوصول في خريطة المجموعة اللوجستية لجنوب السودان، متاحة عبر الرابط [www.logcluster.org/en/document/south-sudan-access-constraints-map-18-october-2024](http://www.logcluster.org/en/document/south-sudan-access-constraints-map-18-october-2024)

(10) تزود هذه البرامج الأفراد أو المجتمعات المحلية بالنقود، بدلاً من الطعام أو السلع والخدمات الأخرى.

(11) مقابلات مع سبعة من الجهات الفاعلة في مجال العمل الإنساني ومن المحللين المحليين، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

المحليين من أن هذا الأمر قد خلق محميات "جزرية"<sup>(12)</sup> يمكن أن تعزز أوجه عدم المساواة القائمة بينما تترك المجتمعات الأخرى مهمشة<sup>(13)</sup>.

16 - ولما أدت الفيضانات إلى تشريد الناس والماشية على حد سواء، فقد تداخلت أيضاً مع التوترات القبلية الكبيرة والعنف على الصعيد دون الوطني، بما في ذلك في ولايات واراب وجونقلي ووسط الاستوائية وأعلى النيل<sup>(14)</sup>. وقد حذر الخبراء من أن هذه التحديات قد لا تكون مؤقتة، حيث قد لا يكون من الممكن الآن العودة إلى أنماط الحياة السابقة في بعض المناطق التي تعطلت فيها دورات الزراعة والحصاد بشكل دائم<sup>(15)</sup>.

## باء - أدت محدودية التخطيط والدفاعات ضد الفيضانات إلى تفاقم الأثر

17 - كانت الفيضانات الأخيرة نتيجة متوقعة بشكل متزايد لتغير المناخ في المنطقة. ويرتبط حوض نهر النيل وأراضي السدود الرطبة في جنوب السودان بثلاثة أنظمة هيدرولوجية متقاربة؛ الروافد الغربية لنهر النيل، والتدفقات الخارجة من بحيرة فيكتوريا، والمجاري السطحية من المرتفعات الإثيوبية. وفي عام 2024، أدت زيادة هطول الأمطار السنوية في شرق أفريقيا، إلى جانب التشبع الحالي في السهول الفيضانية في جنوب السودان، إلى فيضانات لم يسبق لها مثيل في التاريخ<sup>(16)</sup>.

18 - ومع ذلك، ووفقاً لمجموعة من الخبراء، فإن مدى الفيضانات وتأثيرها في جنوب السودان يمكن عزوه أيضاً إلى الأثر التراكمي لمحدودية استعدادات الحكومة وفشل الكثير من البنى التحتية للتخفيف من آثار الفيضانات والوقاية منها على مدى سنوات عديدة<sup>(17)</sup>. فقد أعرب عدة خبراء، على سبيل المثال، عن قلقهم من أن أنظمة السدود المحدودة قد أعطت "أملاً زائفاً" لبعض المجتمعات المحلية التي بقيت في الأجزاء المعرضة للفيضانات في ولاية جونقلي وولاية الوحدة<sup>(18)</sup>. وفي عدة من هذه المواقع، سرعان ما غمرت المياه السدود المشيدة يدوياً بالمياه، مما أدى إلى نزوح كبير<sup>(19)</sup>.

(12) مقابلة مع خبير محلي في البنية التحتية، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر أيضاً المرفق 3.

(13) مقابلات مع خبير محلي في البنية التحتية ومسؤول حكومي في ولاية الوحدة، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(14) وتشير التقارير الأخيرة أيضاً إلى أن هناك خطر "كبير للتعرض" للعنف الجنساني في 80 في المئة من مقاطعات جنوب السودان، حيث زادت التقارير عن العنف الجنسي بنسبة 168 في المائة في الربع الثاني من عام 2024 مقارنة بالفترة نفسها من عام 2023. انظر "UNHCR Protection Cluster, "South Sudan: Protection Monitoring Spotlight, July to August" 2024, 25 September 2024، متاحة عبر الرابط <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-protection-monitoring-spotlight-july-august-2024> و "UNMISS, "Brief on violence affecting civilians, April to June 2024"، متاحة عبر الرابط [https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly\\_brief\\_on\\_violence\\_affecting\\_civilians\\_april\\_-\\_june\\_2024\\_0.pdf](https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_brief_on_violence_affecting_civilians_april_-_june_2024_0.pdf) ومكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية "South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot, September 2024"، متاحة عبر الرابط [www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024).

(15) مقابلات مع جهات فاعلة في مجال العمل الإنساني وعلماء مناخ وممثلين للمجتمع المحلي، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(16) تقارير عن اتجاهات الأرصاد الجوية في جنوب السودان، محفوظة لدى الفريق.

(17) مقابلات مع 19 من علماء المناخ والمسؤولين الحكوميين والوكالات الإنسانية وممثلي المجتمع المحلي، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(18) مقابلات مع عاملين في المجال الإنساني ومحليين محليين وخبير في البنية التحتية، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(19) المرجع نفسه، تؤكد تقارير من مراقبين محليين، أيلول/سبتمبر وتشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، وصور فوتوغرافية استعرضها الفريق.



19 - وبالمثل، مضى المسؤولون الحكوميون قدماً في مشروع تجريف مسيس للغاية كمحاولة جزئية لفتح روافد النيل في ولاية الوحدة، على الرغم من انتقادات وجهها خبراء إيكولوجيون وتقنيون<sup>(20)</sup>. وأبلغ عدة خبراء محليين الفريق أنهم يعتقدون أن هذا المشروع كان له تأثير محدود أو "لا تأثير له" حتى الآن<sup>(21)</sup>. وأبلغ خبراء آخرون الفريق بأن عدة مشاريع لتشبيد الطرق والجسور في جميع أنحاء البلد قد أعاققت أو عطلت جريان المياه، وأن مقاولين أقوياء يعملون في تشبيد الطرق قد تجاهلوا دراسات الجدوى الخاصة بتصميم الطرق ومقاومة الفيضانات، مما أدى إلى دمار ونزوح على حد سواء<sup>(22)</sup>.

20 - كما أدى تحويل وجهة الموارد العامة المحدودة للبلاد واختلاسها إلى تقويض قدرة البلد على التخفيف من آثار الفيضانات والتصدي لها. ففي أيلول/سبتمبر 2022، على سبيل المثال، خصصت الحكومة ما مجموعه حوالي 26,7 مليون دولار لبرنامج وطني للتصدي للفيضانات<sup>(23)</sup>، وتعاقبت مع 25 شركة من جنوب السودان<sup>(24)</sup> لتوفير الإمدادات، بما في ذلك الذرة الرفيعة والناموسيات، بقيمة تبلغ نحو 20 مليون دولار<sup>(25)</sup>. ومع ذلك، لم يصل سوى القليل من هذه الموارد إلى ضحايا الفيضانات في نهاية المطاف، ويُزعم أن عدة أطنان من المساعدات الغذائية قد سُرقَت<sup>(26)</sup>. ولم يكن لدى العديد من الشركات المتعاقد معها خبرة كبيرة في إدارة الخدمات اللوجستية للاستجابة لحالات الطوارئ أو لم يكن لديها خبرة على الإطلاق، ولم تسدد الحكومة مستحقات عدة موردين<sup>(27)</sup>.

21 - وفي تموز/يوليه 2024، وافقت الحكومة على خطة استجابة طارئة للفيضانات بقيمة بلغت 76 مليون دولار<sup>(28)</sup>. ولكن، حتى تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، لم يُخرج عن هذه الأموال، حيث لا تزال المالية العامة مقيدة بسبب الانقطاع الخطير لصادرات البلد من النفط<sup>(29)</sup>.

(20) مقابلات مع خبير في البنية التحتية ومنسق للاستجابة الدولية، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر أيضا المرفقين 4 و 5.

(21) مقابلات مع عالم إيكولوجي محلي وثلاثة محللين محليين في ولاية الوحدة، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(22) مقابلة مع أحد خبراء البنية التحتية المشاركين في صياغة دراسات جدوى الطرق، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. تؤكد منشورات عبر وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي وصور فوتوغرافية ومقاطع فيديو سجلها ممثلون للمجتمع المحلي في ولاية غرب بحر الغزال وولاية شمال بحر الغزال وولاية البحيرات. انظر أيضاً، على سبيل المثال، "ARC commits to resolving Wau road blockage after heavy rainfall", 24 May 2024، متاحة عبر الرابط [www.eyeradio.org/arc-commits-to-resolving-wau-road-blockage-after-heavy-rainfall/](http://www.eyeradio.org/arc-commits-to-resolving-wau-road-blockage-after-heavy-rainfall/). انظر أيضاً S/2024/343.

(23) Eye Radio, Govt allocates \$16.7m to flood-affected populations, 10 September 2022، متاحة عبر الرابط [www.eyeradio.org/govt-allocates-16-7m-to-flood-affected-populations/](http://www.eyeradio.org/govt-allocates-16-7m-to-flood-affected-populations/)، و Statement by the Office of the President, 30 November 2022.

(24) Eye Radio, "Govt allocates \$16.7m".

(25) Number One Citizen, "Government procures food for vulnerable flood victims", 2 November 2022، انظر أيضاً [www.eyeradio.org/govt-procures-food-non-food-aid-worth-20m-for-floods-survivors/](http://www.eyeradio.org/govt-procures-food-non-food-aid-worth-20m-for-floods-survivors/).

(26) Sudans Post, "Ex-humanitarian minister Peter Mayen denies walking away with flood victims' emergency funds", 27 November 2022. انظر أيضاً Sudans Post, "Ex-humanitarian minister Peter Mayen denies walking away with flood victims' emergency funds", 27 November 2022.

(27) مقابلة مع أحد الأفراد الذين تعاقدت معهم الحكومة، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2022.

(28) مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، إحاطة إلى مجلس الأمن بشأن جنوب السودان، 14 آب/أغسطس 2024.

(29) مقابلات مع أحد منسقي الاستجابة الدوليين ومسؤول حكومي كبير مشارك في الاستجابة للفيضانات، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

22 - ومع انخفاض الإيرادات الحكومية والتخفيضات الكبيرة في تمويل المساعدات الإنسانية، سعت الحكومة أيضًا بشكل متزايد إلى فرض ضرائب على الإمدادات الإنسانية<sup>(30)</sup>. وأفادت تقارير بأن العوائق التي تحول دون إمكانية إيصال المساعدات الإنسانية، بما في ذلك الهجمات على العاملين في مجال تقديم المساعدة الإنسانية والأصول الإنسانية والقيود المفروضة على التنقل وغيرها من العوائق البيروقراطية، كانت أعلى بنسبة 15 في المائة في عام 2024، مقارنة بعام 2023<sup>(31)</sup>. كما أن التحويلات النقدية، التي بلغت قيمتها أكثر من 76 مليون دولار في عام 2024، فقدت بشكل روتيني ما يصل إلى نصف قيمتها بسبب تباين سعر الصرف الرسمي الذي يُطلب من الوكالات الإنسانية استخدامه بشكل كبير عن السعر الموازي غير الرسمي الذي يتعامل به معظم الأشخاص والشركات<sup>(32)</sup>.

### ثالثاً - مشهد سياسي وأمني يتسم بالتفتت

23 - في 13 أيلول/سبتمبر 2024، وافق قادة جنوب السودان على تمديد الفترة الانتقالية التي حددها اتفاق السلام لعام 2018 لمدة عامين، مما أدى إلى زيادة تأجيل أول انتخابات في البلد حتى كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2026. وجاء هذا القرار في أعقاب تقييم أجرته اللجنة الدائمة الرفيعة المستوى التي تراقب تنفيذ اتفاق السلام، وخلصت فيه اللجنة إلى أن 17 في المائة فقط من بنود الاتفاق قد نُفذت، في حين أن 57 في المائة من بنوده ظلت "معلقة"<sup>(33)</sup>. وقد أصبح تأجيل الانتخابات أمراً مرجحاً على نحو متزايد مع اقتراب موعد الاقتراع، حيث لا توجد سوى استعدادات أولية للغاية لإجراء الانتخابات. وقد أكد مستشار الرئيس للأمن القومي أن التمديد سيُتيح للحكومة "استكمال التعداد السكاني وتسجيل الأحزاب السياسية وتعزيز العمليات الدستورية"<sup>(34)</sup>.

24 - ومع تمديد فترة الحكم الانتقالي في البلاد، أصبح المشهد السياسي والأمني في جنوب السودان يتسم بالتفتت بشكل متزايد. ومنحت هيكل السلطة الشديدة المركزية في الفترة الانتقالية الموقعين الرئيسيين على اتفاق السلام، وخاصة رئيس جنوب السودان، سلفاً كبيراً ميارديت، السيطرة على جميع المناصب السياسية والأمنية في البلد تقريباً، بما في ذلك داخل البرلمان والمؤسسات دون الوطنية. ومع تطاول الفترة الانتقالية، ازداد ضعف العديد من المعارضين أو شعروا بأنهم مضطرون للانفصال ومحاولة الانضمام إلى

*Wall Street Journal*, "South Sudan's Economic Crisis Is So Bad It's Taxing Its Only Lifeline", (30) October 2024.

(31) مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، "South Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (September 2024)", 11 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، متاحة عبر الرابط [www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024](http://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024).

(32) مقابلات مع ثلاثة متخصصين في برنامج التحويلات النقدية، أيلول/سبتمبر وتشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر أيضًا the Cash Working Group, "Cash and Voucher Dashboard, January to August 2024" متاحة عبر الرابط <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiMzhkMzkyZWItMDFjZi00OTgyLTgzYWYtMjEyNDhjNTdmMTE3IiwidCI6IjBmOWUzNWRLTU0NGYtNGY2MC1iZGNjLTViYTQxNmU2ZGM3MCIiLCJmMiOiJh9>.

(33) تقرير اللجنة الدائمة الرفيعة المستوى، بتاريخ 10 أيلول/سبتمبر 2024، محفوظ لدى الفريق.

(34) "The East African, "South Sudan delays polls to 2026, extends transitional government""، 14 أيلول/سبتمبر 2024.

الأحزاب المهيمنة داخل النظام. وقد وجد حزب الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان الذي ينتمي إليه الرئيس وقوات الدفاع الشعبي لجنوب السودان في هذا الأمر أرضًا خصبة لإضعاف الخصوم السياسيين والعسكريين من خلال تشجيع الانشقاقات، مع إعادة توزيع المناصب العليا في قطاع الأمن<sup>(35)</sup>.

## ألف - أدى تفكك جبهة الخلاص الوطني إلى زعزعة الاستقرار في وسط الاستوائية

25 - وفي ولايات الاستوائية، واصلت الحكومة جهودها الناجحة لتشجيع كبار قادة جبهة الخلاص الوطني ومقاتليها على الانشقاق عن توماس سيريلو، زعيم جبهة الخلاص الوطني. وقد أدى ذلك إلى تفكك جبهة الخلاص وإضعافها، كما سمح للحكومة باستخدام المنشقين الجدد كقوات بالوكالة لملاحقة العناصر المتبقية من الجبهة. وهذا يعكس الاستراتيجيات التي استخدمتها الحكومة بفعالية في أجزاء أخرى من البلد، بما في ذلك ولايتي أعالي النيل والوحدة<sup>(36)</sup>. وكما هو الأمر في هذه الحالات الأخرى، أدت هذه الحملة أيضًا إلى تدهور كبير في الوضع الأمني المحلي.

26 - ومع تزايد التحديات اللوجستية وتحديات الموارد التي تواجهها جبهة الخلاص أصبح من السهل على الحكومة تشجيع قادتها على الانشقاق<sup>(37)</sup>. وقد أغري عدد منهم بوعدهم بالحصول على وظائف مدفوعة الأجر داخل الشرطة أو قوات الدفاع الشعبي، وقد تم بالفعل دمج بعض المنشقين عن الجبهة في وحدات قوات الدفاع الشعبي في مقاطعتي شرق موندري وموروبو<sup>(38)</sup>.

27 - ويُزعم أيضًا أن جزءًا كبيرًا من الأموال المخصصة لتنفيذ اتفاق السلام، والتي تم تحويلها إلى وزارة شؤون مجلس الوزراء، تُستخدم لتشجيع الانشقاقات عن جبهة الخلاص الوطني<sup>(39)</sup>. وأكد وزير شؤون مجلس الوزراء، مارتين إيليا لومورو، على سبيل المثال، بعد استدعائه أمام البرلمان، أنه قد سُحب مبلغ 050 000 1 دولار على نحو غير نظامي لتسهيل "تنفيذ السلام" مع قادة جبهة الخلاص في نيسان/أبريل 2024<sup>(40)</sup>.

28 - ومن أبرز الانشقاقات الأخيرة انشقاق كينيدي كيني "المحارب" عبده لوبونوق، الذي يعمل الآن كقوة بالوكالة متحالفة مع قوات الدفاع الشعبي؛ وجون لاتيو كيني لوبورونوق، الذي يقود الآن جماعته الخاصة، قوات الخلاص الوطني المتحدة<sup>(41)</sup>. وتشير الوثائق التي استعرضها الفريق إلى أن كلا هذين

(35) انظر المرفقين 6 و 7.

(36) يمكن الاطلاع على أمثلة بارزة أخرى لهذه الاستراتيجية في الوثائق التالية: S/2024/343 و S/2023/294 و S/2022/884 و S/2022/359.

(37) انظر المرفق 8. مقابلات مع توماس سيريلو، أيلول/سبتمبر وتشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(38) مقابلات مع مدنيين محليين ومصادر سرية، أيلول/سبتمبر وتشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(39) انظر المرفقات من 9 إلى 12. مقابلات مع أربعة ممثلين للمجتمع المدني ومحليين، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر أيضًا Eye Radio, "Dr. Lomuro admits to diverting peace funds to special projects", 7 June 2024 and Sudans Post, "Lomuro claims he was quoted 'out of context' on \$10 million peace funds", 10 June 2024.

(40) انظر المرفقات من 9 إلى 12. انظر أيضًا Eye Radio, "Dr Lomuro admits diverting peace fund".

(41) انظر المرفقات من 13 إلى 16.

الانشقاقين تم التفاوض بشأنهما من قبل أعلى مستويات الحكومة، بما في ذلك رئاسة الجمهورية ووزارة شؤون مجلس الوزراء<sup>(42)</sup>.

29 - وقد سعت الحكومة على نحو متزايد إلى استخدام بعض هؤلاء المنشقين كقوات بالوكالة ضد ما تبقى من عناصر جبهة الخلاص. وفي حالات أخرى، استهدف كل منهما الآخر. فالقوات الخاضعة لقيادة كينيي "المحارب"، على سبيل المثال، يقال إنها تعمل خارج الهياكل الرسمية لقوات الدفاع الشعبي، ولكنها مكلفة باستهداف عناصر من جبهة الخلاص الوطني و جبهة الخلاص الوطني المتحدة، في ولاية وسط الاستوائية<sup>(43)</sup>.

30 - وفي إحدى الحوادث التي وقعت في 9 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، قُتل ما لا يقل عن 24 شخصًا، من بينهم 19 مدنيًا، وأصيب عدة أشخاص في وندوروبا في ولاية وسط الاستوائية نتيجة لاشتباكات بين قوات الدفاع الشعبي، متحالفة مع قوات يقودها كينيي "المحارب"، وقوات جبهة الخلاص الوطني المتحدة، بقيادة لوبورونق<sup>(44)</sup>. وجلبت تلك الاشتباكات إدانات من المجتمعات المحلية ومنظمات المجتمع المدني وحكومة الولاية<sup>(45)</sup>.

31 - كما كانت هناك زيادة كبيرة في عمليات الاختطاف والابتزاز في أجزاء من ولاية وسط الاستوائية، بما في ذلك في مقاطعات جوبا وموروبو وياي<sup>(46)</sup>. وقد استهدفت العديد من الجماعات المنشقة التي تقتدر إلى الموارد المدنيين والعاملين في المجال الإنساني، مما أدى إلى تعليق بعض العمليات الإنسانية في المنطقة.

32 - وقد تحدث الفريق إلى سبعة أشخاص اختطفوا لمدة تصل إلى أربعة أيام، وزعموا أن عناصر من جبهة الخلاص طلبت آلاف الدولارات من أرباب عملهم لتأمين إطلاق سراحهم<sup>(47)</sup>. كما زعم الأفراد أنفسهم أن وحدات محلية تابعة لقوات الدفاع الشعبي قامت باعتقال واحتجاز المدنيين المشتبه في تعاطفهم مع جبهة الخلاص الوطني بشكل تعسفي، وطالبت بما يصل إلى 200 000 جنيه جنوب سوداني (65 دولاراً) مقابل الإفراج عنهم<sup>(48)</sup>.

(42) مقابلات مع خمسة ممثلين للمجتمع المدني، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر أيضًا المرفقات من 13 إلى 16.

(43) مقابلات مع ممثلي المجتمع المحلي، أيلول/سبتمبر وأكتوبر/تشرين أول 2024. انظر أيضًا المرفق 16.

(44) المرجع نفسه. تؤكد تقارير من مراقبين ميدانيين، محفوظة لدى الفريق. انظر أيضًا المرفقات 18 و 21 إلى 23. انظر أيضًا UNMISS, "UNMISS alarmed by violent attacks in Juba County, calls for investigation and accountability", متاحة عبر الرابط <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/unmiss-alarmed-violent-attacks-juba-county-calls-investigation-and-accountability>.

(45) انظر المرفقات من 17 إلى 20.

(46) تقارير من مراقبين في ولاية وسط الاستوائية، أيار/مايو وأيلول/سبتمبر 2024، محفوظة لدى الفريق. مقابلات مع ثلاثة ممثلين للمجتمع المدني وجهات العمل الإنساني، أيلول/سبتمبر وتشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر أيضًا UNMISS, "Brief on violence affecting civilians".

(47) مقابلات مع سبعة مختطفين وممثل عن المجتمع المحلي، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(48) مقابلات مع أفراد عائلات مدنيين مختطفين وقادة من المجتمع المحلي، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

33 - وعلى الرغم من فقدان عدة قادة، فقد تمكنت جبهة الخلاص الوطني بقيادة توماس سيريلو من البقاء أيضًا وتجديد صفوفها من خلال عمليات الاختطاف والتجنيد<sup>(49)</sup>، في حين أن عدة جماعات مسلحة محلية أخرى قد حملت شعار جبهة الخلاص الوطني<sup>(50)</sup>.

34 - ورداً على ذلك، كثفت الحكومة عملياتها العسكرية في المنطقة من خلال نشر أعداد إضافية من المنشقين والقوات<sup>(51)</sup>. كما استُعيض عن عدد من مفوضي المقاطعات المحليين المدنيين بمسؤولين جدد ذوي خلفيات عسكرية<sup>(52)</sup>، وكإجراء إضافي، تم توحيد العمليات العسكرية لقوات الدفاع الشعبي في جميع أنحاء ولاية وسط الاستوائية الجنوبية تحت قيادة قائد قوات الدفاع الشعبي الذي تمت ترقيته مؤخراً في ياي<sup>(53)</sup>. وفي الوقت نفسه، أبلغ الفريق بأن إدماج ضباط قوات الدفاع الوطني المنشقين في وحدات قوات الدفاع والأمن السودانية التي ظلت شهوراً دون أجر قد زاد من حدة التوتر وأضعف القيادة والسيطرة داخل أجزاء من الجيش<sup>(54)</sup>.

## باء - مبادرة تومايني التي تقودها كينيا للتوسط مع جماعات المعارضة

35 - أدت تفتت جماعات المعارضة إلى تعقيد جهود بناء السلام، حيث أصبح المشهد السياسي والأمني المتغير الآن يتماشى من خلال عدد متزايد من الاتفاقات والعمليات المتداخلة جزئياً.

36 - وفي 9 أيار/مايو 2024، عُقدت وساطة رفيعة المستوى في نيروبي، كينيا، بين حكومة جنوب السودان وبعض جماعات المعارضة التي لم توقع على اتفاق السلام لعام 2018. ومن بين المشاركين في "مبادرة تومايني" - التي تعني "الأمل" - الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان - الجناح الحقيقي بقيادة باقان أموم؛ وجبهة/جيش جبهة جنوب السودان المتحدة المسلحة، بقيادة الشخص الخاضع للجزاءات بول مالونق أوان (SSi.008)؛ والحركة الشعبية/الجيش الشعبي لجنوب السودان، بقيادة ستيفن بواي. كما دُعي أيضاً الشخص الخاضع للجزاءات سيمون قاتويش (SSi.002) من الجناح المعارض في الحركة الشعبية/الجيش

(49) انظر المرفقين 24 و 25. مقابلات مع توماس سيريلو وممثل عن المجتمع المدني، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024؛ و UNMISS، "UNMISS gravely concerned by rising abductions in Greater Yei, calls for collective action", 2 August 2024. انظر أيضاً مقطع الفيديو الذي نشرته جبهة الخلاص الوطني من الرابط التالي: [www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-mEqXbj-FA](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-mEqXbj-FA); and Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, "Quarterly report on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS from 1 July to 30 September 2024" متاحة عبر الموقع <https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/reports/rjmec-quarterly-reports/254-rjmec-quarterly-report-on-the-status-of-implementation-of-the-r-arcss-from-1st-july-to-30th-september-2024/file>.

(50) مقابلات مع ممثلي المجتمع المدني، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. تؤكد تقارير مستقلة من المجتمع المحلي، استعراضها الفريق، حزيران/يونيه إلى أيلول/سبتمبر 2024، وتقارير من مراقبين دوليين، محفوظة لدى الفريق.

(51) تقارير من مراقبين دوليين، آذار/مارس 2024، محفوظة لدى الفريق. مقابلات مع ثلاثة ممثلين عن المجتمع المدني وتوماس سيريلو، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(52) تقارير من مراقبين محليين، آب/أغسطس 2024، محفوظة لدى الفريق. مقابلات مع محلل محلي وممثل عن المجتمع المدني، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر أيضاً The Dawn, "Governor Wani urge newly appointed county commissioners to improve security", 7 August 2024.

(53) مقابلات مع محلل محلي وممثل عن المجتمع المدني، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(54) مقابلات مع ثلاثة ممثلين للمجتمع المدني، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. تؤكد تقارير من مراقبين محليين، آب/أغسطس 2024، محفوظة لدى الفريق.

الشعبي لتحرير السودان - فصليل كيتقوانق، ولكنه لم يتمكن من السفر من موقعه في السودان للمشاركة في المحادثات<sup>(55)</sup>.

37 - وكان من بين الحضور أيضًا ماريو لوكو توماس جادا، الذي كان قد انشق عن جبهة الخلاص الوطني ليشكل مجلس قيادة الثورة التابع للجبهة قبل بضعة أشهر من المحادثات. وقد رفض بقية أعضاء تحالف حركة المعارضة في جنوب السودان المشاركة في هذه العملية متذرعين بالمخاوف الأمنية في كينيا وعدم الثقة في العملية. وفي آب/أغسطس 2024، سافر كبير الوسطاء في مبادرة تومايني، لازارو سومبيو إلى روما في محاولة فاشلة لإقناع توماس سيريلو بالانضمام إلى المحادثات<sup>(56)</sup>.

38 - وفي 15 تموز/يوليه 2024، وقّعت الأطراف المشاركة في مبادرة تومايني بالأحرف الأولى على وثيقة توافقية حددت ستة "بروتوكولات"<sup>(57)</sup>. ولكن في اليوم التالي، رفض الجناح المعارض في الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان الوثيقة وانسحب رسميًا من المحادثات<sup>(58)</sup>.

39 - وفي معرض تفسيرهم لانسحابهم، ذكر مسؤولو الجناح المعارض في الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان أن المبادرة انحرفت عن هدفها المنشود كمنتهى للوساطة. وجادلوا بأن الخطط الرامية إلى أن تسفر المبادرة عن اتفاق قائم بذاته، عوضا من دمجها في اتفاق السلام الحالي لعام 2018 ترقى إلى "انتهاك" لاتفاق السلام "يقوض" تنفيذه<sup>(59)</sup>.

40 - فعلى سبيل المثال، اعترض ممثلو الجناح المعارض في الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان على اقتراح إنشاء مجلس قيادة وطني ليكون بمثابة "ضامن داخلي" للاتفاق النهائي لمبادرة تومايني<sup>(60)</sup>. وجادلوا بأن مثل هذه الهيئة، التي لن تخضع قراراتها لموافقة مجلس الوزراء أو الهيئة التشريعية الحالية في جنوب السودان، ستتعدى بوضوح على صلاحيات مؤسسات تقاسم السلطة التي أنشئت بموجب اتفاق السلام لعام 2018. كما اعترضوا بالمثل على أن اللجان الجديدة لإصلاح قطاع الأمن والرقابة على القطاع الأمني ستؤدي إلى تكرار مهام الآليات الأمنية القائمة<sup>(61)</sup>.

41 - وتنعكس هذه الاعتراضات مخاوف الجناح المعارض في الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان منذ فترة طويلة من تفوق اتفاق السلام لعام 2018، الذي يحرص قادتها على أن يكون لها دور في الحكومة وحصة من المناصب القيادية في قوات الأمن في البلد ودمج قواتها في جيش وطني موحد<sup>(62)</sup>.

42 - كما أعربت شخصيات سياسية بارزة أخرى في جوبا عن مخاوف مماثلة. كما وجد تقرير أعدته اللجنة الدائمة الرفيعة المستوى التي ترافق تنفيذ اتفاق السلام لعام 2018، والتي تضم وزير شؤون مجلس

(55) مقابلات مع سيمون غاتويش (SSi.002)، أيار/مايو وحزيران/يونيه 2024.

(56) مقابلات مع توماس سيريلو وسيمون غاتويش (SSi.002) وأعضاء فريق الوساطة، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(57) انظر المرفق 26.

(58) انظر المرفق 27.

(59) المرجع نفسه.

(60) مقابلات مع أعضاء فريق الوفد الحكومي وشخصيات سياسية أخرى في جوبا، أيلول/سبتمبر وتشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر المرفق 27.

(61) انظر المرفق 27.

(62) مقابلات مع أطراف مشاركة في مبادرة تومايني، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

الوزراء، والأمين العام للحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان، بيتر لام بوث، أن عدة بروتوكولات تتعارض مع اتفاق السلام، وأوعز إلى الوفد الحكومي بضمان عدم إنشاء آليات أو مؤسسات جديدة<sup>(63)</sup>.

43 - لكن بالنسبة لأحزاب المعارضة المشاركة في مبادرة تومايني، فإن الفشل في تنفيذ اتفاق 2018، وخاصة الإصلاحات الأمنية التي تضمنها، يثبت الحاجة إلى آليات تنفيذ جديدة أكثر متانة<sup>(64)</sup>. وقد أخبر المتحدث باسم إحدى مجموعات المعارضة الفريق أنه من دون آليات إضافية، فإن المبادرة قد تواجه خطر أن تصبح اتفاقاً آخر غير منقذ. وقال المتحدث آخر للفريق: "لن أوقع على توافق تومايني إذا ألغيت آليات الرقابة والتنفيذ؛ وسأعود إلى الغابة"<sup>(65)</sup>. وشدد بول مالونق (SSi.008) على أن وضع اتفاقية جديدة، فقط لدمجها مع اتفاقية 2018 الفاشلة، لن يؤدي إلا إلى تقويض مبادرة تومايني<sup>(66)</sup>.

44 - وبعد سلسلة من المشاورات، اقترح حل وسط يتم بموجبه إضافة الجوانب غير المنفذة من اتفاق السلام لعام 2018 إلى مصفوفة تنفيذ لمبادرة تومايني، يجري وضعها حالياً<sup>(67)</sup>.

## رابعاً - المسائل الإقليمية

### ألف - الاستجابة الإقليمية لتمديد الفترة الانتقالية

45 - تبقى الدول والمنظمات الإقليمية الأعضاء والمنظمات الإقليمية ذات أهمية بالغة في حل التحديات في جنوب السودان، كما يتضح من دور كينيا البارز في مبادرة تومايني. وقد لاقى قرار تمديد الفترة الانتقالية وتأجيل الانتخابات لمدة عامين إضافيين ردود فعل متباينة في المنطقة.

46 - ففي بيان صادر عن الهيئة الحكومية الدولية المعنية بالتنمية (إيغاد)، رحب الأمين التنفيذي بـ "الطريقة التوافقية" التي اتخذ بها القرار وحث حكومة الوحدة الوطنية الانتقالية على بذل كل جهد ممكن لاستكمال تنفيذ المهام المتبقية من اتفاق السلام من أجل ضمان إجراء الانتخابات في الوقت المناسب<sup>(68)</sup>. وأشار الأمين التنفيذي في ذلك البيان إلى أن هذا هو التأجيل الرابع للانتخابات، وبالتالي فإن وضع خطة عمل ملموسة يعد الآن مسألة ملحة.

(63) المرجع نفسه، تقرير اللجنة الدائمة الرفيعة المستوى، بتاريخ 7 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، استعرضه الفريق.

(64) مقابلات مع أطراف مشاركة في مبادرة تومايني، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(65) مقابلة مع أحد أطراف مبادرة تومايني، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(66) مقابلات مع بول مالونق (SSi.008)، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(67) مقابلات مع أطراف مشاركة في مبادرة تومايني، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(68) الهيئة الحكومية الدولية المعنية بالتنمية، "IGAD Executive Secretary's Statement on the Extension of South Sudan's Transitional Period and Call for Renewed Efforts in Implementing the Revitalized Peace Agreement", 23 September 2024, available from: <https://igad.int/igad-executive-secretarys-statement-on-the-extension-of-south-sudans-transitional-period-and-call-for-renewed-efforts-in-implementing-the-revitalised-peace-agreement/>.

- 47 - وقدم رئيس مفوضية الاتحاد الأفريقي بياناً مماثلاً، حيث أحاط علماً بقرار الحكومة بتمديد الفترة الانتقالية، داعياً في الوقت نفسه إلى اتخاذ خطوات ملموسة لتنفيذ اتفاق السلام بالكامل<sup>(69)</sup>.
- 48 - وأشار بيان مشترك لبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في جنوب السودان وإيغاد وبعثة الأمم المتحدة في جنوب السودان إلى أنه كان يلزم تمديد الفترة الانتقالية للمرة الثانية بسبب "عدم تنفيذ النقاط المرجعية الحاسمة المعلقة"<sup>(70)</sup>.

## باء - التواصل مع دول المنطقة

- 49 - واصلت قيادة جنوب السودان، وخاصة الرئيس، برنامج التواصل الإقليمي، حيث برز النزاع في السودان وعلاقة جنوب السودان مع أوغندا بشكل خاص.
- 50 - وكما أفاد الفريق سابقاً، لا تزال حكومة جنوب السودان منخرطة في جهود الوساطة في النزاع في السودان، بما في ذلك من خلال عدة اجتماعات بين الرئيس كير وعبد الفتاح البرهان، رئيس مجلس السيادة في السودان. وناقش الزعيمان خطة مشتركة لحماية عبور صادرات جنوب السودان من النفط، ومعالجة الأزمة الإنسانية في السودان، فضلاً عن القضايا الأمنية المشتركة، بما في ذلك الجريمة العابرة للحدود<sup>(71)</sup>.
- 51 - وتشير مقابلات أجراها الفريق إلى أن عناصر من قوات الدعم السريع لا تزال موجودة في أجزاء من ولاية غرب بحر الغزال، في حين أن علاقة جوبا المستمرة مع الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان - قطاع الشمال<sup>(72)</sup> والقوات المسلحة السودانية وقوات الدعم السريع لا تزال مهمة، لا سيما فيما يتعلق بعبور نفط جنوب السودان<sup>(73)</sup>.
- 52 - وجلب تعيين لورانس كوربندي من جنوب السودان، وهو حليف مقرب من الرئيس، مبعوثاً خاصاً لإيقاد إلى جمهورية السودان في 26 آذار/مارس 2024، مزيداً من الأمل في دور بارز لجنوب السودان في التوسط لحل النزاع في السودان<sup>(74)</sup>.

(69) الاتحاد الأفريقي، "AUC Chairperson statement regarding the extended political transition in South Sudan", 21 September 2024, available from: <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240921/chairperson-statement-regarding-extended-political-transition-south-sudan>

(70) انظر <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/joint-press-release-aumiss-igad-and-unmiss-note-decision-to-extend-transitional-period-of>

(71) بيانات أدلى بها مكتب الرئيس، محفوظة لدى الفريق.

(72) انظر S/2023/922 و S/2024/343.

(73) مقابلات مع مراقبين دوليين ومحليين، ومسؤولين حكوميين محليين، وممثلين عن جماعات مسلحة أجنبية موجودة في جنوب السودان، ومدنيين تعاملوا مع قوات الدعم السريع في جنوب السودان، أيار/مايو وتشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(74) الهيئة الحكومية الدولية المعنية بالتنمية، "IGAD Executive Secretary Announces the Appointment of Hon. Lawrence Korbandy as Special Envoy for Sudan", 26 March 2024, available from: <https://igad.int/igad-appoints-hon-lawrence-korbandy-as-special-envoy-for-sudan>



53 - كما واصلت قيادة جنوب السودان مشاركتها مع إثيوبيا، بما في ذلك ما يتعلق بتشييد البنية التحتية مثل الطرق والمسار البديل لنقل نفط جنوب السودان عبر إثيوبيا إلى جيبوتي<sup>(75)</sup>.

## خامسا - الأسلحة

### ألف - وجود قوات الدفاع الشعبي الأوغندية في أراضي جنوب السودان

54 - وثق الفريق نشاطاً عسكرياً كبيراً لعناصر من قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية في ثلاث مناطق على الأقل في جنوب السودان. وفي كل حالة من هذه الحالات، كانت بعض قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية على الأقل مسلحة بمعدات عسكرية فتاكة. وبموجب الفقرة 4 من القرار 2428 (2018)، الذي تم تجديده مؤخراً بموجب القرار 2731 (2024)، حظر مجلس الأمن نقل معدات عسكرية فتاكة إلى أراضي جنوب السودان<sup>(76)</sup>. وعلى هذا النحو، فإن وجود قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية في جنوب السودان يرقى إلى مستوى انتهاك لحظر الأسلحة.

55 - وفي ولايتين استوائيتين لديهما حدود مع أوغندا، يبدو أن عدة عمليات انتشار مرتبطة بنزاعات محلية على ترسيم الحدود.

56 - وفي آب/أغسطس 2024، على سبيل المثال، احتجز عدد من جنود قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية المسلحين مؤقتاً ما بين 6 إلى 12 مدنياً في مقاطعة كاجو كيجي في ولاية وسط الاستوائية، وذلك في أعقاب توترات محلية تركزت حول مشروع بناء طريق كان مقاولوه تحت حماية قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية. ويقال إن الجنود الأوغنديين ادعوا أن الأرض تعد جزءاً من أوغندا<sup>(77)</sup>. وفي بيان لاحق، أدرجت السلطات المحلية في جنوب السودان أكثر من 100 قرية في مقاطعة كاجو كيجي زعمت أنها تتعرض بانتظام لانتهاكات من قبل القوات الأوغندية<sup>(78)</sup>.

57 - كما أبلغ عن دخول جنود مسلحين من قوات الدفاع الشعبي الأوغندية "بكامل [عتادهم] القتالي"<sup>(79)</sup> إلى مواقع في ولاية شرق الاستوائية "في شاحنات كبيرة"<sup>(80)</sup> خلال شهر تموز/يوليه 2024. وقد اتهمت المجتمعات المحلية الجنود بتسيير دوريات ومضايقة المدنيين وتشريدهم. وزعم ممثلون عن قوات الدفاع

(75) انظر Sudan Tribune, "Ethiopia, South Sudan agree to build alternate oil pipeline route", 7 July 2024 and Eye Radio, "Ethiopia challenges South Sudan to road construction race", 15 February 2024.

(76) وثّق الفريق عدة من هذه الانتهاكات، بما في ذلك في الوثائق S/2020/342 و S/2020/1141 و S/2019/897 و S/2018/1049.

(77) مقابلات مع الحكومة المحلية وممثلي الشباب أجراها مراقبون، استعرضها الفريق، آب/أغسطس 2024. أُكِّدَت المعلومات من خلال مقطع فيديو حصل عليه الفريق. انظر أيضاً المرفق 28. انظر أيضاً Eye Radio, "Uganda provokes another encroachment in Kajo-Keji", 7 August 2024.

(78) انظر المرفق 29.

(79) Eye Radio, "UPDF rounds up Magwi villagers, threatens them to evacuate – official", 20 August 2024.

(80) مقابلة مع مراقب محلي في ولاية شرق الاستوائية، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر أيضاً Eye Radio, "Ugandan army reportedly encroaches into South Sudan's Magwi", 11 July 2024.

الشعبي لجنوب السودان أن قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية احتجزت عدة من جنودها<sup>(81)</sup>. وفي إحدى الحوادث التي وقعت في تموز/يوليه، قُتل ما بين 11 و 21 مواطناً من جنوب السودان في ولاية شرق الاستوائية على أيدي القوات الأوغندية واتهموا فيما بعد بأنهم صيادون غير شرعيين<sup>(82)</sup>.

58 - وفي 28 أيلول/سبتمبر 2024، سافر قائد قوات الدفاع الشعبي لجنوب السودان، سانتينو دينق وول (SSi.004)، إلى أوغندا للقاء نظيره في قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية، اللواء موهوزي كاينيروغابا<sup>(83)</sup>. وفي بيان صحفي، أشارت قوات الدفاع الشعبي لجنوب السودان إلى أن الطرفين اتفقا على أن "توقف قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية القيام بالمزيد من التعديات على أراضي جنوب السودان"<sup>(84)</sup>.

59 - ويخضع سانتينو دينق وول (SSi.004) لحظر السفر منذ 1 تموز/يوليه 2015، وذلك وفقاً لنظام الجزاءات المفروض من قبل مجلس الأمن في قراره 2206 (2015). ولم يجر تقديم أي طلب إعفاء عملاً بأحكام الفقرة 11 من القرار 2206 (2015)، وبالتالي فإن سفره يرقى إلى انتهاك لحظر السفر.

60 - وبموازاة التوترات عبر الحدود في الولايات الاستوائية، وثق الفريق أيضاً عمليات انتشار كبيرة لقوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية في شهري تموز/يوليه وأب/أغسطس 2024 في ولاية غرب بحر الغزال كجزء من عمليات مشتركة مع قوات الدفاع الشعبي لجنوب السودان وجهاز الأمن الوطني في جنوب السودان<sup>(85)</sup>.

61 - وقد حصل الفريق على شهادات من مجموعة من المصادر في المنطقة، حيث وصف عدد منهم أيضاً طائرات وطائرات عمودية استخدمت لنشر قوات ومعدات أوغندية<sup>(86)</sup>. تؤكد ذلك جزئياً من خلال صور فوتوغرافية استعرضها الفريق. وقد تعرف الفريق على طائرة واحدة على الأقل مسجلة في أوغندا، وهي طائرة شحن من طراز Lockheed L-100 Hercules، كانت تعمل بشكل متكرر في المنطقة وقت نشر القوات<sup>(87)</sup>.

(81) المرجع نفسه. انظر أيضاً المرفق 30، و Radio Tamazuj, "South Sudan tells Uganda to free detained soldiers", 21 July 2024.

(82) مقابلة مع مراقب محلي في ولاية شرق الاستوائية، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. يؤكد هذا تقرير أعده مراقبون دوليون، استعرضه الفريق، آب/أغسطس 2024. انظر أيضاً Eye Radio, "Ugandan wildlife rangers allegedly killed 21 S. Sudanese poachers", 23 July 2024, and Number One Citizen, "Budi murder: Lobong, ministers to face MPs", 30 July 2024.

(83) انظر المرفقين 31 و 32.

(84) انظر المرفق 31.

(85) مقابلات مع ثلاثة مراقبين محليين وموظف في قطاع الأمن، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر أيضاً Sudans Post, "Lawmaker says Kiir's office involved in Ugandan army encroachment", 2 September 2024 and Radio Tamazuj, "Questions over presence of Ugandan soldiers in Raja", 16 August 2024.

(86) المرجع نفسه.

(87) انظر المرفق 33.

- 62 - وبحسب ما ورد، استهدفت بعض العمليات الأمنية المشتركة بين أوغندا وجنوب السودان عناصر من جيش الرب للمقاومة العاملة في المناطق الحدودية في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى وجنوب السودان والسودان<sup>(88)</sup>.
- 63 - وفي أعقاب انتقادات محلية لعملية الانتشار، فضلاً عن مخاوف من انجرار القوات إلى نزاع مع عناصر من قوات الدعم السريع السودانية التي لوحظ وجودها في المنطقة أيضاً، أشارت مصادر في قطاع الأمن في جنوب السودان إلى أن جهاز الأمن الوطني كان قد أثنى قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندي عن إقامة وجود أكثر ديمومة في المنطقة<sup>(89)</sup>.

## باء - شراء المركبات العسكرية

- 64 - في 13 آب/أغسطس 2024، أعلنت شركة خاصة تقع خارج جنوب السودان أنها "أبرمت صفقة لتوريد مركبات إلى جيش جنوب السودان" لدعم "احتياجاته العملية"<sup>(90)</sup>.
- 65 - ولكن في 19 آب/أغسطس 2024، دحض المتحدث باسم قوات الدفاع الشعبي لجنوب السودان هذا الادعاء<sup>(91)</sup>. وأكدت قوات الدفاع الشعبي لجنوب السودان أن الشركة قد اجتمعت مع القوات، ولكن فقط لإجراء تقييم عام لقدرات الشركة. وفي تنفيذها، أشارت قوات الدفاع الشعبي إلى أنها "لا تزال خاضعة لحظر الأسلحة"، مما يشير إلى أن بعض إمدادات المركبات المقترحة ربما تتدرج تحت أحكام حظر الأسلحة المفروض عملاً بقرار مجلس الأمن 2428 (2018)، الذي تم تجديده مؤخراً بموجب القرار 2731 (2024). وكان الفريق قد أبلغ في وقت سابق عن شراء ناقلات جنود مدرعة في انتهاك لحظر توريد الأسلحة<sup>(92)</sup>.
- 66 - وفي حين أن نطاق حظر توريد الأسلحة المفروض عملاً بالفقرة 4 من قرار مجلس الأمن 2428 (2018) يشمل "المركبات العسكرية"، فإن الفقرة 5 (و) تسمح باستثناءات من هذه التدابير عندما توافق عليها اللجنة مسبقاً. كما تجيز الفقرة 2 من قرار مجلس الأمن 2683 (2023)، التي أعيد تأكيدها مؤخراً في الفقرة 1 من القرار 2731 (2024)، توريد المعدات العسكرية "غير الفتاكة" التي يقصد منها حصراً دعم تنفيذ أحكام اتفاق السلام دون أن يلزم تقديم طلب إعفاء أو إخطار مسبقين إلى اللجنة.
- 67 - وفي رد بناء على استفسار للفريق، ذكرت الشركة أنها لم تناقش توريد أي فئة من فئات المركبات التي تقع ضمن نطاق حظر الأسلحة، وأنها على أي حال "كانت قد قررت أنه لا ينبغي المضي قدماً في أي مناقشات أخرى من أي نوع"<sup>(93)</sup>.

(88) مقابلات مع مراقبين دوليين ومحليين وموظف في قطاع الأمن في ولاية غرب بحر الغزال، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر أيضاً منشور قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية على وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي، 20 آب/أغسطس 2024، متاح عبر الرابط [https://x.com/MODVA\\_UPDF/status/1825871279808729213](https://x.com/MODVA_UPDF/status/1825871279808729213).

(89) مقابلات مع اثنين من المراقبين المحليين وموظف في قطاع الأمن، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(90) بيانات عامة أدلت بها الشركة، نُقِحت أو حُذفت لاحقاً، محفوظة لدى الفريق. تأكد ذلك أيضاً من خلال مراسلات مع الشركة.

(91) انظر المرفق 34.

(92) انظر S/2024/343 و S/2023/294 و S/2022/359.

(93) مراسلات الفريق مع الشركة.

## جيم - شراء جماعات المعارضة للأسلحة

68 - يواصل الفريق التحقيق في الجهود التي تبذلها جماعات المعارضة لشراء الأسلحة في انتهاك لحظر الأسلحة. ويشمل ذلك جهود كل من أبراهام تشول كيتش وبيتر بيار أباك، وكلاهما من مواطني جنوب السودان، اتهما في آذار/مارس 2024 في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بالتآمر لشراء أسلحة بقصد التحريض على انقلاب في جنوب السودان<sup>(94)</sup>. ويُزعم أنهما سعيًا إلى شراء مجموعة من الأسلحة، بما فيها منظومات الدفاع الجوي المحمولة "Stinger" FIM-92<sup>(95)</sup> وقنابل يدوية من طراز M-67<sup>(96)</sup>، واستفسرا عن منظومات أسلحة مضادة للدبابات من طراز FGM-148 Javelin. ووفقًا لوثائق المحكمة<sup>(97)</sup>، "طلب المتهم مرارًا وتكرارًا [...] الحصول على أنظمة صواريخ ستينغر لتعطيل الطائرات العمودية العسكرية لجنوب السودان. وبالمثل، [أوضح] المتهم أيضًا [...] أنه كان بحاجة إلى أسلحة مضادة للدبابات لتعطيل ما بين 13 إلى 15 دبابة عاملة في جنوب السودان". وهذا الأمر يظهر اهتمامًا خاصًا بقدرات قوات الدفاع الشعبي لجنوب السودان المدرعة والجوية.

## سادسا - الشؤون المالية والموارد الطبيعية

### ألف - استمرار توقف صادرات النفط

69 - في 25 أيلول/سبتمبر 2024، قدم وزير المالية والتخطيط في جنوب السودان، ماريال دونقرين أثير، ميزانية السنة المالية 2025/2024 إلى الجمعية التشريعية الوطنية الانتقالية في جنوب السودان<sup>(98)</sup>. وأشار الوزير إلى أن خط الأنايبب الذي ينقل نقط مزيج الدار الخام من جنوب السودان إلى بورتسودان في السودان قد تصدّع في شباط/فبراير 2024<sup>(99)</sup>. ونتيجة لذلك، انخفضت صادرات جنوب السودان من النفط الخام من حوالي 150 000 برميل يوميًا إلى 45 000 برميل يوميًا فقط. ونظرًا لمحورية صادرات النفط بالنسبة لاقتصاد البلاد، أكد الوزير أن "استمرار تعطل إنتاج النفط الخام وتصديره يعد مسألة أمن وطني"<sup>(100)</sup>.

70 - وفي 20 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، سافر وفد من مسؤولي جنوب السودان إلى للقاء رئيس مجلس السيادة السوداني، عبد الفتاح البرهان، ومسؤولين آخرين لمناقشة جهود إصلاح خط الأنايبب<sup>(101)</sup>.

(94) انظر S/2024/343.

(95) على وجه التحديد، خمسة من منظومات الدفاع الجوي المحمولة.

(96) انظر المرفق 35.

(97) انظر - [https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA\\_v\\_Keech\\_et\\_al\\_azdce-24-00394\\_0022.0.pdf](https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA_v_Keech_et_al_azdce-24-00394_0022.0.pdf)

(98) خطاب الميزانية للسنة المالية 2025/2024، بتاريخ 25 أيلول/سبتمبر 2024، محفوظ لدى الفريق. قِيمَت الميزانية في وقت متأخر، حيث بدأت السنة المالية 2025/2024 في 1 تموز/يوليه 2024. وحتى تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، لم تجر القراءة الثانية للميزانية بعد.

(99) انظر S/2023/922 و S/2024/343.

(100) خطاب الميزانية للسنة المالية 2025-2024، بتاريخ 25 أيلول/سبتمبر 2024، محفوظ لدى الفريق.

(101) بيان صادر عن مكتب رئيس جنوب السودان.

وأبلغ المسؤولون السودانيون وفد جنوب السودان الزائر أنه تم اتخاذ الاستعدادات اللازمة لاستئناف تصدير نفط جنوب السودان الخام. وأكد عدة خبراء للفريق أن الإصلاحات التقنية قد اكتملت على الأرجح، لكنهم أشاروا إلى أن الأمر قد يستغرق بعض الوقت الإضافي لتنظيف خط الأنابيب الذي أُصلح تماماً واستعادة الإنتاج الكامل في حقول نفط أعالي النيل، حيث تم تسريح عدد من المقاولين من الباطن<sup>(102)</sup>.

71 - غير أن العقبة الأهم هي إيجاد اتفاق سياسي في ما يتعلق بتقاسم عائدات أي صادرات نفطية مستأنفة بين أطراف النزاع في السودان<sup>(103)</sup>. وتشير المقابلات التي أجراها الفريق إلى أن القوات المسلحة السودانية سعت إلى إعادة التفاوض على الرسوم التي يجب على جنوب السودان دفعها مقابل استخدام خط الأنابيب والبنى التحتية النفطية الأخرى، في حين طالب ممثلو قوات الدعم السريع أيضاً بحصة من أي صادرات نفطية مستأنفة<sup>(104)</sup>.

72 - وقد شجع التعطيل المستمر لصادرات النفط من جنوب السودان الحكومة على النظر في طرق تصدير بديلة، بما في ذلك بناء خط أنابيب جديد إلى جيبوتي<sup>(105)</sup>. كما بُذلت جهود لتتبع قاعدة الإيرادات في جنوب السودان، حيث تم تحديد تعدين الذهب على وجه الخصوص كأولوية من قبل المسؤولين الحكوميين على كلا الصعيدين الوطني والمحلي<sup>(106)</sup>.

## باء - زيادة التنافس على عائدات النفط في جوبا

73 - وفي ظل توقف صادرات نفط مزيج الدار، ازداد التنافس للتحكم في شحنة أو شحنتين<sup>(107)</sup> من نفط مزيج النيل، الذي لا يزال بإمكان الحكومة جلبه إلى السوق كل شهر<sup>(108)</sup>. وفي حين أن عملية المزاد الرسمي تُستخدم لتحديد سعر شحنات النفط، إلا أن الأفراد داخل مكتب الرئيس غالباً ما يقررون الشركات التي يتم منحها الشحنة في نهاية المطاف<sup>(109)</sup>.

74 - وعادةً ما يجري تخصيص عائدات شحنات مزيج النيل لبرنامج النفط مقابل الطرق المتعاقد عليه في المقام الأول مع شركة يسيطر عليها أحد المبعوثين الخاصين للرئيس<sup>(110)</sup>. ومع ذلك، فقد حث أعضاء

(102) مقابلات مع مسؤولين من جنوب السودان والسودان ومشاركين في صناعة النفط في جنوب السودان، أيلول/سبتمبر وتشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. حتى وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024، لم تكن الصادرات قد استؤنفت.

(103) انظر S/2023/922.

(104) مقابلات مع مسؤولين من جنوب السودان والسودان ومشاركين في صناعة النفط في جنوب السودان، أيلول/سبتمبر وتشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. وتفترض ميزانية جنوب السودان للفترة 2025/2024 أن رسوماً تبلغ نحو 52 مليون دولار ستُدفع إلى السودان.

(105) مقابلات مع مسؤولين حكوميين وجهات فاعلة في قطاع النفط، تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر أيضاً Eye Radio, “Sudan makes preparations to export South Sudan crude oil”, 21 October 2024.

(106) مقابلات مع مسؤولين حكوميين وأفراد من المجتمع المدني. انظر أيضاً Kapoeta gold Number One Citizen Daily, “Kapoeta gold rush: South Sudan’s silent trade that fuels inequality”, 7 September 2024.

(107) تبلغ شحنة النفط الخام حوالي 600 000 برميل.

(108) مقابلات مع أفراد على دراية بقطاع النفط في جنوب السودان، أيلول/سبتمبر وتشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(109) مقابلات مع مسؤولين حكوميين وجهات فاعلة في القطاع الخاص، تأكدت من خلال وثائق استعرضها الفريق، أيلول/سبتمبر وتشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(110) انظر S/2024/343.

برلمان جنوب السودان وعدة وزارات حكومية على وقف هذه المدفوعات لصالح المرتبات والنفقات الحكومية الأساسية الأخرى<sup>(111)</sup>. كما واصل تجار السلع الدولية أيضًا ممارستهم المتمثلة في الدفع المسبق للشحنات المستقبلية من النفط الخام قبل عدة أشهر<sup>(112)</sup>.

75 - وفي الوقت نفسه، خُصّصت شحنات نفط لسيطرة عدد من الشركات في جنوب السودان وقد حاولت بيعها في السوق، مع الاحتفاظ بالعائدات كمقابل لسلع وخدمات قدمتها للحكومة<sup>(113)</sup>. وتعرّف إحدى هذه الشركات نفسها على أنها شركة بناء، ولكن يديرها شخصان كانا مرتبطين في السابق بشركة سهلت استيراد ناقلات جنود مدرعة إلى جنوب السودان<sup>(114)</sup>. ويدير شركة أخرى من هذه الشركات المدير التنفيذي السابق لمكتب الرئيس. ولا تظهر أي من الشركتين على قائمة مقَدّمي العطاءات المعتمدين لنفط جنوب السودان، حيث تم إلغاء شحنة نفط واحدة مُنحت للشركة الأخيرة لهذا السبب<sup>(115)</sup>.

76 - وتتص المادة 4-8-1-10 من اتفاق السلام في جنوب السودان، وكذلك المادة 6-2 من قانون إدارة عائدات النفط، على أن جميع المدفوعات المتعلقة بالنفط يجب أن تُدفع في حساب واحد لعائدات النفط ولا تسمح للمشتريين بدفع مبالغ مباشرة للشركات الخاصة مقابل النفط الحكومي<sup>(116)</sup>.

77 - لم يجر الاعتراف بالتأثير الاقتصادي لانخفاض عائدات النفط إلا جزئيًا في ميزانية جنوب السودان للسنة المالية 2025/2024<sup>(117)</sup>. وفي حين تتوقع الميزانية أن يبلغ إجمالي إيرادات حكومة جنوب السودان 2,6 تريليون جنيه جنوب سوداني، يبلغ إجمالي الإنفاق المدرج في الميزانية 4,1 تريليون جنيه جنوب سوداني. وهذا يجعل ما يقرب من نصف النفقات المخطط لها غير ممولة إذا لم تجر استعادة صادرات النفط بالكامل. ويجري تخصيص أكثر من ثلث الميزانية الإجمالية لدفع المرتبات، بما في ذلك المتأخرات، حيث يتم دفع نحو 70 في المائة من المرتبات لقطاع الأمن. كما أن الميزانية لا تزال مثقلة بشكل كبير تجاه المؤسسات التي توظف المشاركين في عملية السلام، حيث تبلغ ميزانية البرلمان ثلاثة أضعاف ميزانية قطاع الصحة بأكمله تقريبًا<sup>(118)</sup>.

(111) مقابلات مع ممثلي عن القطاع الخاص والمجتمع المدني، أيلول/سبتمبر وتشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024. انظر أيضًا، على سبيل المثال، 5، Number One Citizen Daily, “MP proposes suspension of Oil for roads project fund”, September 2024.

(112) مقابلات مع أفراد على دراية بقطاع النفط في جنوب السودان، أيلول/سبتمبر وتشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024.

(113) المرجع نفسه.

(114) انظر S/2024/343 والمرفق 36.

(115) انظر المرفق 36.

(116) انظر أيضاً المرفق 37.

(117) ميزانية السنة المالية 2025-2024، بالصيغة التي عُرضت بها على البرلمان في 25 أيلول/سبتمبر 2024.

(118) انظر أيضاً المرفق 38.

## سابعا - خاتمة

78 - يُصارع قادة جنوب السودان تحديات متعددة ومعقدة. بعضها ذاتي، والبعض الآخر نتيجة صدمات خارجية كبيرة. وستكون هناك حاجة إلى دعم إقليمي ودولي مستدام لضمان إحراز تقدم ملموس نحو تنفيذ الإصلاحات التي ستكون ضرورية لإعادة بناء ثقة السكان في حكومتهم مع تسهيل الإغاثة الإنسانية والتنمية المستدامة.

## ثامنا - التوصيات

79 - يوصي فريق الخبراء بأن تشجّع لجنة مجلس الأمن المنشأة عملاً بالقرار 2206 (2015) بشأن جنوب السودان حكومة جنوب السودان على القيام بما يلي:

- (أ) بذل كل جهد ممكن لتسهيل تقديم المساعدات الإنسانية من خلال القضاء على العوائق البيروقراطية، ومنع الهجمات على العاملين في المجال الإنساني وأصولهم، وتسهيل الحركة دون عوائق في جميع المناطق، بما في ذلك على طول نهر النيل؛
- (ب) بذل كل جهد ممكن لتخصيص جميع الموارد اللازمة لاستكمال تدريب ونشر ما تبقى من القوات الموحدة الضرورية ومواءمة هيكل قيادتها وتنشيط المزيد من الانشقاقات خلال الفترة الانتقالية؛

- (ج) إضافة إلى احتمال استئناف صادرات نفط مزيج الدار، استئناف النشر المنتظم لتقارير تسويق النفط، عملاً بالفصل 9 من قانون إدارة عائدات النفط في جنوب السودان<sup>(119)</sup>، وكذلك وثائق الميزانية الأخرى، بما في ذلك تقارير النفقات الفصلية.

80 - ويوصي فريق الخبراء بأن تشجّع اللجنة حكومة أوغندا على الاستفادة من إجراءات الإعفاء المبينة في قراري مجلس الأمن 2206 (2015) و 2428 (2018)، والتي تم تمديدها مؤخراً بموجب القرار 2731 (2024)، في حال النظر في نقل معدات عسكرية فتاكة إلى أراضي جنوب السودان، وفي حال تسهيل سفر أفراد خاضعين لتدابير تقييدية منصوص عليها في هذه القرارات.

81 - ويوصي فريق الخبراء بأن تتظر اللجنة في وضع مذكرة للمساعدة على تنفيذ حظر الأسلحة توفر معلومات إضافية، لصالح كل من حكومة جنوب السودان والموردين المحتملين، بشأن عبارتي "المعدات العسكرية غير الفتاكة" و "حصر دعم تنفيذ أحكام اتفاق السلام"، لا سيما في ما يتعلق بالمركبات التي يستخدمها الجيش والشرطة.

(119) انظر المرفق 37.

## تاسعا - المرفقات

**Annexes**

Annex 1: List of abbreviations . . . . .	26
Annex 2: Partial data on flood-related impacts . . . . .	27
Annex 3: Images of flooding at Bentiu IDP camp and Rubkona airfield . . . . .	28
Annex 4: Press statement on waterway dredging, issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 8 June 2022 . . . . .	29
Annex 5: Image of waterways in Unity State . . . . .	31
Annex 6: Republican orders reshuffling senior SSPDF command positions, October 2024 . . . . .	32
Annex 7: Statement by former Director General of the Internal Security Bureau, 10 October 2024 . . . . .	36
Annex 8: Partial list of known defections from the National Salvation Front (NAS). . . . .	37
Annex 9: Parliamentary summons letter, 29 May 2024 . . . . .	38
Annex 10: Summary Report on the payment of \$10 million to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, 6 June 2024 . . . . .	40
Annex 11: Talking points for Deputy Speaker of Parliament, 3 May 2024 . . . . .	45
Annex 12: Authorization of transfer of \$10 million toward ‘Special Projects’ under Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, 2 April 2024 . . . . .	46
Annex 13: John Latio Kenyi Loburong’s defection, 14 May 2023 . . . . .	47
Annex 14: Roadmap of negotiations between Kenyi Loburong and the Government of South Sudan . . . . .	49
Annex 15: Negotiations between Kenyi Loburong and President Salva Kiir, 19 May 2023 . . . . .	57
Annex 16: Partial Integration List of Kennedy Kenyi “Warrior” Abdu Lopiong’s forces into the SSPDF, 2 February 2024 . . . . .	59
Annex 17: Press statement by the Central Equatoria State Government, 10 October 2024 . . . . .	62
Annex 18: Reaction from the Pujulu community in Juba, 14 October 2024 . . . . .	63
Annex 19: Reaction from the Wonduruba Community Association in Juba, 12 October, 2024 . . . . .	65
Annex 20: Reaction from the Central Equatoria State Youth Union, 10 October, 2024 . . . . .	66
Annex 21: Photographs of victims of killings in Wonduruba, Central Equatoria State . . . . .	67
Annex 22: Press release by the National Salvation United Forces, 10 October 2024 . . . . .	68
Annex 23: NAS press release concerning defections, 13 October 2024 . . . . .	69
Annex 24: Appointment of Commissioners to the NAS Federal Civil Authority, 7 September 2024 . . . . .	72
Annex 25: Appointment of Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority, 4 May 2024 . . . . .	74
Annex 26: Tumaini protocols, 15 July 2024 . . . . .	76
Annex 27: Withdrawal of SPLM-IO from Tumaini Initiative . . . . .	81
Annex 28: UPDF in Kajo Keji, Central Equatoria State . . . . .	83
Annex 29: Statement by Kajo Keji County Commissioner, 29 August 2024 . . . . .	85
Annex 30: SSPDF Press Release concerning meeting with UPDF, 2 October 2024 . . . . .	88
Annex 31: UPDF Press Statement concerning meeting with SSPDF, 28 September 2024 . . . . .	89



---

Annex 32: Pictures of meeting between UPDF and Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004) . . . . .	91
Annex 33: Partial flight-data for flights between Uganda and South Sudan . . . . .	95
Annex 34: SSPDF statement refuting a “vehicles supply deal,” 19 August 2024 . . . . .	96
Annex 35: Final list of military items requested by Peter Biar Ajak . . . . .	97
Annex 36: Allocation of Nile blend cargos, May and September 2024 . . . . .	98
Annex 37: Legal framework for oil-related payments and transparency . . . . .	101
Annex 38: Budget for the financial year 2024/25 . . . . .	104

---

**Annex 1: List of abbreviations**

IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NAS	National Salvation Front/Army
NASU	National Salvation United Forces
NSS	National Security Service
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defence Forces
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces

## Annex 2: Partial data on flood-related impacts

The following is representative data of the impact of flooding. It does not capture the full extent of the impacts.

### Reported displacement:<sup>1</sup>

- About 271,000 displaced by floods across South Sudan as of mid-October
- Jonglei – Tens of thousands reported displaced in Pochalla, Ayod, Twic East, Uror, Fangak in September
- Northern Bahr el Ghazal – almost 155,000 people impacted across four counties in September
- More than 6,000 flood-displaced households identified in Unity state in September
- In parts of Upper Nile, figures of flood and conflict displaced people revised to nearly 20,000 in September

### Impact on schools:

- 127 schools reported damaged in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024<sup>2</sup>
- In Unity, 65 schools submerged due to floods, affecting 20,214 students<sup>3</sup>

### Impact on health facilities:

- 29 health facilities damaged in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024<sup>4</sup>
- 58 health facilities submerged in five counties, and nearly 90 others inaccessible<sup>5</sup>

### Impact on water points:

- 103 water points rendered unusable in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024<sup>6</sup>

### Impact on agriculture and farmlands:

- 53,100 farmers and cattle keepers lost crops and livestock in September<sup>7</sup>
- In Mayendit County, Unity State, about 4,275 hectares of farmland submerged as of mid-September<sup>8</sup>
- In Jur River in Western Bahr el Ghazal, more than 150,000 acres of farmland were destroyed<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> UN OCHA, South Sudan: Floods Snapshot (as of 18 October 2024), available from: <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-floods-snapshot-18-october-2024> and UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> UN OCHA, South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 4 (As of 18 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-4-18-september-2024>

<sup>4</sup> UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

<sup>5</sup> WHO, Severe flooding compounds health crisis in South Sudan, 21 October 2024: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/severe-flooding-compounds-health-crisis-south-sudan>

<sup>6</sup> UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> UN OCHA, South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 3 (as of 12 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-3-12-september-2024>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

### Annex 3: Images of flooding at Bentiu IDP camp and Rubkona airfield





Image depicts the airstrip in Rubkona, the UNMISS Internally Displaced Persons camp, and the UNMISS base, all in Unity State, surrounded by water. Image date 28 October 2024.

Source: Planet Labs PBC

**Annex 4: Press statement on waterway dredging, issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 8 June 2022**




screening of the project sites there after develop TORs for the conduct of the ESIA and any relevant studies. Following the development of the TORs, a tender for the conduct of the ESIA will be advertised and Environmental Firms or Individual consultants will bid and those vetted and deemed qualified by the ministry will be awarded the contracts to conduct the assessments and studies. They will then submit their reports to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry for review and endorsement. If the report(s) concludes that the projects have no, minimal or severe environmental or social impacts, with recommended mitigation measures in place, then a letter of no Objection will be issued and the project will commence.


Therefore since the above process has not commenced, any dredging of the rivers is illegal.

On the resumption of the Jonglei Canal to drain the Sudd Wetland to mitigate floods, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry will not approve the resumption or completion of the Canal because of the Ecosystems services that Sudd provides to our nation, the region and the world.

Finally rest assured that such projects are not the remit of a single ministry and that's why as a cross-cutting ministry with the mandate of protecting and conserving our environment, no project with such a magnitude without the clearance of the ministry is to be implemented.




## Annex 5: Image of waterways in Unity State




Source: Planet Labs PBC. Image date 28 October 2024

Partial river clearing operations were conducted downstream (north) on the Bahr el Ghazal River, which flows past Bentiu town in Unity State. However, the accumulation of vegetation upstream, near the low-lying bridge, has blocked water flow into the dredged sections of the river.

**Annex 6: Republican orders reshuffling senior SSPDF command positions, October 2024**







REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
The President

RSS/RO/J/13/2024

7<sup>th</sup> October 2024

**TRANSFER OF AN OFFICER FROM THE TIGER DIVISION OF THE  
SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF) TO THE  
GENERAL HEAD QUARTERS OF THE SSPDF.**

Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 27(1) of the Sudan People's Liberation Army Act, 2009, I, Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, the Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF do hereby **Transfer Maj. Gen. Lual Wek Guem Maroldit from being the Commander of Tiger Division of the SSPDF to the General Head Quarters of the SSPDF.**

*Signed under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Sudan in Juba, this Seventh Day of the Month of October in the Year 2024.*

**Salva Kiir Mayardit,  
President,  
Commander -In- Chief of the SSPDF,  
Republic of South Sudan,  
Juba.**

**SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES**

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS**

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCES FOR ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL AND FINANCE

10<sup>th</sup> October, 2024,

FROM: A/CDF FOR ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL & FINANCE  
 TO: ALL UNITS  
 RPT: DIRECTOR FOR OFFICERS AFFAIRS  
 RPT: GROUND FORCE COMMANDER

INFO: ALL A/CDFS  
 INFO: CMI  
 INFO: IG  
 INFO: D/CDF  
 INFO: CDF

REFERENCE TO THE REPUBLICAN ORDER NO, RSS/RO/J/13/2024 AND  
 RSS/RO/J/14/2024 FOR THE RESHUFFLING DEPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER OF TWO  
 OFFICERS WITHIN THE SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLES DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF) AS HERE  
 UNDER AND IT HAS COME INTO FORCE WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT.

1. MAJ. GEN LUAL WEK GUEM TRANSFER FROM TIGER DIVISION TO 1<sup>ST</sup>  
 INFANTRY DIVISION AS COMMANDER
2. MAJ. GEN "PSC" ABRAHAM GUM MAKUAC TRANSFER FROM 1<sup>ST</sup>  
 INFANTRY DIVISION TO TIGER DIVISION AS COMMANDER.

THEREFORE, THE TWO ABOVE MENTIONED SENIOR OFFICERS ARE DIRECTED TO  
 EXECUTE THIS ORDER ACCORDINGLY TO HANDOVER AND TAKEOVER  
 IMMEDIATELY.


I CONGRATULATES, THEM AND BEST WISH ON THEIR NEW RESPECTIVE  
 OBLIGATION:

THIS IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION

For *[Signature]*

LT. GEN MALUAL MAJOK CIENGKUACH JOK  
 A/CDF FOR ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL & FINANCE

CC: FILE


*10/10/2024*  
*ALL UNITS*

Office of Assistant Chief of Defence Forces for Administration, Personnel and Finance  
 South Sudan People's Defence Forces, General Headquarters- Juba

**Annex 7: Statement by former Director General of the Internal Security Bureau,  
10 October 2024**

10<sup>th</sup> October, 2024

**Subject: Letter of Appreciation to H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit,  
President and C-In-C of SSPDF and all other Organized Forces,  
Republic of South Sudan**

First and foremost, I would like to appreciate H.E. the President for the opportunity and the trust he bestowed upon me during my thirteen (13) years of service as the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau (ISB).

Your Excellency, it was an honour to serve under your Comradeship in one of the most sensitive and important institutions in the country. It was through your guidance and directives, that I was able to deliver and achieve some of the assigned tasks within the Service. I have cherished every moment of it.

Secondly, H.E. the President is a mentor and one of the role models who, without his unwavering support, I would not have succeeded in the Service during my tenure.

Despite my little disappointment following my recent appointment to the Gubernatorial position as Governor of Warrap State, its subsequent revocation and the ensuing rumours flying around, I want to assure the public that I am one of those cadres trained, tested, committed and loyal to the Revolution. I will never deviate from the line of the Revolution. One of the basic principles of the cadres of the Revolution is that a cadre is the first to attack and the last to withdraw. We are still at the phase of being attacked as a Revolution and therefore I will be the last to withdraw.

Lastly, allow me to reiterate to your top echelon, my sincere gratitude and steadfastness in supporting your able leadership.

Kind Regards,

 10/10/2024

**Gen. Akol Koor Kuc,**

Former DG of ISB and also Former Governor-Designate of Warrap State

**Annex 8: Partial list of known defections from the National Salvation Front (NAS)**

In May 2023, operational commander John Latio Kenyi Loburong defected from NAS to government.

In February 2024, Kennedy Kenyi “Warrior” Abdu Lopiong defected to government.

In May 2024, nine commissioned and non-commissioned NAS officers defected and joined the SSPDF in Yei.<sup>10</sup>

In August 2024, forces under the command of former NAS zonal commander, Emmanuel Salah Juma, deployed under the command of the SSPDF to Dollo Payam in Central Equatoria.<sup>11</sup>

On 9 September, Asiki Samson, a former SPLA-IO and SSNMC commander who later joined NAS, split from NAS and offered to join the SSPDF in Morobo in southern Central Equatoria.<sup>12</sup>


---

<sup>10</sup> Reports from field observers in Yei, obtained by the Panel. May 2024. See also, No. 1 Citizen, NAS officers denounce rebellion, 7 May 2024: <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2024/05/07/nas-officers-denounce-rebellion/>

<sup>11</sup> Field report by international monitors, obtained by the Panel, August 2024. See also, South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, 1,500 NAS soldiers join SSPDF in Kudra, Central Equatoria, 17 August 2024: [https://www.farsightmediawatch.com/index.php/editorial/view\\_clip\\_email/779593/56/0](https://www.farsightmediawatch.com/index.php/editorial/view_clip_email/779593/56/0)

<sup>12</sup> Reports from local observers, September 2024. Interview with Thomas Cirillo, October 2024. See also, No. 1 Citizen, Morobo receives NAS defectors, 25 September 2024: <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2024/09/25/morobo-receives-nas-defectors/>

## Annex 9: Parliamentary summons letter, 29 May 2024



For the purpose of this meeting, the following TNLA's specialized Committees and representatives of relevant institutions and Mechanisms shall be invited:

1. Public Accounts Committee (PAC), (four members)
2. Finance and Planning Committee (FPC), (Four members)
3. Governance Assurance, Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (GAME), (four members)
4. National Constitution Review Commission (NCRC), (two Members)
5. National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC), (two members)
6. Judicial Reform Committee (JRC), (two members)


The meeting shall take place on:

Date: Monday, 3<sup>rd</sup> June, 2024

Time: 3:00 Pm

Venue: TNLA's Blue Room

Best Regards



Rt. Hon Oyeth Nathaniel Pierino  
First Deputy Speaker  
TNLA/RSS/Juba



Cc: Rt. Hon Speaker  
Cc: Rt. Hon Deputy Speaker for Administration and Finance  
Cc: Rt. Hon Deputy Speaker for Welfare  
Cc: Clerk  
Cc: Legal Advisor  
Cc: NCRC, NCAC, JRC  
CC: TNLA's PAC, GAME, Finance and Planning.  
Cc: File

## Annex 10: Summary Report on the payment of \$10 million to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, 6 June 2024



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
**TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY**  
**First Deputy Speaker**

Date: 6<sup>th</sup> June 2024

SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE TNLA LEADERSHIP WITH THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE AND PLANNING, JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CABINET AFFAIRS AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF SOUTH SUDAN ON THE PAYMENT OF USD 10,000,000 (SSP: 15,322,939,000) TO THE MINISTRY OF CABINET AFFAIRS TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIORITY PROVISION OF THE R-ARCSS AND THE ROADMAP SPECIAL PROJECTS

### INTRODUCTION

1. The TNLA received petition from the beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms in late April 2024 regarding controversial payments of USD 10,000,000 allocated to NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc.
2. The TNLA made consultations with relevant institutions including the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Planning, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Bank of South Sudan etc on the credibility of the petition and the report of payments.
3. The TNLA obtained a letter of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024, addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, with the Subject; "Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account Number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects".
4. The letter from the Ministry of Finance and Planning indicated that the fund in question was to facilitate the implementation of the priority provisions of the R-ARCSS and the Special Projects of the Roadmap. Attached to the letter was a document of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs outlining allocations to the following beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms:



Page 1 of 5

Email: [nla1stdeputyspeaker@gmail.com](mailto:nla1stdeputyspeaker@gmail.com) | Telephone: +211 (0) 920 085 551



S/No	Institutions	Total amount in USD	Total amount in SSP
1.	National Constitutional Amendment Committee	1,871,340	1,871,340,000
2.	Constitutional Making Process (10% the of budget)	3,583,887.73	3,583,887,725
3.	National Human Right Council	1,052,000	1,052,000,000
4.	Judicial Reform Committee	999,380	999,380,000
5.	2022/2023 Roadmap Arrears	1,000,000	1,000,000,000
6.	Popularization of the Agreement on the Roadmap (R-ARCSS)	945,871.57	945,871,575

#### AUTHORITY AND MANDATE

5. Pursuant to TCRSS, 2011 (as amended), Article 82 (1) (3), and the TNLA Conduct of Business Regulations, 2011 (Amended 2021), Regulations; 8(1)(c)(d), 133, 134 & 135, the TNLA leadership involving relevant Specialized Committees of Public Accounts (PAC), Finance and Economic Planning, Government Assurances, Monitoring and Evaluation (GAME) convened a meeting on 29<sup>th</sup> May 2024 and summoned the Ministers of Cabinet Affairs, Finance and Planning, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan to clarify and resolved the matter of payments to the relevant institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanism; NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. The representatives of these beneficiary Institutions and mechanisms were also invited.

#### FINDINGS

The outcome of the meeting of the First Summon which was attended by the Ministers of Finance and Planning, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, representatives of the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC and JRC, and the Second Summon for the Minister of Cabinet affairs which was attended also by representatives of the aforementioned beneficiary institutions and the Minister of Cabinet Affairs were as follows:

- 1) **Confirmation** by the Ministry of Finance and Planning of the letter of the Ministry of Finance referenced NF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024 addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, Subject; "Authorization to Transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account No 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects"
- 2) **Confirmation** by the Bank of South Sudan of receipt of the letter from the Ministry of Finance referenced NF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024 addressed to the Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, Subject; "Authorization to Transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account No 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects' SSP Account (General Secretariat) 00269122001036.
- 3) **Confirmation** that, on the 8<sup>th</sup> April 2024, an equivalent of SSP 15,322,939,000 was deposited in SSP Account No. 00269122001036 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) using the bank buying rate of SSP/USD 1532.2939
- 4) **Confirmation that** on 16<sup>th</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received payment request from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account-

Page 2 of 5



- 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD 1,050,000- Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415, as cash withdrawal using bank official selling of SSP/USD 1578.2423
- 5) **Confirmation that** on 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received another payment request from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account- 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD 2,000,000- Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600 as cash withdrawal using bank official selling of SSP/USD 1578.5358
  - 6) **Confirmation that** on 13<sup>th</sup> May 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received authorization from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account- 00269122001036 to transfer the amount of SSP: 10,460,570,724.85 to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Project SSP Account No. 00269121269233
  - 7) **Confirmation that** from date 13<sup>th</sup> – 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, several transactions (Withdrawals) occurred on the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs- Special Project Account totaling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83
  - 8) **Confirmation that** as of 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, the remaining balance in the Special Project Account-00269121269233 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, is SSP: 8,879,850,921.02, roughly equivalent to USD 5,627,281.95
  - 9) **The Minister of Cabinet Affairs stated that:**
    - a. An equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000 was paid to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs' Accounts on 8<sup>th</sup> April 2024.
    - b. The purpose of the fund was for the facilitation of the activities of NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. outlined in the document attached to the payment request Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024, addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, with the Subject: "Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account Number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects"
    - c. Payments (withdrawals) from the Account Number 00269122001036, done on dates 16<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2024 were made for the following additional projects that **were not** included in the attached documents in (b) above:
      - a) NAS peace implementation (USD 1,050,000- Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415, using bank official selling rate of SSP/USD 1578.2423)
      - b) Phase II of Security Arrangement under the office of the Senior Presidential Advisor on Security, Hon. Tut Gatluak Manime (USD 2,000,000- Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600 using bank official selling rate of SSP/USD 1578.5358)
      - c) The unspecified amount of payment for the **9BR** Special projects
      - d) The Minister of Cabinet Affairs denied knowledge of the several transactions (withdrawals) that occurred on the Account 00269121269233, between dates 13<sup>th</sup> - 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, totaling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83.
    - d. The attached document to the payment request of 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024 was reviewed by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs to ensure reduction of payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. which the Ministry of Cabinet communicated to the Ministry of Finance.
    - e. Finally, the Minister confirmed the remaining balance in the Special Project Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, Account No. 00269121269233 was SSP 8,879,850,921.02



- 10) **The TNLA observes** that, the fund in question meant to facilitate the implementation of the priority provisions of the R-ARCSS and the Roadmap special projects was first deposited in the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account-00269122001036 instead of the Ministry's Account 0026912279231 as per the letter of the Ministry of Finance and Planning dated 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024. However TNLA cannot fault the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs since currency was changed from USD to SSP.
- 11) **The TNLA also observes** that, two transactions (withdrawals) were carried out by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs on the fund, under the Account- 00269122001036 on date 16<sup>th</sup> April 2024 and 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2024.
- 12) **The TNLA further observes** that, the balance of the fund SSP 10,460,570,724.85 was then moved from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Account (General Secretariat)-00269122001036 to the Ministry's Account for Special Projects SSP Account 00269121269233. The fund was already less by at least SSP 4,862,368,276.
- 13) **The TNLA is concerned** of the following:
- Despite the fund amounting to **USD 10,000,000** in its equivalent in **SSP 15,322,939,000** was transferred to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs' Account on 8<sup>th</sup> April 2024 and was to be paid to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc, some of these institutions and mechanisms were either partially paid their money or not at all.
  - The Ministry of Cabinet Affairs introduced payments for additional projects namely; NAS, High Level Committee (Office of the Senior Presidential Advisor on Security) and the **9BR** Special Projects against the funds meant for NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC, Popularization of the R-ARCSS Roadmap and payment of 2022/2023 Roadmap Arrears and these payments were done in full and as a matter of priority.
  - The Payments in (b) above has deviated from the purpose for which the fund was requested and paid by the Ministry of Finance and Planning in their letter dated 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024, Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1 contravening the Public Finance Management and Accountability Act, 2011
  - The attached document to the payment request of 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024 was reviewed by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs to ensure reduction of payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. which the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs communicated to the Ministry of Finance has total amount approximated USD 17,000,000 of which payments approximated USD 8,000,000 was expected from the Ministry of Finance and Planning. In light of this discrepancies of total amounts on documents not consistent with total amount of SSP: 15,322,939,000 requested and paid, therefore, the new claims of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs could not have been approved and authorized for payment by the Ministry of Finance and Planning.
  - The changes claimed by the Minister of Cabinet Affairs on the attached document to the payment request of 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024 which reduced payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. was done without the resolution of the Council of Ministers hence this was unilateral and personal discretion of the Minister of Cabinet Affairs.



- f) In light of the above transactions (withdrawals), there is prima facie case of misappropriation of funds SSP: 15,322,939,000 (USD 10,000,000, @ bank buying rate of SSP/USD 1532.2939)

#### RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

In light of the above facts, the TNLA hereby directs the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs as follows:

1. To pay in full, all allocations due to the beneficiary institutions and peace implementation mechanisms as requested by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs and paid by the Ministry of Finance.
2. To pay without further delay allocations due to the beneficiary institutions; NCRC, NCAC, NHRC and JRC etc.
3. Adhere to the principles of Public Finance Management and Accountability Act, 2011 including ensuring no diversion/misappropriation of funds once approved and paid to the spending agencies by the Ministry of Finance and Planning.
4. The Ministry of Cabinet Affairs has no authority to unilaterally divert funds meant for the aforementioned institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms as this contravenes Financial Regulations and the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011
5. Decisions to allocate and pay funds to the beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms was taken in the Council of Ministers meeting, the TNLA expects any change in the payment affecting the amount due the institutions and Mechanisms should be by a resolution of the Council of Ministers' meeting.
6. The Ministry of Finance and Planning to pay directly every spending agency through official Account rather than through a third party Institution. This shall ensure proper auditing and accountability by spending agencies as per the Constitution and the relevant laws.

Sign.....

Rt. Hon Oyot Nathaniel Pierro  
First Deputy Speaker  
TNLA/RSS/Juba



## Annex 11: Talking points for Deputy Speaker of Parliament, 3 May 2024

03-May-2024

### Talking Points

The Ministry of Finance and Planning has done an allocation of USD: 30,000,000.00 to some relevant institutions and Mechanisms as directed by them. The equivalent was allocated in SSP as of which the Ministry of Cabinet received an amount of USD: 10,000,000.00 in equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000.00

1. On the 02<sup>nd</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received Authorization Letter from the Ministry of Finance & Planning to Deposit the amount of USD: 10,000,000.00 to the SSP Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036.
2. On the 8<sup>th</sup> April 2024, an equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000.00 was deposited in SSP Account No: 00269122001036 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) using the Bank buying rate of SSP/USD: 1532.2939.
3. On 16<sup>th</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received payment request from Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD: 1,050,000.00 - Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415.00 - (Cash Withdrawal) using Bank Official Selling Rate of SSP/USD @ 1578.2423
4. On 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received another payment request from Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD: 2,000,000.00 - Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600.00- (Cash Withdrawal) using Bank official Selling Rate of SSP/USD @ 1578.5358
5. On 13<sup>th</sup> May 2024., the Bank of South Sudan received another Authorization from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 to transfer the Amount of SSP: 10,460,570,724.85 to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Project SSP Account No:00269121269233.
6. From date 13<sup>th</sup> - 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, several transactions (Withdrawal) occurred at the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs – Special Project Account Totalling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83.
7. As of 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, the remaining balance in the Special Project Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs A/C No: 00269121269233 is SSP: 8,879,850,921.02

Kind Regards

**Annex 12: Authorization of transfer of \$10 million toward 'Special Projects' under Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, 2 April 2024**

REF: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1.

Date: April 2, 2024

Hon. Governor,  
Bank of South Sudan  
RSS-Juba

Subject: Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from account number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects

Dear Hon. Governor,


Reference to the above mentioned subject, we write to authorize the Bank of South Sudan to transfer the sum of USD 10,000,000 (Only Ten Million United States Dollar) from account 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects account below. Being funds required to facilitate the implementation the priority provisions and special projects.

Account Name: Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects  
Bank Name: Bank of South Sudan  
Account Number: 00269212279231

Please accept the assurances of our highest regards.


  
Maual Tap Dieu  
1st Undersecretary of Finance



  
Dheh Mayuol Tong  
Director General of Accounts

Cc: Hon. Minister of Finance & Planning  
Cc: Hon. Deputy Minister of Finance & Planning  
Cc: Director of Expenditure  
Cc: File.

## Annex 13: John Latio Kenyi Loburong's defection, 14 May 2023



Chief of the SSPDF and all other Organized Forces, with Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and Secretary General of High-Level Standing Committee for the implementation of the revitalized Agreement as the Mediator and Internal Guarantor.

5. Appoint Honourable Kawunda John Mogga as the NAS Chief negotiator and the Team Leader of the negotiations with the membership of the following:
  - (i) Major General Pitiya Yoane Suma. CDR Amadi and Dollo Area Command.
  - (ii) Brigadier General Kasbash John Darius-Secretary and CDR for Office Affairs and Dem Records.
  - (iii) Brigadier General Bingo Apolo Valentino-Commissioner Wonduruba Payam.
  - (iv) Brigadier General Alex Lomeling Martin. Coordinator and Finance Officer, Aru, Uganda.
6. Direct all NAS forces to allow unhindered and safe return of refugees from the neighbouring countries, and the internally displaced, to their areas of origin in order for them to engage in livelihood activities to alleviate hunger and poverty without any disturbance.


Issued under my hand and Seal of NAS today the 14<sup>th</sup> / 05 / 2024 in the NAS Headquarters.



Signed \_\_\_\_\_  
 General John Latio Kenyi (Kenyi Lo-Burong)  
 Chairman and Commander-in-Chief



**Annex 14: Roadmap of negotiations between Kenyi Loburong and the Government of South Sudan**



## 1. Introduction

General John Kenyi Latio, commonly known as Kenyi Lo-Burong, of NAS has taken a courageous decision opening talks directly with General Salva Kiir Mayardit, The President of the Republic of South Sudan. The decision came after several months of thought and consultation with Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro and Hon. Kawunda John Mogga in the United States of America, both of whom hail from the same constituency.

These thoughts and consultation focused on the untold suffering of the citizens in the war thorn areas specially and South Sudan in general. As a result General Kenyi Loburong and his brothers decided to have dialogue which triggered the government to send a delegation to meet with the delegation of General Kenyi Lo-burong, in Nairobi, Kenya. The objective is to understand the reasons which led to rebellion of General Kenyi Lo-Burong and his forces, their grievances and how to achieve genuine peace.

## 2. Background to the conflict between the Government of South Sudan and the National Salvation Front (NAS).

- 2.1 The current Government-NAS conflict has its roots as early as the 1960s. Everyone knows that the Any-anya-1 war was started by elders and leaders of Equatoria region and especially Poculum heroes like Aggrey Jaden and many others. Most of our elders and leaders joined the Any-anya-1 rebellion and continued struggling until the Addis Ababa agreement was signed of 1972. Thereafter, our people were side-lined and the movement was high jacked by Maulana Abel Allier and General Joseph Lagu Yanga and other Political Parties and Allies. As a result, most of the founders of the Any-anya-1 Movement found themselves out of the military and the government of the then Southern Sudan all together.
- 2.2 This political manipulation which occurred during the integration of the Any-anya-1 Forces was intended to marginalize those who fight and instead dominate the system by others with no compensation done to the war affected areas and to the fighters. A good number of the fighters were recruited as road laborers and forest guards and the heroes were not recognised up to now, especially a leader like Aggrey Jaden Wani.
- 2.3 It was thought that the Arab Policy of divide and rule applied on the leaders of the then Government of South Sudan. But, history repeated itself again as everyone knows that during the SPLA/M struggle, able Men, Women and Youth of the Pöjulu people and other Communities of Greater Equatoria joined only to be mistreated in the movement.



2.4 Our people stood firm by supporting the movement physically, politically and militarily making the SPLA/M strong enough and was able to control most of the areas till it gained independence of South Sudan. The Independence of South Sudan created hope that all our people will enjoy the fruits of the struggle. But to our surprise, the contrary became true and the situation became worse than during the Arab regime. The people of greater Equatoria, especially the Pöjulu who are known to be strong and brave politically and militarily, were purposely marginalized as follows:

- (i) Most of our leaders who were leading the movement were undeployed, side-lined, demoted, targeted, manhandled and eliminated by the same SPLM/A system which they fought for and supported wholeheartedly. The intention was to reduce their strength, demoralize and frustrate them so that they do not participate in the governance of the independent South Sudan which they died for.
- (ii) Our brave men who were in the struggle were then not considered during the integration into the military and the government in the eve of the CPA-2005 simply because they were from certain ethnic background. Most of them were said to be unfit, no unit and were stripped off their ranks just to demoralize them in order to abundant military. This was done in mid-SS by late General Salva Mathok-gendit and as a result most of them find their ways to their villages.
- (iii) Those who survived the process were intentionally deployed to the far end of South Sudan like Upper Nile, Unity and Bahr-el-Ghazal areas with their departure orders verbally stated as 'mission of no return'. Indeed, three quarters of them, if not all, died. Their orphans and widows are undergoing untold sufferings, left to be taken over by their colleagues.
- (iv) General Kenyi lo-Burong who was a roaring lion and great fighter controlling Central Equatoria, especially Greater Juba and most parts of Yei, remained unpromoted. Yet, even Former President Bashir knew him very well. Despite all of that, he did not give up and continued to sacrifice himself for the sake of the struggle of the people of South Sudan for independence.
- (v) General Kenyi lo-Burong was later promoted to the rank of 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt by General Abu John when he was the Governor of Equatoria. He felt unrecognized and discouraged and went to his village. Later, General Ladu Gore convinced him to return and promoted him to the rank of colonel and made him in charge of his forces in Luri. He was attacked in Luri and in his residence in Hai-Tarawa in Juba. Even then, he was captured and then



taken to prison in Yei where he spent years and again demoted to the rank of 1<sup>st</sup> Lt and deployed to Mogiri.

- (vi) Again, he was transferred and deployed to Police, where he was demoted to the rank of warrant officer. All these grievances forced him and those who went through the same treatment to demand justice, equality and freedom through the barrel of gun. So, when Dr. Riek Machar rebelled most of us joined his rebellion with the hope of getting their rights and liberating ourselves from the bad ideology of mischief, marginalization and domination by our fellow countrymen.
  - (vii) In SPLA-IO the same tactics of mischief, marginalization and domination by fellow South Sudanese was even worse. Killing, nepotism, tribalism and disregard of our military commanders by the entire leadership of the SPLM/A-IO was rampant. Logistics were only supplied to Upper Nile and hence Equatorians were left helpless struggling to arm ourselves. They carried assassinations attempts some of which succeeded and that angered us to have our own movement.
  - (viii) In view of the SPLM/A-IO treatment, General Kenyi Lo-Burong decided to form his own movement, which he deliberating decided not to disclose its name or declare its commencement. When suddenly General Thomas Cirillo Swaka rebelled and declared his movement on 6<sup>th</sup> March, 2017, he immediately engaged General Kenyi Lo-Burong to be the military wing of his movement, the National Salvation Front (NAS). It was not until 28<sup>th</sup> July, 2017, when General Kenyi Lo-Burong, who had already decided to form his own movement, accepted and announced joining NAS as the military wing.
  - (ix) Unfortunate, General Thomas Cirillo Swaka, who joined us in the bush has a hidden agenda and was not sincere to General Kenyi Lo-Burong. We discovered that he has no sincere political agenda for the welfare of the people of South Sudan and our own concerns. He clearly displays tribalism, nepotism and no care for the issues of the movement.
- 2.5 Therefore, General Kenyi Lo-Burong has taken the decision for genuine and wholistic peace in South Sudan by engaging in direct peace talks with President Salva Kiir Mayardit who he respects as a true SPLM/A separatist leader. It has become clear that there is no future in tribalism, nepotism and marginalization of a people in their own country.
- (i) General Kenyi Lo-Burong decided to join our brothers in good heart for peace so that so we together can give a massive support to our President and our elder Dr. Martin



Elia Lomuro in a move to open a new chapter of peace, reconciliation and development in our country instead of following leaders who are selfish and continue to cause destruction in the country.

- (iii) If general Thomas want to continue with war, he should form his own force but not using us as his tools to achieve his own selfish intension of wanting to gain big position in the government because we are tired of this game. In this regard we hope the government will negotiate with us in good faith so that we create a very strong alliance to defeat Dr. Riek Machar in the upcoming contested general election, in favour of President Salva Kiir Mayardit.

2.6 You have all witnessed the destruction of properties, loss of lives, displacement of people and the suffering of the civil population in the war affected areas. All these requires social services to be fixed in the country. What does this call for? That calls for honest and genuine peace and security so that the government can speed up the process of reconciliation and development. Hence, for genuine peace and security the NAS under the leadership of the General Kenyi Lo-Burong, demand the following:

- (i) Cessation of hostilities, ceasefire, separation and demonization of forces in their areas of control.
- (ii) Integration of our forces into all the Security Sectors i.e., SSPDF, National Security and other Organized Forces. The NAS, under General Kenyi Lo-Burong, demand for the confirmation of all ranks of its forces without compromise.
- (iii) The process of integration, disarmament, demotion and demobilization should be handled in a dignified manner to avoid internal dispute between different forces which will be integrated together as one national force.
- (iv) Most importantly, guarantee for the safety of our leadership and forces before, during and after the negotiation period in the town of negotiations to avoid the unnecessary danger.
- (v) Although the peace talks are direct between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and General Kenyi Lo-Burong, with Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro as the Mediator and Internal Guarantor on the side of the government and Hon. Kawunda John Mogga on the NAS side, we demand the Government of Uganda to be the over-all witness and guarantor as it is in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.



- (i) Based on our experience, we demand that our forces be integrated, trained and deployed in areas under NAS control until the end of the election period so that we support the democratic elections to defend our interest as well as the interest of the government in favour of President Salva Kiir Mayardit to defeat the SPLM/A-IO leader Dr. Riek Machar Teny.
- (ii) SPLA-IO battalion under the command of General John Mabie Gar should be relocated from Morobo county, Panyune Payam, because they are committing atrocities against the civilian population in those areas. They continue to loot civilian properties, murder, violently rape women and girls, and occupying civilian homes and social amenities causing displacement of inhabitants of the area to the refugees' camp, scaring returnees and inflicting more suffering to the civilians
- (iii) All deployed SSPDF forces in civilian populated areas and social amenities should be redeployed to their previous designated military garrisons to pave way for returnees and displace persons to come back and secondly for our forces to have free movement in the process of assembling such that they are able to prepare themselves early enough to participate in upcoming general election.
- (iv) The areas are as follows: In Yei County they are Morsak, kejiko, Ombasi, Goja and Tokori. In Lainya County they are Kon-kat, Rejonga, America Amarat and Mongiling. In Morobo county they are Bura, Panyana, Udabi and other parts of Kaju-keji. Also, Mundari, Amadi, Maridi and parts of eastern Juba County.
- (v) Any confiscated property of those who rebelled and those who ran to the refugee's camp should be returned back to their owners without hindrance. This is a very vital step towards reconciliation and healing so that all will gain trust and believe in a meaningful agreement.
- (vi) Representation of NAS political Cadres in all levels of the government: National, State and County levels in order to work for federalism as a means of permanent peace in the Republic of South Sudan.
- (vii) Destroyed and targeted business men with fear of losing their lives and freedom of movement should be compensated and those who currently reside outside the country whose licenses were confiscated be returned to them so that they start business afresh in secure environment without any interference.



6

J.K.L

- (viii) Government should evacuate **Mundari** and **Dinka Bor** cattle herder in Central Equatorial and take them back to their place to allow quick return of the refugees and displaced persons who are purely farmer to start cultivation in a peaceful environment.
- (ix) We demand the Government to reconsider Wonduruba as a county of its own in order to avoid further political dispute between the citizens of Lainya County and the Bari Community. Rokon should also be given a county of its own so that no one is not kept hostage by others in the so call Juba County because they are all equal citizens of South Sudan. They also deserve the same right like any other citizen of South Sudan so that everybody enjoy equal rights.
- (x) For the duration of the peace talks, the leadership of the NAS should be given the responsibility for their logistics to avoid the challenges being encountered by the current process of cantonment, training and deployment of the R-ARCSS forces.
- (xi) Our fallen comrades who fought tirelessly during the two civil wars deserves to be recognized and honored by including their names in historical statutes, such as Schools, Roads and other monuments, structures and Institutions in consultations with the Pojulu Community leadership.
- (xii) We demand that the Government of South Sudan build a mausoleum in the name of Pojulu people. Further, we demand upgrading of the historic Loka Secondary School into a University and the promised Dr. Samson Kwaje memorial agriculture institute be constructed in a memory of Aggrey Jaden, Dr Samson Kwaje Lukare and my other fallen heroes in Pojulu land.
- (xiii) The President through the Ministry of Humanitarian Affair and SSRRC should bring more Non-governmental Organisations, National NGOs and other organizations to provide services and other life support assistance to the war affected areas including destroyed social amenities. The Government should grant special sponsorship and scholarship for the benefit of those whose education was interrupted by the conflict.
- (xiv) In this regard, the President, through Dr. Marin Elia Lomurö who is our only trustworthy elder, should believe that we shall remain loyal to him and support him for permanent peace in the Republic of South Sudan and make sure he becomes more powerful.



*J. K. L.*

- (xv) The NAS under the leadership of General Kenyi Lo-burong submit these demands for negotiations in good faith and in the spirit of peace. May God bless our President, our country the Republic of South Sudan and our people




**General John Latio Kenyi (Kenyi Lo-Burong)**  
**Chairman and Commander-in-chief**

**Cc**

- President Salva Kiir Mayardit-President of the Republic of South Sudan.
- Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro-Minister of Cabinet Affairs and SG of the HLSC for R-ARCSS implementation.
- Honourable Kawunda John Mogga-NAS Chief Negotiator and Team Leader.
- File



**Annex 15: Negotiations between Kenyi Loburong and President Salva Kiir, 19 May 2023**



basis of the roadmap you sent him. As soon as you make the declaration, as per the copy attached to the roadmap, negotiation will commence.

Further, His Excellency the President has appointed Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and the Secretary General of High-level Standing Committee (HLSC) for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, as the Mediator and Guarantor for the peace negotiations between him and you. In due course, a team will be set-up to assist Dr. Lomurö with the negotiation process.


To this end General Kenyi-Loburong, please accept the gratitude of President Salva Kiir Mayardit and of the entire Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) for accepting peace and joining the R-TGoNU. We look forward to seeing you and your forces amidst our national security sector and government. Again, thank you for accepting peace and please accept the assurance of our highest consideration.

**Dr. Barnaba Marial Benjamin**  
Minister for Presidential Affairs,  
R-TGoNU, The Republic of South Sudan.

**Cc:**

- Salva Kiir Mayardit-President of the Republic of South Sudan.
- Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö-Minister of Cabinet Affairs and the Secretary General of High-level Standing Committee (HLSC) for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement.
- Bishop Elias Taban, The Bishop of Presbyterian Church of South Sudan

**Annex 16: Partial Integration List of Kennedy Kenyi “Warrior” Abdu Lopiong’s forces into the SSPDF, 2 February 2024**




**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
The President

**RSS/RD/J/33/2024** **2<sup>nd</sup> February 2024**

**INTEGRATION OF OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF FORMER NAS SOLDIERS FROM LAINYA COUNTY OF CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE. INTO VARIOUS RANKS IN THE SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE’S DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF).**

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Act, 2009 (Amendment) Act, 2022, I, Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan and the Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF, do hereby integrate and Commission **Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of Former NAS Soldiers from Lainya County of Central Equatoria State, into Various Ranks in the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF)** as hereunder:

S/NO	Rank	Name in Full
1.	Brigadier	Kenned Kenyi Abdu Lopiong
2.	Lt. Colonel	Peter Jima Oliver Loboton
3.	Lt. Colonel	Peter-Lomoro Lotigo Kurispino
4.	Lt. Colonel	Kabash John Dario
5.	Major	Charles Wani Michael
6.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	James Lusuku John Lokule
7.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	Joseph Liwa Elly Duku

The President 

8.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	Kenyl John Martin
9.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	Moses Hakim Pasquale
10.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	Charles Nicola Julu
11.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Isaac Malish Confucius Luat
12.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Cosmos Alakai Live Martin
13.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Gatwech Guol Garang Long
14.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Charles Lubanga Paskal Lowate
15.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	John Salimba Emmanuel
16.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Angelo Lemi Bullen
17.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	James Kenyl Joseph
18.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Kuch Abut Maker Madoldit
19.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Atem Malong Atem Maluk
20.	R/SM	Peter Lubang Charles
21.	R/SM	Robert Bida Martin Wani
22.	R/SM	Both Nyang Deng Padlet
23.	R/SM	Dominic Bittenson Lawyer
24.	R/SM	Sallah Isaac Mick
25.	R/SM	Kenyl John Emmanuel
26.	R/SM	Stephen Wujugu Stanley
27.	R/SM	John Luka Samuel
28.	R/SM	Charles Lujang Mathew
29.	S/M	Morris Malesh Lora Sebit
30.	S/M	Peter Data Justin Davis


SKM

2

The President

4.	Pvt	James Yap Diet Yuot
55.	Pvt	Justin Bidai Alex
56.	Pvt	David Loputu Lizira
57.	Pvt	David Lado Jacob
58.	Pvt	Samuel Lokudu Gore
59.	Pvt	Essien Oliver Taban
60.	Pvt	Lomom Wilson Steven
61.	Pvt	Denis Bidai Steven
62.	Pvt	Emmanuel Lukudu James


Issued under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Sudan in Juba,  
this Second-Day of the Month of February in the Year 2024.

  
Salva Kiir Mayardit,  
President,  
Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF,  
Republic of South Sudan,  
Juba.


4

The President

## Annex 17: Press statement by the Central Equatoria State Government, 10 October 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE  
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION



---

For immediate Release

October 10, 2024

---

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER

**Press Statement on the Tragic Massacre of Youth in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq).**

On October 09, 2024 the Government of Central Equatoria learnt with shock the horrific massacre of 10 youth in Wonduruba Administrative Payam, and 9 others in Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq) of Ganji Payam Juba County the victims lost their lives in an absurd act of violence and cowardice targeting innocent civilians on Wednesday night, preliminary reports indicate that the attack took place when armed individuals targeted the youth and shoot at them while others were hacked by machetes and murdered in cold blood.

The Government of Central Equatoria State expresses its deepest sorrow and condemnation over the horrific massacre, this heinous act which occurred is a grave violation of rights and a threat to peace and stability of the people of Central Equatoria and South Sudan as a whole and will not go unabated.



The state government, in collaboration with national authorities and security forces, will work together in conducting investigations to identify those responsible for this barbaric act and hence assure the public that swift and decisive action will be taken to ensure justice and peace will prevail accordingly.

The Central Equatoria State Government under the leadership of the Governor, HE. Gen. Augustino Jadalla Kamilo Wani, extends its deepest condolences to the families of the victims. Our thoughts and prayers are with the entire people of Wonduruba, Kulipapa (Ganji Payam) and the state at large as it grieves this profound loss, equally the state Government reaffirms its commitment to ensuring a peaceful and secure conditions for all its citizens warranting that violence in any form will not be tolerated.

May the souls of the deceased rest in eternal peace, and may we find strength and unity in this time of sorrow.

**Hon. Gerald Francis,**

Minister of Peacebuilding and Acting Minister of Information and Communication  
Central Equatoria State/Juba

**Ministries Road, West of State Secretariat – CES**

## Annex 18: Reaction from the Pujulu community in Juba, 14 October 2024



Date: 14-10-2024

**Subject:** Condemnation on the Killings of the Twenty-one (21) and Wounding of Four (4) Innocent Civilians in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and Jebel Iraq at Ganyi Payam.

---

Pojulu Community is mourning the brutal murdering of over twenty-one (21) innocent civilians and wounding of four (4) in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and road travelers at Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq) Ganji Payam in Juba County, in Central Equatoria State and on the 9<sup>th</sup> of October 2024 immediately after the returned of Governor from Wonduruba.

During the visit of H. E. Governor Augustino Jadalla Kamilo Wani and accompanying delegations to Lainya and Wonduruba respectively, Governor has stressed a clear message for durable peace prospect to the citizens and assured them on the President H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit efforts in engaging the holdout oppositions through Tumaini peace initiative currently taking place in Nairobi Kenya. Also, H.E. Governor echoed publically to the citizens of Lainya County and Wonduruba Administrative Payam on the general Amnesty declared by our President H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit in 2017 in Yei which still holding up to now as way of restoring peace in the State.

H.E. Governor left Wonduruba on the 8<sup>th</sup> of October 2024 and immediately on the next day Wednesday on the 9<sup>th</sup> of October 2024 Government Forces, from the Ground Unit including Bridger Gen. Kennedy Kenyi Abdu popularly known as "Kenyi Warrior", clashed around Wonduruba Administrative Payam with the holdout rebels groups under John Kenyi Lotio popularly known as "Kenyi Loburong". In the fight Officers belonging to the ground forces at Jebel Iraq were killed in that joint operations. Casualties on the rebel side are unknow to us. As a result of receiving the sad news of their killed officers in those operations on the same date the 9<sup>th</sup> of October 2024 at 02:00 pm, Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa reacted massively by; arresting, torturing and massacring the motorists and travelers from Juba to Lainya and vice-versa killing eleven (11) travelers.

Page 1 of 2

Only four bodies of civilians were recovered through the efforts from Lainya County and Juba County Commissioners and four bodies were handed over to the grieved families but the rest were not found their where-about. Then at 04:00 pm the Ground Unit elements took seven motorcycles of those killed victims each bike carrying three armed officers backed by one Toyota Land Crusher pickup full with armed SSPDF officers moving to Wonduruba very fast via Lainya and the convoy was seen by the civilians in Lainya. Upon their arrivals to Wonduruba at night the same Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa carried out systematic house to house arrests, handcuffed and dragged those unarmed civilians to the road side and all were executed through shootings while others hacked by the machetes on the road side killing ten (10) civilians and wounded four (4) who are under treatment in Yei.


The entire Pojulu Community was outraged and saddened by such barbaric and illegitimate actions committed by the Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa. Totally and Heartily, Pojulu Community everywhere strongly expressed their greatest disappointments over the grossly execution of the unarmed civilians who were massacred in cold blood at Jebel Iraq in Juba County and Wonduruba Administrative Payam.

Therefore, we call our State and national governments to uphold to the constitution and take serious measures to bring the culprits to the book. On the other hand, Pojulu Community leaderships argue everyone to remain calm and not to take law into their own hands as we pursue justice to prevail through the State and National Government to investigate and bring all the culprits to face the law.

Also, Pojulu Community argues the State and national governments to provide security to allow the grieved families to search for the missing bodies in Jebel Iraq for decent burial. Finally, on the behalf of the Pojulu Community we would like to extend our deepest heartbroken sympathies and condolences to the families of those massacred innocent souls and their forcefully departure.

May Almighty God and Our Lord Jesus Christ consoles the entire Pojulu Community and South Sudanese for these un-wanted deaths.


Yours in grief

  
**Mr. Lole Laila Lole**  
 D/Chairman of Pojulu Community  
 Juba, South Sudan






## Annex 19: Reaction from the Wonduruba Community Association in Juba, 12 October, 2024



## Annex 20: Reaction from the Central Equatoria State Youth Union, 10 October, 2024




**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

**CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE**

**YOUTH UNION**

*United Youth for Sustainable Development*



---

**CHAIRPERSON**

Date: 10. 10. 2024

**#PRESS RELEASE#**

**CONDEMNATION ON THE KILLING OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN JEBEL IRAQ AND WONDURUBA ADMINISTRATIVE AREA PAYAM**

On behalf of *Central Equatoria State Youth* we want to express our profound condemnation of the recent acts of violence that have resulted in the tragic loss of innocent civilian lives killed by cowardice act of terror.


The indiscriminate targeting of civilians is a violation of fundamental Human rights and international Humanitarian Law. Such actions are not only morally reprehensible but also constitute war crimes against humanity under the Geneva Conventions.

The ongoing violence in our state has inflicted unimaginable suffering on countless families, leaving communities shattered and lives forever altered. There is absolutely no justification for attacks that deliberately target innocent individuals, and it is imperative that government should hold accountable those who perpetrate such heinous acts.

The protection of civilian lives must be a priority for all parties involved in any conflict. As members of these state, we have a collective responsibility to advocate for peace and to ensure that the voices of the youth and innocent people are heard. We must call for an immediate investigation and the perpetrators must face the full force of law.

Therefore, we call upon our leaders in the state and representative of international community to take a firm stand against the killing of innocent civilians and to advocate for measures that protect human life and promote peace.

###END##



**Tel: +211 926 666 939 | +211 982 380 000**

**Email: ccsyouthunion@gmail.com**

**CES Youth Training Center - Hai Neem, Juba - South Sudan.**

## Annex 21: Photographs of victims of killings in Wondoruba, Central Equatoria State

Images widely circulated in South Sudan, and corroborated by representatives from civil society organizations and members of the local Pujulu community. Injuries indicate victims were tied and shot or hacked to death by blunt instruments, including possibly machetes<sup>13</sup>



<sup>13</sup> Interview with a medical professional, October 2024

## Annex 22: Press release by the National Salvation United Forces, 10 October 2024



**OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON  
National Salvation United Forces; Hope General Headquarters  
South Sudan**

---

Ref: nasu/osp/02/024

Date: 10/10/2024

***For Immediate Press Release***

In their continuing offensive against the National Salvation United Forces (NASU), which started September 5, 2024, the SSPDF and the allied Militia of Dr. Martin Elias Lomuro on October 7 pulled out from Mile 58 Juba Lainya road to attack our bases in Wonduruba and Lainya counties for the 4<sup>th</sup> time in row. On the same day they proceeded to open a base at Logoko, in Logwerle Boma close to our locations.

At around 4 pm while the Governor of Central Equatoria State was addressing the people in Wonduruba centre, the hungry SSPDF and their militia rolled out and attack us at our base. Our gallant forces fought back in defense and forced them to retreat to their base in Logoko leaving behind one dead and several others injured. Wednesday October 8, 2024 early morning they again attack us. This time our forces fought hitting hard, killing 7 at the spot, over ran their newly established base, and burn down 1 land cruiser vehicle which was rushing reinforcement to the besiege forces. Finally the force was defeated and the remnants flee to Wonduruba town in panic. Five of them died in hospital meaning a total 13 traitors have been eliminated while none was killed or injured on our side.

At around 10 pm, 3 motor bikes, a fighter tank, and truck arrived Wonduruba centre from Lainya town to collect those who are injured. They decided to launch a revenge attacks on innocent civilian who had gathered to mourn a dead family member. The mourners were rounded up and the youth were picked, some were collected from their rooms while sleeping tied up and were either shot or hacked by machetes. 10 innocent youth were killed in cold blood, with reasons that they are either related to General Kenyi Loburong or a member of his clan. If John Kenyi is a rebel, then his family members are all rebels as well?

This is what the Mathiang Anyoor fighters are encouraged to do by the clan government in J1 after defeat. Kenyi Warrior is implementing this strategy in

Wonduruba and Lainya counties because earlier he called our command and told us that he has been instructed by CDF, Dr Martin, Ambrose, and Gen Toy to clear us from these areas in 6 months. Why can't they face us instead of killing the innocent people who they claim to protect.

NASU leadership, urges the people of South Sudan to condemn this heinous crime perpetuated by the failed government in Juba. We call upon the Human right organizations, The Troika, peace monitors to investigate these atrocities done to the innocent people of wonduruba and to call for the release of those who are innocently being detained for simply being people from the area. The NASU forces remains committed to seeking for a durable peace for the well-being of all South Sudanese people.

Thank,

  
Maj Gen. Paul Gideon Subian  
Spokesperson  
NASU



**Annex 23: NAS press release concerning defections, 13 October 2024**

**SOUTH SUDAN**  
Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People  
**National Salvation Front/ Army**  
**OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON**  
**General Headquarters**

---

Ref: NAS/OSM/12

13th October, 2024.

**FOR IMMEDIATE PRESS RELEASE**

The Leadership of National Salvation Front (NAS) is very much appalled by the horrendous mass murder of innocent civilians in Wonduruba Payam, Juba County, Central Equatoria State, by the South Sudan Defense Force (SSPDF) allied militia, commanded by Brig. Kennedy Kenyi (aka Kenyi Warrior) and funded by Cabinet Minister Martin Elia Lomuro.

On 8<sup>th</sup> October, the SSPDF and militia under Brig. Kenyi Warrior massacred ten (10) innocent boys who were arrested while participating in a funeral occasion. This came as a revenge for the defeat of the SSPDF and their militia by forces under Gen. Kenyi John Loburon. The SSPDF out of frustration turned against the innocent civilians as a result executing ten (10) young boys in cold blood.


Following this outrageous massacre, the Leadership of NAS would like therefore to state the following;

- 01- NAS condemns in the strongest terms possible the mass murder and mafia-style cold blood execution of these innocent boys by the SSPDF and their allied militia under the command of Brig. Kennedy Kenyi (Kenyi Warrior).
- 02- NAS holds the commander of SSPDF in Lainya, the militia commander Brig. Kenyi Warrior, the militia funder Dr. Martin Elia and coordinator Mr. John Lomeling Kaunda (an American citizen) as aiders and accomplices of this heinous crime.
- 03- NAS cautions the people of South Sudan on complacency towards the existence of the illegal and unconstitutional tribal regime of Salva Kiir that relishes to loot, displace, rape and kill the people of South Sudan.

Email: samuelsuiba@yahoo.co.uk

- 04- The Leadership of NAS appeals to the youth, especially those who are being targeted, to join the ranks of NAS and resist the brutality of the regime and its militia or else form vigilante groups to defend their villages from the marauding SSPDF and the murderous militia.
- 05- NAS calls on civil society and International Human Rights Organization to pursue the case against the murderers of these innocent people and their accomplices to ensure that the criminals are brought to justice
- 06- NAS Leadership appeals to Community members to reject the evil plans by the regime of Salva Kiir and its agents of planting seeds of hatred and disunity among the communities while they continue to rule over weak and divided communities. Community members and Leaders therefore, need to exercise maximum restraint as they work to contain this situation.
- 07- NAS Leadership stands in solidarity with the Pojulu community and the people of Wonduruba, sends its condolences to the families of those who have lost their dears ones and pray that the souls of these innocent boys' rest in Eternal peace.

**Suba Samuel Manase**  
**Spokesperson,**  
**National Salvation Front, NAS**



Email: [samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk](mailto:samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk)

## Annex 24: Appointment of Commissioners to the NAS Federal Civil Authority, 7 September 2024



Date: 7 September 2024

**Subject: Appointments of Commissioners for NAS Federal Civil Authority.**

Pursuant to Articles 25(14)/33(2) of the Constitution of National Salvation Front (NAS) 2024, I, **Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the National Salvation Front (NAS), do hereby issue the following Constitutional Order:

*Constitutional Order No. 10/07/09//2024*

- (1) Appointments of Commissioners for NAS Federal Civil Authority, as provided on the list of Compatriots below:

NAMES	PORTFOLIO
1. Mr. Felix Charles Ali Bilal	Commissioner for Federal Governance Affairs
2. Amb. Lado Gubek	Commissioner for International Relations
3. Amb. Daniel Lee	Commissioner for Information, Mass Communication and Cultural Affairs
4. Mr. Turjuman Ramadan	Commissioner for Legal Affairs and Human Rights
5. Mr. Bosco Otim Mario	Commissioner for Finance and Resource Mobilisation
6. Mr. Robert Samson Lugga	Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs
7. Dr Wani Lolik	Commissioner for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
8. Mrs. Vera Mahdi	Commissioner for Health

**NAS**



NAMES	PORTFOLIO
9. Dr Lokuowe Gordon	Commissioner for Education, Social Welfare and Gender
10. Dr Peter Pitya	Commissioner for Infrastructure and Physical Planning

These appointments come into effect from 7<sup>th</sup> Day of September 2024.

I cordially congratulate you on these appointments in recognition of your diligence and commitments to work for the salvation of the people of South Sudan and wish you success in advancing the vision, mission and objectives of NAS.



**Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**  
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief  
National Salvation Front (NAS).

---

**NAS**

## Annex 25: Appointment of Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority, 4 May 2024



**General Headquarters**  
Office of the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief

Date: 14<sup>th</sup> May 2024.

**Subject: Appointment of Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority**

Pursuant to Articles 25(14)/33(1) of the Constitution of National Salvation Front (NAS) 2024, I, **Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the National Salvation Front (NAS), do hereby issue the following Constitutional Order:

*Constitutional Order No. 07/14/05/2024*

- (1) The appointment of Compatriot **Isaac Ajiba Ochang**, as the Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority.

This appointment comes into effect from 14<sup>th</sup> Day of May 2024.

I cordially congratulate you on this appointment in recognition of your diligence and commitment to the work for the salvation of the people of South Sudan and wish you success in advancing the vision, mission and objectives of NAS.

**Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**  
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief  
National Salvation Front (NAS).



**NAS**

facilitation required to ensure that the NIOC performs its functions and duties; and

- 6.1.14 The NIOC shall provide monthly reports to the NLC, the TNLA and the Tumaini Initiative on the progress in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus.

## 6.2 External Guarantors / Observers

**THAT** the Parties and Stakeholders agree to the formation of the High-Level Panel of Heads of State and Government which shall be composed of Heads of State and Government from the region, and Partners and Friends of South Sudan, whose core roles and responsibilities shall be:

- 6.2.1 To steward, monitor and oversee the implementation of all measures, processes, and activities specified in the Tumaini Consensus, in liaison with the National Leadership Council;
- 6.2.2 To receive and consider reports regarding implementation of the Tumaini Consensus from the Tumaini Initiative;
- 6.2.3 To organize, in coordination with the Tumaini Initiative, high-level visits to South Sudan to assess the progress of the implementation of this and other related protocols from the Tumaini Consensus;

*Handwritten notes and signatures:*  
SBR, PER, PS, NB, GLB, P.A.G., M.A.

- 6.2.4 To review briefs and reports and to engage with the East African Community (EAC), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), African Union (AU), Troika, European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), Community of Saint-Egidio, and Friends of South Sudan, as well as other regional and international bodies and partners on the process of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.2.5 To advise and recommend actions to be taken for the proper and timely implementation of the Tumaini Consensus; and

- 6.2.6 To convene Quarterly meetings, or on a need basis, between the Tumaini Initiative and the National Leadership Council to appraise the progress of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus.

*Handwritten notes and signatures:*  
PER, SBR, PS, NB, GLB, P.A.G., M.A.

List of People to Initial the Tumaini Consensus Protocols - 15 July 2024


Name	Representative Organization	Initial
Hon. Amb. Abino Mathon	Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity, Head of Delegation	A/H
Ayuel Aberge	South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA), Chairman, Real-SPUN	PER
Gen. Pagan Amun Olachi	South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA), Chairman and C-in-C, South Sudan United Front/Army	PER
Gen. Paul Maling Aren	South Sudan United Front/Army	PER
Gen. Stephen Bury Ruteyang	South Sudan United National Alliance (SSUNA), Chairman and C-in-C, South Sudan People's Movement / Army	PER
Gen. Mario Loka Thomas Jada	National Salvation Front - Revolutionary Command Council, Chairman and C-in-C	PER
Dr Pauline Riak	Academia	PER
Patrick Godi	Youth	P.A.G.
Bridget Kagomoro	Women	N.B.
Geoffrey Lou Duke	Civil Society	GLB
Bishop Moses Deng	Faith Based	PER
Sheikh Jaramels Khamsa	Faith Based	PER
Gen. Kari Aguer Kuri	People's Coalition for Civil Action	PER
Lt. Gen. Lazaro Sumbalywa (Rtd)	Chief Mediator	PER
Amb. Dr. Mohamed Ali Gyo	Deputy Chief Mediator	PER
Amb. Ismail Waini	IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan, Co-mediator	PER
Paolo Impagiallo	Community of Saint Egidio, Co-mediator	PS
Dr. A. Korir Sing'et	UN, State Department of Foreign Affairs, Principal Secretary	PER

*Handwritten notes and signatures:*  
GLB, PS, PER, P.A.G., M.A.

## Annex 26: Tumaini protocols, 15 July 2024

**HIGH LEVEL MEDIATION**  
**"TUMAINI INITIATIVE"**  
**FOR SOUTH SUDAN**

*Tumaini Initiative*



**TUMAINI CONSENSUS**  
**FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN SOUTH SUDAN**

**PROTOCOLS FOR INITIALING**

Nairobi, 15 July 2024

Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, G.D., R.M., P.S., N.B., M.A., P.A.G., PER, and others.

AA

**Preamble**

**WHEREAS** H.E. General Salva Kiir Mayardit, the President of the Republic of South Sudan requested his brother, H.E. Dr. William Samoei Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya to mediate between the Government and South Sudan Opposition Groups;

**WHEREAS** the Government of the Republic of Kenya accepted to facilitate the mediation of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan through the High-Level Mediation "Tumaini Initiative" for South Sudan that took place in Nairobi, Kenya;

**AWARE** that the Tumaini Consensus resolves the conflict between the Revitalized-Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU), South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) and other opposition groups, to achieve inclusive peace in the Republic of South Sudan, and that the ongoing, pending programs in Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), and newly established programs in the Tumaini Consensus, shall provide the framework for peacebuilding and democratization in South Sudan;

**RECALLING and RECOGNISING** previous and current agreements, consensus and understandings to cease violence, pursue peaceful resolutions of conflicts, and the commitments to build a stable, peaceful, united and prosperous South Sudan;

**MINDFUL** of the devastation, distraction and disruption of lives and livelihoods, loss of lives and property, and other damages that have occurred as a result of past and current conflicts and the continued suffering of communities, families and individuals that still suffer the effects of the conflicts and natural calamities;

**ACKNOWLEDGING** the efforts, commitments, and progress made by the leadership, partners, friends and the people of South Sudan to

Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, G.D., R.M., P.S., N.B., M.A., P.A.G., PER, and others.

AA

---

achieve peace, build a better country and secure a future for the coming generations;

**CONSCIOUS** that much still remains to be done in order to heal the wounds of the past, ensure reconciliation, consolidate peace, restore stability, and put in place developmental programs, and strengthen systems of governance to ensure advancement and growth;

**CONVINCED** that consolidation of peace and effective pursuit of growth and advancement of South Sudan is only possible where the diversity of the people in and outside South Sudan, are recognized and brought together in an all-inclusive process of nation-building;

**PERSUADED** that the envisaged reforms, democratic transition, and changes towards a better South Sudan shall be achieved through a comprehensive and all-inclusive Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS;

**MINDFUL** of the importance of confidence and trust-building measures, implementation modalities, and other steps for guaranteeing commitment and realization of peace;

**RECOGNIZING** the importance of gender parity and empowerment in all spaces and committed to promote intergenerational considerations, the Parties commit to ensure representation of youth, persons with special needs, and at least 35% of women across public institutions;

**FURTHER COMMITTED** to the Tumaini Initiative, resolution of the conflict, and the consolidation of durable peace in South Sudan; and

**COGNIZANT** that Federal system is a popular demand of the people of South Sudan and the constitution shall be drafted based on Federal arrangements and structures.

Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, G.D., R.M., P.S., N.B., M.A., P.A.G., PER, and others.

AA

**Statement of Purpose**

The Tumaini (Hope) Initiative acknowledges that the protracted political conflicts in South Sudan have compromised the wellbeing of the citizens of South Sudan. The future of current and coming generations is bleak if efforts to achieve and protect sustainable peace fail.

Recognizing that past agreements to end conflicts and sustain peace have not registered adequate success, the Tumaini Initiative now presents an opportunity to build consensus among the Parties and Stakeholders.

The aim of this consensus is to attain sustainable peace and democracy by implementing agreed interim programs. The roadmap to sustainable peace in the Republic of South Sudan comprises, *inter alia*, a Permanent Constitution making process with self-executing mechanisms, which addresses root causes of conflicts, and will provide the means for inclusive development and provision of services to all citizens in all corners of South Sudan.

This roadmap comprises several elements:

**First** Trust and Confidence Building measures are required among all Parties and Stakeholders. Some undertakings from previous agreements were not completed because not everyone kept the promise. This Framework presents strong mechanisms for building trust and confidence so as to implement agreed programs and collectively make a Permanent Constitution for South Sudan and secure sustainable peace.

**Second** the urgent need for enhanced civilian protection and support to humanitarian efforts. There are many citizens in need of relief assistance because of floods, droughts, and displacement by violent conflicts. All Parties and Stakeholders have a moral obligation and duty to mobilize resources to address the

Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, G.D., R.M., P.S., N.B., M.A., P.A.G., PER, and others.

AA

humanitarian crises and natural calamities.

**Third** the need for establishing an inclusive government and firming the basis for responsibility sharing. Politics of inclusion and sharing responsibilities hold the key to peace building and good governance.

**Fourth** fostering ceasefire, undertaking security arrangements and reforms. The Parties and Stakeholders recognize that the integration of the various armed groups is key to addressing political instability.

**Fifth** implementing economic recovery programs and institutional reforms to manage public resources will be prioritized to realize the dividends of peace and development.

**Sixth** implementing programs for resolving community conflicts and land related disputes to achieve sustainable peace, security and stability.

**Seventh** national healing, truth, and reconciliation programs to be undertaken throughout the country to heal the wounds inflicted by the conflicts among our people in order to restore the broken social fabric.

**Eighth** the Permanent Constitution Making Process as part of this consensus will consider past and present challenges, provide a strong and inclusive foundation for stability, wellbeing of citizens, sustainable development and build a society founded on democratic values, rights and freedoms.

**Ninth** the Tumaini Initiative in coordination with the Parties, Stakeholders and development partners will convene a donor conference to mobilize technical and financial resources for peace building, post-conflict reconstruction of war affected areas from the region and the international community.

The Tumaini Initiative shall guarantee **PERMANENT PEACE, STABILITY, and SHARED PROSPERITY.**

*Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

*SA* *SBR* *PM* *GD* *NB* *PA.G*

**NOW THEREFORE**, we the negotiating Parties and Stakeholders of the Tumaini Initiative convened in Nairobi, Kenya, resolve as follows:

## 1. General Principles

**THAT** the Parties and Stakeholders agree and commit to the following general principles that shall guide the interpretation and implementation of the commitments under the Tumaini Consensus:

- 1.1 Respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of South Sudan and its people demonstrated through a people-centered and inclusive Permanent Constitution Making Process;
- 1.2 Enhanced civilian protection and secured access to emergency humanitarian and other assistance particularly to vulnerable population including displaced persons, returnees and refugees;
- 1.3 Commitment to a genuine national healing and reconciliation and the building of enduring trust and confidence in South Sudanese society founded on the principles of justice, equality, human dignity, and the advancement of societal welfare;
- 1.4 Strict adherence to constitutional guarantees for equitable representation of all South Sudanese in public institutions and particularly to achieve representation of youth, persons with special needs, and at least 35% of women across public institutions;

*Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

*SA* *SBR* *PM* *GD* *NB* *PA.G*

1.5 Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, association, assembly and movement for the people of South Sudan, as shall be regulated by law;

1.6 Protection of press freedoms and widening of civic and political space in the country, as shall be regulated by law;

1.7 Strengthen commitment to sustaining cessation of hostilities and permanent ceasefire during the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus and beyond;

1.8 Mutual commitment to the Tumaini Consensus, its principles, and structures, including agreement on its guarantors and measures to assure implementation, processes, and timelines;

1.9 Mutual respect and tolerance, respect for opinions, transparency, respect for the rule of law, accountability, the unfettered access to relevant information and commitment to building of consensus;

1.10 Enhance the decentralized system of government during the transitional period and expedite the process of constitution-making to realize the popular demand of the people of South Sudan to establish a federal system of government; and

1.11 Parliament shall enact enabling laws and amend existing laws to be in conformity with the Tumaini Consensus and Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011 (as amended).

*Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

*SA* *SBR* *PM* *GD* *NB* *PA.G*

## 2. Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Support

**THAT** the Parties and Stakeholders reiterate their commitment to creating an enabling political, administrative, operational and legal environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection of vulnerable communities, humanitarian workers and individuals in South Sudan.

The Parties and Stakeholders agree as follows to:

- 2.1 Commit to the facilitation and provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need of such assistance as a result of previous and current conflicts, natural disasters and other factors;
- 2.2 Strengthen the safeguard measures to returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and their families, the reinstatement of their properties in accordance with their constitutional rights and applicable legislations, rules and regulations and full reintegration to their communities or residence of their choice;
- 2.3 Establish, continue and enhance Quick Impact Programs and service delivery targeting vulnerable groups affected by conflict and natural disasters including children, orphans, women, widows, persons with special needs, and war-wounded; and
- 2.4 Establish and allocate adequate resources to the Special Reconstruction Fund (SRF) and appoint a credible management for the Fund to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.

*Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

*SA* *SBR* *PM* *GD* *NB* *PA.G*

### 3. Protocol on Trust and Confidence-Building Measures

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders, as a gesture of their commitment to the Tumaini Initiative, create a conducive atmosphere for the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS that will lead to the adoption of a Permanent Constitution for the Republic of South Sudan, agree to the immediate implementation of the following measures after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus:

- 3.1 Release all the political detainees and prisoners of war (POWs) and dismiss all the cases and charges on persons accused as a result of politically motivated factors;
- 3.2 Expedite the repeal of Sections 54, 55 and 57 of the National Security Act 2014 so as to conform with the provisions of the Constitution, R-ARCSS and the Tumaini Consensus before the commencement of the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 3.3 Refrain from arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions;
- 3.4 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee the freedom of movement of political leaders, in and outside South Sudan;
- 3.5 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee, without exception, the freedom of association and assembly of all persons in South Sudan, in conformity with the Constitution and the law;

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

- 3.6 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee, without exception, the freedom of expression of all persons in South Sudan, including freedom of the media, and equal access for all to the State Media;
- 3.7 The Parties and Stakeholders or their representatives in the Tumaini Initiative, shall make a confidence-building visit to Juba, South Sudan to hold joint public forums, to publicize, and to commit to the Tumaini Initiative;
- 3.8 The Government leadership or their representatives, shall make a confidence-building visit to Nairobi, Kenya to support and commit to the Tumaini Initiative;
- 3.9 The Government shall protect property rights and guarantee security of property and assets of the Government, groups, and individuals in South Sudan, irrespective of their political affiliations;
- 3.10 The Tumaini Initiative to convene a National Leadership retreat inside South Sudan after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus for sensitization and confidence building; and
- 3.11 National Prayers for peace shall be organized and held by the religious leaders after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus in Juba, the States and the Administrative Areas.

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

### 4. Protocol on Permanent Ceasefire, Security Arrangements and Reforms

THAT the Parties recommit to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) (2017), and commit to a permanent ceasefire agreement that shall be agreed in the Tumaini Consensus. The Parties commit to the reform and reorganization of the Security Sector in order to create unified professional national forces that include the Armed Opposition Groups.

THAT to achieve unification of forces, all the mechanisms below shall be reconstituted to ensure inclusion of the Armed Opposition Groups. The defections of security elements or forces shall not be allowed during the Transitional Period and all Armed Forces shall remain under their respective command pending their unification. The Officers from Tumaini Parties shall be included in the existing Unified Command.

#### 4.1 Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission (SSROC)

4.1.1 A Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission (SSROC) shall be established to conduct reforms by overseeing, directing and supervising the security sector reform during the Transitional Period;

4.1.2 The SSROC shall be headed by a neutral and competent South Sudanese security / military expert who shall be vetted by the National Leadership Council (NLC);

4.1.3 The SSROC shall be further composed of the following:

- 4.1.3.1 Representatives of the Parties and Stakeholders signatory to Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS
- 4.1.3.2 South Sudanese military and security experts
- 4.1.3.3 South Sudanese eminent personalities / academics
- 4.1.3.4 Regional and international experts

4.1.4 The Mandate of the SSROC shall be to:

- 4.1.4.1 Oversee the assembly and cantonment/barracking of all security forces, organization, screening, training, unification, deployment and provision of logistics in cantonment sites, barracks and movement of forces as per Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB) program, including among others;
- 4.1.4.2 Oversee the disarmament and ending of private militias through the JDSB and create political space that promotes peace, national unity, equal opportunity and democratic processes to address underlying issues that drive conflicts;
- 4.1.4.3 Oversee and ensure the deployment of Armed forces across the country and at the borders to maintain the territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan;
- 4.1.4.4 Oversee the simultaneous general disarmament, and destruction of the arms collected from civilians using the unified security forces across the country;
- 4.1.4.5 Oversee the assembly and cantonment/barracking of forces, organization, screening, training, unification and deployment of all Unified Forces shall be completed within a specified period from the date of signing of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 4.1.4.6 Ensure fair treatment of all the security forces including their remuneration during the training;
- 4.1.4.7 Receive progress reports from mechanisms tasked with security reform processes;
- 4.1.4.8 Report to the National Leadership Council (NLC);

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

4.1.4.9 Supervise and oversee the screening of unfit personnel by the JDSB, and coordinate with the DDR Commission on their demobilization and reintegration; and

4.1.4.10 Direct and supervise the establishment of the Committees for Defense and Security which shall be Chaired by the respective heads of the Defense and Security Mechanisms in the JDSB;

4.1.4.11 The Committees of the JDSB shall be as follows:

4.1.4.11.1 Defense/Military;

4.1.4.11.2 Police Service;

4.1.4.11.3 Prison Service;

4.1.4.11.4 Wildlife Service;

4.1.4.11.5 Civil Defense Service [Fire Brigade]; and

4.1.4.11.6 National Security Service.

4.1.5 There shall be established a force to be known as VIP Protection Units whose functions and duties shall be determined by law.

4.2 Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB)

4.2.1 The Joint Defense Board (JDB) shall be renamed as the Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB) and shall be reconstituted at the level of Chiefs of Defense Forces/Staff, Inspector General of Police and Directors General of National Security Service and all other organized forces to exercise command and control over all forces during the Transitional Period.

4.2.2 The functions of the JDSB shall be to:

4.2.2.1 Recommend to Commanders in Chief, the reconstitution of Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC) and Joint

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaani Consensus

4.2.2.2 Restructure and unify the army and other organized forces in accordance with the provisions of R-ARCSS and the Tumaani Consensus;

4.2.2.3 Fast-track general and simultaneous disarmament across the country and destroy the arms collected from the civilians and ensure provision of the state security for all the people in South Sudan;

4.2.2.4 Take measures to strengthen the accountability and discipline in the Security Sector; and

4.2.2.5 Ensure deployment of Armed Forces across the Country, including at the Borders, to maintain territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan.

Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) to include representatives of the Armed Opposition Groups;

4.2.2.2 Restructure and unify the army and other organized forces in accordance with the provisions of R-ARCSS and the Tumaani Consensus;

4.2.2.3 Fast-track general and simultaneous disarmament across the country and destroy the arms collected from the civilians and ensure provision of the state security for all the people in South Sudan;

4.2.2.4 Take measures to strengthen the accountability and discipline in the Security Sector; and

4.2.2.5 Ensure deployment of Armed Forces across the Country, including at the Borders, to maintain territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan.

4.3 Further Commitments by Parties and Stakeholders on Security Sector Reforms

4.3.1 Development and implementation of a transformational policy framework to govern the security sector institutions on matters including language, recruitment, retirement and oversight, reorganize and professionalize the security sector;

4.3.2 Incorporation of a general amnesty for persons who rebelled against the Government into the final outcome of the Tumaani Initiative as an avenue for fostering peace and reconciliation;

4.3.3 Taking measures to strengthen the accountability and discipline mechanisms in the Security Sector; and

4.3.4 Taking measures including legislative reforms, to address inter-communal violence, child abduction, movement of cattle, cattle-raiding/ rustling in South Sudan.

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaani Consensus

## 5. Protocol on Communal Conflicts, Armed Civilians, and Land Disputes

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders recognize the importance of advancing sustainable peace, security and stability at local levels, acknowledge the intricate connection between national and local conflicts and insecurity, particularly the prevalence of cattle rustling, child abduction, revenge killings, land-related disputes, climate change-induced conflicts and inter-communal violence, and the prevailing inadequate justice and accountability mechanisms.

The Parties and the Stakeholders agree that the Government, through public participation, shall:

5.1 Identify the root causes of communal conflicts and violence and land disputes and provide solutions so as to contribute to overall peace and stability in South Sudan;

5.2 Conduct a comprehensive inquiry into land- and natural resources-related conflicts and climate change-induced disputes across South Sudan and make recommendations, including policy and legal actions required to address these disputes effectively;

5.3 Formulate policies, laws, and establish institutions for addressing root causes of conflict, communal violence, armed civilian groups, and land disputes, thereby contributing to overall peace and stability in South Sudan;

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaani Consensus

5.4 Enhance coordination and implementation of community dispute resolution mechanisms for addressing land issues, local conflicts, peacebuilding, reconciliation, social cohesion and integration whose functions and composition shall be determined by law;

5.5 Undertake research and analysis on social cohesion, values, peacebuilding and conflict management, and make recommendations to the relevant Government agencies;

5.6 Foster partnerships with the relevant state actors, non-state actors, bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies on peacebuilding and conflict management;

5.7 Establish early warning and response systems for conflicts and put in place an emergency preparedness and response systems to curb imminent conflicts;

5.8 Promote peaceful co-existence, tolerance, respect and acceptance of diversity in all aspects of life, and encourage appreciation by all ethnic and religious communities for the social, economic, cultural, spiritual and political life of all communities;

5.9 Formulate and implement strategies, plans, educational and training programs to create public awareness and support on the importance of social cohesion, integration, peacebuilding and reconciliation;

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaani Consensus

- 5.10 Facilitate nationwide consultations on the management of small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians, in order to disarm them in accordance with the law and human rights principles; and

- 5.11 Establish a mechanism for the operationalization of this protocol.



Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

Handwritten signatures and initials: AM, SBR, F, GLO, Maud, PAL, PJ, N.B, A/A.

## 6. Guarantors

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders shall establish internal and external processes and structures that will have a permanent and consistent role in guaranteeing and taking lead responsibility in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus as provided.

The Parties and Stakeholders have resolved to commit to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus with both internal and external guarantors as detailed below:

### 6.1 Internal Guarantors

- 6.1.1 The Parties and Stakeholders shall establish the National Leadership Council (NLC) that shall be the national / internal guarantor of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.2 The main roles and responsibilities of the NLC shall be to:

- 6.1.2.1 Provide political stewardship and oversight in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.2.2 Provide strategic leadership and guidance to the Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission, the Governance Oversight Commission, and other public agencies whose mandate is relevant to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.2.3 Preside over and resolve disputes and conflicts in matters

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

Handwritten signatures and initials: AM, SBR, F, GLO, Maud, PAL, PJ, N.B, A/A.

- related to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 6.1.2.4 Receive reports from all mechanisms established under the R-ARCSS as amended and the Tumaini Consensus; and
- 6.1.2.5 Coordinate with Tumaini Initiative on implementation of the key elements of this framework and on meeting of the deadlines of scheduled actions.
- 6.1.3 The NLC shall have a Chairperson, in the absence of whom, the Deputy Chairperson shall act;
- 6.1.4 The NLC shall hold regular meetings to deliberate and make decisions, including seeking political consensus, regarding the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 6.1.5 The NLC, in coordination with Tumaini Initiative, shall establish measures and systems to carefully track the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 6.1.6 Decision-making in the NLC shall be by consensus and, in lieu of that, by two thirds (2/3<sup>rd</sup>) majority;
- 6.1.7 The decisions of the NLC shall be final and not subject to approval by the Cabinet or Legislature;
- 6.1.8 The NLC shall establish a National Implementation and Oversight Committee (NIOC) composed of members seconded by each party represented at the NLC, nominees of Civil Society Organisations, Faith-Based groups, other Stakeholders, Donors and Partners, and whose mandate shall be to:

- 6.1.8.1 Act as secretariat of the NLC and, in coordination with Tumaini Initiative, provide technical and administrative support to the NLC to enable the Council to carry-out its functions and duties;
- 6.1.8.2 Manage the day-to-day coordination of activities in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus; and
- 6.1.8.3 Establish a system to track the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus in coordination with Tumaini Initiative.
- 6.1.9 The NIOC shall have a Head of the Secretariat and a Deputy, whom shall be appointed by the NLC;
- 6.1.10 The NIOC shall establish its structures and transparently and competitively recruit staff to carry out its day to day activities;
- 6.1.11 The NIOC shall be funded by the Government, the Tumaini Initiative and Donors;
- 6.1.12 Funds received for the NIOC shall be deposited into the account of the NIOC and shall be jointly managed by the Head of the Secretariat, Representatives of the Tumaini Initiative and Donors/Partners, who shall be the signatories to the Account;

- 6.1.13 All public institutions and agencies of Government, civil society and faith-based organisations, and other stakeholders shall provide the necessary assistance and

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

Handwritten signatures and initials: AM, SBR, F, GLO, Maud, PAL, PJ, N.B, A/A.

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

Handwritten signatures and initials: AM, SBR, F, GLO, Maud, PAL, PJ, N.B, A/A.



## Annex 27: Withdrawal of SPLM-IO from Tumaini Initiative



### SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (IO) GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

#### RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SPLM/SPLA (IO) FROM THE TUMAINI INITIATIVE

The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Political Bureau met on July 16, 2024 to deliberate on the Protocols of "Tumaini Consensus for Sustainable Peace in South Sudan" that were initialed by the Parties and Stakeholders to the Tumaini Initiative.

The initialed Protocols establish alternative institutions, replacing or running in parallel with those in R-ARCSS besides repeating most provisions in R-ARCSS or existing national laws. The Protocols clearly breach the R-ARCSS and undermine the ongoing peace implementation processes.

The Tumaini Initiative was supposedly a mediation forum. However, in the initialed Protocols, this is not the case. The Initiative has arrogated to itself many roles including being a funder, a supervisor, a coordinator, a convener of a donor conference, a fund manager, a monitor of the implementation, a guarantor and a governing authority. Therefore, the "Tumaini Initiative" undermines the sovereignty of the Republic of South Sudan.

The proposed Security Sector Reforms/Oversight Commission takes over functions of the following existing mechanisms and institutions of R-ARCSS:

1. Security Supervision Mechanism (SSM), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
2. Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSMM), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
3. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
4. Strategic Defense and Security Review Board (SDSRB), co-chaired by the Parties to the R-ARCSS and
5. National Transitional Committee (NTC).

The proposed National Leadership Council (NLC) whose decisions "shall be final and not subject to approval by the Cabinet or Legislature" usurps the powers of:

1. The Presidency.
2. The Council of Ministers.
3. The National Legislature and
4. The National Security Council.

The roles of the guarantors namely; IGAD, AU, CS, UN, EU, Troika, and IGAD Partners Forum, who are seized of the peace process in South Sudan, are muted.

*RMTD*





Page 1 of 2

In light of the above development, the SPLM/SPLA (IO) rejects the initialed Protocols and declares its withdrawal from the Tumaini Initiative as it has deviated from the intended purpose of being an Annex to R-ARCSS and not a stand-alone Agreement.

In conclusion, we would like reiterate our unwavering commitment to inclusive peace and implementation of the R-ARCSS as the only viable framework for attaining sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan.

Sign:

  
Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon,   
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of SPLM/SPLA (IO), and  
First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan,  
Juba  
16 July 2024

## Annex 28: UPDF in Kajo Keji, Central Equatoria State

### 1.Excerpts of a video of the detention of South Sudanese men by armed UPDF soldiers in August 2024 in Kajo Keji.

Note: the UPDF soldiers' patches are visible. An SSPDF soldier can be heard in the background reporting the event over the phone to his superior.



**2. Mediation meeting in the presence of the Kajo Keiji county commissioner, David Lisi Christopher, UPDF, Ugandan police and SSPDF officers on 6 September 2024 in Kajo Keiji county in South Sudan.**



## Annex 29: Statement by Kajo Keji County Commissioner, 29 August 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE  
KAJOKEJI COUNTY



OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

Ref: KKC/CES/59/A07/2024

TO MJ. GENERAL KULANG MAYEN  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SSPDF REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
29/8/2024

**AREAS OF KAJO KEJI COUNTY CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN ENCROCHED (GRAPPED) BY UGANDA**

Kajo-Keji is a county in central Equatoria state republic of south Sudan that borders the neighboring Uganda in the districts of moyo, and yumbe.

These districts of Uganda had been engaged in encroachment of land of Kajo-Keji and causing insecurity within the border communities.

Find below the areas graphed and re-named by Uganda

S/No	Payam of origin	Name of area taken	New name given by Uganda	Approximate area in kms
1	Liwolo payam	Sokodo/ tirye	Tire village Kerwa SC	25Kms
2		Kaboro village	Kaboro A&B KSC	26kms
3		Kulasar village	Kulasar village KSC	25 kms
4		Mijale village	Mijale, kerwa sub county	20kms
5		Pingo village	Pingp Kerwa sub county	22kms
6		Rodo village	Rodo kerwa sub county	20kms
7		Merewa village	Merwa KSC	30akm
8		Gorbeleng village	Gorbeleng KSC	30km
9		Mokaden village	Mokaden v11	20kms
10		Guruwa village	Woroworo village	28kms
11		Kolorunga village	Kulurung village	20kms
12		Mapu village	Mapu village KSC	20kms
13		Kopionga village	Kapionga parish KSC	22kms
14		Kolorok village	Uturuko village	22kms
15		Erepunga village	Erepunga KSC	21kms
16		Limu village	Limu parish	21kms
17		Kogwo village	Kogwo village KSC	20kms
18		Longolijo village	Longolijo village KSC	21dkms
19		Wangor village	Wangor village KSC	17kms
20		Alidoro village	Alidoro KSC	15kms
21		Tigawate village	Central mijale village	20kms
22		Matkulu village	Markulu KSC	20kms
23		Aludu village	Centre liku village	15kms
24		Buyi village	Uluga village	20kms
25		Kobe village	Usubira village	15kms
26		Gwuto ko tokoyot	Ura village	22kms

	village		
27	Lema village	Lema KSC	24kms
28	Kukuduk village	Kukuduk KSC	4kms
29	Koburuwa village	Koburuwa KSC	23kms
30	Kilaji village	Kilaji KSC	21kms
31	Kupiya village	Loguteleng village	21kms
32	Sisi village	Sisi KSC	20kms
33	Loduwa village	Midigo Sub county	3kms
34	Dukulya village	Ubetiku village midigo	4kms
35	Biyabe village	Gumbiri village	16kms
36	Lobe village	wombe village	5kms
37	Morsak village	Achilaya villageg	4kms
38	Muluwe village	Sere village	5kms
39	Gwongatulu village	Gwongatulu KSC	23kms
50	Letimekor village	Letimekor KSC	23kms
51	Baranya kuto village	Baranyakuto KSC	22kms
52	Kambala village	Ambala village	24kms
<b>Kangapo 2 payam</b>			
1	Gwere village	Gwere sub county	25kms
2	Masaka village	Masaka GSC	25kms
3	Murerya village	Murerya GSC]	25kms
4	Lunyamiro village	Linyamiro GSC	10kms
5	Morod village	Morodo GSC	15kms
6	Lojili village	Lojili village GSC	12kms
7	Manse village	Manse GSC	10kms
8	Worilowoga village	Worilowoga GSC	8kms
9	Tiwoyo Village	Tiwoyo village GSC	7kms
10	Lere village	Lere village GSC	8kms
11	Ebeya village	Ebeya village GSC	13kms
12	Garamba village	Wakale village]	10kms
13	Monikdisi village	Malanga village	18kms
14	Komba village	Mundusaku village	26kms
15	Majaburo village	Elema east	32kms
16	Gorbeleng village	Kamurope villae	30kms
17	Amerok village	Maru village	16kms
18	Ayumani village	Gobor village	35kms
19	Kolipi village	Elema village	17kms
20	Nyaingamuda village	Fitinabaya village	25kms
21	Lepori village	Lefori sub county	19kms
<b>Kangapo 1 payam</b>			
1	Lojore Village	Lojore afoji Sub county	15kms
2	Koru koria	Koruo village ASC	15kms
3	Loruwondi village	Inigo village	18kms
4	Magorlobong village	Magorlobong village	20kms
5	Waalo village	Wano village	18kms
6	Ludara village	Ludara village	13kms
7	Robojo village	Robojo village	12kms
8	Kimu village	Kimu village	9kms
9	Tor-li village	Tor-li village	15kms
10	Danakorwi village	Danakorwi village	10kms
11	Kiyongo village	Edefia village	20kms
12	Koree village	Eriya village	20kms
13	Masalowa village	Macholola village	25kms





REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE  
KAJOKEJI COUNTY



OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER


14		Yakijimiji village	Abaya village	19kms
15		Gworong lolyong village	Moi anzo village	19kms
16		Apoji village	Afoji village	17kms
17		Fudia village	Fudia village	15kms
18		Onyire village	Onyire village	13kms
19		Gwulukuk village	Gwulukuk village	16kms
20		Minje village	Minje village	17kms
21		Kongolo village	Kongolo village	18kms
22		Pasokwi village	Pasokwi village	16kms
23		Itiya village	Itiya village	17kms
24		Eduwa village	Edua village	20kms
25		Moipileya village	Moipi lea village	15kms
26		Lugwakiya village	Lugwakia village	17kms
27		Aripijo village	Aripijo village	18kms
28		Kerepi village	Kerepi/arepi	20kms
29		metutametun	Metu sub county	25kms
30		Longirakoru	Lepo village	18kms
31		Kuruse village	Wuruse village	15kms
32		Suluwa village	Soloa village	18kms
33		Marindi village	Mulango/ moyo hospital	25kms

These are real fact from the land lords of the three payams.




**David Lisi Christopher**  
County Commissioner Kajo-Keji County  
Central Equatoria State Juba

## Annex 30: SSPDF Press Release concerning meeting with UPDF, 2 October 2024



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
**SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENSE FORCES**  
**DIRECTORATE OF MEDIA AND PRESS**



---

**OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON**



Your Ref: ..... Date: .....

Our Ref: .....

**Press Release on the meeting between SSPDF and UPDF Chiefs of Defence Forces**

On September 28<sup>th</sup>, 2024, SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces travelled to meet with his Ugandan counterpart. The two army chiefs met, held and concluded a very successful meeting. They agreed on immediate implementation of the following points:

1. UPDF stops further encroachment into South Sudan territories. This pause is aimed at giving time to the two governments to find lasting solutions to the recurrent border issues (in other words, allow the High-Levelled Technical Committee, to continue deliberations on Border delimitations and demarcations)
2. Observe & maintain a cordial and harmonious working relationship along the common border.
4. Trade and commerce to continue.
5. SSPDF to deploy additional forces along Juba-Nimule Road to ensure and enhance safety of public road users.
6. SSPDF army chief secured the release of three own servicemen that were arrested and detained by UPDF in July 2024. The army chief had also technically succeeded in securing release of Capt. Machol Majur Madol, from South Sudan National Police Service, Department of Traffic Police, who was arrested in July 2024 by Uganda Revenue Authorities while in possession of a fully loaded pistol.

Signed  

**Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang PSC(ET)**  
 Director for Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesperson,  
 SSPDF GHQs-Bilpam

---

TEL: +211 922 282 534, +211 914 917 786  
 Email: lul\_orcd@hotmail.com



## Annex 31: UPDF Press Statement concerning meeting with SSPDF, 28 September 2024



**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE & VETERAN AFFAIRS**  
**UGANDA PEOPLES' DEFENCE FORCES**  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION  
MoDVA Headquarters



Our Ref: UPDF/DDPI/83A  
Your Ref: .....

28 September 2024

**PRESS STATEMENT**  
**BILATERAL RELATIONS**

Gen Kainerugaba Discusses Security Cooperation with his South Sudan Counterpart.

The Chief of Defence Forces and Senior Presidential Adviser for Special Operations, Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba this afternoon held talks with his South Sudan counterpart Gen Santino Deng Wol.

The meeting at the Defence Intelligence and Security Headquarters focused on regional security issues of mutual interest.


The two military leaders acknowledged the longstanding relationship between Uganda and South Sudan, committing to further enhancing military to military relations, that are equally historic.

The meeting was attended by several UPDF leaders including the deputy CDF Lt Gen Sam Okiding, Airforce Commander Lt Gen Charles Okidi, the Deputy Commander Land Forces Maj Gen Francis Takiwa and the Chief of Defence Intelligence and Security Maj Gen James Birungi.

The meeting was also attended by Chiefs of Staff of Services, the 4Division Commander Brig Felix Busizoori and the 5Division Commander Brig Keith Katungyi among others.

The South Sudan chief was also accompanied by senior military officials from his country.

Since assuming office of the CDF, Gen Kainerugaba has met with his counterparts from several countries including Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, highlighting his resolve to enhance security cooperation with regional militaries and others that may not directly share a common border with Uganda, for Peace and Stability of the African People.




DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC  
INFORMATION  
FELIX M. KULAYIGYE psc (K)  
MINISTER OF DEFENCE  
Brigadier General  
VETERAN AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION

P.O. Box 3776 Kampala – Uganda Tel: +256 -(0) 414 -565344/7/8/9  
Email: [ddpi@updf.go.ug](mailto:ddpi@updf.go.ug) / [modva.updf.spokesperson@gmail.com](mailto:modva.updf.spokesperson@gmail.com)  
Website: [www.updf.go.ug](http://www.updf.go.ug)

## Annex 32: Pictures of meeting between UPDF and Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004)


On 28 September 2024, Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004), the SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces, travelled to Uganda in violation of the travel ban, one of the restrictive measures established by Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015), most recently extended by resolution 2731 (2024).

The meeting was confirmed by a UPDF press release, issued on 28 September 2024. It is available from: [https://x.com/MODVA\\_UPDF/status/1840043839676965095](https://x.com/MODVA_UPDF/status/1840043839676965095)



The South Sudan chief was also accompanied by senior military officials from his country.

Since assuming office of the CDF, Gen Kainerugaba has met with his counterparts from several countries including Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, highlighting his resolve to enhance security cooperation with regional militaries and others that may not directly share a common border with Uganda, for Peace and Stability of the African People.




DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC  
INFORMATION  
FELIX M. KULAYIGYE psc (K)  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
Brigadier General  
VETERAN AFFAIRS  
**DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION**

Additional photographs are also available, depicting the two military leaders meeting at the UPDF Defence Intelligence and Security Headquarters. See for example: Sudan Tribune, Ugandan army chief meets South Sudanese counterpart in Kampala, 28 September 2024: <https://sudantribune.com/article291467/> see also a video of the event, available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3quUP4eZBac>







## Annex 33: Partial flight-data for flights between Uganda and South Sudan



## Annex 34: SSPDF statement refuting a “vehicles supply deal,” 19 August 2024



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
**SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENSE FORCES**  
**DIRECTORATE OF MEDIA AND PRESS**



---

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

August 19<sup>th</sup>, 2024

**SSPDF Refutes Vehicles Supply Deal**

The Office of SSPDF would like to unequivocally deny claims by Dynamic Defence Solutions that it had reached an agreement to supply vehicles to the national army.

To the contrary, on August 12<sup>th</sup>, 2024, some representatives from aforementioned company, accompanied by Assistant Chief of Defence Forces for Logistics and Director for Transport and Maintenance paid a courtesy visit to the Director General for Procurement.

The officials, only used opportunity availed to them to market company's areas of specialty and capabilities. In the light of above, SSPDF command/leadership would like to conclude by underscoring the following:


1. No Memorandum of Understanding was signed between SSPDF and Dynamic Defence Solutions,
2. No contract was offered to Dynamic Defence Solutions to supply vehicles to SSPDF;
3. Purchase of classified/strategic equipment is beyond the jurisdiction of SSPDF and the Directorate of Procurement;
4. SSPDF is still under arms embargo hence has no legal basis and authority to engage in defence contracts and
5. Finally, SSPDF takes this opportunity to officially distance itself and brush aside claims by Dynamic Defence Solutions that it was contracted to supply vehicles.

Signed.....

**Maj. Gen. Lul Kuai Koang PSC (ET)**

Director for Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesperson,

SSPDF GHQs-Bilpam



13 AUG 2024

SSPDF SPOKESPERSON

TEL: +211 922 282 534, +211 914 917 786

Email: lul\_orcd@hotmail.com




**Annex 35: Final list of military items requested by Peter Biar Ajak**Source: US District court for the district of Arizona<sup>14</sup>

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Unit Price</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. AK-47 Rifles (Full Auto)	1,000	\$350.00	\$350,000.00
2. PKM Rifles	300	\$675.00	\$202,500.00
3. RPG-7 launcher	200	\$575.00	\$115,000.00
4. 7.62x39 ammo	2,000,000	\$.17	\$340,000.00
5. 7.62x54 ammo	1,500,000	\$.21	\$315,000.00
6. PG-7 HE round	1000	\$600.00	\$600,000.00
7. PSL Sniper Rifle	70	\$1092.50	\$76,475.00
8. FIM92 Stinger System	10	\$80,000.00	\$800,000.00
9. Satellite phone	20	\$1,200.00	\$24,000.00
10. Handheld Radio	50	\$500.00	\$25,000.00
11. M67 Hand Grenades	500	\$60.00	\$30,000.00
12. PG-7VT/PG-7T AT Round	500	\$800.00	\$400,000.00
13. AN/PVS Monocular	10	\$12,000.00	\$120,000.00
		Subtotal-	\$3,397,975.00
		Transportation-	<u>\$575,000.00</u>
		<b>Total -</b>	<b>\$3,972,975.00</b>

<sup>14</sup> See [https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA\\_v\\_Keech\\_et\\_al\\_\\_azdce-24-00394\\_\\_0022.0.pdf](https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA_v_Keech_et_al__azdce-24-00394__0022.0.pdf).

**Annex 36: Allocation of Nile blend cargos, May and September 2024**

  
**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
**MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM**

---

REF: RSS/MOP/J/O/U/5/24/120 17th May, 2024

[REDACTED]  
Hai Matar  
Juba South Sudan

**RE: NOMINATION LETTER FOR ALLOCATION IN JULY, 2024**

Reference to the above and the letter of the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MOFP) Ref: RSS/MOFP//J/1STUSF14/5/24-1, regarding advance payment on the Cargo.


The Ministry of Petroleum, Republic of South Sudan is pleased to allocate one cargo (600,000 BBL) of Nile Blend loading July 2024, to [REDACTED] LTD.


Final award letter will later indicate the discount/Premium and the lifting window.

[REDACTED] is expected to advance forty million (40m) United States Dollars, after receiving this award letter.

Please accept the assurance of my highest regards and consideration.

Regards.

  
Dr. William Anyak Deng  
Undersecretary



The Undersecretary

---

PO Box 376, Opp. Presidential Palace (J1), Juba - South Sudan  
General Line : +211 915 177 770 | E-mail : undersecretary@mop.gov.ss | www.mop.gov.ss

# Republic of South Sudan (RSS)



## MINISTRY OF FINANCE & PLANNING (MoFP)

1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary of Finance

REF:RSS/MoFP/J/1<sup>st</sup>USF/27/08/2024/05

September 10, 2024

Hon. Dr. Chol Deng Thon Abel  
Undersecretary,  
Ministry of Petroleum

Dear Hon. Undersecretary,

**RE: Allocation of One (1) Crude Oil Cargo for the Month of April, 2025 to** [REDACTED]

Greetings and best wishes from the Ministry of Finance and Planning. Reference is made to the aforementioned subject. I am writing to respectfully request your office to purpose allocation of **One (1) Crude Oil Cargo** for the month of **April, 2025** to [REDACTED] as directed by the Minister of Finance and Planning.

Let me avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Hon. Garang Majak Bol  
1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary  
Ministry of Finance and Planning



***Copy Furnished:***

- Hon. Minister of Finance and Planning
- File



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM

RSS/MOP/J/O/U/9/24/061

19<sup>th</sup> September 2024


**RE: REVOCATION OF ALLOCATION OF ONE CARGO OF NILE BLEND FOR THE  
MONTH OF APRIL 2025 TO [REDACTED]**

Reference is made to the above-mentioned subject and the letter of the 1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary of Ministry of Finance and Planning dated 10<sup>th</sup> September 2024 with Ref: No. **RSS/MOFP/J/I\*USE/27/8/24/05** to Ministry of Petroleum (MoP) pertaining to the allocation of one (1) Cargo of Nile Blend for the Month of April 2025 to [REDACTED]

Ministry of Petroleum, Republic of South Sudan, scrutinizes and ultimately registers potential oil lifting companies through a set of technical requirements, including, but not limited to, checking their presence in both regional and international oil lifting markets, submission of financial statements, approval by the Bank of South Sudan (BSS). [REDACTED] is not registered as one of the oil marketing companies.

Premised on the foregoing, MoP is hereby informing your revered office about the revocation of allocation of one (1) cargo of Nile Blend equivalent to 600,000 bbl due to lack of registration and conflicting schedules.

Please, accept the assurance of my highest regards and consideration.

  
**Dr. Chol Deng Thon Abel**  
Undersecretary  
Ministry of Petroleum



Cc: 1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Cc: File

**The Undersecretary**

PO Box 376, Opp. Presidential Palace (J1), Juba- South Sudan  
General Line: +211 915177770 | Email: [undersecretary@mop.gov.ss](mailto:undersecretary@mop.gov.ss) | [www.mop.gov.ss](http://www.mop.gov.ss)

## Annex 37: Legal framework for oil-related payments and transparency

### Extracts from the 2012 Petroleum Revenue Management Act

- Councils.
- CHAPTER IX**  
**TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY**
- 30. Transparency as a Fundamental Principle**
- (1) The management of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, and any related duty of any relevant party, shall be carried out in an open and transparent manner.
  - (2) In the exercise of their functions and competencies, and as provided for in this Bill, the National Legislature, Ministry, Bank of South Sudan and Investment Advisory Committee shall take all necessary measures to ensure free access to public information.
  - (3) Access to public information shall be in accordance with the Right to Information Act 2013.
- 31. Declaration of Confidentiality**
- (1) Information or data may be declared confidential and not to be disclosed to the public if such information:
    - (a) significantly prejudices the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds;
    - (b) jeopardizes the independence of the Investment Advisory Committee, any of its members, or both;
    - (c) prejudices the freedom of discussion within or among the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan, or the Investment Advisory Committee; or
    - (d) may lead to unfair competition, improper gains or advantage for a third party or unfair disadvantage for the parties involved.
  - (2) The declaration of confidentiality shall be made by the Ministry, Bank of South

28

- Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee and shall provide:
- (a) a justification based on one or more grounds detailed in subsection (1) of this Section; and
  - (b) the period in which such information shall be declared confidential.
- (3) Without prejudice to subsection (1) of this Section, and unless the parties agree to disclose such communication, internal communications within the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee shall be kept confidential.
  - (4) Any party affected by the disclosure of information on grounds detailed in subsection (1)(d) of this Section may request a declaration of confidentiality of such information to the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee.
  - (5) The Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee shall issue a decision on the request for declaration of confidentiality under subsection (4) of this Section.
  - (6) In case of denial, the interested party may appeal to the Competent Court within fifteen days from the date in which the decision under subsection (5) of this Section was communicated to him or her.
  - (7) The Minister shall issue regulations on further detail procedures under subsections (4), (5), and (6) of this Section.
  - (8) The justification on the confidentiality of information shall be made available to the public upon request.
  - (9) Upon expiration of the period referred to in paragraph (2) (b) of this Section, and if any grounds on which the declaration of confidentiality was based no longer exists, information shall be disclosed to the public.

29

- not financial assets of government and the rate of savings; and
- (f) a list of names of persons holding positions relevant for the operation and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, including:
- (i) the Minister;
  - (ii) the director general of accounts of the Ministry;
  - (iii) the chairperson, deputy chairperson and members of the Investment Advisory Committee;
  - (iv) the Governor;
  - (v) the external investment manager(s), if any; and
  - (vi) the designated signatories that are authorized to request transfers from the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds.

- (3) The sources of the information described in subsection (2) of this Section, in whatever form, including the reports and statements, shall be annexed to the annual report in unedited form.
- (4) The annual report shall be published by the Ministry within fifteen days of its submission to the National Legislature.

#### 15. Annual Disclosure and Publication of Payments

- (1) Licensees, contractors and sub-contractors shall annually disclose information on all payments, monetary or in kind, made to Government agencies in connection with Petroleum Activities. The Government shall disclose the revenue received in connection with Petroleum Activities without regard to any provisions of confidentiality.
- (2) Any disclosure under this Section shall be reported to an independent entity, selected and appointed for this purpose, and the information shall be published and verified in accordance with the principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as prescribed in the regulations.
- (3) Confidentiality sections or other sections in a Petroleum Agreement that prevent

31

disclosure of information on any payments made and revenues received in connection with Petroleum Activities conducted in South Sudan shall be void to the extent required for disclosure of such information as set out in subsection (1) of this Section.

- (4) The Ministry shall issue regulations respecting all matters relating to disclosure and publication of information under this Section, including orders to administrative agencies requiring them to provide information relating to payments and revenues.

#### 36. Publication of Information

- (1) The Ministry shall ensure that this Bill and any of its regulations, the Investment Policy, the Investment Guidelines, the operational management agreements provided in Section 8 and 14(7) of this Bill, and the rules and procedures of the Investment Advisory Committee provided in Section 21(8) of this Bill, are readily available to the public not later than thirty days after their respective enactment or adoption.
- (2) Appointment of the Investment Advisory Committee shall be published in the Official Gazette.
- (3) Information required to be made public under this Chapter shall also be published online on the website of the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan and the National Legislature.
- (4) The Ministry shall also make copies of the information available at its headquarters.

32

## 32. Records of Petroleum Revenue

- (1) The Ministry shall publish the records of Petroleum Revenue in accordance with Section 6 of this Bill no more than six weeks after the end of each Quarter.
- (2) The records of Petroleum Revenue published under subsection (1) of this Section shall be disaggregated by type of revenue and individual transaction.
- (3) In addition to the records of Petroleum Revenue, the information shall include transfers from the Petroleum Revenue Account to the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds and the Consolidated Fund, transfers from the Consolidated Fund to the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities, and the balance of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds.
- (4) The information shall be published simultaneously in the official gazette, the Ministry's website and in at least two national daily newspapers and duly communicated to the National Legislature.

## 33. Quarterly Reports

- (1) The Bank of South Sudan shall present to the Minister and the Investment Advisory Committee quarterly reports on the in- and outflow and the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds during the Quarter and the value of the assets and where the assets are held at the end of the Quarter, no later than by the end of the ensuing month.
- (2) The Bank of South Sudan shall make the quarterly reports publicly available no later than six weeks after the end of the Quarter.
- (3) The Bank of South Sudan shall ensure that in releasing, or allowing access to, such reports, measures are taken to prevent the disclosure of confidential information.

31

## 34. Annual Reports

- (1) The Minister shall submit an annual report for the Petroleum Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds to the National Legislature no later than four months after the end of the Financial Year.
- (2) The annual report shall be prepared in such manner that makes it readily adaptable for dissemination to the public and shall contain the following information for the Financial Year for which the report is prepared:
  - (a) a report signed by the Minister describing the investment Policy and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, any advice received from the Investment Advisory Committee, and any other matter related to the management of Petroleum Revenue and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds that may be of concern or interest to the National Legislative Assembly;
  - (b) a report signed by the Investment Advisory Committee describing the investment Guidelines and any changes made during the Financial Year, a comparison of the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds against the established benchmark indices of the investments and against the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds for the previous three years, and any other matter relevant for the implementation of the investment Policy and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, including, but not limited to, an assessment of the internal and external audits and risk management and control systems in place by the Bank of South Sudan;
  - (c) the Auditor General's report, including the audited financial statements with notes of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds and any report from the independent auditor;
  - (d) a list of all payments of Petroleum Revenue made to the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities, and payments of Petroleum Revenue by the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities to each applicable Local Government Councils, for the Financial Year;
  - (e) the liabilities of government borrowings in a manner that provides an accurate representation of the past and expected future development of the

32

## Annex 38: Budget for the financial year 2024/25

Panel analysis, based on first draft of budget presented to the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly on 25 September 2024

Official exchange rate SSP/US\$ (Oct 2024)	3,098		
--	-------	--	--

	SSP	US\$ (est.)	
<b>Projected government revenue</b>			<b>% of total revenue</b>
<b>Projected oil revenues</b>			
DPOC	0	0	
GPOC	943,610,579,883	304,587,017	
SPOC	194,823,738,558	62,886,939	
<b>Total oil revenue</b>	<b>1,138,434,318,441</b>	<b>367,473,957</b>	<b>50.43%</b>
<b>Projected non-oil revenue</b>			
Customs duty	552,284,081,279	178,271,169	
Misc taxes and fees	566,920,329,811	182,995,587	
<b>Total non oil revenue</b>	<b>1,119,204,411,090</b>	<b>361,266,756</b>	<b>49.57%</b>
<b>Total projected government revenue</b>	<b>2,257,638,729,531</b>	<b>728,740,713</b>	


<b>Government expenditure</b>			<b>% of total spending</b>
<b>"Mandatory government expenditure"</b>			
Transfers to Sudan for oil pipeline	157,035,230,468	50,689,229	3.76%
Transfers to oil producing states (2%)	22,768,686,369	7,349,479	0.55%
Transfers to oil producing communities (3%)	34,153,029,553	11,024,219	0.82%
Transfers to Ministry of Petroleum (3%)	34,153,029,553	11,024,219	0.82%
Debt repayment	286,642,748,700	92,525,096	6.87%
National Revenue Authority Retention	54,957,368,080	17,739,628	1.32%
Oil for roads	0	0	0.00%
Other capital projects	493,482,795,275	159,290,767	11.83%
<b>Total "mandatory expenditure"</b>	<b>1,083,192,887,998</b>	<b>349,642,637</b>	<b>25.96%</b>
<b>Salary payments</b>			
Salaries	773,759,678,293	249,761,032	18.55%
Salary arrears	642,316,055,668	207,332,491	15.40%
Foreign mission salary arerars	96,003,600,000	30,988,896	2.30%
<b>Total salary expenditure</b>	<b>1,512,079,333,961</b>	<b>488,082,419</b>	<b>36.24%</b>
<b>Other expenditure</b>			
Operating expenditure	413,329,279,511	133,418,102	26.21%
Transfers to States for State budgets	419,306,834,843	135,347,590	26.59%
Peace budget	93,794,227,620	30,275,735	5.95%
Constituency Fund for MPs	30,000,000,000	9,683,667	1.90%
December 2024 Elections	257,521,457,127	83,125,067	16.33%
Humanitarian and emergency fund	173,660,000,000	56,055,520	11.01%
Various other budget lines	189,336,691,868	61,115,782	12.01%
<b>Total other expenditure</b>	<b>1,576,948,490,969</b>	<b>509,021,463</b>	<b>37.80%</b>
<b>Total all government spending</b>	<b>4,172,220,712,928</b>	<b>1,346,746,518</b>	
<b>Deficit</b>	<b>-1,914,581,983,397</b>	<b>-618,005,805</b>	



## Agency spending:

	Salary budget (SSP)	% of total salary budget	Goods and services (SSP)	% of total goods and services	Total budget (SSP)	% of total Ministry spending
<b>Accountability cluster</b>	894,932,810	0.12%	5,848,736,009	1.45%	7,370,156,266	0.39%
<b>Economic Cluster</b>	19,109,574,136	2.47%	49,631,570,445	12.31%	197,443,429,349	10.48%
Of which Ministry of Finance and Planning	1,832,456,166	0.24%	28,331,191,362	7.03%	32,480,160,993	1.72%
<b>Education cluster</b>	84,975,288,417	11.00%	48,077,271,655	11.92%	225,135,744,981	11.95%
<b>Health cluster</b>	5,326,514,447	0.69%	31,156,159,400	7.73%	54,855,922,636	2.91%
<b>Infrastructure cluster</b>	1,595,558,604	0.21%	8,382,367,085	2.08%	13,336,454,811	0.71%
<b>Natural resources cluster</b>	22,406,328,022	2.90%	33,863,145,894	8.40%	351,649,759,145	18.67%
<b>Public administration cluster</b>	75,991,334,896	9.84%	168,546,330,203	41.80%	290,284,083,280	15.41%
Of which Presidential Affairs	2,577,606,960	0.33%	15,594,234,618	3.87%	23,383,834,620	1.24%
Of which Cabinet Affairs	1,465,091,532	0.19%	7,625,921,167	1.89%	16,773,997,323	0.89%
Of which Foreign Affairs	50,377,424,952	6.52%	4,254,097,101	1.05%	55,111,798,592	2.93%
Of which Parliament	10,277,629,488	1.33%	81,444,261,374	20.20%	114,571,166,718	6.08%
Of which Council of States	6,504,809,940	0.84%	25,000,499,165	6.20%	38,371,858,427	2.04%
<b>Security sector</b>	505,880,647,927	65.51%	35,430,397,122	8.79%	599,433,387,770	31.82%
Of which Police	100,406,257,704	13.00%	4,198,497,310	1.04%	158,507,540,170	8.42%
Of which Ministry of Defence	268,614,128,198	34.78%	15,735,791,888	3.90%	288,412,061,028	15.31%
Of which Veterans Affairs	84,588,459,037	10.95%	6,419,463,234	1.59%	91,007,922,271	4.83%
Of which NSS	51,827,888,804	6.71%	6,812,984,565	1.69%	58,737,678,439	3.12%
<b>Rule of law</b>	56,064,967,796	7.26%	22,327,870,875	5.54%	144,039,451,614	7.65%
<b>Totals</b>	772,245,147,055		403,263,848,688		1,883,548,389,852	

## Distribution of salary payments:



## Distribution of goods and services spending

