



安全理事会

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2024 年 10 月 15 日安全理事会关于青年党的第 2713 (2023)号决议所设
委员会主席给安全理事会主席的信

谨代表安全理事会关于青年党的第 2713 (2023)号决议所设委员会，并根据
安理会第 2713 (2023)号决议第 29 (c)段，随函转递专家小组根据第 2713 (2023)号
决议提交的最后报告。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本函和报告，并将其作为安理会文件分发为荷。

安全理事会关于青年党的第 2713 (2023)号
决议所设委员会主席

山崎和之(签名)

* 由于技术原因于 2024 年 12 月 2 日重发。

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2024 年 9 月 17 日索马里问题专家小组给安全理事会关于青年党的第
2713 (2023)号决议所设委员会主席的信

根据安全理事会第 2713 (2023)号决议第 29 (c)段，我们谨随函转递专家小组
根据第 2713 (2023)号决议将于 2024 年 10 月 15 日提交安理会的最后报告。

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武装团体专家

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海事/自然资源专家

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摘要

安全理事会于 2023 年 12 月 1 日通过第 2713(2023)和 2714(2023)号决议，结束了 1992 年 1 月 23 日安理会第 733(1992)号决议首次实施的长期领土武器禁运，标志着索马里进入一个关键时刻。决议取消了对索马里联邦共和国政府进口武器、弹药和军事装备的所有限制，索马里国民军、国家情报与安全局、索马里国家警察部队、索马里看守部队等索马里安全部门主要机构可以不受限制地获得军事装备。安理会第 2713 (2023)号决议重点对青年党实施武器禁运，防止该团体获得武器和弹药，并减少简易爆炸装置的威胁。决议还保留了联邦成员州、州政府和持照私营保安公司的某些军备控制程序，详情见该决议附件 A 和 B。

解除对政府的武器禁运也揭开了一个新的篇章，为政府及其安全部队同时带来了机遇和挑战。上述决议旨在确保政府加强国家安全架构，包括通过更好地控制陆地和海上边界，同时将第 2713(2023)号决议所设专家小组的调查重点再次放在削弱青年党和伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(伊黎伊斯兰国)索马里的能力以及对索马里和平与安全的任何其他威胁之上。

由于非法武器贩运、对全副武装的部族民兵缺乏问责、对缴获的武器、弹药和简易爆炸装置的分析 and 追查能力不足，索马里武器弹药的安保管理仍然具有挑战性。从青年党缴获的武器制造于最近的 2021 年，证明该团体仍然可以获得非法武器供应。成功占领基地并从索马里国民军和非洲联盟驻索马里过渡时期特派团活动的基地转移武器、区域冲突外延和非法贩运网络，仍然是青年党补给的主要来源。

有鉴于此，青年党继续对索马里的和平与安全构成最大威胁。面对政府领导的专项军事行动，青年党继续进行顽强抵抗。青年党继续对政府、非索过渡特派团和国际部队以及平民和企业实施复合式袭击，包括在摩加迪沙保护区内。2024 年 8 月 2 日，青年党对摩加迪沙丽都海滩的海滩景观餐厅发动了多年来针对平民最致命的复合式袭击之一。

青年党通过高度复杂的商业战略维持着牢固的财政基础。青年党利用合法和非法手段为其行动创收，包括通过检查站、勒索企业、强制征税以及使用第三方企业及账户。专家小组收到的信息显示，2023 年青年党通过几项创收活动积累资金，财政收入总额超过 1.5 亿美元，专家小组将继续对此进行调查。

为削弱青年党，必须继续认识到人道主义需求巨大和平民持续受到威胁的背景。2023 年和 2024 年，平民深受冲突、暴力和气候冲击循环的影响，导致流离失所、资源紧张、基础设施破坏和生计中断。据估计，2024 年索马里有 690 万人需要人道主义援助，其中包括 390 万境内流离失所者。在青年党控制地区，中立和公正的人道主义准入受到限制，突出表明需要这种准入。为使人道主义工作者能够提供援助，反恐立法必须将公正的人道主义活动排除在其适用范围之外。

专家小组注意到关于性暴力和性别暴力，包括与冲突有关的性暴力和严重侵害儿童行为报告的数量。青年党仍然是记录在案的招募和使用儿童、绑架和

强迫婚姻事件最大的肇事者。尽管政府承诺遵守 2014 年移交和接收与武装团体有关联儿童的标准作业程序，但是这些儿童继续被关押在官方和非官方拘留地点，部分儿童因在与青年党关联期间犯下的罪行而被处以死刑。

专家小组在执行任务过程中，调查了伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(ISIL QDe.115)在索马里兵力和部署的变化，包括卡拉尔办事处重新成为伊黎伊斯兰国一个重要的全球行政和金融中心。伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里的存在集中在邦特兰的巴里州，那里的勒索和走私活动有所增加，外国战斗人员涌入给索马里和该州带来了新的安全风险。

专家小组注意到，利用货运和捕鱼单桅帆船(传统帆船)穿越阿拉伯海走私武器和弹药的做法持续存在，武器弹药的目的是索马里或也门的非国家武装团体。2024 年 1 月 11 日，美利坚合众国海军在阿拉伯海拦截了一艘载有导弹部件的单桅帆船。这次走私行动是 2023 年 8 月开始的大规模行动中的第三次，据称从伊朗伊斯兰共和国走私武器，转移到索马里沿海的船上，以也门为最终目的地。此外，2023 年 8 月以来，邦特兰当局成功拦截武器并逮捕了几名武器走私者，其中有六名也门国民。

专家小组注意到，2023 年 11 月 24 日以来，索马里海盗活动再次抬头，发生了 25 起袭击事件，包括据报劫持商船和独桅帆船事件。索马里的海盗行为与陆地上的不安全和经济挑战有关。几年来，海盗行为一直受到安全措施的打击，如部署外国海军，在船上实施最佳管理做法，在船上部署私营武装保安队。然而，一段时间后，配备私营武装保安队的船只越来越少，航运公司也放松了最佳管理做法。在当前的一波海盗行动中，被劫持并被登上的船只无一例外没有配备私营武装保安队。

此外，安全理事会第 2696 (2023)号决议授权一次性出售基斯马尤及周边地区的木炭库存。2024 年 5 月 29 日，专家小组获悉，朱巴兰企业向政府确认，已经找到一个有兴趣的买家。此后，有三艘单桅帆船在基斯马尤装载木炭前往迪拜。截至目前，作为一次性出售的一部分，已从基斯马尤出口了约 125 000 袋木炭。专家小组将继续监测一次性出售的进展以及合规情况。

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* 仅以来件所用语文分发，未经正式编辑。

一. 任务和方法

1. 安全理事会第 2713 (2023) 号决议概述了第 2713 (2023) 号决议所设专家小组的任务。根据决议第 29(c) 段，专家小组向安全理事会关于青年党的第 751(1992) 号决议所设委员会提交最后调查报告。
2. 秘书长在 2023 年 12 月 29 日给安全理事会主席的信(S/2024/48)中任命了专家小组。小组由五名专家组成。在编写本报告时，武装团体/区域专家已经秘书长任命，但尚未加入小组。本报告载有专家小组 2023 年 9 月至 2024 年 8 月 30 日的调查结果。
3. 2024 年 1 月至 8 月，专家小组多次访问索马里，与索马里联邦共和国政府、联邦成员州和州政府当局会面。专家小组访问了摩加迪沙、加罗韦、拜多阿、基斯马尤和哈尔格萨，还会见了非洲联盟索马里过渡时期特派团(非索过渡特派团)的代表以及联合国索马里援助团(联索援助团)、联合国机构、国际伙伴、外交使团和民间社会组织的代表。2024 年 5 月，专家小组参加了由国家安全办公室中央监测局召集的国家武器弹药管理协调会议，参加会议的有联邦政府、联邦成员州、¹ 索马里安全部队和国际合作伙伴的代表。专家小组还参加了 2024 年 5 月 29 日至 30 日欧洲联盟海军部队在马德里主办的第十五届行业战略会议。
4. 专家小组遵循安全理事会制裁所涉一般性问题非正式工作组建议的标准(见 S/2006/997)和秘书长关于信息敏感性、分类和处理的公报(ST/SGB/2007/6)。本报告附件 2 和 3 载有关于方法的详细说明。
5. 在编写本报告时，专家小组正在与政府讨论与政府合作的方式。一旦未决事项得到处理，专家小组将恢复对索马里的访问。

二. 青年党和伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国派别：对索马里和平、安全与稳定的威胁

A. 青年圣战运动(青年党)

6. 青年党(SOe.001)仍然是对索马里和平与安全的最大威胁，它成功抵抗了政府支持的多次军事进攻。不仅如此，青年党还夺回了它以前解放的地区，包括加尔穆杜格的 Ceel Buur 和 Cowsweyne。青年党继续对政府、非索过渡特派团和国际目标以及平民和企业，包括对摩加迪沙繁忙市场进行复合式袭击。² 青年党受益于其情报局在政府控制地区的情报服务，时间证明安全部门难以破坏其情报服务。

¹ 加尔穆杜格、希尔谢贝利、朱巴兰和西南州。

² 见半岛电视台，“索马里首都市场多起爆炸造成 10 人死亡，20 人受伤”，2024 年 2 月 6 日。

1. 领导结构和动态

7. 近年来，青年党的高层领导结构保持相对稳定。去年有一项新的高级别任命：军事办公室主任 Yassir Jiis (未列名)被免去职务，由 Guled 'Ilkacase' (别名红牙 Guled，未列名)，又名 Muse，接任。Guled 来自索马里西北部，先后在 Galgala 山区和盖多州活动。Yassir Jiis 仍然是青年党的重要高级领导人，但目前并不担任正式职务。

8. 专家小组未能证实青年党内斗的说法。Ahmed Diriye (SOi.014，又名 Ahmed Umar, Abu Ubaidah) 作为埃米尔仍然大权在握，由 Abukar Ali Adan (SOi.018) 担任副手。Mahad Karate (SOi.020) 为前副埃米尔，是埃米尔的亲密知己。

9. 青年党设有执行委员会和协商委员会，但出于安全原因，两个委员会目前都没有定期召开会议。执行委员会包括相当于所有办事处负责人(makatib)的人员，协商会议则包括办事处负责人、州长(walis)、军事指挥官(jabha)和一些外国战斗人员。还设有总司令部(Qiyadatal Aama)，即 Diriye 更加密切的咨询小圈子。然而，青年党的埃米尔拥有最终的唯一决策权(见机密附件 5)。

2. 摩加迪沙的高调袭击

10. 青年党继续在摩加迪沙实施高调袭击。这些袭击是对政府权威的挑战，表明青年党仍有能力进入敏感和受保护地区。

11. 这些袭击包括：

- 2024 年 2 月 10 日，戈登将军军事基地遭到针对阿拉伯联合酋长国和巴林军事顾问的内部袭击³
- 2024 年 3 月 14 日至 15 日，对距离索马里宫仅半公里的一家酒店的复合式袭击⁴
- 2024 年 5 月 3 日，警察中校 Adan Omar Ahmed 在 Xamarjajab 区的一个保护区被暗杀⁵
- 2024 年 7 月 14 日，在 Boondhere 区针对一家咖啡店平民的复合式袭击⁶
- 2024 年 8 月 2 日，针对摩加迪沙丽都海滩一家餐厅平民的复合式袭击，据报造成超过 284 人伤亡，其中近 100 人死亡⁷

³ Jon Gambrell, “青年党称在索马里首都发动袭击，造成 4 名阿联酋士兵和 1 名巴林军官死亡”，美联社，2024 年 2 月 12 日。

⁴ Abdi Sheikh, “警察：三名士兵死于索马里首都酒店袭击”，路透社，2024 年 3 月 15 日。

⁵ Horn Observer, “警察被绑架后几周，又一名警察在摩加迪沙遭暗杀”，2024 年 5 月 5 日。

⁶ Ibrahim Aden 和 Basillioh Rukanga, “汽车炸弹杀死欧洲足球决赛索马里观众”，BBC，2024 年 7 月 15 日。

⁷ 机密安全报告，2024 年 8 月。

- 2024年8月21日，针对安全部队和检查站的多起袭击，国家情报与安全局成功拦截两个车载简易爆炸装置。⁸

12. 为防止青年党实施复合式袭击，政府投资缓解措施，包括在摩加迪沙检查站安装摄像头，安全部队人员经常轮换和合用办公房舍，加强对进入摩加迪沙车辆的检查。在某些情况下，内部调查和录像检查导致安全部队人员被捕，但也表明青年党改进了爆炸物容器的隐藏手段，可能需要更多的培训和爆炸物探测设备加以拦截(见第 130 段)。⁹

3. 打击青年党军事行动的成败

13. 2022 年至 2023 年政府领导的打击青年党行动进入最猛烈阶段，但在此后政府遭受重大挫折，突显在部队组建和解放区控制方面存在挑战。此外，由于这些军事失败，索马里特种部队多条战线同时作战的能力以及青年党渗透安全部队的问题成为关注的焦点。

14. 青年党继续对非索过渡特派团和索马里国民军发动袭击，特别是在摩加迪沙周边的下谢贝利和中谢贝利。¹⁰ 青年党利用这些地区的道路向当地商人征税，并转移战斗人员、资金和武器。吉利布和布阿勒到摩加迪沙最直接的路线经过巴拉维、布乌洛马雷尔和梅尔卡。这些城镇由政府控制，但双方仍在争夺周边地区的控制权。摩加迪沙出发的其他主要过境路线经过下谢贝利州的阿夫戈耶和中谢贝利州的巴尔卡德。这些城镇靠近摩加迪沙，平民继续面临青年党和其他武装行为体的不安全感、恐吓和暴力。

15. 青年党继续向索马里国民军和非索过渡特派团车队实施简易爆炸装置袭击，给部队调动和再补给以及伤员后送和医疗后送带来重大安全风险，并对进攻行动和部队士气产生连锁反应。青年党破坏索马里国民军后勤，包括弹药补给能力，仍然是一个重大挑战和薄弱环节(见第 104-105 段)。

16. 尽管存在这些挑战，政府继续控制着加勒穆杜格州的 Ceel Dheer、Xarardheere、Ceel-Huur 的天然港口和 Masagaway 等重要解放区。

17. 2023 年 8 月，政府领导的攻势在 Budbud、Ceel Buur、Cowsweyne 和 Galcad 遭遇重大挫折。截至 2024 年 8 月，这些地点仍在青年党的控制之中。

⁸ 见 <https://mogadishu24.com/al-shabaab-claims-deadly-attack-on-security-checkpoints/>。

⁹ 官方机密来源。

¹⁰ 官方机密来源。另见武装冲突地点和事件数据库，“索马里：关于宪法修正案和青年党袭击事件的争议”，2024 年 4 月 26 日；武装冲突地点和事件数据库，“索马里：青年党在州选举前收复失地”，2024 年 3 月 28 日。

18. 2023 年 8 月 26 日，青年党在几天前解放的 Cowsweyne 对索马里国民军实施重大袭击。青年党媒体称，在袭击中打死超过 175 名索马里国民军士兵。¹¹ 2024 年 8 月 29 日至 30 日，青年党夺回了一度被索马里国民军占领的 Ceel Buur。¹²

19. 2024 年 1 月 24 日，青年党称在穆杜格州 Caad 地区对索马里国民军发动重大袭击，包括 Danab、Gorgor、Darawish 和 Macawisley 部队。青年党真主党旅媒体随后公布了袭击的照片和视频，青年党称缴获了车辆、武器和其他军事装备。¹³

20. 2024 年 3 月 9 日和 14 日，青年党在穆杜格州夺回了此前于 2022 年和 2023 年解放的几个重镇。¹⁴

21. 2024 年 4 月 27 日，在索马里国民军撤退后，青年党重新夺回了希尔谢贝利州中谢贝利 Mahaday 区的 Ciidciidka 和 Cali Fooldheere 两地。¹⁵ 在希谢贝利州，政府继续控制着谢贝利河以东的解放区，但难以应对持续增加的部族冲突，冲突增加带来了新的安全挑战(见第 101-103 段和第 171 段)。

22. 在本报告所述期间，青年党继续声称在西南州实施了次数最多的袭击，而索马里国民军没有取得重大进展。¹⁶ 埃塞俄比亚部队，包括作为非索过渡特派团的一部分，目前在 Baidoa、Ceel Barde、Dinsoor、Hudur 和 Waajid 以及朱巴兰盖多州的 Bardheere、Garbaharrey 和 Luuq 的政府控制的主要城镇和城市提供部队保护。

23. 2024 年 9 月 1 日，青年党对拜多阿机场发动间接火力袭击。没有人员伤亡报告，但跑道受到轻微损坏，突显西南州事实首都的脆弱性(见附件 19)。¹⁷

24. 2024 年 7 月和 8 月，政府领导的打击青年党行动在朱巴兰成功清除了基斯马尤和阿夫马道之间主要公路沿线 100 多公里的地雷，使青年党遭受重大损失。2024 年 7 月 22 日，联邦部队和州部队击退了青年党对 Bulo Haji、Harbole 和 Mido/Biibi 阵地的三次进攻，再次造成青年党重大损失。¹⁸ 朱巴兰州行政当局发布新闻稿称，打死了 135 名青年党好战分子(见附件 4a 和 4b)。

¹¹ Horn Observer, “青年党发动大胆袭击，数十名索马里士兵丧生，多人被俘”，2023 年 8 月 26 日。

¹² Editor, “青年党夺回埃尔布尔”，The Somali Digest, 2023 年 8 月 30 日。

¹³ Site Intelligence, 青年党领导人宣布 191 人在穆杜格索马里国民军特别部队重大行动中死亡，2024 年 1 月 24 日。

¹⁴ Horn Observer, “青年党夺取索马里军队和民兵放弃的城镇和村庄的控制权”，2024 年 3 月 18 日。

¹⁵ Jama, “青年党在部族竞争中重夺中谢贝利的战略位置”，The Somali Digest, 2024 年 4 月 27 日。

¹⁶ 机密来源。另见 Site Intelligence, 青年党称对索马里、埃塞俄比亚、肯尼亚和乌干达军事阵地进行 3 次定点清除和多次袭击，2024 年 5 月 22 日。

¹⁷ 见 Somali Guardian, “迫击炮击中索马里拜多阿机场”，2024 年 9 月 1 日。

¹⁸ Staff reporter, “索马里：数十名青年党好战分子在挫败的袭击中丧生”，Garowe Online, 2024 年 7 月 22 日。

25. 据报道，青年党还在寻求开发新的能力，包括使用武器化无人机(见附件 22)。商用无人机已在索马里投入使用，青年党用无人机进行侦察。¹⁹ 这一能力并不需要转让技术，也不一定表明其他武装团体转让了技术，但专家小组在继续调查。

4. 青年党媒体和宣传

26. 青年党继续维持先进的线上存在和社交媒体部门，包括真主党旅媒体基金和阿拉伯语 *Shahada* 通讯社，该通讯社最近扩大了全球覆盖范围。²⁰ 青年党还经常出现在基地组织的媒体和宣传报道中。

27. 国家情报与安全局经常发现并关闭与青年党有关联的网站、社交媒体账户和聊天群，但数字媒体空间仍然难以控制。被关闭的网站很快被新的网站、社交媒体账户和聊天群取代。

28. 专家小组注意到青年党试图利用该区域和中东最近发生的事件。青年党媒体还继续报道非索过渡特派团和国际部队造成的平民伤亡，有时使用国际人道法的语言。²¹

29. 2024 年 6 月 18 日，真主党旅发布了一年一度的开斋节宣传视频。专家小组审查了视频，其中的突出画面是副标题“我们怎能满足于放弃圣战？”视频大约 30 分钟时，播放了赞颂塔利班的普什图语圣歌(*nasheed*)。视频还显示了几十名“特种部队人员”在乌萨马·本·拉登军事学院进行训练的画面。²²

B. 伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国-索马里

30. 专家小组注意到，伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(伊黎伊斯兰国)-索马里派别的兵力和部署发生了重大变化，在 *Suhayl Aalim Abd El-Rahman* 别名 *Bilal al al-Sudani* 2023 年 1 月死亡后，该派别的力量大大削弱。伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里由驻扎在邦特兰巴里州的一批前青年党武装分子领导，但最近有大量外国战斗人员加入，使该团体打击青年党的能力得到扩大和加强。与此同时，卡拉尔办事处重新成为伊斯兰国重要的全球行政和财政中心。²³

31. 邦特兰是非洲之角和红海对岸海湾之间的“战略桥梁”，伊黎伊斯兰国一直试图利用这一桥梁调动和训练战斗人员，走私武器，通过各种非法活动进行创收，并向索马里博萨索和包括摩加迪沙在内的其他地方的企业征税。

¹⁹ 官方机密来源。

²⁰ 见 *Africa Defense Forum*，“青年党继续扩大媒体行动”，2024 年 7 月 30 日。

²¹ 见 *Site Intelligence*，“青年党控制地区的开斋节庆祝活动，索马里人铭记加沙，谴责被指称的埃塞俄比亚野心”，2024 年 4 月 15 日；*Site Intelligence*，“青年党发誓报复被指控的乌干达在下谢贝利屠杀索马里农民”，2024 年 7 月 17 日。

²² 此外，见 *Caleb Weiss*，“青年党支持创建‘特种部队’”，*The Long War Journal*，2024 年 6 月 19 日。

²³ [S/2024/556](#)，第 3 页。

32. 卡拉尔办事处已重新成为伊黎伊斯兰国重要的行政和财政中心。这给索马里带来了新的安全风险，因为伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里同时扩大了在邦特兰的行动基地，为伊黎伊斯兰国在该地区更广泛的行动提供基地。加密货币的不透明使用给索马里联邦共和国政府和联邦成员州当局带来新的挑战，需要增加调查能力和增强意识来发现加密货币交易。

33. 值得注意的是，伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里和卡拉尔办事处最高领导人目前都没有被列入任何联合国制裁制度。

1. 伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里领导人动态

34. 卡拉尔办事处和伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里“省”的确切领导结构仍不透明。卡拉尔办事处负责收集和分配资金，为外国战斗人员的流动和培训提供便利，协调附属机构之间的行动，并可能参与武器和其他货物走私，支持伊黎伊斯兰国在全球的行动。卡拉尔办事处向各省总局报告，省总局再向“哈里发办公室”报告。

35. 一些报告表明，Abdul Qadir Mumin (未列名)可能已经升任全球“哈里发”，但专家小组没有收到可以证实这一说法的证据。他最后的确认职位是省总局负责人，领导非洲的伊黎伊斯兰国关联机构和人员。

36. Abdirahman Fahiye Isse Mohamud aka Fahiye (未列名)是伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里的埃米尔，负责伊黎伊斯兰国在索马里的行动。Abdiwali Waran-Walac (未列名)同样来自邦特兰巴里州，目前担任伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里的财务主管。²⁴

37. 对卡拉尔办事处的调查表明，取代 Bilal al-Sudani 的不是个人，接替他角色和责任的是几个重要人物，这使这些网络更加分散，难以破坏。²⁵ 专家小组收到的信息显示，目前至少有一名叙利亚国民在卡拉尔办事处担任领导职务。²⁶

38. 穆民曾是青年党成员，2015 年 10 月在邦特兰建立了伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里派，宣布效忠 Abu Bakr al Baghdadi 以及一小批青年党变节者。²⁷ 穆民、Fahiye 和 Waran Walac 受益于他们在巴里州的小部族关系和网络所提供的保护，以及 Cal Miskaad 山区的复杂地形，这使得打击伊黎伊斯兰国的行动变得困难。

2. 伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里和青年党最近在 Cal Miskaad 山区的战斗

39. 2023 年底至 2024 年中，伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里在邦特兰的 Cal Miskaad 山区对青年党的行动取得重大进展，将青年党逼进博萨索东南部的一个小角落。²⁸

²⁴ 官方机密来源。

²⁵ 同上。

²⁶ 同上。

²⁷ BBC Monitoring, “IS 发布罕见的索马里视频作为全球效忠系列的一部分”，2019 年 7 月 20 日。

²⁸ 机密访谈，2024 年 6 月。

伊黎伊斯兰国的进展被描述为与前几年相比发生了“急剧变化”，官方消息来源指出，原因之一可能是外国战斗人员的增加。²⁹

40. 2024年4月，伊黎伊斯兰国在线周刊“Al-Naba”报道称，伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里已完全控制 Cal Miskaad，并缴获了武器和军事装备(见附件 5a 和 5b)。虽然这些说法有所夸张，但是据报伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里正处于成立以来的鼎盛时期。³⁰

41. 伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里目前在巴里州没有占据人口中心，而是在 Balidhidin、Hunbays、Iskushuban 和 Qandala 四个区建立了基地。³¹

42. 青年党在横跨巴里和萨纳格两州的西部 Cal Madow 山区维持据点。Galgai 的青年党战士主要从索马里南部和西北部招募，据报从邦特兰招募的仅占 20%。³²

43. 由于条件艰苦，这两个团体向驻扎在 Cal Madow 和 Cal Miskaad 的战斗人员支付较高军饷，两个团体维持一个据点，勒索企业钱财，并进入邦特兰巴里州的固定走私路线。³³

3. 伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里的外国战斗人员

44. 伊黎伊斯兰国的部队规模和实力难以核实，但最近的估计表明，由于外国战斗人员加入等原因，该团体的规模可能扩大了一倍。2019 年，专家小组估计该团体在邦特兰有 340 名战斗人员。³⁴最近的报告显示，目前该团体的部队规模在 600 至 700 人之间。³⁵外国战斗人员通过海路和陆路抵达邦特兰。值得注意的是，邦特兰占索马里海岸线的近三分之一，与也门仅有 130 海里的距离。

45. 专家小组根据目前向正在接受相关会员国调查的个人提供的签证和机票证实，外国战斗人员使用陆路进入邦特兰。³⁶事实证明，在邦特兰拦截寻求加入伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里的外国战斗人员时，区域会员国之间在协调和信息共享方面尤其遇到挑战。

46. 去年，邦特兰逮捕了数十名来自埃塞俄比亚、摩洛哥、阿拉伯叙利亚共和国、苏丹、坦桑尼亚联合共和国和也门的外国战斗人员。³⁷2024 年 3 月，邦特

²⁹ 机密访谈，2024 年 3 月。

³⁰ 官方机密来源。

³¹ 同上。

³² 同上。

³³ 机密访谈，2024 年 6 月和 8 月。

³⁴ S/2019/858，第 56 段。

³⁵ 官方机密来源。

³⁶ 同上。

³⁷ 同上。

兰因 6 名摩洛哥国民加入伊黎伊斯兰国而定罪，但后来对死刑进行了改判。³⁸ 他们在关押期间证实，有大批外国战斗人员在中东训练员的指导下分小组进行训练。³⁹

47. 一些外国战斗人员在被派往 Cal Miskaad 接受训练后，返回本国或该区域的其他伊黎伊斯兰国关联组织，专家小组也正在对此进行调查。

4. 伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里和青年党争夺勒索款项

48. 伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里一再针对不缴税的企业，试图与青年党展开直接竞争，增加在博萨索和摩加迪沙通过勒索产生的收入。专家小组注意到，在本报告所述期间，博萨索至少发生了三起简易爆炸装置和手榴弹袭击企业事件：

- 2023 年 11 月 20 日，邦特兰爆炸物处置小队对博萨索的 Bulsho 建筑公司的简易爆炸装置进行了安全处理⁴⁰
- 2024 年 5 月 5 日。用遥控简易爆炸装置袭击了博萨索的 Bulsho 建筑公司
- 2024 年 7 月 9 日，用手榴弹袭击了博萨索的“Marhaba 贸易公司”仓库 (见附件 9)

49. 伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里每年产生的收入数额未经证实，但多个官方来源报告称，收入比前几年有所增加。据信，伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里在博萨索的税收现已超过青年党。⁴¹

50. 伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里的规模相对较小，该团体可以做到自我维持，并通过卡拉尔办事处为其他伊黎伊斯兰国关联机构创造额外收入。

51. 虽然伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里的存在仍然有限，与青年党相比预算相对微薄，但由于伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里在邦特兰的存在扩大，外国战斗人员、勒索和走私活动却在增加，对索马里的和平与安全构成重大威胁，对区域和平与安全产生了更加广泛的影响。

三. 区域安全问题概述

52. 在提交本报告时，专家小组的区域专家仍未到位。专家小组计划在区域专家加入后立即扩大区域调查，并注意到以下情况以供进一步调查。

³⁸ Staff reporter, “索马里：军事法庭释放因加入伊黎伊斯兰国被判处死刑的摩洛哥人”，Garowe Online, 2024 年 5 月 14 日。

³⁹ 官方机密来源，2024 年 6 月。

⁴⁰ Staff reporter, “索马里邦特兰挫败伊黎伊斯兰国在亚丁湾港口城市的恐怖袭击”，Garowe Online, 2023 年 11 月 20 日。

⁴¹ 官方机密来源。

53. 专家小组在 2023 年的最后报告中，报告了青年党在埃塞俄比亚和肯尼亚实施的跨境袭击。⁴² 在本报告所述期间，青年党继续对肯尼亚境内，特别是东北部与索马里接壤的 Garissa、Lamu、Mandera 和 Wajir 等县进行跨境袭击。专家小组重申，必须开展跨界合作，⁴³ 追查肯尼亚安全部队收缴的青年党武器的储藏处(见附件 21)。

54. 报告还显示，青年党利用欺骗、胁迫、绑架等手段参与将妇女和女童从肯尼亚贩运到索马里，实施性奴役和强迫婚姻。⁴⁴ 专家小组将继续调查这些报告。

55. 青年党设有外国战斗人员办公室，负责在索马里安置外国战斗人员并提供支持。Maalim Salman (SOi.013)是办公室的负责人，但据报告，他的职责主要是财务和行政而不是行动。专家小组将继续进行调查。

56. 2023 年 11 月以来，胡塞武装在红海从也门对与地区冲突有关或有联系的船只发动袭击。袭击使全球贸易和航行自由受阻，很多船只被迫从红海转到取道好望角更长、更昂贵的路线。从 2023 年 12 月初到 2024 年 2 月上半月，进入亚丁湾的船舶吨位减少了 70%以上。⁴⁵

57. 与此同时，索马里沿海一带海盗活动重新抬头(见第 146-166 段)。两种海上威胁影响到红海的海上安全以及亚丁湾、阿拉伯海、甚至更大的西印度洋区域的安全和稳定(见附件 8)。

58. 协调开展区域和国际合作，加强索马里的国家安全架构和能力，确保武器弹药储存安全，减少非法武器和弹药流动，控制陆地边界，加强对海洋领域的认识，管理停靠港，将对非洲之角区域的安全产生积极影响。

59. 专家小组注意到，索马里代表团不断扩大参与主要的区域和全球军备控制进程，包括在总部举行的联合国《从各个方面防止、打击和消除小武器和轻武器非法贸易的行动纲领》及其相关国际追查文书第四次审议大会和在罗内罗举行的区域筹备会议。

四. 青年党财政的最新情况

A. 青年党的资金来源

60. 过去五年，专家小组作为任务的一部分，查明了青年党筹集、转移、储存和使用资金的方法。专家小组还为政府相关机构编写了案例研究，以发现和调查金融犯罪和资助恐怖主义活动，阻断其资金来源。

⁴² S/2023/724，第 33 至 36 段。

⁴³ 同上，第 33、34、100 段和(建议)131 (a)。

⁴⁴ 联合国人权事务高级专员办事处(人权高专办)和联合国索马里援助团(联索援助团)，“解决索马里的性暴力问题：预防和保护”，2024 年 5 月 7 日，第 15 页。

⁴⁵ Céline Bacrot 和 Marc-Antoine Faure，“红海危机及其对非洲贸易便利化的影响”，《贸发会议运输和贸易便利化新闻》，第 101 期，2024 年 4 月 17 日。

61. 专家小组注意到，如其 2023 年最后报告所述，政府突袭检查站，关闭银行和移动货币账户，对青年党的收入造成了短暂影响，但持续时间较短，因为能力不足，无法维持以协调方式干扰其运作模式。该团体继续使用同样的方法筹集、转移和储藏资金。

62. 青年党继续拥有坚实的财政基础，资金来自对每一项经济活动和经过其控制地区的产品，包括对其控制区内外的财产的征税。一项研究⁴⁶显示，从 2019 年(1.63 亿美元)到 2023 年，该团体的创收率在 20%上下浮动，但 2022 年有所下降(1.44 亿美元)。专家小组收到的资料显示，据报青年党 2023 年的财政收入总额超过 1.5 亿美元，来自其广泛的财政业务，包括确定 2024 年新关税和税收的新产品，如废金属(见附件 9)。作为该团体单一创收活动的指标，一卡车(视卡车大小而定)废金属产生 4 000 至 6 000 美元。按 15 辆卡车穿越青年党控制地区计算，每天可产生 90 000 美元(如果假设这为每天的数字，该团体每年可产生多达 1 080 000 美元)。

63. 青年党对政府最近征收 5% 的销售税作出反应，并向金融机构和企业发出警告，敦促人们收回资金关闭账户，导致摩加迪沙的服务中断。⁴⁷2024 年 8 月 24 日，摩加迪沙的两个市场⁴⁸成为青年党的目标，造成价值数百万美元的货物损失。

64. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组获悉，青年党设立了由该团体财务负责人领导的投资委员会，在埃米尔的领导下运作。⁴⁹据报告，投资委员会⁵⁰的目标是确保“资金投资合法企业，缴纳所有费用和税款避免资金流失”。⁵¹最后的投资决定在青年党吉利布基地作出。根据收到的资料，该团体对合法企业的大部分投资都在摩加迪沙等索马里主要地区。这些企业可以是投资或建立合法企业，也可以是为初创企业提供资金；⁵²在后者这种情况下，青年党的投资回报率在 50% 至 80% 之间。⁵³专家小组正在调查这些业务。

65. 专家小组还发现了有异常交易如大额现金存款超过限额模式的商业账户，显示有合法和非法资金混合的情况(见机密附件 12)。专家小组还发现了可疑账号，其中一个位于哈尔格萨的一家金融机构，是该国南部的一个个人或企业的

⁴⁶ 机密报告，2024 年 4 月。

⁴⁷ Staff reporter, “青年党威胁向索马里金融机构征收 5% 的新销售税”, Garowe Online, 2024 年 8 月 26 日。

⁴⁸ Horn Observer, “在政府未能保护企业的情况下，青年党袭击摩加迪沙市场造成 400 万美元的损失”, 2024 年 8 月 28 日。

⁴⁹ 官方机密来源。

⁵⁰ S/2021/849, 第 52 段(青年党在投资方面的创业性质)。

⁵¹ 机密来源。

⁵² 官方机密来源。

⁵³ 通过各种来源确认。

账号。⁵⁴ 专家小组继续对此进行调查。2024 年 9 月 4 日，摩加迪沙的一次审判揭示了青年党如何能够通过银行部门转移超过 1 200 万美元。⁵⁵

B. 阻断青年党资金的国家努力

1. 实施制裁和阻断青年党的资金

66. 如前所述，政府根据安全理事会第 2551 (2020) 号决议及随后的各项决议，为执行资金阻断计划作出了重大努力。⁵⁶

67. 最近，政府根据 2023 年《定向金融制裁法》第 6 条⁵⁷ 发布了两份涉嫌资助青年党恐怖主义活动的个人的国家指定名单：一份于 2024 年 4 月 13 日指定 9 名个人、一份于 2024 年 7 月 18 日指定 8 名个人涉嫌资助或协助恐怖主义(见附件 10 和 11)。

68. 2024 年 5 月，两名个人⁵⁸ 因利用银行账户为青年党的金融交易提供便利而被发现和逮捕。⁵⁹

69. 此外，如专家小组 2023 年最后报告⁶⁰ 所述，在 2022 年最后一个季度和 2023 年初，索马里当局根据执法部门提供的信息，冻结了 320 个涉嫌与青年党有关的账户。在专家小组本任务期间，索马里联邦共和国政府告知专家小组，这些被冻结账户的总额约为 320 000 美元。

70. 冻结账户是三个步骤中的第一个，通常在司法扣押资产之前。因此，冻结程序是一项特殊措施，是为了拦截可疑的洗钱或资助恐怖主义交易。专家小组指出，只有所有相关机构采取协调一致的集体办法，并以强大的法律、监管和体制框架为后盾，早期取得的成功才能保持下去。专家小组继续调查冻结上述账户的结果。

71. 政府财务报告中心还向专家小组报告，为了改进反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义框架，参与反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义生态系统的所有机构都需要加强能力，更好地把握反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义问题，建立更好的协调与合作，并开展联合调查。相关机构各自的作用和责任需要厘清，并得到这些机构的认可。根据安全理事会第 2713 (2023) 号决议的授权，与联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室及

⁵⁴ 观察名单上账户的官方机密信息。

⁵⁵ Dalmar, “青年党网络通过摩加迪沙的银行系统转移 1 260 万美元”, The Somali Digest, 2024 年 9 月 4 日。

⁵⁶ 请索马里联邦共和国政府、毒品和犯罪问题办公室和专家小组交流有关破坏青年党财政的具体计划的信息。

⁵⁷ 索马里，总理办公厅，《定向金融制裁条例》(2023 年)。

⁵⁸ Mustaqbal Halqabsi, “摩加迪沙法院以资助恐怖主义罪判处一名老人”，2024 年 5 月 17 日。

⁵⁹ Halqabsi News, “妇女因恐怖主义融资和洗钱被判处八年监禁”，2024 年 5 月 20 日。

⁶⁰ S/2023/724, 第 40 段。

其他合作伙伴共同制定的现行资金阻断计划是一个良好的起点。应在初步经验教训的基础上继续努力并有效落实。

2. 即将进行的中东和北非金融行动特别工作组互评活动

72. 国家反洗钱委员会正在筹备即将进行的中东和北非金融行动特别工作组相互评价，评估索马里遵守金融行动特别工作组关于反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义 40 项建议的情况。索马里可利用互评这个独特机会找出差距，制定全面的反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义战略和行动计划，供所有相关机构采用，并确保落实必要的人力、物力、技术和财政资源以弥补不足。这也是政府在应对反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义风险方面取得进展并改善该国在国际投资者和银行中地位的一个机会，这是建立代理银行关系的关键一步，也是公共和私营部门的优先事项。

3. 私营部门在反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义架构中的作用

73. 包括金融和非金融机构在内的私营部门以及指定的非金融企业和行业，处于反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义运动的前沿。为其制定有效的反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义政策和措施是国家经济以及国际金融体系完整性和稳定性的关键。

74. 索马里私营部门需要建立强大的法律框架、监管准则和人力资源，应对该国洗钱和资助恐怖主义的挑战。尽管过去两年索马里财务报告中心和中央银行⁶¹在加强索马里反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义架构方面取得了显著进展，但专家小组注意到该国既缺乏重要的法律法规，⁶²又缺乏必要的人力资源。

75. 此外，摩加迪沙的银行主要报告了 2024 年第一季度的大额现金交易，⁶³但尚未报告可疑交易。指定的非金融企业和行业部门尚未开始向财务报告中心提交可疑活动报告或现金活动报告。没有可疑交易报告，财务报告中心就无法进行分析，无法向有关执法机构传播金融情报产品，无法调查、起诉、裁定洗钱和资助恐怖主义案件。专家小组注意到，2023 年的资金阻断行动由财务报告中心负责，在业务层面很少与国家反洗钱委员会其他成员合作，与私营部门的合作也十分有限。

76. 此外，金融机构报告称，“不清楚财务报告中心是行政型还是执法型金融情报机构”。他们建议财务报告中心加紧与金融及其他相关私营机构的接触，进一步澄清财务报告中心的角色，并改善与报告实体的关系。例如，在摩加迪沙的 100 多个注册公证处，很少受益于反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义的宣传方案。⁶⁴作

⁶¹ 财务报告中心是指定的非金融企业和行业的主管机关，索马里中央银行是金融部门的监管部门。

⁶² 例如，见 www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/recommendations/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf。

⁶³ 财务报告中心 2024 年第三季度记录了 108 份大额交易报告(1 月 42 份，2 月 40 份，3 月 26 份)，见 <https://frc.gov.so/lctr-received/>。

⁶⁴ 对公证处的访谈，2024 年 3 月。

为索马里财产和企业的认证人，公证处是反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义框架的守门人。金融机构依靠公证处核实和认证客户/顾客。

4. 国家身份识别项目延误

77. 如专家小组 2022 年⁶⁵和 2023 年报告，索马里报告实体在切实遵守“了解客户”和“客户尽职调查”方面面临重大障碍，即没有国家身份证件，姓名拼写也不统一。这是反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义生态系统的一个重大缺口，索马里因此无法按照第 2713 (2023)号决议遵守反洗钱金融行动工作组建议 10。⁶⁶然而，专家小组注意到，在国家身份识别系统奠定监管和体制基础方面，政府取得了重大进展。这将便利向索马里民众提供服务，还将有助于查明从事非法活动者的身份。

C. 挪用公款

78. 根据安全理事会第 2002 (2011)号决议第 2 段，制裁制度列名标准包括挪用财政资源，因为挪用公款损害了政府在《吉布提协议》框架内履行提供服务的义务的能力。该国的法律框架将滥用职权、贿赂、贪污和以权谋私定为刑事犯罪，但反腐法律没有得到有效实施。民间社会组织报告，政府官员腐败和大规模挪用公款的情况十分普遍。正如专家小组 2023 年报告，⁶⁷审计长在 2023 年 7 月的年度审计报告中指出，政府官员贪污情况可能普遍存在，政府金库大约有 2 100 万美元失踪。⁶⁸在这一报告之后，有几名高级官员被捕。但是，2024 年 5 月 25 日，摩加迪沙的一家法院以缺乏证据为由宣布这些官员无罪。⁶⁹

79. 国防部长最近承认，在美国训练的达纳卜军官参与了转移运往索马里安全部队物资的活动。⁷⁰专家小组注意到，腐败也为青年党渗透到安全部队内部创造了条件。⁷¹

80. 专家小组注意到，政府在腐败、挪用公款和削弱联邦政府和州政府合法性的根深蒂固的赞助制度方面一直面临挑战。

⁶⁵ S/2022/754，第 58-60 页。

⁶⁶ 第 2713 (2023)号决议，第 9(c)段。

⁶⁷ S/2023/724，第 56 段。

⁶⁸ Hiiraan Online，“在腐败丑闻中被点名的 18 名高级官员中有前任和现任移民局长”，2023 年 7 月 6 日。

⁶⁹ Somali Guardian，“索马里首都一家法院宣布前官员腐败罪名不成立”，2024 年 5 月 25 日。

⁷⁰ Ground News，“索马里因盗窃口粮而拘留美国训练的突击队员”，2024 年 4 月。

⁷¹ Dalmar，“Danab-青年党共谋：警察因破坏安全被起诉 The Somali Digest，2024 年 3 月 27 日；Harun Maruf and Hassan Kafi Qoyste，“索马里酒店袭击 16 名嫌疑人被捕”，美国之音新闻，2024 年 3 月 24 日。

D. 举报人保护机制

81. 第 2713 (2023) 号决议第 9(g) 段促请政府制定计划，降低青年党对国家主管当局和私营部门从事反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义工作的人员构成的风险，并制定计划保护分享该团体勒索策略信息的人员。政府尚待制定举报人保护框架和相关机制。

E. 索马里兰和国家资金阻断计划

82. 打击恐怖主义和清洗跨国有组织犯罪收益的有效反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义架构必须覆盖索马里全国。然而，政府和索马里兰的情况并非如此，两个实体的货币和金融政策以及情报、执法和调查机构各不相同。两个司法管辖区之间没有跨境沟通，为青年党和其他恐怖组织利用这一漏洞留下了空间。

83. 索马里兰有自己的身份识别系统、反洗钱法、⁷² 议定书和政策。它在中央银行设有自己的金融情报单位。金融机构由索马里兰中央银行颁发许可证。索马里兰的所有金融机构和其他报告实体向哈尔格萨的金融情报股提交大额现金交易报告、可疑交易报告和电汇交易报告。摩加迪沙的财务报告中心对哈尔格萨的报告实体没有监督权。

84. 但是，金融部门的活动和资金流动是相互联系的，因为资金在哈尔格萨和摩加迪沙之间顺畅流动。摩加迪沙的哈瓦拉汇款系统、移动货币和银行部门的活动已完全融入哈尔格萨的银行部门，但没有按照反洗钱金融行动工作组的建议进行全面监督和协调。⁷³ 哈尔格萨和摩加迪沙之间缺乏对恐怖主义融资的信息共享和联合调查、联合培训和协调的工作模式，这为青年党和其他恐怖组织所利用。

五. 政府后的武器禁运：武器弹药的管理与追查

85. 安全理事会第 2713 (2023) 号决议和第 2714 (2023) 号决议结束了对索马里实行的长期领土武器禁运，禁运最初于 1992 年由安理会第 733(1992) 号决议实施，又经后续决议部分取消。对索马里国家安全部门主要机构进口武器和军事装备的所有限制都已取消。但是，如第 2713 (2023) 号决议附件 A 和 B 所述，对联邦成员州、州政府和持照私营保安公司⁷⁴ 的军备控制程序仍然存在。⁷⁵ 该决议附件 C 继续限制用于生产简易爆炸装置的材料，敦促会员国支持采取协调一致的国家举措，减轻简易爆炸装置在索马里和该区域构成的重大威胁。⁷⁶

⁷² 专家小组尚未收到该法的副本。

⁷³ 根据第 2713 (2023) 号决议第 9 (a-g) 和第 10 段提出的建议 2 (政策和协调)、10 (客户尽职调查) 和 26 (监管和监督)。

⁷⁴ 第 2713 (2023) 号决议，第 5、6、32、35 和 38 段。

⁷⁵ 同上，第 35-37 段。

⁷⁶ 同上，第 18-22 段和附件 C。

86. 虽然解除了对政府的武器禁运，但第 2713 (2023)号决议保留了定向和领土武器禁运，以防止武器和弹药非法流入青年党和其他破坏稳定团体(如伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里)，直到政府能够有效加强国家安全架构。关键内容包括提高对海洋领域的认识，加强边境管理，减少简易爆炸装置的威胁，破坏武器贩运网络以及对武器和弹药的获取、拥有和使用，建立对索马里国家武器和弹药管理框架之外部族民兵和其他部队的获取、拥有和使用的集中控制、管理和问责，以此加强对索马里海岸、港口和陆地边界的控制。

87. 根据第 2713 (2023)号决议第 26 段，专家小组继续与联邦当局和州当局接触，监测武器和弹药管理的进展和挑战。这包括开发和填充国家武器弹药、缴获武器和反简易爆炸装置数据库，开发追查、利用和反转移专项能力，阻止非法武器流向非国家武装团体。

88. 专家小组还继续监测和调查青年党的间接火力袭击，并记录、分析、追查武器、弹药和简易爆炸装置部件，包括通过陆路和海路贩运的武器、弹药和简易爆炸装置部件(见第九节 A)，以及从索马里非国家武装团体收缴的武器、弹药和简易爆炸装置部件。⁷⁷

89. 此外，安全理事会第 2713 (2023)号决议还要求政府协助专家小组拍摄和追查缴获的武器。⁷⁸ 2024 年，索马里联邦共和国政府和联邦成员为专家小组提供便利，使其能够对 5 件非法武器进行实物记录，并分享了另外缴获的 50 件非法武器的分析数据(朱巴兰 47 件，邦特兰 3 件-见附件 17)。提供的弹药资料十分有限。序列号、各种批号、高分辨标识和印章图像经常缺失，阻碍了追查和核查工作。

A. 关于根据第 2713 (2023)号决议附件 A 和 B 发出通知的信息不足

90. 2013 年至 2023 年 12 月，专家小组和联合核查小组维持一份登记册，记录武器禁运部分解除以来政府正式进口的武器和弹药。登记册显示，截至 2013 年 9 月，联邦政府正式收到了大约 44 000 件武器和 1.01 亿发弹药，包括约 71 000 枚 RPG-7 型火箭榴弹。

91. 在本报告所述期间，根据第 2713 (2023)号决议第 36 和第 37 段的规定，政府没有根据第 2713 (2023)号决议附件 A 和 B 向联邦成员州、州政府或持照私营保安公司提交新的武器交付通知。

B. 武器和弹药管理：政府和联邦成员州的进展和挑战

1. 政府武器和弹药管理最新情况

92. 政府在开发武器和弹药管理架构和流程，包括标识和数字记录保存方面取得了显著进展。索马里国民军共标识和登记了 22 387 件武器(多于 2023 年的 20 710 件)，比 2023 年 8 月的 8 400 件武器显著增加。索马里国民军部队还将带有标识的

⁷⁷ 同上，第 5、6、11、21 和 27(c)段。

⁷⁸ 同上，第 27(a)段。

武器数量增加到 8 921 件(多于 2023 年的 8 867 件)。索马里的国家武器和弹药管理数据库已经更新，以反映这些数字。此外，2019 年的打标机数据库也已更新，列示了索马里安全部队目前可用的大约 20 台台式、半便携式和全便携式打标机。

93. 2024 年 2 月 14 日，政府部长理事会批准了一项旨在规范索马里武器、弹药和爆炸物使用的新的标准作业程序。

2. 联邦成员州一级的运作困难和有限进展

94. 虽然取得了上述进展，但将武器和弹药管理扩大到联邦成员州仍然具有挑战性，往往需要依赖摩加迪沙派出的训练有素的武器弹药工作人员和打标机。将武器弹药管理纳入国家和联邦成员州武器弹药管理框架，⁷⁹ 对于解决武器弹药储存设施和训练有素的军械员和弹药仓库管理员严重短缺问题至关重要。⁸⁰

3. 开发、分析和追查能力不足

95. 迫切需要为弹药技术人员和军械员开办长期的武器管理和追查专门培训方案。⁸¹ 这包括武器技术情报、文件和追查指示；爆炸物处理、简易爆炸装置搜查和查检；实物安保和储存管理；弹药安全储存、危险分类、维护、推进剂分析和处置。⁸²

96. 应优先加强政府和联邦成员州之间的情报共享和技术合作以及国家的开发和追查能力，作为正常运作的索马里国家安全架构的一部分。为此，需要建立正常运作的法医实验室，配备专门的分析设备和能力，系统记录、利用、分析和追查武器、弹药以及简易爆炸装置部件和爆炸物特征。⁸³

4. 弹药安保管理的挑战

97. 由于冲突持续不断、行动环境复杂、资源有限，弹药的有效管理仍极具挑战性。

98. 联合国相关机构目前正在开展风险评估和缓解进程，应对大规模爆炸风险，建立永久性有安全保障的弹药库和爆炸物仓库设施，可以有效缓解这一风险。

99. 2024 年 5 月，土耳其爆炸物处理小组销毁了土耳其向索马里提供的约 16 000 枚无法使用的 81/82 毫米迫击炮弹，大大减少了摩加迪沙法哈兰中央设施储存的高爆爆炸物的净数量。随后，据报告，由于施工几枚 PG-7 式 40 毫米

⁷⁹ 见大湖区、非洲之角及周边国家小武器问题区域中心秘书处及其《大湖区和非洲之角防止、控制和减少小武器和轻武器内罗毕议定书》(2004 年)。

⁸⁰ S/2023/724，(建议)第 130 (d)段。

⁸¹ 同上。

⁸² 同上。

⁸³ 同上。

高爆火箭榴弹从索马里宫转移到哈兰设施。此外，索马里的一个主要国际合作伙伴于 2024 年 5 月对哈兰设施进行的评估证实，有大量高爆弹药流入。⁸⁴

5. 索马里国家缴获武器数据库使用有限

100. 政府继续更新国家收缴武器数据库，以系统记录收缴和收回的武器和弹药的数据。冲突军备研究的技术支持对于培训和装备一支由索马里国民军、索马里警察和国家情报与安全局 15 名成员组成的记录和追查小组至关重要。尽管作出了这些努力，缴获了大量军用物资，但迄今为止，数据库只记录了 137 件武器和 2 发弹药(包括本报告所述期间增加的 52 件武器和 0 发弹药；见第 111 段)。⁸⁵ 强调对收缴军用物资采取“在分发或整合之前进行记录”的办法，增加武器和弹药数据库条目的数量，将有助于发现转用趋势，追查和摸清非法流动情况，并有助于防止收缴武器重新进入非法市场。

6. 武器扩散和对非国家武器持有者缺乏监督：部族民兵和私营保安公司的挑战

101. 部族民兵、私营保安公司和非国家武装团体继续拥有各种武器和军事装备，包括手枪、突击步枪、狙击步枪、机枪、⁸⁶ 火箭榴弹和大口径炮弹，包括 107 毫米火箭、B-10 反坦克武器和 60、81/82 和 120 毫米迫击炮。在对这些武器进行监督和问责方面，政府和联邦成员州当局面临持续挑战(见 2024 年 7 月 15 日机密附件 21, Abudwak 事件和第 118-120 段)。

102. 国家监督要求所有分发给部族民兵或社区防卫部队的武器都应置于国家武器弹药管理问责框架之下。部族民兵在战场上收缴、收回、发现和缴获的所有武器和弹药，在重新整合、重新分配或处置之前应予记录、登记、标识和追查。⁸⁷

103. 第 2713 (2023) 号决议第 32 段请政府向安全理事会关于青年党的第 751 (1992) 号决议所设委员会提供一份获准向索马里进口武器、弹药和军事装备的持照私营保安公司名单。这份名单尚未提交。

C. 青年党从非索过渡特派团和索马里国民军基地收缴武器

104. 从非索过渡特派团和索马里国民军前沿行动基地收缴武器、弹药和军事装备，仍然是青年党的一个主要补给来源(见第三节)。这种收缴使青年党得以加强能力，并保持抵抗当前反恐行动的势头。

105. 专家组曾报告，青年党成功占领基地，盗窃索马里国民军和非索过渡特派团一系列特遣队所属军事装备和资产，随后被用来袭击国际和索马里安全部队。⁸⁸ 在本报告所述期间，继续发生占领事件，利用防御薄弱环节缴获突击步

⁸⁴ 多个机密来源。

⁸⁵ 提交专家小组的政府/CMD 数据。

⁸⁶ 轻型和重型机枪(从 7.62x54R 到 12.7x108mm)、14.5mm 和 23mm 防空炮。

⁸⁷ S/2023/724, (建议)130 (c)(ii)。

⁸⁸ S/2023/724, 第 18、23、27 段和附件 5。

枪、机枪、弹药、火箭榴弹、107 毫米火箭、迫击炮和军事装备(见附件 13)。⁸⁹ 这些被盗火箭和迫击炮被直接用作简易爆炸装置的主装药，或者通过收集军用级高爆炸物与自制爆炸物(称为“青年党爆炸物”)一起用作助推器，以加大装置的爆炸冲击力和致命效果。

D. 非索过渡特派团缩编以及向非洲联盟驻索马里支助和稳定团过渡：吸取经验教训

1. 减少基地占领

106. 非索过渡特派团正在缩编，一些前沿行动基地将变得更加孤立，这些基地延伸到补给线以外，增加了基地对攻击的敏感性，并限制了基地获得补给和增援的机会。要防止青年党的基地扩张，特别是在组建新的非洲联盟驻索马里支助和稳定特派团(非索支助稳定团)的过程中，需要全面分析非索过渡特派团和索马里国民军前沿行动基地的弱点，提高态势感知、情报、监视和侦察能力，加强情报共享和应急规划(见附件 14)。

2. 增强近距离空中支援能力

107. 在这一过渡时期，意大利于 2024 年 7 月和 8 月向索马里国民军交付了 5 架 Agusta-Bell AB 412EPX 多用途直升机，这是一个积极的发展。⁹⁰ 这些直升机为非索过渡特派团和索马里国民军提供了急需的近距离空中支援能力、医疗后送、伤员后送、部队运输和补给能力(见附件 15)。但是，直升机维护费用高昂，⁹¹ 而索马里财政资源不足，维持这一空中能力仍将具有挑战性。⁹²

3. 向非索支助和稳定团移交非索过渡特派团-政府关于收缴武器管理的标准作业程序

108. 2021 年 6 月 29 日，非索过渡特派团与政府就回收武器管理统一标准作业程序达成一致。2023 年 7 月，又签署了更新版。

109. 但在此后，执行进展十分有限。如果在行动区一级任命特派团专门协调人，将能定期将缴获物资移交摩加迪沙的哈兰军械库进行分析和追查。系统传播这一标准作业程序并将其纳入部署前培训，将使索马里国民军和非索过渡特派团的爆炸物处置人员受益。在追查和管理缴获武器方面加强协调和提供更明确的业务指导，有助于追查物证、记录缴获武器和切断对青年党的非法武器供应。在非索过渡特派团与非索支助与稳定特派团之间的移交中，应优先考虑本标准作业程序以及相关武器和弹药管理标准作业程序，以确保取得持续进展(见附件 16)。

⁸⁹ 同上。

⁹⁰ 见 Military Africa, “Italy supplies Bell 412 helicopters to Somalia”, 2024 年 8 月 30 日。

⁹¹ 与空中交通管理信息系统部队派遣国高级军事领导人和军事分析员的机密访谈。

⁹² 据报，直升机由索马里和土耳其地勤人员维修。

4. 非洲联盟驻索马里支助与稳定特派团部队派遣国部署前培训

110. 根据非洲联盟驻索马里特派团和非索过渡特派团在索马里部署 17 年的经验教训，非索支助与稳定特派团部队派遣国将受益于关于政府-非索过渡特派团标准作业程序和文件程序的部署前培训。其他培训应包括武器技术情报、武器、弹药和简易爆炸装置部件的追查和利用。根据青年党和伊黎伊斯兰国不断发展的战术、技术和程序，专门设计爆炸物处理和简易爆炸装置搜索能力，将拯救生命。如情报、监视和侦察、作战工程和弹药技术干事能力得到加强，将有助于确保前沿行动基地和弹药库的安保，防止特遣队所属装备被窃和转移(见附件 16)。

E. 专家小组调查和追查青年党使用的武器、弹药和相关部件

111. 2024 年 5 月，政府和联邦成员州朱巴兰当局为专家小组在基斯马尤检查 5 件非法武器，包括从青年党缴获的 1 件武器提供了便利。邦特兰当局还提供了 3 件缴获武器的详细情况。2024 年 8 月，政府与专家小组分享了 2024 年 7 月在朱巴兰 Bullo Haji 攻势期间缴获的 47 件青年党武器的相关数据。在编写本报告时，专家小组正在追查这些武器(见附件 17)。没有收到关于弹药的数据，表明弹药可能被重新分配。

112. 在这方面，政府和非索过渡特派团应对以下武器弹药进行分析和追查：索马里国民军在希尔谢贝利和加尔穆杜格打击青年党期间缴获的大量武器和弹药；在 Dhobley (非索过渡特派团第 2 区 26 件武器)、Dhusamareb (第 4 区)和 Bananey (第 3 区) 基地储藏处被缴获的武器⁹³(见附件 17)。

113. 专家小组记录了青年党在朱巴兰缴获的武器上的标识、序列号和军械库管理标签。这些标识表明青年党对武器和弹药进行了一定程度集中和系统化的管理(见附件 18)。

F. 跨境武器贩运：次区域视角

114. 专家小组继续追查因区域冲突蔓延而流入索马里的武器、弹药和军事装备⁹⁴(见附件 20)。

115. 专家小组继续监测索马里境内不受管制的黑市和武器、弹药、军事装备的销售以及区域非法市场和贩运网络，包括通过社交媒体和在线通信平台以及使用加密货币进行支付的情况(见第 141-145 段)。⁹⁵

⁹³ S/2023/724，第 97-98 段和(建议)130 (c)(ii)。

⁹⁴ 与安全部队的访谈和其他机密来源。

⁹⁵ 多个机密来源和对在线非法网络和销售平台的监控。

116. 2024 年 7 月在朱巴兰布罗哈吉从青年党战斗人员手中缴获的储藏处记录了带有 SEP 21 胡塞标识⁹⁶ 的 AK 式突击步枪(附件 17)。这些武器的存在证实了非法武器和弹药继续从也门流入索马里⁹⁷ (见附件 18)。

117. 专家小组注意到，在索马里发现的常规武器和弹药类型意外的武器和弹药有所增加。这包括 9 毫米 Taurus 式手枪、配备武器光学系统、可装填 5.56x45 毫米北大西洋公约组织(北约)弹药的 Steyr 式突击步枪以及可装填 7.62x51 毫米弹药、枪管改短、枪托可伸缩并有“ALMARENZ”、“ALMARNZ”或类似标识的改进式 G3-A3 和 A4 式突击步枪 (见附件 20)。⁹⁸

G. 在加尔穆杜格 Abudwak 收缴武器

118. 2024 年 7 月 15 日，两辆满载武器和弹药的卡车在埃塞俄比亚-索马里边界 Galgadug 的 Abudwak 被平民和部族武装民兵拦截。

119. 这次是索马里领土武器禁运解除以来所记录的最大的武器转移事件。收缴的武器在原始包装中有记载，部分武器是最近 2023 年制造的。其来源目前尚未得到证实。据报，这些军事物资流入黑市，压低了非法武器的价格。

120. 这一事件突出表明，不正常采购国家武器弹药采购框架以外武器弹药的问题长期存在。专家小组正在调查来源和预期最终用户(见机密附件 21)。

H. 监测和调查青年党的间接火力袭击

121. 青年党继续使用 60 毫米和 81/82 毫米迫击炮、107 毫米火箭和 82 毫米 B-10 无后坐力反坦克武器，攻击高姿态保护地点，包括总统府(索马里宫)、摩加迪沙的联合国索马里支助办公室联索支助办大院以及西南州拜多阿的非索过渡特派团、索马里国民军和联合国大院。

122. 在本报告和以往报告所述期间，专家小组记录了 11 起使用 107 毫米火箭弹的袭击事件，注意到以往事件中使用的火箭弹类型、品牌、型号和发射技术具有一致的技术特征。青年党称，对 2023 年 10 月 1 日在摩加迪沙以及 2024 年 8 月 20 日和 9 月 1 日在拜多阿发生的袭击事件负责，袭击中向几个国际目标发射了多枚 107 毫米射弹，这可能表明了其针对国际社会的意向(附件 19 A)。

123. 2024 年 6 月 13 日，使用 82 毫米 B-10 高爆反坦克弹头袭击了拜多阿的非索过渡特派团和联合国大院(附件 19 B)。

⁹⁶ 胡塞民兵使用一个由 21SEP 组成的双圆圈符号作为他们拥有的轻小武器的识别标记，指把他们推上台掌权的 9 月 21 日革命。

⁹⁷ 同上。

⁹⁸ 同上。

124. 2024 年 5 月 3 日，一个无人机导弹式物体落在索马里北部有争议的索勒州塔利克斯区。⁹⁹ 虽然调查尚未结束，但对包括机身、涡轮喷气发动机、稳定器和小翼在内的导弹残余物的初步分析表明，这是一枚对陆攻击巡航导弹(附件 19 C)。

六. 简易爆炸装置的威胁

A. 本报告所述期间简易爆炸装置的趋势

125. 2023 年 8 月至 2024 年 7 月，索马里各地记录了 584 起简易爆炸装置袭击事件。¹⁰⁰ 与上一报告期相比，简易爆炸装置的使用随着今年上半年政府领导的进攻行动减少而大幅减少。共记录了 1 477 起简易爆炸装置相关伤亡，包括 555 名平民伤亡和 561 名索马里国民军伤亡。记录的装置中有 28 个车载简易爆炸装置和 10 个人员携带简易爆炸装置。

126. 大多数记录在案的车载简易爆炸装置用于对索马里国民军和非索过渡特派团阵地的复合式袭击，并缴获特遣队所属装备。在索马里国民军记录的简易爆炸装置相关伤亡中，48%是由车载简易爆炸装置造成的。

127. 与上一报告期间相比，2023 年 8 月至 2024 年 7 月期间记录的平民伤亡人数有所减少，主要原因是军事行动减少。据报，虽然记录的装置数量略有减少，但简易爆炸装置造成的平民伤亡人数保持相对稳定(361 人伤亡，上一报告期间为 381 人)(见第 173 段)。

B. 对青年党使用简易爆炸装置的分析

1. 青年党获得简易爆炸装置部件和化学前体的途径

128. 在本报告所述期间，政府积极阻止青年党获得简易爆炸装置部件和化学前体，包括第 2713 (2023) 号决议第 18 至 22 段和附件 C 所列物项，但对青年党生产和部署简易爆炸装置进行军事行动和复合式袭击的能力影响甚微，军事行动和复合式袭击破坏了索马里国民军和非索过渡特派团的部队流动、补给和进攻行动(见第 13-24 段)。

129. 专家小组继续监测索马里遏制简易爆炸装置部件供应的法律和举措，重申提供部件的会员国必须为索马里海关和边境管制当局限制这些物项进口索马里提供支持。

2. 青年党使用的爆炸物的化学分析

130. 专家小组曾报告，青年党使用硝化甘油作为爆炸物、硝酸钾作为氧化剂、木炭作为燃料制造爆炸物。¹⁰¹ 2024 年 5 月，对“青年党爆炸物”或基于硝化甘

⁹⁹ 据 SSC Khatumo 地方当局和在线开源媒体报道。

¹⁰⁰ 机密来源。

¹⁰¹ S/2019/858，第 10 段；S/2020/949，第 116 段。

油的重金属爆炸物的化学特征分析证实，青年党继续使用硝化甘油作为主要爆炸物，并使用环三亚甲基三硝胺作为助推剂(见第 105 段和附件 24.1)。

3. 青年党采购简易爆炸装置部件

131. 尽管禁止使用简易爆炸装置部件，但专家组调查证实，简易爆炸装置开关仍有供应，包括配备干扰传感器和远程学习代码接收器的摩托车警报器。¹⁰² 这些部件来自索马里国内或邻国的公开市场。¹⁰³ (见附件 24.2)。

4. 青年党简易爆炸装置战术、技术和规程的演变

132. 在多个装置中观察到的特征组装技术表明，可能存在有组织和统一的简易爆炸装置生产规程。这些做法包括使用细金属丝延长天线、扩大摩托车警报线圈扩大范围和增加振动的敏感性、使用低金属含量物体如汽车轮胎作为压板避免检测和防水敏感部件防水处理(见附件 24)。¹⁰⁴

5. 追查缴获的青年党简易爆炸装置部件和爆炸物

133. 专家组注意到，非索过渡特派团、政府和联邦成员州在利用、记录、分析和追查缴获的武器、弹药、简易爆炸装置部件和爆炸物方面能力不足。缺乏基本的法医工具，如用于索马里国民军的手持式化学光谱仪和分析实验室，以及进入打击简易爆炸装置数据库的数据很少，这些问题应该得到纠正。应优先考虑在索马里安全部队培训专门的爆炸物处理和打击简易爆炸装置搜索小组，并对非索过渡特派团和非索支助与稳定团部队派遣国进行部署前培训，以应对当前的简易爆炸装置战术、技术和规程。

6. 索马里国家打击简易爆炸装置数据库和战略

134. 政府正在与专门机构合作，包括冲突军备研究所，并与联合国裁军研究所(裁研所)和地雷行动处合作，最终确定国家打击简易爆炸装置战略，¹⁰⁵ 采用裁研所开发的打击简易爆炸装置能力成熟度模型，并加强简易爆炸装置组件和爆炸物的系统数据收集，以填充休眠的国家打击简易爆炸装置数据库(见附件 24)。

7. 伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里简易爆炸装置分析

135. 专家组注意到伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里和青年党简易爆炸装置的一些设计差异，特别是开关设置，¹⁰⁶ 专家组 2023 年最后报告和机密附件 7 中已有详

¹⁰² S/2023/724，第 14-15 段(关于简易爆炸装置的战术、技术和规程)和附件 4(关于截获的学习代码接收器)。

¹⁰³ 2024 年 2 月至 7 月专家组进行的调查。

¹⁰⁴ 机密来源。

¹⁰⁵ 专家组与政府的通信。

¹⁰⁶ 机密来源。

细叙述。¹⁰⁷ 由于发现的伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里的简易爆炸装置很少，需要进一步调查，才能证实所指出的设计差异的重要性(见附件 23)。

七. 木炭禁令

A. 木炭禁令实施情况

136. 专家小组对可能走私木炭的报告进行了调查，但至今没有发现任何证据。专家小组获悉，新生产的木炭可能流入现有库存，安全理事会第 2696 (2023) 号决议授权的一次性木炭销售可能引发从索马里走私木炭的新一轮活动。专家小组正在监测这一情况。

B. 一次性彻底处置木炭库存

137. 安全理事会在第 2696 (2023) 号决议中，授权一次性处置基斯马尤及其周边地区的木炭库存。2024 年 5 月 29 日，政府确认朱巴兰企业已找到有意购买木炭库存的买家。他们还确认，他们将与朱巴兰州政府合作，确保按照第 2696 (2023) 号决议并以透明方式进行一次性处置。政府同意在获得货物日期和详情后立即与专家小组分享。¹⁰⁸

138. 2024 年 6 月 4 日，索马里联邦共和国政府通知专家小组，第一批货物的买方是 Yasmin General Trading LLC。索马里和厄立特里亚监测组(索马里和厄立特里亚监测组)曾在一份报告¹⁰⁹中提到，该公司是 2016 年 5 月 18 日在阿拉伯联合酋长国拍卖会上从单桅帆船 Yasin 轮和 Shree Nausad 轮装载的没收木炭的买家。索马里和厄立特里亚监测组见证了这次拍卖。

139. 2024 年 6 月 4 日，悬挂阿拉伯联合酋长国国旗的货运单桅帆船 Fahad 4 轮在基斯马尤港装载了 40 000 袋木炭，次日前往阿联酋迪拜较小的 Hamriya 港。2024 年 6 月 28 日，木炭在哈姆利亚港卸下。2024 年 7 月 10 日左右，Fazlerabbi 2192 轮和 Al Salima-MNV-2190 轮进入基斯马尤港，¹¹⁰ 共装载 85 000 袋木炭，于 2024 年 7 月 25 日驶往迪拜(见附件 25)。两艘货轮于 2024 年 9 月初在 Hamriya 港卸下木炭。

140. 专家小组注意到基斯马尤及其周边地区木炭库存的变化，如卫星图像所示，过去两个月库存量出现波动。木炭减少与出口时间相对应(见附件 26)。

¹⁰⁷ S/2023/724, (机密)附件 7。

¹⁰⁸ 与 ONS 的信件往来，2024 年 5 月 29 日。

¹⁰⁹ S/2016/919, 第 16 段。

¹¹⁰ 机密来源，2022 年 7 月 21 日；ONS，2024 年 7 月 12 日。


八. 海事保安

A. 贩运与海上拦截

141. 专家小组继续监测索马里海域的海上走私网络，走私网络可能违反第2713 (2023)号决议规定的武器禁运，参与向青年党、伊黎伊斯兰国和索马里海盗团伙供应武器和弹药。
142. 邦特兰和也门之间继续双向走私武器，通常用无国籍和无船名的单桅帆船和渔船或小船走私(见附件 27、29 至 32)。在本报告所述期间，一名索马里人因走私武器在也门被捕，六名也门人因类似罪行在邦特兰被捕。

图一

地图：海上查获的武器和相关物品，2023 年 8 月 16 日至 2024 年 8 月 15 日



资料来源：专家小组。

143. 2024 年 1 月 11 日，美国海军 Lewis B. Puller 舰在阿拉伯海拦截了一艘正在走私武器的无国旗独桅帆船 Yamus 轮。¹¹¹ 在单桅帆船上发现了弹道和巡航导弹组件，包括中程弹道导弹和反舰巡航导弹的推进系统、制导系统和弹头。共有 14 名嫌疑人被美国海军逮捕。美国弗吉尼亚州东区地方法院的一份替代起诉书显示，2024 年 1 月的走私行动是 2023 年 8 月开始的大规模行动中的第三次。据称，这一行动涉及两个伊朗兄弟，他们协助将物资从伊朗伊斯兰共和国走私到索马里沿海，然后转移到另一艘以也门为最终目的地的船上。这对兄弟还协调和资助了这些行动，并通过哈瓦拉汇款系统向船长支付了 20 亿伊朗里亚尔 (47 000 美元)，由其分发给参与这三次行动的船员(见附件 28)。¹¹²

144. 2024 年 5 月 18 日，邦特兰海上警察部队在博萨索成功拦截了一艘船上的武器，并逮捕了 4 名武器走私者。在编写本报告时，专家小组正在等待更多资料；但是，初步图像证实，没收的武器中有 56 式和 G3-A3 式突击步枪(见附件 31)。¹¹³

145. 2024 年 8 月 4 日，邦特兰当局在邦特兰博萨索没收了来自不同制造国的武器和迷彩服。¹¹⁴ 收缴的武器类型通常可以在也门和区域黑市上看到。两名也门人和一名索马里国民因与该事件有关而被捕(见附件 32)。¹¹⁵

B. 海盗行为再次抬头

146. 安全理事会在第 2713 (2023) 号决议在第 27 段中，敦促政府、联邦成员州、非索过渡特派团和合作伙伴与专家小组分享关于青年党和其他行为体意图破坏索马里和区域和平与安全的行为或活动的信息，这些行为或活动属于定向制裁列名标准的范围。列名标准包括参与或支持威胁索马里和平、安全或稳定的行为。海盗和武装抢劫船只不仅威胁索马里的和平、安全与稳定，而且威胁整个区域以及亚丁湾、阿拉伯海和西印度洋无害通过的航运。¹¹⁶ 在这方面，专家小组调查了索马里海盗嫌疑人最近海盗行为和武装抢劫船只行为增加的情况，以及国家、区域和国际社会随后采取的对策。

¹¹¹ 美国中央司令部，“USCENTCOM 缴获运往胡塞武装组织的伊朗先进常规武器”，2024 年 1 月 16 日。

¹¹² 美国，弗吉尼亚地区法院，美利坚合众国诉 Muhammad Pahlawan 及他人，Mirkazei 替代起诉书，2024 年 7 月。




¹¹³ 朱巴兰海事警察部队，2024 年 5 月 18 日收到。

¹¹⁴ 机密来源。

¹¹⁵ 同上。

¹¹⁶ 此后，专家小组使用海盗行为一词。海盗行为的定义，见《联合国海洋法公约》第一百零一条。武装劫持船只的定义，见国际海事组织 A.1025(26)号决议。

图二
2003 年至 2024 年 4 月索马里沿海海盗和武装抢劫船只情况¹¹⁷



资料来源：专家小组。

免责声明：上述地图显示的边界和名称以及使用的指称并不表示联合国的正式认可或接受。

¹¹⁷ 可疑接近未列入此数据集。

1. 2023 年 11 月以来索马里海盗的袭击

147. 索马里的海盗行为与陆地上的不安全有关，这种不全是普遍的社会经济状况、数十年冲突、海上执法能力不足、未刑事起诉海盗头目和资助者、容易获得武器以及渔业冲突造成的。这些问题已被安全措施所抵消，如部署国际和区域海军部队、船上部署私营武装保安队以及在船上实施最佳管理做法。¹¹⁸

148. 近年来，分析家以及欧洲海军部队和海上联合部队等组织警告说，索马里海盗行为受到了压制，但没有根除。

149. 2023 年 11 月 24 日，海盗活动再次出现，伊朗单桅帆船 Al-Meraj 1 轮在邦特兰海岸被劫持。¹¹⁹ 这是 2019 年以来的第一次劫船事件。两天后，即 11 月 26 日，四名索马里海盗在索马里海岸 54 海里(100 公里)处从小艇登上化学品运输船 Central Park 轮。¹²⁰ 按照最佳做法，船员们把自己关进密闭区，¹²¹ 使海盗无法接近。随后，这些海盗于同一天被美国军舰 Mason 轮的船员逮捕(见附件 33)。

150. 从这一事件到 2024 年 8 月 15 日，专家小组注意到对商船的七次袭击，包括两次成功劫持。2024 年 5 月 23 日以来，没有记录到成功的袭击，但截至 2024 年 6 月 7 日，记录到可疑的接近。海盗袭击的间歇可能是由于季风季节的不利天气条件。2024 年 8 月 26 日，在亚丁东南 55 海里处记录到另一次可疑接近。¹²²

151. 自 2017 年 Aris 13 轮被劫持以来，第一次成功劫持商船是在 2023 年 12 月 14 日，在博萨索以东约 700 海里(1 300 公里)处劫持散装货船 Ruen 轮(见附件 34)。2024 年 3 月 12 日，另一艘散装货船 Abdullah 轮被成功劫持(见附件 35)。此外，三艘商船被登船，另外两艘遭到袭击(见附件 36 和 37)。专家小组还注意到，在这些袭击之前，早在 2023 年 3 月就记录了几次可疑的对商船的接近。

152. 此外，有 18 艘单桅帆船遭到索马里海盗袭击或劫持，其中 5 艘被印度海军和塞舌尔海岸警卫队拦截(见附件 38 和 39)。除了支付赎金外，单桅帆船还被用作母船，帮助海盗扩大行动范围。从这些远离海岸的母船上下载快艇，攻击商船。

¹¹⁸ BIMCO 及他人，BMP5: Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf Of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea (Edinburgh, Witherby Publishing Group, 2018 年)。

¹¹⁹ 区域海事信息融合中心，每周报告，2023 年 11 月 20 日至 26 日；EUNAVFOR。


¹²⁰ 信息融合中心，印度洋地区每月海上安全更新，2023 年 11 月；联合王国海上贸易行动 003/NOV/2023 号警告；美国国务院，2024 年 4 月 8 日。

¹²¹ 避难室通常位于船只的机房，供船员在即将登船的情况下集合并等待执法部门的可能反应。良好的避难室配有基本补给、卫生设施、可靠通信、船只的闭路电视覆盖以及控制船只进退和转向的方法。

¹²² X 账户 UKMTO，2024 年 8 月 26 日，可查阅 https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1828146352762564939。

图三

地图：索马里海盗的袭击情况，2023 年 3 月至 2024 年 8 月¹²³



资料来源：专家小组。

2. 索马里沿海海盗和武装抢劫船只再次抬头的原因

153. 安全措施的变化，如国际海军在该区域部署的舰艇减少，私营武装保安队登船，船上实施最佳管理做法，¹²⁴ 以及区域海上冲突，都对索马里沿海海盗的复活产生了影响。

154. 2022 年 3 月，安全理事会没有延长允许国际海军部队在索马里领海开展打击海盗行动的第 2608 (2021)号决议。¹²⁵ 私营海上保安公司的数量从 2008 年至

¹²³ 从若干来源汇编，如非洲之角海事安全中心、欧洲联盟海军部队、海上联合部队、英国海上贸易行动、邦特兰海事警察部队、RMIFC、IFC、海事组织全球综合信息系统、海事安保公司和媒体报道。

¹²⁴ BIMCO 及他人, *BMP5*。

¹²⁵ 欧洲联盟，海军部队，“EUNAVFOR Atlanta 关于联合国安理会打击索马里海盗决议的声明：不延期公告”，2024 年 3 月 9 日。

2011 年海盗袭击高峰期间记录的约 472 家减少到今天的约 20 家。¹²⁶ 自 2023 年 11 月劫持事件增加以来，对保安的需求有所增加，尽管由于胡塞武装袭击导致红海船只交通量下降，这一需求有所减少。有人担心，如果红海停止对船只的袭击，私营海上保安公司和支持它们的浮动军械库将无法满足不同需求的增加。然而，保安公司坚定表示，他们将适应需求的增长。私营海上保安公司的服务价格以及绑架和勒索保险的费率都出现了飙升。

155. 在一段时间之后，船上船员实施最佳管理做法变得松懈。海盗登船时，Abdullah 轮的一些船员正在用手机拍摄袭击过程。根据最佳管理做法 5 建议的行动，船员们应该把自己关进密闭区。

3. 海盗行动、网络和关联

156. 与 Ruen 轮和 Abdullah 轮被劫持有关的海盗活动大多集中在 Eyl 周围，因为 Ruen 和 Abdullah 都停泊在 Eyl 以南 32 海里处。加拉卡德附近的海岸也有单桅帆船，对 Basilisk 轮的攻击就是从那里发动的。对 Chrystal Artic 轮的攻击是从邦特兰北部 Qandala 以西的一个着陆点发动的。阿拉伯海有大量袭击和可疑接近的记录，使邦特兰北部成为理想的袭击发动地(见附件 40)。

157. 参与劫持 Central Park 轮的 5 名被定罪海盗中的 2 人，Abdikarim Salah Mohamed (别名“Owkoombe”) 和 Mohamed Ali Osman，曾因海盗行为被定罪。其余三名成员以前与海盗活动没有任何联系，他们每人得到了 5 万美元的赎金。嫌疑人没有用于船只、燃料或武器等后勤工作的外部资金。他们用武力从沿海索马里人手中夺取了一艘用于行动的小艇。这艘小艇被用来劫持一艘也门单桅帆船作为母舰。袭击中使用了两支生锈的 AK 式步枪(见附件 33)。

158. 海盗团伙通常没有大量武器。他们的武器很容易从索马里获得，主要是手枪(通常是 Tokarev 式和 Makarov 式)、AK 式突击步枪、PKM 式轻机枪或类似武器以及火箭榴弹，在袭击中经常用来向船桥开火。¹²⁷ 在过去的几起案件中，海盗在被劫持船只的甲板上安装 12.7 毫米重机枪，同时在停泊处等待赎金谈判的最后结果，以阻止国际海军的救援行动。在 Abdullah 轮事件中，在印度海军营救 Ruen 轮之后，海盗嫌疑人在甲板上架起了轻机枪，因为他们担心国际海军会采取营救行动(见附件 35)。¹²⁸

159. 在 Al-Meraj 1 轮之前的最后一次以支付赎金告终的劫持是在 2015 年，当时有四艘伊朗单桅帆船被劫持。Al Meraj 1 轮的共同所有人在接受电视采访时说，海盗要求 40 万美元释放这艘单桅帆船和 18 名伊朗船员。¹²⁹ 目前还不清楚支付赎金的数额。由于 Ruen 轮于 2024 年 3 月 16 日被印度海军拦截，因此没有支付赎金。未经证实的报道称，释放散装货船 Abdullah 轮的赎金为 500 万美元，赎

¹²⁶ Lloyds List, “每日简报”, 2024 年 3 月 26 日。

¹²⁷ S/2011/433, 第 101 段。

¹²⁸ 机密来源。

¹²⁹ X 账户 SBC Somali TV, 2023 年 11 月 23 日, 可查阅 <https://twitter.com/sbcsomalitv/status/1727726875244376259>。

金由一架小型飞机投入海中。这一数额是合理的，因为到 2011 年平均赎金数额已增加到 497 万美元。

4. 拦截、逮捕和起诉海盗嫌疑人

160. 2023 年 11 月底至 2024 年 5 月中，欧洲海军部队、美国海军、印度海军、塞舌尔海岸警卫队和索马里当局在 13 起案件中逮捕了 70 名海盗嫌疑人(见附件 38)。

161. 2023 年 12 月 26 日，参与劫持 Central Park 轮的 5 名海盗被移交给摩加迪沙当局。2024 年 6 月 29 日，他们被定罪并被判处 5 年 2 个月 10 天的监禁。¹³⁰ Central Park 轮的嫌疑人没有根据《劫持法》(1975 年 4 月 30 日第 36 号法律)起诉，该法对劫持或海盗行为判处死刑。由于索马里缺乏起诉海盗的具体法律，在此案中适用了《索马里刑法》。新的海盗法目前已起草完成，正在等待议会批准。

162. 2024 年 1 月下旬，印度海军首次拦截了被劫持的伊朗单桅帆船 Iman 轮、Al Naemi 轮¹³¹ 和 Omari 轮，据报抓获了 18 名海盗嫌疑人，并在解除武装后释放。但是，印度海军因劫持 Ruen 轮而逮捕的 35 名海盗嫌疑人以及因劫持 Al Kambar 786 单桅帆船而被捕的 9 名海盗嫌疑人，¹³² 将根据印度 2022 年《打击海盗法》在印度起诉。¹³³

163. 2024 年 1 月 28 日，塞舌尔海岸警卫队在拦截被劫持的悬挂斯里兰卡国旗的捕鱼单桅帆船 Lorenzo Putha-4¹³⁴ 时逮捕了 3 名嫌疑人，塞舌尔当局将提起诉讼。塞舌尔还将起诉参与 2024 年 5 月 10 日 Chrystal Arctic 油轮袭击的五名嫌疑人，他们被欧洲海军部队逮捕，该部队是与“ATALANTA 行动”有法律协议的国家之一，允许审判被其军舰逮捕的海盗嫌疑人。¹³⁵ 塞舌尔最高法院将审判日期定在 2025 年 1 月中旬。¹³⁶

164. 邦特兰当局还在沿海发生的四起事件中逮捕了海盗嫌疑人和与 Ruen 轮和 Abdullah 轮劫持事件有关的后勤供应商(见附件 38)。

165. 索马里沿海海盗袭击不大可能很快结束，也不太可能升级到 2008 年至 2012 年期间的水平。联合王国海上贸易行动自愿报告计划等协调机制以及各国和利益攸关方之间的合作在打击海盗方面发挥了重要作用。在海盗活动休眠时期，这些机制仍然存在，尽管能力有所下降。

¹³⁰ 机密来源。

¹³¹ 邦特兰海事警察部队给印度驻肯尼亚高级委员会的信，2024 年 3 月 20 日。

¹³² X 账户印度海军发言人，2024 年 4 月 4 日，可查阅 <https://twitter.com/indiannavy/status/1775740476446191823>。

¹³³ 鉴于正在开展行动，印度海军出于安全考虑拒绝与专家小组分享信息。

¹³⁴ The Sunday Times (Sri Lanka)，Lorenzo Putha 4 轮船东表示，“索马里海盗威胁可能影响渔业，2024 年 2 月 4 日。

¹³⁵ 欧洲联盟，海军部队，“关于 Chrystal Arctic 轮事件的最新信息”，2024 年 5 月 13 日。

¹³⁶ Rita Joubert-Lawen，“定于 2025 年 1 月在塞舌尔审判 6 名索马里海盗嫌疑人”，塞舌尔通讯社，2024 年 8 月 9 日。

166. 虽然大量的逮捕和起诉将对海盗行为产生威慑作用，但 Abdullah 轮收到的高额赎金可能会进一步助长袭击的发生。由于缺乏足够的海上警察、海岸警卫队船只和基础设施，索马里只能从陆地而不是从海上采取反海盗措施。国际和区域国家以及利益攸关方之间的战略协调和业务合作以及国内海上执法的能力建设，对于遏制当前的海盗浪潮至关重要。长期解决方案必须优先考虑建立可持续的蓝色经济，其中应包括利润丰厚的渔业和有利于当地社区的港口投资。

九. 重要的保护和人道主义考虑

167. 要削弱青年党的势力，必须继续认识到人道主义需求巨大和平民持续受到威胁的背景。估计 2024 年将有 690 万人(接近该国人口的三分之一)需要人道主义援助。¹³⁷

168. 目前，国内流离失所者人数估计达到 390 万。¹³⁸ 2023 年，有 290 万人流离失所，主要原因(依次)是洪水、冲突、不安全和干旱。2024 年 1 月至 7 月，记录了 28.3 万新的流离失所者，主要是(依次)冲突、不安全和洪水造成。¹³⁹ 在国内流离失所者中，80%是妇女和儿童。此外，2024 年 1 月至 12 月期间估计有 170 万 6 至 59 个月大的儿童面临急性营养不良。¹⁴⁰

169. 境内流离失所者基本集中在索马里中部和南部，那里持续的冲突和不安全、后勤和官僚主义对人道主义准入构成挑战。

A. 冲突和不安全对平民的影响

170. 2023 年和 2024 年，武器和弹药扩散、青年党的不对称袭击、简易爆炸装置的威胁、持续的部族暴力以及政府对青年党的进攻，包括 2024 年 7 月和 8 月在朱巴兰的进攻，都是冲突和不安全的驱动因素(见第 24 段)。

171. 在本报告所述期间，发生了几起部族间暴力事件，迫使各州近 15 万人逃离家园，并造成人道主义援助中断，特别是在 Dinsoor 和 Qoryooley (西南州)、Jowhar (希尔谢贝利州)、Luuq (朱巴兰州)和 Abud-waaq (加尔穆杜格州)。例如，2024 年 7 月 5 日至 7 日，盖多州 Luuq 的武装部族间暴力导致约 42 000 人流离失所，其中三分之一逃往 Yurkud, Ceel Boon 和 Bashihiro 等难以到达的地区。¹⁴¹ 在穆杜格州，2024 年 6 月 26 日至 7 月 2 日的部族冲突使 26 000 多人流离失所，主要来自 Galdogob 和 Jariiban 两区。¹⁴²

¹³⁷ 联合国，人道主义事务协调厅，《2024 年人道主义需求和响应计划：索马里》(2024 年)，第 18 页该文件对 2024 年预计人道主义需求进行了广泛审查。

¹³⁸ 联合国难民事务高级专员公署(难民署)，“索马里局势：难民署关注的人口”，2024 年 2 月 29 日。

¹³⁹ 难民署，“索马里的流离失所问题：按年度列示”。保护和回返监测网络仪表板。可查阅 <https://prmn-somalia.unhcr.org/yearly-displacement>。

¹⁴⁰ 粮食安全阶段综合分类，“索马里：2023 年 10 月至 2024 年 2 月急性营养不良状况和 2024 年 3 月至 6 月预测”，2024 年 2 月 15 日。

¹⁴¹ 联合国，人道主义事务协调厅，“索马里局势报告”，2024 年 8 月 13 日。

¹⁴² 同上。

172. 2024 年 7 月，索马里国民军支持的朱巴兰部队与青年党在下朱巴州 Afmadow 区的 Harbole、Mido、Biibi、Soya 和 Bula-Haji 村发生战斗，导致更多人流离失所。¹⁴³ 据报，朱巴兰部队控制了 Harbole 和 Bula-Haji，但据称青年党指示当地社区撤离，导致居民逃往基斯马尤。¹⁴⁴

173. 简易爆炸装置袭击继续对平民和人道主义准入构成威胁。根据可靠报告，2023 年 8 月至 2024 年 7 月期间记录的伤亡人员总数中有三分之一是平民(见第 125 段)。在重要道路沿线布设简易爆炸装置，扰乱了民众的行动和获得基本服务的机会。¹⁴⁵ 大多数报告的平民伤亡似乎并非简易爆炸装置直接造成。简易爆炸装置被放置在平民场所并被引爆，例如 2024 年 2 月的 Baraka 市场、2024 年 8 月的丽都海滩袭击¹⁴⁶ 和几家茶叶店(2024 年 6 月在下谢贝利州的 Janaale、2024 年 7 月在摩加迪沙的 Boondhere、2024 年 8 月在摩加迪沙的 Daynile)。¹⁴⁷ 简易爆炸装置还破坏人道主义援助准入，但专家小组不了解有任何针对人道主义行为体的记录案件。

B. 气候冲击的加剧效应

174. 经常发生的自然灾害造成流离失所和资源紧张，破坏基础设施、住房、基本服务和生计。2023 年，索马里经历了几十年来最严重的干旱，随后又发生了大范围的洪水(2023 年下半年和 2024 年中)。这些事件使政府和人道主义资源进一步紧张，突显了国家服务的差距，并为青年党利用这些弱点创造了机会。

175. 2023 年 10 月至 12 月 Deyr 雨季的受灾民众达到近 250 万，其中包括 31 个区的 120 多万流离失所者，主要是在加尔穆杜格、希尔谢贝利、朱巴兰和西南州。洪水淹没了大约 150 万公顷农田，并破坏了基础设施。由于重要的道路、桥梁、设施和简易机场被洪水淹没和(或)摧毁，援助物资运输受阻，物流通道的限制大大增加。洪水还引发了水传播疾病的激增。¹⁴⁸

176. 2024 年 4 月至 6 月 Gu 雨季的受灾民众超过 225 000 人，造成进一步流离失所和生计损失，特别是在朱巴兰、希尔谢贝利和西南州。索马里灾害管理局警告洪水易发地区的社区为持续的困难和潜在的生计损失做好准备。¹⁴⁹

¹⁴³ 军事行动的目的在于确保控制基斯马尤-Afmadow 和 Dhobley-Afmadow 公路，以保持前往该地区主要城镇的通道。

¹⁴⁴ 全球保护群组，“朱巴兰州基斯马尤和 Afmadow 地区全球保护群组联合保护和住房前线应对”，2024 年 8 月 17 日。

¹⁴⁵ Wen Zhour and Andrea Raab，“简易爆炸装置与《禁雷公约》：定义雷区”，红十字国际委员会，人道法与政策博客，2019 年 9 月 17 日。

¹⁴⁶ 联合国，“秘书长强烈谴责索马里丽都海滩发生的致命恐怖袭击事件”，SG/SM/22325，2024 年 8 月 3 日。

¹⁴⁷ 机密报告。

¹⁴⁸ 见 [S/2024/129](#)。

¹⁴⁹ 联合国，人道主义事务协调厅，“索马里：局势报告”，2024 年 5 月 7 日。

177. 2024 年 4 月和 5 月，青年党发布了几段视频，展示其对洪水的反应，包括朱巴河(包括 Buulo Mareer 村和 Jilib 村)的修复工程和房屋重建。¹⁵⁰ 专家小组注意到，该团体 2022 年采取了类似的姿态应对冠状病毒病(COVID-19)大流行和干旱。

178. 最近的洪水突出表明，政府、联邦成员州和国际行为体之间迫切需要合作，制定强大备灾和应对战略，以应对与气候有关的灾害，并为受影响人口提供可持续的解决方案。这方面的真正努力可以促进社区信任，并可能成为吸引民众进入政府控制地区的一个因素。

C. 青年党控制地区的人道主义准入

179. 根据《2024 年人道主义需求和应对计划》，索马里 74 个区中有 23 个被认为“难以”进入或“极难”进入。¹⁵¹ 这些难以进入地区大多数在青年党的控制之下，包括盖多、中朱巴、下朱巴、下谢贝利、巴科勒、加尔穆杜格和穆杜格州的部分地区。¹⁵²

180. 专家小组了解到，大多数人道主义行为体不在青年党控制地区提供人道主义援助，也就是说，对这些地区弱势群体的人道主义和保护需求并无充分了解。不过，在该团体影响地区附近的地区开展了人道主义行动。这些准入限制的根本原因突出表明，作为一项基本的人道主义原则，必须始终维护人道主义的必要性，在任何有需要的地方提供援助。

181. 此外，专家小组回顾，安理会第 2462 (2019) 号和第 2482 (2019) 号决议敦促会员国确保其反恐措施符合国际人道法和人权法，并考虑反恐措施对国际人道主义活动的潜在影响。因此，反恐立法必须明确将公正的人道主义活动排除在适用范围之外。¹⁵³ 例如，专家小组指出，索马里的反恐怖主义法案(2023 年)没有包含对国际人道主义组织的具体保障，这可能会阻止有原则的人道主义行为体在青年党控制地区提供援助。例如，如果该法案第 14 条规定的义务——提供关于恐怖主义团体的信息——被解释为包括人道主义行为者，就有可能损害中立的人道主义原则。

D. 第 2664 (2022) 号决议最新执行情况(人道主义例外)

182. 2022 年，安全理事会通过第 2664 (2022) 号决议，以确保其金融制裁包括所有制裁制度的人道主义例外。与以往通过的索马里问题决议相比，例外规定涵盖范围更广的人道主义组织和活动。安理会着重指出联合国制裁并非意在造成不利的人道主义后果，并重申执行制裁的措施必须符合国际人道法和人权法。

183. 据人道主义消息来源称，人道主义例外对索马里境内的人道主义活动产生了积极影响。援助工作者报告说，例外创造了更有利的行动环境，促进了以前

¹⁵⁰ 见 Site Intelligence, “在对肯尼亚和索马里的袭击索赔中，青年党推动以平民为中心的项目”，无日期；机密来源。[未找到]

¹⁵¹ 这些县对应索马里的正式行政边界。

¹⁵² 见 2024 年《人道主义需求和应对计划》中的人道主义准入地图，第 31 页。

¹⁵³ 见 <https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/counterterrorism-and-ihl-humanitarian-exemptions>。

会受到阻碍的人道主义活动。据指出，援助提供更加及时，信息共享和金融交易尽职调查和风险缓解措施得到加强和改善。¹⁵⁴


E. 性暴力和性别暴力

184. 性暴力和性别暴力，特别是与冲突有关的性暴力，在索马里仍然普遍存在，报告严重不足，并受到结构性性别不平等、不安全、周期性人道主义危机和害怕报复等因素的驱动。它继续影响儿童、少女和妇女等弱势群体。国内流离失所者、少数族裔和单身户主也特别容易受到影响。

185. 关于性暴力和性别暴力的统计数据，具体关于与冲突有关性暴力的统计数据，不同的报告机制数据有所不同(性别暴力信息管理系统和监测与分析报告安排的统计数据，见附件 42)。¹⁵⁵ 2024 年 4 月秘书长关于与冲突有关性暴力的报告 (S/2024/292) 提供了有关与冲突有关的性暴力模式和肇事者的最新概述。¹⁵⁶ 根据联索援助团-联合国人权事务高级专员办事处(人权高专办)的一份报告，¹⁵⁷ 在经核实的与冲突有关性暴力的案件中，近一半是身份不明的武装行为体所为，其次是青年党、国家行为体、部族民兵和地区部队(见图四)。

图四

性暴力肇事者简况(2017-2022 年)



资料来源：联索援助团和人权高专办。

¹⁵⁴ 机密人道主义来源。

¹⁵⁵ 为数据管理系统，帮助为性别暴力幸存者提供服务的人员安全地收集、存储、分析和共享与报告的性别暴力事件有关的数据；见 www.gbvims.com。关于冲突中性暴力的监测、分析和报告安排是根据安全理事会第 1960 (2010) 号决议设立的一个机制。

¹⁵⁶ 见 S/2024/292，第 56 至 58 段。

¹⁵⁷ 人权高专办和联索援助团，“解决索马里的性暴力问题”，第 10 页。

186. 在青年党控制地区，了解妇女的作用和暴力侵害妇女的普遍范围非常具有挑战性，部分原因是外人进入该地区难度较大(第 179-180 段)，以及受害者担心因分享信息而遭受污名或报复。

187. 妇女与青年党的联系也可能是因为别无选择：或者采用青年党的做法确保自己的生存，并保持在该团体影响或控制地区谋生的能力，或者跟随她们选择加入该团体的丈夫(见附件 43)。¹⁵⁸

188. 许多妇女为青年党武力所迫。据广泛报道，青年党利用与冲突有关的性暴力对付妇女和女童，作为征服其控制社区的一种战略，并把绑架和强迫婚姻作为对战斗人员的一种补偿，并与重要的部族领导人建立联系。¹⁵⁹ 专家小组约谈了一名社区成员，她 16 岁的表妹逃离了拜多阿北部的村庄，因为一名青年党成员坚持要娶她，如果拒绝就要威胁她的家人。随后，她的父亲被关在青年党的一个“拘留所”七天(地点不明)，在支付相当于 100 美元的赎金后获释。¹⁶⁰

189. 有些妇女可能自愿作为特工加入青年党，分享情报或提供后勤支助。这些妇女如果利用社会影响剥削女童和男童以支持该团体或为强迫婚姻提供便利时，她们就可能成为严重侵害儿童和与冲突有关性暴力的肇事者。

190. 研究表明，无论她们扮演何种角色，大多数离开青年党的妇女都很容易受到耻辱，并因被排斥在社区和资源之外而生活在极端贫困之中。逃亡的妇女带着孩子和极少的财产，许多妇女是文盲且无技能，被迫依靠社区的支持和援助。许多妇女因为害怕耻辱而选择独处。¹⁶¹ 专家小组注意到，在本报告所述期间，专门为以前与青年党有关联的妇女设立的康复中心已经关闭。

191. 专家小组注意到，2022 年 9 月，政府通过了《索马里妇女宪章和执行安全理事会第 1325 (2000)号决议国家行动计划》，纳入了关于解决与冲突有关性暴力问题的联合公报中规定的优先事项。可以通过采用联合国专门知识制定的工作计划来简化这项工作。

F. 严重侵害儿童行为

192. 2023 年 12 月，负责儿童与武装冲突问题的秘书长特别代表强调，迫切需要保护索马里儿童¹⁶² 免受持续高水平的严重侵害儿童行为的影响。¹⁶³

¹⁵⁸ 人权高专办和联索援助团，“解决索马里的性暴力问题”，第 13 页。

¹⁵⁹ 与社区成员的访谈。另见，人权高专办和联索援助团，“解决索马里的性暴力问题”，第 13 页。

¹⁶⁰ 专家小组访谈，2024 年 4 月。

¹⁶¹ 人权高专办和联索援助团，“解决索马里的性暴力问题”，第 18 页；Orly Maya Stern 和 Catherine Peterson，“援助以前与青年党有关联的妇女：拟议的方案编制办法”，2023 年，第 12-14 页。

¹⁶² A/HRC/55/57，第 15 段。

¹⁶³ 六种严重侵害儿童行为包括：杀害和残害儿童事件；招募儿童或把儿童作为士兵使用；针对儿童的性暴力；绑架儿童；袭击学校或医院；剥夺儿童的人道主义援助。

193. 2023 年 7 月，联合国秘书长报告表示，2022 年核对了 2 783 起严重侵犯 2 282 名儿童(1 810 名男童，472 名女童)事件。¹⁶⁴ 专家小组注意到，各种安全部队都犯有侵权行为，青年党是记录在案的以下事件的最大肇事者：(a) 袭击学校和医院(44 起案件中有 40 起是青年党所为)；(b) 招募和使用儿童(在总共 1 094 名儿童中，902 名被青年党招募和使用，其余被部族民兵和各种安全部队招募和使用)；(c) 绑架儿童(据报，696 名儿童中有 663 名被青年党绑架)。¹⁶⁵ 没有迹象表明，在本报告所述期间这一模式发生了变化。

194. 青年党通过绑架和强迫招募、灌输思想和向家人征税招募的新兵中，儿童占有相当大的比例。秘书长报告说，青年党为招募和使用目的继续绑架儿童事件主要发生在拜州、巴科勒州、希兰州、中朱巴州和下谢贝利州。¹⁶⁶

195. 据报，青年党绑架过年仅 3 岁的幼童。¹⁶⁷ 专家小组约谈了一名社区成员，他讲述了他 12 岁的侄子被青年党在家中绑架的情况。其父试图寻求社区领袖的帮助，就儿子的返回进行谈判，但没有成功，他被告知“算了吧”。

196. 男童 13 岁参加战斗训练，年幼儿童在该团体设立的学校接受该团体好战思想的灌输。青年党 2024 年 6 月发布的视频显示，在盖多和加尔古杜德州等几个地区的社区庆祝活动中，学校男生手持武器参加游行(见机密附件 44)。¹⁶⁸

197. 保护以前与武装部队和团体，包括与被指定为恐怖主义团体有关联的儿童，既是一个基本权利问题，也是向他们提供通往积极未来途径和防止再犯的关键一步。儿童首先应该被视为受害者。¹⁶⁹ 确保他们的权利和福祉对于他们的康复和重返社会、减少重新招募、支持更广泛的反恐和建设和平努力至关重要。

198. 2023 年 7 月，政府批准年龄评估指南，作为其 2012 年终止和防止招募使用和杀害残害儿童的行动计划以及 2019 年实施路线图(为加快行动计划而通过)的一部分。此外，2023 年，联邦内阁批准了少年司法法案和儿童权利法案。¹⁷⁰ 2014 年，联邦内阁通过了“接收和移交脱离武装团体儿童的标准作业程序”。

199. 尽管在规范方面取得了进展，但以前与青年党有关联的儿童仍面临被拘留的风险，包括在非官方或未宣布的拘留设施中，在某些情况下甚至面临死刑。2024 年 3 月，基斯马尤的朱巴兰军事法庭判处一名 17 岁男童死刑，罪名包括其

¹⁶⁴ [A/77/895-S/2023/363](#)，第 151-158 段(按行为人列示索马里境内严重侵害儿童行为)。

¹⁶⁵ 同上。

¹⁶⁶ [S/2024/129](#)，第 59 段。

¹⁶⁷ 机密访谈。

¹⁶⁸ Site intelligence group 和青年党视频，2024 年 6 月 25 日(见机密附件 45 中的图像截图)。

¹⁶⁹ 儿基会，“儿基会关于索马里邦特兰州处决四名青年的声明”，2024 年 8 月 22 日。

¹⁷⁰ [A/79/245](#)，第 29 段。

在关联期间所犯的罪行；经过争取，¹⁷¹ 上诉获得批准。¹⁷² 最近在邦特兰，4 名儿童因与青年党有关联而被处决。判决由无儿童司法程序的军事法庭作出。邦特兰年龄核查委员会证实，他们是未成年人，不应被判处死刑。¹⁷³ 拘留和起诉与武装团体有关联儿童的事件，突出显示了上述 2014 年标准作业程序和 2019 年路线图执行工作可以改进的领域。

十. 建议

200. 专家小组建议安全理事会：

(a) 鼓励战略伙伴，包括会员国和专门机构向政府、联邦成员州和州政府提供能力建设和技术援助，调查和跟踪移动资金转移和加密货币交易(见第 32 段)；

(b) 请政府根据反洗钱金融行动工作组建议 24 和 25 提供关于受益所有权框架的最新进展，作为索马里向安全理事会提交的半年期报告的一部分(根据第 2713(2023)号决议第 45(a)段)；

(c) 鼓励政府、联邦成员州和州政府以及会员国为专家小组接触青年党嫌疑成员和其他在押人员提供便利，包括因恐怖主义、资助恐怖主义、武器走私和海盗相关指控而被拘留的人员。

201. 专家小组建议安全理事会关于青年党的第 751(1992)号决议所设委员会：

(a) 考虑召开区域会员国会议，处理伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里再次出现的问题，加强反恐，包括外国战斗人员跨越区域边界行动调查的区域协调与合作(见第 44-47 段)；

(b) 组织委员会访问索马里和区域其他会员国，提高对制裁制度的认识，包括对削弱青年党能力的区域角度的认识，并支持专家小组执行任务；

(c) 促请会员国和发展伙伴，包括欧洲联盟和联合国向政府、联邦成员州和州政府提供反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义资金阻断能力增强方案方面的技术援助；

(d) 鼓励政府通过采取以下行动执行反洗钱金融行动工作组的建议：

(一) 在联邦成员州、州政府、国际监管机构和执法当局之间交流信息，开展联合调查，并履行第 2713(2023)号决议第 9 和第 10 段规定的监管职能(见第 71 段)；

¹⁷¹ 机密报告，2024 年 3 月。

¹⁷² 同上。

¹⁷³ 儿基会，“儿基会关于索马里邦特兰州处决四名青年的声明”。

- (二) 建立公私伙伴关系，促进财务报告中心与报告实体 (如金融机构、保险和被指定非金融企业、专业领域部门的国家反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义合规官员论坛等) 的合作；
- (三) 完成唯一身份证件流程，推广唯一数字身份证，并将其与提供服务(即银行服务、公共服务)、了解客户和客户尽职调查联系起来；
- (e) 请会员国和专门机构促进摩加迪沙和哈尔格萨金融情报股与报告实体、金融和非金融机构以及执法机构之间的协调机制以促进合作(见第 81-84 段)；
- (f) 考虑到非索过渡特派团正在向非索支助和稳定特派团过渡，请非洲联盟：
 - (一) 采取步骤降低基地被占和青年党获取武器、弹药和其他类型特遣队所属装备的风险(见第 104 至 106 段)；
 - (二) 确保全面执行和顺利将政府-非索过渡特派团收缴武器标准作业程序从非索过渡特派团向非索支助和稳定特派团过渡(见第 108-110 段)；
 - (三) 促进专家小组与非索支助和稳定特派团之间的合作，包括根据任务规定查阅文件和追查收缴的武器、弹药和相关材料；
- (g) 鼓励政府：
 - (一) 加强联邦成员州武器和弹药管理，包括关于标识、追查和其他反转用战略的培训；
 - (二) 将分发给部族民兵的所有武器和弹药纳入索马里国家武器和弹药管理框架；
 - (三) 对部族民兵在战场上缴获的所有武器和弹药进行记录、标识、登记和追查(见第 102 段)；
- (h) 根据第 2713 (2023)号决议第 32 段，寻求从政府获得准许向索马里出口武器、弹药和军事装备的持照私营保安公司的最新名单(见第 103 段)；
- (i) 鼓励会员国和战略伙伴提供强化的反简易爆炸装置培训和设备，包括爆炸物测试和分析设备(见第 133 段)；
- (j) 鼓励政府、会员国和国际安全伙伴紧急制定持久解决方案，建立有安全保障的永久性弹药仓库设施，减少索马里境内弹药意外爆炸的风险(见第 97-99 段)；
- (k) 促请会员国培训和装备政府和联邦成员州海事警察和海岸警卫队，使其具备适当的近海巡逻能力和海岸警卫站，通过打击海盗和其他非法海上活动以及开展搜索和救援行动加强海上安全；
- (l) 鼓励政府考虑到最近通过的反恐立法对公正的人道主义行为体开展人道主义活动的潜在影响，确保根据第 2482 (2019)号决议第 16 段执行决议不妨碍或不针对以符合国际人道法的方式提供中立和公正的人道主义援助(见第 183 段)；

(m) 欢迎将联合公报纳入关于第 1325 (2000)号决议的国家行动计划，促请索马里联邦共和国政府与联索援助团和联合国专门机构合作，根据联合公报制定工作计划(见第 191 段)；

(n) 赞扬政府核可 2012 年行动计划下的年龄评估指南，以制止和防止招募、使用、杀害和残害儿童，并鼓励全面执行 2019 年路线图和 2014 年接收和移交脱离武装团体儿童标准作业程序(见第 198 段)；

(o) 敦促政府、联邦成员州、联合国和儿童保护工作组开展合作，以便：


(一) 对关押脱离武装团体儿童的所有正式和非正式拘留设施进行全面摸底调查(见第 199 段)；

(二) 确保儿童保护行为体在这些儿童获释和重返社会进程的所有阶段及时和不受限制地与他们进行接触。

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Annex 1: UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Map

Annex 2: Methodology

1. The Panel ensured compliance with the methodological standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). As a matter of principle, the Panel strives to rely on verified documents and, wherever possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves, including photographs.¹ It endeavours to ensure that their assertions are corroborated by solid information and that their findings are substantiated by credible sources.²
2. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, in the developments of its reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
3. The Panel used satellite imagery procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations, as well as open-source imagery. Commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data were referenced. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. While the Panel wishes to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel decided not to include identifying information in this document.
4. The Panel reviewed social media, and always seeks to corroborate using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
5. The Panel is committed to impartiality in investigating incidents of non-compliance by any party.
6. The Panel is conscious that upholding the confidentiality of sources of information regarding sanctions-busting or non-compliance may be necessary to ensure the personal safety of individual sources. In all cases, the Panel makes effort to ensure the veracity of information gained in confidence against independent and verifiable sources.³ While maintaining confidentiality, the Panel may provide more clarification on such sources by attributing such information received from States to an “official but confidential” source.⁴
7. The Panel observes impartiality and fairness during the report drafting process, and make available to relevant parties (State authorities, entities or individuals), if appropriate, any evidence of wrongdoing for their review, comment and response, within a specified deadline. Responses will be assessed by the Panel and when the Panel agrees, it will seek to address this in future reports by noting the change in previously reported assessments (see Annex 3 for further details on ‘the opportunity to reply’).⁵

¹ S/2006/997, para 22.

² S/2006/997, para 23.

³ S/2006/997, para 24.

⁴ S/2006/997, para 25.

⁵ S/2006/997, para 28.

Annex 3: ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity in a Panel’s report could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/materiel in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.
2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
 - a. Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
 - b. The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
 - i. Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - ii. Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
 - iii. Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
 - iv. Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field; or
 - v. For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
4. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
5. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.
6. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or his/her government) to communicate on his/her behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

Annex 4: Jubaland statement following Al-Shabaab assault on Bulo Haji

Figure 1: Jubaland statement following Al-Shabaab assault on Bulo Haji



Hay'adda Sirdoonka iyo Nabad Sugida Jubaland
Jubaland Intelligence and Security Agency

WAR SAXAAFADEED

In ka badan 135 Khawaarij ah oo isugu jira horjoogeyaal iyo maleeshiyaad ayaa lagu dilay hawlgal ka hortag ah oo ay Ciidanka Jubbaland iyo kuwa Xoogga dalka ka sameeyeen deegaannada Buulo Xaaji, Harboole iyo Biibi ee gobalka Jubbada Hoose.

Hawlgalkan ayaa ka dambeeyay kadib markii maleeshiyaadka Khawaarijta ah ay weerar nafla caari ah ku soo qaadeen fariisimo geesiyaasha Jubbaland iyo kuwa Xoogga Dalka ay ku lahaayeen deegaannadan, laakiin ciidanka oo u diyaarsanaa dhagarta cadowga ayaa ku guulaystay inay cagta mariyaan maleeshiyaadka Khawaarijta ah.

Ciidamadda ayaa hawlgalkan ku furtay hub aad u farabadan oo ay wateen cadowga, kuwaasi oo ay ka mid yihiin qoryaha RPG, BKM, AK47 iyo kuwa kale.

Geesiyaasha Jubbaland iyo kuwa Xoogga Dalka ayaa hadda ku jira uruurinta meydadka cadowga ee daadsan goobaha lagu dagaalamay, iyadoo dhanka kale wali lagu raad joogo maleeshiyaad fara ku tiris ah oo isku dayaya inay naftooda la baxsadaan.

Sidoo kale halyeeyada cashirka u dhigay Argagixisada waxa ay gacanta ku dhigeen islamarkaana nolosha ku qabteen koox dhagarqabayaal ah oo kamid ahaa kuwii isku dayay in ay weerar kusoo qaadaan fariisimaha ciidanka.

-Dhammaad-

/Nisajubbaland

Source: Jubaland NISA

Figure 2: Jubaland statement following Al-Shabaab assault on Bulo Haji unofficially translated



Annex 5: Members of the Al-Shabaab Executive and Shura Council

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

Annex 6: Infographic from Islamic State media Al-Naba

Figure 1: English translation of Arabic infographic from Islamic State media Al-Naba issue #439 page 8 (original Arabic below) claiming full control of the Cal Miskaad Mountains.



Source: Al-Naba

Figure 2: Original Arabic infographic from Islamic State media Al-Naba claiming full control of the Cal Miskaad Mountains.



Source: Al-Naba

Annex 7: 9 July ISIL-Somalia grenade attack against ‘Marhaba Trading company’ in Bosaso

Images below: 9 July ISIL-Somalia grenade attack against ‘Marhaba Trading company’ in Bosaso.




Source: Puntland Security Coordination Office

Annex 8: Regional Perspective on Maritime Security

With the prevalence of both Houthis attacks against ships allegedly affiliated or linked to Israel, and pirate attacks since November 2023, ships run a gauntlet of possible threats transiting the Red Sea, through the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea to the Western Indian Ocean. With the UAV attack on *MSC Orion*, the range of Houthi attacks increased beyond the Red Sea, into the Arabian Sea, overlapping with attacks by Somali pirates. The combination of these threats affects freedom of navigation, maritime security and regional stability not only in the Red Sea, but also in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and wider Western Indian Ocean.

Map: Houthi Conflict related incidents and Piracy Attacks November 2023 to August 2024⁶

Regional Perspective – Piracy and Conflict Related Incidents



Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

⁶ Compiled from several sources such as MSCHOA, EUNAVFOR, U.S. Central Command, CMF, UKMTO, PMPF, RMIFC, IFC, IMO GISIS, maritime security companies and media reports.

Annex 9: Scrap metal tariffs for 2024**Image 1:** Scrap metal tariffs for 2024

laayada islaamiga
ah ee Sh/hoose

ولاية شبيلى السطلى
الإسلامية

التجارة والقطاعات

Tacriifada cusub ee lawaazimta

NO	Magaca qaadiidka	Lacagta laga qaadayo
1	Inataree cilinle	
2	Inataree Candho meydle .zy.IWM	\$400
3	L six	\$325
4	Fuso,Fur inataree, Tm,8boole	\$260
5	110,jante diyeshe	\$220
6	UD	\$130
7	Sabaax iyo BG	\$120
8	UD Imuduufiko	\$120
9	DYNA 3.5tan	\$170
10	Dyna Niic	\$80
11	Dyna box Rar wada	\$60
12	Atlas	\$35
13	Homey xamuul wada	\$40
14	Birta culus fasalkii	\$25
15	Iska rogaha dhagaxa	\$250
16	Iska rogaha carrada	\$5
17	Mooto 3lugood	\$3
18	Xaaji qansiin IWM	\$2
19	Ronet rakaab	Nafar iyo bar
20	Land rovel,Qooqan,cabdi bile baasajeeri ah	Nafar iyo bar
21	Homey nooha, Market 2 Baasajeeri	Nafar iyo bar
22	Dyna box Baasajeeri	Nafar iyo bar

FG: gaariga haduu haaf yahay waxaa laga qaadayaa kala bar intii laga qaadi jiray haduuse dhexda kasii buuxsado koontaroolka xiga ayaa looga qaadayaa lacagta inta dhiman rasiid ayaana la siinayaa.

Source: Confidential, May 2024

Image 2: Scrap metal tariffs for 2024

Gaadiidka cusub

NO	Magaca gaadiidka	Lacagta laga qaadayo
1	Riig	\$2000
2	Inataree, candhomeyde, zy	\$1000
3	Tareel, Baldoos, baallar, forliif weyn	\$1000
4	Fuso, Fur inataree, Tm	\$600
5	8 Boole, Eveeco, Foraliif yar	\$600
6	UD, jantediyeesh, Dyno	\$500
	Bass sabaax, cagal	\$500
	Dyna box, Dyna niic	\$300
	C/bile, landrovel, prado, runet, pajeero IWM	\$300
	Nissan safari, leyla calaawi	\$300
	Nissan 4X4, Qooqan.	\$300
	Dyna madax kanool	\$200
	Market 2, corolla, mini pajero, karib	\$200
	Noho probox, homey, Suzuki	\$200

dmada badeecada ka gudubta xuduud beenaadyad

nataree cilinle,	\$900
nataree 4 qooble	\$800
andho meydle zy	\$700
oole, fur inataree, fuzo, Tm	\$400
	\$250
e diyeesh	\$220
o	\$200
	\$100

Source: Confidential, May 2024

Table: Scrap metal tariffs for 2024

Items	Rates payable in \$	Items	Rates payable in \$
1. inataree	400	9. Dyna 3.5 tons	80
2. Inataree candha meydle	325	10. Dyna niic	60
3. Lixle	260	11. Dyna box rar drive	35
4. Fuso fur inataree, Ti, Em	220	12. Atlas	40
8 bole		13. Homey truck driver	
5.110 janta diyeshe	130	14. Heavy metal class	25 250
6. yudhii	120	15. Rock roll	5
7. Sabah bijii	120	16. Anger	3
8, yudhii inmadufiko	170	17. tricycle	2
Taxation on vehicle parts as scrap metal			

Annex 10: Federal Republic of Somalia - The National Anti-money laundering And Counter Terrorism Financing Committee List of Financial Sanctions Targets dated 13 April 2024



Federal Republic of Somalia
The National Anti-money laundering And Counter Terrorism Financing Committee
(NAMLC)

Mogadishu – Somalia

REF: NAMLC/001/24
 Date: 13/04/2024

List of Financial Sanctions Targets

The National Anti-Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Committee of NAMLC, in strict adherence to the provisions of Article 6 of the Targeted Financial Sanctions Act of 2023, has issued a national list of individuals suspected of financing Al-Shabaab terrorist group.

Name of the listed individuals

1. Abdullahi Tahleel Hirey
2. Hassan Ali Afgio
3. Abdulkarim Ahmed Jugjuge
4. Feisal Abdullahi Yusuf
5. Noah Isse Lugole
6. Sayed Ali Shirwa
7. Abdullahi Osman Mohamed (Tutah)
8. Abdullahi Hassan Abdi Osobleh
9. Mohamed Sahal Idleh

All reporting entities referred to in Article 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Act, all Somali citizens & individuals or other entities within Somalia:

1. Are prohibited to deal with the individuals on this list;

2. All reporting entities are obliged to freeze any property belonging or related to the individuals in this list;
3. All reporting entities are required to immediately send a suspicious transaction report on the activities of these individuals to the Financial Reporting Center (FRC).

Rights of Persons Listed by the Commission

Any person on this list who feels that he/she has been wrongly designated has a legal right to request a review of this designation from the Committee and an amendment. In this quest, they are to submit reasonable proof that he/she is not involved in financing terrorism and that the designation was a mistake.

If he is not satisfied with the committee's response to the complaint, he can appeal this decision to the country's Supreme Court in accordance with Article 9 of the Targeted Financial Sanctions Act of 2023. The Court's decision in this regard will be final.

Annex 11: Federal Republic of Somalia - The National Anti-money laundering And Counter Terrorism Financing Committee List of Financial Sanctions Targets dated 18 July 2024



Federal Republic of Somalia

The National Anti-money laundering And Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee (NAMLC)

Mogadishu – Somalia

REF: NAMLC/002/24

Date: 18/07/2024

List of Financial Sanctions Targets

The National Anti-Money Laundering & Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee NAMLC, in strict adherence to the provisions of Article 6 of the Targeted Financial Sanctions Act of 2023, has issued a national sanction list of individuals of Al-Shabaab terrorist group.

All reporting entities referred to in Article 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Act, all Somali citizens & individuals or other entities within Somalia:

1. Are prohibited to deal with the individuals on this list;
2. All reporting entities are obliged to freeze any property belonging or related to the individuals in this list;

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National Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee (NAMLC)

Mogadishu-Somalia

3. All reporting entities are required to immediately send a suspicious transaction report on the activities of these individuals to the Financial Reporting Center (FRC).

Rights of Persons Listed by the Commission

Any person on this list who feels that he/she has been wrongly designated has a legal right to request a review of this designation from the Committee and an amendment. In this quest, they are to submit reasonable proof that he/she is not involved in financing terrorism and that the designation was a mistake.

If he is not satisfied with the committee's response to the complaint, he can appeal this decision to the country's Supreme Court in accordance with Article 9 of the Targeted Financial Sanctions Act of 2023. The Court's decision in this regard will be final.

National Sanction list of individuals of Al-Shabaab Terrorist Group.

No	Name	AKA	Role	Clan	Age	Comments
1.	Abukar Ali Adan (Abuukar Cali Aadan)	Abdullahi large beard (Cabdullaahi Garweyne)	Deputy of the AS leader	Gaaljeceel, Abtisame	55-60	He has a major role in planning and coordinating activities related to the AS armed wing.
2.	Mohamed Mire Jama (Maxamed Mire Jaamac)	Mire	Governor of the regions	Majeerteen, Idigfacle	59-62	He leads, coordinates and directs the leaders of the regions for the AS.

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National Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee (NAMLC)

Mogadishu-Somalia

3.	Hassan Yakub Ali Bari (Xasan Yacquub Cali Bari)	Khawlajaan, Abu Abbaas	Leader of the Council of Shura.	Leesaan, Bari	55-60	He influences the direction of the group's general strategy and the decisions made by the Shura council.
4.	Mahad Abdirahman Warsame	Karatay, Qaley, Abu Abdirahman	Deputy AS leader	Habargididr, Cayr	60-63	He leads security, finance and information functions of the AS.
5.	Yusuf Ahmed Haji Nunow (Yuusuf Axmed Xaaji Nuunow)	Geescadde, Bishaar	Head of the security branch	Yantaar, Mad-dheerow	45	He is responsible for planning, supervising, and executing security operations, as well as bombings and assassinations for the AS.
6.	Abdikarim Osman Jilaow (Cabdikariin Cismaan Jilacow)	Mustaf Caato (Mustaf skinny)	Head of regional security branch	Hawaadle, Cabdalle	40-45	He leads the security, bombings and assassinations in the regions for the AS.
7.	Nur Abdi Roble (Nuur Cabdi Rooble)	Nuunuule	Head of the AS in Mudug	Duduble	35-40	He is the leader of the AS militia in the Mudug region. He is central to the group's battles in the country's central regions.
8.	Bakar Bashe Adan Ahmed (Bakar Baashe Aadan Axmed)	Shariif	Head of the zakawaat	Asharaaf	45-50	He is responsible for collecting extortions from merchants in the Bay & Bakool regions.

Wabillaahi towfiq

For more Information Contact

National Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee (NAMLC)

E-mail: info@namlc.gov.so

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National Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee (NAMLC)

www.namlc.gov.so

Mogadishu Somalia

Annex 12: Finance

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

Annex 13: Arms seizure by AS from ATMIS and SNA base overruns

Diversion of contingent owned equipment from ATMIS troop contributing countries and the Somali National Army is a key source of resupply for Al-Shabaab, enabling the group to maintain its operations in Somalia.

This annex includes footage released by Al-Shabaab's Al-Kata'ib media channel which often accompanies the groups fighters into battle to document attacks conducted against ATMIS and SNA forces in Somalia. This footage frequently includes footage of the weapons, ammunition and military equipment looted from the SNA base overruns. (Source: Site Intelligence Group)

The materiel seized by Al-Shabaab includes:

- **Weapons:** AK-pattern assault rifles, PKM-pattern light machine guns, SVD-pattern sniper rifles, under-barrel grenade launchers, RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade launchers, mortar tubes
- **Ammunition:** 7.62x39mm, 7.62x54R, 12.7x108mm, 40mm PG-7 rockets, 40mm under-barrel grenades
- **Contingent-owned equipment:** Boots, uniforms, radios, cellphones, generators, ammunition packs and personal protection equipment.

Annex 13 – Appendix A: 22 July 2024 Al-Shabaab successful base overrun of three SNA bases, Jubaland

Al-Kata'ib, Al-Shabaab's news channel published a four-minute video of the group's 22 July 2024 attack on SNA bases in Bulo Haji, Harbole, and Mido in Jubaland. Screenshots of the video are included below.

Source: Site Intelligence Group https://sitemultimedia.org/video/SITE_Shabaab_KNC_Harbole_Raid_220724.mp4



Annex 13 – Appendix B: 10 July 2024 Al-Shabaab ambush of a SNA military convoy outside Buul Haji, Jubaland reportedly killing 31 soldiers

Source: Site Intelligence Group



AMBUSH AGAINST APOSTATE MILITIA | BUULOXAAJI - THE ISLAMIC WILAAYAH OF LOWER JUBBA | 10 - JULY- 2024



AMBUSH AGAINST APOSTATE MILITIA | BUULOXAAJI - THE ISLAMIC WILAAYAH OF LOWER JUBBA | 10 - JULY- 2024



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Annex 13 – Appendix C: 15 July 2024 Al-Shabaab counterattack on SNA forces in Waninle, outskirts of El Dheer, in Galguguud, allegedly killing 27 personnel and wounding 38 others

Source of six images: Site Intelligence Group





AMBUSH AGAINST THE APOSTATE SOMALI MILITIA | WANINLE - ISLAMIC WILAAAYAH OF GALGADUUD | 15-JULY - 2024



AMBUSH AGAINST THE APOSTATE SOMALI MILITIA | WANINLE - ISLAMIC WILAAAYAH OF GALGADUUD | 15-JULY - 2024



Annex 14: ATMIS drawdown and transition into AUSSOM: drawing on lessons learned to mitigate base overruns

Al-Shabaab's ability to capture weapons, ammunition and military equipment from ATMIS and SNA forward operating bases (FOBs) continues to serve as a key source of resupply for the group. The Panel has previously documented successful base overruns and theft by Al-Shabaab of a range of ATMIS contingent-owned military equipment as well as SNA military assets that have subsequently been used by the group in attacks against international forces and Somali security forces.

Large calibre ammunition rounds including mortars and rocket artillery have frequently been repurposed as IEDs by Al-Shabaab who often use the harvested military-grade high-explosive in combination with home-made explosives to increase the blast impact and lethal effect of their devices.

Mitigating these base overruns will require a comprehensive strategic risk analysis and an improved understanding of Al-Shabaab modus operandi to ensure countermeasures are put in place to reduce the risk of future diversion, particularly in light of the ongoing ATMIS drawdown and transition to AUSSOM. ATMIS and SNA troops manning forward operating bases will need to enhance their ISR capabilities by increasing situational awareness and cultivating local intelligence to thwart potential attacks. Combat engineers embedded within the FOBs as well as Company Commanders need to ensure that mitigation measures such as digging trenches, to counter VBIED attacks; strategic positioning of weapons and ammunition assets around the camp to prevent base overruns; and establishing retreat and fallback positions within the bases in the event of major attacks, are established without delay or graft in order to prevent further loss of life, morale and military assets.

As the ATMIS drawdown continues, some FOBs become increasingly isolated which increases lead times for resupply and reach-back support. Floods and difficult road conditions as well as the presence of roadside IEDs further complicate ground access, lengthening response times of quick-reaction or logistical support teams in the event of an attack. In the current reporting period, the Panel notes Somalia's acquisition of five Italian supplied Bell412XEP multi-role helicopters within the SSF air fleet in order to provide close air support as well as troop transport, surveillance, resupply, MEDEVAC and CASEVAC services. While this is a welcome development, sustaining this aerial capacity given limited financial resources and high maintenance costs has also been identified as a challenge to the Panel by certain troop contributing countries (TCCs).

Analysis of several SNA and ATMIS positions that came under attack reveals that they are technically more similar to 'harbour positions' than a full -fledged FOB. Often there are minimal protections, no HESCO or proper defences such as trenches to thwart vehicle borne IED attacks. In several instances there are no hard structures or explosive storehouses or armouries on the base with minimal facilities and supplies for the troops manning the base. The SNA often extended well beyond lines of support without adequate protection or protected locations from which to launch patrols or conduct surveillance. In the event of an attack, the bases were too far to receive support. A frequently used modus operandi of Al-Shabaab is to conduct mortar attacks on any nearby bases to prevent them from supporting fellow allies under fire.⁷

⁷ Multiple confidential interviews with military experts, combat engineers, SNA, AMISOM and ATMIS personnel.

Annex 15: Helicopter deliveries to Somalia

The Panel notes the presence of five Agusta-Bell412EPX multi-role helicopters within the SAF air fleet. The twin-engined Bell412EPX helicopter can provide close air support as well as troop transport, surveillance, resupply, MEDEVAC and CASEVAC services as well as combat search and rescue and support roles for the civilian population.

Two helicopters were delivered by Italy in July 2024 with another three delivered in August 2024. The groundcrew has reportedly received training in Turkey.

Image 1: Four Agusta-Bell412EXP helicopters stand by on the tarmac in Aden Ade International Airport, Mogadishu, Somalia. August 2024.

Source: <https://www.military.africa/2024/08/italy-supplies-helicopters-to-somalia/>





Image 2 and 3: The first two Agusta-Bell412EXP helicopters in Somalia prior to conducting a demonstration flight in Mogadishu to mark Somalia's Independence Day on 1 July 2024.

Source: https://x.com/abdi_guled/status/1808283338521940341?s=46&t=e-ncYmXy7wtDdgQ0NQ7ZKQ

Annex 16: The ATMIS-GFRS SOP on Recovered Weapons, Ammunition and Associated Material and other WAM SOPs

Annex 16 - Appendix A: Operationalising the harmonized ATMIS-GFRS SOP on Recovered Weapons, Ammunition and Associated Materiel



**HARMONIZED FGS / ATMIS
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE
ON RECOVERED WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND ASSOCIATED MATERIEL**

Version Reference *2.0*

Approved by
Approval date
Effective date

Contact *FGS: ONS WAM NFP*
 ATMIS: CHIEF OF OPERATIONS
Review date *Reviewed; May 2023*

**HARMONIZED FGS / ATMIS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE ON RECOVERED
WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND ASSOCIATED MATERIEL**

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Annex 16 – Appendix B: List of relevant WAM SOPs in Somalia

These nine WAM SOPs have been tailored to the specific needs of Somali security forces while aligning with international best practices on weapons and ammunition management including the Modular Small Arms Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) and International Ammunition Training Guidelines (IATGs).

Implementing these existing SOPs and regularly disseminating them to operational level Ammunition Technical Officers and armourers in Mogadishu and the FMS would positively impact weapons and ammunition management capabilities in the country, preventing diversion, unintentional munitions explosions and facilitate the safe and secure destruction or disposal of surplus ammunition and unserviceable weapons.

SOP 1: General Armoury Procedures

SOP 2: Armoury Procedures for Weapons

SOP 3: Armoury Procedures for Ammunition & Explosive

SOP 4: Accounting

SOP 5: Marking

SOP 6: Destruction of Weapons and Ammunition

SOP 7: Transportation of Weapons and Ammunition

SOP 8: Reception and Documentation at Halane

SOP 9: Management of Captured Weapons

Source: GFRS Office of National Security, Central Monitoring Division, and Joint Verification Team.

Annex 17: Panel investigations and tracing of weapons, ammunition and related components used by Al-Shabaab**Panel access to trace captured weapons**

In line with paragraphs 5 and 6 of Security Council resolution 2713 (2023), following on from paragraph 9 of resolution 2662 (2022),¹ the GFRS has been requested to facilitate access for the Panel to document, analyse and trace recovered weapons, ammunition or related materiel seized from areas liberated by the renewed campaign against Al-Shabaab by Somali security forces, clan militias and ATMIS as well as recovered from Al-Shabaab attacks or defectors. The Panel has also previously requested access¹ to inspect weapons, ammunition and military materiel captured or seized through raids in all major cities and ports of entry, including Mogadishu, in order to more effectively identify and trace illicit supply networks.

Annex 17 – Appendix A: Inspection and tracing of weapons captured from Al-Shabaab, Bar Sanguni, Jubaland

During the current reporting period, the Office of National Security of the GRFS and the Jubaland state authorities facilitated an inspection by the Panel of one weapon that was captured from Al-Shabaab by the Somali National Army during the 19 April 2024 clashes in Bar Sanguni base (located outside of Kismayo in Jubaland). The Panel also documented an additional four weapons presented to the Panel as having been procured from illicit markets in and around Kismayo. In Puntland, the Panel was provided details of three intercepted AK pattern assault rifles seized in Geesaley, Bari region of Puntland in February 2024.

The Panel is currently in the process of tracing these eight weapons, on the basis of their markings and technical characteristics.


The inspected weapons included:

1. One AK pattern rifle captured from Al-Shabaab on 19 April 2024 in Bar Sanguni, Jubaland, Somalia (image 1,2,3):

One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to a Type 56-1 AK pattern rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 2019 with Factory 26 production mark followed by weapon markings CN-19 Type 56-1 64050906.

Source of images 1, 2 and 3: Panel





Annex 17 – Appendix B: Inspection and tracing of weapons sourced from illicit markets, Bar Sanguni, Jubaland

The four AK-pattern assault rifles presented to the Panel as having been procured from illicit or unregulated black markets in Jubaland included:


1. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to an original AK-47 rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 1951 with markings 1951r CΦ1515.


Source of images 1, 2 and 3: Panel



2. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to a AKM pattern rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 1962 with markings Δ 1962 ИС 8000.

Source of images 1, 2 and 3: Panel



3. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to an AKM pattern rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 1974 with markings  1974 77.

Source of images 1, 2 and 3: Panel



4. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to a Type 56 AK pattern rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition with markings 56 型 (Type) and serial number 40465.

Images 1, 2, 3 **Source:** Panel



Annex 17 – Appendix C: Inspection and tracing of weapons captured by Puntland security forces

The three AK-pattern assault rifles allegedly captured by Puntland security forces in Gar Saleel in February 2024 included:

1. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to an AK pattern rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 1980 with weapon markings

G △ 1980 S-A62247.

Source of image 1: confidential



2. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to an AKM rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 1974 with weapon markings Δ 1974 491826 on the receiver and 10 1826 on the chamber.

Source of image 2: confidential



3. One AK-pattern rifle with technical characteristics and factory markings similar to an AKM rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition and manufactured in 1974 with factory markings \star 1974 512357 on the receiver and matching numbers 51 2317 on the chamber.

Source of image 3: confidential



Annex 17- Appendix D: Summary of weapons serial numbers captured from Al-Shabaab in Bulo Haaji, Kismayo in July 2024

date of documentation	location of documentation	date of seizure	seized by unit	city town village of seizure	seized from whom	circumstances of seizure	serial number	weapon type ID (verified)	calibre	year of manufacture
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	66042923	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2021
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	66041902	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2021
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64054555	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64049222	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64043430	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64054190	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64046147	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64007204	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62111961	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64036939	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2019
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	63014674	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2018
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	63014887	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2018
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62126926	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2017
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62138516	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2017
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62109301	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2017
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62163849	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2017
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	61041106	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2016
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	61085143	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2016
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	60013516	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	2015
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	3333189	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	407294	Type 56-2	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	5223531	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	3660110	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	11040388	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	36000168	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	4863155	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	17093971	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	5232351	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64054163	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	400???	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	61113840	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	67081668	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	61106012	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62174652	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64050375	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	67081434	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	60043298	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	64012266	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	63007472	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	14180414	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	62122402	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	60054705	Type 56-1	7.62 x 39 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	308400	RPG Type 69	40 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	1601984	RPG Type 69-1	40 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	907041	RPG Type 69-1	40 mm	
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	17-CN 51163	M80 LMG	7.62 x 54R mm	2017
2024-07-29	Kismayo	2024-07-22	Jubaland Darwish Forces	Bulo Haji	Al Shabaab	Operations	EM1702721	AKMS	7.62 x 39 mm	

Source: GFRS ONS/CMD

Overview of captured weapons data:

- **Date of documentation:** 29 July 2024
- **Date of seizure:** 22 July 2024
- **Location:** Bulo Haji Buulo Xaaji
- **Seized by:** Jubaland Darwish Forces
- **Seized from:** Al-Shabaab
- **Total number of weapons:** 47
- **Year of manufacture:** 2015 to 2021
- **Type of weapons:**
 - 44 Assault Rifles (7.62x39mm), including 43 AK Type 56-1 and 1 AKMS
 - 02 Rocket Propelled Grenades (40mm PG7), Type 69-1
 - 01 Medium Machine Gun (7.62x54R), type M80 MMG

NB: The Panel is currently in the process of tracing these weapons.

Annex 18: Al-Shabaab Weapons Markings Analysis**Annex 18 – Appendix A: Al-Shabaab weapon markings, Bullo Haaji, Jubaland, July 2024**

Image 1: This likely Type 56-2 AK-pattern assault rifle chambered for 7.62x39mm ammunition was seized from Al-Shabaab fighters by Somali National Army in Bullo Haaji, Jubaland in August 2024. In addition to the weapon serial number 6604192, the weapon contains a sticker on the rear dust cover (contents unverified), as well as a weapons mark associated with the Yemeni Armed Forces stockpiles. Additional markings indicate that the likely Type56-2 weapon was manufactured in 2021 and likely sourced from Yemeni Armed Forces stockpiles diverted to Al-Shabaab. The weapon is currently in the process of being traced.

Source: GFRS and Jubaland authorities



Image 2: Close-up of Yemen Armed Forces marking on the same assault rifle pictured above:



Source: GFRS and Jubaland authorities.

Annex 18 - Appendix B: Al-Shabaab weapons markings, Bulo Haaji, Jubaland, July 2024

Image 1: Al-Shabaab weapons marks on AK Type56-2-pattern rifles. The alphanumeric markings are made by various means including a dot-peen percussion marking machine. In this case, XSH37243 the mark begins with the letters XSH followed by a 5- digit numerical sequence. According to some analysts, XSH represents the Somali-language version of Al Shabaab (Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen).

The weapon was seized from Al-Shabaab fighters by Somali National Army and Jubaland Darwish Forces in Bulo Haaji, Jubaland in July 2024.

Source: GFRS/ Jubaland Darwish Forces



Annex 18 – Appendix C: A list of Al-Shabaab marked weapons captured by ATMIS

These Al-Shabaab marking, and weapon serial numbers represent a sample of AK-pattern rifles seized from Al-Shabaab fighters by ATMIS forces from 2021 to 2024 (source: ATMIS).

1. XSH-43361 (15003386)
2. XSH-43359 (60013158)
3. XSH-43354 (15005828)
4. XSH-14058 (56352602)

XSH and the five-digit number represent a sample of Al-Shabaab post-production marking sequences, while the number in the bracket represents the original production serial number on the weapon.

Annex 19: Monitoring Al-Shabaab indirect fire attacks

Annex 19 – Appendix A: Summary of Al-Shabaab 107mm rocket in Mogadishu and Baidoa, Somalia

A summary of eleven Al-Shabaab 107mm rocket attacks in Mogadishu and Baidoa from 2022, 2023 and in the period from 15 August 2023 to 1 September 2024 are outlined below.

Since submitting its 2023 final report, the Panel has recorded eight additional 107mm rocket attacks conducted by Al Shabab on 19 August 2023, 1 October 2023, 27 December 2023, 30 January 2024, 4 May 2024 in Mogadishu and 28 February 2024, 20 August 2024, 01 September 2024 in Baidoa, South-West State.

9 June 2022

- Al-Shabaab launched seven 107 mm rockets against Villa Somalia.⁸

25 June 2023 and 4 July 2023

- Al-Shabaab used 107 mm rocket variants to conduct two significant attacks in Mogadishu against the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) compound in the Aden Adde International Airport (AAIA) protected area and Villa Somalia on 25 June 2023 and 4 July 2023, respectively.⁹

19 August 2023

- Five 107mm rockets impacted the airport compound in Mogadishu near several UN offices and an embassy. Two additional 107mm rockets were confirmed by ATMIS and SPF teams outside the AAIA area in



Mogadishu.

Image 1: 107mm rocket used in Al-Shabaab attack on 19 August 2023 in Mogadishu. (Source: confidential)

⁸ See Panel's report S/2022/754, para. 84.

⁹ See Panel's report 2022 and 2023 final reports accessible online at S/2022/754, para. 84., S/2023/724, para 28 and S/2023/724, annex 5.

1 October 2023

- Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the 1 October 2023 attack where multiple 107mm projectiles were launched at several international targets on the same day in Mogadishu.



Image 2: 107mm rocket used in Al-Shabaab attack on 1 October 2023 in Mogadishu. (Source: confidential.)

30 January 2024

- Four 107mm rockets were fired towards Aden Abdulle International Airport (AAIA) in Mogadishu making impact at 0018hrs. One rocket landed on the airport apron, close to the runway where Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) search teams cleared the area and confirmed there were no casualties. Three other 107mm rockets landed in the Waberi District of Mogadishu where one rocket started a fire that was extinguished by the fire service, indicating a high likelihood of the rocket being equipped with an incendiary warhead, consistent with the 19.85 KG markings observed on the rocket body¹⁰.

¹⁰ Markings on Iranian Fajr-1 or Haseb-1 Type 63 rockets typically indicate the weight of the rocket. Rockets weighing 18.4 kilos typically denote High Explosive (HE) warheads while rockets weighing 19.85 kilos (similar to those in the images from the Mogadishu attacks) represent High-Explosive Incendiary Warheads (HEI).

27 December 2023 and 4 May 2024

- The 107mm rockets used in both the 27 December 2023 and 4 May 2024 attacks resulted in rockets that failed to launch and were documented at their Point of Origin prior to disposal by EOD teams.



Image 3 and 4: 107mm rockets used in Al-Shabaab attack on 4 May 2023 in Mogadishu that failed to initiate. (Source: confidential).

28 February 2024, Baidoa

- Two 107mm rounds fired with point of impact in or in the vicinity of SNA base.

20 August 2024, Baidoa

- Four 107mm rockets fired at UN and ATMIS compounds.

01 September 2024, Baidoa

- Six 107mm rockets fired; five rockets with confirmed point of impact, one rocket made impact outside the safe zone, detected by sense and warm system.

All 107mm rockets used by Al-Shabaab in Baidoa functioned on impact resulting in limited imagery of the weapons.

Analysis of 107mm rocket attacks by Al-Shabaab in Somalia

Despite slight variations in the colour of the 107mm rockets, the lot number 1100 and other identifying markings in all five attacks since 15 August 2023 are consistent with 107mm rockets documented in all previous 107mm incidents in 2023. The method of establishing the rocket trajectory using sandbags for elevation as well as using the electric charge from a cell phone to initiate the propellant in the rocket motor are also consistent with all previously documented 107mm attacks.

As previously reported in 2023,¹¹ remnants of the 107 mm rockets recovered from these attacks in the current reporting period by EOD teams all bore the markings “Lot 1100, NW 19.85 KG”, and exhibited characteristics similar to 107 mm Fajr-1 High-Explosive Incendiary Warheads (HEI) variants known to be stockpiled in ATMIS forward operating bases, including those overrun by Al Shabab as outlined in the Panel’s 2023 final report¹².

Source: confidential source and additional information in 2023 final report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia [S/2023/724](#), Annex 5.

¹¹ Confidential source.

¹² See Panel’s 2022 and 2023 final reports accessible online at S/2022/754, para. 84., [S/2023/724](#), para 28 and [S/2023/724](#), annex 5.

Annex 19 – Appendix B: Al-Shabaab uses B-10 High-Explosive Anti-Tank recoilless rifle to attack UN and ATMIS in Baidoa, Somalia, 13 June 2024

Incident Report: On 13 June 2024, Al-Shabaab attacked the ATMIS and UN protected compounds in Baidoa with multiple 82mm High-Explosive anti-tank warheads using B-10 recoilless anti-tank weapons¹³.

Image 1: Stock image of B-10 High-Explosive Anti-Tank recoilless rifle



Technical Information: B-10 High-Explosive Anti-Tank recoilless rifle

Calibre 82 mm

Length 1,445 mm

Weight (unloaded)

Without tripod: 33 kg With tripod: 41 kg

sighting systems: optical and open sights

Recoilless, multi-vent breech

Muzzle velocity 200–252 m/s

The B-10 is primarily an anti-armour weapon that delivers an 82 mm high-explosive anti-tank warhead to ranges exceeding 2,500 m. The weapon can also fire high-explosive ammunition for use against lightly armoured vehicles, infrastructure, and personnel. The weapon's distinct, bulbous breech (rear end) is arguably its most distinctive identifying feature.

Source: https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/SAS_weapons-recoilless-guns-B10.pdf

¹³ Confidential source.

Annex 19 – Appendix C: Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) impact in Sool region, northern Somalia

Incident: Possible LACM impact, Taleex district, Sool, northern Somalia; 3 May 2024

Technical characteristics: The Quds-2 LACM is an upgraded version of the Quds-1 LACM, featuring enhanced speed and a range of up to 1,350 kilometers (840 miles). According to some analysts, Quds-2 LACM missiles are modified versions of a Soumar cruise missile, which in turn is based on the Soviet-era Kh-55 missile.




Image 1, 2, 3: rocket fuselage, winglet and rocket motor.

Source: Twitter/
https://x.com/AAGA_CAWLAN101/status/178632288452628514
confidential source.

X:
and

Image 2: Map with location of LACM point of impact in Sool, northern Somalia. (Source: Confidential)




Map Source: Based on United Nations map, 01 March 2012

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Image 3 and 4: Quds-2 LACM engine with serial number “10029399”


Source : https://twitter.com/AAGA_CAWLAN101/status/1786324082838884725



Comparison with previously documented Quds-2 LACM jet engine

Eight digits serial number “10029400” documented on the jet engine of the Quds-2 LACM launched by the Houthis on 17 January 2022 against the ADNOC fuel depot, Abu Dhabi, UAE. This serial number differs only by one digit to the one documented in Somalia “10029399”(see image 3 and 4 above).

Image 5: Quds-2 LACM engine serial number **Source:** Panel of Experts on Yemen 2023 final report [S/2023/130](#), figure 5.18



Annex 20: Cross-border arms trafficking: a regional perspective

Challenges in Controlling Illicit Trafficking

The Panel continues to monitor the black-market sale of weapons and ammunition within Somalia and through regional markets. Ongoing regional conflict in Yemen continues to contribute to the flow of illicit arms into Somalia, complicating efforts to control trafficking. The Panel notes the presence of weapons with markings consistent with ‘Sep21’ Houthi identification marks in Somalia confirming the continued presence of a weapons supply pipeline between Yemen and Somalia. The Panel also confirms the presence of weapons in Somalia commonly available on the illicit market in Yemen (images 3 to 12 below).

These findings highlight the complex challenges of controlling the flow of illicit arms and underscore the need for continued vigilance by Somali and international stakeholders. The presence of such weapons in Somalia represents a significant threat to regional stability and security, necessitating coordinated efforts to disrupt these illicit supply chains.

Image 1 and 2: Houthi Sep21 post-production weapons identification mark (21SEP in a double circle) on a Type56-2 AK-pattern assault rifle

Source: Conflict Armament Research




Image 3: Close-up of Yemeni Armed Forces post-production weapons mark

The Panel confirms weapons with Yemeni Armed Forces markings among weapons offered for sale in illicit markets in Somalia as well as in caches captured from Al-Shabaab.

Source: Conflict Armament Research



Image 4, 5 and 6: G3 pattern assault rifle with Almarenz markings documented in Las Anood. These G3 rifles are often modified with shortened barrels and retractable stocks.

Calibre: 7.62x51mm

Source: Conflict Armament Research



Image 7: Steyr AUG 1 pattern assault rifle documented in Bossaso, Puntland

Calibre: 5.56x45mm

Source: Conflict Armament Research



Image 8, 9, 10 and 11: Taurus pistol documented in Mogadishu

Calibre: 9x19mm

Source: Conflict Armament Research



Annex 21: Cross-Border Attacks and Weapons Seizures

Annex 21 – Appendix A: Materiel seized from Al-Shabaab forces in cross-border attacks into Kenya


Location: Banisa Sub-Country, Mandera along the Kenya-Somalia border, 13 July 2024

Materiel seized by Kenyan security forces from Al-Shabaab fighters included a Type 69 RPG-7 launcher and four PG-7 warheads, a PKM-pattern light machine gun, three AK-pattern assault rifles with 11 magazines and 7.62x39mm ammunition, four 9mm pistols with five magazines and 9mm ammunition.

Source: <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2024-07-13-kenyan-forces-kill-four-terrorists-deal-major-blow-to-al-shabaab-in-border-operation/> and multiple confidential sources









Annex 21 - Appendix B: Arms Seizure in Abudwak, Galmudug on 15 July 2024

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

Annex 22: Armed group access to UAVs: August 2024 FPV UAV intercept in Galkayo by Puntland authorities

Image 1: One of five FPV UAVs reportedly intercepted in Galkayo in August 2024, Source: [Radio Dalsan](#)

Al-Shabaab is also seeking to develop new capabilities, which reportedly includes the use of weaponized uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). Commercial UAVs have been documented in Somalia and have been used by Al-Shabaab in the past to carry out surveillance. An increase in UAV sightings has been recorded in the current reporting period¹⁴. These capabilities exist within Al-Shabaab and do not require or necessarily indicate technology transfer from other armed groups, including the Houthis.

In a potentially significant development on 26 August 2024, Puntland authorities reportedly intercepted five first-person-view (FPV) UAVs together with a cache of explosives¹⁵. The UAVs and explosives, hidden in speakers, were intercepted in a convoy in Galkayo¹⁶ and seven people were detained. The availability of UAVs, even if not weaponized, represents a threat multiplier as they may be used for surveillance, target identification, and potentially facilitating future attacks.

While any risk of an immediate attack has been successfully mitigated in this incident, initial information indicates that the intercepted UAVs are FPV-type UAVs which, seized together with a cache of explosives, may signify a greater security threat that warrants further investigation. No FPV goggles were declared in the intercept.

FPV-UAVs are significantly more difficult to fly compared to more commonly available commercially available UAVs which would be better suited to carry out surveillance flights, target acquisition or filming propaganda footage. FPV-UAVs are either purpose-built using off-the-shelf components or available as kits. FPV-UAV components are often pared down to save weight and increase the UAV's payload-carrying capacity. FPV-pattern UAVs, including larger winged models, have been customized to carry explosive charges and used to serve as 'one-way attack' or

¹⁴ Confidential sources.

¹⁵ "Puntland Intercepts Kamikaze Drones from Yemen Intended for Al-Shabaab," Horn Observer, 27 August 2024, <https://hornobserver.com/articles/2928/Puntland-Intercepts-Kamikaze-Drones-from-Yemen-Intended-for-Al-Shabaab>


¹⁶ "Puntland Seizes Suicide Drones, Arrests Seven Suspects in Major Security Operation," Radio Dalsan, 27 August 2024, <https://www.radiodalsan.com/puntland-seizes-suicide-drones-arrests-seven-suspects-in-major-security-operation/>

‘suicide’ UAVs in ongoing conflicts such as in Syria and Ukraine. While this is an ongoing investigation and there is no confirmation of weaponised UAV-use by non-state armed groups in Somalia, the increasing availability of technology and frequency of FPV-UAV use in nearby conflicts requires this potential threat to be closely monitored.

Annex 23: IED likely produced by ISIL-Somalia in Puntland

On 20 November 2023, a Puntland EOD team conducted a render-safe procedure on an IED. The remote-control device utilized a mobile telephone as a switch and had been emplaced to impact the employees of Bulsho Company in Bosaso, Bari region, Puntland.


Image 1: IED likely produced by ISIL-Somalia in Puntland



Source: “Sirdoonka Puntland oo Fashiliyay Qarax Miino oo Lagu Diyaariyay Boosaaso,” Puntland Post, 20 November 2023, <<https://puntlandpost.net/2023/11/20/sirdoonka-puntland-oo-fashiliyay-qarax-miino-oo-lagu-diyaariyay-boosaaso/>>


Annex 24: Analysis of Al-Shabaab Improvised Explosive Devices

Annex 24 – Appendix A: Chemical analysis of Al-Shabaab home-made explosive sample



Images 1 and 2, source: confidential source and Panel

In its 2020 and 2021 final reports (S/2021/849 and S/2020/949), the Panel reported on Al-Shabaab's ability to manufacture its own explosives including nitroglycerine. In the current reporting period, the Panel was able to conduct chemical analysis of a limited sample of home-made explosives (HME) extracted from Al-Shabaab manufactured IEDs. The chemical analysis confirmed the HME main charge was mainly nitroglycerine, a substance restricted under Annex C of resolution 2713 (2023). This analysis aligns with other examples of Al-Shabaab manufactured IEDs using nitroglycerine-based HME as the main charge and military grade explosive such as cyclotrimethylene trinitramine (RDX) as a booster charge (Source: Panel).



Annex 24 – Appendix B: Evolution of Al-Shabaab Improvised Explosive Device techniques, tactics and procedures

Image 1: IED produced by Al-Shabaab with additional waterproofing of key components to ensure functionality in heavy rains and flooding. Waterproofing is normally reserved for victim-operated devices that may have to lie dormant for longer periods of time.



Source: Confidential


Image 2 and 3: The Panel also takes note of signature IED assembly techniques such as adding copper wire coils to battery electrodes to ensure a more reliable connection to generate sufficient electrical charge to initiate the explosive device.

Source: Panel



Annex 24 – Appendix C: Continued availability of motorcycle alarms equipped with disturbance sensors in Somalia

The Panel has previously reported in its 2023 final report (S/2023/724) on specific risks that motorcycle alarms equipped with disturbance sensors pose to Somali and international EOD search teams. Despite the IED components restrictions outlined in Annex C of resolution 2713 (2023), long range learning code receivers and motorcycle alarms equipped with disturbance sensors, such as the one pictured here in image 1-5 below, are still readily available in Somalia or easily sourced from neighbouring countries (source: Panel).



This motorcycle alarm was purchased from a well-known Kenyan supermarket chain, as evident by the close-up image of the purchase tag on the motorcycle alarm box, image 2 (below left).

Source: Panel.

The speaker unit, in image 3 (above right), that is a part of the motorcycle alarm kit is reportedly used by Al-Shabaab IED operatives to test the alarm and ensure the device is functioning (source: Panel).

The second motorcycle alarm (image 4, pictured below), equipped with a disturbance sensor as well as a remote key fob to arm the alarm, was purchased in a market in Somalia for \$16 (source: Panel).



Annex 24 – Appendix D: Examples of Al-Shabaab IED device switches

Image 1: Al-Shabaab manufactured IEDs using similar motorcycle alarm switches found during a seizure of weapons, ammunition and IED components by the SNA on 6 August 2024 at an undisclosed location.

Source: confidential



Image 2: Learning code receivers found during a seizure of weapons, ammunition and IED components by SNA on 26 July 2024 at an undisclosed location. Two killed Al-Shabaab operatives are pictured with an IED steel container, two Honest LCR fobs, Al-Shabaab 'dynamite' or home-made explosive, a motorcycle lead acid battery, a Kalashnikov pattern Type 56-2 assault rifle, two ammunition magazines and materiel to implant the IED including duct tape and wire.

Source: Confidential source (NB: image blurred due to graphic content).



Annex 25: Vessels loading and transporting charcoal from Kismayo

Three consignments of charcoal were loaded in Kismayo in June 2024.


Vessels were not transmitting AIS signal at all times. Both the *MSV Fazlerabbi* and *Al Salima* reached Dubai in early August 2024. The charcoal was offloaded at Hamriya Port in early September 2024.¹⁷

Table: Vessels loaded in Kismayo in June and July 2024 as part of the one-off charcoal sale.

Name of Vessel	Flag	MMSI Number	Date Enter Port	Date Left Port	Destination	Consigner	Consignee	Size Consignment - bags
<i>FAHAD 4</i> 0007178	UAE	470007178	2/06/2024	4/06/2024	Hamriya, Dubai, UAE	Waamo Trade and Logistics	Yasmin General Trading LLC	40000
<i>MSV FAZLERABBI</i> 2192	India	419956786	10/07/2024	25/07/2024	Dubai, UAE			
<i>AL SALIMA-MNV-2190</i>	India	419956503	10/07/2024	25/07/2024	Dubai, UAE			

Source: Panel¹⁸

Figure 1: AIS data *Fahad 4* on 18 June 2024.



Source: Data Source Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite¹⁹

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

¹⁷ Confidential source, 6 September 2024.

¹⁸ Information from ONS, UN and confidential source. All dates except for the date the *Fahad 4* left port are approximate from source reports and derived from AIS.

¹⁹ <https://maritime.ihs.com>

Photo Source: *Fahad 4*: ONSFigure 2: AIS data MSV Fazlerabbi on 12 August 2024



Source: Source: Data Source Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Figure 3: AIS data Al Salima on 12 August 2024



Source: Data Source Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 26: Changes in Charcoal Stockpiles in and around Kismayo

Satellite image 1: Location of Charcoal Stockpile Sites in and around Kismayo where changes were noted




UNITED NATIONS
Map No. 4690.1 (SEP 2024)

Office of Information and Communications Technology
Geospatial Information Section

Source: UN GIS²⁰

²⁰ Colour map available in <https://www.un.org/geospatial/mandates/securitycouncil>

Satellite image 2: Changes in Stockpiles at Kismayo Market – between 17 May and 7 July 2024



Source: UN

GIS²¹



Satellite image 3: Changes in Stockpiles in south Kismayo – between 17 May and 7 July 2024

²¹ Colour map available in <https://www.un.org/geospatial/mandates/securitycouncil>

Charcoal stock at south Kismayo (Area-2)

UN Panel of Experts

Established pursuant to Resolution 2713 (2023)



UNITED NATIONS
Map No. 4690.3 (SEP 2024)

Office of Information and Communications Technology
Geospatial Information Section

Source: UN GIS²²

²² Colour map available in <https://www.un.org/geospatial/mandates/securitycouncil>

Annex 27: Maritime weapon interdictions 16 August 2023 to 15 August 2024

Between 16 August 2023 and 15 August 2024 several maritime interdictions were noted by the Panel. The majority of interdictions were by Puntland authorities. The following table represent some of the interdictions:

Table 1: Maritime Weapons Interdictions - 16 August 2023 to 15 August 2024

Vessel	Date	Place	Authority Intercepted	Detail
Boat	22/10/2023	Bossaso Port	Puntland Police Force	Puntland police seized a vessel, carrying weapons and ammunition allegedly smuggled from Yemen. The weapons included AK-pattern rifles, PKM-pattern machine guns, and pistols. A suspect was arrested.
Boat	23/10/2023	Al Ghayzah, Al Mahrah, Yemen	Yemen Police Forces	Al Ghaydah police intercepted a shipment of 250 small weapons from Somali nationals.
<i>Yunus</i> , Dhow	11/01/2024	49 nm northwest of Socotra, Yemen	US	Intercepted en route to Somali coast. Cargo was intended for ship to ship transfer to Yemen. Weapons included components for MRBM and ASCM, and propulsion and guidance components. (annex 28). 14 suspects arrested.
Boat	7/02/2024	Raas-Casayr	PMPF	Seizure of a boat carrying weapons allegedly intended for pirates. 3 suspects arrested.
Boat	7/02/2024	Carmo	Puntland Police	Weapon seizure. 5 suspected allegedly members of Al-Shabaab arrested.
Boat	15/02/2024	Ash Shihr Al Mahra, Yemen	Yemeni authorities	Yemeni authorities arrested 6 suspects allegedly involved in arms smuggling from Al Mahrah to Berbera on the Somali coasts with links to individuals in Houthi-controlled area.
Boat	2/05/2024	Eyl	PMPF	Weapons seized and pirate suspects arrested in counter-piracy operation.
Boat	18/05/2024	Bossaso	PMPF	Weapons seizure. 4 suspects arrested.
None	4/08/2024	Bossaso	PMPF & PISA	Weapons seizure including anti-aircraft ammunition, PKM-pattern machine guns, AK-pattern rifles, TNT powder, hand grenades, and camouflage uniforms. 3 suspects arrested including 2 Yemenis.

Source: Panel²³

²³ Compiled from PMPF, USCENTCOM, media reports and confidential sources.

Annex 28: 11 January 2024 - USCENTCOM seizes dhow carrying missile components

On 10 January 2024, USCENTCOM Navy forces identified an unflagged dhow, since then identified as the Yanus, which was assessed to be in the process of smuggling.²⁴ On 11 January 2024, U.S. Navy SEALs operating from USS Lewis B. Puller boarded the unflagged dhow near the coast of Somalia, 49nm (90km) northwest of Socotra, Yemen in international waters, seizing ballistic and cruise missile components, including propulsion, guidance, and warheads for medium range ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as Pan, Tilt, Zoom (PTZ) high speed cameras

The January 2024 smuggling operation was the third in a larger operation starting in August 2023. The operation allegedly involved two Iranian brothers, who smuggle materials from Iran to the Houthi rebel forces in Yemen. The brothers also coordinated and funded the operations. The crew under the captain completed multiple smuggling voyages, by travelling with weapons from Iran to the coast of Somalia and transferring the weapons to another dhow for a ship-to-ship transfer.²⁵

Timeline

First Smuggling Operation:

- Between August 2023 and October 2023: In August 2023, One of the Iranian brothers paid the captain of the dhow approximately 100 million Iranian Rials from a bank account registered in his name. The captain arranged for hawaladars to engage in hawala services to receive payments from the brothers in Iran and distribute the money to his family and others. The captain and one of the brothers prepared the dhow, Yunus for smuggling operations. They also obtained and had new equipment installed on the dhow.
- 26 October 2023: The brothers paid the captain through hawala services around 800 million Iranian Rials from a bank account in brother A's name.
- 28 October 2023: The Captain left the area of Chabahar Bay, Iran on the dhow and headed for the coast of Somalia.
- 11 November 2023: The crew steered the dhow to a specific latitude and longitude off the coast of Somalia that was provided to him via satellite phone, where they conducted a ship-to-ship transfer of the cargo to another vessel.

Second Smuggling operation

- Between 23 November and 29 November 2023, the captain worked with the brothers in preparation of a second smuggling voyage.
- From 25 November 2023: The captain recruited crewmembers for the upcoming smuggling voyage.
- 26 November 2023, brother B paid the captain through hawala services approximately 300 million Iranian Riyals from a bank account in brother A's name.
- 28 November 2023: The crew sailed the dhow from Konarak, Iran to Chabahar Port, Iran, where multiple bags of cargo were loaded on the dhow.
- 29 November 2023: The dhow left for the coast of Somalia.
- 5 December 2023: The second ship-to-ship transfer was executed off the coast of Somalia.
- 25 December 2023: On return the Iranian authorities allegedly arrested the crew, upon which brother A went to the prison where the captain and the crew were detained and facilitated their release.


²⁴ "USCENTCOM Seizes Iranian Advanced Conventional Weapons Bound for Houthis", USCENTCOM, 16 January 2024, <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3645241/uscentcom-seizes-iranian-advanced-conventional-weapons-bound-for-houthis/>

²⁵ U.S. Department of Justice, Mirkazei Superseding Indictment, July 2024, https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-08/mirkazei_superseding_indictment.pdf.

Third Smuggling Operation

- 3 January 2024: Brother B paid the captain through hawala services. The captain arranged to transfer approximately 800 million Iranian Rials through hawaladars to the families of his crew and to his own family. Brother B informed the captain that materials were ready for to be transported.
- 5 January 2024: The captain steered, the dhow from Konarak, Iran, to Chabahar Port, Iran, where various packages, which included advanced conventional weaponry such as a warhead, antiship cruise missile components, and ballistic missile components, from a truck in Chabahar Port, Iran into the net hold of the dhow.
- Between 5 January 5 and 11 January 2024: The dhow left the area of Chabahar Bay, Iran underway to the coast of Somalia. The captain communicated with brother A via satellite phone during the journey.
- 11 January 2024: The Boarding Team of the USS Lewis B. Puller interdicted the Yanus. On approach of the Boarding Team, the captain instructed the crew not to stop the dhow and to burn the dhow down. During the interdiction by the Boarding Team, he instructed the crewmembers not to identify him as the captain to the Boarding Team and to lie about the cargo on the dhow.

Image 1: The USS Lewis B. Puller conducted a night-time seizure of an illegal weapons on this dhow suspected of smuggling weapons.



Source: U.S. CENTCOM

Image 2: A search of the dhow revealed suspicious packages throughout the holds of the dhow



Source: U.S. CENTCOM

Image 3: The dhow tied alongside the USS Lewis B. Puller to allow for the offloading of missile components




Source: U.S. CENTCOM

Image 4: Suspicious material was concealed in tubing in the holds of the vessel during the search



Source: U.S. CENTCOM

Image 5: Missile components found on the intercepted dhow included Noor missile guidance sections, Noor missile motors, a Noor missile warhead, Qiam-4 missile motor systems, missile sets, Qiam-4 motor assemblies, and radar antenna assemblies for missiles. The blue missile is similar to a C-802 pattern anti-ship missile.



Source: U.S. CENTCOM²⁶

²⁶ "USCENTCOM Seizes Iranian Advanced Conventional Weapons Bound for Houthis", USCENCOM, 16 January 2024, <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3645241/uscentcom-seizes-iranian-advanced-conventional-weapons-bound-for-houthis/>

Image 6: Missile warhead found on the dhow similar to semi-armour piercing, blast fragmentation warheads designed to penetrate the hull of ships and then explode outward to maximize damage.



Source: U.S. CENTCOM

Annex 29: 5 February 2024 -Puntland Police Force weapon interdiction

On 5 February 2024, the Puntland Police Force arrested three men allegedly involved in piracy in the Ras Casey region, Puntland.²⁷ They also confiscated several items consistent with pirate operations such as firearms, including RPGs, PKM-pattern machine guns, AK-pattern rifles, ammunition and several containers with fuel.²⁸

Image 1: Containers for fuel and a PKM-pattern machine guns and ammunition (Source: Puntland State TV²⁹)



Image 2: Likely type 80 PKM-pattern machine guns and 7.62x54Rmm ammunition (source: Puntland State TV)



²⁷ Confidential Source 8 February 2024

²⁸ *Centre régional de fusion d'informations maritimes (CRFIM)*, Weekly Report, 5 to 11 February 2024

²⁹ Official Facebook Page of Puntland State TV, Garowe, 6 February 2024, https://web.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid02SL4tcKs9MYJZ4ec44qoXJCt929hY4oggSmSj9vf7SBwjMeUp29qdocB9yXsPKvy1l&id=100044155853572&sfsn=wa&mibextid=RUbZ1f&paipv=0&eav=Afb_xkDC-rKB6Fp4170bONrSf4o64oFghJTH4D_NgR-k3lIC3Y5umP_frsYRxLakfKQ&_rdc=1&_rdt

Image 3: Likely Type 69-1 pattern RPG-7 launcher (source: Puntland State TV)



Image 4: 40mm rocket propelled grenades (source: Puntland State TV)



Annex 30: 7 February 2024 weapon interdiction Puntland

On 7 February 2024, Puntland authorities intercepted a boat carrying weapons and arrested three suspects on the coast of Raas-Casayr town, Bari. It is alleged that the weapons were intended to be used for piracy.³⁰

Image 1: Weapons intercepted on 7 February 2024 (source: Puntland authorities ³¹)



Image 2: Weapons intercepted on 7 February 2024 (source: Puntland authorities)



³⁰ Dalsan TV Station on X, 7 February 2024, <https://x.com/DalsanTv/status/1755303232346157100>

³¹ Taliska Qaybta Booliska Gobolka Raas casayr, Raas Casey Police Division.

https://web.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02cbALnTRmCGH8B3i9fMXz2FEGWR5UTng6bDxq2CmbwyZ97JU7db2AQBjEdPfFYs2Ul&id=100063614635994&locale=cs_CZ

Annex 31: 18 May 2024 PMPF weapon interdiction

On 18 May 2024 the PMPF intercepted a shipment of weapons in Bossaso and arrested four suspected weapon smugglers.

Image 1: In the background - Type56, G3 rifles and 14.5mm heavy machine gun components were amongst the confiscated weapons.



Source: PMPF³²

Image 2: Shipment of weapons confiscated by the PMPF (source: PMPF)



³² PMPF, 18 May 2024.

Annex 32: 4 August 2024 Weapon Interdiction Puntland authorities

On 4 August 2024, PMPF troops in support of PISA seized weapons in Bossaso town.³³ Three individuals, a Somali national and two Yemeni nationals, were arrested.³⁴ Some of the weapons identified from the images are similar to weapons for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled area.³⁵ These are likely:

- Zastava assault rifles;
- Type 56-1 assault rifle;
- Colt M4 compact assault rifle;
- M80 light machine gun;
- M79 Osa 90mm anti-tank weapon;
- RPG-7 rocket launcher, (Al-Nasirah);
- Type 85 HMG; and
- HG-M75 and RG-4 grenades.

Image 1: In the background - type56 rifles and 14.5mm heavy machine gun components were amongst the confiscated weapons.



Source: PMPF ³⁶

³³ PMPF, 4 August 2024 <https://web.facebook.com/pmpfofficial/videos/3097168470420388>

³⁴ Confidential source.

³⁵ Panel of Experts on Yemen.

³⁶ PMPF, 4 August 2024 <https://web.facebook.com/photo?fbid=899059472251651&set=a.293674539456817>

Image 2: Type56 rifles and 14.5mm heavy machine gun components were amongst the confiscated weapons.



Source: PMPF

Image 3: Likely RG-4 and M75 grenades



Source: PMPF

Image 4: Mortar tube and PG-7 40mm grenades



Source: PMPF

Image 5: Likely 14.5mm HMG barrels, Type77 12.7mm machine guns, M4 and Type56 assault rifles, M79 Osa 90mm anti-tank weapon, M80 LMG, RG-4 and M75 grenades



Source: PMPF

Annex 33: Central Park Pirate Group

On 26 November 2023, the chemical tanker *Central Park* managed by an Israeli registered company was boarded in the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden³⁷, 53 nm off the coast of Somalia.³⁸ The suspects attempted to flee in their small boat when the *USS Mason* and coalition ships counter-piracy task force (TF 151) arrived on the scene.³⁹ They were intercepted and arrested by the crew of the *USS Mason*.

Prior to this incident, on 19 November 2023, the Bahamas-flagged, Israel affiliated, vehicle carrier *Galaxy Leader* was boarded by the Houthis from a helicopter in the Red Sea, hijacked and sailed to Hudaydah off the coast of Yemen. The fact that this hijacking of the *Central Park* was shortly after the *Galaxy Leader* and that no Somali piracy related hijackings on commercial vessels were recorded in several years, resulted in speculation that the hijacking was committed by or instigated by the Houthis working with Somali pirates. This perception was enforced when Houthi members took responsibility for the boarding on social media, and which was later disclaimed by Houthi leaders a day after the attempted hijacking.

Abdulmalik Alejri a senior member of the Ansar Allah (Houthi) Politburo wrote on 27 November 2023:

“The statements issued by the Yemeni Armed Forces are clear that their naval operations only target enemy Israeli ships, and that our naval forces are the authority authorized to carry out any naval operations, and do not allow any other party to carry out any piracy operations that threaten international navigation under any pretext, especially in the territorial waters adjacent to areas. The control of the National Authority in Sanaa, and with regard to the acts of piracy announced by the United States yesterday in the Gulf of Aden, if not a lofty theatrics, it confirms that the fragility of the situation in the occupied territories and the adjacent Yemeni territorial waters represents a suitable theatre for acts of piracy and terrorist groups. Its responsibility lies with the occupation forces.”⁴⁰

It was later confirmed by US authorities⁴¹ that the sole reason for the attack was hijack for ransom and that it was by no means political in nature. The pirate group was also not affiliated with any other group or larger pirate network.


³⁷ DNK IOC INTELLIGENCE REPORT (INTREP) – The threat from Somali Pirates in southern Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean, 13 January 2024

³⁸ UKMTO WARNING 003/NOV/2023

³⁹ <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1728982985238843665>

⁴⁰ Unofficial translation from <https://twitter.com/alejri77/status/1729203821358756030>

⁴¹ Confidential official source

Figure 1: Central Park Pirate Group⁴²

Source: Panel

Profile of suspects:

Two of the five suspects involved in the *Central Park* hijacking were previously involved in piracy and had been convicted for piracy.

Abdikarim Salah Mohamed Mohamud (Ow koombe) was part of a pirate gang based in the town of Alula. He was involved in the hijacking of the tanker, *Aris 13* on 13 March 2017. At that time, no hijackings of commercial ships were reported off the coast of Somalia since 2012. A two-day long standoff between pirates and the PMPF led to negotiations between the pirates, local elders and Puntland authorities and the tanker was subsequently released without the payment of a ransom on 16 March.⁴³ Mohamud was identified through call records from his satellite phone while onboard the *Aris 13*. On 8 April, he was part of a pirate team that hijacked the cargo vessel, *OS 35*. The Chinese and Indian Navies intercepted the vessel the next day and the suspect was apprehended and transferred to Puntland for

⁴² Confidential source.

⁴³ John Steed, March 2017.

prosecution and served part of his five-year sentence at Bosaso Central Prison. He escaped from Bosaso Central Prison on 5 March 2021⁴⁴ when Al-Shabaab attacked the prison and freed 400 prisoners, many members of Al-Shabaab.⁴⁵

Mohamed Ali Osman was arrested by the IN in 2010, prosecuted and released in 2018. The remaining three members had no prior affiliation with piracy and were each offered \$50,000 of the ransom money for their participation. The suspects had no funding from outside parties for logistics such as boats and fuel or weapons. They used a hijacked Yemeni boat to launch the attack, and two rusty AK pattern weapons were used in the attack.⁴⁶

The case was prosecuted by the Office of the Attorney General in Mogadishu and the weapons used during the attack, hammers and tools to break into the citadel and a video recording of the attack was placed into evidence. On 29 June 2024, the five pirates were found guilty and sentenced.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Confidential source.

⁴⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN2AX183/>

⁴⁶ Confidential source

⁴⁷ Confidential source.

Annex 34: The Bulk Carrier, *Ruen* Hijacking


On 14 December 2023, armed men boarded and hijacked the bulk carrier *Ruen* while underway approximately 700nm East of Bossaso. An Indian maritime patrol plane spotted the merchant ship during the early hours of 15 December, and established radio communications with the crew. According to information received, the 18 crew members were safe and locked in the citadel at the time. Later the same day, the suspected pirates managed to break into the citadel and capture the crew, hijacked the vessel and sailed it to the coast of Somalia.

On 18 December, the ship reached the Somali coast off Geesaley, east of Bossaso in northern Puntland.¹ According to the timeline provided by the Indian Navy, at that point, the pirate suspects allowed an injured member of the crew of the *MV Ruen* to be evacuated to the Indian Navy Ship *INS Kochi*, for medical care.² At this point in time, the *ESPS Victoria* was still tracking the *Ruen* as the GFRS granted the naval vessel ad hoc permission to continue to track the *Ruen* in Somali territorial waters; however, by 19 December the navy vessel left the area for logistical reasons.

The *MV Ruen* then sailed in a southern direction, along the coast of Puntland, moving to a location near Eyl in early January 2024.³ In a coordinated effort, EUNAVFOR and local authorities kept the *Ruen* under constant surveillance. The vessel remained at anchor near Eyl until 14 March 2024 when the ship was spotted on an eastbound course moving out of Somalia's Territorial Waters (STW).⁴⁸ At this stage, no ransom has been paid for the release of the vessel.⁴ The reason for this change in course by the *Ruen* is not clear, but it was speculated that the pirate suspects intended to use the *Ruen* as a mother vessel to hijack other ships.

On 15 March 2024, the Indian Navy reportedly located the *Ruen* approximately 260 nm off the coast of Somalia, confirming that the pirate suspects are still onboard with the help of an UAV, which the suspects allegedly shot down. At this time the pirates turned back to STW. The Indian Navy vessels *INS Kolkata* intercepted the *Ruen* on 16 March 2024, arrested all 35 pirate suspects, confiscated illegal arms, ammunition and contraband in the suspects possession, and safely evacuated the 17 crew members from the vessel.⁶

Image 1: MV Ruen: AIS track from 13 December 2023 to 17 March 2024



AIS Source: Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite

Source: Data Panel

⁴⁸ Confidential source.

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Image 2: MV Ruen - Activity onboard MV Ruen while under pirate control



Source: confidential source

Image 3: Logistical supplies taken to MV Ruen



Source: Confidential source

Image 4: Pirates onboard MV Ruen prior to Indian Navy boarding



Source: Indian Navy open source

Image 5: Pirate firing at IN asset from the deck of the MV Ruen



Source: Indian Navy open source

Image 6: Indian Navy rescue operation



Source: Indian Navy⁴⁹

Image 7: Indian Navy forces boarding Ruen



Source: Indian Navy open source

⁴⁹ “Anti-Piracy Operations against Pirate Ship MV Ruen by Indian Navy”, Indian Ministry of Defence, 16 March 2024, <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2015285%20>

Image 8: Pirate suspect apprehended by Indian Navy



Source: Indian Navy open source

Annex 35: The Bulk Carrier, MV Abdullah Hijacking

On 12 March 2024, the bulk carrier *Abdullah* with a crew of 23 Bangladeshi nationals, was boarded 525nm east of Mogadishu.⁵⁰ The ship was heading towards the Al Hamriyah Port in the UAE at the time, carrying coal from the port of Maputo in Mozambique.⁵¹ EU NAVFOR ATALANTA reported that they contacted the captain of the *Abdullah* who confirmed that there were 20 suspected pirates on board and that the ship's crew were not in the citadel. The suspects took control of the vessel and proceeded towards the Somali coast.⁵²

Shortly after the hijacking a video recording of the attack⁵³, a crew list⁵⁴, an audio recording in Bangla from a mobile WhatsApp account claiming to be from Chief Officer Atiq Ullah Khan to SR Shipping CEO Mohammad Meherul Karim, and another WhatsApp message appearing to be from one Hossain in English, were posted to the Facebook accounts belonging to crew members and accounts belonging to family of the crew.

Part of the translated message allegedly from Chief Officer Atiq Ullah Khan reads as follow:

"...[O]ur ship holds sustenance for 20-25 days, which includes 200 MT of fresh water. We already requested everybody to use the water cautiously and we shall handle the provisions accordingly. There are 55 thousand tons of coal on board, which is a fire hazard, and methane concentration may also go up. The last time we checked the oxygen level, it was 9/10%, which we need to monitor regularly. If the methane level increases, we shall have to consult with the experts. Kindly make arrangements for this."

According to the crew the pirates were looking for a possible target for more than a month before they found and attacked the *Abdullah*. The pirates used the satellite phones onboard the *Abdullah* for instructions after they gained control over the ship and crew. Once on the coast they requested mobile phones. While at anchor there were up to 65 individuals onboard at times, but only one suspect spoke English with the crew. The crew of the *Abdullah* reported that the pirates had close links to the community, they were well organized, had basic knowledge of the communication and bridge equipment, and they maintained their weapons. They constantly chewed khat and they were never hostile to the crew.⁵⁵

On 23 March 2023 the *Abdullah* was anchored 36nm south of Eyl in close proximity to where the *Ruen* was anchored while ransom negotiations were ongoing.⁵⁶ The *Abdullah* was released on 13 April 2024 on payment of ransom. The potentially hazardous nature of the coal on board could be the reason why ransom negotiations were concluded in a relatively short time. The Panel is awaiting a response of the owners concerning this matter. The ransom was dropped in the ocean from a small plane that circled the *Abdullah*. Interviews with the crew after the release resulted in information with regard to the identities of the pirate suspects.⁵⁷

⁵⁰ Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) Alert number 038 / 2024 - UPDATE 009.

⁵¹ IFC IOR MMSU March 2024.

⁵² MSCHOA.

⁵³ <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=802824491871456>


⁵⁴ <https://web.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1143880173649061&set=pcb.1143880290315716>

⁵⁵ Confidential source.

⁵⁶ MSCHOA Alert number 038 / 2024 - UPDATE 009

⁵⁷ Confidential source

Image 1: AIS track Abdullah before and after hijacking



AIS Source: Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite, accessed March 2024

Data Source: Panel

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Image 2: Pirates approaching the Abdullah



Source: Image from videos posted on Facebook pages of crew and family of crew.

Image 3: Pirate boarding the Abdullah



Source: Image from videos posted on Facebook pages of crew and family of crew.⁵⁸

Full unofficial translation of an audio recording in Bangla from a mobile WhatsApp account claiming to be from Chief Officer Atiq Ullah Khan to SR Shipping CEO Mohammad Meherul Karim⁵⁹

“I am the Chief Officer of Abdullah ship, speaking. This morning, around 10.30 am GMT 7.30, a speed boat approached us at high speed. Hearing the ship alarm, we all went to the bridge, and from there, we went to ...(inaudible)...Captain and the second office were there. We tried reaching UKMTO, but they didn’t


⁵⁸ <https://web.facebook.com/watch/?v=802824491871456>

⁵⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=770861178324830>

receive the call. By the time pirates arrived, they had captured the Captain and the second officer. They called all of us and fired some blank shots. They didn't attack anyone. Then, more pirates came in another speed boat, a total of 15-20 of them. After a while, a pirate fishing boat arrived. That was an Iranian boat that the pirates captured a month back. Since then, the pirates have been doing reconnaissance in the fishing boat, looking for a ship. They wanted to release the Iranian fishing boat and refuel it from our ship. We used the pump and refueled the fishing boat. Then, the pirates went to the engine room and shut down the ship. There has been no damage or casualties as of now by the grace of almighty, but everyone is afraid. Our ship holds sustenance for 20-25 days, which includes 200 MT of fresh water. We already requested everybody to use the water cautiously and we shall handle the provisions accordingly. There are 55 thousand tons of coal on board, which is a fire hazard, and methane concentration may also go up. The last time we checked the oxygen level, it was 9/10%, which we need to monitor regularly. If the methane level increases, we shall have to consult with the experts. Kindly make arrangements for this. Please pray for us and our families. God bless you, sir."

(Unofficial Bangla translation)

Image 5: Pirate watch positions MV Abdullah



Source: Confidential source

Image 6: Pirates onboard MV Abdullah




Source: Confidential source

Image 7: Pirates onboard MV Abdullah



Source: confidential source

Image 8: Pirate Weapons onboard Abdullah



Source: confidential source

Image 9: Ransom drop in sea for Abdullah and crew




Source: confidential source

Annex 36: Attempted Hijacking Products Tanker *Chrystal Arctic*

On 10 May 2024, the Products Tanker, *Chrystal Arctic* were approached from the starboard side by six armed men in a skiff approximately 96 nautical miles northwest of Bossaso. An RPG, AK-pattern rifles and ladder could be observed onboard the skiff. The tanker altered course and sounded its horn in an attempt to prevent boarding from the men in the skiff, but the skiff continued its approach. The onboard security team on the *Chrystal Arctic* showed their weapons, after which the skiff started firing. The armed guards shot 4 rounds which started a fire on the skiff, which later sunk. The skiff did not make use of a mothership during the operation.⁶⁰

After the attack was repelled by the security team, one of ATALANTA warships in the area responded and arrested the six suspected pirates.⁶¹ EUNAVFOR treated injured pirates while one was transferred to hospital and later died from his injuries. On 14 May 2024, the remaining five suspects were delivered to Seychelles Authorities, with whom ATALANTA has a legal agreement for the trial of suspected pirates arrested by warships.

Image 1: AIS track *Crystal Arctic*



AIS Source: Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite accessed May 2024


Data Source: Panel

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

⁶⁰ Confidential source.

⁶¹ "Updated Information on MV *Chrystal Arctic* Event", European Union Naval Force, 13 May 2024 <https://eunavfor.eu/news/updated-information-mv-chrystal-arctic-event>

Image 2: GPS tracks from pirates' skiff between Yemen and Somalia led to the assumption that the crew was also involved in other illegal activities



Source: confidential source

Disclaimer: The boundaries used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Image 3: The blue hulled skiff involved in the attack of the Chrystal Artic caught fire. The suspects were saved by EUNAVFOR.



Blue hulled skiff responsible for attack



Skiff caught fire



Suspects arrested by EUNAVFOR

Source: confidential source

Annex 37: Boarding General Cargo Ship *Basilisk*

On 23 May 2024, six armed suspects in two skiffs attacked and boarded the Liberian flagged general cargo ship, *Basilisk*⁶² approximately 280 nm from Hobyo, Somalia. All crew, except for the captain, took shelter in the citadel.⁶³ There was no communication equipment in the citadel⁶³ which was why the master stayed on the bridge to establish communication for a possible rescue. The pirate suspects were aggressive, and the master sustained a bullet wound in his arm. The pirates were unable to breach the citadel, but damaged the opening mechanism in the process which meant that the crew was unable to open the door from the inside.

Subsequently, Spanish Frigate *Canarias*, part of Operation ATALANTA, intercepted and boarded the cargo vessel fast roping from a helicopter, but no pirates were found onboard. The injured crewmember received medical assistance by the crew of the *Canarias*. The vessel continued to the next port of call.⁶⁴

The crew did not implement BMP5, the citadel was unprepared, and the crew were also unaware that they were in an area that had a high piracy risk.

The skiffs likely operated from Garacaa. Reports from Garacaa local fisheries union indicate that the pirates who attacked the *Basilisk* returned to the Garacaa Area with their hijacked a fishing dhow at coordinates 07.063870N 49.432530E.

Image 1: AIS tracks *Basilisk*



⁶² Indian Navy, Monthly Maritime Security Update: May 2024, International Fusion Centre, Indian Ocean Region, May 2024 https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/ifc-ior/static/data/reports/monthly/MMSU_May_2024.pdf

⁶³ MSCHOA Alert number 051/2024.

⁶⁴ "Merchant Vessel *Basilisk* Liberated," European Union Naval Force, 24 May 2024, <https://eunavfor.eu/news/merchant-vessel-basilisk-liberated>.

AIS Source: Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite accessed May 2024


Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Image 2: The pirates were unable to breach the citadel, but damaged the opening mechanism



Source: confidential source

Image 3: Boarding team from Spanish Frigate Canarias fast rope onto Basilisk deck



Source: EUNAVFOR⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Ibid

Annex 38: Interceptions, arrests and prosecution of pirate suspects

In total, eight vessels were intercepted by naval forces and the Seychelles Coast Guard. Seventy piracy suspects were apprehended in 13 cases by EUNAVFOR, the US Navy, the Indian Navy, the Seychelles Coast Guard, and Somali authorities between the end of November 2023 and mid of May 2024.

Table: List of Interceptions, Arrests and Prosecution of Pirate Suspects

Name of Vessel and Flag	Date Intercepted	Intercepting Authority	Country Prosecuting	Details of the incident	Number suspects arrested
Central Park, Chemical Tanker, Liberia	26/11/2023	US Navy	Mogadishu, Somalia	On 26/11/2023 the MV Central Park was boarded by 5 suspects. The USS Mason and coalition ships intercepted and arrested the suspects. On 26/12/2023 suspects were transferred to authorities in Mogadishu. The case proceeded to court on 18/05/2024 and all 5 individuals were found guilty and sentenced on 29/06/2024.	5
Lorenzo Putha-4, Fishing Dhow, Sri Lanka	28/01/2024	Seychelles Coast Guard	Seychelles	Intercepted by the Seychelles Coast Guard 230 nautical miles from Seychelles and 3 suspects detained.	3
Iman, Dhow, Iran	29/01/2024	Indian Navy	Suspects likely released	INS Sumitra responded to a distress message from the Iman which had been boarded by pirate suspects. INS Sumitra intercepted the vessel and released the 17 crew members.	0
Al Naeemi, Dhow, Iran	29/01/2024	Indian Navy	Suspects likely released	Al Naeemi was boarded off Abo, Somalia. INS Sumitra intercepted the dhow and released the crew.	0
Omari, Dhow, Iran	2/02/2024	Indian Navy	Suspects likely released	Dhow hijacked on 31/01/2024 off the East coast of Somalia by 7 suspects. Intercepted on 2/02/2024 by INS Sharda and 19 fishermen released.	0
Unknown	5/02/2024	Puntland State Police	Puntland, Somalia	The Puntland State Police arrested 3 suspects.	3

Ruen, Bulk Carrier, Malta	24/02/2024	Puntland State Police	Puntland, Somalia	The Puntland State Police arrested 3 suspects.	3
Ruen, Bulk Carrier, Malta	16/03/2024	Indian Navy	Mumbai, India	INS Kolkata intercepted the Ruen and arrested 35 pirate suspects. On 8/08/2024 it was decided that all suspects will be prosecuted as adults.	35
Abdullah, Bulk Carrier, Bangladesh	17/03/2024	Mudug Regional Police and PMPF	Puntland, Somalia	On 17/03/2024 the Mudug Regional Police and the PMPF captured a vehicle that was delivering supplies to pirates in control of the MV Abdullah near Jiifle.	2
Al Kambar 786, Fishing Dhow, Iran	29/03/2024	Indian Navy	Mumbai, India	Boarded on 29/03/2024 by nine armed suspects approximately 90 nm southwest of Socotra. INS Sumedha intercepted vessel, rescued the crew of 23 Pakistanis and arrested the suspects.	9
Abdullah, Bulk Carrier, Bangladesh	13/04/2024		Likely released	The vessel was released on 13/04/2024. On the same day pirate suspects were reportedly arrested by Puntland Authorities and a part of the ransom recovered. The Panel found some discrepancies in reports. Government sources reported 4 suspects arrested while 8 were reported in the media.	4
Chrystal Arctic, Products Tanker, Marshall Islands	10/05/2024	EUNAVFOR	Seychelles	6 suspected pirates apprehended. The case is under investigation. One injured pirate died. Remainder delivered to Seychelles Authorities on 13/05/2024. ATALANTA has a legal agreement with the Seychelles allowing for the trial of suspected pirates arrested by warships. The Seychelles' Supreme Court set trial date for mid-January 2025.	6

Source: Panel

Image 1: Pirate suspects who hijacked the *Al-Naeemi* apprehended by the Indian Navy



Source: Indian Navy published in open source

Image 2: Three armed suspects on the Dhow, *Al-Naeemi*



Source: Indian Navy open source

Image 3: Dhow *Omari*



Source: Indian Navy open source

Image 4: Dhow *Omari*



Source: Indian Navy open source

Image 5: Indian Navy arrested suspects on *Al-Kambar*



Source: Indian Navy open source

Annex 39: Vessels held by Somali Pirates

Since 22 November 2023, two bulk carriers and several fishing dhows have been hijacked off the coast of Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Western Indian Ocean. It is not clear how many dhows are currently held by pirates off the coast of Somalia, but it is likely that the majority has been released. As per the information received by the Panel, the list below contains vessels that are/were allegedly held by pirates off the coast of Puntland or used as motherships in the attack of commercial vessels. The motive of hijacking of dhows is also often related to fisheries conflict between Somali fishermen and foreign dhows.¹

Table: List of hijacked vessels held by Somali Pirates

Ship Name	Type of Vessel	Flag	Date	Released
AL-MERAJ 1	Fishing Dhow	Iran	22/11/2023	5/12/2023
AL-ASHKAAN	Fishing Dhow	Iran	29/11/2023	Yes
RUEN	Bulk carrier	Malta	14/12/2023	16/03/2024
EMERAT-2	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	22/12/2023	11/01/2024
FATAH AL KHAIR	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	22/12/2023	11/01/2024
AL SAQAR 1	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	30/12/2023	
AL YOOS No 81	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	2/01/2024	3/01/2024
AL ANDALUS	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	12/01/2024	
UNKNOWN	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	12/01/2024	
AL JABAR	Fishing Dhow	Yemen	18/01/2024	
AL WAHEEB	Fishing Dhow	Unknown	19/01/2024	
FV AL MECCA	Fishing Dhow	Unknown	28/01/2024	
UNKNOWN	Fishing Dhow	Iran	2/03/2024	
ABDULLAH	Bulk Carrier	Bangladesh	12/03/2024	13/04/2024
UNKNOWN	Fishing Dhow	Unknown	13/05/2024	

Source: Panel


Image 1: AIS track fishing dhow, *Almeraj 1*



AIS Source: Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite accessed January 2024

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 40: Pirate Launching sites, camps and anchorages




Map: Thematic Mapping

Source: Panel⁶⁶

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

⁶⁶ Compiled from information received from the PMPF, piracy reports and confidential source.

Annex 41: Patterns of displacement in 2024



Annex 42: UN reported statistics of SGBV and CRSV

Except from report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). “Tackling Sexual Violence in Somalia: Prevention and Protection”. Page 10-11, 7 May 2024 (OHCHR-UNSOM report, May 2024).

“Between 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2022 16 the GBVIMS data gathering organizations reached 1,606,105 with gender-based violence (GBV) prevention, response, and capacity-building services mainly required by women who reported some form of violence against them. While the data available from the GBVIMS covers a four- year period only (instead of the six years covered by the report), service providers reached a significant number of individuals requiring GBV services in this timeframe, thereby illustrating the context is one in which there is systematic violence against women, including in areas where the MARA and the MRM cannot access.


Between 2017 and 2022, the MARA verified cases of CRSV perpetrated against 105 women, 37 girls, two boys and one man. For the same reporting period, the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) through the MRM verified incidents of sexual violence against 1,810 girls and 13 boys.

Yearly figures show that for the MRM the number of verified violations ranged between 331 in 2017 to 221 in 2022 with 2020 having the highest number of 406 as follows: 331 in 2017, 331 in 2018, 227 in 2019, 406 in 2020, 307 in 2021 and 221 in 2022. These numbers give an average number of violations of 303.

For the MARA, the number of verified violations ranged between 22 survivors in 2017 to 19 survivors in 2022, with 2021 having the highest number of 31 as follows: 22 in 2017, 22 in 2018, 28 in 2019, 23 in 2020, 31 in 2021 and 19 in 2022. These numbers give an average of 24 survivors.”

Annex 43: IOM table on the path followed by women that disengaged from Al-Shabaab**ENTRY TO AL-SHABAAB (AS)**

- **Direct role/participation** in the AS acts of violent extremism as perpetrator
i.e. spies, recruiters, transport of weapons planting of explosive items, fundraising for AS activities
- **Indirect role/non-combative** i.e. as cooks, cleaners, wives of AS fighters etc.

**EXIT FROM AL-SHABAAB**

* wives of active AS who did not follow their husbands into the group are not included

Figure 5: IOM table on the path followed by women that disengaged from Al-Shabaab

Annex 44: Use and recruitment of children by Al-Shabaab

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
