



Conseil de sécurité

Distr. générale
11 octobre 2024
Français
Original : anglais

Lettre datée du 11 octobre 2024, adressée à la Présidente du Conseil de sécurité par le Groupe d'experts sur le Yémen

Les membres du Groupe d'experts sur le Yémen ont l'honneur de vous faire tenir ci-joint le rapport final qu'ils ont établi en application du paragraphe 3 de la résolution [2707 \(2023\)](#).

Ce rapport a été soumis le 6 septembre 2024 au Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), qui l'a examiné le 19 septembre 2024.

Nous vous serions reconnaissants de bien vouloir porter le texte de la présente lettre et du rapport à l'attention des membres du Conseil de sécurité et de le faire distribuer comme document du Conseil.

(Signé) Debi Prasad **Dash**
Coordonnateur

(Signé) Jasser **Alshahed**
Expert

(Signé) Raymond **Debelle**
Expert

(Signé) Patrícia **Pinto Soares**
Experte

(Signé) Miriam **Zampatti**
Experte



Rapport final du Groupe d'experts sur le Yémen créé en application de la résolution 2140 (2014) du Conseil de sécurité

Résumé

À l'origine un conflit armé interne, le conflit au Yémen, qui a débuté il y a dix ans, a évolué en confrontation régionale pour prendre maintenant les proportions d'une crise internationale majeure. La guerre à Gaza a marqué un tournant dans la dynamique régionale et s'est répercutée sur le processus de paix au Yémen, auquel elle a porté un coup d'arrêt. L'accord relatif à une feuille de route ne pourra être signé que lorsque la situation régionale s'y prêtera et que les houthistes auront cessé de s'en prendre aux navires en mer Rouge.

Les houthistes ont exploité la situation régionale et renforcé leur coopération avec « l'axe de la résistance », en violation du régime de sanctions prévu par la résolution 2140 (2014) du Conseil de sécurité. Selon les informations recueillies par le Groupe d'experts, ils reçoivent une assistance technique, des formations, des armes et un soutien financier de la République islamique d'Iran, de groupes armés irakiens et du Hezbollah. Des centres opérationnels conjoints ont aussi été mis en place en Iraq et au Liban avec une représentation houthiste, dans le but de coordonner les actions militaires conjointes de l'axe de la résistance.

La collaboration accrue entre les houthistes et des groupes terroristes tels qu'Al-Qaida dans la péninsule arabique est aussi préoccupante. Les deux groupes sont convenus de renoncer à l'affrontement interne, de transférer des armes et de coordonner leurs attaques contre les forces du Gouvernement yéménite. On observe également une augmentation des activités de contrebande d'armes légères et de petit calibre entre les houthistes et les Chabab, certains éléments indiquant le partage de matériel militaire ou le recours à un fournisseur commun. Les sanctions imposées aux houthistes n'auront qu'un impact limité tant que des mesures appropriées n'auront pas été prises contre l'ensemble des responsables de violations du régime des sanctions.

L'ampleur, la nature et le volume des transferts par des sources extérieures de matériel et de technologies militaires divers aux houthistes, y compris le soutien financier et la formation des combattants, sont sans précédent.

Lors du défilé militaire organisé à Sanaa en septembre 2023, les houthistes ont présenté plusieurs missiles balistiques, missiles de croisière, missiles antinavires, missiles sol-air, drones, drones d'attaque unidirectionnels, patrouilleurs d'attaque rapide, drones de surface, systèmes de surveillance électro-optiques, mines terrestres et mines marines. Sans aide extérieure, ils ne peuvent développer et produire la plupart des équipements susmentionnés. Depuis janvier 2023, le Gouvernement yéménite a intercepté de nombreux articles militaires et à double usage. En janvier 2024, les États-Unis d'Amérique ont intercepté dans les eaux internationales deux navires transportant du matériel létal, notamment des composants de missiles et d'engins sous-marins sans pilote, qui s'acheminaient apparemment vers des zones contrôlées par les houthistes.

Les houthistes ont adopté une stratégie d'escalade progressive en ciblant les navires marchands et les navires militaires en mer Rouge. Le détournement du navire *Galaxy Leader* a eu lieu le 19 novembre 2023 et, à ce jour, les 25 membres d'équipage, de nationalités différentes, sont toujours détenus. En réponse, différentes forces de la coalition navale internationale ont été formées afin de dissuader les houthistes et de protéger la liberté de navigation. Les houthistes ne se laissent pas décourager pour autant et continuent d'attaquer les navires. Au moins 134 attaques

ont été lancées depuis des zones contrôlées par les houthistes contre des navires, notamment des navires militaires des États-Unis et du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, au moyen de nouveaux modèles de missiles.

Sur le plan intérieur, les houthistes ont intensifié leurs opérations contre le Gouvernement yéménite, voulant ainsi réaliser des avancées sur plusieurs fronts. Ils ont également recruté un grand nombre de jeunes et d'enfants yéménites, de migrants en situation irrégulière et de mercenaires venus de tribus éthiopiennes. Sur le plan interne, la situation militaire est fragile et tout événement interne ou externe pourrait déclencher la reprise des affrontements militaires.

Pour financer leurs activités militaires, les houthistes continuent d'adopter diverses mesures illégales afin de générer d'importantes ressources à des fins militaires. Ils usent de leur contrôle sur le secteur des télécommunications afin de solliciter des fonds publics pour la « force aérienne » des drones et les « forces de défense côtière » en envoyant des millions de messages aux abonnés. Les houthistes utilisent divers réseaux opérant depuis différentes juridictions, notamment des sociétés écrans et des sociétés de change, pour financer leurs activités, en particulier dans le secteur du pétrole et du gaz de pétrole liquéfié. Les réseaux houthistes utilisent de faux documents tels que les certificats d'origine, ont recours aux transferts de navire à navire et déploient des navires qui désactivent régulièrement le système d'identification automatique pendant les traversées afin que les ports visités et les itinéraires empruntés ne soient pas détectés, ou afin d'éviter les inspections par le Mécanisme de vérification et d'inspection des Nations Unies. Les houthistes continuent également d'utiliser de manière généralisée et illégale du personnel armé pour geler ou confisquer les biens de particuliers et d'entités, prendre le contrôle de sociétés, se livrer à une vaste contrebande d'armes, de drogues, de matériel de télécommunication à double usage, de pesticides, de médicaments et d'objets culturels yéménites.

Les personnes visées dans le cadre du régime de sanctions prévu par la résolution 2140 (2014), celles qui agissent en leur nom ou sur leurs instructions et les entités qu'elles possèdent ou contrôlent continuent de recevoir, de posséder ou de contrôler, directement ou indirectement, des fonds, d'autres avoirs financiers et des ressources économiques. Les sanctions financières ont été d'une efficacité limitée. Cela s'explique d'une part par l'approche adoptée par la communauté internationale pour éviter que les sanctions financières n'entraînent des conséquences humanitaires néfastes, et d'autre part par l'incapacité du Gouvernement yéménite de geler les avoirs soumis au contrôle effectif des autorités désignées par les houthistes et se trouvant dans les zones contrôlées par ces derniers.

Les houthistes ont tenté à plusieurs reprises d'imprimer des billets de banque à l'étranger. Les rivalités se sont intensifiées, lorsque le 30 mars 2024, la Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Sanaa a émis une nouvelle pièce de 100 rials, qui a ensuite été déclarée comme fausse monnaie par la Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Aden. Plus récemment, cette dernière a révoqué les licences de six grandes banques basées à Sanaa et menacé de les retirer de la Société de télécommunications interbancaires mondiales (SWIFT). Ces banques réalisent un grand nombre de transferts de fonds internationaux, notamment pour le compte de plusieurs entités contrôlées par les houthistes. L'interdiction a donc porté atteinte aux intérêts économiques des houthistes, qui ont alors menacé de reprendre la guerre et de lancer des attaques transfrontalières contre des infrastructures économiques vitales du Royaume d'Arabie saoudite. Le gouverneur de la Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Aden a vu sa maison de Sanaa attaquée et ses biens saisis par un tribunal constitué par les houthistes.

Toutefois, grâce aux efforts de médiation sérieux déployés rapidement par les parties prenantes, la Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Aden serait revenue sur sa décision de révocation émise contre lesdites banques. Le conflit a été désamorcé et la guerre évitée. Quant au Gouvernement yéménite et au Conseil de transition du Sud, la réponse de la communauté internationale leur a fortement déplu. Cela souligne le risque qu'un problème économique dégénère en véritable guerre, d'où l'importance et l'urgence de remédier aux difficultés économiques qui menacent depuis longtemps la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité du Yémen. Les liens entre intérêts économiques, luttes de pouvoir politiques et actions militaires font apparaître la complexité de la situation au Yémen. Les attaques houthistes contre les navires marchands en mer Rouge ont eu un effet d'entraînement, le Yémen étant le premier touché. L'augmentation considérable des coûts de transport et d'assurance a entraîné une hausse des prix des biens essentiels au niveau mondial. L'interdiction persistante imposée par les houthistes sur les exportations de pétrole brut, qui a asséché les réserves en devises et entraîné la dévaluation du rial yéménite, a eu de graves répercussions sur la prestation de services publics dans les zones contrôlées par le Gouvernement yéménite. Cette situation a entraîné des manifestations régulières, des troubles publics et des querelles entre le Conseil de transition du Sud et le Gouvernement yéménite, ce qui menace la stabilité politique et économique du pays.

Les violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit des droits humains, en particulier par les houthistes, se poursuivent. Il s'agit notamment d'attaques indiscriminées contre des civils et des biens de caractère civil, de violences sexuelles liées au conflit et de violence fondée sur le genre, notamment de violence fondée sur l'orientation sexuelle et l'identité de genre, ainsi que de torture et d'autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants. Les cas de détentions arbitraires, de disparitions forcées et d'entrave à l'accès à l'aide humanitaire, à l'acheminement et à la distribution de celle-ci sont nombreux. Des informations font état de plusieurs violations graves du droit à une procédure régulière, qui bien souvent entraînent des condamnations à mort, apparemment pour réprimer toute opposition.

La détention arbitraire de membres de personnel humanitaire et leur mise au secret par les houthistes ainsi que la saisie de biens appartenant à des acteurs humanitaires sont particulièrement alarmantes. Ces actes empêchent l'accomplissement des mandats humanitaires et entravent les efforts déployés par l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour promouvoir la paix et la sécurité au Yémen. En outre, le recrutement et l'utilisation d'enfants dans le conflit menacent la stabilité future de la société yéménite et les perspectives de paix et de sécurité durables.

Les camps d'été sont utilisés par les houthistes pour propager la haine, la violence et la discrimination. Les professionnels de l'éducation qui s'opposent à la politisation du système éducatif s'exposent à de graves représailles, notamment des détentions arbitraires et des disparitions forcées. Autre constat préoccupant, les houthistes produisent localement des mines terrestres, en plaçant certains mécanismes de déclenchement destinés à accroître les préjudices causés aux humains. La neutralisation des mines terrestres est devenue plus dangereuse pour les démineurs, notamment parce que les houthistes ne suivent pas de plan de pose de mines.

Toutes ces violations politiques, économiques, humanitaires et de sécurité, qui sont inextricablement liées, doivent faire l'objet d'une réponse globale.

Table des matières

	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction	6
II. Actes entravant la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité au Yémen	7
A. Dynamique régionale	7
B. Dynamique nationale	11
III. Sécurité maritime	15
A. Attaques houthistes contre des navires marchands et des navires militaires	15
B. Menaces adressées par les houthistes contre les compagnies maritimes	17
IV. Armes et application de l'embargo ciblé sur les armes	18
Violations de l'embargo sur les armes d'une ampleur sans précédent	18
V. Application des sanctions financières	28
Violations des dispositions relatives au gel des avoirs.	28
VI. Actes contraires au droit international humanitaire et au droit international des droits humains	37
A. Attaques indiscriminées contre des civils et des biens de caractère civil.	38
B. Détentions arbitraires et disparitions forcées.	40
C. Violences sexuelles liées au conflit et violences fondées sur le genre	41
D. Violations des droits des enfants	42
E. Entrave à l'accès humanitaire ainsi qu'à l'acheminement et à la distribution de l'aide	43
VII. Recommandations	45
Annexes*	47

* Les annexes sont distribuées uniquement dans la langue de l'original et n'ont pas été revues par les services d'édition.

I. Introduction

1. Le présent rapport, soumis au Conseil de sécurité en application du paragraphe 3 de la résolution 2707 (2023), couvre la période du 1^{er} septembre 2023 au 31 juillet 2024¹ et comprend des conclusions actualisées à partir des enquêtes qui avaient été citées dans le cadre du rapport final du Groupe d'experts sur le Yémen daté du 2 novembre 2023 (S/2023/833).

2. Le mandat du Groupe d'experts a été prorogé le 14 novembre 2023 par le Conseil de sécurité dans sa résolution 2707 (2023) jusqu'au 15 décembre 2024. Sur les cinq membres du Groupe d'experts désignés par le Secrétaire général (S/2024/50 et S/2024/418), les contrats de l'expert en armements, de l'expert en questions financières et de l'expert en affaires régionales ont débuté le 19 janvier 2024 et les contrats de l'experte en groupes armés et de l'experte en droit international humanitaire ont débuté le 5 juin 2024 et le 15 juillet 2024, respectivement. Par conséquent, les enquêtes sur les violations du droit international humanitaire et des droits humains commises pendant la période considérée n'en sont qu'à leurs débuts.

3. Le Groupe d'experts a adopté les meilleures pratiques et méthodes recommandées par le Groupe de travail informel du Conseil de sécurité sur les questions générales relatives aux sanctions (voir S/2006/997). Il a mis l'accent en particulier sur le respect des normes relatives à la transparence, à l'objectivité et aux sources, preuves documentaires et allégations corroborées par des sources indépendantes et vérifiables, et donné à ses interlocuteurs la possibilité de répondre². Le Groupe d'experts a maintenu également une coopération avec l'Équipe d'appui analytique et de surveillance des sanctions créée par la résolution 1526 (2004) et coopéré étroitement avec le Groupe d'experts créé par la résolution 2713 (2023).

4. En 2024, les membres du Groupe d'experts se sont rendus en France, en Israël, en Arabie saoudite, aux Émirats arabes unis, au Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, aux États-Unis d'Amérique et au Yémen (Aden et Moukalla)³. Dans une demande adressée à la République islamique d'Iran, le Groupe d'experts a sollicité la possibilité de se rendre à Téhéran du 28 au 30 juillet 2024. Toutefois, la République islamique d'Iran a indiqué ne pas être en mesure d'accueillir la délégation à la période proposée en raison de l'élection présidentielle qui s'y déroulait. Le Groupe d'experts a alors proposé la date du 24 août 2024 pour la tenue d'une réunion à Téhéran, mais n'a toujours pas reçu de réponse. Il a procédé à des inspections physiques de matériel, notamment des composants de missiles et des munitions saisis par l'Arabie saoudite, les États-Unis et le Gouvernement yéménite. Il a tenu des réunions en présentiel et s'est entretenu à distance avec un large éventail d'interlocuteurs, dont plusieurs États Membres. Le Groupe d'experts a également rencontré le Premier Ministre, le Ministre des affaires étrangères et d'autres responsables du Gouvernement yéménite lors de ses visites à Aden et à Riyad en mars et en juillet 2024.

¹ La période couverte dans le rapport final du Groupe d'experts (S/2023/833) s'est achevée le 31 août 2023 ; le présent rapport final couvre donc la période du 1^{er} septembre 2023 au 31 juillet 2024. La date limite d'examen des réponses des États Membres et des entités aux questions du Groupe d'experts était fixée au 15 août 2024.

² On trouvera un complément d'information sur la méthode de travail du Groupe d'experts et la possibilité de répondre à l'annexe 1.

³ Les principaux lieux au Yémen sont épelés selon les transcriptions utilisées par le Système d'information géographique des Nations Unies sur la carte figurant à l'annexe 2.

5. Le Groupe d'experts a adressé 204 lettres officielles, dont 161 à 46 États Membres et 43 à des organisations, entités et sociétés ; il attendait encore 128 réponses au 15 août 2024 (voir annexe 3). En tout, 62 % des lettres envoyées sont restées sans réponse.

II. Actes entravant la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité au Yémen

A. Dynamique régionale

6. La complexité et l'évolution rapide de la situation régionale pendant la période considérée ont éclipsé les progrès réalisés en 2023 dans le cadre du processus de paix au Yémen⁴. La guerre à Gaza a marqué un tournant dans la politique régionale et s'est répercutée sur le conflit au Yémen du fait de la participation des houthistes à la guerre⁵, des attaques en mer Rouge⁶ et des frappes aériennes lancées par les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni contre le groupe⁷.

7. Les houthistes ont exploité la situation régionale pour consolider leur régime, en particulier dans un contexte de dégradation des conditions économiques et de mécontentement généralisé dans les zones qu'ils contrôlent. Ils ont également cherché à renforcer leur statut au sein de l'axe de la résistance⁸ et à gagner en popularité dans la région.

8. La tentative de l'Envoyé spécial du Secrétaire général pour le Yémen de faire avancer le processus de paix par l'annonce d'une feuille de route pour la paix au Yémen en décembre 2023 s'est heurtée aux répercussions des événements régionaux. En outre, l'escalade militaire entre la République islamique d'Iran et Israël en avril et l'attaque israélienne contre le port de Hodeïda en juillet 2024, à la suite d'une frappe de drone houthiste visant Tel-Aviv (Israël), ont soulevé de sérieux doutes quant à la reprise du processus de paix.

9. Les récentes mesures prises par la Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Aden contre six banques basées à Sanaa ont été considérées par les houthistes comme une guerre économique lancée contre eux. Poussant la situation au bord de la guerre, le chef des houthistes, Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004), a accusé l'Arabie saoudite d'être à l'origine de ces mesures et menacé d'attaquer les aéroports, les ports maritimes, les installations pétrolières et les banques du Royaume si les choses perduraient⁹.

⁴ La visite des houthistes à Riyad en septembre 2023 a été le signe de progrès tangibles dans le processus de paix au Yémen.

⁵ En tant que membre de l'axe de la résistance, le mouvement houthiste a menacé d'attaquer Israël en riposte à ses frappes aériennes sur Gaza. Depuis le 19 octobre 2023, les houthistes ont lancé plusieurs missiles et drones d'attaque unidirectionnels contre Israël et attaqué des navires marchands en mer Rouge, « appartenant ou destinés à Israël ».

⁶ Le 10 janvier 2024, le Conseil de sécurité a adopté la résolution 2722 (2024), dans laquelle il a exigé que « les houthistes mettent fin immédiatement à [toutes les] attaques » contre des navires marchands et des navires de commerce et pris note « du droit qu'ont les États Membres, conformément au droit international, de défendre leurs navires contre les attaques, notamment celles qui portent atteinte aux droits et libertés de navigation ».

⁷ Les États-Unis et l'Union européenne ont formé des coalitions navales pour sécuriser les routes de navigation en mer Rouge, et les États-Unis ont pris des mesures d'escalade progressives contre les houthistes.

⁸ L'expression « axe de la résistance » désigne une alliance géopolitique au Moyen-Orient opposée à l'influence dite occidentale et reposant sur l'entraide dans divers conflits et luttes contre des ennemis considérés comme communs. L'idée d'« action collective et d'unité des fronts » partagée par les parties à l'axe de la résistance indique que les houthistes participeraient à tout conflit régional futur.

⁹ Les médias affiliés aux houthistes ont publié des images aériennes de sites saoudiens importants (voir annexe 4).

Toutefois, grâce aux efforts de médiation déployés rapidement par les parties prenantes, les tensions sont actuellement désamorçées (voir par. 42).

10. L'accord relatif à la feuille de route¹⁰ ne pourra être signé que lorsque le contexte régional sera favorable et que les houthistes auront cessé de s'en prendre aux navires en mer Rouge. Cependant, les houthistes ne se laissent pas dissuader et le processus de paix piétine.

11. Pendant ce temps, les houthistes ont renforcé leur coopération avec d'autres membres de l'axe de la résistance et reçu le soutien de groupes armés présents en Iraq, au Liban, en République arabe syrienne et à Gaza. Le Groupe d'experts a analysé, dans le cadre d'études de cas, les relations entre les houthistes et les groupes armés irakiens et libanais, les activités conjointes entre ces groupes s'étant récemment intensifiées. Il note que tant que la question du réseau qu'entretient le mouvement avec les groupes armés régionaux n'aura pas été réglée, les sanctions imposées aux houthistes n'auront qu'un impact limité.

Étude de cas n° 1 : coopération des houthistes avec les groupes armés irakiens

12. Les enquêtes menées par le Groupe d'experts ont révélé une présence croissante des houthistes en Iraq ces dernières années. La guerre à Gaza a renforcé les liens politiques et militaires entre les houthistes et les groupes armés irakiens. Le chef du mouvement, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, a confirmé en juin 2024 que les houthistes coordonnaient leurs activités militaires avec la « Résistance islamique en Iraq¹¹ », dont l'un des principaux groupes, Kataëb Hezbollah, a publié une déclaration commune avec les houthistes concernant leur rôle dans l'axe de la résistance¹². Le groupe Kataëb Hezbollah, a affirmé qu'il attaquerait des cibles américaines et britanniques avec tous les moyens dont il disposait, si le Yémen venait à être attaqué (voir annexes 5 et 6).

13. Différentes sources ont indiqué que des campagnes de collecte de fonds avaient été lancées en Iraq pour soutenir les houthistes, en particulier par le groupe Kataëb Hezbollah¹³. En janvier 2022, l'opération de collecte de fonds qu'il a organisée a été dirigée par Amir al-Musawi, porte-parole du Tajammu Chabab al-Charia (« Sharia Youth Gathering »), une organisation-cadre relevant du contrôle du groupe (voir annexe 7). Le Groupe d'experts n'a pas pu estimer le montant du soutien financier apporté aux houthistes. D'autres sources confidentielles ont indiqué que les houthistes recevaient également un soutien financier de l'Iraq sous forme de livraisons de pétrole.

14. Selon les renseignements obtenus par le Groupe d'experts, les groupes armés irakiens envoient des experts et des combattants au Yémen depuis 2015 pour superviser les formations des houthistes, transférer des technologies militaires et combattre aux côtés des houthistes. Selon des sources confidentielles, les Forces de mobilisation populaire en Iraq, intégrées aux forces armées irakiennes depuis 2019¹⁴, ont récemment formé environ 80 combattants houthistes dans le centre de

¹⁰ Des responsables de haut niveau ont exprimé la crainte que les houthistes ne mettent en œuvre que la première phase de la feuille de route afin d'en retirer des avantages financiers.

¹¹ Selon certaines sources, la Résistance islamique en Iraq se compose des groupes suivants : Kataëb Hezbollah, Kataëb Sayyid el-Chouhada, Harakat Ansar Allah el-Awfiya et Harakat Hezbollah el-Noujaba.

¹² Le secrétaire général du groupe Kataëb Hezbollah, Hajj Abu Hussein Al-Hamidawi, s'est entretenu avec Abdulmalik al-Houthi, soulignant l'importance de se maintenir en état de préparation et d'assurer un niveau élevé de coordination entre les forces de l'axe (voir annexe 6).

¹³ D'autres groupes armés chiites, tels que Harakat Hezbollah el-Noujaba, Kataëb Sayyid el-Chouhada, Asaëb Ahl el-Haq et l'organisation Badr, ont déclaré leur soutien aux houthistes.

¹⁴ Voir <https://x.com/IraqiPMO/status/1145735482518724608>.

formation Bahbahan¹⁵, dans la région de Jourf el-Sakhr¹⁶. Parmi les combattants figuraient des chefs des brigades el-Nasr (« de la victoire »), déployées dans les provinces côtières telles que Hajja et Hodeïda et affiliées aux houthistes. Des sources indiquent que les combattants se sont rendus en Iraq munis de faux passeports et que ces visites se sont multipliées après l'ouverture de l'aéroport de Sanaa en avril 2022 (voir annexe 9). Toujours selon elles, les formations les plus récentes visaient à renforcer les capacités des houthistes à cibler avec précision les navires en mer Rouge.

15. Au cours des derniers mois, les houthistes ont aussi coordonné des opérations militaires conjointes contre Israël avec des groupes armés iraqiens. En juin 2024, la Résistance islamique en Iraq et le porte-parole des houthistes ont confirmé avoir lancé des attaques conjointes contre des villes israéliennes comme Haïfa et Ashdod (voir annexe 10)¹⁷. Abdulmalik al-Houthi a également affirmé dans une déclaration télévisée diffusée en juin 2024 que son groupe prévoyait de lancer, conjointement avec la Résistance islamique en Iraq, des attaques contre Israël depuis le plateau du Golan (voir annexe 11). D'après certaines sources, un centre opérationnel stratégique a été mis en place en Iraq à cette fin, réunissant des représentants de plusieurs groupes armés, dont les houthistes.

16. Les activités des houthistes en Iraq sont menées par Ahmed Al-Sharafi, également connu sous le nom d'Abu Idris, fondateur en 2010 de la première usine militaire houthiste à Saada. Plusieurs sources confidentielles ont confirmé qu'il supervisait également l'achat de matériel pour le mouvement houthiste, qu'il organisait des formations pour les combattants houthistes auprès de groupes armés, ainsi que les visites des dirigeants houthistes à Bagdad (voir annexe 12).

17. Al-Sharafi a participé à des rencontres avec différents chefs de groupes armés, chefs tribaux et responsables officiels, afin d'accroître l'influence des houthistes en Iraq (voir annexe 13). Le Groupe d'experts note qu'il a dernièrement tenu ses premières rencontres avec des responsables iraqiens de haut rang. En juin, Al-Sharafi s'est ainsi réuni avec le conseiller iraquien pour la sécurité nationale, Qasim al-Araji ; il s'agit de la première rencontre déclarée avec un responsable iraquien de haut rang (voir annexe 14). Selon des sources confidentielles, Al-Sharafi a également transféré les activités du groupe des bureaux clandestins situés dans les districts de Jadriyé et d'Arasat el-Hindiya à Bagdad vers un bureau de représentation officiellement reconnu. Toujours selon des sources confidentielles, les houthistes disposent d'un autre bureau dans la ville de Najaf.

18. Les hauts fonctionnaires du Gouvernement yéménite ont fait savoir au Groupe d'experts que le Ministre de l'intérieur devait discuter des activités des houthistes en Iraq avec son homologue iraquien.

19. Les formations, l'aide militaire et le soutien financier fournis par les groupes armés iraqiens aux houthistes constituent une violation de l'embargo sur les armes et des sanctions financières imposées. Le Groupe d'experts attend encore la réponse du Gouvernement iraquien à la demande d'information qu'il lui a adressée.

¹⁵ Des sources ont indiqué que les houthistes avaient également reçu des formations dans un autre camp iraquien situé à proximité de la frontière saoudienne.

¹⁶ Plusieurs combattants houthistes, dont un officier de haut rang, ont été tués lors de la frappe aérienne lancée par les États-Unis sur cette zone en août 2024 (voir annexe 8).

¹⁷ Le général de brigade Yahya Saree, porte-parole militaire des houthistes, a déclaré : « La première opération conjointe a visé deux navires qui transportaient du matériel militaire dans le port de Haïfa. La seconde opération a visé un navire qui avait enfreint l'interdiction de pénétrer le port de Haïfa en Palestine occupée ». Il a ajouté que « les deux opérations conjointes ont été menées à l'aide de plusieurs drones et les frappes ont été précises ».

Étude de cas n° 2 : coopération des houthistes avec le Hezbollah

20. Le Groupe d'experts considère que le Hezbollah est l'un des principaux soutiens des houthistes et qu'il est impliqué dans ce qui suit :

- a) La structure décisionnelle des houthistes (voir par. 72) ;
- b) Le soutien opérationnel, au moyen de formations militaires (soit en techniques d'infanterie soit en systèmes d'armes) dispensées au Yémen et dans le sud du Liban (voir annexe 15) ;
- c) Le soutien technique, notamment à l'assemblage de systèmes d'armes ;
- d) Le soutien financier, notamment la mobilisation et l'utilisation des ressources à des fins militaires (voir par. 108) ;
- e) L'orientation idéologique, en particulier l'endoctrinement des jeunes lors des prétendus camps d'été (voir par. 149) ;
- f) Le soutien en matière de gestion de la propagande médiatique, y compris la création de contenu en vue des campagnes militaires¹⁸.

21. Entre octobre 2023 et avril 2024, des représentants et des porte-parole houthistes ont fait de nombreuses déclarations par l'intermédiaire de médias basés au Liban et en République islamique d'Iran, où ils évoquaient l'existence d'un dispositif de coordination conjoint entre tous les groupes armés membres de l'axe de la résistance. L'analyse des déclarations par le Groupe d'experts ainsi que des vidéos diffusées suggère une alliance de ces groupes au niveau politique et militaire, répondant à un certain degré de coordination opérationnelle et placée sous un commandement conjoint, et laisse supposer l'existence d'un centre dit de commandement et de contrôle ou d'un dispositif de coordination conjointe des opérations (voir annexes 16 à 22)¹⁹.

22. Selon des sources confidentielles, ce centre de commandement et de contrôle est basé à Beyrouth, et dirigé par Mohammad Said Izadi, chef de la branche des affaires palestiniennes de la Force Al-Qods relevant du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique.

Étude de cas n° 3 : présence des houthistes dans d'autres pays

23. Selon des sources confidentielles, depuis au moins 2018, les houthistes disposent de « bureaux de liaison » dans plusieurs pays pour permettre le renforcement de leurs capacités, grâce aux formations et au soutien matériel et financier, en violation de la résolution 2216 (2015). Ils disposaient d'un bureau de liaison en République arabe syrienne, lequel aurait été fermé en 2023 (voir annexes 23 et 24).

¹⁸ Les locaux d'Al-Masirah, l'organe de communication houthiste, et d'Al-Manar, l'organe de communication du Hezbollah, sont situés à proximité l'un de l'autre.

¹⁹ L'attaque de grande envergure menée contre Israël le 14 avril 2024 au moyen de missiles et de drones tirés simultanément depuis l'Iran (République islamique d'), l'Iraq, le Liban, la République arabe syrienne et le Yémen semble confirmer l'existence d'un tel dispositif.

B. Dynamique nationale

1. Actes de groupes armés menaçant la paix et la sécurité au Yémen

a) L'escalade militaire houthiste

24. Rompant avec la situation proche de l'accalmie qui régnait depuis avril 2022, les houthistes ont renforcé leurs capacités sur les lignes de front en transférant des armes et des équipements et en recrutant de nouveaux combattants. Ils ont intensifié leurs opérations militaires contre les forces gouvernementales yéménites et ont tenté de réaliser des avancées sur plusieurs fronts, tels que Hajja, Chaboua, Dalea, Mareb, Kourch, Jaouf, Taëz, Saada et Hodeïda. Au cours de ces opérations, ils ont utilisé des missiles, des drones, des pièces d'artillerie, des fusils de tireurs d'élite, des engins explosifs improvisés et des mines terrestres. Selon les sources du Groupe d'experts, le Gouvernement yéménite a perdu 329 soldats et 883 de ses hommes ont été blessés au premier semestre 2024 (voir annexe 25).

25. Selon certaines sources, les houthistes ont utilisé les nouvelles routes pour renforcer leurs effectifs militaires, transférer des armes et des équipements et fortifier leurs positions. Récemment, ils ont construit des tunnels sur la route Houban-Taëz mais aussi de nouvelles routes le long des lignes de front à Mareb, Chaboua, Beïda, Moukeïras, Yafeh, Dalea, Kourch et Taëz (voir annexe 25, figure 25.1).

26. En juin, le Gouvernement yéménite a reçu des informations selon lesquelles les houthistes prévoient d'attaquer plusieurs lignes de front, à savoir Kourch, Mareb et Taëz. Il a donc pris de nombreuses mesures de précaution pour mobiliser ses forces.

27. D'après une circulaire obtenue par le Groupe d'experts, les forces armées du Gouvernement yéménite ont reçu pour instruction de se préparer à d'éventuelles attaques surprises des houthistes sur plusieurs fronts et de prendre les précautions nécessaires à cet égard (voir annexe 25, figure 25.2).

28. Le Gouvernement yéménite estime que la communauté internationale devrait le soutenir politiquement et militairement afin de faire contrepoids aux capacités des houthistes et de sécuriser les routes de navigation en mer Rouge.

29. Le Groupe d'experts juge la situation militaire interne fragile, notamment en raison des tentatives continues des houthistes de s'emparer de nouvelles positions. Tout événement interne ou externe pourrait potentiellement déclencher la reprise des hostilités.

b) Recrutement massif de nouveaux combattants

30. Le discours houthiste pendant la guerre à Gaza a permis le recrutement d'un grand nombre de nouveaux combattants pour « libérer la Palestine des ennemis ». La plupart des interlocuteurs yéménites doutent que ces nouvelles recrues se rendent un jour à Gaza, estimant qu'elles pourraient en revanche être poussées à combattre le Gouvernement yéménite.

31. Les houthistes ont activement recruté et formé des personnes dans la plupart des provinces qui sont sous leur contrôle. Ils ont lancé une vaste campagne de recrutement et de formation sous le nom de « Déluge d'Al-Aqsa ». Les représentants du Gouvernement yéménite ont informé le Groupe d'experts que plusieurs milliers de personnes, dont des enfants, ont été recrutées par les houthistes depuis novembre 2023. Les estimations varient de 220 000 en 2022 à 350 000 combattants au moment de l'élaboration du présent rapport, contre 30 000 en 2015. Si le Groupe d'experts n'a pas été en mesure de confirmer lui-même le nombre de nouveaux combattants, une mobilisation massive serait source de préoccupation (voir annexe 26).

c) Recrutement de migrants et mercenaires éthiopiens

32. Le Groupe d'experts a été informé que les houthistes exploitaient les migrants éthiopiens en situation irrégulière, les obligeant à rejoindre leurs rangs, à se battre contre le Gouvernement yéménite et à se livrer au trafic de stupéfiants. Selon des sources confidentielles, 92 000 migrants en situation irrégulière se trouvent dans les provinces du sud. D'autres sources ont indiqué au Groupe d'experts que les houthistes avaient également recruté des mercenaires venus des tribus éthiopiennes du Tigré et des Oromo, pour des salaires allant de 80 à 100 dollars. Le Groupe d'experts n'a pas été en mesure de confirmer ces allégations et continue d'enquêter.

d) Relations des houthistes avec les organisations terroristes d'Al-Qaida dans la péninsule arabique et des Chabab

Les houthistes et Al-Qaida dans la péninsule arabique

33. Des sources confidentielles ont exprimé leur inquiétude quant à la résurgence potentielle d'Al-Qaida dans la péninsule arabique (AQPA) (QDe.129) avec l'aide des houthistes (voir par. 36). À la suite du décès de Khaled Saeed Batarfi, également connu sous le nom d'Abū al-Miqdād al-Kindī (S/2019/83, par. 71), le 9 mars 2024, AQPA a désigné un nouveau chef, Sa'd bin 'Atef al-Awlaki²⁰. Originaire de la province de Chaboua (S/2018/594, annexe 30), il est considéré comme un commandant militaire puissant. AQPA a réactivé ses canaux médiatiques, apparemment pour encourager le recrutement et inciter à la commission d'attaques.

34. Ainsi, cette alliance opportuniste²¹ repose sur une coopération en matière de sécurité et de renseignement. Les deux groupes offrent des zones de sécurité à leurs membres respectifs, consolident leurs bastions et se concertent lorsqu'il s'agit de s'en prendre aux forces du Gouvernement yéménite.

35. Des sources ont informé le Groupe d'experts que les deux groupes ont accepté de cesser les hostilités et de procéder à un échange de prisonniers. Le Groupe d'experts a reçu des informations du Gouvernement yéménite selon lesquelles l'ancien chef d'AQPA, Sami Dayan²², condamné en 2014 à 15 ans d'emprisonnement, avait été libéré à Sanaa par les houthistes. Cet incident et la dissolution du front d'AQPA contre les houthistes dans la province de Beïda sont les signes d'une collaboration entre les deux groupes.

36. Depuis le début de 2024, les deux groupes coordonnent directement leurs opérations. Ils sont convenus que les houthistes transféreraient quatre drones, des roquettes thermiques et des engins explosifs et qu'ils dispenseraient des formations à des combattants d'AQPA. Ils ont d'autre part discuté du soutien qu'AQPA pourrait éventuellement apporter aux attaques contre les cibles maritimes. Selon des sources du Gouvernement yéménite, les stocks d'armes d'AQPA comprennent des armes légères et de petit calibre et les munitions correspondantes, des grenades, des engins explosifs improvisés, des mines terrestres ainsi que des roquettes thermobariques et des systèmes portables de défense antiaérienne.

37. Récemment, AQPA a utilisé des drones et des engins explosifs improvisés dans des attaques menées contre les forces gouvernementales à Abiyan et à Chaboua²³.

²⁰ Voir https://x.com/Dr_E_Kendall/status/1767231710322655630.

²¹ Voir www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/05/04/houthis-team-up-feared-al-qaeda-branch-new-threat-yemen/. Bien qu'ayant critiqué les houthistes pour leur attaque contre Radaa, à Beïda, en mars 2024, AQPA n'a pas pris les houthistes pour cible récemment (voir annexe 27).

²² Il aurait été un dirigeant important d'AQPA, second d'Ayman al-Zawahiri.

²³ Des sources ont mentionné environ cinq attaques de ce type, commises à l'aide de drones et d'autres matières explosives.

L'utilisation croissante de drones par le groupe, en particulier de drones à longue portée, est source de préoccupation.

38. Dans ses affrontements contre les forces du Gouvernement yéménite, AQPA emploie des tactiques de guérilla et utilise des enfants dans ses activités de reconnaissance afin d'obtenir des informations sur les positions du Gouvernement. Selon le Gouvernement yéménite, entre 2023 et la mi-juillet 2024, 84 soldats ont été tués (66 en 2023 et 18 en 2024) et 133 blessés (89 en 2023 et 44 en 2024) par des engins explosifs improvisés, utilisés à 49 reprises.

Les houthistes et les Chabab

39. Selon des sources confidentielles, afin d'étendre leur zone d'opération, les houthistes étudient les possibilités de mener des attaques en mer depuis la côte somalienne. C'est dans cette optique qu'ils renforcent leurs liens avec le groupe terroriste Harakat el-Chabab el-Moujahidin (les Chabab) (SOe.001).

40. Selon le Gouvernement yéménite, les activités de contrebande, surtout d'armes légères et de petit calibre, entre les houthistes et les Chabab se sont intensifiées²⁴. Le fait que les deux groupes possèdent les mêmes modèles d'armes, qui portent des numéros de série provenant des mêmes lots (voir annexes 126 à 151), indique soit la fourniture et le transfert illicite d'armes entre les deux groupes, soit le recours à un fournisseur commun, ou les deux. Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter sur la question, avec la coopération du Groupe d'experts sur la Somalie.

41. La collaboration croissante entre les houthistes et les Chabab en matière de transfert illicite et de contrebande d'armes menacent la paix et la sécurité au Yémen et dans la région.

2. Incidences des sanctions économiques

42. Les actions économiques, politiques et militaires continuent ensemble de représenter une menace sérieuse contre la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité au Yémen. Les activités des houthistes visant l'économie dans les zones dirigées par le Gouvernement yéménite ont des conséquences qui vont au-delà du seul domaine économique. Ainsi, la poursuite des attaques contre les navires en mer Rouge et dans le golfe d'Aden, l'interdiction d'exporter du pétrole brut, les restrictions au commerce intérieur, l'ingérence dans les activités des banques et des institutions financières (voir annexe 28), l'émission de pièces de monnaie (voir par. 103), la saisie d'avions de la compagnie aérienne Yemenia Airways et le gel de ses avoirs (voir annexes 178 à 180) ont de profondes conséquences sur les plans politique et de la sécurité. Les tensions économiques persistantes, en particulier après que la Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Aden a révoqué les licences de six banques basées à Sanaa et menacé de leur interdire d'utiliser la Société de télécommunications interbancaires mondiales (SWIFT)²⁵, exposent le Yémen à un conflit majeur, les houthistes ayant menacé de reprendre la guerre pour cette raison (voir annexe 29).

43. Les actions politiques et militaires ont également des incidences directes sur l'économie, exacerbant le cycle d'instabilité au Yémen. Les menaces et les attaques régulièrement lancées par les houthistes contre les navires traversant la mer Rouge, en particulier depuis la mi-novembre 2023, ont perturbé le commerce international et l'économie yéménite, ce qui a fait augmenter les coûts de fret et les primes d'assurance et retardé l'arrivée des marchandises au Yémen. Les prix de plusieurs produits de base, notamment des biens de première nécessité, ont par conséquent

²⁴ Le Groupe d'experts tente de confirmer les noms reçus par le Gouvernement yéménite.

²⁵ SWIFT est un réseau mondial de messagerie utilisé par les banques et les institutions financières pour échanger de manière sûre et fiable des données sur les transactions financières.

augmenté. De même, le maintien de l'interdiction d'exporter du pétrole brut a entraîné une perte de 43 % des recettes et, par voie de conséquence, des pertes de devises, une dévaluation du rial yéménite et une montée en flèche des taux d'inflation. Le cours du rial a franchi le seuil record de 1 900 rials pour 1 dollar en juillet 2024, contre 1 452 en septembre 2023. Tous ces éléments ont empêché le Gouvernement de fournir des services de base à la population, tels que le paiement des traitements, l'approvisionnement en électricité et en eau et la fourniture de services éducatifs. La détérioration des conditions économiques a souvent déclenché des troubles publics et des conflits.

44. Les partis politiques ont exploité la dégradation de la situation économique. Cela a suscité des affrontements politiques au Conseil de direction présidentiel, menaçant ainsi la stabilité politique du pays (voir par. 46). L'absence de perspectives économiques continue d'inciter les individus à se livrer à des activités illicites, notamment en rejoignant des groupes armés ou des réseaux criminels organisés, ce qui déstabilise encore plus la région.

3. Situation interne

a) Divergence de vues au sein du Gouvernement yéménite

45. La composition du Gouvernement yéménite reste incohérente. Le Conseil de transition du Sud critique le Gouvernement sur plusieurs sujets, et affirme qu'il finira par proclamer un État indépendant dans le sud. Toutefois, selon certaines sources, le Conseil de transition n'est pas certain qu'il pourra obtenir la reconnaissance de la communauté internationale et répondre aux exigences économiques et politiques liées à la création d'un État indépendant.

46. Selon certaines sources, le Conseil de transition du Sud est mécontent du bilan du Gouvernement²⁶ en raison des problèmes économiques²⁷ et de l'absence de services publics. En tant que partenaire du Gouvernement et principale force dans le sud du pays, il estime que le « bilan médiocre » du Gouvernement nuira à la popularité du Conseil dans le sud, en particulier à Aden. Des sources ont révélé qu'Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, le chef du Conseil de transition du Sud, avait récemment déclaré que le Conseil de transition se retirerait du Conseil de direction présidentiel et du Gouvernement si la situation économique restait inchangée.

47. Sur le plan politique, le Conseil de transition du Sud a refusé que le Parlement (chambre des représentants) se réunisse à Aden, car il serait un vestige de l'ancien régime. Selon certaines sources, il plaide pour son remplacement par la Commission de consultation et de réconciliation²⁸.

48. En outre, comme l'a décidé son chef²⁹, le Conseil de transition du Sud ne souhaite toujours pas faire partie des forces unifiées placées sous un commandement unique³⁰, et préfère rester indépendant. Des sources ont informé le Groupe d'experts

²⁶ Le nouveau Premier Ministre yéménite, Ahmed Binmubarak, a pris de nombreuses initiatives pour améliorer les services publics et lutter contre la corruption. Il ne fait aucun doute que le Gouvernement yéménite a besoin d'un plus grand soutien financier pour instaurer la stabilité.

²⁷ Le Conseil de transition du Sud a également insisté pour que les décisions économiques prises dernièrement par la Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Aden soient mises en œuvre.

²⁸ La Commission de consultation et de réconciliation est une entité yéménite créée par l'ancien Président Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi et rassemblant diverses composantes afin de soutenir le Conseil de direction présidentiel et d'unifier les forces nationales.

²⁹ Le processus de réunification, dans le cadre d'un commandement des forces conjointes et d'un centre d'opérations conjointes, a enregistré quelques progrès, selon des sources gouvernementales. Le manque de ressources a néanmoins ralenti ce processus.

³⁰ Le président du Conseil de direction présidentiel et le commandant suprême des forces armées ont adopté la décision n° 40 de 2023 portant création de l'Autorité des opérations conjointes en 2024.

que le Ministère de la défense avait demandé au Conseil de transition de lui communiquer une liste des soldats affiliés au groupe afin d'unifier les salaires de tous les hommes appartenant aux différentes factions, ce que le Conseil n'a toujours pas fait. Elles ont ajouté que les salaires des soldats variaient grandement et que les listes de certains groupes affiliés au Gouvernement yéménite devaient être complètement révisées. Pour percevoir un plus grand nombre de salaires, certains groupes gonflent le nombre de leurs soldats en ajoutant des noms fictifs ou les noms d'employés qui travaillent dans d'autres ministères.

b) Atteintes à la sécurité

49. En raison de la lutte d'influence dans le sud, un incident s'est produit dans le Hadramout entre deux groupes armés du Gouvernement yéménite. Les forces d'élite, soutenues par le Conseil de transition du Sud, ont empêché les Forces du bouclier national d'entrer dans la ville de Moukalla et le Conseil de transition a indiqué, dans une déclaration, qu'il serait préférable que les Forces du bouclier protègent la vallée et le désert et que les forces d'élite conservent le soin de protéger les zones côtières, comme elles l'ont toujours fait jusqu'alors. Le Groupe d'experts a été informé par des responsables du Gouvernement yéménite que cette question avait été facilement réglée et que le nouveau commandement conjoint, qui réunit des représentants de toutes les forces, ne permettrait pas que de tels incidents se reproduisent.

50. Plus récemment, un grave incident a provoqué une crise interne qui a mis en péril le statut du Conseil de transition dans le sud. Un officier de l'armée yéménite, le lieutenant-colonel Ali Ashal al-Jaadani, a été enlevé sur fond de litiges fonciers personnels. Yusran al-Maqtari, chef du bureau d'Aden de l'Unité de lutte contre le terrorisme soutenue par le Conseil de transition du Sud, a été mis en accusation dans cette affaire. Le Comité suprême de sécurité, dirigé par le Ministre de la défense, a décidé de suspendre et d'arrêter Al-Maqtari pour son implication dans l'enlèvement. Malgré l'arrestation de nombreux suspects, l'affaire est toujours en cours et le principal suspect n'a pas encore été appréhendé.

51. L'incident a déclenché des manifestations et des émeutes à Aden et Abiyan, où est installée la tribu de l'officier kidnappé. D'après des sources confidentielles, plusieurs membres de cellules houthistes qui tentaient de profiter de la situation ont été arrêtés à Aden, à Dalea et à Abiyan. Les personnes arrêtées voulaient dresser les foules contre le Gouvernement, le Conseil de transition du Sud et l'Unité de lutte contre le terrorisme. Toujours d'après ces mêmes sources, la situation demeure précaire et le président du Conseil de direction présidentiel n'est pas retourné à Aden depuis la mi-août, en raison des tensions qui règnent dans la ville.

III. Sécurité maritime

A. Attaques houthistes contre des navires marchands et des navires militaires

52. Le conflit au Yémen, à l'origine terrestre, s'est étendu à la mer Rouge et au golfe d'Aden, compromettant considérablement la sécurité maritime. L'intensification des

Le Conseil de direction a également émis une directive visant à fusionner, en six mois, plusieurs agences de sécurité et de renseignement sous une même entité, appelée « Agence centrale pour la sécurité de l'État ». Des sources ont indiqué au Groupe d'experts que cette opération se heurtait toutefois à des difficultés. Conformément à cette directive, une agence spécialisée, appelée « Unité de lutte contre le terrorisme », a également été créée à Aden, avec à sa tête un dirigeant de premier plan du Conseil de transition du Sud.

attaques houthistes³¹ contre les navires marchands et les navires militaires en mer Rouge, dans le golfe d'Aden et dans l'océan Indien a perturbé le transport maritime international dans cette zone géopolitique clé. En déplaçant ses actions vers la mer, le groupe a renforcé son influence dans la région. Jamais, depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, n'ont été commises contre des navires des attaques de cette ampleur à l'aide de systèmes d'armes.

53. L'enquête du Groupe d'experts a révélé que bien qu'ayant affirmé qu'ils viseraient les navires « liés à Israël », les houthistes ciblaient les navires naviguant en mer Rouge et dans le golfe d'Aden sans distinction (voir annexe 100).

54. L'analyse par le Groupe d'experts des données communiquées par l'Organisation maritime internationale (OMI), le Bureau des opérations commerciales maritimes du Royaume-Uni et le Commandement central des États-Unis révèle qu'entre le 15 novembre 2023 et le 31 juillet 2024, au moins 134 attaques ont été menées depuis des zones contrôlées par les houthistes contre des navires marchands ou commerciaux et contre des navires de guerre américains et britanniques en mer Rouge et dans le golfe d'Aden. Le Groupe d'experts note que pour attaquer les navires, les houthistes ont utilisé un nouveau missile balistique dont l'existence n'avait jusqu'alors jamais été révélée, le Hatem-2 (voir par. 71). Parmi les navires marchands visés, 31 étaient des pétroliers, des transporteurs de gaz de pétrole liquéfié ou des navires-citernes pour produits chimiques. Sept d'entre eux ont été touchés mais ont pu continuer à naviguer. Ces attaques ont entraîné la mort d'au moins quatre marins (voir annexe 30).

55. Le 19 novembre 2023, le navire *Galaxy Leader* a été attaqué et détourné (voir annexe 31). Le navire et les 25 membres d'équipage, de nationalités différentes, sont toujours détenus par les houthistes. Selon des experts en aéronautique, l'équipage de l'hélicoptère devait avoir une formation spécialisée pour pouvoir atterrir sur le navire *Galaxy Leader* en mouvement. Les manœuvres des commandos sur le navire suggèrent l'utilisation de techniques qui n'étaient pas auparavant associées aux pratiques des houthistes. Le Groupe d'experts n'écarte pas la possibilité que l'équipage de l'hélicoptère et les commandos impliqués dans l'opération aient reçu une formation spécialisée par des formateurs étrangers.

56. Le lendemain, Hazam al-Assad, membre du conseil politique du mouvement houthiste, a déclaré que si l'axe de la résistance s'est bien concerté avec la République islamique d'Iran et a été guidé par elle, la décision d'attaquer le navire avait été prise par les dirigeants houthistes. Il a également déclaré que leurs opérations navales ne faisaient que commencer (voir annexe 32)³².

57. Après avoir été frappé par les houthistes, le 18 février 2024, le vraquier *Rubymar* a coulé avec à son bord 22 000 tonnes de phosphate d'ammonium, laissant derrière lui une nappe de carburant. Cela pose un risque pour l'environnement et la sécurité

³¹ À partir du 14 novembre 2023, les houthistes ont intensifié leurs attaques contre les navires, plus particulièrement contre ceux qui se dirigent vers Israël ou qui y sont liés (première et deuxième phases). Le 9 décembre 2023, lors de la troisième phase, les houthistes ont promis de s'en prendre à tout navire en route vers des ports israéliens. Depuis le 24 mai 2024, lors de la quatrième phase, en réponse à l'offensive israélienne à Rafah dans le sud de Gaza, les houthistes continuent d'attaquer les navires de toutes les compagnies liées à Israël ou transportant des marchandises pour Israël. Une déclaration des houthistes à cet égard peut être visionnée à l'adresse suivante : <https://youtu.be/pBfd4W808zk>.

³² Déclarations faites dans un entretien accordé à Al-Araby al-Jadeed, un organe de presse qatarien, daté du 20 novembre 2023.

maritime car le Gouvernement yéménite n'a pas la capacité de contenir les éventuelles fuites³³.

58. Le Groupe d'experts observe également qu'environ un tiers de ces attaques contre des navires ont eu lieu dans le golfe d'Aden, loin des lignes de front, hors de toute couverture radar et sans visibilité directe des houthistes (voir annexe 30). En outre, de nombreux navires attaqués désactivent leur système d'identification automatique avant d'entrer dans cette zone, ce qui porte à croire que les houthistes ont reçu une aide extérieure pour identifier, localiser et prendre pour cible les navires. La plupart de ces attaques ont été revendiquées par les houthistes. Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter.

59. Selon l'analyse du Groupe d'experts, la coalition américano-britannique a intercepté ou détruit plus de 800 missiles, drones, drones de surface, engins sous-marins sans pilote et missiles sol-air. Elle a également neutralisé des postes de commandement, des radars et de multiples installations de stockage. Ces frappes auraient réduit les moyens stratégiques des houthistes, affaiblissant considérablement leur capacité à mener des attaques de grande envergure. Cependant, le Groupe d'experts n'a pas été en mesure de confirmer les effets réels de ces frappes (voir annexe 33).

B. Menaces adressées par les houthistes contre les compagnies maritimes

60. Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu les copies de trois messages envoyés aux compagnies maritimes par le Centre de coordination des opérations humanitaires, créé le 17 février 2024 au sein du cabinet du président du Conseil politique suprême houthiste, Mahdi al-Mashat. Les messages interdisaient à ces compagnies de transiter par la mer Rouge, le détroit de Bab el-Mandab, le golfe d'Aden, la mer d'Arabie et l'océan Indien, sous peine de voir leurs navires pris pour cible (voir annexes 34 et 36).

Unité flottante de stockage et de déchargement *Safer*

61. Le navire *Safer*, unité flottante de stockage et de déchargement, est toujours amarré au port de Ras Issa, en mer Rouge, aux côtés du navire *MOST Yemen* (S/2023/833, par. 51 à 54). Environ 1,1 million de barils de pétrole brut ont été transférés depuis l'unité *Safer* vers le navire *MOST Yemen* entre le 25 juillet et le 25 août 2023. Ce dernier était enregistré au Libéria sous le nom de *Nautica* et battait pavillon libérien. Cependant, après l'expiration de l'enregistrement, le navire n'a pas été enregistré sous pavillon yéménite. La situation en mer Rouge aurait entraîné le report des opérations restantes. Il s'agit notamment de l'enlèvement du navire *Safer* du Yémen pour recyclage et élimination, ainsi que l'acquisition de la barge et de l'équipement connexe nécessaires pour mener à bien l'assistance au navire. Aucune décision n'a encore été prise concernant l'utilisation de la valeur de récupération de l'unité *Safer* et le produit de la vente du pétrole stocké dans le navire *MOST Yemen*. Selon les informations communiquées au Groupe d'experts par le Gouvernement yéménite, les houthistes ont pris le contrôle total de la zone opérationnelle où se trouvaient les deux navires et ont nommé une équipe chargée de superviser les

³³ Les plans de remorquage du navire ont échoué après que les autorités portuaires d'Aden, de Djibouti et de l'Arabie saoudite ont refusé de l'accueillir, selon l'opérateur libanais du navire. Jusque-là, trois navires ont coulé, ce qui menace l'environnement et la sécurité de la navigation. Voir wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/MediaCentre/Documents/Circular%20Letter%20No.4890%20-%20Mv%20Rubymar%20-%20Call%20For%20Contributions%20Of%20Oil%20Pollution.pdf et www.lloydslist.com/LL1148431/Houthis-claim-first-casualty-as-Rubymar-sinks-two-weeks-after-attack.

opérations sur le nouveau navire *MOST Yemen*. Le représentant de la SAFER Exploration and Production Operations Company, société propriétaire de l'unité *Safer*, a informé le Groupe d'experts que la société ne contribuait pas à la formation et à la supervision de l'équipe affiliée aux houthistes, soulignant qu'elle n'assumerait aucune responsabilité pour les conséquences éventuelles de cette situation.

62. Compte tenu de la détérioration de la situation dans la région de la mer Rouge et étant donné que le site est contrôlé par les houthistes, le risque de dégâts causés à l'environnement suscite de vives inquiétudes. Tout dommage causé aux deux navires entraînerait des fuites de pétrole, ce qui aurait de graves conséquences pour l'environnement marin et les populations côtières, qui dépendent en grande partie de la pêche pour vivre.

IV. Armes et application de l'embargo ciblé sur les armes

Violations de l'embargo sur les armes d'une ampleur sans précédent

63. Conformément aux paragraphes 14 à 17 de la résolution [2216 \(2015\)](#) du Conseil de sécurité, le Groupe d'experts a porté son attention sur une série d'activités de surveillance et d'investigation pour répertorier les violations de l'embargo ciblé sur les armes, comprenant la fourniture, la vente et le transfert directs ou indirects au profit des personnes et entités désignées par le Conseil et le Comité créé par la résolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), ainsi que de celles agissant pour leur compte. Conformément au paragraphe 16 de la résolution [2624 \(2022\)](#), le Groupe d'experts a porté son attention sur les composants disponibles dans le commerce qui ont été utilisés par des personnes ou une entité désignées par le Comité pour assembler toutes sortes de missiles, drones, vecteurs offensifs maritimes, certains systèmes d'armes (tels que les missiles antichars guidés et les systèmes portables de défense antiaérienne, les systèmes de surveillance électro-optiques), et leurs pièces détachées, ainsi que sur l'assistance technique, la formation ou toute autre assistance, en rapport avec les activités militaires ou la fourniture, l'entretien ou l'utilisation de tous armements et matériels connexes.

1. Systèmes d'armes acquis, assemblés et utilisés par les houthistes avec un soutien étranger

64. Les multiples témoignages recueillis par le Groupe d'experts auprès d'experts militaires, de responsables yéménites et même d'individus proches des houthistes, indiquent que, sans soutien étranger, le mouvement n'a pas la capacité de développer et de produire des systèmes d'armes complexes tels que les missiles balistiques à courte portée, les missiles balistiques à moyenne portée, les missiles de croisière d'attaque au sol, les missiles balistiques antinavires, les missiles de croisière antinavires, les missiles sol-air, les drones de surveillance, les drones d'attaque unidirectionnels (et leurs plateformes de lancement et postes de commandement), les systèmes portables de défense antiaérienne, les engins sous-marins sans pilote, les missiles antichars guidés, les systèmes de surveillance électro-optiques, les radars maritimes, les viseurs thermiques et les lunettes de visée pour fusils de tireur d'élite. Les interceptions de matériel réalisées par divers États Membres et organismes chargés de l'application de la loi depuis 2018 ont mis en évidence ce soutien étranger (voir annexe 37).

65. Le Groupe d'experts a constaté des similitudes entre les différents équipements utilisés par les houthistes et ceux produits et utilisés par la République islamique d'Iran ou les groupes armés de l'axe de la résistance. Cela indique que le matériel n'a

peut-être pas été développé par les houthistes eux-mêmes. Les similitudes constatées suggèrent également que les schémas et le savoir-faire technique nécessaires à la fabrication ou à l'assemblage de ces systèmes d'armes en toute indépendance pourraient avoir été transférés aux houthistes par la République islamique d'Iran³⁴ ou par des groupes étrangers. En outre, le transfert de composants spécifiques, en particulier ceux qui présentent des caractéristiques techniques complexes, se poursuit. C'est ce qu'a permis de montrer l'inspection par le Groupe d'experts des composants interceptés aux frontières maritimes et terrestres, ainsi que des débris de matériel utilisé par les houthistes, où l'on voit clairement que la marque, les modèles, les marquages, les numéros de série et les vignettes de contrôle de la qualité sont semblables à ceux d'équipements produits en dehors du Yémen, en particulier en République islamique d'Iran.

66. Depuis le 19 octobre 2023, en réponse à la guerre à Gaza et à la frappe israélienne contre l'ambassade d'Iran à Damas, les houthistes (voir annexe 99), la République islamique d'Iran et plusieurs groupes armés de l'axe de la résistance prennent pour cible le territoire israélien. L'opération est menée au moyen de missiles balistiques à moyenne portée, de missiles de croisière d'attaque au sol et de drones d'attaque unidirectionnels, dont la plupart ont été interceptés ou se sont écrasés en route. Dans une lettre du 6 novembre 2023 adressée au Conseil de sécurité, Israël a indiqué que le 19 octobre, les houthistes avaient lancé cinq missiles de croisière d'attaque au sol et 30 drones d'attaque unidirectionnels Samad-3 en direction de son territoire, suivis d'un premier missile à moyenne portée le 27 octobre, puis d'un deuxième ainsi que de deux missiles de croisière d'attaque au sol le 31 octobre.

67. Dans la nuit du 13 au 14 avril 2024, le territoire israélien a été la cible d'une attaque massive : plus de 300 missiles balistiques à moyenne portée, missiles de croisière d'attaque au sol et drones d'attaque unidirectionnels ont été lancés depuis des zones contrôlées par les houthistes, ainsi que depuis l'Iran (République islamique d'), l'Iraq et le Liban³⁵. Cette attaque, baptisée « Promesse sincère » par la République islamique d'Iran, illustre le niveau de coordination entre les houthistes, la République islamique d'Iran et les autres acteurs non étatiques impliqués (voir annexe 101).

68. Le 5 juin 2024, les houthistes ont publié une vidéo montrant le tir d'un missile appelé « Palestine » qui correspond au missile balistique à moyenne portée tiré contre la ville d'Eilat (Israël) (voir annexe 102). Le Groupe d'experts note que ce missile balistique, dont la présence dans l'arsenal houthiste n'avait pas été établie auparavant, présente des similitudes avec le Kheibar Shekan, un missile balistique hypersonique à moyenne portée qui fait partie de l'arsenal avancé de la République islamique d'Iran et qui a été présenté pour la première fois le 11 février 2022 lors du défilé militaire organisé à Téhéran (voir annexe 46).

69. Le 19 juillet 2024, les houthistes ont lancé une attaque contre la ville de Tel-Aviv au moyen d'un drone d'attaque unidirectionnel baptisé « Jaffa ». Selon les informations dont dispose le Groupe d'experts, ce drone est similaire au drone houthiste Samad-3, doté d'un moteur plus récent, voire d'une avionique améliorée. Le moteur dont est équipé ce drone d'attaque unidirectionnel est semblable à celui du MADO MD275 iranien (voir annexe 103).

70. Le Groupe d'experts constate de grandes similitudes entre le matériel répertorié et celui développé ou exploité par la République islamique d'Iran (53 articles). Des articles semblables sont également utilisés par des groupes armés au Liban (11), dans

³⁴ Le 29 mai 2024, Tasnim News, un organe de presse iranien, a rapporté que les houthistes disposaient désormais de la technologie iranienne de missiles antinavires (voir annexes 38 et 39).

³⁵ Au total, 220 des missiles et drones lancés l'ont été depuis des zones contrôlées par les houthistes.

le territoire palestinien occupé (5), en Iraq (20), au Bahreïn (1) et en Somalie (1) (voir annexes 40 à 83).

Étude de cas n° 4 : Présentation à grande échelle de matériel militaire par les houthistes

La présentation à grande échelle de matériel militaire par les houthistes à Sanaa le 21 septembre 2023 montre la présence de nouveau matériel, depuis le dernier défilé du 21 septembre 2022 (S/2023/833, par. 101 à 103). Le nouveau matériel, qui présente des caractéristiques similaires à celles du matériel fabriqué ou produit en République islamique d'Iran, comprend deux modèles de missiles balistiques à moyenne portée, un modèle de missile de croisière d'attaque au sol, un modèle de missile de croisière antinavire, deux modèles de missiles balistiques antinavires, un modèle de roquette guidée à longue portée, un modèle de drone d'attaque unidirectionnel, deux modèles modifiés de drones d'attaque unidirectionnels, trois modèles de missiles sol-air et trois modèles de systèmes de surveillance électro-optiques. Le Groupe d'experts a également constaté la présence d'un modèle de patrouilleur d'attaque rapide, de deux modèles de navires de surface sans équipage^a (tous deux équipés de radars navals) et de deux modèles de véhicules blindés (voir annexes 84 à 94).

^a Patrouilleur d'attaque rapide télécommandé transportant des explosifs.

Étude de cas n° 5 : déclarations de responsables iraniens

Dans un entretien accordé le 21 avril 2021 à Russia Today, un organe de presse russe, le général Rostam Qasemi, Commandant adjoint de la Force Al-Qods du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique, a annoncé la présence de conseillers militaires iraniens au Yémen et la fourniture de technologies iraniennes de fabrication d'armes. Le même entretien a été diffusé par Memri TV, un organe de presse iranien.

Le 22 septembre 2020, Noor News, un autre organe de presse iranien, a rapporté que le général de brigade Abolfazl Shakarji, porte-parole en chef de l'état-major général des forces armées iraniennes, a annoncé à la télévision le transfert d'expertise technique dans le domaine de la défense et le partage d'expérience et de connaissances avec le peuple du Yémen.

Le 1^{er} octobre 2019, Tasnim News a rapporté que, lors d'une visite à Beijing, le général de division Mohammad Bagheri, chef d'état-major des forces armées iraniennes, avait déclaré à la chaîne chinoise Phœnix TV ce qui suit : « Nous fournissons à l'armée populaire du Yémen une assistance consultative et intellectuelle, et le Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique en est responsable » (voir annexes 95 à 98)

2. Missile d'un nouveau modèle utilisé pour attaquer un navire marchand


71. Le 25 juin 2024, les houthistes ont affirmé avoir attaqué le navire MSC Sarah V en mer d'Arabie au moyen d'un nouveau missile dont l'existence n'avait pas encore été révélée (voir annexe 104). Le lendemain, ils ont diffusé une vidéo du lancement du missile, en précisant qu'il s'agissait d'un Hatem-2, un missile balistique

hypersonique qui aurait été fabriqué au Yémen. Le Groupe d'experts observe que ce missile est également semblable en apparence au Kheibar Shekan iranien (voir par. 68).

3. Rôle du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique et du Hezbollah dans la prise de décisions par les houthistes

72. Plusieurs sources confidentielles ont évoqué le rôle prédominant que jouent le général Abdulreza Shalai de la Force Al-Qods du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique et son second, un cadre supérieur du Hezbollah, dans la structure de commandement et de contrôle des houthistes. Le général Shalai, agissant sous le titre d'« adjoint au jihad »³⁶, a pour rôle de conseiller et d'assister Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004) dans les affaires stratégiques, jihadistes et militaires. Il supervise les forces aérospatiales (missiles et drones), les forces navales et toutes les régions militaires, ainsi que la mobilisation et la logistique.

Figure I
Organigramme des houthistes



Source : confidentielle.

Abréviation : MR, *military regions* (régions militaires).

4. Assistance et formation fournies aux houthistes par des spécialistes et des techniciens étrangers

73. Le Groupe d'experts fait observer que le mouvement houthiste est passé d'un groupe armé local aux capacités limitées à une puissante organisation militaire, qui a étendu ses capacités opérationnelles bien au-delà des territoires qu'il contrôle. Les houthistes doivent cette transformation au transfert de matériel (voir par. 64 à 66) et

³⁶ L'officier de liaison principal de la Force Al-Qods du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique détaché auprès des Kataëb Hezbollah porte également le titre d'« adjoint au jihad » et a pour second un cadre du Hezbollah.

à l'assistance et à la formation fournies par la Force Al-Qods du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique, le Hezbollah et des spécialistes et techniciens irakiens. Cela a été confirmé au Groupe d'experts par de multiples sources, souligné dans divers médias, et communiqué dans des déclarations de responsables iraniens.

74. Des sources ont informé le Groupe d'experts que cela faisait plusieurs années que les combattants houthistes recevaient une formation tactique et technique en dehors du Yémen. Selon elles, les combattants se sont rendus de Sanaa dans les pays suivants munis de faux passeports (par. 14 et annexe 9) :

a) République islamique d'Iran : début 2020, 200 combattants ont été formés à l'Université Imam Khamenei des sciences et technologies marines, centre de formation du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique situé à Ziba Kenar, sur la mer Caspienne. Fin 2022, 54 combattants ont été formés dans la caserne Imam Ali du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique, située à Bagh-e Bakhshi, à l'ouest de Téhéran ;

b) Liban : depuis au moins 2020, des combattants ont été formés dans les terrains d'entraînement du Hezbollah à Qalaat Jabbour, dans le sud du Liban³⁷ ;

c) Iraq : plusieurs formations ont été organisées par les Forces de mobilisation populaire (voir par. 12 à 19)

5. Acquisition de matériel et assistance par l'intermédiaire des représentants houthistes en République islamique d'Iran

75. En 2019, Ibrahim Mohammed al-Dailami a été nommé par décret houthiste³⁸ ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Yémen en République islamique d'Iran³⁹, ce qui représente un geste de reconnaissance par l'État iranien du pouvoir des houthistes (voir annexes 105 et 106 ; voir aussi S/2020/326, par. 42).

76. Selon une source confidentielle, jusqu'à la fin de 2022, Adnan Qasim Ali Qafrah, l'actuel directeur général des ressources humaines du ministère de l'intérieur constitué par les houthistes, occupait un poste élevé au bureau des houthistes à Téhéran, où il a reçu une formation au renseignement dispensée par la Force Al-Qods du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique.

77. Des sources ont informé le Groupe d'experts que le général de division Muhammad Ahmad al-Talibi (S/2021/79, annexe 27), directeur des achats au ministère de la défense constitué par les houthistes et rattaché au bureau du mouvement à Téhéran, était chargé de l'envoi illicite de matériel aux houthistes à l'aide d'un réseau d'individus et d'entités. Il organise également la formation de combattants houthistes en République islamique d'Iran (voir par. 79 et études de cas 6 et 11).

³⁷ Le 21 mai 2023, trois journalistes houthistes travaillant pour l'organe de presse houthiste Al-Masirah ont assisté à une simulation d'attaque par le Hezbollah contre une colonie de peuplement israélienne (voir annexe 15). Le Groupe d'experts note que les combattants houthistes suivent souvent ce type d'entraînements (voir annexe 16).

³⁸ Voir <https://en.yppagency.net/125613>.

³⁹ En 2011, le Hezbollah a aidé les houthistes à établir Al-Masirah, dans la banlieue sud de Beyrouth.

Étude de cas n° 6 : mécanisme d'approvisionnement dirigé par le général de division Al-Talibi

Selon des sources confidentielles, en 2022, Al-Talibi a ordonné le transfert à Djibouti d'un courtier yéménite en douane qui facilitait le dédouanement de matériel de contrebande destiné aux houthistes.

La saisie par la douane yéménite de 52 missiles antichars Dehlahieh, le 10 mars 2022, au poste frontière de Chihan (S/2023/130, par. 54 à 56) a permis l'identification du courtier. Il aurait été arrêté en février 2024 à Djibouti.

6. Contrebande maritime d'armes légères et de petit calibre depuis des bases de la marine iranienne

78. Des sources confidentielles ont informé le Groupe d'experts de la contrebande, par voie maritime depuis la République islamique d'Iran, de trois cargaisons importantes d'armes légères et de petit calibre destinées aux houthistes, entre juillet et septembre 2022. Ces armes ont été transférées dans un boutre, fourni à un équipage yéménite par les autorités iraniennes. Le premier transfert comprenait 9 000 fusils d'assaut, les deuxième et troisième des fusils d'assaut et des mitrailleuses légères et lourdes. Les armes étaient emballées dans des sacs verts, comme dans le cas des précédentes interceptions (S/2019/83, annexe 16 ; S/2021/79, annexe 14, figure 14.6 ; S/2022/50, figure XI et annexe 20 ; S/2023/130, figure IV). Le premier transfert a été fait depuis le port de la marine iranienne de Sarkhour Tahrouyi, dans la province d'Hormozgan, tandis que les deux suivants l'ont été depuis le port de Chabahar, d'où des transferts d'armes avaient déjà été signalés par le Groupe d'experts (S/2017/924, par. 112 à 114 ; S/2018/193, par. 70). L'équipage était logé dans un appartement situé au port. Lors de ces transferts, les armes ont été déchargées dans des bateaux plus petits, à 12 milles marins de la côte, près de la frontière entre le Yémen et Oman.

79. Cette opération aurait été planifiée par un responsable houthiste, Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, également connu sous le nom d'Abu Ali (YEi.002). En République islamique d'Iran, Al-Talibi (voir par. 77) et Abu Laith ont supervisé les transferts. Ces deux officiers feraient partie de la cellule de liaison chargée de coordonner et de superviser les transferts de matériel vers les zones contrôlées par les houthistes.

80. Les fusils d'assaut, identifiés comme étant des fusils de type 56-1, se sont révélés être similaires à ceux interceptés entre 2018 et 2023 (S/2023/833, annexes 24 à 27).

7. Contrebande maritime de composants de missiles et d'équipements de surveillance

81. Le 11 janvier 2024, un boutre apatride transportant des composants de missiles destinés aux houthistes a été intercepté par les États-Unis près des côtes somaliennes. Les articles saisis comprenaient des systèmes de propulsion et de guidage et des têtes de missiles de croisière antinavires, cinq systèmes de propulsion à propergols liquides, quatre ensembles de turbopompes, divers composants de missiles balistiques à courte portée et 14 caméras thermiques (voir annexes 107 à 109). Les composants des missiles de croisière antinavires présentent des caractéristiques similaires à celles du Ghadir iranien et du missile balistique à courte portée « 351 » (voir annexe 110).

82. D'après les États-Unis, le capitaine, qui résidait en République islamique d'Iran depuis environ deux ans, ainsi que le propriétaire du boutre et son frère, ressortissants

iraniens, travaillaient pour le Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique. Après avoir été inspecté par la marine iranienne, le boutre aurait quitté Konarak (République islamique d'Iran) et se serait rendu à la base de la marine à Chabahar (voir par. 78 ; voir aussi S/2017/924, par. 112 à 114 ; S/2018/193, par. 70) pour se ravitailler, avant d'être intercepté après environ six jours en mer.

8. Contrebande maritime de matériel létal et d'appareils électroniques

83. Le 28 janvier 2024, un boutre apatride a été intercepté par les États-Unis en mer d'Arabie. Les articles saisis comprenaient 200 sacs chargés d'explosifs, 17 pieux lance-fusées de missiles antichars guidés iraniens Dehlavieh, des composants d'un engin sous-marin sans pilote, des composants de trois systèmes de surveillance électro-optiques (S/2023/833, annexes 29 et 63), et des outils d'usinage pour la fabrication locale des mortiers de canons sans recul portables sur trépied (SPG) et de mortiers de 120 et de 81 mm (voir annexe 111).

84. Le Groupe d'experts observe ce qui suit :

a) Une partie du matériel saisi était dissimulée dans des emballages similaires à ceux interceptés en mer par les États-Unis le 6 mai 2021⁴⁰ (S/2022/50, par. 65 et figure XII) ;

b) Certains de ces composants sont semblables à ceux du missile balistique à courte portée Borkan-3 lancé par les houthistes contre Dammam (Arabie saoudite), le 7 mars 2021 (S/2023/833, annexe 36, figure 36.5) ;

c) Les systèmes de déviation de jet, les composants de guidage et de contrôle et les vignettes apposées sont similaires à ceux du missile balistique à courte portée Qiam-2 lancé le 8 janvier 2021 par la République islamique d'Iran contre une base américaine à Erbil (Iraq)⁴¹, tir revendiqué par la République islamique d'Iran (S/2023/833, par. 75 et annexes 30 à 37) ;

d) Les marquages et les vignettes figurant sur plusieurs équipements correspondent à ceux figurant sur les équipements susmentionnés interceptés le 11 janvier 2024 (par. 83, et annexes 112 à 114), et sur certains des équipements interceptés par le Royaume-Uni le 25 février 2023 à bord d'un navire en provenance de la République islamique d'Iran (S/2023/833, par. 74 à 76, et annexes 30 à 37) ;

e) La pointe de fusée de l'engin sous-marin sans pilote est semblable à celle des nouveaux équipements présentés au début de 2022 par la marine du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique (voir annexe 114, figures 114.23 à 114.26) ;


f) Il existe des similitudes avec plusieurs équipements produits par la République islamique d'Iran (annexe 114).

85. La saisie de composants d'engins sous-marins sans pilote par les États-Unis et la destruction récente de deux engins sous-marins sans pilote qui auraient été utilisés par les houthistes ont été signalées par le Commandement central des États-Unis (voir figure II). Cela semble indiquer que les houthistes disposent de ces systèmes d'armes, les utilisent et ont la capacité de s'en servir, ce qui présente une nouvelle menace sérieuse contre la sécurité maritime, ces armes pouvant gravement endommager les navires visés.

⁴⁰ Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu des coordonnées, à partir d'un dispositif de navigation qui aurait été trouvé à bord, selon lesquelles deux jours avant son interception, le boutre s'était trouvé à proximité du port de Jask (République islamique d'Iran) (S/2022/50, annexe 20, figure 20.44).

⁴¹ Voir www.memri.org/tv/general-hajizadeh-irgac-aerospace-missile-attack-us-iraq-beginning-revenge-casualties-arab-countries-expel-region-else.

Figure II
Activités en mer Rouge, 17 février 2024



Source : Commandement central des États-Unis

9. Matériel militaire et à double usage saisi par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni

86. Depuis janvier 2023, d'importantes quantités de matériel ont été saisies au poste frontière de Chihan par la douane yéménite et à Aden par l'Unité de lutte contre le terrorisme, alors qu'ils étaient apparemment en voie d'acheminement vers des zones contrôlées par les houthistes (voir annexes 115 à 121).

10. Vente de matériel dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes

a) Armes légères et de petit calibre et matériel connexe

87. Le Groupe d'experts note que de nombreuses armes faisant l'objet d'un trafic dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes sont semblables à celles utilisées par le mouvement et à celles saisies en mer depuis 2018.

88. Le Groupe d'experts observe également que 26 modèles différents d'armes légères et de petit calibre, dont la présence avait été confirmée en Somalie, portent des numéros de série qui correspondent aux lots d'armes mises en vente dans des zones contrôlées par les houthistes ou interceptées depuis 2018 en voie d'acheminement vers les houthistes. Cela indique soit le recours à un fournisseur commun, soit le transfert d'une partie des armes légères et de petit calibre aux houthistes via la Somalie ou son transfert du Yémen vers la Somalie (voir annexes 126 à 144, et 147 à 151)⁴². Le Groupe d'experts a également répertorié un modèle d'armes légères et de petit calibre et un modèle de dispositif de vision thermique portant des numéros de série correspondant à ceux répertoriés en Afghanistan (voir annexes 146 et 152).

89. Selon certaines sources, ce sont les houthistes qui organisent et supervisent l'achat et la vente illégaux d'armes dans les zones qu'ils contrôlent, opérations qui pourraient constituer une violation de l'embargo sur les armes et du gel des avoirs. Plusieurs dirigeants houthistes collaborent avec des marchands d'armes ou exploitent des commerces d'armes et en tirent des revenus importants, y compris des taxes. Le

⁴² Certaines des armes légères et de petit calibre répertoriées ont également été observées dans plusieurs autres pays.

Groupe d'experts a identifié des centaines de vendeurs, opérant principalement à Sanaa, Saada et Hodeïda, et note qu'en février 2024, des armes légères et de petit calibre de fabrication récente ont été présentées à l'occasion d'une exposition d'armes tenue à Sanaa (voir annexes 122 à 125).

90. Parmi ces armes proposées à la vente sur le marché noir, le Groupe d'experts en a recensé plus de 11 000⁴³ (S/2023/833, par. 104), dont plusieurs centaines portent des marquages suggérant une fabrication récente et par conséquent, un transfert récent. Le volume important et la variété du matériel montrent la facilité avec laquelle les houthistes ont pu contourner l'embargo sur les armes.

91. Parmi les armes légères et de petit calibre susmentionnées, 31 présentent des caractéristiques et des marquages semblables à ceux d'armes de production iranienne. Toutefois, la République islamique d'Iran a fait savoir au Groupe d'experts que ces caractéristiques étaient différentes de celles des armes qu'elle produisait (voir annexes 144, 145 et 151).

92. Les enquêtes du Groupe d'experts ont révélé que sur les 73 pistolets produits au Brésil et proposés à la vente dans des zones contrôlées par les houthistes, 2 ont été légalement transférés entre 2021 et 2023 vers l'Arabie saoudite, 37 étaient couverts par un certificat d'utilisateur final délivré en décembre 2022 par les autorités tanzaniennes, et 20 ont été légalement transférés en 2015 à Djibouti. Ces armes ont pu faire partie de la cargaison détournée en 2015 par Fares Mohammed Mana'a (SOi.008) et illégalement transférée par la suite vers une zone contrôlée par les houthistes (voir annexes 153 à 157).

93. En outre, sur les 255 pistolets produits en Türkiye, le Groupe d'experts a confirmé le transfert de 2 pistolets aux autorités irakiennes en 2015 et de 184 pistolets entre 2022 et 2023 comme suit : 1 pistolet à un vendeur d'armes en Tchéquie, 2 pistolets à deux vendeurs d'armes en Arabie saoudite, 180 pistolets à deux vendeurs d'armes au Soudan et 1 pistolet à un vendeur d'armes aux États-Unis (voir annexes 158 à 164).

94. Le Groupe d'experts a confirmé le transfert, entre 2022 et 2023, d'un pistolet produit en Tchéquie et d'un pistolet produit en Slovaquie à l'un des vendeurs susmentionnés en Arabie saoudite (voir annexes 165 et 166).

95. Le Groupe d'experts a demandé aux États Membres concernés des informations concernant le transfert ultérieur de ces articles vers des zones contrôlées par les houthistes. Il attend les réponses de l'Arabie saoudite, du Soudan et de la Tanzanie.

11. Activités navales suspectes

96. Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu d'une source confidentielle des informations selon lesquelles les installations portuaires de Hodeïda et de Salif sont utilisées pour décharger d'importantes quantités de matériel militaire. Ses enquêtes ont révélé que six navires ont gagné des ports contrôlés par les houthistes sans avoir obtenu l'autorisation du Mécanisme de vérification et d'inspection des Nations Unies. Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter sur l'implication éventuelle des navires identifiés dans le transfert illégal de marchandises interdites aux houthistes.

97. Les navires à destination des ports contrôlés par les houthistes sont inspectés par le Mécanisme de vérification et d'inspection des Nations Unies à Djibouti. Le Mécanisme n'est pas responsable de l'octroi de l'autorisation finale aux navires se rendant dans les ports de la mer Rouge. Depuis février 2023, toutes les restrictions à

⁴³ Le Groupe d'experts a analysé les comptes des vendeurs sur les médias sociaux et cherché à déterminer la correspondance des modèles et des numéros de série du matériel présenté.

l'importation de marchandises, à l'exception de celles qui sont interdites, via les ports contrôlés par les houthistes ont été levées. En outre, les navires à destination de ces ports sont de plus en plus nombreux et les cargaisons de marchandises de plus en plus variées. Toutefois, depuis les dernières années, le Mécanisme de vérification et d'inspection des Nations Unies fait face à de grandes difficultés en matière de disponibilité et de durabilité des financements.

98. Les enquêtes du Groupe d'experts concernant les six navires susmentionnés ont révélé ce qui suit :

a) *Almas* (IMO-8864957), pavillon comorien : avant d'arriver le 18 octobre 2023 à la zone de mouillage de Ras Kathib, dans la province de Hodeïda, contrôlée par les houthistes, le navire était amarré à Bandar Abbas (République islamique d'Iran), entre le 20 septembre et début octobre 2023 (voir annexe 167).

b) *Kasra-3* (IMO-9109184), pavillon tanzanien : avant d'arriver à la zone de mouillage de Salif contrôlée par les houthistes le 6 octobre 2023, le navire était amarré à Bandar Abbas (République islamique d'Iran) le 25 septembre 2023. Il s'est ensuite rendu en Iran et est revenu à la zone de mouillage de Salif le 22 novembre 2023, où il est resté jusqu'au 30 novembre 2023 (voir annexe 168).

c) *AH-Union* (IMO-9109005), pavillon panaméen : le navire a gagné le port de Salif le 5 décembre 2023.

d) *Dubai-1* : le navire est arrivé au port de Salif le 9 décembre 2023 puis le 23 mars 2024, battant apparemment pavillon sri-lankais. Les autorités sri-lankaises ont cependant nié l'existence de cet enregistrement et ont indiqué que le numéro OMI (988850) était erroné. Le Groupe d'experts note que depuis 2020, le *Dubai-1* navigue entre Djibouti, l'Iran (République islamique d'), Oman, la Somalie et le Yémen, et que son système d'identification automatique est fréquemment désactivé, ce qui laisse supposer des activités suspectes (voir annexe 169).

e) *Alakh Shakti* (IMO-419956818), pavillon indien : le navire est arrivé au port de Salif le 27 septembre 2023.

f) *Mahdar* (IMO-417898786) : le navire est arrivé au port de Salif le 25 avril 2024, et battait apparemment pavillon sri-lankais. Les autorités sri-lankaises ont cependant nié tout enregistrement de ce navire.

99. Les enquêtes du Groupe d'experts ont révélé que de faux documents d'enregistrement à Sri Lanka sont utilisés par différents navires transportant des marchandises interdites ou restreintes.

100. Les autorités comoriennes, indiennes, iraniennes et tanzaniennes n'ont pas encore répondu aux lettres du Groupe d'experts.

Étude de cas n° 7 : utilisation de faux documents d'enregistrement de navires sri-lankais

Le 18 janvier 2022, les États-Unis ont intercepté un boutre apatride dans le golfe d'Oman et saisi 40 tonnes d'engrais d'urée. Il s'agissait du même navire qui avait été saisi le 11 février 2021 avec une cargaison d'armes légères et de petit calibre au large des côtes somaliennes (S/2022/50, par. 62 et 63, et annexe 19). D'après les documents trouvés à bord, dont un faux certificat d'enregistrement du navire à Sri Lanka, le boutre est dénommé Al-Etihad. (S/2023/130, par. 44, annexe 15 et figure 15.8).

Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur le document d'enregistrement du navire *Bari-2*, intercepté en mer par l'Arabie saoudite le 24 juin 2020, chargé

d'une importante cargaison d'armes légères et de petit calibre dont les modèles sont semblables à ceux des armes interceptées alors qu'elles étaient en voie d'acheminement vers les houthistes. Bien que le navire ait été prétendument enregistré à Sri Lanka, le Groupe d'experts a conclu que le document d'enregistrement était falsifié (S/2021/79, par. 74 et annexe 15, figure 15.9.).

En 2017, le Groupe de contrôle pour la Somalie et l'Érythrée a également fait état d'informations concernant un navire impliqué dans le trafic illégal de charbon de bois. Là aussi, le Groupe avait découvert que les trafiquants utilisaient des documents d'enregistrement de navires sri-lankais falsifiés (S/2017/924, par. 208, annexes 12.2.1 et 12.2.3).

V. Application des sanctions financières

Violations des dispositions relatives au gel des avoirs

101. Les personnes visées dans le cadre du régime de sanctions prévu par la résolution 2140 (2014), celles qui agissent en leur nom ou sur leurs instructions et les entités qu'elles possèdent ou contrôlent continuent de recevoir, de posséder ou de contrôler, directement ou indirectement, des fonds, d'autres avoirs financiers et des ressources économiques, comme exposé ci-après, en violation dudit régime de sanctions.

102. Une interprétation plus stricte de la résolution susmentionnée porterait à englober, dans l'application des dispositions relatives au gel des avoirs, toutes les formes de fonds, d'avoirs financiers et de ressources économiques des autorités instituées par les houthistes. Il semblerait que les recettes douanières et fiscales, les redevances des services de télécommunications et le produit des ventes de carburant et de gaz soient partiellement détournés par les houthistes à des fins militaires ; cependant, les autorités établies à Sanaa ont besoin d'en utiliser une partie pour fournir des services essentiels à la population. Les sanctions financières ont été d'une efficacité limitée. Cela tient, d'une part, à l'approche adoptée par la communauté internationale pour éviter que les sanctions financières n'aient des conséquences humanitaires néfastes et, d'autre part, à l'incapacité de l'État yéménite de geler les avoirs qui sont sous le contrôle effectif des autorités instituées par les houthistes, dans les zones contrôlées par ces derniers. De ce fait, le Groupe d'experts concentre son enquête sur les avantages financiers obtenus ou contrôlés illégalement, à des fins militaires, par les houthistes.

1. Frappe de monnaie et impression présumée de devises par les houthistes

103. En prenant cette mesure, les houthistes avaient pour objectif, outre celui d'envoyer un message fort quant à leur revendication du droit pécuniaire souverain d'émettre leur propre monnaie, celui de générer des fonds sans dépendre de sources extérieures. Ils peuvent facilement utiliser cet argent à des fins militaires sans craindre d'être découverts.

Étude de cas n° 8 : contrefaçon de billets et de passeports

Le Groupe d'experts a observé que les houthistes avaient tenté à trois reprises d'introduire illégalement des billets de banque et des passeports imprimés à l'étranger :

- Le Groupe d'experts a fait état précédemment de la saisie de faux billets à ordre, d'une valeur de 35 milliards de rials yéménites, et de faux passeports, imprimés illégalement à l'étranger et introduits clandestinement au Yémen (S/2018/594, par. 142 à 144 ainsi qu'annexe 53, S/2019/83, par. 125, et S/2020/50, par. 90 et 91).
- Dans son rapport précédent, le Groupe d'experts a indiqué qu'en août 2023, les houthistes avaient tenté de faire produire de faux billets de banque par une imprimerie en Chine (S/2023/833, par. 175 et 176). La suite de l'enquête lui a permis de découvrir que Mahmood Saeed Hezam Al-Ameri, l'homme ayant contacté ladite imprimerie, ne représentait pas l'État yéménite et que le passeport (n° 07865754) établi à son nom avait été délivré à Sanaa par les houthistes (voir annexes 170 et 171).
- Récemment, le Groupe d'experts a reçu des informations selon lesquelles des représentants des autorités instituées par les houthistes auraient contacté une entreprise en Indonésie afin de se procurer des fonds de sécurité, de l'encre et d'autres accessoires servant à imprimer des billets de banque, des billets à ordre, des timbres fiscaux et des passeports. Il a demandé à la l'Indonésie d'enquêter, et écrit à l'entreprise concernée pour obtenir des renseignements. Cependant, dans le premier cas comme dans le second, il n'a pas encore reçu de réponse. L'enquête qu'il a menée a révélé que ni la Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Aden ni l'État yéménite n'avaient passé de commande de ce type auprès de l'entreprise en question. Par ailleurs, ses sources l'ont informé qu'en 2016, les houthistes auraient acquis des passeports vierges imprimés par ladite entreprise. Le Groupe d'experts n'a pas été en mesure de confirmer ces allégations. Toutefois, dans le cadre de son enquête, il a établi que des personnes s'étaient rendues à l'étranger, munies de faux passeports délivrés par les houthistes, pour suivre une formation militaire (voir annexe 9). L'enquête se poursuit.

Étude de cas n° 9 : émission d'une pièce de monnaie par les houthistes

Le 30 mars 2024, la Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Sanaa a annoncé qu'elle avait émis des pièces de 100 rials, sous prétexte de remplacer des billets de banque endommagés. Après enquête, le Groupe d'experts a déterminé que d'anciens billets de 100 rials, représentant une valeur totale de 12 milliards de rials, étaient en circulation. Des sources l'ont informé qu'étant dans l'incapacité de faire imprimer des billets de banque au Yémen, faute de pouvoir se procurer le nécessaire (fond de sécurité, fil et encre spéciale, entre autres) à l'étranger, les houthistes avaient fait frapper des pièces sur place. D'après ces sources, les houthistes allaient continuer d'émettre ainsi des pièces ou des billets afin de financer leurs activités de guerre et de se présenter comme constituant l'autorité centrale d'une économie indépendante.

La Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Aden, qui représente l'administration reconnue sur le plan international, se considère comme la seule entité juridique habilitée à émettre la monnaie yéménite. De tels agissements de la part des houthistes portent atteinte à sa légitimité. La Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Aden tient pour faux les billets ainsi émis. De ce fait, elle a publié sans tarder un communiqué de presse dans lequel elle déclarait que les pièces émises par les houthistes constituaient des faux (voir annexe 172).

2. Collecte de fonds pour les « forces aériennes de drones » et les « forces de défense côtière »

104. Le secteur des télécommunications demeure une importante source de revenus pour les houthistes. Grâce à la mise en place de services 4G, les entreprises de télécommunications contrôlées par les houthistes ont augmenté considérablement leurs recettes. Des sources ont informé le Groupe d'experts qu'une grande partie des recettes était utilisée à des fins militaires, notamment pour l'achat de matériel de télécommunication à double usage.

105. Exploitant les possibilités offertes par le secteur des télécommunications, les houthistes sollicitent avec succès, notamment au moyen de millions de messages, des fonds publics destinés à leurs activités militaires (voir annexe 173).

Étude de cas n° 10 : messages en faveur des « forces aériennes »

Après enquête, le Groupe d'experts a établi que les houthistes avaient lancé une vaste campagne de collecte de fonds, par SMS, en faveur de leurs « forces aériennes de drones ». Y étaient indiquées les coordonnées de comptes domiciliés auprès de la Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Sanaa, destinés à recevoir des dons en rials yéménites et en dollars des États-Unis (comptes n° 10262-1128 et n° 10262-1019-01) (voir illustration).

Traduction non officielle d'une capture d'écran de SMS visant à collecter auprès de la population des fonds en faveur des forces aériennes

7:08 PM

Sunday, 24 December 2023

Support the Air Force
via the following accounts:
Central Bank No.
1128 - 10262 (riyals)
01-1019 - 10262 (dollars)

Source : Groupe d'experts.

D'après les sources du Groupe d'experts, l'un des derniers messages sollicitait une contribution en faveur des « forces de défense côtière ».

3. Collecte de fonds pour des drones aériens menée auprès du ministère de l'éducation

106. Le Groupe d'experts a appris de ses sources que l'office de l'éducation constitué par les houthistes à Sanaa contraignait régulièrement les établissements scolaires des zones contrôlées par ces derniers à verser des fonds pour des drones aériens. Il a

obtenu une copie du reçu attestant de l'encaissement d'un montant de 20 956 250 rials yéménites par les houthistes (voir annexe 174). L'enquête sur cette affaire est en cours.

4. Soutien financier apporté aux houthistes depuis l'extérieur du Yémen

107. Après enquête, le Groupe d'experts a établi que les houthistes utilisaient divers réseaux de personnes et d'entités opérant à partir de plusieurs juridictions, notamment Djibouti, l'Iran (République islamique d'), l'Iraq, la Türkiye et le Yémen, pour financer leurs activités. Ils ont ainsi recours à des banques, à des sociétés écrans, à des sociétés de change, à des sociétés de transport maritime et à des facilitateurs financiers. Le Groupe d'experts a interrogé les responsables d'un petit nombre de sociétés de change et de transport maritime et de banques, qui, sous le couvert de l'anonymat, ont confirmé ce modus operandi.

108. Le Groupe d'experts a été informé qu'un comité spécial a été récemment mis en place pour accroître les revenus des houthistes et pour planifier les dépenses militaires, notamment en matière d'armes, sous la direction présumée d'un expert de haut niveau, alias Abu Radwan, lié à la Force Radwan du Hezbollah. L'homme donnerait des conseils sur l'augmentation des droits de douane, des taxes ainsi que des prélèvements, notamment dans le secteur des télécommunications. Récemment, les houthistes ont alourdi les droits de douane relatifs à des produits de base, appliqué de nouvelles taxes et augmenté de près de 35 % les prélèvements effectués auprès des sociétés de télécommunications (voir annexe 175).

109. Selon les mêmes sources, des sommes considérables sont transférées illégalement sous la direction de Sa'id al-Jamal, dont il semblerait qu'il soit affilié à la Force Al-Qods du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique, au profit des houthistes. Sous le couvert de l'anonymat, des sources confidentielles ont mentionné l'implication présumée de plusieurs personnes, y compris de hauts dirigeants houthistes, et d'entités qui ont facilité l'apport d'un soutien financier aux houthistes, à savoir Nabil Ali Ahmed al-Hadha, Abdallah Najib Ahmad al-Jamal, parent de Sa'id al-Jamal installé au Yémen, Abdi Nasir Ali Mahamud, associé de Sa'id al-Jamal affilié aux houthistes, et Ibrahim al-Nashiri, houthiste, ainsi que certaines des principales sociétés détenues ou contrôlées par Mohamed Salah Falitah et Mohammed Abdulsalam. L'apport aux entreprises affiliées aux houthistes des devises nécessaires pour les importations aurait été facilité par le comité économique houthiste chargé des paiements.

110. Au cours de l'enquête, le Groupe d'experts a reçu des signalements concernant l'implication présumée des entités suivantes dans le transfert illégal de fonds au profit des houthistes, tant au Yémen qu'à l'étranger :

- a) Al Aman Kargo Ithalat Ihracat Ve Nakliyat Limited Sirketi ;
- b) Al Alamiyah Express Company for Exchange and Remittance ;
- c) Nabco Money Exchange and Remittance Co ;
- d) Al-Rawda Exchange and Money Transfers Company ;
- e) Al Radwan for Exchange Co.

111. Le Groupe d'experts n'a pas pu vérifier de manière indépendante l'implication présumée des personnes et entités susmentionnées. Il a reçu plusieurs documents. L'enquête est en cours.

Étude de cas n° 11 : homme d'affaires yéménite impliqué dans des achats et des paiements au profit des houthistes

Le Groupe d'experts enquête sur un dossier dans lequel un homme d'affaires yéménite lié à de hauts responsables houthistes serait impliqué dans l'achat d'armes, pour les houthistes, à l'aide de fonds acheminés via plusieurs sociétés de change. Il a été informé que cet homme travaillait comme agent en douane et qu'il avait tenté de faire dédouaner une cargaison comportant 52 pièces de missile ou missiles antichars Dehlavieh destinés aux houthistes, laquelle avait été saisie par les douanes yéménites au poste frontière de Chihan le 10 mars 2022 (voir étude de cas n° 6).

L'homme serait impliqué dans l'achat et le paiement de diverses pièces de matériel militaire acquises par les houthistes. Il a créé une société à Djibouti, où il vivait sous un autre nom, muni d'un faux passeport, dont une copie a été remise au Groupe d'experts. Par ailleurs, le Groupe d'experts a examiné des copies de plusieurs documents faisant état de dépôts d'espèces et de transferts de fonds au nom de trois sociétés de change à Djibouti et au Yémen (voir annexe 176).

a) Soutien financier présumé de la République islamique d'Iran pour la contrebande d'armes

Étude de cas n° 12 : financement de la contrebande d'armes

Au cours de son enquête, le Groupe d'experts a examiné plusieurs documents. Le général Rostam Qasemi, commandant adjoint de la Force Al-Qods du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique, a déclaré aux médias : « Toutes les armes détenues par les Yéménites sont le fruit de notre aide » (voir étude de cas n° 5 et annexe 95). Un acte d'accusation daté du 7 août 2024^a, déposé par les autorités américaines auprès de la cour de district de Virginie, contient des renseignements concernant des paiements qui auraient été effectués par deux ressortissants iraniens, Mir'Kazei, alias Shahab Regi, et son frère Yunus Mir'Kazei, au capitaine du boutre *Yunus*. Les deux frères, propriétaires du *Yunus* et travaillant pour le Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique, auraient eu recours aux services du capitaine pour faire passer du matériel militaire de la République islamique d'Iran, où ce dernier résidait, à plusieurs destinataires, dont les houthistes. Entre août 2023 et janvier 2024, le capitaine aurait effectué plusieurs voyages de contrebande, coordonnés et financés par les deux frères, Shahab et Yunus. Les opérations financières sont décrites ci-après.

- *août 2023* : depuis son compte bancaire, Shahab verse environ 100 millions de rials iraniens au capitaine.
- *De septembre à octobre 2023* : le capitaine reçoit des paiements de Shahab et de Yunus via le réseau parabancaire *hawala*^b et distribue l'argent à sa famille et à des tiers.
- *26 octobre 2023* : depuis son compte bancaire, Yunus verse, via le *hawala*, environ 800 millions de rials iraniens au capitaine.
- *26 novembre 2023* : depuis son compte bancaire, Shahab verse, via le *hawala*, environ 300 millions de rials iraniens au capitaine.

- 3 janvier 2024 : depuis son compte bancaire, Yunus verse, via le *hawala*, environ 800 millions de rials iraniens au capitaine. Par la suite, le capitaine a distribué, via plusieurs opérateurs utilisant le système *hawala*, une partie de l'argent aux familles des membres de l'équipage qu'il employait sur le *Yunus*. Par ailleurs, il a évoqué avec sa famille l'achat d'un bien immobilier et la construction d'une nouvelle maison.

^a Voir www.justice.gov/d9/2024-08/mirkazei_superseding_indictment.pdf.

^b Système informel de transfert de fonds hors systèmes bancaires traditionnels.

b) Soutien financier de l'Iraq

112. Le Groupe d'experts a reçu des informations de diverses sources sur le soutien financier fourni aux houthistes par l'Iraq. Des jeunes irakiens lancent régulièrement des campagnes pour solliciter un soutien financier en faveur des houthistes du Yémen (voir par. 13).

5. Perception présumée de droits de transit illégaux destinés à garantir un passage maritime sûr

113. Les sources du Groupe d'experts ont indiqué que les houthistes auraient perçu auprès de quelques agences maritimes des droits illégaux permettant aux navires de celles-ci de naviguer dans les eaux de la mer Rouge et du golfe d'Aden sans être attaqués. Elles lui ont indiqué également que ces agences maritimes travaillaient en coordination avec une société affiliée à un dirigeant houthiste de haut rang, que les droits versés étaient déposés sur divers comptes dans plusieurs juridictions au moyen de transferts via le réseau *hawala* et d'opérations de blanchiment sous couvert de transactions commerciales. Elles estiment à environ 180 millions de dollars le profit mensuel que les houthistes tirent de ces droits illégaux de sécurisation du transit. Le Groupe d'experts n'a pas pu vérifier de manière indépendante ces informations.

6. Confiscation d'avoirs

114. Le système de la « tutelle judiciaire », mis en place par les houthistes en 2017 pour gérer les fonds et les biens des opposants accusés de trahison, continue de permettre l'appropriation généralisée et illégale d'avoirs, avec l'aide des forces armées. Auparavant, Saleh Mesfer Saleh al-Shaer (YEi.007) était le « tuteur judiciaire » dans ce système. Les houthistes continuent de s'en prendre aux entreprises et aux personnes qui leur sont opposées, en gelant, confisquant et accaparant les avoirs des personnes, notamment la maison du Gouverneur de la Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Aden, et en prenant la direction des entreprises, au mépris total de l'état de droit (voir annexes 177 à 180).

a) Prise de contrôle des fonds, des avoirs et de la gestion de la compagnie aérienne Yemenia

115. L'enquête du Groupe d'experts a révélé que, suivant les instructions du ministère des finances constitué par les houthistes, la Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Sanaa avait demandé à toutes les banques commerciales de suspendre le décaissement des fonds de tous les comptes bancaires de Yemenia, dans toutes les devises (voir annexes 178 à 180). Un montant de 100 millions de dollars est sous le contrôle des houthistes depuis plus d'un an.

116. En outre, les 25 et 26 juin 2024, les houthistes ont immobilisé à l'aéroport de Sanaa des avions de Yemenia (voir tableau ci-dessous), qui revenaient de Djedda avec des pèlerins à leur bord.

<i>Avion</i>	<i>Numéro de vol</i>	<i>Ligne</i>	<i>Date d'arrivée</i>
A320-A-70AFC	IY 5555	Djedda-Sanaa	25 juin 2024
A320-C-70AFC	IY5547	Djedda-Sanaa	26 juin 2024
A320-F-70AFF	IY5559	Djedda-Sanaa	26 juin 2024

117. Un autre avion, un Airbus A330-3-F70AFE, a été retenu à Sanaa. Yemenia a l'interdiction d'utiliser les pièces détachées se trouvant dans son hangar d'entretien à Sanaa.

118. L'enquête du Groupe d'experts a révélé que les houthistes voulaient que Yemenia exploite trois vols hebdomadaires internationaux au départ de Sanaa et à destination, entre autres, d'Amman. En outre, la compagnie aérienne s'est vu interdire d'utiliser des comptes bancaires dans les zones contrôlées par l'État yéménite. Lorsqu'elle s'est déclarée incapable de satisfaire aux demandes des houthistes, étant donné qu'elle ne pouvait accéder aux fonds nécessaires, les houthistes se sont emparés de l'avion mentionné plus haut. En outre, ils ont pris le contrôle de la gestion des opérations de la compagnie à Sanaa, par l'intermédiaire de complices, et refusé de reconnaître la légitimité du conseil d'administration qui intervenait depuis Aden⁴⁴. Par conséquent, il s'agit d'un cas où les houthistes ont pris par la force le contrôle des avoirs, des fonds et de la gestion d'une compagnie aérienne publique afin d'accroître leurs avantages financiers en augmentant la fréquence des vols internationaux et le nombre de destinations desservies, aux dépens de Yemenia.

119. Bien que les autorités de l'État yéménite et les houthistes soient parvenus à un accord pour régler ce problème, les fonds demeurent sous le contrôle de ces derniers.

b) Confiscation des avoirs de compagnies pharmaceutiques

120. Le 10 juin 2024, le tribunal pénal spécialisé de Sanaa, d'obédience houthiste, a publié une communication adressée à la Banque centrale du Yémen sise à Sanaa, dans laquelle ordre était donné à l'ensemble des banques et des sociétés de change de saisir et de geler tous les soldes, comptes et transferts de deux des plus grandes compagnies pharmaceutiques en activité au Yémen, à savoir la Modern Pharmaceutical Company et l'International Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company, ainsi que des membres de leur direction et de leur personnel (voir annexe 181).

⁴⁴ Voir <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3346352.htm>

Figure III
Copie de la communication du 10 juin 2024 publiée par le tribunal pénal
spécialisé de Sanaa, d'obédience houthiste



Source : confidentielle.

7. Contrebande

121. Les houthistes ont amassé d'importantes ressources illégales grâce à la contrebande organisée de diverses sortes : armes, drogues, matériel de télécommunication (voir annexe 182), biens proscriés tels que des pesticides interdits (voir annexe 183), des médicaments non autorisés (voir annexe 184) et des biens du patrimoine culturel (voir par. 123 et annexe 185).

a) Contrebande et trafic de stupéfiants

122. La contrebande et le trafic de stupéfiants ont pris de l'ampleur au Yémen, les autorités du pays faisant état de saisies de cargaisons de drogue et de l'interception par les forces navales internationales de boutres transportant ce type de cargaison. Par ailleurs, les houthistes perçoivent des taxes et des droits illégaux auprès des cultivateurs de khat (*Catha edulis*). Récemment, ils ont imposé aux cultivateurs de khat de la province d'Ibb de nouvelles taxes, supérieures à 300 %.

Étude de cas n° 13 : saisie dans le port d'Aden de drogue découverte dans des conteneurs destinés au transport de sucre

L'Unité de lutte contre le terrorisme a informé le Groupe d'experts qu'avait été saisie dans le port d'Aden une quantité importante de drogue découverte dans un conteneur (n° 536854) faisant partie d'une cargaison de sucre transportée par le navire *Vanessa MSC* en provenance du Brésil. L'affaire s'est soldée par la condamnation de Muhammad Ibrahim Ahmed al-Matari à 25 ans d'emprisonnement, peine qui a été ramenée à 12 ans en appel. En examinant les dossiers et en interrogeant les fonctionnaires de l'Unité de lutte contre le terrorisme à Aden, en mars et juillet 2024, le

Groupe d'experts a établi que les houthistes étaient impliqués dans la contrebande de la drogue saisie.

b) Fonds issus de la contrebande et du trafic d'objets culturels

123. Diverses sources ont informé le Groupe d'experts que les houthistes se livraient à la contrebande et au trafic d'antiquités du patrimoine culturel yéménite et qu'ils les vendaient à l'étranger.

124. Le 26 octobre 2023, les douaniers yéménites ont saisi un livre ancien comportant 19 pages de cuir écrites en lettres d'or, en hébreu (voir figure IV).

Figure IV

Livre ancien en hébreu saisi par les douanes yéménites



Source : douanes yéménites.

8. Importation, à l'aide de faux documents, de pétrole et de gaz de pétrole liquéfié

125. Le Groupe d'experts a reçu des informations de plusieurs sources selon lesquelles des entreprises contrôlées par les houthistes importaient, au moyen de faux certificats de pays d'origine, du pétrole et du gaz de pétrole liquéfié, via les ports de Hodeïda et de Ras Issa, en contournant parfois les inspections du Mécanisme de vérification et d'inspection des Nations Unies. Les navires utilisés procèdent de deux manières : certains se rendent dans le pays concerné en ayant désactivé leur transpondeur d'identification automatique pour éviter d'être détectés, tandis que d'autres effectuent en mer des transferts de navire à navire sans se rendre dans les ports désignés sur les certificats de pays d'origine.

126. L'enquête en cours du Groupe d'experts a révélé qu'entre le 1^{er} janvier 2023 et le mois de juillet 2024, le Mécanisme de vérification et d'inspection des Nations Unies avait reçu 44 demandes d'inspection de navires transportant du gaz de pétrole liquéfié et que l'une de ces demandes avait été rejetée. L'enquête a également révélé que Port Khalid (Émirats arabes unis) était indiqué comme port d'origine de l'expédition effectuée le 18 octobre 2023 sur le *LPG OM* et de celle effectuée le 8 juin 2024 sur le *Raha Gas*⁴⁵.

⁴⁵ Ces deux navires et leurs propriétaires, à savoir Arafat Shipping Company et KDS Shipping Limited, ont été sanctionnés par le Bureau du contrôle des avoirs étrangers du Département du Trésor des États-Unis (voir annexe 186). Voir également <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240815>.

127. Le Groupe d'experts enquête sur les navires liés au Hezbollah et aux dirigeants houthistes de haut rang. Il a recueilli des informations sur plusieurs personnes, entités et itinéraires. Cependant, étant donné l'insuffisance d'éléments permettant de déterminer l'ensemble de la chaîne d'approvisionnement et les risques potentiels encourus par certaines sources confidentielles, il n'a pas divulgué ces informations à ce stade.

128. Les enquêtes du Groupe d'experts ont révélé qu'entre le 1^{er} avril 2022 et le 30 juin 2024, les autorités instituées par les houthistes ont perçu, au titre de droits de douane concernant les importations de carburant via les ports qu'elles contrôlaient, environ 994 milliards de rials yéménites, selon le taux de change en vigueur dans les zones contrôlées par l'État yéménite. Si l'on tient compte des autres redevances illégales et de la marge bénéficiaire correspondante, le revenu total retiré de ce seul secteur par les houthistes au cours de la même période est estimé à 1 340 milliards de rials yéménites. Le Groupe d'experts a été informé par ses sources qu'une part importante de ce montant avait été détournée à des fins militaires. Cependant, il n'a pas pu vérifier de manière indépendante le montant des fonds ainsi détournés.

9. Collecte d'argent contre de faux achats de matériel de télécommunication

129. Des sources du Groupe d'experts ont indiqué que les entités contrôlées par les houthistes avaient adopté un autre mode opératoire et qu'elles avaient transféré environ 132 millions de dollars destinés à l'achat d'appareils et de matériel de télécommunication et à la construction de tours afin d'agrandir le réseau de télécommunications. Une part importante de ces fonds serait parvenue aux hauts dirigeants houthistes via divers comptes. Les entreprises de télécommunications passent ces montants en pertes, en affirmant que le matériel a été saisi aux frontières par les autorités yéménites, sans qu'aucune opération d'achat ou de construction n'ait été effectuée.

130. Le Groupe d'experts a reçu des informations selon lesquelles dans un autre cas, les houthistes ont vendu aux abonnés, au prix de 75 dollars, des modems achetés à 56 dollars (le coût réel étant de 8 dollars) auprès d'une société liée au dirigeant houthiste Ahmed Hamed. Sous le couvert de l'anonymat, une source confidentielle issue du secteur des télécommunications a indiqué que parmi les destinataires présumés figuraient les principaux dirigeants houthistes ou leurs associés, à savoir Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim, Ahmed Hamed, Mesfer al-Numair et Ismail Hamid al-Din. Le Groupe d'experts n'a pas pu vérifier de manière indépendante ces allégations. L'enquête sur cette affaire est en cours.

VI. Actes contraires au droit international humanitaire et au droit international des droits humains

131. L'enquête menée, qui repose notamment sur le recueil d'informations auprès de sources et l'analyse de documents⁴⁶, révèle des violations généralisées du droit international humanitaire et du droit des droits humains : attaques indiscriminées visant des civils, détentions arbitraires, disparitions forcées, actes de torture, actes de violence sexuelle liée aux conflits ou de violence fondée sur le genre, violations du droit à un procès équitable. En outre, le recrutement et l'utilisation d'enfants dans le conflit au Yémen, ainsi que les obstacles à l'accès humanitaire et à l'acheminement de l'aide, suscitent l'inquiétude.

⁴⁶ L'experte en droit international humanitaire n'a pas encore participé à des missions au Yémen et dans la région (voir par. 2).

A. Attaques indiscriminées contre des civils et des biens de caractère civil


132. Pour la période du 1^{er} janvier au 30 juin 2024, des sources gouvernementales font état de 128 civils tués (dont 33 enfants et 6 femmes) et de 93 civils blessés (dont 35 enfants et 8 femmes). La province la plus touchée a été Beïda, suivie d'Amran, de Jaouf et de Taëz⁴⁷. En outre, 101 attaques ont été perpétrées contre des biens de caractère civil, notamment des lieux de culte, des établissements scolaires, des installations médicales et des propriétés privées. Ces attaques ont entravé l'accès aux services essentiels et porté atteinte aux droits à la santé, à l'éducation, à un niveau de vie correct et à la liberté de religion (voir par. 136, 137 et 139). Des sources confidentielles ont informé le Groupe d'experts qu'au moins 13 civils avaient péri et 26 avaient été blessés lors de deux frappes aériennes menées par la coalition américano-britannique, les 8 avril et 30 mai 2024, dans la province de Hodeïda. L'attaque israélienne du 20 juillet 2024 contre le port de Hodeïda a fait au moins 9 morts et 83 blessés parmi les civils. Le Groupe d'experts continuera d'enquêter sur les répercussions des frappes aériennes internationales sur les civils.

1. Victimes civiles de mines terrestres, d'engins explosifs improvisés et de munitions non explosées

133. Les mines terrestres, les engins explosifs improvisés et les munitions non explosées continuent de faire de nombreuses victimes civiles, notamment parmi les femmes et les enfants.

Figure V

Cas d'engins explosifs ayant fait des victimes civiles à Hodeïda entre le 1^{er} juin 2023 et le 31 mai 2024



Source : MINUAAH, « Mine Action Update for May 2024 ».

Note : les chiffres figurant dans cette illustration proviennent de sources multiples et n'ont pas été vérifiés de manière indépendante par la MINUAAH.

Abréviations : EO : engin explosif ; UNMHA : Mission des Nations Unies en appui à l'Accord sur Hodeïda.

⁴⁷ Des informations issues de sources publiques font état d'au moins 393 attaques ayant visé des civils entre septembre 2023 et mars 2024, avec un bilan présumé de 367 morts et 44 blessés. Voir <https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/>.

134. Entre le 17 septembre 2023 et le 28 juillet 2024, dans les zones contrôlées par l'État yéménite, le projet Massam a neutralisé 37 804 pièces, dont 232 mines antipersonnel, 3 097 mines antichar, 33 488 munitions non explosées et 177 engins explosifs improvisés⁴⁸. Durant le seul mois de juillet, les équipes en ont éliminé 4 230⁴⁹. Des représentants de l'État ont informé le Groupe d'experts qu'au cours du premier semestre de 2024, au moins 61 civils avaient été tués, et 119 blessés, par des mines terrestres, des mines marines et d'autres restes de guerre. L'enquête indique que les houthistes produisent sur place des mines terrestres, qu'ils dotent de mécanismes de déclenchement afin d'en accroître les préjudices humains. En outre, la neutralisation des mines terrestres est devenue plus dangereuse pour les démineurs (voir annexe 187 ; voir également S/2023/833, par. 84).

2. Attaques contre des civils et des biens de caractère civil

135. Le Groupe d'experts a recueilli des informations sur les cas où des civils, notamment des femmes ou des enfants, avaient été tués ou blessés (voir annexe 188). Les houthistes auraient lancé des attaques aveugles contre des quartiers résidentiels à l'aide de lance-roquettes, de pièces d'artillerie, de drones aériens et de tireurs embusqués. On dénombre au moins 153 morts et 180 blessés (dont des femmes, des enfants et des personnes âgées) au cours de la période considérée dans le présent rapport. Les provinces de Taëz, Dalea, Mareb, Hodeïda et Beïda ont été particulièrement touchées au cours du premier semestre de 2024.

136. Le Groupe d'experts enquête sur des attaques menées contre des biens de caractère civil, notamment des établissements scolaires, des installations médicales et des édifices religieux. À la fin du mois de juillet 2024, au moins 35 établissements scolaires ou installations médicales auraient été occupés par des forces ou groupes armés. Au cours de la période considérée dans le présent rapport, quatre établissements scolaires ont été occupés et trois édifices religieux ont été attaqués⁵⁰. Des sources gouvernementales ont fait état d'attaques systématiques (pillages, fermetures de locaux et confiscation de matériel) perpétrées contre des organes d'information au cours du premier semestre de 2024, en violation de la liberté d'expression. Les houthistes auraient placé des explosifs dans des zones agricoles et des pâturages ainsi qu'à proximité de puits d'eau, de terrains de jeux et d'habitations abandonnées. En perturbant le trafic sur des voies de transport essentielles, ils ont entravé la circulation des personnes et des marchandises dans tout le Yémen, ce qui a eu pour effet d'allonger la durée des trajets et d'alourdir les coûts de transport des marchandises (voir annexe 189).

137. Les houthistes continuent de saisir ou confisquer systématiquement des biens privés, sans procédure régulière, afin de réprimer la dissidence et de financer leurs activités de guerre (voir par. 114 à 120). Par exemple, au cours du premier semestre de 2024, au moins 108 résidences auraient été pillées et saisies. Le fait de déposséder des personnes de leurs avoirs contribue à accroître le nombre de déplacés et accentue les besoins d'aide humanitaire alors que l'accès et la distribution sont très difficiles (voir annexe 189, par. 2).

⁴⁸ Le projet Massam contribue à l'élimination des mines terrestres et d'autres engins explosifs au Yémen. Voir www.projectmasam.com/eng/news/.

⁴⁹ Voir www.projectmasam.com/eng/project-masam-clears-4230-landmines-unexploded-ordnance-and-improvised-explosive-devices/.

⁵⁰ Selon des sources confidentielles, les houthistes ont mené au moins 20 attaques sur des sites de culte, 10 sur des établissements d'enseignement, 5 sur des installations médicales et 80 sur des zones résidentielles.

138. En outre, le Groupe d'experts enquête sur des attaques qui auraient été perpétrées contre des biens culturels au Yémen (voir par. 123 et 124, ainsi qu'annexe 185 et annexe 189, par. 3).

139. Les opérations menées depuis novembre 2023 par les houthistes contre des navires commerciaux en mer Rouge constituent des attaques illégales de biens de caractère civil (voir par. 52 à 59). De même la détention arbitraire d'équipages de navires, comme celui du *Galaxy Leader*, est proscrite par le droit international humanitaire et le droit des droits humains (voir par. 55 et 56). Les navires attaqués transportant souvent des cargaisons à haut risque, telles que du pétrole, cela engendre un risque d'atteinte grave à l'environnement, qui constitue une violation du droit à un environnement sain (voir par. 54 et 57).

B. Détentions arbitraires et disparitions forcées

140. Le Groupe d'experts a eu accès à des informations concernant des détentions arbitraires perpétrées par certaines parties au conflit. Les personnes perçues comme des opposants au régime houthiste, notamment les membres des communautés bahaïe et ismaélienne, les personnes qui défendent les droits humains, les journalistes, les juges ainsi que les femmes et hommes d'affaires, seraient systématiquement pris pour cible. La situation se serait détériorée à la suite des attaques perpétrées par les houthistes en mer Rouge, celles-ci ayant provoqué des tensions avec certains États occidentaux. Le régime houthiste a durci la répression de la dissidence à mesure que s'amplifiaient les critiques à l'égard de ses politiques. Les personnes ayant ainsi exprimé leur opinion ont été accusées d'espionnage et d'atteinte à la sécurité de l'État (voir annexe 190). Des familles entières, y compris des enfants, auraient été détenues et gardées au secret, et, dans certains cas, des aveux télévisés auraient été obtenus sous la contrainte.

141. Des représentants de l'État yéménite ont informé le Groupe d'experts que les enseignants et les spécialistes du domaine de l'éducation étaient systématiquement pris pour cible, principalement à Sanaa. Les victimes, qui s'étaient opposées à des révisions de programmes scolaires visant à politiser le système éducatif, auraient été détenues arbitrairement, soumises à des actes de torture ou à d'autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, ou gardées au secret. Au moins sept membres du corps éducatif auraient été détenus depuis septembre 2023 et l'un d'entre eux serait mort en détention ; selon les informations disponibles, sa dépouille présentait des traces de blessures au visage. Cinq de ces sept personnes collaboraient avec des organisations internationales sur des initiatives ayant trait à l'éducation (voir annexe 191).

142. En juin 2024, 13 membres du personnel de l'ONU et plusieurs personnes travaillant pour des organisations non gouvernementales ou des organisations de la société civile, dont 8 femmes, ont été détenus arbitrairement par les houthistes⁵¹. Malgré les appels de la communauté internationale à leur libération immédiate et inconditionnelle, toutes ces personnes restent gardées au secret, sans procédure régulière ni accès à leur famille ou à l'organisation qui les emploie. Elles sont accusées d'espionnage pour le compte des services de renseignement américains et israéliens, entre autres. Les aveux présumés de certaines d'entre elles ont été diffusés⁵² de telle sorte que les houthistes y apparaissent comme étant contraints

⁵¹ Des sources ont indiqué qu'au total, 67 personnes, dont des proches et des enfants, qui ont été libérés par la suite, ont été détenues arbitrairement au cours de l'opération.

⁵² Voir www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240613-houthis-publish-confessions-of-us-israel-spy-network/.

d'entrer en conflit avec les États-Unis et Israël, ce qui justifiait l'adoption de politiques et de lois répressives (voir par. 156).

1. Torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants

143. Les houthistes continuent de soumettre les personnes détenues à des actes de torture et à d'autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants (S/2023/833, par. 124 à 131) : arrachage des ongles, chocs électriques, pendaison par les pieds, simulacres d'exécution, passages à tabac, privation de nourriture ou d'utilisation des toilettes, d'après les informations disponibles. Les personnes détenues sont placées pendant de longues périodes dans des cellules d'isolement sombres, ce qui provoque de graves séquelles physiques et psychologiques, telles que la paralysie, l'amnésie, des déficiences physiques permanentes et la cécité. L'accès aux soins médicaux est souvent refusé, ce qui entraîne parfois la mort. L'enquête menée indique que des femmes ont subi des agressions sexuelles comme forme de torture. Le Groupe d'experts a reçu des informations sur l'identité de cinq personnes qui seraient décédées au cours de la période considérée dans le présent rapport, du fait des tortures subies pendant des années de disparition forcée. Un mannequin yéménite, arrêté en novembre 2021, est toujours en détention. Cette personne aurait été torturée afin qu'elle signe des aveux prérédigés, et soumise à des tests de virginité ; les violences sexuelles seraient incessantes.

2. Violations du droit à un procès équitable

144. Des représentants de l'État yéménite ont informé le Groupe d'experts que le tribunal pénal spécialisé de Sanaa, dirigé par les houthistes, avait prononcé de nombreuses condamnations à mort, en violation des droits de la défense. L'indépendance et l'impartialité du tribunal suscitent des inquiétudes, étant donné que des juges auraient été nommés en raison de leur allégeance aux houthistes. Selon les informations recueillies, les victimes sont détenues pendant des années sans inculpation, privées d'accès à un avocat et à leur famille, et maintenues à l'isolement pendant des mois. Lorsque les avocats sont autorisés, l'accès aux preuves leur est souvent refusé. La présomption d'innocence n'est pas respectée. Le tribunal aurait prononcé des condamnations à mort par lapidation et crucifixion. Le Groupe d'experts a été informé que le tribunal pénal spécialisé avait prononcé au moins 67 condamnations à mort au cours du premier semestre de 2024 (voir annexe 192). Le 1^{er} juin 2024, le tribunal a condamné à la peine de mort 44 personnes, la plupart pour espionnage. Les victimes ont été détenues en avril et mai 2020, principalement dans les provinces de Sanaa, Dhamar et Amran, et gardées au secret. En décembre 2023, une militante des droits humains et ancienne responsable de la branche yéménite de l'Union des femmes d'influence de la Ligue des États arabes a été condamnée à mort. Elle n'aurait pas été autorisée à voir sa famille ni à se faire représenter par un avocat. Le 14 octobre 2023, les forces houthistes auraient rassemblé 30 condamnés pour les exécuter par lapidation. L'exécution de ces hommes a été interrompue par crainte d'une réaction négative de l'opinion publique (voir par. 148)⁵³.

C. Violences sexuelles liées au conflit et violences fondées sur le genre

145. D'après les informations communiquées au Groupe d'experts, les violences sexuelles liées au conflit et les violences fondées sur le genre demeurent

⁵³ Voir également https://x.com/mashhadyemeni/status/1757656074801332480?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Eembeddedtimeline%7Ctwtterm%5Escreen-name%3Amashhadyemeni%7Ctwcon%5Es1.

omniprésentes. De nombreux signalements font état de violences sexuelles, y compris en tant que formes de torture, perpétrées en détention contre des femmes, des enfants et des hommes.

146. Selon des sources gouvernementales, les Zeïnabiyat⁵⁴ ont été impliquées dans l'enlèvement, la disparition forcée et l'extorsion de femmes et de jeunes filles, notamment lors de manifestations et d'autres rassemblements publics. De nombreuses militantes auraient été battues et détenues arbitrairement, leur libération étant souvent subordonnée à la présentation d'une garantie de la part d'un tuteur masculin (*mahram*).

147. La violence sexuelle à l'égard des femmes est particulièrement dévastatrice dans la société yéménite, où la pureté sexuelle des femmes revêt une grande importance, notamment pour la réputation de familles entières. Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter pour déterminer si les houthistes utilisent la violence sexuelle comme outil stratégique de guerre contre les personnes dissidentes.

148. D'après les informations auxquelles le Groupe d'experts a eu accès, il semble que le tribunal pénal spécialisé d'obédience houthiste discrimine des personnes sur la base de l'orientation sexuelle et de l'identité de genre. Par exemple, le 23 juin 2024, à Sanaa, les houthistes ont condamné 9 hommes à la mort par lapidation et crucifixion, et 23 à une peine d'emprisonnement, parfois d'une durée de dix ans, pour avoir eu des relations homosexuelles. Trois hommes ont été condamnés à la flagellation publique. Les victimes auraient été soumises à un procès de masse et privées des garanties d'une procédure régulière⁵⁵. En février 2024, à Ibb, 13 hommes ont été condamnés à mort et 3 à des peines d'emprisonnement, tandis que 35 ont été placés en détention pour des motifs liés à l'homosexualité. La stigmatisation associée à de telles accusations, même infondées, est très préjudiciable dans la société yéménite. Bien souvent, les familles des accusés fuient leur ville d'origine.

D. Violations des droits des enfants

149. Les informations reçues par le Groupe d'experts font état de violations continues des droits des enfants. Les houthistes ont adopté des mesures qui portent atteinte au droit à l'éducation, notamment en modifiant les programmes scolaires (S/2023/833, annexe 85), en imposant la ségrégation, en gelant les salaires des enseignants et en appliquant au ministère de l'éducation des taxes pour financer l'achat de matériel à des fins militaires (voir par. 106). Des établissements scolaires ont été détruits, endommagés ou occupés. Des enseignants et des spécialistes du domaine de l'éducation ont été détenus arbitrairement. Dans le cadre de prétendus camps d'été, les houthistes continuent de promouvoir la haine, la violence et la discrimination, ce qui compromet l'avenir de la société yéménite et les perspectives de paix et de sécurité internationales (S/2023/833, annexe 86). Certaines sources ont indiqué que des conseillers du Hezbollah aidaient les houthistes à remanier les programmes scolaires et à gérer les camps d'été (voir annexe 193).

Recrutement et utilisation d'enfants

150. Le recrutement et l'utilisation d'enfants par les houthistes auraient augmenté après le déclenchement de la guerre de Gaza et les frappes américano-britanniques au

⁵⁴ Les Zeïnabiyat constituent la branche féminine houthiste chargée de la sécurité, s'agissant notamment de recueillir des renseignements, de participer aux combats et de veiller au respect de l'interprétation houthiste de la loi islamique (par exemple, en ce qui concerne les codes vestimentaires et les comportements sociaux acceptables).

⁵⁵ Voir <https://x.com/mashhadyemeni/status/1749604938630521164>.

Yémen. Lesdits événements, en particulier le premier, ont servi à promouvoir les activités de recrutement. Les houthistes ont employé un discours religieux extrémiste dans les médias, les mosquées et d'autres espaces publics (voir annexe 194). Exploitant les taux élevés d'analphabétisme, en particulier dans les zones tribales, ils auraient mobilisé des garçons de 10 ou 11 ans, souvent contre l'avis des parents. Des sermons de recrutement et des cours hebdomadaires sur le jihad seraient dispensés dans les établissements scolaires.

151. Certains enfants s'inscrivent à des « camps d'été » pour obtenir des avantages pécuniaires ou des rations alimentaires, qui sont très attractifs en période d'extrême pauvreté. D'autres sont enlevés, menacés ou contraints. Selon des témoignages, dans les camps d'été « fermés » les enfants sont isolés de leur famille et du monde extérieur pendant deux semaines. Ils sont endoctrinés afin d'adhérer à l'idéologie du jihad, et formés aux techniques de combat. Des signalements font état d'enfants abattus par les forces houthistes dans les camps d'été ou à proximité, ou soumis à des violences sexuelles, y compris des viols, dans ces camps. Les mariages d'enfant, les mariages précoces et les mariages forcés seraient encouragés pour renforcer l'adhésion à la cause houthiste. L'État yéménite a informé le Groupe d'experts que le 4 avril 2024, les autorités houthistes de la province d'Amran avaient émis, à l'intention de tous les ministères de l'éducation, une directive imposant la mise en place rapide de camps d'été supplémentaires. Selon certaines informations, en juin 2024, cette province comptait au moins 696 camps d'été ouverts et 5 camps d'été fermés, totalisant 15 000 élèves inscrits.

152. Des sources confidentielles ont informé le Groupe d'experts d'une intensification du recrutement de filles par les Zeïnabiyat ou pour le compte de ces dernières, souvent au moyen d'enlèvements et de menaces. Certaines filles qui ont été enlevées seraient exploitées pour des travaux domestiques forcés, tandis que d'autres seraient victimes de violences sexuelles.

153. L'État yéménite a informé le Groupe d'experts qu'avaient été signalés 3 298 cas de recrutement d'enfants par les houthistes au cours du premier semestre de 2024. Ces enfants auraient servi de boucliers humains, d'espions, ou encore de main d'œuvre pour poser des mines terrestres et d'autres engins explosifs, effectuer des opérations de reconnaissance, faire la cuisine et livrer des combats. Pour la période du 15 septembre 2023 au 31 juillet 2024, des sources confidentielles ont fait état de : a) 142 cas avérés de recrutement et d'utilisation d'enfants, b) 75 morts et de 1 blessé parmi les enfants mobilisés.

E. Entrave à l'accès humanitaire ainsi qu'à l'acheminement et à la distribution de l'aide

154. La situation humanitaire au Yémen reste très préoccupante, plusieurs facteurs entravant l'accès humanitaire et la distribution de l'aide.

155. L'intégrité physique des membres du personnel humanitaire est préoccupante, tant dans les zones contrôlées par l'État yéménite que dans celles contrôlées par les houthistes. Dans le premier cas, les enlèvements par des groupes armés et le contrôle fragmenté de l'utilisation de la force créent de l'incertitude et de la peur, ce qui a des répercussions sur les services humanitaires.

156. La détention arbitraire et la disparition forcée que les houthistes ont fait subir à des membres du personnel humanitaire (voir par. 142) ont compromis les services fournis par ces derniers. Les organisations qui fournissent des services humanitaires ont informé le Groupe d'experts que, pour des raisons de sécurité, certains membres de leur personnel évitaient les zones contrôlées par les houthistes. Ceux-ci auraient

contraint des membres du personnel humanitaire placés en détention à faire des « aveux » impliquant leurs collègues. La menace de condamnation à mort et le gel des comptes bancaires ont également contraint le personnel humanitaire à partir. En outre, au début du mois d'août 2024, les houthistes ont pris le contrôle des locaux du Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme à Sanaa et saisi des biens, notamment des documents. Lorsque les membres du personnel et les biens de l'ONU sont ciblés, cela compromet la capacité de l'Organisation à remplir sa mission humanitaire. Cela compromet également son action politique en faveur de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Le 17 juillet 2024, les houthistes ont exigé que les organisations internationales obtiennent une autorisation avant d'embaucher du personnel et qu'elles détaillent la structure organisationnelle, en précisant les titres fonctionnels des personnes y figurant (voir annexe 195). Grâce à cette mesure, les houthistes pourraient exercer un plus grand contrôle sur les acteurs humanitaires, notamment en ce qui concerne les bénéficiaires de l'aide humanitaire.

157. Selon les organisations qui fournissent des services humanitaires, 260 incidents ont eu des répercussions sur l'accès humanitaire et l'acheminement de l'aide au cours du deuxième trimestre de 2024, contre 140 au cours du premier trimestre. Il s'agit notamment de retards administratifs dans l'approbation des agréments permettant aux organisations non gouvernementales d'exercer leurs activités. Les organisations non gouvernementales jouant un rôle essentiel dans l'amélioration de la situation humanitaire, la longueur de la procédure d'approbation reste une préoccupation majeure dans tout le Yémen⁵⁶. Les autorités, en particulier dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes, s'opposent fréquemment aux activités comportant la collecte de données, telles que les évaluations et les enquêtes, et les intervenants concernés sont souvent pris pour cible. Il a été rapporté que la mésinformation sur les activités de l'ONU et des organisations non gouvernementales, de même que la sous-efficacité perçue du processus d'acheminement de l'aide, alimentait la méfiance des autorités et du public. Les restrictions imposées par les houthistes en matière de liberté de circulation des femmes entravent les services qui ne peuvent traditionnellement pas être assurés par des hommes, tels que les soins prénataux. Les travailleuses humanitaires auraient réduit leurs opérations sur le terrain. La situation à Sanaa est particulièrement préoccupante par rapport à d'autres endroits, comme Ibb.

158. Des sources ont informé le Groupe d'experts que le bombardement par Israël, en juillet 2024, de réservoirs de pétrole et d'une centrale électrique près du port de Hodeïda avait détruit les réserves de carburant des acteurs humanitaires, dont une partie était destinée à des installations médicales. L'évaluation des répercussions de l'attaque est en cours. Pour éviter une nouvelle détérioration de la situation humanitaire, en particulier dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes, il est essentiel que le port de Hodeïda continue de fonctionner.

159. Les attaques houthistes de navires commerciaux en mer Rouge (voir par. 43) ont fait augmenter les prix des marchandises et retardé l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire.

160. Les attaques houthistes de voies de communication essentielles ont compromis encore davantage l'accès des Yéménites à l'aide humanitaire (voir par. 136, ainsi qu'annexe 189, par. 4).

⁵⁶ Les autorités de l'État yéménite et les autorités instituées par les houthistes ont approuvé 19 agréments d'organisations non gouvernementales au deuxième trimestre de 2024, contre 42 au premier trimestre.

Utilisation de plateformes de médias sociaux par les houthistes

161. Le Groupe d'experts a observé que les houthistes utilisaient des plateformes de médias sociaux, en violation du régime de sanctions prévu par la résolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), pour vendre des armes, solliciter un soutien financier et idéologique, et faire l'apologie de la haine nationale, raciale ou religieuse qui constitue une incitation à la discrimination, à l'hostilité ou à la violence (voir par. 13, 90 et 112, ainsi qu'annexes 194 et 196 à 201).

VII. Recommandations

162. Le Groupe d'experts recommande que le Conseil de sécurité :

a) Condamne l'utilisation par les houthistes de plateformes de médias sociaux en violation du régime de sanctions prévu par la résolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) (voir par. 150 et 161) ;

b) Demande aux médias sociaux concernés de prendre des mesures urgentes et appropriées afin que leurs plateformes ne soient pas utilisées par des personnes ou des entités en violation du régime de sanctions prévu par la résolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) (voir par. 150 et 161) ;

c) Demande aux houthistes qu'ils s'abstiennent de geler et de confisquer, arbitrairement et par la force, les biens de personnes et d'entités et qu'ils libèrent sans délai les biens saisis ou confisqués et en indemnisent les propriétaires légitimes pour les pertes subies (voir par. 114 et 137) ;

d) Demande aux groupes armés régionaux de s'abstenir de fournir une assistance militaire ou financière aux houthistes en violation du régime de sanctions, et exprime son intention d'appliquer des sanctions à ceux qui se livrent à de tels agissements (voir par. 11 à 22) ;

e) Envisage d'élargir le Groupe d'experts sur le Yémen en lui adjoignant un membre supplémentaire, chargé de surveiller les activités maritimes, notamment la contrebande, qui menacent la paix et la sécurité au Yémen ;

f) Engage tous les États Membres à fournir des ressources suffisantes pour renforcer la capacité du Mécanisme de vérification et d'inspection des Nations Unies, et faciliter ainsi le dédouanement des cargaisons commerciales ainsi que la surveillance des violations potentielles de l'embargo sur les armes et des mesures de sanction financière (voir par. 97) ;

g) Exhorte tous les États Membres à fournir des ressources suffisantes pour renforcer la capacité de l'État yéménite à prévenir les marées noires en mer Rouge et à y faire face (voir par. 57) ;

h) Invite les États Membres à contribuer à la coopération internationale pour renforcer la lutte antimines au Yémen et à fournir un soutien financier durable aux organisations non gouvernementales opérant dans le domaine du déminage (voir par. 134) ;

i) Encourage les États Membres ainsi que les organisations internationales, régionales et sous-régionales à renforcer la collaboration afin d'enrayer l'intensification du recrutement et de l'utilisation d'enfants dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes (voir par. 150 à 153), notamment :

i) en promouvant les interventions communautaires axées sur les conséquences à moyen et long termes de l'implication des enfants dans le conflit

armé, et en favorisant ainsi un changement social mené par les populations locales ;

ii) en élaborant des stratégies durables de génération de revenus pour les familles dont les enfants sont particulièrement vulnérables ;

iii) en mettant en œuvre des stratégies efficaces de réintégration des enfants démobilisés, en particulier en ce qui concerne la prévention de la remobilisation.

j) Exhorte la communauté internationale à aider, le cas échéant (voir par. 144), les autorités yéménites à :

i) intensifier leurs activités de surveillance et d'enquête afin d'examiner en détail et de recenser les violations du droit à un procès équitable qui sont perpétrées dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes, où ces violations aboutissent souvent à des condamnations à mort ;

ii) renforcer leurs moyens d'enquête, leurs infrastructures judiciaires, ainsi que leurs ressources humaines et matérielles.

163. Le Groupe d'experts recommande que le Comité envisage de publier un communiqué de presse dans lequel il condamne le recours à la mésinformation et à la propagande visant à permettre que soient commises au Yémen des violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit des droits humains, notamment la détention arbitraire de membres du personnel humanitaire et de dissidents politiques, et dans lequel il exhorte toutes les parties prenantes à mener activement et à soutenir la lutte contre la mésinformation (voir par. 142 et 150).

**Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)**

CONTENTS

Annex 1: Methodology.....	47
Annex 2: UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Map.....	52
Annex 3: Summary of Panel correspondence (up to 15 August 2024).....	53
Annex 4: the Houthi threats to KSA.....	56
Annex 5: Article published on 24 May 2024 by Al-Mayadeen on the Houthi coordination with Kata'ib Hizballah	58
Annex 6: Kata'ib Hizballah Press Release on the phone call between its Secretary General and the Houthi leader	59
Annex 7: Fund-raising by the PMF to support the Houthis	60
Annex 8: List of Houthis combatants who were killed in the US airstrike in Iraq	65
Annex 9: Issuance of passports by the Houthis	67
Annex 10: Military cooperation between the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.....	68
Annex 11: The Houthis' Al Masirah TV on 13 June 2024 quoting the movement's leader talking about collaboration with the IRI to attack Israel from Golan Heights	71
Annex 12: The Houthi representative in Iraq.....	72
Annex 13: The Houthi representative's activities in Iraq.....	73
Annex 14: Al-Sharafi in Iraq meets high ranking officials.....	75
Annex 15: Training provided to the Houthis in southern Lebanon by Hezbollah	76
Annex 16: Houthi cooperation with Hezbollah	78
Annex 17: Video released by the "Axis of Resistance" military media, on 13 April 2023, showing representatives from all the members of the Axis in the joint situation room	80
Annex 18: Article published on 9 June 2024 by the Iranian media Mehr News Agency, in which the Houthi Brigadier-General Hamid Abdul Qader Antar, advisor to the Houthi Prime Minister, mentions about the coordination with the 'Axis of Resistance'	81
Annex 19: Interview conducted on 20 June 2024 by Al Mayadeen with Muhammad Abdulsalam, official spokesman for the Houthis, during which he acknowledged operational coordination with the Iraqi factions, Hezbollah and other parties	85
Annex 20: Article published on 29 October 2024 in the Iranian media ABNA news, in which Mahdi Al-Mashat, President of the Houthis' Supreme Political Council, was quoted discussing about the "joint operations rooms"	86
Annex 21: Article published on 9 November 2023 by the Iranian media PressTV in which Abdulaziz bin Habtour, Houthi Prime Minister is quoted as saying that "It is one axis and there is coordination taking place, a joint operations room, and a joint command for all these operations".....	90
Annex 22: Interview conducted on 1 March 2024 by the Qatari media Al Jazeera of Abdulmalik al-Ajri, member of the Houthi political council, during which he acknowledged the existence of a coordination mechanism between the armed groups comprising the 'Axis of Resistance'.....	91

Annex 23: Press article dated 11 November 2020 from the Houthi media reporting that Abdullah Sabri was appointed by decree as the Ambassador to the Arab Republic of Syria	96
Annexes 24: Press article dated 18 October 2021 in the Syrian media North Press Agency, related to a meeting between Colonel Sharaf al-Mawri, Houthi military attaché at the Yemeni “embassy” in Damascus, Syria, and the head of the Military Intelligence Division of the Syrian Ministry of Defence	97
Annex 25: Houthi military escalation.	98
Annex 26: Large-scale Recruitment and Training Conducted by the Houthis	100
Annex 27: Statement released on 23 March 2024 by AQAP	103
Annex 28: Rivalry between central banks: Economic stability under threat	104
Annex 29: Recent conflict between the CBY, Aden and the Houthis.	112
Annex 30: Information on Houthi attacks and suspicious activities towards merchant and military vessels from 19 November 2023 to 1 August 2024.	115
Annex 31: Hijacking by the Houthis of the Galaxy Leader on 19 November 2023	120
Annex 32: Interview conducted on 20 November 2023 by the Qatari media al Araby al-Jadeed with Hazam al-Assad, member of the Houthis political council.	125
Annex 33: Houthis missiles, UAVs, USVs, UUVs, SAMs, and other weapon systems destroyed during strikes conducted by the coalition, or intercepted on the way	126
Annex 34: Threatening messages sent on 25 April 2024 by HOCC (Houthis) to the bulk carrier Cyclades, sailing under Liberia flag	127
Annex 35: Threatening messages sent on 22 May 2024 by HOCC (Houthis) to the bulk carrier Alexandria, sailing under Liberia flag	128
Annex 36: Decree issued on 17 February 2024 by Mahdi al-Mashat, President of the Houthi supreme political council establishing the HOCC	129
Annex 37: Components of weapons systems and various materiel, which have been intercepted, and documented in previous reports of the Panel	130
Annex 38: Article published on 29 May 2024 by the Iranian media Tasnim News stating that the achievement of Shahid Tehrani Moghadam is today in the hands of the Yemeni Mujahideen as an anti-ship weapon.	132
Annex 39: Article published on 29 May 2024 by the Iranian media Tasnim News stating that Iranian naval ballistic missile’s technology is at disposal of Yemen	134
Annex 40: Table illustrating materiel with similar characteristics documented in the hands of the Houthis, in Iran, and in the hands of several armed groups belonging to the ‘Axis of Resistance’	135
Annex 41: Comparison between Borkhan-2H SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and Qiam SRBM produced by Iran	137
Annex 42: Comparison between Borkhan-3 SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and Revzan SRBM produced by Iran	138
Annex 43: Comparison between Falaq SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and Qiam SRBM produced by Iran	139
Annex 44: Comparison between Qarar SRBM displayed by the Houthis, Fateh-110 / Zolfagar SRBM produced by Iran, Aqsa-1 SRBM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and Jamal-69 SRBM operated by Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq	140
Annex 45: Comparison between Tankil SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and Raad 500 SRBM produced by Iran.	142

Annex 46: Comparison between Hatem SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and Khaybar Shekan SRBM produced by Iran.	143
Annex 47: Comparison between Palestine SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and Khaybar Shekan SRBM produced by Iran.	144
Annex 48: Comparison between Qaher-1 SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and Tondar-69 SRBM produced by Iran.	145
Annex 49: Comparison between Qaher-M2 SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and Tondar-69 SRBM produced by Iran.	146
Annex 50: Comparison between Toofan MRBM displayed by the Houthis, and Shahab-3 MRBM produced by Iran.	147
Annex 51: Comparison between Aqeel MRBM displayed by the Houthis, and Qiam MRBM produced by Iran.	148
Annex 52: Comparison between Quds-1 LACM displayed by the Houthis, Soumar LACM produced by Iran, and a LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq	149
Annex 53: Comparison between Quds-2 LACM displayed by the Houthis, Soumar LACM produced by Iran, and a LACM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq	150
Annex 54: Comparison between Quds-3 LACM displayed by the Houthis, and Soumar LACM produced by Iran.	151
Annex 55: Comparison between Quds-4 LACM displayed by the Houthis, Paveh-04 LACM produced by Iran, and a LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq	152
Annex 56: C-802 ASCM operated by the Houthis, the C-802 / Noor ASCM operated by Iran, and C-802 ASCM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon	153
Annex 57: Comparison between <i>Al-Mandab-1</i> ASCM displayed by the Houthis, and <i>Ghadir/Noor</i> ASCM produced by Iran.	154
Annex 58: Comparison between Mandab-2 ASCM displayed by the Houthis, and Ghadir/Noor ASCM produced by Iran.	155
Annex 59: Comparison between Faleq-1 ASBM displayed by the Houthis, and Fadjr-4CL ASBM produced by Iran.	156
Annex 60: Comparison between Badr-2 Long-range guided rocket displayed by the Houthis, and Fadjr-5 Long-range guided rocket produced by Iran	157
Annex 61: Comparison between Mersad-2 UAV displayed by the Houthis, and Chamrosh-4 UAV produced by Iran.	158
Annex 62: Comparison between Waeed-1 OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, Shahed 131 OWA-UAV produced by Iran, and OWA-UAV similar to Shahed 131 reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)	159
Annex 63: Comparison between Waeed-2 OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, Shahed 136 OWA-UAV produced by Iran, and OWA-UAV similar to Shahed 136 operated by the PMF, Iraq.	160
Annex 64: Comparison between Rased OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, Chamrosh OWA-UAV produced by Iran, Rased OWA-UAV displayed by the Hezbollah, Lebanon, and Rased OWA-UAV displayed by PMF, Iraq.	161
Annex 65: Comparison between Qasef-2K OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, Ababil-2 OWA-UAV produced by Iran, Mirsad-1 OWA-UAV operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon, Shebab OWA-UAV operated by Hamas, Palestinian occupied territory, OWA-UAV similar to Ababil-2 operated by	163

Liwa al-Ghaliboun, Iraq, and OWA-UAV similar to Ababil-2 operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)	
Annex 66: Comparison between Samad-2 OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, Sayyad OWA-UAV produced by Iran, OWA-UAV similar to Sayyad reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, OWA-UAV similar to Sayyad reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and OWA-UAV similar to Sayyad reportedly operated by Al-Ashtar, a Bahraini Shia militant group.	165
Annex 67: Comparison between Khatif-2 OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, Shahed 101 OWA-UAV produced by Iran, Jenin OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, Murad-5 OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Saraya Ababeel, Iraq, and Murad-5 OWA-UAV reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq	167
Annex 68: Comparison between Rujum UAV displayed by the Houthis, and UAV displayed by the Iranian armed forces.	169
Annex 69: Comparison between Saqr-1 SAM displayed by the Houthis, “358” SAM produced by Iran, “358” SAM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon, and “358” SAM observed in Iraq	170
Annex 70: Similarities of the characteristics of the Barq-2 SAM operated by the Houthis and the Khordad-3 SAM produced by Iran	172
Annex 71: Misgah-2 Manpads displayed by the Houthis, -2 Manpads produced by Iran, and Misgah-2 Manpads reportedly operated by Kata’ib Hizballah, Iraq.	173
Annex 72: Saegheh-2 ATGM displayed by the Houthis, Saegheh-2 ATGM produced by Iran, Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by PMF, Iraq	174
Annex 73: Toophan ATGM displayed by the Houthis, Toophan ATGM produced by Iran, Toophan ATGM reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, Toophan ATGM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, and Toophan ATGM reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Iraq	176
Annex 74: Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by the Houthis, Dehlavieh ATGM produced by Iran, Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Hezbollah, Lebanon, Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, and Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by the PMF, Iraq	178
Annex 75.1: Comparison between Sadiq EOSS displayed by the Houthis, and IRSS-I-3 Saadad EOSS produced by Iran	180
Annex 75.2: Comparison between Shafak EOSS displayed by the Houthis, and EOSS I-103, produced by Iran	181
Annex 75.3: Comparison between Ofok EOSS displayed by the Houthis, and I-103 EOSS produced by Iran	182
Annex 76: AM-50 “Sayyad” AMR displayed by the Houthis, AM-50 AMR produced by Iran, Ghoul AMR reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Kata’ib Hizballah, Iraq, AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Saraya al-Salam, Iraq, AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Sinjar Resistance Units, Iraq, AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq, and AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Iraq	183
Annex 77: Qader 40mm grenade launcher presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and Qader 40mm grenade launcher, produced by Iran.	186
Annex 78: Comparison between Rujoom 120mm mortar displayed by the Houthis, HM-16, 120mm mortar produced by Iran, and HM-16, 120mm mortar reportedly operated by Al-Quds brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, HM-16, 120mm mortar reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and HM-16, 120mm mortar reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory.	187

Annex 79: Comparison between Rujoom 60mm mortar displayed by the Houthis, HM-12/14, 60mm mortar produced by Iran, HM-12/14, 60mm mortar reportedly operated by Al-Quds brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, HM-12/14, 60mm mortar reportedly operated by Al-Mujahideen brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, and HM-12/14, 60mm mortar reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory	189
Annex 80: Saegheh rocket launcher displayed by the Houthis, Saegheh rocket launcher produced by Iran, Saegheh rocket launcher reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, Saegheh rocket launcher reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, and Saegheh rocket launcher reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq	191
Annex 81: RU-60G thermal sight displayed by the Houthis, RU-60G thermal sight operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces, RU-60G thermal sight reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, RU-60G thermal sight reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq, and RU-60G thermal sight reportedly recovered on Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Iraq.	193
Annex 82: M18A2 horizontal effect land mine documented as used by the Houthis, M18A2 horizontal effect land mine produced by Iran, and M18A2 horizontal effect land mine reportedly recovered in Syria.	195
Annex 83: Thaqib (MTA) sea mine displayed by the Houthis, and limpet mine produced by Iran	196
Annex 84: Large-scale military display on 21 of September of materiel by the Houthis held in Sana'a	197
Annex 85: MRBMs and SRBMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023	199
Annex 86: Long-distance guided rockets presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023	205
Annex 87: LACMs and ASCMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023	208
Annex 88: ASBMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023	214
Annex 89: SAMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023	217
Annex 90: UAVs and OWA-UAVs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023	219
Annex 91: Armoured vehicles presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023	230
Annex 92: EOSSs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023	232
Annex 93: Fast attack boats and WBIEDs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023	234
Annex 94: Helicopters and fighter jet displayed by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023	241
Annex 95: Interview of General Rostam Ghasemi, Assistant Commander of the IRGC-QF, by the Russian media Russia Today and released on 21 April 2021 by Memri TV, where he announces the presence of military advisors in Yemen and the supply of weapons manufacturing technology.	243
Annex 96: Statement by the Iranian forces' spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji published by the Iranian media Noor News on 22 September 2020 announcing the transfer of experiences in technology in the defence sphere, and sharing their experience and knowledge with the people of Yemen.	249

Annex 97: Statement by the Iranian forces' spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji published by the Russian media Russia Today on 22 September 2020 announcing the transfer of military technology to Yemen to make missiles and drones	250
Annex 98: Statement by the Iranian Chief of Staff General Mohammad Bagheri published by the Tehran office of the Qatari media Al Jazeera on 2 October 2019 announcing the advisory support of Iran to the Houthis	252
Annex 99: Statement of the Houthis' military spokesman issued on 31 October 2023 claiming the attacks on Israel	254
Annex 100: Media reports/Messages by the Houthis preventing ships linked to, or heading to Israel from crossing the Indian Ocean	255
Annex 101: Article published on 14 April 2024 by the Iranian media Tasnim News stating that the 13 April 2024 attack on Israel was conducted from Iran, Yemen, Hezbollah, and the Iraqi resistance	257
Annex 102: Houthi MRBM "Palestine" launched on 3 June 2024 against Israel.	259
Annex 103: Houthi OWA-UAV "Jaffa" launched on 19 July 2024 against Israel	261
Annex 104: Scenes of the launching of a Hatem 2 hypersonic ballistic missile allegedly targeting the Israeli ship MSC Sarah V presented on "X" by the Houthi military media "MMY.YE"	263
Annex 105: Press article dated 19 November 2019 from the Yemeni pro-Houthi media YPA highlighting Ibrahim Al-Dailami's presentation of the credentials as Houthi-affiliated Ambassador to the Iranian President.	264
Annex 106: Press article dated 22 December 2019 from the Iranian media Al-Alam regarding a meeting between Ibrahim Al-Dailami, as Houthis-affiliated Ambassador in Iran, and Brigadier-General Amir Hatami, Iranian Defence Minister	265
Annex 107: Maritime smuggling of missile components	266
Annex 108: Dahua DH-TPC-PT8620A-B thermal vision devices intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024	277
Annex 109: Black plastic tubular container used to hide materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024 by US.	280
Annex 110: Similarities of the materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024 with materiel produced by Iran.	281
Annex 111: Maritime smuggling of lethal material and surveillance equipment	288
Annex 112: Stickers documented on the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024.	328
Annex 113: Quality control (QC) stickers of four different models observed by the Panel.	329
Annex 114: Similarities of the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024 with materiel produced by Iran.	330
Annex 115: Material seized since 12 March 2023 by the GoY Customs	339
Annex 116: Components of AK-47 and G3 or MP5 intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023	344
Annex 117: Tactical rails and equipment for SALW intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023	345
Annex 118: Sniper scopes intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023	346
Annex 119: Rifle scopes intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023	347
Annex 120: Red dot holographic sights intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023.	348

Annex 121: Communication devices intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023.	349
Annex 122: Case study N° 1, “Glock store” armory located in Sana’a	352
Annex 123: Case study N° 2, Haider Tayef artisanal store in Sana’a.	356
Annex 124: Case study N° 3, Abdul Khaleq Al-Masry artisanal store in Sana’a.	358
Annex 125: Arms exhibition held in Sana’a in February 2024.	360
Annex 126: Model 213 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.	362
Annex 127: Type 54 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.	363
Annex 128: Type 59 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.	364
Annex 129: CF-98 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.	366
Annex 130: NP-34 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.	367
Annex 131: NP-34 pistols with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those commercialized by Norconia GmbH presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	368
Annex 132: NP-42 Mini pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.	369
Annex 133: FB-83 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Poland presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.	370
Annex 134: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	371
Annex 135: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	372
Annex 136: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 and with serial numbers consistent with the batches of those operated by the GoY, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.	381
Annex 137: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	382
Annex 138: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 66 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	383
Annex 139: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 313 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	384
Annex 140: Type 56-2 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 313 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	385
Annex 141: Type 56-2 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 386 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	386
Annex 142: M80 LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and which are consistent with the model and batch that those intercepted between 2020 and 2023	387
Annex 143: MPiKMS 72 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings, similar to those manufactured in former East Germany, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	389

Annex 144: KL serie assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, similar to those manufactured in Iran, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	399
Annex 145: TK-9 Tondar sub-machine gun (SMG) with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Iran, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	392
Annex 146: FEG AMD-65 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Hungary presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.	393
Annex 147: HK G3-A3 rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those manufactured under licence in the UK, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	394
Annex 148: PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Romania presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and which are also consistent with the model and batch of those intercepted in 2023	396
Annex 150: PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Hungary, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	397
Annex 151: RPG-7 grenade launcher with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Iran presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and which are consistent with the model and batch of those intercepted between 2016 and 2021.	398
Annex 152: Pulsar Trail XQ50 thermal sight with technical characteristics and markings presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, consistent with those produced in Lithuania	399
Annex 153: Taurus G3 pistols manufactured in Brazil, which have been legally transferred between 2021 and 2023 to KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	400
Annex 154: Taurus G3XL pistol manufactured in Brazil, which has been legally transferred in 2022 to KSA, and which has been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.	401
Annex 155: Taurus TH-9 pistols manufactured in Brazil, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	402
Annex 156: Taurus G3c pistols manufactured in Brazil, which have been legally transferred to Tanzania, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	405
Annex 157: Taurus 24/7 pistols produced in Brazil, which have been legally transferred to the Ministry of Defence of Djibouti, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	408
Annex 158: Canik TP9 Elite Combat pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2023 to KSA and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	412
Annex 159 Canik TP9 Elite SF pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to USA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	414
Annex 160: AHSS FXS-9 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to the Sudan and to Czechia, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	416
Annex 161: Sarsilmaz SAR-9 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to the Sudan, and in 2023 to KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.	418
Annex 162: Sarsilmaz SAR-9 SP pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to the Sudan, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	419

Annex 163: Sarsilmaz B6 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2015 to Iraq, and in 2022 to the Sudan, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	420
Annex 164: Sarsilmaz Kiliç 2000 Mega pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2015 to Iraq, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	421
Annex 165: CZ P-07 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Czech Republic, which have been legally transferred in 2023 to KSA and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas	422
Annex 166: X-Calibur Mk23 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Slovak Republic, which have been legally transferred to first Czechia and then to KSA and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.	423
Annex 167: Presence of the aggregated carrier Almas at the Port of Saleef, Yemen in October 2023	426
Annex 168: Presence in September and October 2023 of the general cargo ship Kasra-3 at the Port of Saleef, Yemen	431
Annex 169: Dubai-1 anchored on 23 March 2024 at Port Saleef	436
Annex 170: Copy of the letter from the Director-General of Passports	438
Annex 171: Copy of the passport of the person who allegedly approached the company	439
Annex 172: Issuance of YR100 coin by CBY, Sana'a	440
Annex 173: Screenshots of messages for collection of funds for the UAV Force	442
Annex 174: Receipt of payment from schools for Drones (UAVs)	444
Annex 175: Houthi revenue from customs, taxes, fees, and other illegal fees	446
Annex 176: Financing the purchase of military materiel	448
Annex 177: Misappropriation of the assets of Amran cement factory	450
Annex 178: Ministry of Endowment regarding threats from the Houthis not to deposit ticket amount for Haj pilgrims in other accounts	451
Annex 179: Yemenia Chairman's letter to the PM regarding seizure of aircrafts	452
Annex 180: Yemenia's excess war liability for flying in Houthi-areas	453
Annex 181: Freezing of the assets of pharmaceutical companies	454
Annex 182: Smuggling of telecom equipment	458
Annex 183: Smuggling of prohibited pesticides.	459
Annex 184: Smuggling of medicines	460
Annex 185: Seizure of cultural properties	462
Annex 186: LPG Tankers	474
Annex 187: Landmines locally produced by the Houthis.	475
Annex 188: Attacks on civilians.	498
Annex 189: Attacks on civilian objects	500
Annex 190: Critique of Houthis' attacks on the Red Sea followed by arbitrary detention of its author	503
Annex 191: Arbitrary detention of teachers and education experts	504

Annex 192: Prosecution Office documents relating to the death sentences issued by the Houthi-appointed specialised criminal court	505
Annex 193: Reported influence of Hezbollah on the Houthis' summer camps and the alteration of curricula in Houthi-Controlled Areas	507
Annex 194: Indoctrination and Promotion of Hatred, Violence and Discrimination among Children	508
Annex 195: Directive issued by Houthi appointed authority on requirements for the operation of international organisations in Houthis-controlled areas	519
Annex 196: Facebook accounts identified by the Panel of arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas.	511
Annex 197: WhatsApp accounts identified by the Panel of arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas.	523
Annex 198: "X" accounts identified by the Panel of arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas	524
Annex 199: Telegram accounts identified by the Panel as belonging to arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas	526
Annex 200: "X" accounts identified by the Panel of Houthi political and military leadership, and/or of media associated, and/or of activists promoting their ideology	527
Annex 201: "X" accounts identified by the Panel as used by the Houthis to indoctrinate the youth	528
List of Acronyms	529

Annex 1: Methodology

1. The Panel uses satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also uses commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone records. Public statements by officials through their official media channels are accepted as factual unless contrary facts are established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would expose these sources or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel does not include identifying information.
2. The Panel reviews social media, but no information gathered is used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
3. The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update.
4. The Panel places importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agrees that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions, and recommendations by a majority of the members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
5. The Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in most incidents that are covered in this report. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix A.

Appendix A ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity⁵⁷ in a Panel’s public report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.
2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
 - (a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
 - (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
 - (i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
 - (iii) Endanger Panel sources or their relatives or Panel members;
 - (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field;
 - (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.
4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
6. In no circumstances the third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, can determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.
7. The individuals, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or their government) to communicate on their behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

⁵⁷ Hereinafter, the term individual will be used to reflect both individuals and entities.

Appendix B: Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses

1. The Panel adopts the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations meet the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting places in Yemen. In doing so it pays particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, (S/2006/997), on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as per paragraph 14 of resolution 2564 (2021).

2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning alleged IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is as set out below:

(a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.

(b) In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at least three or more of the following sources of information:

- (i) At least two eyewitnesses or victims;
- (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
- (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel will endeavour to obtain copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations;
- (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixilation distortion:
 - a. In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and
 - b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other sources of information.
- (v) The utilization of open source or purchased satellite imagery, wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident;
- (vi) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;
- (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced;
- (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area;
- (ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident;

(x) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.

(c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations, the Panel relies on the following sources of information:

- (i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview;
- (ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody;
- (iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
- (iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates;
- (v) Documentation issued by prison authorities;
- (vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible;
- (vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim;
- (viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates;
- (ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;
- (x) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings;
- (xi) Detainees do not have always access to medical care, nor is it always possible to obtain medical reports, especially in cases of prolonged detention. Therefore, the Panel accepts testimonies received from detainees alleging that violence was used against them during detention by the detaining parties as prima facie evidence of torture;
- (xii) For the same reasons, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place.

(d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement human rights violations and abuses against migrants, or threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:

- (i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview;
- (ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
- (iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained;
- (iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;
- (v) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.

(e) In carrying out its investigation in respect to the recruitment of children by parties to the conflict, the Panel is particularly mindful of the risk pose by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel also refrains from interviewing directly the victim, unless it is sure that this will not have a negative impact on them. Therefore, the Panel often relies on sources such as:

- (i) Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;
- (ii) Interviews with people and organizations providing assistance to these children;

(iii) Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.

(f) The standard of proof is met when the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt”.


(g) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel’s findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel’s standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information in any opportunity to respond, including geo-locations. However, detailed information on incidents are not provided when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel’s sources, for example, in violations related to deprivation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian home, or in violations associated with children.

(h) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, the Panel will consider whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non-compliance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2624 (2022) and thus consideration for reporting to the Committee.

3. The Panel does not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel deposits such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.

4. The Panel does not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result of such disclosure of information. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to support the Panel’s findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will, however, be taken to protect the anonymity of its sources.

Annex 2: UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Map



Annex 3: Summary of Panel correspondence (up to 15 August 2024)

Table 3.1

Correspondence with Member States

Member states	Number of letters sent by the Panel	Number of unanswered letters by Member State	Number of letters where the deadline is after 15 August 2024
Austria	2	2	
Barbados	1	1	
Belize	2		
Brazil	1		
Bulgaria	1	1	
China	12	11	
Comoros	6	6	
Czechia	5	1	
Djibouti	6	2	
France	3	1	
Germany	2		
Greece	1	1	
Guinea Bissau	1	1	
Hungary	1		
India	1	1	
Indonesia	1	1	
Iraq	1	1	
Iran	4	2	1
Israel	2	2	
Jordan	1	1	
Lebanon	1	1	
Liberia	2	2	
Lithuania	1		
Marshall Islands	3	3	
KSA	8	6	
Oman	2	1	
Palau	6	3	
Panama	18	18	
Poland	2	2	
Portugal	2	2	
Romania	2		
Russia	11		
Serbia	2	1	
Singapore	6	3	
Slovak Republic	1		
Somalia	2	1	
Spain	2	2	
Sri Lanka	2	1	
Syria	2	2	
Tanzania	2	2	
The Sudan	3	3	
Togo	1	1	
UAE	4	4	
UK	3	2	
USA	8	4	
Yemen	11	7	
Total	161	104	1

Table 3.2

Correspondence with armed groups and other non-governmental entities

<i>Commercial Company/Government Entity</i>	Number of letters sent by the Panel	Number of unanswered letters by Government Entity	Number of letters where the deadline is after 15 August 2024
Sana'a-based Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2	2	
Total	2	2	

Table 3.3

Correspondence with commercial companies/governmental entities

<i>Commercial Company/Government Entity</i>	Number of letters sent by the Panel	Number of unanswered letters by Commercial Company	Number of letters where the deadline is after 15 August 2024
Adler Firearms	1	1	
AHSS	1		
AirTronic USA	1	1	
Barrett Firearms Mfg Corporation	1		
Beretta USA	1	1	
Canik Arms	1		
Caracal International LLC	1	1	
Česká zbrojovka a.s.	1		
Colt's Manufacturing Company	1	1	
DPMS Panther Arms	1	1	
Girsan Firearms	1		
European Union	3	1	
FN America LLC	1	1	
Glock USA Inc	1	1	
Grand Power Ltd.	1	1	
IMO	1		
Kahr Firearms Group	1	1	
Lipsley Guns.Com	1	1	
Lloyd's	1		
LWRC International LLC	1	1	
North Sylva sports	1	1	
ParkWest Arms	1		
Remington Arms Co. LLC	1	1	
RM Equipment Inc.	1		
Safir Arms Industrial	1		
Sarsilmaz	1		
Shadow System LLC	1	1	
Sig Sauer USA	1	1	
Smith & Wesson Brands Inc.	1	1	
Stamco Ship Management Co Ltd	1		
Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc	1	1	


Springfield Armory	1	1
System Defence Firearms	1	1
Taurus Armas S.A.	1	
Tisaş Trabzon Silah Sanayi	1	
Zaffiri Precision	1	
Zastava Arms	1	1
Total	41	21

Annex 4: the Houthi threats to KSA

On 7 July 2024, the Houthis released video footage showing Aramco oil facilities located in Jizan, KSA. The content of the message accompanying these videos is unambiguously a threat to these installations (“*The coordinates are ready, the missile force, and the unmanned air force are ready to deliver a fatal blow to the Saudi enemy*”).

Figure 4.1

Houthis affiliated media threatening to target Saudi refineries in Jizan



Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

On 25 March 2024, in an interview with the Houthi-run Al-Masirah television channel, ahead of the ninth anniversary of the Saudi-led military campaign against Yemen, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, a member of the group’s Supreme Political Council warned KSA that the country “*would be a target for us if they provided aid and support to the US-British aggression against Yemen*”.⁵⁸

Following the Houthi leader's threats to escalate military action against KSA, the Houthi-affiliated Yemeni military media has started posting posters of key Saudi sea and airports with a hashtag “Try it”.

Following the Houthi leader's threats to escalate military action against KSA, the Houthi-affiliated Yemeni military media has started posting posters of key Saudi sea and airports with a hashtag “Try it”.

⁵⁸ <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/houthis-warn-saudi-arabia-would-be-target-if-it-backs-us-uk-strikes#ixzz8fMB8s8Ep>

Figure 4.2:

Photos of vital Saudi installations

Source: <https://x.com/zy08fv82LGn4dH3/status/1810016373877494252>

Saudi Aramco installations have already been targeted by the Houthis in June 2021 (S/2022/50, paras. 47, 59, and annex 16), in September 2019 (S/2020/326, para. 54., and annex 14), and in December 2015 (S/2018/193, table 42.1). In the immediate aftermath of the September 2019 attack, Saudi Aramco's daily oil production fell from 9.8 million barrels to about 4.1 million barrels, which is a production loss of almost 60 percent overnight. This reduction represents about five percent of global oil production.

Annex 5: Article published on 24 May 2024 by Al-Mayadeen on the Houthi coordination with Kata'ib Hezbollah Al-Houthi, al-Hamidawi stress coordination between 'Axis of Resistance'

24 May 2024

Houthi leader and Kata'ib Hezbollah chief discuss during a phone call on the 'Axis of Resistance' operations in support of Gaza.



The leader of the Yemeni Ansar Allah movement in Yemen, Sayyed Abdul Malik al-Houthi, emphasized on Friday that **coordination among members of the 'Axis of Resistance' in the region will increase the impact of their operations against the Israeli occupation entity.**

His remarks came during a phone call with the Secretary-General of the Islamic Resistance, Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq, Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi.

For his part, al-Hamidawi praised the military operations of the Yemeni forces, which "have significantly contributed to imposing a blockade on Israeli maritime navigation." He also stressed the need to maintain high readiness and coordination among the Axis of Resistance forces, especially between Iraq and Yemen, to support the Palestinian people.

Since the Israeli genocidal war on Gaza began last October, the Axis of Resistance factions initiated support fronts against the occupation entity, which included over 1,500 operations combined.

Source: https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/al-houthi--al-hamidawi-stress-coordination-between-axis-of-r?utm_source=mango-searchx&utm_medium=exact_title&utm_campaign=houthi

Annex 6: Kata'ib Hizballah Press Release on the phone call between its Secretary General and the Houthi leader

Iraq's Kata'ib Hizballah vows resolute support for Yemen after US-British aggression

Press TV (Iran), Saturday, 01 June 2024 4:02 PM

Iraq's anti-terror group Kata'ib Hizballah has assured Yemeni people and fellow Ansarullah resistance movement that it will continue to give its unwavering support for the Arab nation in the struggle against the US-British maritime coalition.

In a statement, the group highlighted the failure of colonial powers in preventing Yemeni strikes from continuing military operations against Israeli-owned merchant vessels or commercial ships affiliated to the Tel Aviv regime in support of Palestine.

“The latest US-British aggression against the Yemeni nation came in light of the arrogant powers’ disappointment at breaking the maritime blockade of Israel [in the Red Sea and the Arab Sea].

“We reiterate that enemies will receive many blows from us. We will not hesitate to give unwavering support to our Yemeni brethren in the battle between the truth and falsehood,” Kata'ib Hezbollah pointed out.

The spokesman for the Yemeni Armed Forces announced on Friday that the country’s naval units had launched a missile attack on a United States aircraft carrier in the Red Sea in response to deadly US and British strikes on Yemen.

Brigadier General Yahya Sarea said in a statement that the attack was “in response to last night's multiple airstrikes launched by the US-British coalition” against positions in the Yemeni Red Sea port city of Hudaydah, the capital Sana'a, and the southwestern province of Ta'izz.

He added that Yemeni forces “will not hesitate to respond directly and immediately to every new aggression on Yemeni territory by targeting all sources of threat and all hostile American and British targets in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea.”

Source: <https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/06/01/726656/Iraq's-Kata'ib-Hezbollah-vows-resolute-support-for-Yemen-after-US-British-aggression>

Annex 7: Fund-raising by the PMF to support the Houthis

Figure 7.1

Abu Ali Alaskari, Kata'ib Hizballah, launches fundraising campaign for Houthis



Appendix A

Unofficial translation for Abu Ali Alaskari's Tweet

Abu Ali Al-Askari

In His name Almighty

The victories achieved by the axis of goodness and faith over the axis of evil and tyranny, especially over the rivals of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, is a matter of pride and pride. As we see the cracking of these evil states, and the clear signs of their imminent disintegration and collapse, we must be fully prepared in anticipation of any emergency or surprise in the region, and from here we emphasize the following:

First: The policy of mixing the cards adopted by the election riggers and the corrupt will not work, the latest of which is targeting Baghdad Airport with missiles, which requires the loyal leaders of the security services, and the security services of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Reveal these mercenaries and who standing behind them.

Second: The hostile actions that have begun to be repeated in the western provinces, and which target most of the Iraqi security services, are behind senior leaders in the current government, and the loyal ones must expose them to public opinion and bring them to justice.

Third: In fulfilment of the legitimate duty and in support of the oppressed, the Islamic Resistance/Hezbollah Brigades donated an amount of one billion Iraqi dinars in support of the "Your Money" campaign, marches against Al Zayed and Al Salul, which is led by a group of zealous Iraqi youth. An invitation to all honorable people to contribute by donating to this blessed campaign in order to clear their conscience and support the oppressed Yemeni people.

t.me/abualaskary

28 January 2022

Source: <https://justpaste.it/b11p9>

Article published on 1 February 2022 by the Washington Institute stating that Kata'ib Hizballah (KH) launched a fundraising campaign purporting to help the Yemeni Houthi movement acquire more drones

The Iran-backed militia tried to make its solo effort to boost the Houthi drone arsenal look like a widely coordinated and highly popular campaign, whereas it was anything but

On January 23, **Kataib Hezbollah (KH) launched a fundraising campaign purporting to help the Yemeni Houthi movement acquire more drones** intended for attacks against the United Arab Emirates. The campaign was advertised as a "grassroots" initiative and named *hamlat shabab al-Iraq* (Iraqi youth campaign). But clear and convincing evidence suggests it was in fact a KH-organized initiative and not that successful.

The campaign was launched by Amir al-Musawi, the spokesman for Sharia Youth Gathering (Tajamma Shabab al-Sharia, or TSS), an umbrella organization controlled by KH. In a video clip circulated on Iraqi *muqawama* (resistance) social media, Musawi stated: "After a series of continuous assaults by those who made the Zionist dream come true [referring to the Emiratis] against the oppressed and victorious Yemeni people, the honorable sons of Iraq had to...support their Yemeni brothers. Therefore, we will launch a big campaign under the slogan *amwalokum mosayarat* [your money will turn to drones]...to gather money for the Yemeni people to buy drones—drones that will be Ababil and whips to punish...al-Salul and the House of Zayed [the UAE ruling family]." ("Al-Salul" is a derogatory term used to describe the rulers of Saudi Arabia. "Ababil" refers to the miraculous flock of birds described in the Quran as protecting the Kaaba by dropping stones on an army invading Mecca. The Musawi clip was posted with two mobile numbers for people to donate money.

Source: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/kataib-hezbollah-behind-grassroots-iraqi-fundraising-yemen>

Figure 7.2

Musawi announcing the launch of the campaign, on 23 January 2022 channel promoting fundraising



#Iraq_Youth_Campaign

#Your_money_marches

Source: <https://t.me/qodsana/6201>

Although TSS social media accounts did not post the clip itself, the organization's Telegram channel was the most active in the campaign. TSS also produced video clips showing young men erecting stands in the street with boxes for people to donate (Figure 7.3).

Figure 7.3
TSS video clips promoting the fundraising campaign, 27 January 2022



Other KH social media channels actively advertised the campaign as well. Tahalof Thawrat al-Ishrin al-Thaniyah (Alliance of the Second Revolt of 1920) — a tribal group that appears to be tied to KH based on the content of its material) — was among the small number of Telegram channels posting video clips promoting the fundraising campaign. Some of these clips were reposted by TSS (Figure 7.4).

Figure 7.4
TSS reposts Tahalof Thorat al-Ishrin al-Thaniya video clip, 30 January 2022



Source: <https://t.me/sayhgg/228>

Additionally, some of the graphics used in the campaign clearly indicate that KH was the organizer. Mido, the tag name for one of the main *muqawama* graphic designers, posted an image featuring a fighter wearing a uniform that resembles KH's signature attire: a boonie hat and a military chest name tape showing the "313" nomenclature, a practice that is closely and almost exclusively associated with KH personnel (Figure 7.5).

Figure 7.5

Mido's graphic featuring a KH fighter next to a Houthi fighter, 31 January 2022



Source: <https://t.me/Alimido13/687>

Figures 7.6 (up), 7.7 (middle), and 7.8 (down)
Fund raising to support the purchase of UAVs for the Houthis (visible on figure 7.8)




Source: <https://t.me/Alimido13/695>

Annex 8: List of Houthis combatants who were killed in the US airstrike in Iraq

An Iraqi journalist revealed a list of 11 dead people who were killed in the US raid that targeted a building in the Jurf al-Sakhr area south of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad.

Figure 8.1 (left), and 8.2 (right)

List of names of Houthi soldiers who were allegedly killed in the US airstrike



The list published by Iraqi journalist Othman al-Mukhtar includes the names of four of the dead who are Iraqi nationals, while seven are members of the Houthi militia who were sent to Iraq as militia delegates in the joint operations room between the Shiite militias affiliated with Iran.

While sources had revealed a few days ago the killing of the Houthi leader (Brigadier General) Hussein Abdullah Mastour al-Shaabal, the list includes six other militia members alongside him.

According to the Iraqi journalist "al-Mukhtar", who is interested in tracking the movements of the armed Shiite militias, the seven Houthi members "died with the Hezbollah Brigades militia affiliated with Iran, which occupies Jurf al-Sakhr and displaced about 200,000 Sunni Iraqis from its people."

Al-Mukhtar quoted his sources as saying that the dead were buried in the "Wadi al-Salam" cemetery in Najaf the day before yesterday, Monday. Most of the Houthi dead are from Saada Governorate/Haydan District. He pointed out that the dead were in the coordination room between several Iraqi militias, most notably "Kata'ib Hezbollah", "Al-Nujaba", and "Ansar Allah Al-Awfiya", and the Houthi militia.

In more details he mentioned about the nature of the group that the Houthi militia delegated to Iraq, he stated that the Houthi group that was killed in the American strike works in the field of fixed-wing suicide drones (operation and location determination) GPS.

He pointed out that they do not reside in the targeted location, but in the Al-Jadriya neighborhood, but the strike was timed shortly after they arrived at the building. The names of the Houthi militia members who were killed in the "Jurf Al-Sakhr" raid according to the document published by Othman Al-Mukhtar, which is a handwritten list:

Hussein Abdullah Mastour Al-Shaabal
 Ahmed Bashir Kazem Al-Shaabal
 Ali Al-Muathra Al-Houthi
 Hassan Mohsen Al-Youssef
 Ali Sayyah Alaa Al-Din
 Abdullah Hussein Al-Astar
 Abdulmalik Ismail

Source: https://almasdaronline.com/articles/299764?fbclid=IwY2xjawEgZENleHRuA2FibQIxMAABHYT74SkS__zIdhLIHTiw6iYW1v3wPxgdkTeeu2Qetv2eqBib01Eh5xheOA_aem_zFNJaXvNIFNBt1wW4UCaUQ

The Iranian Tasnim News Agency confirmed that Houthi commander (Brigadier general) Hussein Mastoor was killed while on a mission outside Yemen. The agency reported that Mastoor died during the recent U.S. airstrikes in Iraq. He was initially announced killed while fighting alongside Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.

Martyr Brigadier General Abu Jihad Hussein Abdullah Mastur Al-Shaabal
Martyrdom of a Yemeni commander
Yemeni sources of the martyrdom of one of the commanders of Ansarullah named "Hussein Abdullah Mastoor al-Shabal" in the mission reported outside Yemen.
This Yemeni commander in the recent US attack on Iraq has been martyred.
@TasnimNews

Source: https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1820040251005706352?fbclid=IwY2xjawEckApleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHWMmZJBFJPIO8LJHrsM-dSDrF-XMJIF8I9Yopu-nbmyXvjZ0nwp09oPaxg_aem_vcdhElrOtmR9URGYcxGIFQ

Source: <https://x.com/Osint613/status/1819895986774282372>

Martyr Mujahid

Abu Jihad

Hussein Abdullah Mastur Al-Shaabal

Saada Governorate - Haidan District

The battle of the promised friendship and the holy jihad

Death to America, death to Israel, curse on the Jews, victory for Islam

Source: <https://x.com/BabakTaghvaeel/status/1820007354055680006/photo/2>

Source: <https://x.com/YemAware/status/1820524174328410422>

Annex 9: Issuance of passports by the Houthis

The Panel's investigations revealed that the Houthis issue counterfeit⁵⁹ passports to people who act on their behalf, for their support or under their control. These people are tasked with the procurement and/or transfer of illicit goods or weapons or they travel abroad to participate in military training (para. 103 and para. 111). Foreign trainers and advisors travelling to Yemen are purportedly also provided with Yemeni passports (para. 14).


According to GoY sources, the opening of the Sana'a airport in connection with Houthis' issuing of passports is a factor aggravating the security situation in Yemen. According to GoY sources, the passports issued by the Houthis are not printed in accordance with standards adopted by the GoY.

The Panel received information from relevant GoY sources that ten Yemeni nationals allegedly belonging to the Houthis were arrested on 3 August 2023 at Shehen border post. According to confidential sources, these detainees are on the list of Houthis' prisoners list, and negotiations on a possible prisoner swap are underway. The verification of the passports, in connection with investigations carried out by the relevant GoY authorities, indicates that the passports were issued by the Houthis in Sana'a, and fake identities were mentioned in the passports. According to the analysis carried out by the Panel from the passports and visa stamps, they travelled purportedly from Yemen to Jordan, then to Oman, from where they returned and then were arrested by the GoY border authorities on 3 August 2023.

However, Yemeni authorities consider that these individuals received military trainings in Iran. The detainees, however, stated that the purpose of their travel to Iran was to receive a 40-day long training on aviation safety and regulations, such as passengers and inspection procedures, while admitting to travelling with fake, Houthi-issued passports. Notably, two passports seized from two detained persons also had visa stamps indicating their travel to Syria, and surprisingly, both had the same visa number. Further, there were entry and exit stamps of Omani and Jordanian authorities. The Panel sent a letter to the Syrian Arab Republic, requesting verification of the discrepancies noticed by the Panel, including the authenticity of the visas, and related travel dates.

Figures 9.1 (upper-left), 9.2 (lower-left), 9.3 (upper-right), and 9.4 (lower-right)

Analysis of the passports of two individuals arrested by GoY on their way back from Syria




Source: Panel

⁵⁹ The Panel reported on the printing of passports (S/2023/833, para. 175) and on allegations concerning printing of passports in Indonesia (para. 103).

Annex 10: Military cooperation between the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq

Figure 10.1

Statement posted on 22 June 2024 in which the Houthi military spokesperson claims that the attacks on Haifa, Israel, resulted from cooperation with the Iraqi Islamic Resistance.



Yemeni Armed Forces
2024
22 June


Triumphing for the oppression of the Palestinian people and in response to the crimes committed against our brothers in the Gaza Strip.

The Yemeni Armed Forces, alongside the Iraqi Islamic Resistance, carried out two joint military operations as follows:

- ▶ **The first operation targeted four ships in the port of Haifa, in which two of them are cement tanker ships, and the other two were general cargo ships that belong to companies violated the ban decision of entry to the ports of occupied Palestine, using a number of drones.**
- ▶ **The other operation targeted the (Shorthorn Express) ship in the Mediterranean Sea while was on its way to the port of Haifa, using a number of drones.**


- Both operations have achieved their objectives successfully, and the strikes were accurate and direct.
- The Yemeni Armed Forces will continue to carry out their joint military operations with the Iraqi Islamic Resistance in support and solidarity with the Palestinian people until the aggression stops and the siege on the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip is lifted.

WWW.SABA.YE
وكالة الأنباء اليمنية سبأ



Source: <https://x.com/army21ye/status/1804630348481118300/photo/2>

Figure 10.2
IRI statement on 12 June 2024 claiming two joint attacks with the Houthis



Source: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/aljmaat-alraqyt-walhwthywn-fy-alymn-ylnwn-msswlythm-n-almzyd-mn-alhjmat-almshtrkt>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the IRI statement on 12 June 2024 claiming two joint attacks with the Houthis

Islamic resistance in Iraq

2024-6-12

In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful

[Indeed, God loves those who fight in His cause in array, as if they were a solid building.]

In continuation of our approach to resisting the occupation and supporting our people in Palestine, and in response to the massacres committed by the usurping entity against civilians, including children, women and the elderly, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq carried out two joint military operations with the Yemeni armed

forces. The first targeted a vital target in the city of Ashdod with missiles, and the second targeted an important target in the city of Haifa by drone. The Islamic Resistance confirms that operations are continuing to destroy enemy strongholds at an increasing pace.

(And victory is only from God. Indeed, God is Mighty, All-Wise)

Islamic resistance in Iraq

Wednesday 5 - Dhu al-Hijja - 1445 AH

Source : <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqi-groups-and-yemens-houthis-claim-more-joint-attacks-israel>

Annex 11: The Houthis' Al Masirah TV on 13 June 2024 quoting the movement's leader talking about collaboration with the IRI to attack Israel from Golan Heights



Source: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/aljmaat-alraqyt-walhwthywn-fy-alymn-ylnwn-mswwlythm-n-almzyd-mn-alhjmat-almshtrkt>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the Houthis' Al Masirah TV on 13 June 2024 quoting the movement's leader talking about collaboration with the IRI to attack Israel from Golan Heights

Al-Masdarah

Al Masirah Channel

Mr. Commander Abdul Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi: In Golan Heights there is also the important track that is within the framework of the fourth stage of escalation, which is joint operations between our dear brothers, the Mujahideen in the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Yemeni army.

Mr. Commander Abdul Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi

07- Dhul-Hijjah - 1445 AH

almasirah.net.ye

Source: <https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1801246804995936458>

Annex 12: The Houthi representative in Iraq

Figure: 12.1

Abu Idris al-Sharafi (2nd from left) is a close associate of Mohammed Ali al-Houthi. In Iraq, he is reportedly building up the Houthi network: finance, procurement, etc.



12:57 AM · Jan 30, 2024 · 2,846 Views

Source: <https://x.com/ariheist/status/1752118718073802962>

Annex 13: The Houthi representative's activities in Iraq

Figure 13.1:

Meeting held on 17 May 2023 with the Secretary-General of the Sayyid Martyrs Brigades (PMF), Hajj Abu Alaa al-Wala'i, the envoy of Mr. Abdul Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi and the representative of the Houthis in Iraq, Mr. Ahmed al-Sharafi.




Al-Sharafi conveyed the greetings of the Commander-in-Chief of the Yemeni Ansar Allah movement, Mr. Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi, and expressed his interest in the issues in the region, and the two parties discussed the latest developments related to the Syrian and Sudanese events. Iraqis on social media welcomed Al-Sharafi's visit to Iraq, and the importance of strengthening ties between the parties of the axis of resistance in the region and the world.

Source: <https://www.infoplusnetwork.com/news/إدر-أبو-اليمن-غرب-شمال-في-الله-أنصار-قائد-بزيارة-عراقي-ترحيب/>

Figure 13.2

Al-Sharafi visit on 7 July 2024 visits a tribe in Dhi Qar Governorate, Iraq



Source: <https://www.newarab.com/news/yemens-houthis-open-office-baghdad-amid-regional-tensions>

Figure 13.3

Article by Mandab press dated 9 July 2024 on Al-Sharafi visiting a PMF headquarters north of Baghdad



Source: <https://mandabpress.com/news68145.html>

Annex 14: Al-Sharafi in Iraq meets high ranking officials

Figure: 14.1

Ahmed Al-Sharafi meets the Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassim Al-Araji



Source: <https://www.ajnet.me/politics/2024/7/13>

Annex 15: Training provided to the Houthis in southern Lebanon by Hezbollah

Confidential sources also informed the Panel about military training provided to the Houthi combatants by Hezbollah in their training ground located in Qalaat Jabour, southern Lebanon. The Panel notes that on 21 May 2023, three Houthi journalists, allegedly working with the Houthi media *Al-Masirah*, were present during the demonstration of an exercise simulating an attack against an Israeli settlement conducted by the Hezbollah. The Panel notes that Houthi combatants often conduct similar trainings.

Trainings, as well as other support provided by the Hezbollah, are supervised by the Houthis' liaison office, located in Beirut. Ammar al-Hamzi, who is the general manager of the Beirut-based Houthi media *al-Masirah* and who works as the Houthi representative in Lebanon. He is reportedly in direct contact with Hezbollah's political and military leadership.

Figure 15.1

Presence of three Houthi representatives in December 2023 during a military demonstration held in southern Lebanon by Hezbollah



Source: Confidential

The link below illustrates the military exercise held in December 2023 in southern Lebanon where the three Houthi representatives were present as observers

Source: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/22/hezbollah-conducts-wargames-near-lebanons-border-with-israel>

Figures 15.2 (left) 15.3 (middle), 15.4 (right)
Live-firing exercises conducted in January 2024 by the Houthis



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mxyZKIAfmkw>

Figures 15.5 (left), and 15.6 (right)
Live-firing exercises conducted in March 2024 by the Houthis



Figures 15.7 (left), and 15.8 (right)



Figures 15.9 (left), and 15.10 (right)



Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2QDWa-_zak0

Annex 16: Houthi cooperation with Hezbollah

Figure 16.1

A confidential Hezbollah document indicates its involvement in the fighting with the Houthis



Source: <https://al-omana.net/news163996.html>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the confidential Hezbollah document indicating its involvement in the fighting with the Houthis

Hezbollah - General Secretariat

In the name of God the most Merciful, the most Compassionate

Subject / Suspension of the memorial of the martyrs

Mr. Media Relations Manager

Mr. Director of the Martyrs' Families Affairs

According to the directives of His Eminence the Secretary-General, Mr. Hassan Nasrallah, may God protect him.

We inform you that the memorial service for the martyrs who were martyred in Yemen has been suspended. The ceremony is limited to holding a funeral for relatives of the first and second degree only without clarifying the place of martyrdom. These directives shall be effective until further notice is received.

Annex 17: Video released by the “Axis of Resistance” military media, on 13 April 2023, showing representatives from all the members of the Axis in the joint situation room



13/04/2023

بالفيديو: من غرفة عمليات محور المقاومة.. جاهزون

فاصل من إنتاج الإعلام الحربي في محور المقاومة بعنوان "جاهزون". يحاكي جوهزية المحور، بكل فصائله، للدفاع عن القدس وفلسطين، حتى بلوغ اليوم الموعود لتحرير فلسطين.

Source: <https://www.alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=52859&cid=141>

Figures 17.1-17.6

Screenshots of the video illustrating the joint situation room



Screenshots of armed groups' arm patches visible in the video



Figures 17.7 (left), and 17.8 (right)
Houthis, Yemen



Figure 17.9
IRGC, Iran



Figure 17.10
Hamas, Gaza strip, Palestinian occupied territory, Lebanon



Figure 17.11
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Gaza strip, Palestinian occupied territory, Lebanon



Figure 17.12
Abi Ali Mustapha Brigades, Palestinian occupied territories, Lebanon



Figure 17.13
Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria




Figure 17.14
Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq



Figure 17.15
Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq



Figure 17.16
Asa'ib Hal Al Haq, Iraq



Figure 17.17
Liwa Zainebeyoun, Syria



Figure 17.18
Liwa Fatmiyoun, Syria

Annex 18: Article published on 9 June 2024 by the Iranian media Mehr News Agency, in which the Houthi Brigadier-General Hamid Abdul Qader Antar, advisor to the Houthi Prime Minister, mentions about the coordination with the 'Axis of Resistance'

الرئيسية | إيران | فلسطين | المقاومة الدولية | ماتي مديا | آخر الأخبار

غرب آسيا | دول الجوار

الاقتصادية / غرب آسيا

من ٣١/٥/٢٠٢٤/٧/٩

العميد اليمني حميد عبد القادر عنتر لوكالة مهر:

لا تستطيع اي قوة في العالم ان تكسر شوكة اليمن... نُنسِّق مع محور المقاومة و تم تغيير قواعد الاشتباك



أكد مستشار رئاسة الوزراء، العميد اليمني "حميد عبد القادر عنتر" أنه "هناك تنسيق بين اليمن ودول المحور وتم تشكيل غرف عمليات مشتركة من أجل ان تكون الضربات العسكرية في وقت واحد للكيان الصهيوني، مما يجبره على وقف العدوان على غزة، وتم تغيير قواعد الاشتباك من أجل فرض واقع جديد ومعادله عسكرية جديدة".

وكالة مهر للأخبار- وردة سعد: يواجه اليمن معارك مستمرة مع قوى الاستكبار العالمي، ضمن اطار المساندة للمقاومة الفلسطينية ودعمها لاهالي غزة، فحقق اليمن انتزاعات وبطولات ادهشت العالم بالتنسيق مع محور المقاومة، والملفت في الأونة الأخيرة تنفيذ عملية مشتركة مع المقاومة العراقية ضد اهداف في كيان العدو.

حول هذه العناوين، أجرت مراسلة وكالة مهر للأخبار، الأستاذة وردة سعد، حواراً صحفياً مع مستشار رئاسة الوزراء ورئيس الحملة الدولية لكسر الحصار عن مطار صنعاء الدولي العميد "حميد عبد القادر عنتر"، وجاء نص الحوار على النحو التالي:

منذ أشهر عديدة يواصل الجيش اليمني عمليات الاسناد للمقاومة الفلسطينية واهالي غزة بالضغط على الاحتلال ومحاصرته اقتصادياً.. ولا يزال الجدل قائماً حول الاثر الفعلي لهذا الجهد العسكري المميز.. فبتقديركم كيف أثرت هذه العمليات ضد السفن المتجهة لموانئ الاحتلال على الكيان الاسرائيلي ؟

اليمن أعلن التدخل العسكري مناصرة واسناد لعملية طوفان الاقصى، فمنذ اندلاع معركة طوفان الاقصى تم التدخل عسكرياً مع فلسطين وتم اطلاق عدد من الصواريخ الباليستية والمسيرات الى فلسطين المحتلة وفرض الجيش اليمني والقوة الصاروخية حصار خانق على الكيان الصهيوني في البحر الاحمر والبحر العربي والمحيط الهندي وتوسعت خارطة بنك الاهداف الى البحر الابيض المتوسط وتم استهداف السفن الصهيونية والأمريكية والبريطانية في البحر الاحمر والمحيط الهندي المساندة للكيان اللقيط ومن خلال الحصار الخانق في البحر الاحمر تم إفراغ السفن في ميناء ابيلات وتم محاصرة الكيان اقتصادياً.

الى جانب القرار اليمني يمنع مرور السفن المتوجهة الى موانئ الاحتلال ردا على العدوان الوحشي على غزة، يواصل الشعب اليمني مظاهراته المليونية، لإبداء الدعم والتأييد والتضامن مع الشعب الفلسطيني، كيف نفهم هذا الحراك الذي ليس له مثيل عند الشعوب العربية الاخرى؟ ولماذا الشعب اليمني تحديداً؟

بالاضافة الى التدخل العسكري من خلال جبهة الاسناد في اليمن لفلسطين المحتلة هناك حراك سياسي وجماهيري يخرج ابناء الشعب اليمني ملايين في كل جمعه في كافة المحافظات رافعين اعلام فلسطين وشعار الصرخه في وجه قوى الاستكبار هذا الحراك الجماهيري اعطى زخم ثوري لشعوب واحرار العالم وانتفض الملايين في كافة شعوب واحرار العالم لمناصرة فلسطين الذين اتخذوا من اليمن مصدر الهام.

في خطوة جريئة اضافية اعلنت القيادة اليمنية الشجاعة عن توسيع مدى عملياتها لحصار الموانئ الصهيونية الى البحر المتوسط.. بينما يفتح بعض العرب والمسلمين الابواب الخلفية للتعويض على الاحتلال وتزويده بحاجاته الاقتصادية.. هل وصلت الامة الى هذا الحد من الانقسام؟ ولماذا برأيكم ؟

نعم اليمن وسع من خارطة بنك الاهداف من خلال عمليات العسكرية في البحر الاحمر والمحيط الهندي والبحر الابيض المتوسط واعلن حرب كبرى شاملة على الكيان الصهيوني وقوى الاستكبار حتى يتم وقف العدوان على غزة ودخول المساعدات الى قطاع غزة، هذا التحرك الكبير لليمن هو من واجب وطني واخلاقي وقومي وديني لمناصرة فلسطين خصوصا عندما نشاهد الجرائم الذي يرتكبها الكيان بحق المدنيين والاطفال والنساء وهدم المنازل على ساكنيها وتدمير البنية التحتية في ظل صمت عربي ودولي واممي مطبق من المجتمع الدولي والعالم فكان من واجب اليمن التحرك واسناد ومناصرة شعب فلسطين.

في اخر انجازاته الثورية والعملية لتشديد الضناق على كيان الاحتلال اعلن اليمن عن عمليات مشتركة مع المقاومة العراقية لضرب مواقع داخل كيان الاحتلال.. كيف تنظرون الى هذه الخطوة المتقدمة من التنسيق بين قوى محور المقاومة؟ وكيف يمكن ان تؤثر هذه الخطوة على كيان الاحتلال؟

نعم هناك تنسيق بين اليمن ودول المحور وتم تشكيل غرف عمليات مشتركة من اجل ان تكون الضربات العسكرية في وقت واحد للكيان الصهيوني تسبب له شلل وارباك وهذا يشكل ضغط على الكيان الصهيوني مما يجبره على وقف العدوان على غزة وتم تغيير قواعد الاشتباك من اجل فرض واقع جديد ومعادله عسكرية جديدة.

بعض اليمنيين في المناطق المحتلة والخاضعين لادارة المخابرات الاجنبية، يخرجون بين الحين والآخر للتشويش على ما يقوم به الجيش اليمني والموقف القومي والاسلامي المتقدم لقيادة السيد عبد الملك الحكيم.. كيف تنظرون الى استجابة الشعب اليمني في كل المناطق لمواقف صنعاء؟ وما الذي يخشاه اولئك المعارضون من نصرة شعب فلسطين؟

بالنسبة للمرتزقة هم ادوات لصالح قوى العدوان واتخذت منهم دول العدوان مطيه من اجل شرعنه واحتلال اليمن وكي لا تتم ملاحقه قوى العدوان واعتبارهم مجرمي حرب امام المحاكم الدولي، كذلك دول العدوان هم ادوات لقوى الاستكبار وهم من ينفذ المشاريع الامريكية في دول المنطقة، لذلك ليس غريب عليهم التشويش والتقليل من القدرات العسكرية اليمنية التي فرضت واقع جديد ومعادله عسكرية جديدة سببت للعدو شلل وارباك.

اليمن بمواقفه المتقدمة لنصرة الشعب الفلسطيني ومساندة مقاومته، يضع نفسه في مواجهة القوة البحرية الاميركية وحلفائها الغربيين، فهل تعتقدون ان الامر قد يعرض اليمن وشعبه لمخاطر اضافية؟ وهل يمكن للجيش اليمني وانصار الله ان يواجهوا قوة بحجم القوة الاميركية ؟

اليمن يواجه معركة عسكرية مباشرة مع قوى الاستكبار العالمي، لكن اليمن استطاع ان يكسر شوكة قوى الاستكبار في البحر الاحمر والمحيط الهندي والبحر المتوسط وكسر هيمنة وغطرسة قوى الاستكبار، لا تستطيع اي قوة في العالم ان تكسر شوكة اليمن او تلي ذراعه لان ثورة اليمن هي امتداد لثورة ابا الاحرار ابي عبد الله الحسين الذي قاد اعظم ثورة في تاريخ الحياة البشرية واسقط عروش الطغاة والظالمين والمستبدين والمستكبرين وانتصر الدم على السيف من اليمن سيتم تغير وجه المنطقة والعالم، ومن اليمن ستخرج راية اليماني، ومن يتخذ من الامام الحسين عليه السلام مصدر الهام لا يعرف الهزيمة اطلاقا.

Source: <https://ar.mehrnews.com/news/194527>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the article published on 9 June 2024 by the Iranian media Mehr News Agency, in which the Houthi Brigadier-General Hamid Abdul Qader Antar, advisor to the Houthi Prime Minister, mentions about the coordination with the 'Axis of Resistance'

Yemeni Brigadier-General Hamid Abdul Qader Antar told, "No force in the world can break the power of Yemen... we coordinate with the axis of resistance and the rules of engagement have been changed"



The advisor to the Prime Minister, Yemeni Brigadier General Hamid Abdul Qadir Antar, confirmed that "there is coordination between Yemen and the Axis countries and joint operations rooms have been formed in order for military strikes to be carried out simultaneously against the Zionist entity, forcing it to stop the aggression against Gaza, and the rules of engagement have been changed." In order to impose a new reality and a new military equation."

Mehr News Agency - Warda Saad: Yemen faces ongoing battles with the forces of global arrogance, within the framework of support for the Palestinian resistance and in support of the people of Gaza. Yemen achieved achievements and heroism that astonished the world in coordination with the axis of resistance, and what is striking recently is the implementation of a joint operation with the Iraqi resistance against targets in the enemy entity. .

Regarding these headlines, Mehr News Agency correspondent, Ms. Warda Saad, conducted a press interview with the advisor to the Prime Minister and head of the international campaign to break the siege of Sana'a International Airport, Brigadier General Hamid Abdul Qadir Antar. The text of the interview was as follows:

For many months, the Yemeni army has continued its support operations for the Palestinian resistance and the people of Gaza by pressuring the occupation and besieging it economically. Controversy still exists about the actual impact of this distinguished military effort. In your estimation, how did these operations against ships heading to the occupation's ports affect the Israeli entity?

Yemen announced military intervention in support of and support for the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation. Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Flood Battle, there has been military intervention with Palestine, and a number of ballistic missiles and marches were launched into occupied Palestine. The Yemeni army and missile force imposed a stifling siege on the Zionist entity in the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, and the bank's map expanded. The targets reached the Mediterranean Sea, and Zionist, American, and British ships were targeted in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, which supported the bastard entity. Through the stifling siege in the Red Sea, the ships were emptied in the port of Eilat, and the entity was besieged economically.

In addition to the Yemeni decision to prevent the passage of ships heading to the occupation ports in response to the brutal aggression against Gaza, the Yemeni people continue their million-man demonstrations, to express support, support and solidarity with the Palestinian people. How do we understand this movement that has no parallel among other Arab peoples? Why the Yemeni people specifically?

In addition to the military intervention through the Support Front in Yemen for occupied Palestine, there is a political and mass movement that brings out millions of Yemeni people every Friday in all governorates, raising the flags of Palestine and the slogan of screaming in the face of the forces of arrogance. This mass movement gave revolutionary momentum to the peoples and free people of the world, and millions rose up in all peoples. And the free people of the world to support Palestine, who took Yemen as a source of inspiration.

In an additional bold step, the courageous Yemeni leadership announced the expansion of the scope of its operations to blockade Zionist ports to the Mediterranean. While some Arabs and Muslims are opening the back doors to compensate the occupation and provide it with its economic needs. Has the nation reached this point of division? Why do you think?

Yes, Yemen has expanded its map of the target bank through military operations in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea, and has declared a major comprehensive war against the Zionist entity and the forces of arrogance until the aggression against Gaza is stopped and aid enters the Gaza Strip. This major move by Yemen is a national, moral, and national duty. My religion is to support Palestine, especially when we see the crimes committed by the entity against civilians, children, and women, the demolition of homes for their residents, and the destruction of infrastructure, in light of the deafening Arab, international, and international silence of the international community and the world. It was Yemen's duty to move, support, and advocate for the people of Palestine.

In its latest revolutionary and practical achievements to tighten the noose on the occupying entity, Yemen announced joint operations with the Iraqi resistance to strike sites within the occupying entity. How do you view this advanced step of coordination between the forces of the axis of resistance? How might this step affect the occupation entity?

Yes, there is coordination between Yemen and the Axis countries, and joint operations rooms were formed in order for simultaneous military strikes on the Zionist entity to cause it paralysis and confusion. This puts pressure on the Zionist entity, forcing it to stop the aggression against Gaza, and the rules of engagement were changed in order to impose a new reality and its equation. New military.

Some Yemenis in the occupied areas, who are under the administration of foreign intelligence, come out from time to time to confuse what the Yemeni army is doing and the advanced national and Islamic position of the wise leadership of Mr. Abdul Malik. How do you view the response of the Yemeni people in all regions to Sana'a's positions? What do those who oppose supporting the people of Palestine fear?

As for the mercenaries, they are tools for the forces of aggression, and the aggression countries took them as a vehicle in order to legitimize and occupy Yemen, so that the forces of aggression would not be pursued and considered war criminals before international courts. Likewise, the aggression countries are tools for the forces of arrogance, and they are the ones who implement American projects in the countries of the region, so it is not strange for them to cause confusion. Reducing the Yemeni military capabilities imposed a new reality and a new military equation that caused the enemy paralysis and confusion.

Yemen, with its advanced positions to support the Palestinian people and support their resistance, is putting itself in the face of the American naval force and its Western allies. Do you think that the matter might expose Yemen and its people to additional risks? Can the Yemeni army and Ansar Allah confront a force the size of the American force?

Yemen is facing a direct military battle with the forces of global arrogance, but Yemen was able to break the strength of the forces of arrogance in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean and break the dominance and arrogance of the forces of arrogance. No force in the world can break the strength of Yemen or bend its arm because the Yemen revolution is an extension of the revolution. The father of the free, Abu Abdullah Al-Hussein, who led the greatest revolution in the history of human life and brought down the thrones of tyrants, oppressors, tyrants and arrogant people, and blood triumphed over the sword. From Yemen, the face of the region and the world will be changed, and from Yemen the banner of Yamani will emerge, and whoever takes Imam Hussein, peace be upon him, as a source of inspiration will never know defeat. .

The Yemeni flag is the foundation for the establishment of a state of divine justice under which the world will enjoy peace.

Annex 19: Interview conducted on 20 June 2024 by Al Mayadeen with Muhammad Abdulsalam, official spokesman for the Houthis, during which he acknowledged operational coordination with the Iraqi factions, Hezbollah and other parties



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jBjWmJ79yxo>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of a segment of the interview

Presenter: Also, there is a new topic brother Mohamed about the joint operations between the Yemeni Armed Forces and the Islamic resistance in Iraq. Two statements were issued about joint operations. What is the goal of this statements and will be there any horizon for this cooperation? Shall we see any joint operation between the Yemeni Armed Forces and Hizbullah or with Alqassam Brigades? Will these operations have a goal and what is the aim? Why do you have operation on two frontlines at the same time?

Mohamed Abdul Salam: The joint operations are already taking place as you mentioned between the Yemeni Armed Forces and Iraqi factions and other groups. The main aim of these operations is to cooperate in righteousness and piety and in that right and just project that is important to all. The enemy is making this kind of alliances and cooperation. The US, the UK, Germany, and France are cooperating to target Yemen. Also, the US, Israel, the UK, France, and some regional countries cooperated to obstruct the drones and the missiles launched from Iran. They are allying and cooperating... isn't it more important for us to cooperate and we believe that we defend our cause, aggrievance, children and women. The aim of this cooperation is to exert more pressure on the Israeli entity. First because of the geographical nature in Iraq and the proximity to the Israeli entity and to cause more disturbance and distraction to Israel so as not to know from where the strikes will come. It is not excluded that there will be joint operations and today we have already a joint situation room that is coordinating the operation coming from Iraq, Lebanon. It is true that each party in the 'Axis of Resistance' has its own conditions, nature and assessments as a result of its conditions and capabilities but overall, there arrangements that could be done directly as happened with Iraqis or in indirect way that harmonizes with the general spirit with which the Axis is acting today, and the Axis started to shape in a more powerful and tough manner. We think the Axis today, despite all the challenges, is in a more developed and shaped stage which will make it a strong and effective Axis. We think that these operations are honorable and do not target any regional countries or any Arab or Islamic countries, but it targets the Israeli entity only. So, it is likely yes that this situation room might coordinate joint operations with Hizbullah and Iraqi brothers and with all liberals and in the fore with our brothers in Palestine including Alqassam Brigades, Saraya Alquds and all other Palestinian factions.

Annex 20: Article published on 29 October 2024 in the Iranian media ABNA news, in which Mahdi Al-Mashat, President of the Houthis' Supreme Political Council, was quoted discussing about the "joint operations rooms"

ABNA وكالة أهل البيت (ع) للأخبار

المرجعية الدينية الحج والعمرة كدام القائد المجمع العالمي لأهل البيت (ع) الوسائط المتعددة - أسام أخرى - أبنا برس - ملفات خاصة

الخيار الجزيرة العربية

19 أكتوبر 2024
1405447

صنعاء: لدينا غرف عمليات مشتركة وسنواجه أي حماقة إسرائيلية باقتحام غزة



قال رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، مهدي المشاط، إن "الطرف الأميركي يهدد بعودة الحرب في اليمن، لمنع الشعب اليمني من القيام بمسؤولياته تجاه شعب الفلسطيني".

وفقاً لما أفادته وكالة أنباء أهل البيت (ع) الدولية - أبنا - رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، مهدي المشاط يكشف أن هناك غرف عمليات ترافق عن كثب في حال ارتكبت "إسرائيل" حماقة واقتحمت غزة برأى.

قال رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، مهدي المشاط، إن "الطرف الأميركي يهدد بعودة الحرب في اليمن، لمنع الشعب اليمني من القيام بمسؤولياته تجاه شعب الفلسطيني".

وأكد المشاط أن موقف الجمهورية اليمنية واضح وهو إقامة الدولة الفلسطينية كاملة السيادة، على كامل التراب الوطني الفلسطيني، مشيراً إلى أنه "لا يوجد لدينا شيء اسمه أراضي 48 أو 67".

وكشف أن "هناك غرف عمليات مشتركة وجهوداً ترافق وتعمل لمواجهة أي حماقة صهيونية إذا اقتحمت برأى غزة، ونحن نراقب الوضع عن كثب".

وأشار إلى أن "ما يقوم به الشعب اليمني هو أقل واجب إيماني وديني وأخلاقي وإنساني"، مشدداً على أن "المسؤولية الدينية والأخلاقية والإنسانية تحتم على الجميع التحرك".

وأكد المشاط أن "الحرب في فلسطين أصحت حرباً على الإسلام، يتحسد فيها الغرب والولايات المتحدة إلى جانب العدو الصهيوني"، مستهجنًا في الوقت نفسه "من بقاء الموقف العربي والإسلامي دون المستوى المطلوب في هذه المواجهة والهجمة الشرسة".

وقال إن "معركة طوفان الأقصى انطلقت وستدمر كل ما بنته قوى الاحتلال والإمبريالية العالمية"، مشدداً على أنه "لا يوجد في المنطقة العربية شيء اسمه إسرائيل".

وتوجه المشاط إلى الفلسطينيين قائلاً: "الكل معكم، الشعوب وحركات المقاومة معكم، حتى تنهزم هذه الهجمة الشرسة"، مشيراً إلى أن "رفع العدو لسقوفه مجرد عنتريات فارغة".

وأشار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن إلى أن "الغرب هرب من مشاكله وحروبهم بتصدير اليهود إلى الوطن العربي، وأوجد كياناً لهم خارج طبوغرافيا المنطقة".

ويواصل اليمنيون التظاهرات المؤيدة لفلسطين. وشاركت أمس الجمعة، حشود يمنية في "جمعة الغضب" في ميدان السبعين في صنعاء، وفي المحافظات تضامناً مع فلسطين وتنديداً بالمجازر الإسرائيلية في غزة.

وقبل أيام أكد المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، في بيان، أنّ "صنعاء تراقب الوضع عن كثب، ولن تقف مكتوفة الأيدي تجاه حرب الإبادة الجماعية ضد أهلنا في غزة"، مشدداً على أنّ "تجاوز الخطوط الحمر يحتم على صنعاء القيام بواجبها الديني والمبدي تجاه ذلك".

وقال عضو المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، محمد علي الحوثي، إنّ "المعركة ضد العدو الإسرائيلي قائمة"، مؤكداً أنّ حركة "أنصار الله" على تنسيق دائم مع كل جهات محور المقاومة.

وكانت وسائل إعلام إسرائيلية، تحدثت عن صواريخ برؤوس حربية تنز ما "مجموعه 1.6 طن" أطلقتها حركة "أنصار الله" على ما يبدو نحو منطقة الفنادق في "إيلات".

وقبل أيام، أفاد مسؤول عسكري أميركي، لشبكة "سي أن أن"، بأنّ السفينة البحرية الأميركية "يو أس أس كارني"، اعترضت 4 صواريخ "كروز" و15 طائرة مسيرة، قبالة سواحل اليمن، مضيفاً أنّ عملية الاعتراض هذه استغرقت 9 ساعات.

وكان رئيس الوزراء في حكومة تصريف الأعمال في صنعاء، عبد العزيز بن حبتور، قد هدّد، بأنّ سفن الاحتلال ستعرض للاستهداف في البحر الأحمر في حال استمرّ العدوان الإسرائيلي على غزة.

.....

انتهى/185

Source: <https://ar.abna24.com/story/1406447>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the article published on 29 October 2024 by the Iranian media ABNA news, in which Mahdi Al-Mashat, President of the Houthis' Supreme Political Council, was quoted discussing about the "joint operations rooms"



Sanaa: We have joint operations rooms and we will confront any Israeli foolishness by storming Gaza



The head of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, Mahdi Al-Mashat, said, "The American side threatens the return of war in Yemen, to prevent the Yemeni people from carrying out their responsibilities towards the Palestinian people."

According to what was reported by Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon him) International News Agency - ABNNA - the head of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, Mahdi Al-Mashat, reveals that there are operations rooms that are closely monitored in case "Israel" commits foolishness and storms Gaza by land.

The head of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, Mahdi Al-Mashat, said, "The American side threatens the return of war in Yemen, to prevent the Yemeni people from carrying out their responsibilities towards the Palestinian people."

Al-Mashat stressed that the position of the Republic of Yemen is clear, which is to establish a Palestinian state with full sovereignty, over the entire Palestinian national territory, noting that "we do not have such a thing as the lands of 48 or 67." He revealed, "There are joint operations rooms and efforts that monitor and work to confront any Zionist foolishness if it invades Gaza by land, and we are monitoring the situation closely."

He pointed out that "what the Yemeni people are doing is the minimum duty of faith, religion, morals and humanity," stressing that "religious, moral and humanitarian responsibility requires everyone to take action."

Al-Mashat stressed that "the war in Palestine has become a war against Islam, in which the West and the United States are mobilizing alongside the Zionist enemy," deploring at the same time "that the Arab and Islamic position remains below the required level in this confrontation and fierce attack."

He said, "The Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood has begun and will destroy everything that the occupation forces and global imperialism have built," stressing that "there is no such thing in the Arab region as Israel."

Al-Mashat addressed the Palestinians, saying: "Everyone is with you...the peoples and the resistance movements are with you...until this fierce attack is defeated," noting that "the enemy raising its roofs is just empty ramblings."

The head of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen pointed out that "the West escaped from its problems and wars by exporting the Jews to the Arab world, and created an entity for them outside the topography of the region."

Yemenis continue demonstrations in support of Palestine. Yesterday, Friday, Yemeni crowds participated in the “Friday of Anger” in Sabeen Square in Sanaa, and in the governorates, in solidarity with Palestine and denouncing the Israeli massacres in Gaza.

A few days ago, the Supreme Political Council in Yemen confirmed, in a statement, that “Sanaa is closely monitoring the situation, and will not stand idly by in the genocidal war against our people in Gaza,” stressing that “crossing the red lines requires Sanaa to carry out its religious and principled duty regarding this matter.”

A member of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, Muhammad Ali Al-Houthi, said, “The battle against the Israeli enemy is ongoing,” stressing that the “Ansar Allah” movement is in constant coordination with all sides of the axis of resistance. Israeli media reported about missiles with warheads weighing “a total of 1.6 tons,” apparently launched by the “Ansar Allah” movement towards the hotel area in “Eilat.”

A few days ago, an American military official told CNN that the US Navy ship USS Carney intercepted 4 cruise missiles and 15 drones off the coast of Yemen, adding that this interception took 9 hours.

The Prime Minister of the caretaker government in Sanaa, Abdul Aziz bin Habtoor, had threatened that the occupation ships would be targeted in the Red Sea if the Israeli aggression against Gaza continued.

Annex 21: Article published on 9 November 2023 by the Iranian media PressTV in which Abdulaziz bin Hattour, Houthi Prime Minister is quoted as saying that “It is one axis and there is coordination taking place, a joint operations room, and a joint command for all these operations”



Yemen’s Ansarullah resistance movement has vowed to continue operations in support of the innocent people of the Gaza Strip until Israel ends its bloody onslaught on the besieged Palestinian territory.

Ansarullah spokesman Mohammed Abdul-Salam made the pledge in a post shared on social media on Wednesday, after Yemen’s Armed Forces shot down an American MQ-9 Reaper drone which was conducting a “hostile espionage” operation in support of the Israeli regime.

“The downing of the American drone shows that our armed forces will continue their operations in support of Gaza until the Israeli acts of aggression stop,” he said.

Abdul-Salam also noted that the Yemeni armed forces had reaffirmed their readiness to counter all hostile manoeuvres against Yemen’s national sovereignty by bringing down the American UAV over the country’s territorial waters.

Over the past month, the Yemeni Army has carried out several missile and drone strikes against Israeli targets in response to the occupying regime’s war crimes in Gaza.

The prime minister of Yemen’s National Salvation Government announced recently that Ansarullah fighters are “part of the Axis of Resistance” against Israel.

“It is one axis and there is coordination taking place, a joint operations room, and a joint command for all these operations,” Abdulaziz bin Hattour said. “We cannot allow this arrogant Zionist enemy to kill our people.”

Israel waged the war on Gaza on October 7 after the Palestinian Hamas resistance group conducted Operation Al-Aqsa Storm against the occupying entity in retaliation for its intensified atrocities against the Palestinian people.

Since the start of the aggression, the Tel Aviv regime has killed at least 10,569 Palestinians, mostly women and children, and injured 26,475 others.

It has also imposed a “complete siege” on the coastal sliver, cutting off fuel, electricity, food and water to the more than two million Palestinians living there.

Yemen prioritizes confronting Israel over peace talks: PM

In an interview with Iran’s Arabic-language news channel Al-Alam on Wednesday, bin Hattour said that confronting the Israeli aggression is a major issue for Yemen even if it causes a setback in the peace process with the Saudi-led coalition.

“This is a sacred duty for us and all Muslims and Arabs. However, it is primarily the task of the Arab countries,” he added.

The Yemeni premier further said that millions of Yemenis participated in nationwide rallies in a show of solidarity with Ansarullah leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi who called for using all capabilities to counter the Israeli regime.

Source: <https://www.presstv.ir/doc/Detail/2023/11/09/714284/Yemen-vows-keep-up-operations-until-Israel-ends-Gaza-war>

Annex 22: Interview conducted on 1 March 2024 by the Qatari media Al Jazeera of Abdulmalik al-Ajri, member of the Houthi political council, during which he acknowledged the existence of a coordination mechanism between the armed groups comprising the ‘Axis of Resistance’



Figure 22.1



Figure 22.2



Figure 22.3



Figure 22.4



Figure 22.5



Figure 22.6



Figure 22.7



Figure 22.8



Figure 22.9



Figure 22.10



Figure 22.11



Figure 22.12



Figure 22.13



Figure 22.14



Figure 22.15



Figure 22.16



Figure 22.17



Figure 22.18



Figure 22.19



Figure 22.20



Figure 22.21



Figure 22.22



Figure 22.23

Source: <https://youtu.be/c63OAX6pAIY?si=-Yh7nYjdQ7P-0NZH>

Annex 23: Press article dated 11 November 2020 from the Houthi media reporting that Abdullah Sabri was appointed by decree as the Ambassador to the Arab Republic of Syria

Home > Republican decision to appoint Abdullah Sabri as Yemen's ambassador to Syria



Republican Decision To Appoint Abdullah Sabri As Yemen's Ambassador To Syria

نشر في Nov 11, 2020

A decree No. (62) for 2020 appointing a new ambassador of Yemen to Syria was issued by the President of the Supreme Political Council, Madi al-Mashat on Wednesday .

He appointed Abdullah Ali Saleh Sabri as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Yemen to Arab Republic of Syria.

Y.A

Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com.ye/archives/387108>

Annexes 24: Press article dated 18 October 2021 in the Syrian media North Press Agency, related to a meeting between Colonel Sharaf al-Mawri, Houthi military attaché at the Yemeni “embassy” in Damascus, Syria, and the head of the Military Intelligence Division of the Syrian Ministry of Defence



Oct 18, 2021

The military attaché of the Houthis meets head of the Syrian Military Intelligence in Damascus.

QAMISHLI, Syria (North Press) – Military attaché of Houthi Movement in Damascus, met with the head of the Military Intelligence Division of the Syrian Ministry of Defense, embassy of the Movement in Damascus said on Monday.



“During the meeting that brought together Colonel Sharaf al-Mawri and Major-General Kifah al-Milhem, they discussed cooperation with Syria in relevant fields,” Embassy of the Houthi Movement said in a statement.

“Colonel Sharaf al-Mawri conveyed greetings of the head of the Yemeni Military Intelligence Authority (affiliated with the Houthis), Major General Abdullah al-Hakim to his Syrian counterpart, military commands, and all officials of the Ministry of Defense,” the statement added.

The meeting “addressed the latest field development and military confrontations in Yemen,” according to the same sources.

Major-General Milhem stressed, “the importance of cooperation between Yemen and Syria in fighting organizations (al-Qaeda and ISIS) and exchanging information and experiences that can reduce the practices of Takfiri groups in the two countries.”

In 2016, Houthis appointed the leader of National Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party – Yemen Region, the Syrian wing, Nayef Ahmed al-Qans, as their ambassador to Damascus.

Source: <https://npasyria.com/en/66309/>

Annex 25: Houthi military escalation

Table 25.1:

Ceasefire Violations/Fire Incidents from January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024:

Region	Ceasefire / Truce Violations					
	Infiltrations	Attacks	Artillery	Missiles	Drones	
					Reconnaissance + Combat	Shot Down by Our Forces
Total	1019	48	3566	232	4527	15

Table 25.2

Statistical Report of Human Losses from 1 Jan. 2024 to 30 Jun. 2024:

Cases	Martyrs	Injured	Total
Total	329	883	1212

Table 25.3:


Statistical Report of Material Losses for Government Forces and Allied Formations from 1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024:

Category	Total Destruction	Partial Destruction
Equipment and Vehicles	15	18
Cars and Trucks	33	103
Weapons	21	38
Weapon Accessories	5	
Communication Accessories	13	
Communication Equipment		8
Technical and Administrative		13

Source: Panel

Figure 25.1


One of the new roads being constructed by the Houthi terrorist militias on the Shaqab - Hayfan - Taiz front



Source: Panel

Figure 25.2


Circular from the GoY asking the armed forces to be prepared for a potential Houthi attack on several fronts



Source: Confidential

Annex 26: Large-scale Recruitment and Training Conducted by the Houthis

Figure 26.1
Graduation ceremony in February 2024 held in Hudaydah



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKooztz___/status/1759604731331203177/photo/1

Figure 26.2
Graduation ceremony held in February 2024 in Arhab, Sana'a



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKooztz___/status/1754176438750568927

Figure 26.3
Graduation ceremony held in February 2024 in Dawran Anss, Dhamar Governorate



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKooantz_/status/1754181369066856575

Figure 26.4
Graduation ceremony held in February 2024 in Jahran, Dhamar Governorate



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKooantz_/status/1755398350105440549

Figures 26.5 (up), 26.6 (middle), and 26.7 (down)
Graduation ceremony held in January 2024 in Manakhah, Sana'a

The following SALWs are displayed: AK-47/Type 56 assault rifles, PKM/M80 LMG, M240 LMG, M249 LMG, RPG-7/Type 59-1 rocket launcher, AM-50 AMR, and a 9M133 "Konkurs" ATGM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKootz_/status/1754268618785685609

Annex 27: Statement released on 23 March 2024 by AQAP

Figure 27.1

Statement released on 23 March 2024 by AQAP

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
قَاعَةُ الْجِهَادِ
فِي جَزِيرَةِ الْعَرَبِ

(بَيَانٌ بِشَأْنِ تَفْجِيرِ الْخَوَاتِمِ الْمَنَازِلِ الْمُسْلِمِينَ فِي رَدَاعِ - الْبَيْضَاءِ)

الحمد لله رب العالمين، ولا عدوان إلا على الظالمين، والصلاة والسلام على إمام المجاهدين وقائد الغر المحجلين، صلى الله عليه وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين، أما بعد:

في ذات الوقت الذي يستمر فيه العدو الصهيوني في عمليات التنكيل بالمسلمين في فلسطين المحتلة، يستمر أيضاً العدو الرافضي في التنكيل بالمسلمين في اليمن؛ في جريمة جديدة ارتكبتها جماعة الحوثي -مليشيا إيران الرافضية- في اليمن، وذلك بتفجير عدد من المنازل الأملية بالسكان في حي الحفرة بمدينة رداغ، ما أدى لمقتل وإصابة أكثر من (٢٥) من عوام المسلمين، في استهتار صارخ في سفك دماء المسلمين، وظهور سافر لحقد الرافضة الدفين على أهل الإسلام، من خلال تكرار مثل هذه الجرائم البشعة، في الوقت الذي تدعي فيه تلك المليشيا نصرته للمسلمين في غزة، الأمر الذي يدل دلالة واضحة أن استخدام الحوثي للقضية الفلسطينية ليس إلا لحشد أكبر عدد من المقاتلين في صفوفهم لبيسط نفوذهم في اليمن، وإلا فما هو الفرق بين دم المسلم في اليمن، ودم المسلم في غزة؟

بل إن الجريمة الحوثية هي أمرٌ من جرائم اليهود في فلسطين؛ فاليهودي يُفجر بيوت المسلمين في غزة باسم اليهودية، أما الحوثي فإنه يفجر بيوت المسلمين باسم الإسلام، وحسبنا الله ونعم الوكيل.

وتأتي هذه العملية الإجرامية ضمن سلسلة جرائم الحوثي بحق الشعب اليمني المسلم، فمن قبل فجر الحوثي منزل الخبيثي بأطفاله ونسائه في صعدة، وتوالت التفجيرات للمنازل والمساجد ودور القرآن ولا يزال الحوثي يمارس إلى اليوم جرائمه البشعة المشابهة لجرائم الصهاينة، وما هذه الجريمة النكراء التي لم يراخ فيها دماء المسلمين الصائمين في شهر رمضان المبارك إلا واحدة من بين عدة جرائم ارتكبتها في عدة مناطق باليمن، وربما يوصلها بغيرها من الجرائم البشعة، ثم يقف مضطراً على بعض طوامه التي عجزت أساطين دجله ونفاقه عن ترقيعها ليدعي خبثاً ومكرراً وفجوراً بأنها أعمال فردية حتى يصدقه السذج من الناس.

فيا أبناء الإسلام وقبائلنا الأبية في اليمن عامة، وفي البيضاء ورداغ خاصة، لتعلموا أن الحوثي قد طغى وبغى، وأكثر في الأرض الفساد، ولتوقنوا أن الحل في إنهاء فسادهِ وإفساده، وضمنان عدم تكرار هذه المأساة لن يكون إلا برفع السلاح في وجهه، وحمل راية الجهاد المقدس ضده، والشأر لكل الشهداء الذين قتلوا على يده، فشمروا عن ساعد الجُد، وقوموا قومة رجل واحد في وجه هؤلاء المستكبرين، وإن إخوانكم المجاهدين قد أخذوا الميثاق على أنفسهم بأن يشاروا لدماء المسلمين الزكية التي تُسفك بغير حق، سواء في فلسطين أو اليمن أو باقي ديار الإسلام، فليتنظر العالم ذلك اليوم الذي سيشفى الله بجهادنا المبارك صدور المسلمين، ويتحقق فيه النصر والشأر من الحوثي الرافضي، ومن اليهود الصهاينة وأعوانهم، وسيعلم الذين ظلموا أي منقلب ينقلبون.

وأخر دعوانا أن الحمد لله رب العالمين



تنظيم قاعدة الجهاد في جزيرة العرب
12 رمضان 1445 هـ - الموافق 23 مارس 2024 م

Source: <https://twitter.com/G88Daniele/status/1771542623209115966>

Annex 28: Rivalry between central banks: Economic stability under threat

Punitive measures taken by CBY, Aden, against banks and exchange companies.

The Panel was informed by its sources that some of the leading banks were under pressure by the Houthis not to comply with the instructions of CBY, Aden, and out of fear of reprisal, many of them did not comply. Getting irked by this non-compliance, CBY, Aden, tightened its grip on violating banks and issued a circular Ref. No 159/CBY/2024 dated 19 March 2024 addressed to all banks, exchange companies and facilities, and remittance agents, informing them of suspension of dealings with the following banks that violated its instructions:

- i. Tadhamon Bank
- ii. Bank of Yemen and Kuwait
- iii. Al-Amal Microfinance Bank
- iv. Shamil Bank of Yemen and Bahrain
- v. Al-Kuraimi Islamic Microfinance Bank

Figure 28.1
Circular Ref. No 159/CBY/2024 dated 19 March 2024 issued by CBY, Aden

<p>Republic Of Yemen CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN Head Office Aden Ref: 159/CBY/2024 Date 19/3/2024</p>		<p>الجمهورية اليمنية البنك المركزي اليمني المركز الرئيسي / عدن</p> 
<p>تعميم موجه الى كافة شركات ومنشآت الصرافة ووكلاء الحوالات</p>		
<p>الاخوة/ شركات ومنشآت الصرافة ووكلاء الحوالات المحترمون تحية طيبة وبعد،</p>		
<p>الموضوع/ إيقاف التعامل مع البنوك المخالفة لتعليمات البنك المركزي</p>		
<p>بالإشارة للموضوع أعلاه، يتم إيقاف التعامل الكامل مع البنوك المدرجة أدناه بما في ذلك الشبكات التابعة لها:</p>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. بنك التضامن 2. بنك اليمن والكويت 3. بنك الامل للتمويل الأصغر 4. مصرف اليمن والبحرين الشامل 5. بنك الكريمي للتمويل الأصغر الإسلامي 		
<p>وذلك لمخالفاتها التعليمات الصادرة عن البنك المركزي اليمني وسيتم إتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة حيال المخالفين لهذا التعميم.</p>		
<p> أحمد أحمد هالبي المحافظ</p>		
<p>www.cby-ye.com governor.office@cby-ye.com 02 264401 02 264450 الجمهورية اليمنية المركز الرئيسي - عدن - الجمهورية اليمنية</p>		

Source: CBY, Aden

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the Circular Ref. No 159/CBY/2024 dated 19 March 2024 issued by CBY, Aden

Republic of Yemen

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN

Head Office, Aden

Ref. No 159/CBY/2024

Date: 19 March 2024

A circular addressed to all exchange companies, establishments, and remittance agents

Brothers/companies, exchange facilities and remittance agents, best regards

Subject: Stop dealing with banks that violate the instructions of the Central Bank

With reference to the above topic, all dealings with the banks listed below, including their affiliated networks, are suspended:

- 1 Tadamon Bank
- 2 Bank of Yemen and Kuwait
- 3 Al-Amal Microfinance Bank
- 4 Shamil Bank of Yemen and Bahrain
- 5 Al-Kuraimi Islamic Microfinance Bank

This is due to their violations of the instructions issued by the Central Bank of Yemen, and deterrent measures will be taken regarding those who violate this circular.

Governor

However, on 26 March 2024, CBY, Sana'a issued the Circular No. 14 resuming dealings with the following two exchange companies, which were banned earlier vide Circular No. 13 dated 14 March 2024:

- i. Al-Qutaybi Exchange Company
- ii. Al-Bassiri Exchange Company

In response to this, on the very next day on 27 March 2024, CBY, Aden issued another Circular Ref. No. 179/CBY/2024 lifting the ban imposed on 19 March 2024, and resuming dealings with the aforesaid five banks.

The CBY, Aden also issued directions to stop dealings with 13 exchange companies in the Ma'rib Governorate for violating its instructions. The CBY, Aden informed the Panel that it will conduct intensive inspection campaigns to ensure compliance, and penal measures would be taken against those who violated the provisions of its circulars.

During the period from January to December 2023 and from January to February 2024, CBY, Aden took punitive measures against 156 and 29 exchange companies and institutions respectively. These measures were taken for not providing the required data or for violating its instructions and included imposition of financial penalties, temporary suspension of licenses, and freezing of assets.

The table 2 below shows the total amount of fines and penalties imposed by CBY, Aden on banks and money exchange companies during the period from January to December 2023 and from January to February 2024.

Table 1
Fines and penalties imposed by CBY, Aden

Period	Total amount of Fines imposed on banks (in YR)	Total amount of Fines imposed on exchange companies (in YR)
January – December 2023	337,386,000	921,000,000
January – June 2024	294,093,125	174,940,000

Such actions of the central banks underscore the politically driven and volatile regulatory policies in Yemen, highlighting how banking institutions have become casualties in this rivalry. By instructing banking and financial institutions not to comply with directives of the central bank operating in GoY-controlled areas, the Houthis impede the effectiveness of monetary and banking regulatory policies aimed at stabilizing Yemen's economy. Such interference undermines investor confidence, leading to economic instability.

Circular Ref. No 159/CBY/2024 dated 19 March 2024 issued by CBY, Aden

Control over financial transfers mechanism

The confrontation to exercise control over the financial transactions between the GoY-controlled areas and the Houthi-controlled areas reached a critical juncture when CBY, Aden established a unified network for such transfers. The Unified Money Network (UMN) is a closed joint stock company, established in 2021 with 47 shareholder members, who represent exchange companies licensed by the CBY, Aden. The network obtained the final license from the CBY, Aden in January 2024 as a payment service provider and operator. UMN obliges the exchange companies to stop transfers through other companies, and transfer only through this network. The aim of the UMN is to merge the internal transfer networks owned by exchange companies, which number more than 40, into one network.

In response, based on directives from CBY, Sana'a, the Yemeni Exchange Association, affiliated with the Houthis, issued a circular on 4 March 2024 prohibiting the exchange companies and local financial transfer networks, from dealing with:

- i. The UMN set up by CBY, Aden,
- ii. The Al Basiri Exchange Company,
- iii. The Al Qutaibi Exchange Company, and
- iv. any banks not licensed by the CBY, Sana'a.

The CBY, Sana'a issued an order disallowing the acceptance of external transfers in USDs or YRs.

Banking sources reveal that customers encounter significant challenges in sending remittances to areas under Houthi control, or receiving remittances sent from those regions to areas governed by the GoY. These measures have already exacerbated the severity of the financial divide enforced by the Houthis in 2021,

when they banned the circulation of the new edition of the currency notes issued by CBY, Aden, and imposed hefty fees on transfers from GoY-controlled regions to other areas.

Circular No 14 dated 26 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

Figure 28.2

Circular No 14 dated 26 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

<p>CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN HEAD OFFICE Sana'a</p> <p>Date: 26/ 03/ 2024 NO:</p>	 <p>قطاع الرقابة على البنوك الإدارة العامة للرقابة على البنوك</p>	<p>البنك المركزي اليمني المركز الرئيسي صنعاء</p> <p>التاريخ: 16 / 09 / 1445 هـ الرقم القياسي (٥٤٠٠)</p>
<p>تعميم رقم (14) موجه إلى كافة البنوك العاملة في الجمهورية اليمنية</p>		
<p>الأخ/ مدير عام / المدير الاقليمي / لبنك ... المحترم</p> <p>تحية طيبة وبعد،،،</p> <p>بالإشارة إلى التعميم رقم (13) بتاريخ 4 رمضان 1445 هـ الموافق 14 مارس 2024 م، وبناءً على توجيهات الأخ المحافظ، يتم إعادة التعامل مع شركات الصرافة التالية:</p> <p>1. شركة القطبي للصرافة. 2. شركة البسيري للصرافة.</p> <p>وتقبلوا تحياتنا،،،</p>		
 <p>فواز قاسم البناء وكيل قطاع الرقابة على البنوك بنك المركزي اليمني صنعاء</p> <p>26 MARCH 2024</p>	<p>نسخة مع التعمية:</p> <p>- للأخ/ المحافظ - للأخ/ نائب المحافظ</p> <p>المحترم المحترم</p>	

Source: Panel

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the circular dated 26 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
HEAD OFFICE
Sana'a
Date: 26/03/2024
NO:

Central Bank of Yemen, head office
Sana'a
09/16/1445/ date
Number: Qur'an (520)

CBY - Banking Supervision Sector, General Administration of Banking Supervision

Circular No. (14) addressed to all banks operating in the Republic of Yemen

Respected

Brother / General Manager / Regional Director / Bank....

After Greetings...

With reference to Circular No. (13) dated 4 Ramadan 1445 AH corresponding to 14 March 2024 AD, and based on the directives of the Governor, dealing with the following exchange companies will be resumed:

- 1 Al-Qutaybi Exchange Company.
- 2 Al-Bassiri Exchange Company.

Please accept our regards....

|

For the Governor

Circular Ref. No. 179/CBY/2024 dated 27 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

Figure 28.3

Copy of the Circular Ref. No. 179/CBY/2024 dated 27 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

Republic Of Yemen
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Head Office Aden
Ref: 179/CBY/2024
Date: 27/3/2024

الجمهورية العربية اليمنية
البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي / عدن

المحترمون الإخوة/ المدير العام/المدير الإقليمي لبنك
تحية طيبة وبعد،

الموضوع/استئناف التعامل مع البنوك الموقفة

إشارة الى الموضوع اعلاه، والى التعميم الصادر بتاريخ 2024 /3/19 م برقم (160/ CBY /2024) بشأن إيقاف التعامل مع عدد من البنوك لمخالفتهم لتعليمات البنك المركزي. ونظراً لوزوال المخالفة والتعهد بالالتزام بعدم تكرارها، فقد تقرر رفع الحظر واستئناف التعامل مع البنوك التالية:

1. بنك التضامن
2. بنك اليمن والكويت
3. بنك الامل للتمويل الاصغر
4. مصرف اليمن والبحرين الشامل
5. بنك الكريمي للتمويل الاصغر الإسلامي

مرسل للتنفيذ اعتباراً من تاريخ اليوم الموافق 2024/3/27.

المحافظ
احمد احمد خالد

Source: Panel

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the circular dated 27 March 2024 issued by CBY, Aden

Republic Of Yemen
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Head Office Aden

Ref: 179/CBY/2024

Date: 27/3/2024

Brothers/General Manager/Regional Manager of the Bank.
After Greetings

Topic: Resuming dealings with suspended banks

Respected people

A reference to the above topic, and to the circular issued on 3/19/2024 No. (2024 C160 C) regarding stopping dealings with a number of banks due to their violation of the instructions of the Central Bank. Given the disappearance of the violation and the pledge not to repeat it, it was decided to lift the ban and resume dealing With the following banks:

- 1 ~~Tadhamon~~ Bank
- 2 Bank of Yemen and Kuwait
- 3 Al-Amal Microfinance Bank
- 4 Shamil Bank of Yemen and Bahrain
- 5 Al-Kuraimi ~~Islamic~~ Microfinance Bank

Sent for implementation as of today, 3/27/2024.

Governor

Annex 29: Recent conflict between the CBY, Aden and the Houthis

So far, the conflict involving the control over the banking system in Yemen was witnessed between the two central banks - CBY, Sana' a, and CBY, Aden. However, the developments in the last two months not only shook the entire banking sector in Yemen, but it escalated the conflict to a different level. It became a war between the CBY, Aden and the Houthis.

On 30 May 2024, the CBY, Aden issued its circular no. 20 threatening to stop dealings with the following six banks for not complying with its instructions:

- 1- Tadamon Bank
- 2- International Bank of Yemen
- 3- Yemen and Kuwait Bank
- 4- Shamil Bank of Yemen and Bahrain
- 5- AlAmal Microfinance Bank
- 6- Alkuraimi Islamic Microfinance Bank

Figure 29:1

Circular No. 20 dated 30 May 2024 of CBY, Aden

Republic Of Yemen
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Head Office Aden
Ref: 294/CBY/2024
Date: 30/5/2024

البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي - عدن

**قرار محافظ البنك المركزي رقم (20) لسنة 2024م
بشأن إيقاف التعامل مع عدد من البنوك والمصارف**

محافظ البنك المركزي

بعد الإطلاع على القانون رقم (14) لسنة 2000م، بشأن البنك المركزي اليمني وتعديلاته، وعلى القانون رقم (38) لسنة 1998م، بشأن البنوك، وعلى القانون رقم (21) لسنة 1996م بشأن المصارف الإسلامية وتعديلاته، وعلى القانون رقم (15) لسنة 2009م بشأن بنوك التمويل الأصغر، وعلى القانون رقم (1) لسنة 2010م، بشأن مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب والمعدل بالقانون رقم (17) لسنة 2013م، ولائحته التنفيذية وتعديلاتها، وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (119) لسنة 2016م بشأن نقل المقر الرئيسي للبنك المركزي اليمني إلى العاصمة المؤقتة عدن، وعلى قرار محافظ البنك المركزي اليمني رقم (17) لسنة 2024م بشأن نقل المراكز الرئيسية للبنوك التجارية والمصارف الإسلامية وبنوك التمويل الأصغر إلى العاصمة المؤقتة عدن،

وتنظراً لفضل البنوك المشار إليها أدناه في الالتزام بأحكام القانون وتعليمات البنك المركزي وعدم الامتثال لمتطلبات مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، وإستمرارها في التعامل مع جماعة مصنفة إرهابية وتنفيذ تعليماتها بالمخالفة لشواهد العمل المصرفي وأحكام القانون وتعليمات البنك المركزي، الأمر الذي يتطلب التدخل ووضع القيود اللازمة على أنشطة البنوك المخالفة إجبارها على الامتثال لأحكام لقانون وحرصاً على سلامة القطاع المصرفي،

ولما تقتضيه المصلحة العامة

www.cby.ye | 02 264401 | 02 264430 - الجمهورية اليمنية - المركز الرئيسي - عدن

Republic Of Yemen
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Head Office Aden

البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي - عدن

"قرار"

المادة (1): على كافة البنوك والمصارف وشركات ومنتجات الصرافة ووكلاء الحوالات العاملة في الجمهورية وقف التعامل مع البنوك والمصارف المدرجة أدناه:

- 1- بنك التضامن
- 2- بنك اليمن والكويت
- 3- مصرف اليمن والبحرين الشامل
- 4- بنك الأمل للتمويل الأصغر
- 5- بنك الكرمي للتمويل الأصغر الإسلامي
- 6- بنك اليمن الدولي

المادة (2): على البنوك والمصارف المذكورة الإستمرار بتقديم خدماتها المصرفية للجمهور والوفاء بالتزاماتها تجاه عملائها حتى إشعار آخر.

المادة (3): يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ 2024/6/2م وعلى جميع الجهات المعنية العمل بموجبه وبيلغ به من يلزم محلياً ودولياً.

صدر بالمركز الرئيسي - عدن
22 ذو الحجة 1445هـ
الموافق: 30 مايو 2024م.

Source: Panel

However, since, these banks did not comply with the directions of the CBY, Aden, the bank issued circular no.30, on 8 July 2024, communicating its intention to revoke the licenses of the above-mentioned six banks. The CBY, Aden also decided to get these six banks delinked from the society for worldwide interbank financial telecommunications (SWIFT) system. SWIFT is an international messaging network used by the financial institutions to quickly, accurately, and securely send and receive information, such as money transfer instructions.

Since the aforesaid six banks are the leading banks in Yemen and engage in significant amount of international funds transfers, including for the Houthi-controlled entities, cancellation of the SWIFT facility would have seriously impacted the interests of the Houthis and also of the banking system in the Houthi-controlled areas. Taking this action of the CBY, Aden as an act of economic war launched by the GoY against it, the Houthis threatened to attack the assets in the KSA and to return to war, if the CBY, Aden did not revoke its decision. The house of the Governor of the CBY, Aden in Sana'a was allegedly attacked by the Houthis and they have seized the house.

Figure 29.2

House of the Governor of the CBY, Aden, in Sana'a which has been seized by the Houthis. The writings on the boundary wall of the house says, "The house is seized by the court".



Source: Panel

This led to serious mediation efforts by the stakeholders to de-escalate the situation. Consequently, the CBY, Aden issued circular no. 35 dated 22 July 2024, cancelling the circular nos. 20 and 30, withdrawing the revocation orders against the aforesaid six banks. Although, the conflict was deescalated, and the war averted, it left the CBY management, the GoY, and the STC highly dissatisfied with the developments. The Governor and the Deputy Governor of the CBY, Aden reportedly sent their letters of resignation to the GoY.

This incident highlights how an economic issue could spiral into a full-blown war, underlining importance and urgency of addressing the long-standing economic challenges that threaten Yemen's peace, security, and stability.

Annex 30: Information on Houthi attacks and suspicious activities towards merchant and military vessels from 19 November 2023 to 1 August 2024

Nature/impact	Number
Attack on merchant vessels	118
Attack on military vessels	16
Attack on oil/chemical tankers	31
Vessels hit	30
Tankers hit	7
Vessels abandoned	3
Vessels sunken	3
Seafarer killed	4

Reported date of attack	Targeted merchant and military vessel	Information on the attack	Gulf of Aden
			Red sea
			Indian ocean
20/07/24	<i>MV Pumba</i> , container ship with Liberia flag	UAV attack followed by USV attack, minor damages reported. Later, the explosion of a missile at close vicinity of the vessel was reported	
19/07/24	<i>Lobivia</i> , container ship with Singapore flag	Direct hit by unidentified projectile	
15/07/24	<i>MT Chios Lion</i> , oil tanker with Liberia flag	Attack by USV, damage reported	
15/07/24	<i>MT Bentley</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Attack with two small boats and one USV followed by three ASBMs	
11/07/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Two explosions at close vicinity of the vessel	
10/07/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Explosion at close vicinity of the vessel	
09/07/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Explosion at close vicinity of the vessel	
30/06/24	<i>Summer Lady</i> , bulk carrier with Marshal Islands flag	Suspicious approach by 12 crafts, included some uncrewed.	
28/06/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO (probably <i>Delonix</i> , chemical tanker with Liberia flag)	Five missiles hit the water near the vessel	
27/06/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO (probably <i>Seajoy</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag)	Attack with WBIED	
26/06/24	<i>MSC Sarah V</i> , container ship with Liberia flag	A missile hit the water near the vessel	
25/06/24	<i>Lila Lisbon</i> , bulk carrier with Kitts and Navis flag	A missile hit the water near the vessel	
23/06/24	<i>MV Transworld Navigator</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag	Direct hit by OWA-UAV. Vessel suffered minor damage. Several seafarers suffered minor injuries.	
23/06/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Hit by OWA-UAV. Vessel suffered flooding that could not be contained, and vessel was abandoned	
21/06/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO (probably <i>MV Transworld Navigator</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag which has been attacked twice)	Explosions at the vicinity of the vessel	
16/06/24	<i>Captain Paris</i> , oil tanker with Malta flag	Two explosions in close proximity of the vessel	
13/06/24	<i>MV Verbena</i> , general cargo ship with Palau flag	Targeted with three ASCMs, fire on board. One seafarer heavily wounded.	
13/06/24	<i>MV Seaguardian</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag	Explosion at close vicinity of the vessel, no damage	

12/06/24	<i>MV Tutor</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag	Targeted by one WBIED impact under the stern. Later in the day, the vessel was hit by an OWA-UAV. One seafarer killed. Vessel was abandoned by the crew, and sunk on 18/06/24.
09/06/24	<i>MV Tavvishi</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag	Targeted by one ASBM and one ASCM, one direct hit
08/06/24	<i>MV Norderney</i> , bulk carrier with Antigua and Barbados flag	Targeted by two ASBMs, one direct hit, one intercepted
06/06/24	<i>AAL Genoa</i> , bulk carrier with Cyprus flag	Two explosions at close distance of the vessel
01/06/24	US Navy <i>USS Gravelly</i> (DDG107)	Targeted by one ASBM, intercepted by US Navy
01/06/24	<i>Al Salam</i> , LNG tanker with Liberia flag	Explosion at distance from the vessel
28/05/24	<i>MV Laax</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Targeted by five ASBMs, one direct hit
23/05/24	<i>MV Yannis</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag	Impact of a missile at close vicinity, no damage
17/05/24	<i>Wind</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Targeted with one ASBM, one direct hit
07/05/24	<i>MSC Gina</i> , container ship, with Panama flag	Two explosions at close vicinity of the vessels, no damage
07/05/24	<i>MSC Diego</i> , container ship with Panama flag	
29/04/24	<i>Cyclades</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag	Targeted with three ASBMs and three OWA-UAVs, minor damage reported
29/04/24	US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG58) or <i>USS Philippine sea</i> (CG58)	Targeted with one OWA-UAV, intercepted by US Navy
26/04/24	<i>MV Maisha</i> , oil tanker with Antigua and Barbuda flag	No precision
26/04/24	<i>MV Andromeda Star</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Targeted with three ASBMs, minor damage reported
24/04/24	<i>MSC Darwin VI</i> , container ship with Liberia flag	One explosion ahead of the vessel, no damage
24/04/24	<i>MV Yorktown</i> , container ship with US flag	Targeted by one ASBM, intercepted by US Navy
09/04/24	<i>MV Yorktown</i> , container ship with US flag	Targeted by one missile, intercepted by US Navy
07/04/24	<i>Hope Island</i> , container ship with Marshall Islands flag	Targeted by one missile, no direct hit
06/04/24	<i>Hope Island</i> , container ship with Marshall Islands flag	Targeted by two missiles. The first was intercepted by the coalition and the second hit the water
03/04/24	US Navy <i>USS Gravelly</i> (DDG 107)	Targeted by one ASBM and two UWA-OAVs, no direct hit
01/04/24	<i>Crystal Symphony</i> , cruise ship with Bahamas flag	Suspicious approach followed by gun shots
28/03/24	Names of the targeted US and Coalition warships not mentioned by CENTCOM	Targeted by four OWA-UAVs, no direct hit
27/03/24	Name of the targeted US warship not mentioned by CENTCOM	Targeted by four OWA-UAVs, no direct hit
23/03/24	<i>MV Huang Pu</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Targeted by five ASBMs, one direct hit
17/03/24	<i>MV Mado</i> , LPG tanker with Marshall Islands flag	Targeted by a missile, no direct hit
15/03/24	<i>MV Mado</i> , LPG tanker with Marshall Islands flag	One explosion ahead of the vessel, no damage
15/03/24	<i>Pacific-01</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Targeted by a missile, no direct hit
14/03/24	<i>Fuxing V</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag	Targeted by two missiles, no direct hit
12/03/24	US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG58)	Targeted by one SRBM, no direct hit

10/03/24	<i>Pinocchio</i> , container ship with Liberian flag	Targeted by two ASBMs, no direct hit
08/03/24	<i>MV Propel Fortune</i> , ship carrier with Singapore flag	Targeted by two ASBMs, no direct hit
06/03/24	<i>True Confidence</i> , bulk carrier with Barbados flag	Targeted by one ASBM, one direct hit Three fatalities, at least four injuries, of which three are in critical condition, and significant damage to the ship
05/03/24	US Navy <i>USS Carney</i> (DDG64)	Targeted by one ASBM and three OWA-UAVs. Missile and OWA-UAVs intercepted
04/03/24	<i>MSC SKY II</i> , container ship with Liberian flag	Targeted by two missiles. One direct hit
27/02/24	<i>Jolly Vanadio</i> , container ship with Marshall Islands flag	Attack by two UAVs
27/02/24	<i>Lady Youmna</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Panama flag	Targeted by a missile, no direct hit
24/02/24	<i>MV Torm Thor</i> , oil/chemical tanker with US flag	Targeted by one ASBM. Missile intercepted
22/02/24	<i>MV Islander</i> , cargo with Palau flag	Targeted by two missiles, fire onboard
20/02/24	US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG58)	Targeted by one ASCM. Missile intercepted
19/02/24	<i>Navis Fortuna</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Hit by missile
19/02/24	<i>Sea Champion</i> , grain carrier with Greek flag	Targeted by one OWA-UAV, one direct hit , minor damage
18/02/24	<i>Rubymar</i> , bulk carrier with Belize flag	Targeted by two ASBM, one direct hit , crew abandoned the vessel. The vessel sunk.
17/02/24	<i>MT Pollux</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Targeted by three ASBMs, one direct hit
15/02/24	<i>MV Lycavitos</i> , bulk carrier with Barbados flag	Targeted by one ASBM, one direct hit
12/02/24	<i>MV Star Iris</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Targeted by two missiles
06/02/24	<i>MV Star Nasia</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Targeted by three ASBMs, no direct hit, minor damage. One ASBM intercepted by US Navy
06/02/24	<i>MV Morning Star</i> , cargo ship with undetermined flag	Targeted by three ASBMs, no direct hit
06/02/24	<i>Morning Tide</i> , cargo ship with Barbados flag	Explosion in close vicinity of a merchant vessel, no damage
06/02/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Rounds fired from a small craft, slight damage on the merchant vessel
02/02/24	<i>Daffodil</i> , oil tanker with Saudi Arabia flag	UAV attack, no direct hit
02/02/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	Seven suspicious UAVs intercepted by US Navy
01/02/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	One suspicious UAV intercepted by US Navy
01/02/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	One suspicious USV intercepted by US Navy
01/02/24	<i>MV Koi</i> , cargo ship with Liberia flag	Targeted by two ASBMs, no direct hit. ASBMs intercepted by US Navy
01/02/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Explosion at distance of a merchant vessel, no damage
31/01/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	One ASBM intercepted by US Navy
31/01/24	US Navy <i>USS Carney</i> (DDG64)	Three UAVs intercepted by US Navy
30/01/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	One ASBM intercepted by US Navy
30/01/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	Approached by three small crafts, one of these crafts has a front mounted weapon

27/01/24	Royal British Navy <i>HMS Diamond</i>	One UAV intercepted
26/01/24	<i>Marlin Luanda</i> , oil tanker with Marshall Islands flag	One ASBM, direct hit
26/01/24	<i>Achilles</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Explosion at close vicinity
26/01/24	US Navy <i>USS Carney</i> (DDG64)	One ASBM intercepted by US Navy
24/01/24	<i>Maersk Chesapeake</i> , container ship with USA flag	Two ASBMs intercepted by US Navy, one impacted the sea
24/01/24	<i>Maersk Detroit</i> , container ship with USA flag	Missile attack, no direct hit
24/01/24	<i>Tomahawk</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag	UAV attack, no direct hit
18/01/24	<i>Chem Ranger</i> , chemical tanker with Marshall Islands flag	Two ASBMs impacted the sea near the ship
17/01/24	<i>MV Genco Picardy</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	One UAV, direct hit
16/01/24	<i>MV Zografia</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag	One ASBM, direct hit
16/01/24	<i>Panda</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Suspicious approach
15/01/24	<i>MV Gibraltar Eagle</i> , bulk carrier with	Possible missile attack
14/01/24	US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG 58)	One ASBM intercepted by US Navy
14/01/24	<i>Khalissa</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	One ASBM, impacted the sea
14/01/24	<i>Orchid Rising</i> , bulk carrier with Panama flag	Suspicious approach
12/01/24	<i>Khalissa</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Kinetic attack, vector not identified
11/01/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	One ASBM, impacted the sea
09/01/24	<i>Federal Masamune</i> , bulk carrier with Singapore flag	Approached by three small crafts which opened fire with two missiles
09/01/24	<i>Caravos Harmony</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Two UAVs dropped each one bomb, impacted the sea
06/01/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Six small crafts approached a merchant vessel
06/01/24	US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG 58)	One UAV intercepted
02/01/24	<i>CMA CGM Tage</i> , container ship with Malta flag	Two ASBMs, impacted the sea
01/01/24	<i>Advantage Life</i> , oil tanker with Marshall Islands flag	Threat over radio
31/12/23	<i>Maersk Hangzhou</i> , container ship with Singapore flag	Boarding attempt by four small crafts. Attack repelled by US Navy
31/12/23	<i>Maersk Hangzhou</i> , container ship with Singapore flag	Three ASBMs, one direct hit and two intercepted by US Navy
25/12/23	<i>MSC United VIII</i> , container ship with Liberian flag	One way attack UAV, attack missed
25/12/23	<i>Navig8 Montel</i> , oil tanker with Liberian flag	One way attack UAV, attack missed
25/12/23	<i>MV Mariona</i> , livestock carrier with Tanzanian flag	Threat over radio
23/12/23	<i>Sai Baba</i> , oil tanker with Gabonese flag	One way attack UAV, one direct hit
23/12/23	<i>Blaamanen</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Norwegian flag	One way attack UAV, attack missed
23/12/23	<i>Fassa</i> , bulk carrier with Cayman Islands flag	One way attack UAV attack missed

18/12/23	<i>MSC Clara</i> , container ship with Panama flag	One way attack UAV, attack missed
18/12/23	<i>Swan Atlantic</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Cayman Islands flag	One way attack UAV, one direct hit
18/12/23	<i>Magic Vela</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Attempted hijack
18/12/23	<i>Green Trader</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Marshall Islands flag	Suspicious approach
15/12/23	<i>Palatium III</i> , container ship with Liberia flag	Explosion onboard
15/12/23	<i>Al Jasrah</i> , container ship with Liberia flag	Direct hit
15/12/23	<i>MSC Alanya</i> , container ship with Liberian flag	Threat over radio
14/12/23	<i>Maersk Gibraltar</i> , container ship with Hong Kong flag	Targeted by ASBM
13/12/23	<i>Lady Tramp</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag	Suspicious approach
13/12/23	US Navy <i>USS Mason</i> (DDG 87)	UAV attack
12/12/23	<i>Ardmore Encounter</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Marshall Islands flag	Boarding attempt
11/12/23	<i>Strinda</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Norwegian flag	Missile attack, one direct hit
11/12/23	<i>Icarius</i> , cargo ship with Vanuatu flag	UAV attack
10/12/23	<i>Centaurus Leader</i> , vehicle carrier with Singapore flag	Two missed UAV attacks
09/12/23	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Threat over radio
06/12/23	<i>Dianella</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Liberian flag	UAV incident
03/12/23	<i>AOM Sophie II</i> , bulk carrier with Panama flag	Missile attack, one direct hit
03/12/23	<i>Number 9</i> , container ship with Panama flag	Threat over radio
03/12/23	<i>Unity Explorer</i> , bulk carrier with Bahamas flag	Missile attack, one direct hit
03/12/23	<i>CGenuine</i> , oil tanker with Liberian flag	Missed UAV attack
27/11/23	US Navy <i>USS Mason</i> (DDG 87)	Two ASBMs intercepted
29/11/23	US Navy <i>USS Carney</i> (DDG 64)	UAV intercepted
26/11/23	<i>MV Central Park</i> , chemical tanker with Liberian flag	Boarding attempt
19/11/23	<i>Galaxy Leader</i> , vehicle carrier with Bahamas flag	Attackers used a helicopter to hijack the vessel

Source: CENTCOM and UKMTO

Annex 31: Hijacking by the Houthis of the *Galaxy Leader* on 19 November 2023

Video of the attack presented by the Houthis: <https://gcaptain.com/watch-houthis-release-video-of-galaxy-leader-seizure/>

On 19 November 2023 Houthi commandos were dropped by a Mi-171Sh helicopter onto the deck of the *Galaxy Leader*, a vehicle carrier with Bahamas flag sailing in the Red Sea.

An analysis of the weaponry carried by some commandos dropped on the ship shows that they were armed with AK-103 assault rifles, observed for the first time in 2022 with Houthi marine commandos, alongside at least one anti-material rifle (AMR) and a Glock pistol.⁶⁰ Similar pistols have been documented as presented for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas.

Figures 31.1 (up) and 31.2 (below)

Mi-171Sh armed with two UBM-57 pods (each with 32 x 57mm rockets)



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1726641438279315476

⁶⁰ Glock pistols have also been observed in the hands of high-ranking Houthi officers.

Figures 31.3 (up), 31.4 (middle), and 31.5 (below)

***Malah & Aseef-1* Fast attack boats as part of the operation**

These boats are generally armed with 14.5mm or 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun (HMG) and 7.62mm LMG.



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1726643889615040591

Figures 31.6 (left) and 31.7 (right)

Houthi boarding team members mainly armed with AK-103, calibre 7.62x39mm



Figure 31.8

Houthi naval commando unit with AK-103, a standard weaponry used by them



Source: <https://www.memri.org/tv/houthis-release-music-video-commando-operation-uae-ship-rawabee-captured-kill-jews-flood>

Figure 31.9

Houthi naval commando unit members equipped with AK-103. Picture taken during the 21 September 2022 military parade held in Sana'a



Source: <https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2022/09/30/ansar-allah-are-switching-to-the-ak-103/>

Figure 31.10

One of the boarding team members was equipped with a 12.7mm *Khatef* Anti Materiel Rifle (AMR)



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1726648786876043496

Figure 31.11

Khatef AMR in the hands of a Houthi fighter



Source: <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1482848987531169797>

Figure 31.12

Member of the boarding team equipped with a Glock pistol



Figures 31.13 (left) and 31.14 (right)

Glock pistol presented for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas

Glock pistols have been largely documented by the Panel as presented for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=810754580785830&set=pb.100055538851439.-2207520000>

Annex 32: Interview conducted on 20 November 2023 by the Qatari media al Araby al-Jadeed with Hazam al-Assad, member of the Houthis political council



قال عضو المكتب السياسي لجماعة الحوثيين (أنصار الله) حزام الأسد، في تصريحات لبرنامج "مواكبة" على "العربي الجديد - بودكاست"، إن السفينة الإسرائيلية، التي أعلنت الجماعة، أمس الأحد، احتجازها في البحر الأحمر قرب اليمن: "ليست إلا باكورة لعمليات بحرية قادمة سواء في استهداف القطع البحرية والبوارج الإسرائيلية أو السفن التجارية"، لافتاً إلى أن المواجهة مع إسرائيل "لم تؤثر على مجريات المحادثات

Source: al Araby al-Jadeed

Appendix A

Summary of the interview

Hazam al-Assad, a member of the Houthi political council, responding to accusations of Iranian involvement in the hijacking of the ship, said the 'Axis of Resistance' had coordinated with and been guided by Iran, but that the decision to attack had been made by the Houthi forces. He also stated that it was just the beginning of their naval operations.

Annex 33: Houthi missiles, UAVs, USVs, UUVs, SAMs, and other weapon systems destroyed during strikes conducted by the coalition, or intercepted on the way

Matériel	Destroyed during strikes	Intercepted on the way	Total
SRMB/MRBM/LACM	15		15
ASCM/ASBM	172	66	238
Missile launcher (without precision)	15		15
OWA-UAV/UAV	382	35	417
Unidentified weapon system		20	20
Patrol boat	6		6
USV	66	5	71
UUV	2		2
SAM	8		8
Radar and air defense sensor	22		22
Command post and ground control	7		7
Ammunition storage	10		10
Helicopter	2		2
Total	707	126	833

Source: CENTCOM

Annex 34: Threatening messages sent on 25 April 2024 by HOCC (Houthis) to the bulk carrier Cyclades, sailing under Liberia flag

From: Director@hocc.gov.ye <Director@hocc.gov.ye>

Sent: Friday, April 26, 2024 1:30 AM To: Emergency Responce <ert@eastmed.gr>; media <media@eastmed.gr>; Chartering Dept - Dry Cargo Division - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <drychartering@eastmed.gr>; Contchartering - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <Contchartering@eastmed.gr>; ops-dry <ops-dry@eastmed.gr>; ops-containers <ops-containers@eastmed.gr>; Technical Dept - Dry Cargo Division - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <tech-dry@eastmed.gr>; Insurance & Claims Dept - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <insur-claim@eastmed.gr>; Office Administration - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <admin@eastmed.gr>

Cc: operations@hocc.gov.ye

Subject: IAA-1C2CF6 Violation of the ship CYCLADES of the ships ban criteria – URGENT.

Importance: High

Subject: Violation of the ship CYCLADES of the ships ban criteria – URGENT. To: EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME, ARMAR SHIPPING LTD

Sent: 25/04/2024.

Importance: High.

Good day, This email is sent to you from the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) which is located in the Republic of Yemen - Sana'a. It is a center affiliated to the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Yemen, which was established with the aim of alleviating the humanitarian effects and repercussions in the theater of military operations, by neutralizing civilians and civilian objects and other humanitarian aspects.

According to the information, we would like to inform you that the ship CYCLADES IMO: 9799616, which is considered to be owned/managed/operated by your company, violated the ships ban criteria: (C) Ships heading to Israel ports. By arriving at the port of Eilat, Israel in 21 Apr. 2024.

Therefore, the mentioned ship will be included in the list of ships that are banned from crossing the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab and the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, unless you respond to this email.

Therefore, as a part of the safety of ships and their crews, the Yemeni Armed Forces warn the ship owned/managed/operated by your company of continuing to violate the ships ban criteria (C) again.

We will consider stopping your ships' voyages to Israeli ports as the first step in your cooperation, and this is a serious matter that requires your immediate attention. If you do not comply and respond, we confirm that you will bear full responsibility.

We strongly urge you to respond to this email without delay.

Best Regards.

Director of HOCC

Source: Confidential

Annex 35: Threatening messages sent on 22 May 2024 by HOCC (Houthis) to the bulk carrier Alexandria, sailing under Liberia flag

Urgent: Inclusion of the vessel ALEXANDRIA IMO (9448889) in the ban list.

To: Island Oil Holdings Ltd, Petronav Ship Management Ltd,

Sending Date: 22/05/2024. Importance: High

This email is sent to you from the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) which is located in the Republic of Yemen - Sana'a.

It is a center affiliated to the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Yemen, which was established with the aim of alleviating the humanitarian effects and repercussions in the theater of military operations, by neutralizing civilians, civilian objects and other humanitarian aspects.

As the vessel ALEXANDRIA IMO:9448889 which is considered to be owned, managed and operated by your company, has violated the ban criteria: (C) Vessels heading to the usurping Israeli entity ports, and entered the port of Haifa on 5/21/2024.

Therefore, we inform you that the vessel ALEXANDRIA has been included in the ban list within "Sanctions program linked to vessels entering the usurping Israeli entity ports", starting from the date of 03/05/2024.

As a result, the vessel is prohibited from transiting the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, and will be directly targeted by the Yemeni Armed Forces in any area they deem appropriate.


The targeting of Israeli vessels by the Yemeni Armed Forces and preventing the entry of other vessels into the ports of the usurping Israeli entity is based on the religious, humanitarian and moral responsibility towards the oppressed Palestinian people and the unjust siege and the continuation of horrific and heinous massacres by the usurping Israeli entity, and within the framework of the sanctions imposed on it as a result of its aggression, siege, and starvation of the Gaza Strip, the crimes of genocide against the Palestinian people, the killing of children and women, and the prevention of medicine and food entry for more than 8 months.

Therefore, you bear the responsibility and consequences of including the vessel in the ban list, and if your vessels continue to violate the ban criteria and enter the ports of the usurping Israeli entity, sanctions will be imposed on your company and the entire fleet of vessels associated with it.

HOCC Director

Source: Confidential

Annex 36: Decree issued on 17 February 2024 by Mahdi al-Mashat, President of the Houthi supreme political council establishing the HOCC




Yemen News Agency (SABA)

Home
Revolution Leader
About President
Local
International
US-Saudi Aggression
Economy
Reports

فارسي | English

Search ▶ | Advance Search

About President



President of Political Council issues decree to establish HOCC

President of Political Council issues decree to establish HOCC

[17/February/2024]

SANA'A February 17. 2024 (Saba) - Decree No. (95) of the year 1445 AH was issued today, Saturday, by the President of the Supreme Political Council establishing the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC).

The decree included four articles. The first article stipulated the establishment of a center called the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC), affiliated with the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, subject to his supervision, and enjoying legal personality, with its main center in the capital, Sana'a.

The second article stipulates that "the Center contributes to mitigating the humanitarian effects and repercussions (on civilians and civilian objects) in the theater of military operations (land, sea and air) through adherence to Islamic teachings , compliance with international humanitarian law , other relevant international laws and conventions in a manner that does not conflict with the interests of the Republic." Yemen or harm it.

Article Three stipulates that the Center has the right to carry out its tasks:

- A- Communication and coordination internally and externally with all parties, governmental and non-governmental agencies and relevant international organizations.
- B- Including representatives from the relevant competent authorities as needed.

Article Four stipulates that this decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance and shall be published in the Official Gazette.

J.A

resource : SABA

Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3305712.htm>

Annex 37: Components of weapons systems and various materiel, which have been intercepted, and documented in previous reports of the Panel

Figure 37.1

MRBMs, LACMs, ASCMs, SAMs, OWA-UAVs, UAVs, DPVs, and UUVs

Materiel	Qty	Reference
MRBM Borkan inertial system	1	S/2023/833 , paras. 74-75
MRBM Borkan nose cone	6	S/2023/833 , paras. 74-75
MRBM Borkan jet vane	16	S/2023/833 , paras. 74-75
MRBM (without precision) engine	5	Para. 81 and annexes 107-109 of this report
Quds-1 LACM components	1	S/2021/79 , table 2
“358” SAM components	10	S/2023/130 , paras. 50-53
“358” SAM	3	S/2021/79 , table 2
“358” SAM	2	S/2021/79 , table 2
DLE-170 drone engine	100	S/2023/833 , paras. 91-93
Matrice 300 RTK drone	1	S/2023/130 , para. 52
Surveillance drone (without precision)	200	S/2023/833 , para. 96
DPV Bonex Constellation	2	S/2023/833 , paras. 87-89
UUV components	Multiple	Para. 83 and annex 111 of this report

Figure 37.2

Electronic materiel or component

Materiel	Qty	Reference
EOSS	1	S/2023/833 , para. 74
EOSS component	2	Para. 83 and annex 111 of this report

Figure 37.3

SALWs, ammunition and related materiel

Materiel	Qty	Reference
Type 56-1 assault rifle	1,406	S/2023/130 , para. 42
Type 56-1 assault rifle	3,752	S/2022/50 , para. 62
Type 56-1 assault rifle	1,918	S/2023/833 , para. 68
Type 56-1 assault rifle	2,999	S/2023/833 , para. 69
Type 56-1 assault rifle	2,556	S/2022/50 , para. 65
Type 56-1 assault rifle	4,300	S/2021/79 , para. 86
Type 56-1 assault rifle	2,522	S/2019/83 , para. 95
AKS20U compact assault rifle	198	S/2023/833 , para. 68
AKS20U compact assault rifle	100	S/2023/833 , para. 69
AKSU	35	S/2022/50 , para. 65
Type 85 sniper rifle	100	S/2022/50 , para. 65
Hoshdar-M sniper rifle	64	S/2018/193 , table 2
AM-50 Sayyad AMR	50	S/2022/50 , para. 62
AM-50 Sayyad AMR	52	S/2022/50 , para. 65
AM-50 Sayyad AMR	59	S/2021/79 , para. 85
RG 004-A1 optical sight for AM-50	50	S/2022/50 , para. 62
PSOP optical sight for sniper rifle	35	S/2021/79 , para. 88
Ghadir II optical sight for sniper rifle	37	S/2022/50 , para. 88
Optical sight for sniper rifle	+50	Para. 86 and annex 118 of this report
RU-90/120G thermal sight	56	S/2022/50 , para. 88

RU-100LH laser telemeter	3	S/2022/50, annex 14
PKM LMG	50	S/2023/833, para. 69
PKM LMG	198	S/2022/50, para. 62
PKM LMG	192	S/2022/50, para. 65
PKM LMG	434	S/2021/79, para. 84
DSHK HMG components	82	S/2022/50, para. 62
DSHK HMG Barrel	60	S/2021/79, annex 14
RPG-7	90	S/2022/50, para. 62
RPG-7	194	S/2022/50, para. 65
RPG-7	200	S/2021/79, para. 85
RPG-7	23	S/2020/326, para. 61
PGO7-V3 sight for RPG-7	45	S/2020/326, para. 61
RPG-29	5	S/2020/326, annex 14
Dehlavieh ATGM	23	S/2023/833, para. 69
Dehlavieh ATGM	7	S/2023/833, para. 74
Dehlavieh ATGM	52	S/2023/130, para. 56
Dehlavieh ATGM	191	S/2021/79, para. 84
Dehlavieh ATGM	21	S/2020/326, para. 52
Dehlavieh ATGM	28	S/2018/594, paras. 115-116
ATGM launching post (without precision)	4	S/2023/833, para. 96
ATGM launching post (without precision)	15	S/2023/833, para. 96
9M111/9M113 ATGM	50	S/2022/50, para. 65
9M113 ATGM	19	S/2018/192, annex 12
Toophan ATGM launching post	3	S/2018/192, annex 13
Toophan ATGM	56	S/2018/192, annex 13
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	1,080,000	S/2023/833, para. 67
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	578,400	S/2023/833, para. 69
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	220,000	S/2023/130, para. 42
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	2,640	S/2023/130, para. 42
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	476,000	S/2021/79, para. 75
12.7x99mm ammunition for AMR	25,000	S/2023/833, para. 67
Fuzes for 122mm rocket for BM-21 MRL	6,960	S/2023/833, para. 67
PG-7 strip propellants	870 boxes	S/2023/833, para. 67

Figure 37.4

Others

Materiel	Qty	Reference
Electric detonator	40,000	S/2023/833, paras. 77-78
Reel of detonating cord	100	S/2023/833, paras. 77-78
Explosive precursors	5 tons	S/2023/833, paras. 85-86
Explosive precursors	40 tons	S/2023/130, paras. 44-47
Explosive precursors	170 tons	S/2023/130, para. 48
Explosive precursors	697 bags	S/2021/79, para.75
Cylinder for scuba diving equipment	200	S/2023/130, para. 96

Annex 38: Article published on 29 May 2024 by the Iranian media Tasnim News stating that the achievement of Shahid Tehrani Moghadam is today in the hands of the Yemeni Mujahideen as an anti-ship weapon

29 May 2024 by Tasnim News (Iranian media)

Modeling Yemeni fighters from Iran's missile technology

Iran's first maritime ballistic missile named "Qadr" was built by Shahid Hassan Tehrani Moghadam, and now, after several years, the same technology is available to the Yemeni Mujahideen.

Defense Group of Tasnim News Agency Seyed Mohammad Taheri: Without a doubt, the missile capability of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force is one of the most important aspects of the Islamic Republic of Iran's deterrence capability, and the achievement of this capability is due to the efforts and efforts of unknown generals and scientists, among them the martyred general Hassan Tehrani Moghadam Nakhshi. It has played an irreplaceable role.

Many of the country's defense products and achievements in the field of missiles were founded by this honorable martyr and today it has become a powerful tool for defense against any threat.

But in the meantime, the achievement of anti-ship ballistic missile technology can be considered a turning point in the country's missile capabilities, which was followed from idea to product by Shahid Tehrani Moghadam.

The sensitive and strategic area of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, together with the Oman Sea, all of whose northern shores are part of our country's territory, is one of the most important economic bottlenecks in the world, especially in the field of energy, which has caused all the powers of the world to have a desire for many years. With the presence of the military in this region, they use their power to secure their sometimes-illegitimate interests. On the other hand, the economic beating heart of our country is also located in this region.

These features have caused extra-regional forces to always threaten the Islamic Republic of Iran with the presence of their military fleet in this region, so that they can impose their policies on Iran and the countries of the region.

The easy movement of extra-regional military vessels in the Persian Gulf continued until our country did not have a suitable weapon to deal with American vessels to drive them away from its shores. The attack of the American forces on Afghanistan and Iraq also caused an increase in the presence of the American fleet and extra-regional forces in the Persian Gulf, and this led to a struggle at the level of senior commanders to obtain a weapon that could keep the American forces away from the shores of Iran.

At this time, Shahid Tehrani Moghadam comes into action without having direct responsibility in the field of naval weapons. Shahid Tehrani Moghadam's idea was to build a naval ballistic missile, even though there was no such weapon in the country's armed forces until then.



Thunder 69

At that time, the IRGC's most accurate operational missile was the Thunder 69 missile. Thunder 69 was actually the Chinese B610 missile that was purchased by the IRGC from China in 1369 (1990). The Chinese missile was actually a surface-to-surface SAM-2 air defense missile and had a range of 150 km.

Shahid Tehrani Moghadam's idea was based on this axis to design an anti-ship ballistic missile by changing the use of Thunder 69 missile. Based on this, a project named "Qadr" is keyed in the self-sufficiency jihad of the IRGC Air Force.

But this project has faced many issues. Anti-ship missiles in that period were mainly cruise missiles that have a straight trajectory, but the ground-to-ground ballistic missile has a curved trajectory and is designed to target fixed targets, and building a ballistic missile that can target moving targets is difficult. It was very difficult. At the same time, the specialists of the Ministry of Defense had also started the construction of the anti-ship cruise missile in the form of the "Yaali" project.

Finally, with the support of Sardar Shahid Ahmed Kazemi, who was in command of the IRGC Air Force at that time, the Tander surface-to-surface missile became an anti-floating missile.

A lot of tests are done for the Qadr anti-submarine missile to be operational, but the final test is done when Shahid Tehrani Moghadam is no longer responsible for the air force's jihad, but he will be present at Lake Urmia for the final test.

On the day of the missile test, the weather in Lake Urmia will be cloudy, and this makes the success of the work doubtful. But by the grace of God, an opening is opened in the clouds and the order to fire is issued. The missile is fired and by passing through the opening between the clouds and locking onto the predetermined target, it hits and destroys it precisely. Later, the achievements of this missile will be used in the design and construction of "Persian Gulf" and "Hormoz" missiles.

In this way, the "Qadr" missile becomes the first Iranian anti-ship ballistic missile. Now years have passed since then, and the achievement of Shahid Tehrani Moghadam is today in the hands of the Yemeni Mujahideen as an anti-ship weapon.

The "Environment" missile of the Yemeni armed forces is actually designed with the exact model of the Iranian Qadr anti-ship missile. The Yemeni army also had a significant number of SAM-2 defense missiles for years. With the start of the Saudi invasion of Yemen, these defense missiles became Qahir 2 and Qahir 2 ground-to-ground missiles, which carried out successful operations against the Saudi army and its allies.

However, during the parade of Ansar Allah's forces, the anti-submarine model of Qahir missiles, which was now equipped with an optical seeker to target enemy ships, like the Iranian Qadr, was displayed under the name "Environment".

This issue indicates that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been able to pursue the level of support for the resistance front higher than before in recent years, and in addition to all-round support for this front, it has put the transfer of technology in order to make the resistance groups more powerful. An issue that has led to the formation of an integrated command and control network in the region, especially in the fields of drones and missiles.

Now, the missile that was once able to keep the Americans away from Iran's shores has turned into a weapon that has been able to face serious challenges to the interests of the United States and its main ally in the region, the Zionist regime.

Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1403/03/09/3094099/> قدر-اولین-موشک-بالستیک-ضدکشتی-ایران-در-اختیار-انصارالله-یمن

Annex 39: Article published on 29 May 2024 by the Iranian media Tasnim News stating that Iranian naval ballistic missile's technology is at disposal of Yemen

29 May 2024 by Tasnim News (Iranian media)

Inspired by Iran, the Yemeni military forces have obtained the technology to manufacture anti-ship ballistic missiles.

Iran's first homegrown naval ballistic missile, called 'Qadr', was developed by late Iranian commander Brigadier General Hassan Tehrani-Moqaddam more than a decade ago.

Iran's technical know-how to produce such anti-ship missiles is now at the disposal of the Yemeni military forces.

Patterned after the Iranian missile, Yemen's 'Muhit' (Ocean) missile is capable of detonating naval targets.

The Yemeni Army has been in possession of surface-to-air missiles for many years. After the invasion of Yemen by a Saudi-led coalition in March 2015, the Yemeni forces converted the SAMs into surface-to-surface missiles, known as Qaher-2 and Qaher-2M, which carried out many successful operations against hostile targets.

Source: https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2024/05/29/3094955/iranian-naval-ballistic-missile-s-technology-at-disposal-of-yemen?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAR2s06j6TwTDI61e7PsDFzEdejmcJfM1By17jIWBkAQxZhne4IgVzN01gE_aem_Acim3z2OWsfiVweSvZuT6ff_dTRhbY3u9Jvx_d0SjamS8YmxuF8TIpOvmTuzea7WyLUrib0-n21ZsjTDO05sOwvJ

Annex 40: Table illustrating materiel with similar characteristics documented in the hands of the Houthis, in Iran, and in the hands of several armed groups belonging to the ‘Axis of Resistance’

Documented with the Houthis	Designation by Iran	Documented with an AG	Annex
SRBM			
Borkan-2H	Qiam		41
Borkan-3	Revzan		42
Falaq	Qiam		43
Qarar	Zolfagar	Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq	44
Tankil	Raad 500		45
Hatem	Khaybar Shekan		46
Palestine	Khaybar Shekan		47
Qaher-1	Tondar-69		48
Qaher-M2			49
MRBM			
Toofan	Shahab-3		50
Aqeel	Qiam family		51
LACM			
Quds-1	Similarities with Soumar	Islamic Resistance in Iraq	52
Quds-2		PMF, Iraq	53
Quds-3			54
Quds-4		Islamic Resistance in Iraq	55
ASCM			
C-802	C-802	Hezbollah, Lebanon	56
Al Mandab-1	Similarities with 351		57
Al Mandab-2	Ghadir/Noor		58
ASBM			
Faleq-1	Fadjr-4CL		59
Long range guided rocket			
Badr-2	Fadjr-5		60
UAV			
Mersad-2	Chamrosh-4		61
Waeed-1	Shahed-131		62
Waeed-2	Shahed-136		63
Rased	Chamrosh	Hezbollah, Lebanon, and PMF, Iraq	64
Qasef-2K	Ababil	Hezbollah, Lebanon, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, Liwa al-Ghaliboun, Iraq, and Islamic Resistance in Iraq	65
Samad-1	Sayyad	Lebanon and Iraq	66
Samad-2		PMF, Iraq, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and Al-Ashtar, Bahrain	
Samad-3		Hezbollah, Lebanon	
Khatif-2	Shahed 101	Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, Saraya Ababeel, Iraq, and Islamic Resistance in Iraq	67
Rujum	Observed Denomination unknown		68
SAM			
Saqr-1	SAM-358	Hezbollah, Lebanon, and unidentified AG, Iraq	69
Barq-2	Taer-2B/Khordad-3		70
MANPADS			
Documented with Houthis	Misagh-2	Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq	71
ATGM			
Documented with Houthis	Saegheh-2	Hezbollah, Lebanon, and PMF, Iraq	72
Documented with Houthis	Toophan	Hezbollah, Lebanon, PMF, Iraq, and Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Iraq	73
Documented with Houthis	Dehlavieh	Hezbollah, Lebanon, Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, PMF, Iraq	74

EOSS			
Sadiq	IRSS-I-3 Saadad	PMF, Iraq	75.1
Shafak	EOSS I-103		75.2
Ofok	EOSS I-103		75.3
SALW			
Documented with Houthis	KL assault rifle	Somalia	144
Documented with Houthis	M80 LMG	Al-Shabaab, Somalia	142
Documented with Houthis	AM-50 AMR	Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, Al-Mujahideen brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, Hezbollah, Lebanon, Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq, Saraya al-Salam, Iraq, Sinjar Resistance Units, Iraq, Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq, and Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Iraq	76
Documented with Houthis	Qader 40mm		77
Documented with Houthis	RPG Saegheh	Hezbollah, Lebanon, PMF, Iraq	80
Mortar			
Rujoom 120mm	HM-16	Al-Quds brigades, occupied Palestinian territory, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory	78
Rujoom 60mm	HM-12 or HM-14	Al-Quds brigades, occupied Palestinian territory, Al-Mujahideen brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, and Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory	79
Thermal sight			
Documented with Houthis	RU-60G	PMF, Iraq, Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq, and PKK, Iraq	81
Land mine			
Documented with Houthis	M18A2	Recovered in Syria	82
Sea mine			
Thaqib (MTA)	Limpet mine		83

Annex 41: Comparison between *Borkhan-2H* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Qiam* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 41.1

***Borkhan-2H* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**

Source: <https://weaponsreputation.com/weapons/burkan-2h.php>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, Annexes 32-33, 36, S/2018/594, paras. 80–91, S/2019/83, para. 89, S/2018/594, table 34.4, annex 36

Figure 41.2

***Qiam* SRBM produced by Iran**

Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2010/08/iran-test-fires-new-qiam-1-ballistic.html>

Annex 42: Comparison between *Borkhan-3* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Revzan* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 42.1

Borkhan-3 SRBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/1

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, Annex 30, figure 56.2

Figure 42.2

Revzan SRBM produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/476984/Iran-discloses-surface-to-surface-ballistic-missile-with-1400-km>

Annex 43: Comparison between *Falaq* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Qiam* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 43.1

***Falaq* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**

Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018084874956885/photo/4>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 56, S/2023/130, figure 10.9

Figure 43.2

***Qiam* SRBM produced by Iran**

Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2010/08/iran-test-fires-new-qiam-1-ballistic.html>

Annex 44: Comparison between *Qarar* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, *Fateh-110* / *Zolfagar* SRBM produced by Iran, *Aqsa-1* SRBM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and *Jamal-69* SRBM operated by Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq

Figure 44.1
***Qarar* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704893550586991094

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 56.5

Figure 44.2
***Zolfagar* SRBM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/09/25/1195645/iran-releases-video-of-launch-of-new-ballistic-missile> <https://www.flickr.com/photos/theisraelproject/11406979775/>

Figure 44.3
Aqsa-1 SRBM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://theaviationist.com/2023/11/14/new-al-aqsa-1-ballistic-missile/>

Figure 44.4
Jamal-69 SRBM operated by Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq



Source: <https://www.taghribnews.com/fa/news/548016/>

Annex 45: Comparison between *Tankil* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Raad 500* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 45.1

Tankil SRBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: https://twitter.com/iraniannmil_ar/status/1704996859742408765/photo/1

Figure 45.2

Raad 500 SRBM produced by Iran



Source: <https://en.irna.ir/news/83667792/Iran-unveils-Raad-500-missile>

Annex 46: Comparison between *Hatem* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Khaybar Shekan* SRBM produced by Iran


Figure 46.1
***Hatem* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704891978243088890/photo/1

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 56.4

Figures 46.2 (left) and 46.3 (right)
***Khaybar Shekan* SRBM produced by Iran**




Source figure 46.2: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/186257/Iran-s-latest-ballistic-missiles-unveiled-on-Quds-Day>

Source figure 46.3: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1806261755821121812/photo/2

:


Annex 47: Comparison between *Palestine* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Khaybar Shekan* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 47.1
***Palestine* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://x.com/AmirIGM/status/1798447207080702086/photo/1>

Figures 47.2 (left) and 47.3 (right)
***Khaybar Shekan* SRBM produced by Iran**



Source figure 47.2: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/186257/Iran-s-latest-ballistic-missiles-unveiled-on-Quds-Day>

Source figure 47.3: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1806261755821121812/photo/2

Annex 48: Comparison between *Qaher-1* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Tondar-69* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 48.1

***Qaher-1* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**

Source: https://x.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704917288334328131/photo/1

References in previous reports: S/2018/594, table 34.4, S/2018/193, annex 42, table 42.2

Figure 48.2

***Tondar-69* SRBM produced by Iran**

Source: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1360741334739537921/photo/1

Annex 49: Comparison between *Qaher-M2* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Tondar-69* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 49.1

***Qaher-M2* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/2

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 56.7

Figure 49.2

***Tondar-69* SRBM produced by Iran**



Source: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1360741334739537921/photo/1

Annex 50: Comparison between *Toofan* MRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Shahab-3* MRBM produced by Iran

Figure 50.1
Toofan MRBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/status/1704915482535440407/photo/1


Figure 50.2
Shahab-3 MRBM produced by Iran



Source: <https://nuke.fas.org/guide/iran/missile/shahab-3.htm>

Annex 51: Comparison between *Aqeel* MRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Qiam* MRBM produced by Iran

Figure 51.1
Aqeel MRBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/status/1704918186443833561/photo/1

Figure 51.2
MRBM *Qiam* produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/qiam-1-mod-tasnim-2020-01-03.jpg>

Annex 52: Comparison between *Quds-1* LACM displayed by the Houthis, *Soumar* LACM produced by Iran, and a LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq

Figure 52.1
***Quds-1* LACM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1208062/meet-the-quds-1/>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, Annex 61.1, S/2021/79, para.79, and S/2020/326, paras. 13, 16, 58–60, figures 5, 14.7-14.8, 20.10, annex 16

Figure 52.2
***Soumar* LACM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/03/iran-publicly-unveils-soumar-land.html>

Figure 52.3
LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://twitter.com/mhmiranusa/status/1777530237846233328/photo/1>

Annex 53: Comparison between *Quds-2* LACM displayed by the Houthis, *Soumar* LACM produced by Iran, and a LACM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq

Figure 53.1
Quds-2 LACM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, Annex 51-5, figure 61.2, S/2023/130, figures 5.11-5.19, S/2022/50, annex 16, and S/2020/326, footnote 47 of the para. 57

Figure 53.2
***Soumar* LACM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/03/iran-publicly-unveils-soumar-land.html>

Figures 53.3 (left), and 53.4 (right)
LACM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq




Source (left): <https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq/iraqi-police-discover-iranian-cruise-missile-failed-to-launch/>

Source (right): <https://english.almanar.com.lb/2111540>

Annex 54: Comparison between *Quds-3* LACM displayed by the Houthis, and *Soumar* LACM produced by Iran

Figure 54.1

***Quds-3* LACM displayed by the Houthis**

صواريخ اليمن في عرض العيد الثامن للثورة الـ21 من سبتمبر "اليوم الطويل" في ردة الأعداء

Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGfJgU>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 61.3

Figure 54.2

***Soumar* LACM produced by Iran**

Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/03/iran-publicly-unveils-soumar-land.html>

Annex 55: Comparison between *Quds-4* LACM displayed by the Houthis, *Paveh-04* LACM produced by Iran, and a LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq

Figure 55.1
***Quds-4* LACM displayed by the Houthis**




Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3266848.htm>

Figure 55.2
***Paveh-04* LACM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1705231960598069648/photo/1>

Figure 55.3
LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1720295088083943843/photo/1>

Annex 56: C-802 ASCM operated by the Houthis, the C-802 / Noor ASCM operated by Iran, and C-802 ASCM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon

Figure 56.1

C-802 ASCM operated by the Houthis



Source: Panel

References in previous reports: [S/2020/326](#), para. 52, and annex 20, and [S/2019/83](#), paras. 80-82, annex 11, figure 11.7

Figure 56.2

C-802 / Noor ASCM operated by Iran



Source: <https://asian-defence-news.blogspot.com/2015/11/iranian-mi17-with-c-802-version-of.html>

Figures 56.3 (left) and 56.4 (right)

C-802 ASCM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source figure 56.3: <https://iranpress.com/hezbollah-s-c-802-anti-ship-cruise-missiles>

Source figure 56.4: <https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2019/09/16/hezbollah-se-jacto-de-un-nuevo-misil-capaz-de-destruir-cualquier-buque-de-guerra-y-matar-a-todos-a-bordo/>

Annex 57: Comparison between *Al-Mandab-1* ASCM displayed by the Houthis, and *Ghadir/Noor* ASCM produced by Iran

Figure 57.1
Al-Mandab-1 ASCM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://youtu.be/igDWAJ-QoDA>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 71.1, S/2023/130, figure 10.2, and S/2019/83, para. 81, annex 1

Figure 57.2
Ghadir/Noor ASCM produced by Iran



Source: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/112393/Navy-equipped-with-long-range-cruise-missile-Ghadir>

Annex 58: Comparison between *Mandab-2* ASCM displayed by the Houthis, and *Ghadir/Noor* ASCM produced by Iran

Figure 58.1

***Mandab-2* ASCM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://youtu.be/igDWAJ-QoDA>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 71.2, S/2023/130, figures 10.5-10.6, and S/2019/83, para. 81

Figure 58.2

***Ghadir/Noor* ASCM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/112393/Navy-equipped-with-long-range-cruise-missile-Ghadir>

Annex 59: Comparison between *Faleq-1* ASBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Fadjr-4CL* ASBM produced by Iran

Figure 59.1

Faleq-1 ASBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018166399602805/photo/2>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 71.3, and S/2023/130, annex 10

Figure 59.2

Fadjr-4CL ASBM produced by Iran



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranMilitaryNet/status/1635764125287477256/photo/1>

Annex 60: Comparison between *Badr-2* Long-range guided rocket displayed by the Houthis, and *Fajr-5* Long-range guided rocket produced by Iran

Figure 60.1

***Badr-2* Long-range guided rocket displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/550566>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 57.3

Figure 60.2

***Fajr-5* Long-range guided rocket produced by Iran**



Source: <https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2017/iran-unveils-new-fajr-5-300mm-mlrs-multiple-launch-rocket-system-using-guided-rockets-10702171>

Annex 61: Comparison between Mersad-2 UAV displayed by the Houthis, and Chamrosh-4 UAV produced by Iran

Figure 61.1

Mersad-2 UAV displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/550566>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.2

Figure 61.2

Chamrosh-4 UAV produced by Iran



Source: https://x.com/nasir_military/status/1705189224805462455/photo/3

Annex 62: Comparison between *Waeed-1* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Shahed 131* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, and OWA-UAV similar to *Shahed 131* reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)

Figure 62.1

***Waeed-1* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704953936484970662

Figures 62.2 (left) and 62.3 (right)

***Shahed 131* OWA-UAV produced by Iran**



Source figure 62.2: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2024/02/20/3042241/irgc-ground-force-equipped-with-suicide-combat-drones>

Source figure 62.3: <https://www.shutterstock.com/fr/editorial/image-editorial/veiled-iranian-schoolgirls-stand-front-iran%27s-shahed-131-141468061>

Figures 62.4 (left) and 62.5 (right)

OWA-UAV similar to *Shahed 131* reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/06/the-islamic-resistance-in-iraq-increases-its-drone-attacks-on-israel.php>

Annex 63: Comparison between *Waeed-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Shahed 136* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, and OWA-UAV similar to *Shahed 136* operated by the PMF, Iraq

Figure 63.1

***Waeed-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/550566>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.4, S/2023/130, para. 57, S/2022/50, para. 60, and S/2020/326, paras. 51 and 52

Figures 63.2 (left) and 63.3 (right)

***Shahed 136* OWA-UAV produced by Iran**



Source figure 63.2: <https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2023/11/25/the-drone-index-ai0-hesa-shahed-136/>

Source figure 63.3: <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/12/iran-unveils-new-karrar-drones-upgraded-air-air-missiles>

Figure 63.4

OWA-UAV similar to *Shahed 136* operated by the PMF, Iraq



Source: <https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/iraqi-resistance-attacks-a-vital-israeli-site-in-eilat>

Annex 64: Comparison between *Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Chamrosh* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, *Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by the Hezbollah, Lebanon, and *Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by PMF, Iraq

Figure 64.1

***Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://postimg.cc/ZWvdByVF>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.3, and S/2019/83, para. 83, and S/2018/594, para.102, annex 39

Figures 64.2 (left) and 64.3 (right)

***Chamrosh* OWA-UAV operated by Iran**



Source figure 64.2: <https://sg.news.yahoo.com/finance/news/south-korean-tanker-boarded-armed-052526366.html>

Source figure 64.3: <https://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/8553112/مراسم-رژه-نیروهای-مسلح-به-مناسبت-آغاز-هفته-دفاع-مقدس-استان-ها>

Figures 64.4 (left) and 64.5 (right)

***Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by the Hezbollah, Lebanon**



Source: <https://www.militantwire.com/p/weapons-used-by-hezbollah-during>

Figures 64.6 (left) and 64.7 (right)
Rased OWA-UAV displayed by PMF, Iraq



Source figure 64.6: <https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1408766077396570114/photo/2>

Source figure 64.7: <https://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/25062021>

Annex 65: Comparison between *Qasef-2K* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Ababil-2* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, *Mirsad-1* OWA-UAV operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon, *Shebab* OWA-UAV operated by Hamas, Palestinian occupied territory, OWA-UAV similar to *Ababil-2* operated by Liwa al-Ghaliboun, Iraq, and OWA-UAV similar to *Ababil-2* operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)

Figure 65.1

***Qasef-2K* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://i.postimg.cc/rsxzSj8H/D-4-LBO2-VUAAAn-LNl.jpg>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.7

Figure 65.2

***Ababil-2* OWA-UAV produced by Iran**



Source: <https://en.topwar.ru/213983-mnogocelevoj-bpla-ababil-2-iran.html>

Figures 65.3 (left) and 65.4 (right)

***Mirsad-1* OWA-UAV operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon**



Source figure 65.3: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1800986950356045889/photo/2

Source figure 65.4: <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1806322092788592679>

Figures 65.5 (left) and 65.6 (right)
Shebab OWA-UAV operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory



Source figure 65.5: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-rockets-palestinian-groups>

Source figure 65.6: <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/hamas-bets-locally-made-drones-next-confrontation-israel>

Figure 65.7
OWA-UAV similar to Ababil-2 operated by Liwa al-Ghaliboun, Iraq



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1640345398521786368/photo/1>

Figure 65.8
OWA-UAV similar to Ababil-2 operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://x.com/azelin/status/1744506225008464267/photo/1>

Annex 66: Comparison between *Samad-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Sayyad* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Al-Ashtar, a Bahraini Shia militant group

Figure 66.1

***Samad-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://twitter.com/IbnSiqilli/status/1574590410894151682/photo/3>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.8, S/2020/326, para. 56, and S/2019/83, paras. 84-85, 87, annex 12

Figures 66.2 (left) and 66.3 (right)

***Sayyad* OWA-UAV produced by Iran**



Source figure 66.2: <https://twitter.com/mhmiranusa/status/1638145845106278400>

Source figure 66.3: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1705232648791052295/photo/4>

Figures 66.4 (left) and 66.5 (right)

OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq



Source figure 66.4: <https://x.com/JasonMBrotsky/status/1408766077396570114/photo/1>

Source figure 66.5: <https://t.me/Alimido13/886>

[https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/Sahab drone at Camp Ashraf%2C June 26%2C 2021.jpg](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/Sahab%20drone%20at%20Camp%20Ashraf%20June%2026%202021.jpg)

Figure 66.6
OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian occupied territory



Source: https://x.com/imp_navigator/status/1711308309871943714/photo/2

Figure 66.7
OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source:
https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/1744708216989061132/photo/1 https://x.com/imp_navigator/status/1711308309871943714/photo/2

Figures 66.8 (left) and 66.9 (right)
OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Al-Ashtar, a Bahraini Shia militant group



Figures 66.10 and 66.11
Close-up on the “QC” sticker, similar to those already documented on materiel with similar characteristics to those manufactured in Iran



Source: https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1786082957502841143

Annex 67: Comparison between *Khatif-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Shahed 101* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, *Jenin* OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, *Murad-5* OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Saraya Ababeel, Iraq, and *Murad-5* OWA-UAV reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq

Figure 67.1
Khatif-2 OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705030787123323174

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.11

Figures 67.2 (left), and 67.3 (right)
Shahed 101 OWA-UAV produced by Iran



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1645062026123681795/photo/2>

Figure 67.4
Jenin OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: <https://thecradle.co/articles-id/3960>

Figure 67.5
Murad-5 OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Saraya Ababeel, Iraq



Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3310954.htm>

Figure 67.6
Murad-5 OWA-UAV reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://en.irna.ir/news/85504960/Iraqi-resistance-launches-drone-attack-against-Israeli-base>

Annex 68: Comparison between *Rujum* UAV displayed by the Houthis, and UAV displayed by the Iranian armed forces

Figure 68.1

Rujum UAV displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://x.com/VleckieHond/status/1557346455316271104/photo/1>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figures 59.12, 60.3, and 60.5, S/2022/50, figure 18.4

Figures 68.2 (left) and 68.3 (right)

UAV displayed by the Islamic Republic of Iran armed forces (IRIAF)



Source figure 68.2: <https://english.iswnews.com/27708/iran-army-ground-forces-receive-military-equipment/>

Source figure 68.3: <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/iran-reveals-upgraded-multi-rotor-smart-bomber-drone-in-recent-military-drills-2023-10-31-0/>

Annex 69: Comparison between *Saqr-1* SAM displayed by the Houthis, “358” SAM produced by Iran, “358” SAM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon, and “358” SAM observed in Iraq

Figure 69.1
***Saqr-1* SAM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202302010186>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 62.1, S/2023/130, paras. 51, 53, figures 18.10-18.18, S/2022/50, para. 61, S/2021/79, table 2, figure 13.7, annexes 19-20, and S/2020/326, para. 52, figures 20.4-20.8

Figure 69.2
“358” SAM produced by Iran



Source: <https://x.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1704477188328665175/photo/2>

Figures 69.3 (left) and 69.4 (right)
“358” SAM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source: <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2023-11-29/ty-article/saqr-358-iran-hezbollah-loitering-missile-israel-us-uavs-yemen-houthis/0000018c-1ac5-d3b6-aded-bbfd2efd0000>

Figure 69.5
“358” SAM documented in Iraq (near a US base)



Source: <https://x.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1451577368410214408/photo/3>

Annex 70: Similarities of the characteristics of the *Barq-2* SAM operated by the Houthis and the *Khordad-3* SAM produced by Iran

Figure 70.1
***Barq-2* SAM operated by the Houthis**



Source: <https://twitter.com/mamashami/status/1704881294335734060/photo/2>

Figure 70.2
***Khordad-3* SAM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1705234591496167672/photo/1>

Annex 71: *Misgah-2* Manpads displayed by the Houthis, -2 Manpads produced by Iran, and *Misgah-2* Manpads reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq

Figure 71.1
***Misgah-2* Manpads displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://postimg.cc/8JKf3gYY>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 62.4

Figure 71.2
***Misgah-2* Manpads produced by Iran**



Source: <https://en.topwar.ru/116150-pvo-islamskoy-respubliki-iran-chast-3.html>

Figure 71.3
***Misgah-2* Manpads reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq**



Source: https://x.com/green_lemonnn/status/610173400376569858

Annex 72: Saegheh-2 ATGM displayed by the Houthis, Saegheh-2 ATGM produced by Iran, Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by PMF, Iraq

Figures 72.1 (left), and 72.2 (right)
Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by the Houthis



Source figure 72.1: <https://x.com/Mansourtalk/status/897833730508763136/photo/1>
Source figure 72.2: https://x.com/Harry_Boone/status/837943165235695617/photo/1

Figures 72.3 (left), and 72.4 (right)
Saegheh-2 ATGM displayed by Iran



Source figure 72.3: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2008/05/iranian-anti-tank-guided-missiles.html>
Source figure 72.4: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2010/08/irgc-video-documentary-farsi.html>

Figure 72.5
Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1725592679323426980/photo/1>

Figure 72.6
Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by PMF, Iraq



Source: <https://x.com/klkamashiq/status/881446623095685120/photo/3>

Annex 73: *Toophan* ATGM displayed by the Houthis, *Toophan* ATGM produced by Iran, *Toophan* ATGM reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, *Toophan* ATGM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, and *Toophan* ATGM reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Iraq

Figure 73.1
***Toophan* ATGM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://i.postimg.cc/5yNPY8pF/image.jpg>

References in previous reports: S/2018/192, para. 82, annex 12

Figures 73.2 (left) and 73.3 (right)
***Toophan* ATGM produced by Iran**



Source figure 73.2: <https://english.iswnews.com/29718/military-knowledge-toophan-anti-tank-missiles/>

Source figure 73.3:

https://www.reddit.com/r/awesometechnicals/comments/jtwthy/iranian_safir_jeeps_with_toophan_atgms/

Figure 73.4
Toophan ATGM reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source: https://x.com/green_lemonnn/status/682496740143042560

Figure 73.5
Toophan ATGM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq



Source: <https://x.com/IraqiSecurity/status/717053810854793216/photo/1>

Figure 73.6
Toophan ATGM reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Iraq



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/11/soleimani-among-iran-equipped-iraqi.html>

Annex 74: Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by the Houthis, Dehlavieh ATGM produced by Iran, Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Hezbollah, Lebanon, Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, and Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by the PMF, Iraq

Figure 74.1
Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://debrief.net/en/news-30800.html>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, paras. 69 and 74, S/2023/130, para. 56, S/2021/79, para. 84 and annex 13, S/2020/326, para. 52, annex 20, S/2018/193, figure 35.12, figures 37.5-37.6, S/2018/594, paras. 115-116, figures 42.1-42.3, and S/2017/91, table 4

Figure 74.2
Dehlavieh ATGM produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/media/2015/09/26/871344/photos-iran-s-army-ground-force-receives-new-homegrown-equipment - photo=12>

Figures 74.3 (left) and 73.4 (right)
Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source figure 74.3: <https://www.militantwire.com/p/weapons-used-by-hezbollah-during>

Source figure 74.4: <https://www.islamtimes.org/en/news/1137037/when-sayyed-raisi-met-hezbollah-fighters-prayed-for-its-leadership>

Figure 74.5
Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2014/12/izz-ad-din-al-qassam-brigades-parade-at.html>

Figure 74.6
Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by the PMF, Iraq



Source: <https://english.iswnews.com/24403/the-pmu-commemorate-its-8th-anniversary-unveiling-new-weaponry/>

Annex 75.1: Comparison between *Sadiq* EOSS displayed by the Houthis, and *IRSS-I-3 Saadad* EOSS produced by Iran

Figure 75.1.1
***Sadiq* EOSS displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alidarawani/status/1704866265569882588/photo/4>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 63.1

Figure 75.1.2
***IRSS-I-3 Saadad* EOSS produced by Iran**



Source: <https://www.mindexcenter.ir/node/1015>

Figure 75.1.3
***IRSS-I-3 Saadad* EOSS reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq**



كما شارك في العرض عدة أنواع من عائلة صدد (Stopper) الإيرانية المركبة على المركبات لأنظمة المراقبة الكهروضوئية ، لتشمل طرازي Sadad-103 و -202 ، وبعضها مجهز بـ RU-1000 يوم / كاميرا حرارية مبردة ليلاً مستخدمة على نطاق واسع من قبل فيلق الحرس الثوري الإسلامي (IRGC) جنباً إلى جنب مع أنظمة الدفاع الجوي على ارتفاعات منخفضة. يتم تسويق هذه الأنظمة البصرية على أنها قادرة على اكتشاف البشر من مسافة تصل إلى 10 كم والمركبات من مسافة تزيد عن 20 كم أثناء النهار أو الليل

Unofficial translation:

Several variants of Iran's vehicle-mounted *Sadad* (Stopper) family of electro-optical surveillance systems also participated in the display, to include the *Sadad*-103 and -202 models, some of which are equipped with the RU-1000 day/night-cooled thermal camera widely used by the IRG combined with low-altitude air defence systems. These optical systems are marketed as being able to detect humans from up to 10 km away and vehicles from over 20 km away during the day or night.

Source: <https://ida2at.org/article/19939>

Annex 75.2: Comparison between *Shafak* EOSS displayed by the Houthis, and *EOSS I-103*, produced by Iran

Figure 75.2.1
Shafak EOSS displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1705240052878520524/photo/3>

Figure 75.2.2
I-103 EOSS produced by Iran



EOSS-I-103
Passive Electro Optical Surveillance System

The EOSS-I 103 is an ideal system for long range surveillance, observation and monitoring of land, air and sea related operations. The system is designed in a modular construction for conversion and adapting system performance to mission parameters. A variety of sensors and control equipment have been integrated, including precise high speed payload, infrared and visible cameras with variable focal length lenses and a laser range finder.

Source: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Annex 75.3: Comparison between *Ofok* EOSS displayed by the Houthis, and *I-103* EOSS produced by Iran

Figure 75.3.1
***Ofok* EOSS displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1705240052878520524>

Figure 75.3.2
***I-103* EOSS produced by Iran**



I-103
Passive Electro Optical Surveillance System



The EOSS-I 103 is an ideal system for long range surveillance, observation and monitoring of land, air and sea related operations. The system is designed in a modular construction for conversion and adapting system performance to mission parameters. A variety of sensors and control equipment have been integrated, including precise high speed payload, infrared and visible cameras with variable focal length lenses and a laser range finder.

Source: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Annex 76: AM-50 “Sayyad” AMR displayed by the Houthis, AM-50 AMR produced by Iran, Ghoul AMR reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Kata’ib Hizballah, Iraq, AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Saraya al-Salam, Iraq, AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Sinjar Resistance Units, Iraq, AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq, and AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Iraq

Figure 76.1
AM-50 “Sayyad” AMR displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://medium.com/@jmkoon2/geolocating-an-iranian-am-50-sayyad-sniper-rifle-in-majaza-battlefront-baqim-district-saada-98bc4bec2c59>

References in previous reports: S/2022/50, paras. 62 and 64, figures 20.19-20.22, S/2021/79, para. 85, table 2, figures 14.10-14.11, and S/2018/193, figures 38.3-38.4

Figures 76.2 (left) and 76.3 (right)
AM-50 AMR produced by Iran



Source figure 76.2: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/03/16/1029798/iran-s-army-snipers-equipped-with-homegrown-rifle>

Source figure 76.3: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1705237075081994491/photo/1>

Figures (left) 76.4, and 76.5 (right)
Ghoul AMR reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory



Source figure 76.4: <https://jcpa.org/iran-admits-a-revolutionary-guard-commander-killed-in-an-israeli-attack-in-iraq-on-july-19/>

Source figure 76.5: <https://inf.news/en/military/ec6dd2595eb6cfbc12fcafc1be7bd034.html>

Figure 76.6
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: <https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/resistance-forces-confront-israeli-forces-near-al-shifa-hosp>

Figure 76.7
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon (picture reportedly taken in Syria)



Source: <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/07/hezbollah-issues-ultimatum-to-militants-in-arsal-battle.php>

Figure 76.8
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1420059140618178560/photo/2

Figure 76.9
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Saraya al-Salam, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1564547684844933120

Figure 76.10
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Sinjar Resistance Units, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1567919660703617025/photo/1

Figure 76.11
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1778878987269271806/photo/2

Figure 76.12
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Iraq



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/11/soleimani-among-iran-equipped-iraqi.html>

Annex 77: *Qader* 40mm grenade launcher presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and *Qader* 40mm grenade launcher, produced by Iran

Figure 77.1

***Qader* 40mm grenade launcher presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas**



Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1603087005398835200>

Figure 77.2

***Qader* 40mm grenade launcher produced by Iran**




Source: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1574787070991687681/photo/3>

Annex 78: Comparison between *Rujoom 120mm mortar* displayed by the Houthis, *HM-16, 120mm mortar* produced by Iran, and *HM-16, 120mm mortar* reportedly operated by Al-Quds brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, *HM-16, 120mm mortar* reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and *HM-16, 120mm mortar* reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory

Figures 78.1 (left), and 78.2 (right)

***Rujoom 120mm mortar* displayed by the Houthis**



Source 78.1: <https://postimg.cc/WhNBG3MD>

Source 78.2: <https://x.com/CalibreObscura/status/1370073166861758474/photo/2>

Figure 78.3

***HM-16, 120mm mortar* produced by Iran**



Source: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Figure 78.4

***HM-16, 120mm mortar* reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory**



Source: <https://x.com/CalibreObscura/status/1393226932683251713/photo/1>

Figure 78.5

HM-16, 120mm mortar reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1397922160312602624/photo/4

Annex 79: Comparison between *Rujoom 60mm mortar* displayed by the Houthis, *HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* produced by Iran, *HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* reportedly operated by Al-Quds brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, *HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* reportedly operated by Al-Mujahideen brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, and *HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory

Figures 79.1 (left) and 79.2 (right)

***Rujoom 60mm mortar* displayed by the Houthis**



Source figure 79.1: <https://postimg.cc/XBBCbJ94>

Source figure 79.2: <https://x.com/CalibreObscura/status/1370073166861758474/photo/1>

Figure 79.3

***HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* produced by Iran**

www.dio.ir | 60 mm STANDARD MORTAR LAUNCHER | HM 14

□ **General Specifications:**

This mortar launcher is a kind of smooth-bore and base-loading weapon and has a high elevation angle with a 360° firing field. It is usually operated by two crews, but it can be operated by one crew in emergency. Its sight device is simple and accurate and remains in a steady state during firing. This mortar launcher is able to fire with high accuracy.

□ **Technical Specifications:**

DESCRIPTION	DATA
Model	HM14
Caliber	60 mm
Length of barrel and launch	730 mm
Max. range with Mortar bomb model M14	2000 m
Min. range with Mortar bomb model M14	250 m
Elevation range	140°-360°
Rate of fire	25 in the first minute then 7 continuously
Weight in firing position	17.5 kg

Source: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Figure 79.4

***HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* reportedly operated by Al-Quds brigade, occupied Palestinian territory**



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1825168518876131578

Figure 79.5

HM-12/14, 60mm mortar reportedly operated by Al-Mujahideen brigade, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: <https://en.yagency.net/313414>

Figure 79.6

HM-12/14, 60mm mortar reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1325510346472349698/photo/1

Annex 80: *Saegheh* rocket launcher displayed by the Houthis, *Saegheh* rocket launcher produced by Iran, *Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, *Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, and *Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq


Figure 80.1
***Saegheh* rocket launcher displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://news.sky.com/story/yemen-civil-war-rebel-houthi-fighters-start-to-leave-hodeidah-saleef-and-ras-isa-under-peace-plan-11716868>

References in previous reports: S/2022/50, para. 62, figures 20.17-20.18, S/2021/79, para. 85, annex 14, S/2020/326, para. 61, figures 19.4-19.5, and S/2018/193, tables 2-3, figure 35.5

Figures 80.2 (left) and 80.3 (right)
***Saegheh* rocket launcher produced by Iran**



Source figure 80.2: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Source figure 80.3: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1728394779740827954/photo/3>

Figure 80.4
***Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon**



Source: <https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/estimate-hezbollahs-fatalities-syrian-civil-war-conclusions-arising-analysis-identity/>

Figure 80.5
***Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq**



Source: https://diyaruna.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_di/features/2020/08/12/feature-01

Figure 80.6
***Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq**



Source: <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2308961>

Annex 81: RU-60G thermal sight displayed by the Houthis, RU-60G thermal sight operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces, RU-60G thermal sight reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, RU-60G thermal sight reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq, and RU-60G thermal sight reportedly recovered on Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Iraq

Figure 81.1
RU-60G thermal sight captured on Houthi forces



Source: <https://x.com/LostWeapons/status/978652589456736256/photo/1>

References in previous reports: S/2020/326, figure 20.14


Figures 81.2 (left), and 81.3 (right)
RU-60G thermal sight operated by Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces



Source figure 81.2: https://x.com/green_lemomn/status/617263464466223105/photo/2

Source figure 81.3: <https://armamentresearch.com/arms-diversion-in-iraq-iranian-ru60g-thermal-weapon-sight/>

Figure 81.4
RU-60G thermal sight reportedly diverted from PMF, Iraq




Source: <https://x.com/CalibreObscura/status/1146178495241998336/photo/2>

Figure 81.5
RU-60G thermal sight reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/green_lemonn/status/667430482523607040/photo/1

Figure 81.6
RU-60G thermal sight reportedly recovered from PKK, Iraq



Source: <https://x.com/Acema171/status/885070737303904256/photo/3>

Annex 82: M18A2 horizontal effect land mine documented as used by the Houthis, M18A2 horizontal effect land mine produced by Iran, and M18A2 horizontal effect land mine reportedly recovered in Syria

Figure 82.1
M18A2 horizontal effect land mine documented as used by the Houthis



Source: <https://iedawareness.com/2018/04/12/houthi-directional-mines-captured-in-midi-yemen/>

Figure 82.2
M18A2 horizontal effect land mine produced by Iran



Source: <https://armamentresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/32.jpg>

Figure 82.3
M18A2 horizontal effect land mine reportedly recovered in Syria



Source: <https://armamentresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/25-e1467199584968.jpg>

Annex 83: *Thaqib* (MTA) sea mine displayed by the Houthis, and limpet mine produced by Iran

Figures 83.1 (up), 83.2 (down left), and 83.3 (down right)
***Thaqib* (MTA) sea mine displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/03/houthi-rebels-unveil-host-of-weaponry.html>



Source: *Terrogence*

References in previous reports: [S/2023/833](#), figure 74.3, and [S/2018/594](#), para. 111

Figures 83.4 (left) and 83.5 (right)
Limpet mine produced by Iran



Source: *Terrogence*

Annex 84: Large-scale military display on 21 of September of materiel by the Houthis held in Sana'a

Figure 84.1

Description made by the Houthis of the materiel displayed



Source: <https://twitter.com/ainalaqoran2/status/1702481027522822180/photo/1>

Figures 84.2 (left) and 84.3 (right)

Mahdi al-Mashat, President of the Supreme Political Council and military leader from the Houthi movement on 21 September 2023 at the large-scale military display held in Sana'a



Source: https://twitter.com/Presidency_Ye/status/1704869203663110537/photo/2

Figures 84.4 (up), 84.5 (middle), and 84.6 (below)

Large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023



Source: <https://twitter.com/RiyadhAldubai/status/1704824351315366055/photo/1>



Source: <https://twitter.com/mamashami/status/1704881294335734060/photo/4>

Annex 85: MRBMs and SRBMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 85.1 (up), 85.2 (middle), and 85.3 (down)

Toofan MRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/s_m_marandi/status/1704818695623573684/video/2




Source: https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/status/1704915482535440407/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/fab_hinz/status/1704819625727267199/photo/2

Figures 85.4 (up), and 85.5 (down)
Aqeel MRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/status/1704918186443833561/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/s_m_marandi/status/1704818695623573684/video/2

Figures 85.6 (up), and 85.7 (down)
Borkhan-3 SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/1



Source: <https://twitter.com/Sanaa12023/status/1704802768584581210>

Figure 85.8
Falaq MRBM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018084874956885/photo/4>

Figure 85.9
Hatem SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704891978243088890/photo/1

Figure 85.10
Fateh-11 SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704893550586991094

Figures 85.11 (up), and 85.12 (down)
Tankil SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/iraniannmil_ar/status/1704996859742408765/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704891978243088890/photo/3

Figure 85.13
Qaher M2 SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/2

Figures 85.14 (up), and 85.15 (down)
SS-21 “Tochka” SRBM



Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1704890941167804820>

Annex 86: Long-distance guided rockets presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display pf materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 86.1

***Badr-1* Long-distance guided rocket**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704901189039489243/photo/2

Figure 86.2

***Badr-P* Long-distance guided rocket**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704899823239831704/photo/2

Figure 86.3

Badr-3 Long-distance guided rocket



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKootz_/status/1704958894806589657/photo/1

Figure 86.4

Badr-4 Long-distance guided rocket



Source: <https://twitter.com/timand2037/status/1705056532679794821/photo/1>

Figure 86.5
Saeer, Long-distance guided rocket



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704947846196166710/photo/1

Figure 86.6
Qasim, Long-distance guided rocket



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017924455403578/photo/4>

Annex 87: LACMs and ASCMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 87.1
Quds-2 LACM



Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1707674493559173185/photo/4>

Figures 87.2 (up), and 87.3 (down)
Quds-3 LACM



Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1707674493559173185/photo/3>




Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018143045783735>

Figure 87.4
Quds-4 LACM



Source: https://twitter.com/iranianmil_ar/status/1704967065260437708/photo/1

Figure 87.5
Announcement of 2,000 kilometre-range *Quds-4* LACM



Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1704874454000570707>

Figures 87.6 (up), and 87.7 (below)
Quds-Z0 ASCM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017842456793113/photo/1>



Source: https://twitter.com/fab_hinz/status/1704838068589478383/photo/2

Figures 87.8 (up), and 87.9 (down)
Sayyad ASCM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018158321430703/photo/4>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Figures 87.10 (up), and 87.11 (below)
Sajil ASCM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018114205798882/photo/1>

21
سبتمبر

الطول الكلي: 3.60 م

سجیل

وزن الرأس الحربي: 100 كجم

سجيك المجنح صاروخ ارض بحر

المميزات

- ❖ قدرته على استهداف الاهداف الثابتة والمتحركة
- ❖ يتميز رأسه الحربي بقدرة تدميرية عالية

المواصفات

- ❖ صاروخ كروز مجنح
- ❖ يصل مداه إلى 180 كم
- ❖ يعمل بالوقود الصلب والسائل

المميزات

- ❖ دقته العالية في إصابة الاهداف
- ❖ لا تستطيع الرادارات إكتشافه
- ❖ يمكن خربه من أي نقطة في الأراضي اليمنية إلى أي نقطة في البحر الأحمر

www.mmy.ye

صنع في اليمن
اليمن

Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1705492666769691128/photo/1>

Annex 88: ASBMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 88.1
Mayun ASBM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKooztz_/status/1704874118535872639/photo/4

Figure 88.2
Faleq ASBM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018166399602805/photo/2>

Figure 88.3
Al-Bahr Al-Ahmar ASBM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704958894806589657/photo/2

Figure 88.4
Tankil ASBM



Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3266848.htm>

Figure 88.5
Aasif ASBM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018101702484071/photo/4>

Annex 89: SAMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 89.1 (up), and 89.2 (below)

Sagr-1 SAM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017858877485340/photo/1>



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alidarawani/status/1704866265569882588/photo/1>

Figure 89.3
Barq-2 SAM



Source: <https://twitter.com/mamashami/status/1704881294335734060/photo/2>

Figure 89.4
Mi-raj SAM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705024889269170673/photo/2

Annex 90: UAVs and OWA-UAVs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 90.1
Rujum UAV (new variant)



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1704894030910284111/photo/1>

Figures 90.2 (up) and 90.3 (down)
Waeed-1 OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz___/status/1704953936484970662

Figures 90.4 (up) and 90.5 (below)
Waeed-2 OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017895137251819/photo/1>

Figures 90.6 (up), and 90.7 (down)
Rased OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282218304655532/photo/3



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787

Figures 90.8 (up), and 90.9 (down)
Khatif-2 (new variant) OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz___/status/1705030787123323174



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz___/status/1705375424229085542/photo/1

Figures 90.10 (up), and 90.11 (below)
Shibab OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705027741349761476



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1704891807274881074/photo/1>

Figures 90.12 (up), and 90.13 (down)
Samad-1 OWA-UAV



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017895137251819/photo/3>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787

Figure 90.14
Samad-2



Source: <https://twitter.com/fj048189/status/1704829978301366539>

Figures 90.15 (up), and 90.16 (down)
Qasef-2K OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKooantz_/status/1704898202451726409



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787

Figure 90.17
Mersad-1 OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787

Figure 90.18
Raqeb OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz___/status/1705396398106030484/photo/3

Annex 91: Armoured vehicles presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 91.1 (up), and 91.2 (down)

Hani 4x4 armoured vehicle



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/4



Source: <https://twitter.com/AlMayadeenNews/status/1704797009952088369>

Figures 91.3 (up), and 91.4 (down)
Unknown make of 4X4 armoured vehicle



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704952787392487682/photo/1



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alkhanadeq2023/status/1704788669226168403>

Annex 92: EOSSs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 92.1 (up), and 92.2 (down)
Shafak EOSS



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleekieHond/status/1705240052878520524/photo/3>

Figure 92.3
Sadiq EOSS



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alidarawani/status/1704866265569882588/photo/4>

Figures 92.4 (up), and 92.5 (down)
Ofok EOSS



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1705240052878520524>



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704961058689957980/photo/2

Annex 93: Fast attack boats and WBIEDs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 93.1 (up), and 93.2 (down)

Aasef Fast attack boat



Source: <https://twitter.com/mikaelsyrian/status/1704842128151458125>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705281850732609764/photo/4

Figures 93.3 (up), and 93.4 (down)
Aasef-2 Fast attack boat




Source: <https://twitter.com/mikaelsyrian/status/1704842128151458125>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Figures 93.5 (up), and 93.6 (down)
Malah Fast attack boat



Source: <https://twitter.com/mikaelsyrian/status/1704842128151458125>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Figures 93.7 (up), and 93.8 (down)
Nazeer Fast attack boat



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705281850732609764/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKontz_/status/1704946001646162015/photo/1

Figure 93.9
Tawfan-1 USV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705281850732609764/photo/2

Figures 93.10 (up), and 93.11 (down)
Tawfan-2 USV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705281850732609764/photo/3



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Figures 93.12 (up), and 93.13 (down)
Tawfan-3 USV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704899823239831704/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Annex 94: Helicopters and fighter jet displayed by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 94.1

Mi-8, Mi-17 and Mi-171Sh helicopters displayed by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023



Source: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-flex-military-muscle-parade-riyadh-seeks-ceasefire-2023-09-21/>

Figure 94.2

Mi-171sh, Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters (from the left to the right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/MuradAbdo22/status/1704921947975397755/photo/1>

Figures 94.3 (up), 94.4 (middle), and 94.5 (down)
F5 fighter jet



Source: <https://twitter.com/MuradAbdo22/status/1704921947975397755/photo/3>



Source: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-flex-military-muscle-parade-riyadh-seeks-ceasefire-2023-09-21/>



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705656085686726784

Annex 95: Interview of General Rostam Ghasemi, Assistant Commander of the IRGC-QF, by the Russian media Russia Today and released on 21 April 2021 by Memri TV, where he announces the presence of military advisors in Yemen and the supply of weapons manufacturing technology.

Quds Force Official Rostam Ghasemi: Iran's Friends In The Region Have Retaliated Against Israel And Will Continue To Do So; We Have A Few Military Advisors In Yemen And Have Provided Weapon-Manufacturing Technology To The Yemenis



Source: Russia Today TV (Russia)

*Former Iranian Minister of Oil General Rostam Ghasemi, Assistant Commander of the IRGC-QF said that Israel is behind every sabotage operation around the world and in Iran and that Israel's actions will not go unanswered. He made these remarks in an interview with Russia Today TV that aired on April 21, 2021. General Ghasemi said that while Iran has "espoused a policy of patience and restraint," it has retaliated against Israel with the help of its "many friends in the region" and it will continue to do so. **He added that the Yemenis participated in retaliation against Israeli ships.** General Ghasemi continued to say that "all the weapons the Yemenis possess are a result of our aid." For more information about General Ghasemi, see MEMRI TV clip no. 7080.*

Rostam Ghasemi: "We believe that Israel plays a role in every sabotage operation around the world, and in Iran as well. The Zionist entity plays a role in every act of sabotage that is carried out in Iran. The Israelis know, as well they should, that any act will be met with retaliation. So far, Iran has espoused a policy of patience and restraint. Nevertheless, Iran has retaliated, and Israel will be met with more responses. If this entity carries out any action against Iran anywhere in the world, it will be met with retaliation at the appropriate time, and in a manner that will make it regret what it did. Israel should not think that we are necessarily the ones attacking its ships. We have many friends in the region, and they are the ones retaliating against Israel. They retaliated for those attacks. We have many friends in the region. They will not allow the Israeli actions to go unanswered."

Interviewer: "Are they retaliating on behalf of Iran?"

Ghasemi: "We have many friends in the region and the world. Israel knows, as well it should, that its actions will not go unanswered."

Interviewer: "Have the Yemenis retaliated on behalf of Iran in the Gulf of Oman, for example?"

Ghasemi: "The Yemenis are our friends, and they can easily retaliate, and this is what they are doing."

Interviewer: "Have they retaliated so far? And where?"

Ghasemi: "Yes, they have retaliated, and some of it was published in the media. [...]"

"We are providing advisory aid to the Yemenis on a very small scale."

Interviewer: "Military advice?"

Ghasemi: "Limited military advice. All the weapons that the Yemenis possess are the result of our aid. We helped them with weapon-manufacturing technology, but the actual production of the weapons is done in Yemen. They produce the weapons themselves. These drones and missiles are made in Yemen."

Interviewer: "Are there military advisors in Yemen now?"

Ghasemi: "There is a small number. You can count them on the fingers of one hand."

Interviewer: "What is their mission?"

Ghasemi: "To give advice."

Interviewer: "Are you sending weapons to Yemen now?"

Ghasemi: "There is no need to send weapons."

[...]

"We do not feel threatened by some countries' normalization of relations with Israel. We are a strong country with enormous defensive capabilities. Therefore, this does not pose a direct threat to Iran. But we ask these Muslim and other countries to honour the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people. The Palestinians are still suffering from the Israeli persecution and occupation, and they are not happy about this normalization."

Sources:

مساعد قائد فيلق القدس لـRT: الشعب اليمني يُقتل بأكثر الأسلحة تطورا على يد السعودية

<https://www.memri.org/tv/iran-gen-rostam-ghasemi-israel-knows-actions-not-unanswered-friends-retaliation-weapons-yemen>

Appendix A

Screen shots extracted from the interview of General Rostam Ghasemi, Assistant Commander of the IRGC-QF, by Russia Today









Annex 96: Statement by the Iranian forces' spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji published by the Iranian media Noor News on 22 September 2020 announcing the transfer of experiences in technology in the defence sphere, and sharing their experience and knowledge with the people of Yemen

Iran Has Supplied Yemen with Defence Knowhow

Publication Date: 9/22/2020 9:32:20 PM



NOURNEWS - A senior spokesman for the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces said the Islamic Republic has provided Yemenis with the experience and know-how in the defense sector.

Speaking at a televised program on Tuesday, Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi dismissed the claims that Iran has supplied missiles to Yemen.

“We provided them (Yemenis) with the experiences in technology in the defense sphere, as they have learned how to produce missiles, drones and weapons in Yemen by themselves,” he underlined. **“We have shared our experience and knowledge with the people of Yemen,”** the general added.

Unlike what the enemy is trying to portray, the people of Yemen are smart and sophisticated, as they have managed to manufacture missiles and advanced drones and make great headways in the electronic warfare, Shekarchi noted. The spokesman reiterated that Iran’s assistance for the regional countries is restricted to “spiritual presence and advisory help”.

“The resistance front countries have armies and forces themselves. **We provide them with advisory help. In order to share our experiences with the people of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, our experienced forces go there and give them intellectual assistance,** but this is the people and armies of those countries who stand against the enemies in practice,” he noted. The general finally emphasized that Iran would provide whatever help it can for any country standing against the Zionist regime and the US.

Due to the economic problems, Iran would not give anything to the others for free, he noted, saying the foreigners would make purchases.

In comments in October 2019, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Major General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri had underlined that Iran’s military officers only offer advisory assistance to popular forces in Yemen, rejecting reports that Tehran has supplied missiles to the impoverished Arab country.


Source: <https://nournews.ir/en/news/54058/Iran-Has-Supplied-Yemen-with-Defense-Know-How>

Annex 97: Statement by the Iranian forces' spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji published by the Russian media Russia Today on 22 September 2020 announcing the transfer of military technology to Yemen to make missiles and drones



إيران تعلن عن نقل تكنولوجيا عسكرية إلى اليمن لصناعة الصواريخ والطائرات المسيّرة

تاريخ النشر: 22.09.2020 | GMT 09:44 | آخر تحديث: 22.09.2020 | GMT 10:00 | أخبار العالم



77919 [انسخ الرابط](#)

تابعوا RT على [Google News](#)

قال المتحدث باسم القوات الإيرانية، أبو الفضل شكارجي، إن إيران نقلت تجربتها التكنولوجية في المجال الدفاعي إلى اليمن ليتمكن اليمنيون من صناعة الصواريخ والطائرات المسيّرة بأنفسهم.

وأكد المتحدث باسم القوات الإيرانية: "نحن لا نرسل الصواريخ إلى اليمن لكنهم باتوا يصنعونها بأنفسهم ليطلقوها على رؤوس أعدائهم".

وأضاف أن إيران تدعم الشعب اليمني والشعب الفلسطيني وكل من يصطف في مواجهة أمريكا وإسرائيل.

وأوضح أن الأوضاع الاقتصادية لا تسمح لنا بمنح كل شيء لحلفائنا مجاناً وهم يشترون منا بعض الأشياء أحياناً، مشيراً إلى أن "الشعب اليمني ذكي ويمتلك خبراء كبار تمكنوا من صناعة طائرات مسيّرة متطورة في زمن قياسي ولم تتمكن جبهة الاستكبار من إخماد صوته".

المصدر: RT

تابعوا RT على [Google News](#)

Source: <https://arabic.rt.com/world/1156338-المسيّرة-والطائرات-الصواريخ-من-صناعة-الصواريخ-والتكنولوجيا-عسكرية-إلى-اليمن-لتمكينهم-من-صناعة-الصواريخ-والطائرات-المسيّرة>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the statement by the Iranian forces' spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji published by the Russian media Russia Today on 22 September 2020 announcing the transfer of military technology to Yemen to make missiles and drones

Iran announces transfer of military technology to Yemen to make missiles and drones

Russia Today

22 September 2020

Iran has transferred its technological experience in the defense field to Yemen so that Yemenis can make their own missiles and drones, said Iranian forces spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji.

"We do not send missiles to Yemen, but they are now making them themselves to launch them on the heads of their enemies," the Iranian forces spokesman emphasized.

He added that Iran supports the Yemeni people, the Palestinian people and all those who stand against America and Israel.

"The economic situation does not allow us to give everything to our allies for free and they buy some things from us sometimes," he said, noting that "the Yemeni people are smart and have great experts who were able to make advanced drones in record time and the front of the oppression has not been able to silence their voice.

Annex 98: Statement by the Iranian Chief of Staff General Mohammad Bagheri published by the Tehran office of the Qatari media Al Jazeera on 2 October 2019 announcing the advisory support of Iran to the Houthis

أخبار الآن ▾ أفريقيا اقتصاد ثقافة رياضة مقالات صحة فيديو المزيد ▾

سياسة | أسلحة ومعدات حربية | إيران

إيران تقر لأول مرة بدعم الحوثيين



اللواء باقرى يتوعد كل من ينوي تهديد أمن المنطقة (وكالات-ارشيف)

2/10/2019 |

احفظ المقالات لقراءتها لاحقاً وانشئ قائمة قراءتك

Source: <https://www.ajnet.me/politics/2019/10/2/إيران-تقر-لأول-مرة-بدعم-الحوثيين>

*Appendix A***Unofficial translation of the statement by the Iranian Chief of Staff General Mohammad Bagheri published by the Tehran office of the Qatari media Al Jazeera on 2 October 2019 announcing the advisory support of Iran to the Houthis****Iran admits for the first time to supporting the Houthis**

General Bagheri threatens those who intend to threaten the security of the region (Agencies-Archive)

2/10/2019 by Al Jazeera Net-Tehran

For the first time since the outbreak of the war on Yemen in 2015, Iran has acknowledged that its Revolutionary Guards have provided "advisory and intellectual support" to its Houthi ally.

Iranian Chief of Staff General Mohammad Bagheri revealed his country's support for the Houthis in an interview with the Chinese TV station Phoenix, which was reported by the Iranian press. He emphasized that the situation in Yemen is somewhat different from the Iraqi and Syrian arenas.

"We went to Iraq and Syria at the request of their governments, and we provided advisory support, weapons and equipment, and the Revolutionary Guards were of course responsible for that mission," Bagheri said. He made no secret of the Iranian military's assistance to IRGC forces there.

Bagheri explained that Yemen today is under a blockade and all of its ports are closed, and that for some time there has been no possibility of even sending medicine to the country. He denied that his country had sent missiles to Yemen, asking, "How can large, meter-long missiles be sent to Yemen when medicine cannot be sent to Yemen?"

He emphasized that Iran's assistance to the Houthis is limited to advisory and intellectual aspects, revealing for the first time that the Revolutionary Guards have taken on this task, and stressed that the Islamic Republic will stand by the Yemeni people until they are able to remove this aggression from their country.

Tehran has always denied arming the Houthi group in Yemen, but the United States and Saudi Arabia accuse it of providing military support to the group, which General Bagheri has denied.

Ready for war

Asked about recent developments in Gulf waters and the possibility of a war in the region, the Iranian military commander said that Tehran has not and will not want to start wars in the region, and that it seeks more than others for peace and stability in the region.


He added that the Islamic Republic has not started a war for the past 300 years, and the Iranian people have not attacked any other country. He added that his country's interests in the Gulf region and the Strait of Hormuz are closely linked to the region's security, describing Iran as the most important and strongest country responsible for providing security in the region.

Bagheri said that his country wants security in the Gulf waters more than any other regional country, and that it does not want to participate in any war, but at the same time it will stand strong against anyone who intends to threaten the security of the region, stressing that Iran's enemies will not dare to launch a war against it because they know very well that their losses will outweigh the benefits, he said.

In another matter, the general stressed that his country's military relations with China are developing after the implementation of "strategic consensus" between them, revealing Tehran's intention to hold joint naval military exercises with Russia and China in the northern Indian Ocean and the southern Sea of Oman in December.

Last month, Bagheri paid an official visit to the Chinese capital Beijing at the head of a high-level military delegation at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart, which Iran announced at the time that his visit "comes within the framework of the strategy of defense and military diplomacy, to provide a platform to open a new page in cooperation and relations between the two countries."

Annex 99: Statement of the Houthis' military spokesman issued on 31 October 2023 claiming the attacks on Israel



**Spokesman of Yemeni armed forces
Yahya Sare'e**

Statement of Yemeni armed forces

With the help of God Almighty, our armed forces launched a large number of ballistic and winged missiles, as well as drones at various targets of the #Israeli enemy in the occupied territories.

2-The Yemeni Armed Forces confirm that this is the third operation in support of our oppressed brothers in #Palestine, and that the armed Forces will continue to carry out more qualitative missile and drone attacks until #Israel ceases its aggression.

3-The Yemeni Armed Forces confirm that this is the third operation in support of our oppressed brothers in #Palestine, and that the armed Forces will continue to carry out more qualitative missile and drone attacks until #Israel ceases its aggression.

4-We affirm that our Yemeni people's attitude on the Palestinian issue is firm and ethical, and that the #Palestinian people have the full right to self-defense and legitimate rights.

5-The #Zionist enemy entity's ongoing execution of crimes and killings against the people of #Gaza Strip and all of occupied Palestine destabilizes the region and extends the circle of conflict.

"The victory comes only from Allah"

Tuesday
16 Rabi' al-Thani 1445 AH
October 31, 2023 AD
Issued by the Yemeni Armed Forces

Source: « X » (previously Twitter) page of Yahya Saree, Houthi military spokesman

https://twitter.com/yahya_saree/status/1719356913740095608?s=46&t=DZ_VIGN4tnVNjoReUJutuQ&fbclid=IwAR3xawFqoQRpTY_T7BaNdyeVEPMN1PIWk4LT_vIwlIqMrspilD6vvVu1cnk

Annex 100: Media reports/Messages by the Houthis preventing ships linked to, or heading to Israel from crossing the Indian Ocean

Figure 100.1

“X” message: Preventing ships linked to Israel from crossing the Indian Ocean

بيان صادر عن القوات المسلحة اليمنية
رياض 15645هـ
19 مارس 2024م

قال تعالى: إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَ فِي سَبِيلِهِ صَفًا كَأَنَّهُمْ بِنِينَ مُرْضُوعٌ ﴿ صدق الله العظيم

انتصاراً لمظلومية الشعب الفلسطيني وضمن الرد على العدوان الأمريكي البريطاني على بلدنا

شدت القوات البحرية في القوات المسلحة اليمنية بعون الله تعالى عملية استهداف السفينة (Pacific 01) الإسرائيلية في البحر الأحمر وذلك بعدد من الصواريخ البحرية المناسبة.

فيما نفذ سلاح الجو المعزز عملية استهداف لمدمرة أمريكية في البحر الأحمر وذلك بعدد من الطائرات المسيّرة وقد حققت العملية أهدافها بنجاح بفضل الله.

وتنفيذاً لتوجيهات السيد القائد عبدالملك بدر الدين الحوثي "يحفظه الله" في الانتصار لمظلومية الشعب الفلسطيني الذي يتعرض للعدوان والحصار في قطاع غزة، واستجابة لنداءات أبناء الشعب اليمني وكل أحرار الأمة

بدأت القوات المسلحة اليمنية وبعون الله تعالى في توسيع نطاق عملياتها ضد السفن الإسرائيلية أو المرتبطة بالاسرائيليين أو المتجهة إلى موانئ فلسطين المحتلة لتشمل المحيط الهندي طريق رأس الرجاء الصالح.

وعليه.. فإن القوات المسلحة اليمنية تحذر كافة السفن الإسرائيلية أو المتجهة إلى موانئ فلسطين المحتلة أو القادمة منها بعدم المرور من طريق رأس الرجاء الصالح، ما لم فإنها ستكون هدفاً مشروعاً لقواتنا المسلحة.

إن القوات المسلحة اليمنية وفي إطار تنفيذ هذه التوجيهات انتصاراً للشعب الفلسطيني في غزة نفذت ثلاث بعون الله تعالى عمليات ضد ثلاث سفن إسرائيلية وأمريكية في المحيط الهندي وذلك بعدد من الصواريخ البحرية المناسبة والطائرات المسيّرة وقد حققت العمليات الثلاث أهدافها بنجاح.

إن القوات المسلحة اليمنية تؤكد أنها لن تتوقف عن منع الملاحة الإسرائيلية أو المتجهة إلى موانئ فلسطين المحتلة في البحرين الأحمر والهندي وكذلك المحيط الهندي إلا عند إيقاف العدوان ورفع الحصار عن إخواننا في قطاع غزة.

والله حسبنا ونعم الوكيل، نعمة المولى ونعم النصير

www.sabaye.com

God Almighty said: (Indeed, God loves those who are killed in His cause in rows, as if they were children closely packed together) God Almighty has spoken the truth.

A victory for the oppression of the Palestinian people and a response to the American-British aggression against our country

The naval forces of the Yemeni Armed Forces, with the help of God Almighty, carried out an operation to target the Israeli ship (Pacific-01) in the Red Sea with a number of suitable naval missiles.

Meanwhile, the Air Force carried out an operation to target an American destroyer in the Red Sea with a number of drones, and the operation successfully achieved its goals, thanks to God.

In implementation of the directives of Commander Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, “may God protect him,” triumph over the oppression of the Palestinian people who are subjected to aggression and siege in the Gaza Strip, and in response to the calls of the people of the Yemeni people and all the free people of the nation.

The Yemeni Armed Forces, with the help of God Almighty, have begun to expand the scope of their operations against Israeli ships, those linked to Israel, or those heading to the ports of occupied Palestine, to include the Indian Ocean Cape of Good Hope Road.

Accordingly, the Yemeni armed forces warn all Israeli ships heading to or coming from the ports of occupied Palestine not to pass through the Cape of Good Hope, unless they will be a target.

A project for our armed forces.

The Yemeni Armed Forces, within the framework of implementing these directives to achieve victory for the Palestinian people in Gaza, carried out, with the help of God Almighty, three operations against three Israeli and American ships in the Indian Ocean, using a number of suitable naval missiles and drones.

The three operations successfully achieved their goals. The Yemeni armed forces confirm that they will not stop preventing navigation Israeli or destined for the ports of occupied Palestine in the Red and Arab Seas, as well as the Indian Ocean, except when the aggression is stopped, and the siege imposed on our brothers in the Gaza Strip.

God is sufficient for us, and He is the best disposer of affairs, the best protector, and the best helper

Source: <https://twitter.com/aminhayyan/status/1768615485011042357>

Figure 100.2

Media report: Preventing ships linked to Israel from crossing the Indian Ocean**Yemen imposes new equation by escalating its operations against enemy ships in Indian Ocean**

[17/March/2024]

SANA'A March 17 2024 (Saba) - With the announcement by the leader of the nation and the man of words and deeds, al-Sayeed Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, preventing ships linked to the Zionist enemy from crossing the Indian Ocean, in the direction adjacent to South Africa and the Good Hope Road, Yemen enters a new phase of confrontation with the American-British-Zionist enemy, which has

crossed all borders with what it is committing of horrific crimes against the Palestinian people.

Yemen's entry into the battle of the "Al-Aqsa Flood", since its launch last October, was not a luxury or absurdity, but imposed by the current stage in order to support and assist the Palestinian people, which subjected to an unprecedented war of annihilation in contemporary history by the forces of hegemony and arrogance led by America, Britain and the Zionist entity.

The Yemeni escalation of preventing the passage of ships linked to the Zionist enemy, even through the Indian Ocean, was previously prefaced by the Commander a few days ago when he affirmed that "there are surprises and the expansion of the circle of operations in places that the enemies do not expect, in an effective manner," and here the surprises being realized today and being translated into In fact, through the operations announced by the armed forces regarding targeting enemy ships in the Indian Ocean.

Based on the religious, moral and humanitarian principle of the Yemeni people, to come to the rescue of the oppressed and to support the nation's issues, foremost among which is the Palestinian issue, it necessary for Yemen to fight the battle of "the promised conquest and holy jihad" launched by the Leader through a progressive strategy to deter the arrogance of the American-British-Zionist enemy and its persistence in committing bloody massacres in Gaza.

As long as the Zionist enemy continues to unjustly shed the blood of children, women and civilians in Gaza, the Yemenis will be more enthusiastic and jealous in revenge and victory for the blood of the Palestinians, which what the leader of the revolution confirmed in his speech on Thursday evening by saying: "Our human conscience, our religion, our morals, our dignity, our pride." Our affiliation to Islam prohibits us from watching the oppression of Palestine or remaining silent about it, the siege and starvation of the people of Gaza must be stopped, and the tragedy of children dying of starvation in the Strip must be stopped."

Al-Sayeed Commander sent clear messages and warnings to the American and British enemy that "Washington and London have no choice but to stop their support for the Zionist entity, end the aggression and starvation of the people of Gaza, and bring medicine and food to the residents of the Gaza Strip, who have been dying of murder and starvation for 160 days."

With the honorable and supportive Yemeni position for the Palestinian people and their just cause, Yemen charts a new history for the region away from guardianship, subordination, and dependence on the forces of hegemony and global arrogance, marking the beginning of a new era in which Yemen becomes an effective regional force on the international scene, unlike what it in previous stages.

M.M

Source: Houthi affiliated media <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3313771.htm>

Annex 101: Article published on 14 April 2024 by the Iranian media Tasnim News stating that the 13 April 2024 attack on Israel was conducted from Iran, Yemen, Hezbollah, and the Iraqi resistance

خبرگزاری تسنیم



حمله چهاروجهی و پیچیده ایران به اسرائیل

۲۶ فروردین ۱۴۰۳ - ۲۰۲۴ | اخبار سیاسی | اخبار نظامی | دفاعی | امنیتی

- Tl +



عملیات گسترده سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی علیه اسرائیل پاسخی پیچیده چندوجهی و هوشمندانه به جنایات اخیر اسرائیل است.

به گزارش گروه سیاسی خبرگزاری تسنیم، حمله امروز به اسرائیل که در پاسخ به تجاوز این رژیم به سوریه و شهادت چندتن از فرماندهان نظامی ایرانی انجام شده، در نوع خود بسیار پیچیده است.

در این حمله از ترکیبی از صدها پهباد و تعداد زیادی از موشک از انواع مختلف استفاده شده است، مهمتر اینکه این حمله فقط از ایران صورت نگرفته است و از چهار جهت این رژیم درحال تنبیه است.

بیشتر بخوانید

- اصابت دهها فروند موشک سپاه به اهدافی در سرزمین‌های اشغالی
- شاهد۳۶!! پهباد انتحاری سپاه علیه اسرائیل را بشناسید

غیر از ایران، یمن از جنوب، حزب‌الله لبنان از شمال و مقاومت عراق از شرق سرزمین‌های اشغالی نیز ترکیبی از ابزارهای جنگی خود را به سمت سرزمین‌های اشغالی شلیک کرده‌اند.

رسانه‌های غربی اذعان دارند که سامانه‌های پدافندی رژیم صهیونیستی قادر به خنثی‌کردن این حمله پیچیده نیستند. تنبیه متجاوز در جریان است و در صورتی که اسرائیل حرکت نامعقولی انجام دهد تنبیه تشدید می‌شود.

انتهای پیام/+

Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1403/01/26/3067881>

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Appendix A

Iran's four-pronged and complex attack on Israel (Iranian media Tasnim news, 14 April 2024)

The extensive operation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps against Israel is a complex, multifaceted and intelligent response to Israel's recent crimes.

According to the political group of Tasnim News Agency, today's attack on Israel, which was carried out in response to the aggression of this regime in Syria and the martyrdom of several Iranian military commanders, is very complicated in its kind.

In this attack, a combination of hundreds of UAVs and a large number of missiles of various types were used, more importantly, this attack was not carried out only from Iran, and this regime is being punished from four directions.


Apart from Iran, Yemen from the south, Hezbollah of Lebanon from the north and the Iraqi resistance from the east of the occupied territories have also fired a combination of their war tools towards the occupied territories.

Western media admit that the defense systems of the Zionist regime are not able to neutralize this complex attack. Punishment of the aggressor is ongoing, and if Israel makes an unreasonable move, the punishment will be intensified

Annex 102: Houthi MRBM “Palestine” launched on 3 June 2024 against Israel

Figures 102.1 (top), 102.2 (middle), and 102.3 (down)

Screenshots extracted from a video presented by the Houthis of the launch on 3 June 2024 of an MRBM called “Palestine” against Israel




Source:

https://x.com/amirigm/status/1798447207080702086?s=46&t=DZ_VIGN4tnVNjoReUJutuQ&fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR10CHK5GluNAYWXP37msyOyDatZBnhAUydohdtvF1VPxVP_OLjUtzAGF0_aem_ATZdu8YyY_qv0JJcI_Lts83jIvj4Nr9o6WTDqscv1ImxobBCfNq82UcLcQtuKPV6jOR6Bm7bPFqA5WVB-Kxt707J

Figure 102.4

3 June 2024 attack against Israel claimed by the Houthis on their military media “MMY.YE”




MMY.YE

Source:

https://x.com/amirigm/status/1798447207080702086?s=46&t=DZ_VIGN4tnVNjoReUJutuQ&fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR10CHK5GluNAYWXP37msyOyDatZBnhAUydohdtvF1VPxVP_OLjUtzAGF0_aem_ATZdu8YyY_qv0JJcL_Lts83jIvj4Nr9o6WTDqscv1ImxobBCfNQ82UcLcQtuKPV6jOR6Bm7bPFqA5WVB-Kxt707J

Appendix A


Unofficial translation



Annex 103: Houthi OWA-UAV “Jaffa” launched on 19 July 2024 against Israel

Figures 103.1 (top), and 103.2 (down)

Display of the OWA-UAV “Jaffa” by the Houthis



Source: <https://english.iswnews.com/35712/yemeni-armed-forces-release-images-of-jaffa-suicide-drone/>


Figure 103.3

Debris of a wing of the OWA-UAV lying on the street of Tel Aviv, Israel




Source: <https://x.com/Mdais/status/1814137740646035588/photo/1>

Figure 103.4
MADO MD275 engine recovered from the impact site



Source: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1814226067818717563/photo/1

Figure 103.5
Amateur picture of a MADO MD275 engine taken during the fifth Iranian National Aerospace Exhibition held in October 2014 at Mehrabad International Airport, Tehran



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2014/11/>

Annex 104: Scenes of the launching of a Hatem 2 hypersonic ballistic missile allegedly targeting the Israeli ship MSC Sarah V presented on “X” by the Houthi military media “MMY.YE”

Figure X.1

Presentation of the *Hatem 2* by the Houthis



Hatem 2 ballistic missile
Intelligent control system
Manoeuvrability
Hypersonic speed
The fuel type is solid
It has several generations with different ranges
Made in Yemen MIC

Figures 104.2 (left), 104.3 (center), 104.4 (right), and 104.5 (below)
Sequence of the launching and close-up of the military warhead



Source: <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1806038330993226140>

Annex 105: Press article dated 19 November 2019 from the Yemeni pro-Houthi media YPA highlighting Ibrahim Al-Dailami's presentation of the credentials as Houthi-affiliated Ambassador to the Iranian President



Yemeni ambassador in Tehran delivers credentials to Iranian President

Last updated Nov 19, 2019 5:49 PM



TEHRAN, Nov. 19 (YPA) – Yemeni Ambassador to Tehran Ibrahim Mohammed al-Dailami on Tuesday delivered his credentials to President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Hassan Rouhani.

At the delivery of credentials, al-Dailami conveyed greetings of President of the Supreme Political Council Mahdi al-Mashat to President Rouhani.

President Rouhani reaffirmed, during the meeting, his country's unwavering stance in support of Yemen and its support for a political solution.

Source: <https://en.ypagency.net/142948>

Annex 106: Press article dated 22 December 2019 from the Iranian media Al-Alam regarding a meeting between Ibrahim Al-Dailami, as Houthis-affiliated Ambassador in Iran, and Brigadier-General Amir Hatami, Iranian Defence Minister

فارسي كيف تشاهد العالم

الرئيسية آخر الأخبار طوفان الأقصى العالم العربي - إيران - العالم - فيديو مقالات

قناة العالم

سفير اليمن بطهران يلتقي وزير الدفاع الإيراني



الأحد ٢٢ ديسمبر ٢٠١٩ - ٨:٢٣ - بتوقيت غرينتش

بحث سفير اليمن لدى طهران إبراهيم الديلمي اليوم مع وزير الدفاع الإيراني العميد أمير حاتمي، سبل تعزيز التعاون المشترك بين البلدين في المجالات العسكرية.

العالم - اليمن

وفي اللقاء نقل سفير اليمن، تحيات وزير الدفاع اللواء الركن محمد العاطفي ورئيس هيئة الأركان اللواء الركن محمد الغماري لوزير الدفاع الإيراني.. مشيداً بعلاقات التعاون التي تربط البلدين على مختلف الأصعدة والموقف الإيراني تجاه العدوان على اليمن.

بدوره حمل العميد حاتمي، السفير الديلمي نقل تحياته لوزير الدفاع ورئيس هيئة الأركان العامة.. مشيراً إلى ضرورة تعزيز وتمتين العلاقة بين الجيشين الإيراني واليمني.

وأكد وزير الدفاع الإيراني، دعم إيران للحل السياسي في اليمن وأن يترك لليمنيين تحديد مستقبل بلادهم.

Source: <https://www.alalam.ir/news/4629456>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation

Today, the Yemeni Ambassador to Tehran, Ibrahim Al-Dailami, discussed with the Iranian Minister of Defence, Brigadier-General Amir Hatami, ways to enhance joint cooperation between the two countries in the military fields.

In the meeting, the Yemeni ambassador conveyed the greetings of the Minister of Defense, Major General Mohammed Al-Atefi and the Chief of Staff, Major General Mohammed Al-Ghamari, to the Iranian Minister of Defense, praising the cooperation relations that bind the two countries at various levels and the Iranian position towards the aggression against Yemen.

In turn, Brigadier General Hatami asked Ambassador Al-Dailami to convey his greetings to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, pointing out the necessity of strengthening the relationship between the Iranian and Yemeni armies.

The Iranian Defense Minister affirmed Iran's support for a political solution in Yemen and that it would be left to the Yemenis to determine the future of their country.

Annex 107: Maritime smuggling of missile components

Figure 107.1
Dhow intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figure 107.2
Intercepted material



Source: <https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1747214405291716688>

Inventory of the materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024


Type of materiel intercepted	Quantity
ASCM air intake cabine	1
ASCM engine	1
ASCM fin	2
ASCM warhead	1
LACM jet engine	1
SRBM engine	5
SRBM turbo pump assemblies	4
SRBM sets	2
SRBM missile parts	1
Radar antenna assembly	2
Surveillance thermal camera	14

Source: US

Figure 107.3
Air intake cabin, *Ghadir* ASCM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figures 107.4 (left), and 107.5 (right)



Figures 107.6 (left), and 107.7 (right)





Figure 107.8
Close-up on the sticker



Source: US

Figure 107.9
Booster, *Ghadir* ASCM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figure 107.10



Figures 107.11 (left), and 107.12 (right)
Markings and sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.13 (left), and 107.14 (right)
Fins, Ghadir LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024





Figure 107.15



Figure 107.16
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.17 (up), 107.18 (middle), and 107.19 (down)
Warhead, Ghadir LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024





Figure 107.20
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.21 (up), and 107.22 (down)
Toloue 10 jet engine of « 351 » LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figure 107.23
Rating plate



Model T10-S
S/N: 10278
Manufacturing date: 2022.08 (August 2022)
Take-off power: 110

Figure 107.24
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.25 (up), and 107.26 (down)
Exciter unit of a “351” LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024





Figure 107.27
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.28 (left), and 107.29 (right)
Engines, *Qiam-2* SRBM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figures 107.30 (left), and 107.31 (right)



Figure 107.32
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.33 (left), 107.34 (right), and 107.35 (down)
Turbopump assembly, *Qiam-2* SRBM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024




Figure 107.36
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 107.37
Radar of unidentified model intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figures 107.38 (left), and 107.39 (right)
Close up on the sticker and barcode



Source: US

Figures 107.40 (up), 107.41 (middle), and 107.42 (down)
Radar of unidentified model intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024





Figure 107.43
Marking on the materiel



P.N: PEP.10.06.1
S.N:01040107


Figure 107.44
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Annex 108: Dahua DH-TPC-PT8620A-B thermal vision devices intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024
Quantity documented: 14

Figure 108.1



Figures 108.2 (left), and 108.3 (right)



Figure 108.4



Figure 108.5
Factory markings and barcode present on the materiel



Figure 108.6



P/N: 1.0.01.34.11061/0016
MAC: 08 ED ED 2
S/N:
MADE IN CHINA Date: 2019-12
ZHEJIANG DAHUA VISION TECHNOLOGY CO.
LTD

Figure 108.7
Close up of the packaging



Source: US

Figure 108.8

Commercial presentation of the materiel

Ultra Series| DH-TPC-PT8620A-B

**DH-TPC-PT8620A-B**

Thermal Network Hybrid Pan & Tilt Camera



- 640x512 VOx uncooled thermal sensor technology
- Athermalized Lens(thermal), Focus-free
- 1/1.9" 2Megapixel progressive scan Sony CMOS
- Powerful 30x optical zoom
- Support fire detection & alarm
- Max 160°/s pan speed, 360° endless pan rotation
- Up to 300 presets, 5 auto scan, 8 tour, 5 pattern
- 7/2 alarm in/out
- Micro SD memory, IP67



Source: https://www.cctvdahua.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/DH-TPC-PT8620A-B_Datasheet_20180508.pdf

Annex 109: Black plastic tubular container used to hide materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024 by US

Figure 109.1

Black plastic tubular container used to hide materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024 by the US



Source: US


Annex 110: Similarities of the materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024 with materiel produced by Iran

Figure 110.1
Air intake cabin, *Ghadir* ASCM



Source: US

Figure 110.2
Air intake cabin, *Ghadir* ASCM of Iranian production



Source: <https://english.iswnews.com/13279/military-knowledge-ghadir-cruise-missile-images/>

Figure 110.3
Stabilizer, *Ghadir* ASCM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024




Source: US

Figure 110.4
Stabilizer, *Ghadir* ASCM of Iranian production



Source: <https://english.iswnews.com/13279/military-knowledge-ghadir-cruise-missile-images/>

Figure 110.5
War head, *Ghadir* ASCM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 110.6
War head, *Ghadir* ASCM of Iranian production



Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/01/27/2696464>

Figure 110.7

Rating plate of the *Toloue 10* LACM Jet engine intercepted by US on 11 January 2024



Model T10-S
S/N: 10278
Manufacturing date: 2022.08 (August 2022)
Take-off power: 110

Source: US

Figure 110.8

Rating plate of the *Toloue 10* LACM Jet engine intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2023/833, paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37)




Model T10-S
S/N: 10192
Manufacturing date: 2021.11 (November 2021)
Take-off power: 110

Source: UK

Figures 110.9 (up), and 110.10 (down)

Exciter unit of “351” LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 110.11

Exciter unit of a “351” LACM intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2023/833, paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37)



Source: UK

Figure 110.12

Barcode sticker “MMG 10550”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 110.13

Barcode sticker “MMG 10906”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on a satellite antenna intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran ([S/2023/833](#), paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37)



Source: UK

Figure 110.14
Black plastic tubular container intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figure 110.15
Black plastic tubular container used to hide 9M133 ATGM missiles. These missiles were documented on a dhow interdicted on 6 May 2021 (S/2022/50, paras. 64-66, and figures XII, and 20.30)



The Panel notes that among the materiel intercepted, the presence of AM-50 anti-material rifles and the RPG-7 launchers have technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and POSP sights produced in Belarus. Belarus informed the Panel that they had been exported to the Islamic Republic of Iran between June 2016 and April 2018 and that that country had provided an end-user certificate stating that they would be used exclusively for the needs of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics.

Source: US

Annex 111: Maritime smuggling of lethal material and surveillance equipment

Figure 111.1

Dhow intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.2

Intercepted material



Source: <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/IMAGERY/igphoto/2003394784/>


Inventory of the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024

Type of materiel intercepted	Quantity
UUV nose cone	1
UUV propeller	1
UUV fins	4
UUV part with wiring harness	1
UUV components	2
UUV housing cover	1
UUV plastic components	1
UUV battery	7
UUV various cables	7
UUV extender	1
UUV connecting arms	82
UUV hardware	1
UUV lead weight	12
UUV mounting bracket	2
Gold small bracket	20
Tube with mounting bracket	4
Cables	3
Camera	3
Drone DJI Air 2S	1
Three port black connector box	3
Seven connector black box	21
Electrical connector	104
Back connector wire with magnet	100
White box PN: ADC-PLS-002	24
White plastic wire connector box small	240
White box with 4 connector ports	1
White metal box with connector ports and cooling fans	1
Black box PN: SSG 2918	60
Black Levin box	80
Black exciter box	3
Black IMU Connector box	2
Black connector box with wire	1
Black box with low pressure hose	1
Green and white electric box	14
Green connector cylinder APSIN-5	12
Green electric box	2
Green box HP line	8
Large green box with connector ports	2
Silver electric box	4
Apex APhone 6M	80
Satphone	76
GPS box (with 6 components bags in each)	82
Navico Lowrance Broadband radio	14
Electric motor	1
Electric squib	80
Non-electric primer	90
Power station	2
Ground power supply	1
Lithium Ultra cap charging bank black	15
Three stage battery charger	32
HDC 130P charge bank with Laptop	1
S&A tester	8
Black battery unit	20
Zixel charger	218
PTP 50650 integrated ODU	3
Gas transfer tubing	4
Cables	3
Electrical connector	2
Large electrical connector	117
Various connector	85
Pile of various cable	1
Circuit board	2
Hard drive	7
Network box	2


Small electric box	2
Multi connector with HP line	2
Computer server tray	2
Masterview Max computer	1
Green rackmount computer	1
Portable computer with screen	1
Lenovo ThinkPad laptop	1
Machined rings	3
Machining parts of various size	11
120mm machining parts	6
81mm machining parts	6
SPG machining parts	6
Rail mount	7
Explosive packaging	11
Dehlavieh ATGM Safe and fire mount	17
Dehlavieh ATGM Sight	17
Dehlavieh ATGM Bracket	17
Dehlavieh ATGM Mount	17
Dehlavieh ATGM Stand legs	51
Metal pipe with connector cable	13
Motor assembly with bake light	13
Steel components	3
Steel plate with electrical boxes attached	1
Alternator	1
Flange assembly	1
Flange assembly steel and plastic	1
Metal assembly with gear	1

Source: US

Figures 111.3 (left), and 111.4 (right)
Components of Dehlavieh launching post (ATGM) intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.5 (left), and 111.6 (right)



Figures 111.7 (left), and 111.8 (right)



Figure 111.9
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.10
SPG machining part intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.11 (left), and 111.12 (right)
120mm mortar machining part intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.13
81 mm mortar machining part intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 111.14 (left), 111.15 (right), and 111.16 (down)
23mm machining part intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 111.17
Power bank intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.18 (left), and 111.19 (right)
Stickers on the materiel





Source: US

Figures 111.20 (up), and 111.21 (down)
UUV component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.22 (left), and 111.23 (right)
Stickers on the materiel





Source: US

Figures 111.24 (up), and 111.25 (down)
UUV component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.26 (left), 111.27 (middle), and 111.28 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.29 (up), and 111.30 (down)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.31
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.32 (up), and 111.33 (down)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024





Figure 111.34
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.35 (up), and 111.36 (down)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figure 111.37
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.38 (up), and 111.39 (down)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024





Figure 111.40
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.41 (left), and 111.42 (right)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.43 (left), and 111.44 (right)



Figure 111.45
Marking on the materiel



Figures 111.46 (left), and 111.47 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figure 111.48
SRBM pressure switches intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.49 (left), and 111.50 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.51 (up), and 111.52 (down)
SRBM guidance & control related component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.53
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.54
SRBM actuator intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figure 111.55
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.56 (up), 111.57 (middle), and 111.58 (down)
SRBM jet vane control system intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.59
Sticker on the materiel




Source: US

Figure 111.60
SRBM jet vane control system component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.61
Sticker apposed on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.62
SRBM Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.63 (left), and 111.64 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.65 (up), and 111.66 (down)
Unidentified materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.67 (left), and 111.68 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figure 111.69
Wooden crate containing GPS antennas intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.70 (left), and 111.71 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.72 (left), and 111.73 (right)
GPS antennas intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.74 (left), and 111.75 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Figures 111.76 (left), 111.77 (center), and 111.78 (right)



Figures 111.79 (left), 111.80 (middle), and 111.81 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US


Figures 111.82 (left),and 111.83 (right)
GPS antennas intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.84 (left),and 11.85 (right)



Figures 111.86 (left), 111.87 (middle), and 111.88 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.89 (left), and 111.90 (right)
Levin connector intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.91 (left), and 111.92 (right)




Figure 111.93
Sticker on the materiel




Source: US


Figures 111.94 (left), and 111.95 (right)
Unidentified materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.96
Marking on the materiel



Figures 111.97 (left), 111.98 (middle), 111.99 (right), and 111.100 (down)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.101
SRBM battery intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.102 (left), and 111.103 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.104
SRBM batteries intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figure 111.105
Markings on the materiel



Figure 111.106
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.107
SRBM guidance and control related components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.108 (left), and 111.109 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US


Figures 111.110 (up), and 111.111 (down)
Component of SRBM jet vane control system intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.112 (left), and 111.113 (right)



Figures 111.114 (left), and 111.115 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.116 (up), 111.117 (middle), and 111.118 (down)
Computer intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.119
Sticker on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.120 (up), and 111.121 (down)
S&A tester intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.122 (left), and 111.123 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.124 (up), 111.125 (middle), and 111.126 (down)
EOSS component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.127 (left), and 111.128 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.129
EOSS component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.130
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.131 (up), and 111.132 (down)
Unidentified materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.133
Marking on the materiel




Figure 111.134
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.135 (up), and 111.136 (down)
USB sampler module intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.137
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.138 (up), and 111.139 (down)
Telephone station intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figure 111.140
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.141 (up), and 111.142 (down)
Lowrance maritime radar intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 111.143 (up), and 111.144 (down)
DJI Air 2 drone intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 111.145 (up), and 111.146 (down)
Bags containing explosive intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.147
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Annex 112: Stickers documented on the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024

Most of the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024 is covered by a sticker containing two lines of information, established on similar mode of sequence.




Figure 112.1: Dehlavieh ATGM



Figure 112.2: S&A tester




Figure 112.3: Component of SRBM




Figure 112.4: SRBM GPS antenna




Figure 112.5: Component of a UUV



Figure 112.6: Explosive



Figure 112.7: Power bank



Figure 112.8: Telephone station

Source: US

Annex 113: Quality control (QC) stickers of four different models observed by the Panel

The stickers presented on figures 113.1, 113.2 and 113.3, have already been documented on materiel previously intercepted.

Figure 113.1
QC model 1




Figure 113.2
QC model 2



Figure 113.3
QC model 3



Figure 113.4
QC model 4



Source: US


Annex 114: Similarities of the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024 with materiel produced by Iran

Figure 114.1
Camouflage cover of the localisator of one of the Dehlavieh ATGM intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 114.2
Camouflage cover with similar pattern on the localisator of a Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Iran



Source: <https://en.topwar.ru/225366-ot-kopirovanija-do-samostojatelnoj-razrabotki-inostrannye-korni-iranskih-ptrk.html> (extracted from the Iranian News Agency *Mizan*)

Figure 114.3
Camouflage cover with similar pattern on the localisator of a Dehlavieh ATGM operated by Hezbollah



Source: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/209264/Hezbollah-strikes-various-Israeli-bases-on-Lebanese-borders> (Iranian News Agency « Mehr News)

Figure 114.4


SRBM pressure switches intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024 (respectively marked “TGU.D036”, JAU.D535”, JAU.D540”, “JAU.D546”, “JAU.D549”, and LOU.D520”)



Source: US

Figure 114.5

Similar markings observed on the pressure switches documented on *Borkan-3* debris from attack on 7 Mar 2021 on Damman, KSA (marked “PDU.L068”)



Source: Confidential

Figure 114.6


Similar pressure switches documented on an Iranian *Qiam-2* debris from the attack on 8 January 2020 on a US base in Erbil, Iraq (respectively marked “GNU.D047” and “GNU.D048”) (S/2018/594, para. 90)



Source: Confidential

Figures 114.7 (left), and 114.8 (right)


“Q.A Passed” sticker apposed on component of SRBM jet vane control system (left) and guidance and control system component (right) intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 114.9 (left), and 114.10 (right)

“Q.A Passed” sticker apposed on SRBM components (left), and IMU (right) intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 114.11

Similar “Q.A Passed” sticker on a component of the Iranian *Qiam* SRBM intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2023/833, paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37).



Source: UK

Figures 114.12 (left) and 114.13 (right)
SRBM actuators of jet vane control system component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Source: US

Figure 114.14
SRBM actuators of jet vane control system at the inauguration of the Permanent Exhibition of Achievements and Capabilities of the IRGC's Aerospace Division, Tehran, Iran, on 27 September 2020




Source: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:National_Aerospace_Park_opening_ceremony_\(059\).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:National_Aerospace_Park_opening_ceremony_(059).jpg) (Extracted from the Iranian news agency "Fars")

Figure 114.15
SRBM guidance and control related components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 114.16
SRBM guidance and control related components-of an Iranian *Qiam-2* debris from the attack on 8 January 2020 on a US base in Erbil, Iraq



Source: Confidential

Figure 114.17
SRBM guidance & control related component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 114.18
SRBM guidance and control related component-of an Iranian *Qiam-2* debris from the attack on 8 January 2020 on a US base in Erbil, Iraq



Source: US

Figure 114.19
Barcode sticker “MMG 10942” observed on the component of an EOSS intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 114.20
Barcode sticker “MMG 10943”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US


Figure 114.21
Barcode sticker “MMG 10978”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 114.22


Barcode sticker “MMG 10906”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on a satellite antenna intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2023/833, paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37)



Source: Panel

Figure 114.23 (left), and 114.24 (right)

Nose cone of an UUV intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 114.25 (up), and 114.26 (down)
UUVs with similar nose cone displayed early 2022 by the IRGC Navy



Source: <https://en.mehrnews.com/photo/184946/IRGC-naval-forces-receive-new-defensive-equipment>

Annex 115: Material seized since 12 March 2023 by the GoY Customs

Figure 115.1

29 drones jamming devices seized at Shahan border post on 1 January 2024




Figure 115.2

Four Starlink satellite dishes and associate material seized at Shahan border post in December 2023



Source: GoY customs

Figure 115.3
1,560 Kalashnikov spare-parts seized in Aden free zone custom port on 23 November 2023



Figure 115.4
Two Yamaha motors for boat seized at Al-Wadeeah Customs port on 26 November 2023



Source: GoY customs

Figure 115.5
20 anti-drone jammers seized at Shahan border post on 22 October 2023



Figure 115.6
12 military walkie-talkies and 6 cartons of cables and antennas seized at Shahan border post on 12 August 2023



Source: GoY customs

Figure 115.7
Communication devices and tools seized at Shahan border post on 17 July 2023




Figure 115.8
4,956 laser devices to be adapted on SALWs seized at Shahan border post on 25 June 2023



Source: GoY customs

Figure 115.9
5,175 pistol holsters and 498 binoculars seized at Aden Free zone customs port on 21 May 2023




Figure 115.10
54 drones seized at Aden Free zone customs port on 12 March 2023




Source: GoY customs

Annex 116: Components of AK-47 and G3 or MP5 intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 116.1 (left) and 116.2 (right)
AK-47 assault rifle parts



Figure 116.3
G3 rifle parts




Source: Panel

Annex 117: Tactical rails and equipment for SALW intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 117.1 (left) and 117.2 (right)
Tactical rails for AK-47 assault rifle



Figures 117.3 (left) and 117.4 (right)
Tactical rails for SALW



Figures 117.5 (left) and 117.6 (right)
Glock pistol customized parts



Source: Panel

Annex 118: Sniper scopes intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 118.1 (up), 118.2 (middle), and 118.3 (down)
CODL 3-9x42 sniper scopes concealed in a metal box



Source: Panel

Annex 119: Rifle scopes intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 119.1 (left), and 119.2 (right)
M9 LS3 3-10x42 Rifle scopes with laser sight



Figures 119.3 (up), and 119.4 (down)
M9 LS3 3-10x42 Rifle scopes with laser sight



Source: Panel

Annex 120: Red dot holographic sights intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 120.1 (left), 120.2 (right), and 120.3 (down)
Model 552 Red dot holographic sights



Source: Panel

Annex 121: Communication devices intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figure 121.1
VHF radio Motorola K9



Source: Panel

Figures 121.2 (left) and 121.3 (right)
VHF radio Motorola MT777R



Source: Panel

Figure 121.4
VHF radio Motorola DP4800



Source: Panel

Figures 121.5 (up), and 121.6 (down)
VHF station Motorola DM4600e



Source: Panel

Figure 121.7
VHF station Hytera RD985



Source: Panel

Annex 122: Case study N° 1, “Glock store” armory located in Sana’a

Figure 122.1

Profile of the “Glock store” visible on “X”

جلوك ستور للمهمات العسكرية

@GlocStore

تعتبر شركة جلوك ستور متاجر رائد في توفير الاسلحة الشخصية والفردية في الجمهورية اليمنية وهي شركة مرخصة بشكل رسمي كأول شركة متخصصة 777-754-232

Translated from Arabic by Google

Glock Store is a leading store in the provision of personal and individual weapons in the Republic of Yemen, and it is an officially licensed company as the first Specialized Inc. 232-754-777



جلوك ستور للمهمات العسكرية

@GlocStore

يعتبر السلاح في كثير من الدول خصوصاً بلادنا جزءاً لا يتجزأ من الثقافة والعادات والتقاليد اليمنية فهناك أنواع للسلاح أو ما يسمى بـ السلاح الأبيض و السلاح الشخصي والذي يرتبط بعراقة تاريخنا منذ القدم و الشخصية اليمنية

صور من معرض جلوك ستور اليمن صنعاء شارع الزبيري

Translated from Arabic by Google

Weapons are considered in many countries, especially our country, as an integral part of the Yemeni culture, customs and traditions. There are types of weapons or what is called white weapons and personal weapons, which are linked to the ancient history of our history and the Yemeni character.

Pictures from Glock Store, Yemen, Sana'a, Al-Zubairi Street

Video presenting the “Glock store” armory: <https://twitter.com/GlocStore/status/1629947785729417218>

Figures 122.2 (left) and 123.3 (right)

Some material presented for sale at “Glock store”



Figures 122.4 (left) and 122.5 (right)
Some material presented for sale at “Glock store”



Figures 122.6 (up) and 122.7 (down)
Some material presented for sale at “Glock store”



Source: <https://twitter.com/GlocStore/status/1594090810852925440/photo/1>

SALWs observed by the Panel as presented for sale by the “Glock store” armory in Sana’a⁶¹**Pistols**

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
Glock 17 Gen 4	US (under licence)
Glock 19	Austria
Glock 19 Gen 4	US (under licence)
Glock 19 Gen 5	US (under licence)
Glock 19X	US (under licence)
Glock 21 Gen 4	US (under licence)
Glock 26	Austria
Glock 43X	US (under licence)
Beretta M9	US (under licence)
Beretta M9A4	US (under licence)
Beretta PX4	Italy
Sig Sauer M17	US (under licence)
Smith & Wesson M59	US
Smith & Wesson SD9	US
Smith & Wesson M&P9	US
Ruger 5.7	US
FN 509	US (under licence)
FN GP	Belgium
CZ-75 Automatic	Czech Republic
Taurus G3c	Brazil
Caracal model F	UAE
CF-98	China
Sarsilmaz SAR-9	Turkiye
Canik TP-9	Turkiye
Baikal 442	Russian Federation
TT-33 Tokarev	Russian Federation and/or former Soviet Union

Machine pistols

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
Tondar TK-9	Islamic Republic of Iran

Compact assault rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
AKSU	Russian Federation and/or former Soviet Union
M92	Serbia
AR-SF	Bulgaria
M4 short barrel	US
M4 long barrel	US
HK416	Germany

Assault rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
AK47	Various origin
AK103	Probably of local production
AK74	Former Soviet Union
QLZ-97	China

⁶¹ Presented on Facebook and Twitter: <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100083088382935> and <https://twitter.com/GlocStore>

Steyr AUG	Austria
G3	Germany
FAL	Belgium
SCAR HB	Belgium

Under barrel grenade launchers (UBGL)

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
M203	US

Sniper rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
SVD-1	Russian Federation or former Soviet Union
SVD-S	Russian Federation
Springfield M21	US

LMGs

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
M249/Minimi	Belgium or US
RPK	Not identified

Rocket launchers

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
RPG-7	Not identified

Optics

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
AN/PVS7 NVG	US
EOTech day and night sight	US
1P29	Russian Federation

Annex 123: Case study N° 2, Haider Tayef artisanal store in Sana'a

Figure 123.1
Profile of the Haider Tayef artisanal store visible on “X”



Figure 123.2
Some material presented for sale at Haider Tayef artisanal store



Source: <https://twitter.com/TayfAbn50085>

Figure 123.3 (left), 123.4 (down left), and 123.5 (down right)
Some material presented for sale at Haider Tayef artisanal store



Source: <https://twitter.com/TayfAbn50085>

**Material observed by the Panel as presented for sale by the Haider Tayef artisanal store in Sana'a
 Pistols**

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
Glock 19 Gen 5	US (under licence)
Glock 19X	US (under licence)
Sig Sauer M18	US (under licence)

Smith & Wesson SD9	US
Taurus G3c	Brazil
Sarsilmaz SAR-9	Turkiye
AHSS FXS-9	Turkiye
System Defence C9	Turkiye
Baikal 442	Russian Federation
TT-33 Tokarev	Former Soviet Union
TT-33 Tokarev	Bulgaria
Makarov	Former Soviet Union

Compact assault rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
AKSU	Russian Federation and/or former Soviet Union
M92	Serbia
AR-SF	Bulgaria
AK-104	Probably of local production

Assault rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
AK47	Various origin
Type 56-1	China
AMD-65	Hungary
MiPKMS	Former East Germany
AK103	Probably of local production
AK74	Former Soviet Union
Steyr AUG	Austria
G3	Germany

Sniper rifle

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
Tigr-1 ⁶²	Russian Federation

⁶² Civilian version of the SVD-1

Annex 124: Case study N° 3, Abdul Khaleq Al-Masry artisanal store in Sana'a

Figures 124.1 (left) and 124.2 (right)

Profile of the Haider Tayef artisanal store visible on “X” and some material presented for sale in this store



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=863857151814094&set=a.103401481193002>

Material documented by the Panel as presented for sale by the Abdul Khaleq Al-Masry artisanal store in Sana'a

Pistols

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
Tokarev or TTC	Former Soviet Union or Poland
Baikal 442	Russian Federation
NZ-75	China
Colt Commander	USA

Assault rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
G3	Germany, UK, Portugal, or Saudi Arabia
FAL	Belgium
AUG	Austria
AK-47	Former Soviet Union or Russia
AK-63	Hungary
AMD-65	Hungary
Type 56-1	China
Type 56-2	China
MiPKMS	Former East Germany
VZ-58	Former Czechoslovakia
AR-F	Bulgaria

Compact assault rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
M4	USA
AKSU	Former Soviet Union or Russian Federation
AR-SF	Bulgaria

Sub-machine gun

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
MP-5 or TK-9	Germany, UK or Iran

Sniper rifles

Designation	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
SVD-1 or Type 85	Former Soviet Union, Russian Federation or China

Machine-guns

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
SG-43	Various origin
PKM	Various origin

Rocket launchers

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
RPG-7	Various origin

Annex 125: Arms exhibition held in Sana'a in February 2024

Figure 125.1
Entrance of one display stand



Source: https://twitter.com/alhshar_mhmd/status/1762047504047120754/photo/1

Figures 125.2 (left), and 125.3 (right)
Military materiel on display



Source: https://twitter.com/alhshar_mhmd/status/1762533688133210339

Figures 125.4 (up), 125.5 (middle), and 125.6 (down)
Military materiel on display



Source: <https://twitter.com/4v4uHANec6Bv1yJ/status/1762476161374843170/photo/1>



Source: <https://twitter.com/Amjdhsh55Lby/status/1762155769149943911/photo/2>



Source: https://twitter.com/alhshar_mhmd/status/1761934151253414067/photo/1

Annex 126: Model 213 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 80

Figures 126.1 (left), and 126.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/TbyNasr/status/1666792974213079040>

Serial numbers

14027752	31009398	32012079	33022065
16034201	31011486	32012642	33023064
19001295	31012118	32013326	33025064
19007887	31012127	32013348	33026326
22010610	31014027	32013365	33026484
22016405	31014068	32013918	34002533
25036249	31018099	32015260	34003417
25045760	31018624	32113547	34003563
29022769	31019508	32313272	34004232
29027026	31022373	32616930	34004518
29031757	31023505	33001235	34005434
29034244	32000008	33002430	34006143
29043863	32000810	33004491	34085557
30005647	32002117	33004725	49000539
30009363	32002300	33006136	49001295
30011004	32004079	33007065	49001846
30316210	32004271	33008147	49002016
31008101	32006388	33021623	49006075
31009320	32006826	33021725	49006226
31009385	32006868	33022064	49007887

Model 213 pistol documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

49002016	Documented by the PoE Somalia
----------	-------------------------------

Reference in previous reports: [S/2019/858](#), annex 2.5

Annex 127: Type 54 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 39

Figure 127.1



Figure 127.2.

Comment made by the seller (Unofficial translation)



مستندات ثلاث خط نيم جديد زيروو
مع التوايح وبسعر مناسب جداً
315000 الف يعني او 2250 ريال سعودي
سعر مؤقت

وين المشتري بالخفا فرصة ويقل من محلات حمد طيف

العنوان صنعاء جولة عمران نهايت الجسر باتجاه عمران محلات حمد طيف والقراله
للتواصل والاستفسار على 773334779

Tata Pistols Namim Jadid Zeroo line

With accessories at a very, very favourable price 315000 Yemeni
Thousand or 2250 Saudi Riyals
Temporary price

Where is the buyer to take a chance and buy it from Hamad Tayef
stores

Address Sana'a, Jawala Amran, the end of the bridge towards
Amran, the shops of Hamad Tayef and his brothers
For contact and inquiries at 773334779

Source: <https://twitter.com/k01mup442MDxa5H/status/1757425644416151630/photo/1>

Serial numbers

60000736	61002024	61016551	69001147	69005418
60001479	61003501	61017517	69002330	69006007
60003378	61008297	61019655	69002398	69006148
60003465	61011211	61019678	69002813	69006909
60003507	61013083	61019842	69003180	69007831
60004130	61015775	61019928	69003194	69007945
60004285	61016104	61029520	69004905	69007952
61001319	61016495	69000125	69005100	

Type 54 pistols documented in Bahrain and Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

60002362	Documented in Bahrain by Atlantic Council ⁶³
60002705	Documented in Bahrain by Atlantic Council
61004595	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC ⁶⁴
61007768	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC

⁶³ <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/about/>

⁶⁴ Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)

Annex 128: Type 59 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 108

Figures 128.1 (left), and 128.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/yaser84779686/status/1234446969789124609>

Serial numbers

Model 1

12A0029	12P2348	12P4355	12P7349
12A0224	12P2600	12P4406	12P7478
12P0804	12P2605	12P4672	12P7549
12P0813	12P2686	12P5254	12P7648
12P1018	12P2773	12P5743	12P7709
12P1323	12P2784	12P5587	12P7824
12P1413	12P2861	12P5892	12P7970
12P1472	12P2940	12P5963	12P8133
12P1484	12P3043	12P6092	12P8179
12P1723	12P3584	12P6118	12P8271
12P1728	12P3693	12P6249	12P8448
12P1734	12P3818	12P6493	12P8590
12P1784	12P3896	12P6777	12P8657
12P1819	12P3919	12P7107	12P9188
12P1851	12P3972	12P7182	12P9300
12P2147	12P4151	12P7217	12P9467
12P2204	12P4165	12P7250	12P9516

Model 2

DO 0085	DO 3406	DI 1466	EO 0531
DO 0661	DO 3431	DI 2208	EO 0931
DO 1151	DO 3710	DI 3984	EO 1205
DO 1299	DO 4246	DI 5416	EO 1620
DO 1666	DO 5298	DI 5956	EO 2105
DO 1989	DO 5863	DI 6190	EO 2114
DO 2044	DO 6940	DI 6419	EO 3312
DO 2137	DO 7209	DI 6462	
DO 2256	DO 8054	DI 6596	
DO 2972	DO 8562	DI 7105	
DO 3090	DO 9466	DI 8235	

Type 59 pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

DI 1243	Documented by the PoE Somalia
EO 3056	Documented by the PoE Somalia

Reference in previous report: [S/2019/858](#), annex 2.5

Annex 129: CF-98 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 24

Figures 129.1 (left), and 129.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=207525905638549&set=pb.100091434221975.-2207520000&type=3>

Serial numbers

15-CN 000548	15-CN 000618	15-CN 007633	15-CN 017542	15-CN 028834
15-CN 000618	15-CN 002914	15-CN 008461	15-CN 023096	15-CN 028943
15-CN 001200	15-CN 003259	15-CN 008772	15-CN 026530	15-CN 030084
15-CN 001694	15-CN 005594	15-CN 008795	15-CN 027724	15-CN 030179
15-CN 001954	15-CN 006313	15-CN 009248	15-CN 028081	15-CN 033211
15-CN 000548	15-CN 006718	15-CN 010840	15-CN 028754	

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/833](#), annex 77

CF-98 pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

006331	Documented by the PoE Somalia
025554	Documented by the PoE Somalia
029336	Documented in Somalia in open source ⁶⁵
030930	Documented by the PoE Somalia

Reference in previous report: [S/2019/858](#), annex 2.5

⁶⁵ <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2019-01-21-three-more-dusit-terror-suspects-arrested/>

Annex 130: NP-34 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 30

Figures 130.1 (left) and 130.2 (right)



Source: https://twitter.com/ywsf_mnyf/status/1662110055787839489

Serial numbers

401109	0200173	B013051	B5000908
401289	0200178	B013191	B5000947
85000468	0200976	B014696	B5002799
86002705	B010102	B015374	B6002290
0100372	B011216	B5000266	B6002344
0101393	B011697	B5000619	B8002300
0101793	B011949	B5000624	
0200125	B012965	B5000861	

NP-34 pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

B011653	Documented by the PoE Somalia as seized on ISIL
B6002488	Documented by the PoE Somalia

Reference in previous report: [S/2017/924](#), annex 2.1

Annex 131: NP-34 pistols with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those commercialized by Norconia GmbH presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the German authorities, conveying the comments of Norconia GmbH, the sole importer for Europe of Chinese arms manufacturer North Industries Corporation (Norinco), the documented NP-34 pistols are not counterfeits. After comparing with the files, Norconia GmbH informed that all of the 16 NP-34 pistols documented cannot be found in their weapons books and that they were not imported by them. They said, “The fact that the pistols still bear the ‘DE NORCONIA’ marking is due to the following fact: back in 2016, Norinco as a supplier pre-produced 200 NP-34 pistols with this marking. From that point until today, however, due to declining demand, Norconia GmbH has only ordered five NP-34 pistols, but marked with totally different serial numbers.” Norconia GmbH assumed that the 16 NP-34 pistols documented, which were originally intended for them, were exported directly from China via other channels.

Quantity documented: 16

Figures 131.1. (left) and 131.2 (right)



Figure 131.3 (left) 22-CN (2022 as the year of production)

Figure 131.4 (right) Norinco factory logo



Source: https://twitter.com/Hassan_Ghayeb2/status/1752692840495263875/photo/2

Serial numbers

B026102	B029607	B030301	B031640
B027157	B029615	B030304	B031653
B029125	B029892	B030308	B031723
B029520	B030028	B030528	B032596

Annex 132: NP-42 Mini pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 16

Figures 132.1 (left), and 132.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/lyrby44932777/status/1636067867882921986>

Serial numbers

000648	002237	003427	009248
001439	003259	003485	010840
001525	003325	007985	028943
001954	003395	008086	011775-23-296

NP-42 Mini pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

003629	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
--------	---------------------------------

Annex 133: FB-83 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Poland presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 43

Figures 133.1 (left), and 133.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKimmF0uL2/status/1745499029545369713>

Serial numbers

EF06193	ZU08134	NL00950	NL03416	SF03680
EF07363	ZU08204	NL03355	NL03418	SF03742
EF07426	ZU09166	NL00353	NL03355	SF03751
EF07639	ZU09547	NL00771	NL03524	SF03755
EF09041	ZU09700	NL00981	NL03625	SF03900
EF09123	ZU09767	NL01808	NL03846	MW05959
ZU07715	ZU09806	NL01811	SF08680	MW06124
ZU07443	NL00428	NL02138	SF03083	
ZU07695	NL00490	NL03185	SF03437	


FB-83 pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

ZU08864	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
---------	---------------------------------

Annex 134: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 49

Figures 134.1 (left), and 134.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=479035194412543&set=pb.100069181991038.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

25025413	26018338	26038410	27062180	28006408
25023361	26022476	26039556	27065419	28025788
25024585	26029253	26039773	27105554	28053494
25028608	26030746	26042878	27132734	28081544
25029722	26031111	26072964	27133794	28089548
26009277	26033093	26074596	27183082	28090227
26012778	26035831	26089548	27185674	28100274
26014718	26036101	26108201	27199193	28120521
26015736	26037377	26162017	27205103	28144117
26016445	26037512	26163316	28006802	

Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 26 documented in Bahrain, Iraq, KSA, Niger, Central Africa Republic and Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas


27107135	Documented in Syria
27111509	Documented in Bahrain by Atlantic Council
27138062	Documented in KSA by JSTOR
27144983	Documented in Iraq by JSTOR
27151877	Documented in Iraq by JSTOR
27116626	Documented in Niger by Conflict Armament Research (CAR)
2717018?	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
28168193	Documented in Central Africa Rep by the Panel of experts on RCA
30005215	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)

Reference in previous report: S/2023/724, annex 11, and S/2015/936, annex 1.13

Annex 135: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 17

Figures 135.1 (left), and 135.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/yaser84779686/status/1216947156009078784/photo/2>

Serial numbers

60001470	62042402	63042319
60025564	62069029	63052870
60035053	62117807	63084326
61036441	62146851	63243537
61063770	62161944	64013638
61131431	63042265	

Reference in previous reports: S/2023/833, paras. 70-71, 73, annexes 24-27, S/2022/754, para. 104, S/2022/50, paras. 62, 64, S/2021/79, para. 86, table 2, S/2020/326, para. 61, and S/2019/83, paras. 95-96

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 26, and production batches 15-CN, 16-CN, 17-CN, 18-CN, and 19-CN, intercepted between 2018 and 2023, which have also been documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Production batch 15-CN

Serial numbers	Comment
60000469	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
60001470	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
60006094	Documented by the PoE Somalia
60003785	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
60006094	Documented by the PoE Somalia
60006170	Documented by the PoE Somalia
60009383	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
60012023	Documented by the PoE Somalia
60012270	Documented by the PoE Somalia (arms from Djibouti)
60013158	Documented by the PoE Somalia (arms from Djibouti)
60013577	Documented by the PoE Somalia
60014293	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
60014768	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
60015612	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
60053925	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
60060687	Documented by the PoE Somalia

Production batch 16-CN

61001920	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61002030	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61002149	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61002515	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61003454	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61003463	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61003807	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61003990	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004235	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004373	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61004386	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004407	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004467	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004586	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004595	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61004620	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004647	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61005463	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61005490	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61005520	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61005566	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61005588	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61005589	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61005696	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006058	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61006237	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61016589	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61016600	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006614	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61016742	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61016756	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006787	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61006801	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006814	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006852	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006859	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61006910	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006912	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61007091	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61007494	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61007768	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61007852	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61008170	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61008338	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61008459	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61008749	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61008943	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61008996	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61022748	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61022845	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61022850	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61022854	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61022915	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61026550	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61026562	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen /
61026571	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61026632	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61026638	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61026640	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61032723	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61032991	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61033164	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61037649	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61037796	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61037844	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61038157	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61038225	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61040633	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61040742	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61040869	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61041039	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61041125	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61041256	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61044069	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61044076	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61044080	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61044092	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61044113	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61048624	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61054712	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61055765	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61056959	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61057023	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61060000	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61060324	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61060355	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61060567	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61060593	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61063485	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61063496	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61063543	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61063573	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61063641	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61063681	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61063770	Observed on the black market in Houthi controlled areas
61063879	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61063916	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61069718	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61069749	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61079035	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61080895	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61080994	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61089851	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61089854	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61089885	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61089907	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61089919	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61091409	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61091542	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61091546	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61091556	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61091560	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62096109	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62096303	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61096634	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62096647	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61096657	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62096675	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62096714	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62096761	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62096847	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61096927	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62096929	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62096941	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62098152	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61098408	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62098719	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62098821	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61098882	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62099197	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62099209	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62099322	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61099363	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62099367	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62099375	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61128703	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61129232	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61129414	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
61129726	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61129771	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61131425	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61131427	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61131431	Observed on the black market in Houthi controlled areas
61131439	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61131467	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

Production batch 17-CN

62012652	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
----------	-------------------------------------

62028884	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62028927	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62029096	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62029309	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62029410	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62030167	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62035280	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62035357	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62035360	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
62035391	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62035512	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62042333	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62042402	Observed on the black market in Houthi- controlled areas
62042662	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
62043136	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62045607	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62046363	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62046797	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62047578	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62047742	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62048096	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62048794	Documented in Somalia by CAR

62048834	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62048904	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62048924	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62049153	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62049424	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62050684	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62050742	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62051887	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62051997	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62052003	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62052225	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62052287	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62052753	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62052790	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62053138	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62053233	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62054562	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62054614	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62056023	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62056447	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62056514	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62056601	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62056918	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62057267	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62068569	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62069029	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled area
62069345	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62069377	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62103376	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62103380	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62103427	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62103507	Documented by the PoE Somalia
62103651	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62103661	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62115236	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62115237	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62115254	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
62115261	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62115287	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62117491	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62117740	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62117807	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas
62117821	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62117823	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62131730	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
----------	--------------------------

62131794	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62131917	Documented by the PoE Somalia
62131964	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62131981	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62135349	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62135350	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62143358	Documented by the PoE Somalia
62146851	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas
62163358	Documented by the PoE Somalia

Production batch 18-CN

63000597	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63000600	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63000617	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63000620	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63000639	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63000644	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63000765	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces

63001996	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63001998	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63002004	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63002010	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63002016	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63002018	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63002415	Seized in Yemen by UAE forces
63002455	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63002460	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63004051	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63004061	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63004103	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63004132	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63004158	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63006154	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63006152	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63006160	Seized in Yemen by UAE forces
63006178	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63006192	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63008382	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63008401	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63008409	Seized in Yemen by UAE forces
63008411	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63008416	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63008541	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63008543	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63008553	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63008595	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63008612	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63010580	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63010582	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63010595	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63010617	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63010627	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63010638	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63012260	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63012265	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63012269	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63012280	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63012286	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63014858	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63014863	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63014866	Captured in Yemen by UAE forces
63014880	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63014922	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63025370	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63025371	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)

63039372	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63039391	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63039468	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63039476	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63039502	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63041883	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63041894	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
63041907	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63041909	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63042228	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63042247	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63042265	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas
63042293	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63042298	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63042315	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63042318	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63042319	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas

63042330	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63042811	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63044680	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63044684	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63044712	Captured in Yemen by UAE forces
63044713	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63044715	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63045538	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63045545	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63045561	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63045562	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63045567	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63050942	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63052870	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas
63056702	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63057434	Documented in Somalia by CAR

63006160	Seized in Yemen by UAE forces
63061631	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
63062977	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63069739	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63071650	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
63072304	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63084645	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63088360	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63090647	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63098435	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63243537	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas
----------	---

Production batch 19-CN

640??253	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas
64030876	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
6408??66	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

Annex 136: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 and with serial numbers consistent with the batches of those operated by the GoY, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 8

Figures 136.1 (left), and 136.2 (right)




Figure 136.3

GoY markings



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=321850557236163&set=pb.100082336645878.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

66037518	66042206
66037550	66043417
66037647	66043447
66039126	66044685

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 26 and production batch 21-CN, documented in Somalia, consistent with those operated by the GoY


66769998	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
----------	--

Reference in previous report: [S/2022/754](#), annex 7

Annex 137: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 2

Figures 137.1 (left), and 137.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/AlshwhtyAhmd/status/1667216435871924232>

Serial numbers

36000181
36009444

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 56 documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

36008966	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
36038858	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

Annex 138: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 66 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 11

Figures 138.1 (left), and 138.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/AhmedAh11388275/status/1565673900524068867>

Serial numbers

2016660	3004215	15121613	17214317	18117943
2036211	15197294	16152478	17249009	18143325
2036419				

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 66 documented in Bahrain, Somalia, and Niger, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

2039297	Documented by the PoE Somalia
12094597	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
14067873	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015 ⁶⁶
14079784	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
14095934	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
15005828	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
15041479	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
15066207	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
15075848	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
17189034	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
18120250	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabab)
18210072	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
18217170	Documented in Niger by CAR
18227023	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
20039297	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)


Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

⁶⁶ <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/A-Guide-to-Illicit-Iranian-Weapon-Transfers-in-the-Gulf.pdf>

Annex 139: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 313 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 27

Figures 139.1 (left), and 139.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinnF0uL2/status/1654572263516041224>

Serial numbers

4608015	4912327	5147373	5220591	5566615
4815123	4913503	5215004	5220935	5609746
4862927	4919362	5215084	5240041	5648055
4866277	5003018	5216401	5311772	5648442
4904199	5007172	5220271	5524400	5650567
4901928	5012862			

Reference in previous reports: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11, and [S/2016/254](#), paras. 39-41, and annex 13a

Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 313 documented in Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, and Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

4811827	Documented in Côte d'Ivoire by CAR
4814753	Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire
4815339	Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire
4816062	Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire
4816250	Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire
4851763	Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire
4852923	Documented in Côte d'Ivoire by CAR
5006693	Documented in Niger by CAR
5201355	Documented in Niger by CAR
5212128	Documented in Niger by CAR
5217326	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)

Reference in previous report: [S/2016/254](#), paras. 39-41, and annex 13a

Annex 140: Type 56-2 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 313 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 13

Figure 140.1 (left), and 140.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=227251913639959&set=pb.100090654554764.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

3303707	3507393	3511329	3516991	3530749
3311467	3507870	3512246	3524882	3535499
3322844	3510157	3516837		

Type 56-2 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 313 documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas


3503591	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
---------	--

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

Annex 141: Type 56-2 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 386 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 1

Figures 141.1 (left), and 141.2 (right)



Source:

<https://twitter.com/c2sXAyxqmYMzhon/status/1722710128296644985/photo/1><https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinmF0uL2/status/1654572263516041224/photo/2>

Serial number

2006211

Type 56-2 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 386 documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

2000998	Documented in Somalia by CAR
2002236	Documented in Somalia by CAR
2008394	Documented in Somalia by CAR
2008667	Documented in Somalia by CAR
2009138	Documented in Somalia by CAR

Annex 142: M80 LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and which are consistent with the model and batch that those intercepted between 2020 and 2023

Quantity documented: 8

Figures 142.1 (left), and 142.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/ShakrTayf/status/1681052084005662720>

Serial numbers

Marking 1

288215
325240
322315
330517
330983
360585

Marking 2

15-CN 07677
17-CN 10684

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/833](#), para. 69, annex 18, [S/2022/50](#), para. 64, and [S/2021/79](#), para. 86

M80 LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China documented in Central Africa Republic, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan, and which are also consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

268317	Documented in South Sudan by Small Arms Survey ⁶⁷
272929	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabab)
288215	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
324690	Documented in Central Africa Republic by the PoE on RCA
325240	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
330517	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
330983	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
400515	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
400805	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
401702	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
402185	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
402813	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces

15-CN 07677	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
-------------	--

16-CN 07403	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
16-CN 07478	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
16-CN 07737	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
16-CN 07969	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
16-CN 08057	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
16-CN 08198	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
16-CN 08311	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
16-CN 08384	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

17-CN 00734	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 02301	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 02415	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 02569	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 03482	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 03564	Documented in Somalia by CAR
17-CN 03579	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 03741	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 03786	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 03805	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 03996	Documented in Mali by CAR
17-CN 04591	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
17-CN 05029	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
17-CN 07055	Documented in Somalia by CAR
17-CN 10684	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
17-CN 24547	Documented in Somalia by CAR

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

⁶⁷ <https://smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/Weapons-seized-from-George-Athor-and-John-Duit-Dec-2012.pdf>

Annex 143: MPiKMS 72 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings, similar to those manufactured in former East Germany, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented:

Figures 143.1 (left), and 143.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/m777344073/status/1644884973600530435>

Serial numbers

58 MX 2785	83 LH 1500	84 ML 5540	86 32 7517	86 36 4037
64 MN 2557	83 LH 2787	84 MN 2997	86 33 1745	86 36 4758
72 F 0385	83 LH 3383	84 MO 0099	86 33 2010	86 36 6059
73 MG 7787	83 LH 7508	84 MO 2284	86 33 2239	86 36 6163
77 FC 5467	83 LL 2478	84 MO 5910	86 33 7902	86 37 5773
80 IL 1212	83 LO 1919	84 MU 1272	86 34 5171	87 31 0299
81 JA 3553	83 LR 3923	84 MX 0613	86 34 6582	87 31 4717
81 JA 3945	83 LT 6716	84 MX 0639	86 35 2211	87 31 7668
81 JD 1129	83 XT 0164	84 MX 2788	86 35 2465	
82 XX 3081	83 XV 1443	85 LR 0893	86 35 3433	
83 LA 7175	83 XV 7903	85 NA 2661	86 35 4549	
83 LD 1919	84 MF 4875	86 32 7344	86 35 5076	

MPiKMS 72 assault rifles documented in Niger, and Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

73 BM 2790	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabab)
83 LC 7406	Documented by the PoE Somalia
86 35 3140	Documented in Niger by CAR
86 35 4295	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
86 36 2990	Documented in Niger by CAR

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

Annex 144: KL serie assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, similar to those manufactured in Iran, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

The Iranian authorities stated that none of the documented serial numbers correspond to Iranian products. They also stated that dozens of companies in different countries are manufacturing assault rifles of the type described by the Panel.

Quantity documented: 17

Figure 144.1. (Right view)



Figure 144.2. (Left view)



Figure 144.3. (Firing selector)



Figure 144.4. (Serial numbers)



Source: https://twitter.com/muafaq_tayif/status/1458141150154350595

Serial numbers

1801214	2304094	2305179	2329555	2609260
2003682	2304097	2305192	2415094	
2003996	2304902	2326449	2506339	
2107854	2305039	2327129	2506433	

KL series assault rifles documented in Bahrain, Iraq, KSA, Somalia, and Syria, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

1603504	Documented by the PoE Somalia
2003185	Documented in Syria (Open sources) ⁶⁸
2102933	Documented in Syria by WarNoir ⁶⁹
2200914	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
2204527	Documented in Iraq by Calibra Obscura ⁷⁰
2304094	Documented in Bahrain by JSTOR
2304097	Documented in Bahrain by JSTOR
2304376	Documented in Iraq by Calibre Obscura
2304568	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
2305360	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
2306507	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
2315428	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
2404106	Documented in the KSA ⁷¹

⁶⁸ <https://www.theakforum.net/threads/iranian-aks.112972/page-3#lg=thread-112972&slide=1>

⁶⁹ https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1412555837814579200

⁷⁰ <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1453273573477556237>

⁷¹ <https://twitter.com/thedixiemauser/status/1658239456053264386/photo/3>

The following features are some of the characteristic of the KL assault rifles manufactured in Iran, and which are visible on those documented by the Panel:

- A seven-digit serial number on the left side of the weapon, usually just above the magazine well;
- “0” digit (often covered by a bar);
- Weapon selector markings are on the right side of the receiver to the right of the selector lever. Markings are as follows: « L » (full automatic fire) and « D » (semi-automatic fire);
- Pistol grip, hand guard, and stock made of red-brown plastic furniture;
- Absence of compensator on the muzzle;
- Enclosed front sight.

Annex 145: TK-9 Tondar sub-machine gun (SMG) with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Iran, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

The Iranian authorities stated to the Panel that none of the documented serial numbers correspond to Iranian products. Iranian authorities also stated that at least similar SMGs manufactured in three countries are very similar to Iranian products.

Quantity documented: 12

Figure 145.1. (Right view)



Figure 145.2. (Left view)



Figure 145.3. (Factory markings)



Figure 145.4. (Serial numbers)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=844312487101894&set=pb.100045694508321.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

7505450	7506514	7506699	7506995
7506097	7506627	7506850	7610389
7506299	7506697	7506856	9710110

On the figure 145.3, the marking of the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), Iran, is present.

Samples of DIO marking

Figure 145.5 (on a G3 rifle)



Figure 145.6 (on a TK-9 SMG)



Source: Conflict Armament Research (CAR)


Source: Armament Research Services (ARES)

Annex 146: FEG AMD-65 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Hungary presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the manufacturer, the AMD-65 assault rifle with serial numbers “DD8807” was exported on 7 October 2007 by MFS2000 Inc to the Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Quantity documented:

Figures 146.1 (up) and 146.2 (down)




Source: https://twitter.com/muafaq_tayif/status/1603798570385260547

Serial numbers

DD8807

End User Certificate (EUC) issued by the Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, dated 17 January 2007, covering the transfer of 10,000 AMD-65 assault rifles.

According to the Hungarian authorities, this EUC is covering the AMD-65 assault rifle bearing the serial numbers DD8807



Annex 147: HK G3-A3 rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those manufactured under licence in the UK, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 26

Figure 147.1



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=188701320767070&set=pb.100088816089895.-2207520000&type=3>

Serial numbers

6024446	6050901	6642494	6710115
6024950	6542591	6659193	6720468

6025355	6545317	6661940	6722225
6034862	6546226	6680996	6725929
6037329	6553634	6681927	6733841
6047789	6606289	6700730	
6047871	6628069	6703088	

HK G3-A3 rifle with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced under licence in the UK, documented in Somalia, and which is consistent with those observed as presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas


6050185	Documented by the PoE Somalia
---------	-------------------------------

Reference in previous report: [S/2022/754](#), annex 7

Annex 148: PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Romania presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and which are also consistent with the model and batch of those intercepted in 2023

Quantity documented: 4

Figures 148.1 (left), and 149.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=348554747899077&set=pcb.348554851232400>

Serial numbers

V 1589
V 2752
V 3192
V 4590

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/833](#), annex 20

PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Romania documented in Somalia, and which is consistent with those observed as presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

V 2076	Documented in Somalia by CAR
--------	------------------------------

Annex 150: PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Hungary, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 4

Figure 150.1 (left), and 150.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=840413040825172&set=pb.100045694508321.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

BA 224
BA 233
BA 305
GN 973

PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Hungary documented in Somalia, and which are consistent with those observed as presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

BA 064	Documented in Somalia by CAR
BA 898	Documented in Somalia by CAR
GM 941	Documented in Somalia by CAR

Annex 151: RPG-7 grenade launcher with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Iran presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and which are consistent with the model and batch of those intercepted between 2016 and 2021

Quantity documented: 2

Figure 151.1



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=134483812639506&set=pb.100082336645878.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

Y 00010
9590085

Reference in previous reports: S/2023/833, annex 27, S/2022/50, para. 62, S/2021/79, annex 14, S/2020/326, para. 61, and S/2018/193, tables 2-3

RPG-7 grenade launcher with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Iran documented on their way to Somalia, or seized on the Houthis, and/or also consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

9090074	Documented as seized on its way to Somalia by CAR
9190109	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
9290816	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
9390546	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
9490973	Documented in Yemen by CAR
9593295	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
9593325	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
9593466	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
9594144	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

Annex 152: Pulsar Trail XQ50 thermal sight with technical characteristics and markings presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, consistent with those produced in Lithuania

Quantity documented: 1

Figure 152.1



Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1705911557228572794>

Serial number

9037521

Pulsar Trail XQ50 thermal sight with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Lithuania documented in Afghanistan consistent with the one presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

9007698	Documented in Afghanistan by CAR
9012188	Documented in Afghanistan by CAR
9013831	Documented in Afghanistan by CAR
9025451	Documented in Afghanistan by CAR
9025621	Documented in Afghanistan by CAR
9032474	Documented in Afghanistan by CAR
9037521	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas

Annex 153: Taurus G3 pistols manufactured in Brazil, which have been legally transferred between 2021 and 2023 to KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 12

Figure 153.1



Source: <https://twitter.com/yhyyr522/status/1704553568303300684/photo/1>

Serial numbers of Taurus G3 pistols legally transferred to Rammai Najd Hunting Est, KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

AEB084847	ADL869012	ADL869200
AEB084804	ADL869014	ADL869212
AEB084897	ADL869026	ADL872648
ACJ316834	ADL869185	ADL872677

Annex 154: Taurus G3XL pistol manufactured in Brazil, which has been legally transferred in 2022 to KSA, and which has been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 1

Figure 154.1



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=224402820314271&set=pb.100082336645878.-2207520000>

Serial number of Taurus G3XL pistol legally transferred to Rammai Najd Hunting Est, KSA, and which has been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

ADL872535

Annex 155: Taurus TH-9 pistols manufactured in Brazil, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 3

Figure 155.1



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=303455182409034&set=pb.100082336645878.-2207520000>

Serial numbers of Taurus TH-9 pistols legally transferred to Rammai Najd Hunting Est, KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

ADM978875
ADM978876
ADM978879

Appendix A

Document indicating the models, serial numbers, consignee in KSA, and date of sale of the Taurus pistols documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas



AEB084847	G3	15/02/2023	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83525440	21/02/2023
AEB084804	G3	15/02/2023	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83525440	21/02/2023
AEB084897	G3	15/02/2023	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83525440	21/02/2023
ACJ316834	G3	25/08/2021	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	82967325	17/11/2021
ADL869012	G3	04/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
ADL869014	G3	04/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
ADL869026	G3	04/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
ADL869185	G3	04/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022

ADL869200	G3	04/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
ADL869212	G3	04/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
ADL872648	G3	05/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
ADL872677	G3	05/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022

ADL872535	G3XL	05/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
-----------	------	------------	--------	--	----------	------------

ADM978875	TH9	05/11/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83442104	21/11/2022
ADM978876	TH9	05/11/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83442104	21/11/2022
ADM978879	TH9	05/11/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83442104	21/11/2022

Source: Confidential

Appendix B

End-User certificate related to the Taurus pistols legally transferred in 2022 and 2023 to Rammai Najd Hunting Est, KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas



المملكة العربية السعودية
وزارة الداخلية
(٢٧٢)

The General
Department of Arms and Explosives

وزارة الداخلية
رقم الصخر: ٢٠٣٣٢
تاريخ الصخر: ١٤٤٣/٠١/٢٣
الصفحة: ١

شهادة مستخدم نهائي
END USER CERTIFICATE

الكمية	الوصف	Description	Quantity
٢٢٠٠	مسدس عيار ٩ ملم شبه أوتوماتيكي	Pistol cal.9mm semi auto	2600
٤٠٠	مسدس عيار ٢٢ إل أو شبه أوتوماتيكي	Pistol cal.22 LR semi auto	400

١. تشهد وزارة الداخلية بالمملكة العربية السعودية أن البضائع الموضح وصفها أعلاه سيتم توريدها من شركة تروس بالبرلايل بواسطة مؤسسة رماي نجد للصيد سجل تجاري رقم (١٠١٠٦٠٧٨٢١) وعنوانها: المملكة العربية السعودية / الرياض.
٢. المواد المراد توريدها لصالح التاجر ولأغراض تجارية سيتم بيعها في المملكة العربية السعودية للمواطنين وتسجيلها عليهم تحت إشراف وزارة الداخلية.
٣. لن يعاد تصدير المواد لجهة أخرى غير مصدرها أو التخلص منها أو التفويض بالتصرف فيها خارج المملكة بدون أخذ الموافقة المسبقة من الجهة المعنية لدى حكومة المورد.
٤. هذه الشهادة أعطيت للحصول على شهادات التصدير الضرورية.

BRIG.GEN. ADEEB BIN SAUD BIN THINYAN AL SAUD
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES
IN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Date: 31 AUGUST 2021

Official Stamp

Source: Confidential

Annex 156: Taurus G3c pistols manufactured in Brazil, which have been legally transferred to Tanzania, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 37

Figure 156.1



Source:

<https://www.facebook.com/106950802358384/photos/pb.100091374281039.-2207520000./108029035583894/?type=3><https://twitter.com/DhialArms/status/1758124013597954169/photo/1>

Serial numbers of Taurus G3c pistols legally transferred to Boomslang Logistik East Africa Limited, Tanzania, which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

ADG430680	ADG500858	ADG501445	ADG506587
ADG432528	ADG500921	ADG501739	ADG506630
ADG434270	ADG500923	ADG506087	ADG506862
ADG452187	ADG500959	ADG506163	ADG513901
ADG457983	ADG501032	ADG506255	ADG513905
ADG486791	ADG501235	ADG506261	ADG514296
ADG486856	ADG501288	ADG506311	ADG514463
ADG486882	ADG501300	ADG506367	
ADG487279	ADG501324	ADG506505	
ADG487285	ADG501363	ADG506562	

Appendix A

End-User certificate dated 18 December 2022 by the United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Home Affairs, Tanzania Police Force, related to the documented Taurus G3c pistols transferred to Boomslang Logistics East Africa Limited

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFIARS
TANZANIA POLICE FORCE



The officer incharge
Central Arms Registrar
P.o.box 9141
DAR ES SALAAM.

18th Dec 2020

DSM/CID/HQ/C.5/4/3/79

Boomslang Logistics (EA) Ltd,
P.o.box 11108
Dar es salam,
Tanzania


RE:END USER CERTIFICATE.

1. Name & Address of Final Destination:
Name:BOOMSLANG LOGISTICS EAST AFRICA LIMITED
ADDRESS:Tanzania,Region Dar Es salaam,District Ilala
CBD,Ward Jangwani ,Postal code 11108,Street Mkunguni,Road
Lumumba,Plot number 28,Block number 71,House number 14.
2. Name & Address of the Buyer:
Name:BOOMSLANG LOGISTICS EAST AFRICA LIMITED
ADDRESS:Tanzania,Region Dar es salaam,Disttict Ilala
CBD,Ward Jangwani ,Postal code 11108,Street Mkunguni,Road
Lumumba,Plot number 28,Block number 71,House number 14.
3. Name & Address of the Seller:
Name:TAURUS ARMAS S.A
Address:Avenida Sao Borja,n 2181-Predio-Fazeda Sao Borja-
CEP:93035-411 Sao Leopoldo-RS-Brasil.

4. Descriptions and quantities of the goods:

PRODUCT(s) DESCRIPTION	QUANTITIES
Taurus pistol model G3, 9mm caliber, 17 rounds capacity with two additional mags, cleaning kit and user manual.	12,000
Taurus pistol model G3c, 9mm caliber, 12 rounds capacity with two additional mags, cleaning kit and user manual.	12,000
Taurus pistol model TS9, 9mm caliber, 17 rounds capacity with two additional mags, cleaning kit and user manual.	2000
Taurus revolver model RT85s, 38 spl caliber, 5 shorts, 2" barrel length, cleaning kit and user manual.	12,000
Taurus revolver model RT856, 38spl caliber, 6 shorts, 2" barrel length, cleaning kit and user manual.	12,000

- I. The certificate is used in Tanzania to be presented to the governmental authorities of the Republic of Brazil.
- II. The goods in this End user certificate will be for the exclusive use of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
- III. The final consumer guarantees, by the appropriate signature that the products mentioned in this End User Certificate will not be used for purpose other than for National Security and that it will not be neither sold, nor loaned, nor re-exported, to a third party without prior written agreement from the authorities or Government.

 - SP
 For: DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
 DAR ES SALAAM

For: DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL
 INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT

Annex 157: Taurus 24/7 pistols produced in Brazil, which have been legally transferred to the Ministry of Defence of Djibouti, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 20

Figures 157.1 (left), and 157.2 (right)



Source: https://twitter.com/muafaq_tayif/status/1544746309642584064

Serial numbers of the Taurus 24/7 pistols legally sold to the National Security of Ministry of Defence of Djibouti, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

TGZ50697	TGZ51229	TGZ51619	TGZ52047
TGZ50837	TGZ51242	TGZ51653	TGZ52144
TGZ50875	TGZ51470	TGZ51968	TGZ52187
TGZ51072	TGZ51485	TGZ52033	TGZ52366
TGZ51192	TGZ51509	TGZ52040	TGZ52374

Appendix A

Document indicating the models, serial numbers, consignee, and date of sale of the pistols Taurus 24/7 sold to the Ministry of Defence of Djibouti, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas



production and sales details of the firearms. Furthermore, Taurus attaches hereto, in the following annexes, all documents in which data herein provided is substantiated as well as all the certificates and licenses the company was able to collect (all dates are in the "DD/MM/YYYY" standard):

Serial Number	Model	Production date and local	Consignee	Sales Data		
				Invoice number	Date of Sale	
TGZ50697	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	124.808	11/03/2014
TGZ50837	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	124.808	11/03/2014
TGZ50875	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	124.808	11/03/2014
TGZ51072	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51192	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51229	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51242	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51470	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51485	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51509	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51619	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014





TGZ51653	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ52144	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ51968	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ52033	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ52040	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ52047	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ52187	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ52366	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ52374	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014

Source: Confidential

Appendix B

End User Certificate related to the pistols Taurus sold to the Ministry of Defence of Djibouti, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas



Source: Confidential

Annex 158: Canik TP9 Elite Combat pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2023 to KSA and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the manufacturer, the Canik TP9 Elite Combat pistol with serial numbers T6472-22 BN 08888, was transferred in January 2023 to Ben Humaid National Trading Co, Jeddah – KSA.

Quantity documented: 1

Figures 158.1. (left) and 158.2 (right)



Figure 158.3



Serial number

T6472-22 BN 08888

Source: <https://twitter.com/GlocStore/status/1690671378263920640/photo/1>

Annex 159 Canik TP9 Elite SF pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to USA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the manufacturer, the Canik TP9 Elite SF pistol with serial numbers T6472-22 AT 24009, was transferred in September 2022 to Century Arms Inc., Fairfax, USA.

Quantity documented: 1

Figures 159.1. (left) and 159.2 (right)



Figure 159.3



Serial number

T6472-22 AT 24009

Source: https://twitter.com/Ashraf_Muneeff/status/1692436654168953146

Appendix A

Air Waybill associated to the transfer of the Canik TP9 SF pistol with serial number T6472-22 AT 24009

235		IST 48992355		235 48992355		
Shipper's Name and Address SAMSUN YURT SAVUNMA SANAYI VE TICARET A.S. ORGANIZE SANAYI BOLG. VALI ERDOGAN CEBECI BLV. NO:28 55300 TEKKEKOY-SAMSUN-TURKEY			Not Negotiable Air Waybill Issued by		TURK HAVA YOLLARI A.O. TURKISH AIRLINES INC. THY GENEL YONETIM BINASI, ATATURK HAVALIMANI 34149 YESILKOY-ISTANBUL-TURKEY	
Consignee's Name and Address CENTURY ARMS INC 236 BRYCE BLVD. FAIRFAX, VT 05454 USA PHONE: 802 527 1258 FAX: 802 752 1260 05454 NEW YORK-NEW YORK-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA			E - AWB			
Issuing Carrier's Agent Name and City SOLMAZ GUMRUK MUSAVIRLIGI A.S. ZINCIRLIKUYU ESENTEPE MAH. KORE SEHTLERI CAD. YUZBASI KAYA ALDOGAN NO:9 34394 SISLI-ISTANBUL- TURKEY						
Agent's IATA Code 88 4 727B 0012			Accounting Information FREIGHT PREPAID			
Airport of Departure (Addr. Of First Carrier) and Requested Routing ISTANBUL / ISTANBUL HAVALIMANI			Reference Number		Optional Shipping Information	
To	By First Carrier	To	By	To	By	
JFK	TURK HAVA YOLLARI A.O.					
Airport of Destination NEW YORK UNITED STATES			Requested Flyb/Date TK 6363 19.09.2022	Amount of Insurance XXX	INSURANCE - If Carrier offers insurance, and such insurance is required in accordance with the conditions thereof, indicate amount to be insured in figures in box marked 'Amount of Insurance'	
64 PALLETS 12062 KG HEA						
SCT						
No of Pieces SPC	Gross Weight	Rate Class	Chargeable Weight	Rate / Charge	Total	Nature and Quantity of Goods (incl. Dimensions or Volume)
64	12062	K Q	12062	5.3	63928.60	SEMI AUTOMATIC PISTOLS NOT RESTRICTED DIMS: 26/120X80X100 CM 32/120X80X80 CM 1/123X80X46 CM 2/123X80X55 CM 3/123X80X44 CM
64	12062	K Q				
Prepaid			Weight Charge			Collect
						Other Charges
						AWA= 60
						MOC: 60.- CGC:3.00 FSC: 2412.40
						Valuation Charge
						Tax
						Total Other Charges Due Agent
60.00						Shipper certifies that the particulars on the face
						SOLMAZ GUMRUK MUSAVIRLIGI AS AGENT OF CARRIER
						TURK HAVA YOLLARI A.O.
						Signature of Shipper or its Agent
						1. 17.09.2022 ISTANBUL / ISTANBUL HAVALIMANI DULEK OKTAY
						Executed on (date)
						At (place)
						Signature of Issuing Carrier or its Agent
For Carrier Use only at Destination			Charges at Destination			Total collect Charges

Source: Confidential

Annex 160: AHSS FXS-9 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to the Sudan and to Czechia, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 46

Figures 160.1 (left) and 160.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=106430429046706&set=pb.100090392468856.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

TF674-22A01575 (B)	TF674-22A10232 (B)	TF674-22A11575 (C)	TF674-22A13565 (B)	TF674-22A14223 (B)
TF674-22A01981 (B)	TF674-22A10421 (B)	TF674-22A11585 (C)	TF674-22A13807 (B)	TF674-22A14228 (B)
TF674-22A04707 (A)	TF674-22A10558 (B)	TF674-22A11605 (C)	TF674-22A13597 (B)	TF674-22A44380 (A)
TF674-22A04822 (B)	TF674-22A10292 (B)	TF674-22A11723 (C)	TF674-22A13709 (B)	
TF674-22A04933 (A)	TF674-22A10691 (B)	TF674-22A11733 (A)	TF674-22A13781 (B)	
TF674-22A05250 (B)	TF674-22A10700 (A)	TF674-22A11774 (C)	TF674-22A13823 (B)	
TF674-22A08467 (C)	TF674-22A10726 (A)	TF674-22A11802 (C)	TF674-22A13856 (B)	
TF674-22A08518 (C)	TF674-22A10736 (B)	TF674-22A11830 (C)	TF674-22A13860 (B)	
TF674-22A08544 (A)	TF674-22A10740 (B)	TF674-22A12002 (C)	TF674-22A13864 (B)	
TF674-22A08974 (C)	TF674-22A10775 (B)	TF674-22A12503 (D)	TF674-22A13911 (B)	
TF674-22A08999 (C)	TF674-22A11537 (C)	TF674-22A13466 (B)	TF674-22A13956 (A)	
TF674-22A09024 (C)	TF674-22A11556 (C)	TF674-22A13532 (B)	TF674-22A14004 (B)	
TF674-22A10230 (B)	TF674-22A11567 (C)	TF674-22A13550 (B)	TF674-22A14179 (A)	

- (A) Purchaser not identified
- (B) Moataz Abdelrahman weapons ammunition, Sudan
- (C) Albayarg for firearms, Sudan
- (D) Kozap S.R.O, Czechia

Appendix A

Document related to the legal transfer between February 2022 and December 2022 of 47 AHSS FXS-9 pistols into the Republic of Sudan and to Czechia

SERIAL NUMBER	BRAND	MODEL	DELIVERY	EXPORT PERMISSION NO	PRODUCTION TIME	COUNTRY	COMPANY
TF674-22A01575	AHSS	FXS-9	11/02/22	06.01.2021 - 38100341-545.04-5626	10.02.2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A01981	AHSS	FXS-9	11/02/22	06.01.2021 - 38100341-545.04-5626	10.02.2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A04822	AHSS	FXS-9	15/04/22	06.01.2021 - 38100341-545.04-5626	07.04.2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A05250	AHSS	FXS-9	15/04/22	06.01.2021 - 38100341-545.04-5626	12.04.2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A08467	AHSS	FXS-9	28/06/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	28/06/2022	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A08518	AHSS	FXS-9	28/06/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	28/06/2022	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A08974	AHSS	FXS-9	13/07/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	07/07/2022	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A08999	AHSS	FXS-9	13/07/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	07/07/2022	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A09024	AHSS	FXS-9	13/07/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	07/07/2022	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A10230	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10232	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10292	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10421	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10558	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10691	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10736	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10740	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10775	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A11537	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11556	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11567	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11575	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11585	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11605	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11723	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11774	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11802	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11830	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A12002	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A12503	AHSS	FXS-9	30/09/22	22.07.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1457899	29/09/2022	Czech Republic	KOZAP S.R.O
TF674-22A13466	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13532	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13550	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13565	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13597	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13709	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13781	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13807	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13823	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13856	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13860	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13864	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13911	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A14004	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A14223	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A14228	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A44380	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION

Source: Confidential

Annex 161: Sarsilmaz SAR-9 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to the Sudan, and in 2023 to KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 175

Figures 161.1 (left), and 161.2 (right)



Serial numbers

T1102-22CM00027 (A)	T1102-22BV50524 (B)	T1102-22BV56000 (B)	T1102-22BV59643 (A)
T1102-22BV00592 (A)	T1102-22BV50532 (B)	T1102-22BV56663 (B)	T1102-22BV59650 (C)
T1102-22BV00603 (B)	T1102-22BV50556 (C)	T1102-22BV56718 (B)	T1102-22BV59698 (C)
T1102-22BV00925 (D)	T1102-22BV50557 (A)	T1102-22BV56728 (B)	T1102-22BV59737 (C)
T1102-22BV01329 (A)	T1102-22BV50605 (B)	T1102-22BV56776 (B)	T1102-22BV59749 (C)
T1102-22BV01494 (C)	T1102-22BV50627 (B)	T1102-22BV56797 (B)	T1102-22BV59753 (C)
T1102-22BV02138 (B)	T1102-22BV50642 (C)	T1102-22BV56805 (A)	T1102-22BV59775 (C)
T1102-22BV02973 (C)	T1102-22BV50665 (A)	T1102-22BV56979 (A)	T1102-22BV59880 (C)
T1102-22BV03576 (C)	T1102-22BV50669 (C)	T1102-22BV58171 (B)	T1102-22BV59894 (C)
T1102-22BV03775 (C)	T1102-22BV50702 (C)	T1102-22BV58235 (B)	T1102-22BV59919 (C)
T1102-22BV04258 (C)	T1102-22BV50717 (B)	T1102-22BV58244 (B)	T1102-22BV59977 (C)
T1102-22BV04332 (C)	T1102-22BV50789 (C)	T1102-22BV58259 (B)	T1102-22BV59994 (C)
T1102-22BV04823 (A)	T1102-22BV50827 (C)	T1102-22BV58266 (B)	T1102-22BV60012 (C)
T1102-22BV04833 (A)	T1102-22BV50860 (C)	T1102-22BV58401 (A)	T1102-22BV60013 (C)
T1102-22BV04904 (B)	T1102-22BV50877 (C)	T1102-22BV58413 (B)	T1102-22BV60067 (C)
T1102-22BV04948 (C)	T1102-22BV50882 (C)	T1102-22BV58577 (B)	T1102-22BV60236 (C)
T1102-22BV04975 (C)	T1102-22BV50893 (A)	T1102-22BV58600 (B)	T1102-22BV60339 (B)
T1102-22BV05018 (C)	T1102-22BV50894 (B)	T1102-22BV58606 (A)	T1102-22BV60340 (A)
T1102-22BV05021 (A)	T1102-22BV50921 (B)	T1102-22BV58633 (B)	T1102-22BV60395 (A)
T1102-22BV05043 (A)	T1102-22BV50925 (A)	T1102-22BV58651 (B)	T1102-22BV60427 (B)
T1102-22BV14329 (B)	T1102-22BV50928 (B)	T1102-22BV58763 (B)	T1102-22BV60435 (B)
T1102-22BV50171 (A)	T1102-22BV50939 (B)	T1102-22BV58827 (A)	T1102-22BV60454 (B)
T1102-22BV50173 (B)	T1102-22BV50980 (B)	T1102-22BV58828 (B)	T1102-22BV80288 (A)
T1102-22BV50185 (A)	T1102-22BV51017 (C)	T1102-22BV58908 (A)	T1102-23BV01025 (A)
T1102-22BV50186 (C)	T1102-22BV51049 (C)	T1102-22BV58912 (B)	T1102-23BV01041 (B)
T1102-22BV50211 (B)	T1102-22BV51052 (B)	T1102-22BV58934 (B)	T1102-23BV01082 (B)
T1102-22BV50457 (B)	T1102-22BV55750 (B)	T1102-22BV58942 (A)	T1102-23BV01105 (B)
T1102-22BV50232 (B)	T1102-22BV55763 (B)	T1102-22BV59328 (A)	T1102-23BV01107 (B)
T1102-22BV50242 (A)	T1102-22BV55768 (B)	T1102-22BV59329 (C)	T1102-23BV01121 (A)
T1102-22BV50263 (B)	T1102-22BV55782 (B)	T1102-22BV59342 (C)	T1102-23BV01190 (B)
T1102-22BV50311 (B)	T1102-22BV55790 (B)	T1102-22BV59404 (C)	T1102-23BV01222 (B)
T1102-22BV50328 (B)	T1102-22BV55850 (A)	T1102-22BV59412 (C)	T1102-23BV01233 (B)
T1102-22BV50335 (B)	T1102-22BV55851 (A)	T1102-22BV59440 (C)	T1102-23BV01249 (B)
T1102-22BV50360 (B)	T1102-22BV55852 (B)	T1102-22BV59453 (A)	T1102-23BV01274 (B)
T1102-22BV50365 (B)	T1102-22BV55884 (A)	T1102-22BV59473 (C)	T1102-23BV01276 (B)
T1102-22BV50444 (B)	T1102-22BV55893 (B)	T1102-22BV59504 (C)	T1102-23BV01282 (A)
T1102-22BV50457 (A)	T1102-22BV55894 (B)	T1102-22BV59566 (A)	T1102-23BV01285 (A)
T1102-22BV50480 (C)	T1102-22BV55912 (B)	T1102-22BV59591 (C)	T1102-23BV01294 (A)
T1102-22BV50487 (A)	T1102-22BV55929 (B)	T1102-22BV59621 (C)	T1102-23BV01346 (A)
T1102-22BV50495 (C)	T1102-22BV55932 (B)	T1102-22BV59622 (C)	T1102-23BV02346 (A)
T1102-22BV50496 (B)	T1102-22BV55993 (B)	T1102-22BV59630 (C)	T1102-23BV11762 (A)
T1102-22BV50498 (A)	T1102-22BV55997 (B)	T1102-22BV59642 (C)	

- (A) Purchaser not identified
- (B) Khalid Maki Osman for arms and ammunition, Khartoum, Sudan
- (C) Al Rimala for arms and ammunition and trading, Khartoum, Sudan
- (D) Bin Humaid national trading, KSA

Annex 162: Sarsilmaz SAR-9 SP pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to the Sudan, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 13

Figures 162.1 (left), and 162.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKimmF0uL2/status/1690784112443867136/photo/2>

Serial numbers

T1102-23CM00131 (A)
T1102-23CM00177 (B)
T1102-23CM00179 (A)
T1102-23CM00180 (A)
T1102-23CM00223 (B)
T1102-23CM00232 (B)
T1102-23CM00234 (A)
T1102-23CM00460 (B)
T1102-23CM00462 (B)
T1102-23CM00469 (B)
T1102-23CM00474 (B)
T1102-23CM00484 (B)
T1102-23CM00504 (A)

(A) Purchaser not identified

(B) Khalid Maki Osman for arms and ammunition, Khartoum, Sudan

Annex 163: Sarsilmaz B6 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2015 to Iraq, and in 2022 to the Sudan, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 17

Figures 163.1 (left), and 163.2 (right)



Source: https://twitter.com/ramzy_Awsah_/status/1640451562236436480/photo/2

Serial numbers

T1102-13B00325 (A)
T1102-13E16246 (A)

T1102-14E00339 (C)
T1102-14E00914 (C)
T1102-14E01232 (A)

T1102-22E02300 (B)
T1102-22E03166 (B)
T1102-22E03170 (B)
T1102-22E03791 (B)
T1102-22E06124 (B)
T1102-22E52539 (A)
T1102-22E52581 (B)
T1102-22E52591 (B)
T1102-22E52582 (A)
T1102-22E52588 (A)
T1102-22E52581 (A)
T1102-22E52591 (A)

- (A) Purchaser not identified
- (B) Khalid Maki Osman for arms and ammunition, Khartoum, Sudan
- (C) Office of the Prime minister, Iraq

Annex 164: Sarsilmaz Kiliç 2000 Mega pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2015 to Iraq, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 2

Figures 164.1 (left), and 164.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/yhyyr522/status/1713906770391756920>

Serial numbers

T1102-13B00323 (A)
T1102-15U07340 (B)

- (A) Purchaser not identified
- (B) Office of the Prime minister, Iraq

Annex 165: CZ P-07 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Czech Republic, which have been legally transferred in 2023 to KSA and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the manufacturer, the CZ P-07 pistol with serial numbers F374493, was transferred on 3 December 2021 to Ben Humaid National Trading Co, Exit 13/14, Eastern Ring Road, Riyadh – KSA, and the CZ P-07 pistol with serial numbers H011589, was transferred on 6 March 2023 to the same purchaser.

Quantity documented: 2

Figure 165.1



Figure 165.2



Figure 165.3



Source: <https://twitter.com/mdljbr201/status/1736762856048152873>

Serial numbers

F374493
H011589

Annex 166: X-Calibur Mk23 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Slovak Republic, which have been legally transferred to first Czechia and then to KSA and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to KalibrGun Valdy EU Ltd., Czechia, the X-Calibur Mk23 pistol with serial numbers K102358, was part of a sale agreement signed in January 2022 with Ben Humaid National Trading Co, Jeddah, KSA.

Quantity documented: 1

Figure 166.1



Source: https://twitter.com/Ashraf_Muneef/status/1720885902778515477

Serial number

K102358

Appendix A

Commercial agreement between KalibrGun Valdy EU Ltd., Czechia, and Bin Humaid National trading (Arabian Hunter), KSA

Arabian Hunter Est.
For Air Rifles and Hunting Tools
C.R 4030200680



مؤسسة الصياد العربي
للبنادق الهوائية وأدوات الصيد
س.ت 4030200680

Commercial Agreement

On this day 04/01/2022 in Prague City It was agreed between:

1- KalibrGun Valdy EU LTD His residence (or his headquarter): Czech Republic Holder of Commercial Register no. (VAT no. CZ24779636) City: Praha
www.kalibrgun.cz

Represented in this contract by :
Mr. Janousek Richard
His nationality: Czech , First Party.

2- Bin Humaid National Trading (ARABIAN HUNTER) , His Residence / Headquarter : Jeddah , Saudi Arabia Holder of Commercial Register No. 4030054282 City : Jeddah,

Represented in this contract by :
Mr. Nawaf Bandar Bin Humaid
(second party-Exclusive Agent)

Item (1): The two parties have agreed that the second party will import and sell products of the first party in Saudi Arabia. Second Party will sell these pistols in Firearms trade-fairs held in Saudi Arabia .
Terms of Payment: 50% Advance - 50% before Delivery

Item (2): The subject of this contract is the products and services provided by the first party as hereunder specified:

First supply :

Pistols Grand Power Cal.9mm Model X-Caliber at the price of (599) Quantity 200 manufactured by Grand Power / slovakia
Pistols Grand Power Cal.22LR at the price of (EUR310) quantity 20 pcs manufactured by Grand Power / slovakia
Pistols Grand Power Cal.9mm Model Q1 at the price of (EUR 347)quantity 50 pcs manufactured by Grand Power / slovakia
Pistols Grand Power Cal.9mm Model Q1S at the price of (EUR 347)quantity 50 pcs manufactured by Grand Power / slovakia

Item (3): The geographic area for the validity of this exclusive agreement is determined by countries of Saudi Arabia

Item (4): The validity of this contract is (5) years starting from 01-11-2019 and ending by 31-10-2024

Item (5): The two parties shall execute the contract according to its provisions and in conformity with the rules of Czech law and in a manner that conforms to the requirements of goodwill.

Item (6): The first party guarantees to sell to the second party minimum quantity of (2100) pieces of firearms per annum in good quality of materials and products subject to this contract.

Item (7): This contract shall be governed by the rules of systems valid in the Czech Republic, ie. by the Laws of the Czech Republic.



Arabian Hunter Est.
For Air Rifles and Hunting Tools
C.R 4030200680



مؤسسة الصياد العربي
للبلادق العمالية وأدوات الصيد
س.ت 4030200680

First Party

Name: Mr. Janousek Richard

Signature



Second Party

Name: Mr. Nawaf Bandar Ben Humaid

Signature



Seublas s originalu
Dne: 14.12.2022
Ing. Richard Janousek
PROKURISTA



Source: Confidential

Annex 167: Presence of the aggregated carrier *Almas* at the Port of Saleef, Yemen in October 2023


**Table 1
Statute and change of flag**

Owner & Registration				
Ownership	Ownership History	Registration		
Port of Registry	Zanzibar	Flag	Tanzania (Zanzibar)	
Official Number	90204	Sat Com ID		
Sat Com-Area Back		Flagging Number		
Current P&I Club	Unknown			
P&I Club History				
Date	P&I Club			
2006-02-20	Unknown			
Flag, Call Sign & MMSI History				
Date	Flag	Port of Registry	Call Sign	MMSI
2022-06	Tanzania (Zanzibar)	Zanzibar	SIM257	
2022-05	Unknown	Unknown		
2022-03	Belize	Belize City	VJGJ3	312973000
2004-03	Japan	Iki, Nagasaki	JM6170	431600007
1992-06	Japan	Ishida, Nagasaki		

Source: Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite (MIRS)

**Figures 167.1
Almas to the Port of Hudaydah (around 18 October 2023)**

The *Almas* was visible on satellite imagery on 19, 20 and 21 October (the image of 18 October had 100 percent cloud cover) – it was not visible anymore on 22 October imagery, so *Almas* left Hudaydah on 21 or 22 October 2023.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

**Table 2
Almas to the Port of Hudaydah on 18 October 2023**

According to S&P Global MIRS, the position of the ship on 18 October was 14.91335 N / 42.887875 E, which is almost exactly the location of where the ship is docked, as visible on figure 167.2

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
Report produced by S&P Global on 20 May 2024 16:06										
Mmsi	Imo	Name	LastUpdateReceived	Latitude	Longitude	Speed	Draught	AlsDraught	Narrative	Destination
312973000	8864957	ALMAS	2023-10-13 04:48:51	12.995643	43.285073	8.5	3	4.1	Port call possible during dark period\nfrom 13 Oct 2023\nto 18 Oct 2023	NAN TONG SAI YANGCC
0	8864957	ALMAS	2023-10-18 07:15:45	14.913355	42.887875	0	3	4.1	Port call\nRas Alkatheeb\n18 Oct 2023 84 hours	
312973000	8864957	ALMAS	2023-10-18 07:15:45	14.913355	42.887875	0	3	4.1	Dark activity end of alert \n18 Oct 2023\nPort call possible during dark period	NAN TONG SAI YANGCC
312973000	8864957	ALMAS	2023-10-23 20:05:07	14.057623	48.79288	7.4	3	4.1	Port call possible during dark period\nfrom 23 Oct 2023\nto 26 Oct 2023	NAN TONG SAI YANGCC
312973000	8864957	ALMAS	2023-10-26 18:04:51	15.290595	51.738258	9	3	4.1	Dark activity end of alert \n26 Oct 2023\nPort call possible during dark period	NAN TONG SAI YANGCC

Source: MIRS

Table 3

Presence of *Almas* in the civilian port,⁷² near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbor, Iran, between 20-26 September 2023



Source: MIRS

Based on Planet SkySat 0.5-meter resolution satellite imagery, it could be assessed that the *Almas* arrived in the Bandar Abbas Military Harbor (exact location from MIRS: 27.08.47N / 56.12.12E) on 19 or 20 September (not visible on 19 September image, but present on 20 September image) and left the Harbor on 25 or 26 September (still visible on 25 September image but gone on 26 September image).

Table 4

Presence of *Almas* near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbor, Iran, on 3 October 2023, before sailing directly to the Port of Hudaydah



Source: MIRS

On 27 September, the *Almas* is visible on PlanetScope 3-meter resolution satellite imagery at the Shahid Rajaee Eastern Anchorage location (exact location from MIRS: 27.08.17N / 56.14.39E). The *Almas* is also visible on 29 September, 1 and 3 October but gone on 5 October. So, *Almas* left for Yemen on 3, 4 or 5 October 2023.

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

⁷² IRIN vessels have been observed anchored in the civilian part of this port, see <https://maphub.net/Cengiz/bandar-abbas-iran-navy-base>

Figure 167.2

Almas visible on 20 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.3

Almas visible on 21 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.4

Almas visible on 22 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.5
***Almas* visible on 23 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)**



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.6
***Almas* visible on 24 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)**

The image shows one ship docked in parallel to the *Almas* and activity visible on the dock. The Panel does not exclude that the loading of the *Almas* was taking place.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.7
***Almas* visible on 25 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)**

Last image with *Almas* visible in the Bandar Abbas Harbour.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.8
***Almas* visible on 27 September 2023 at the Shahid Rajaei Anchorage (first image)**



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.9
***Almas* visible on 3 October 2023 at the Shahid Rajaei Anchorage (last image before *Almas* was sailing to the Port of Hudaydah)**



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Annex 168: Presence in September and October 2023 of the general cargo ship *Kasra-3* at the Port of Saleef, Yemen

**Table 1
Statute and change of flag**

Timeline	
Date	Significant Events
202402	Flagged by Comoros, Operator Mohammadi M, Owner Mohammadi M, Ship Manager Mohammadi M
202204	Name changed to KASRA 3, Flagged by Tanzania (Zanzibar), Operator Rptd Sold Undisclosed Interest, Owner Rptd Sold Undisclosed Interest, Ship Manager Rptd Sold Undisclosed Interest
200401	Flagged by Japan
199410	Flagged by Japan, Status changed to In Service/Commission
199409	Status changed to Launched
199408	Status changed to Keel Laid
199400	Name changed to Eiju Maru No. 12, Status changed to On Order/Not Commenced, Operator Eiju Maru, Owner Eiju Maru, Ship Manager Eiju Maru

Source: MIRS


Part 1: Whereabouts of *Kasra-3* in September/October 2023

The *Kasra-3* spends,

According to MIRS, the *Kasra-3* spent sometime in the Port of Shahid Rajae and then waited in the Shahid Rajae Eastern Anchorage for a while. The *Kasra-3* was visible on 24 September 2023 in the Shahid Rajae Eastern Anchorage. On the next available satellite imagery on 29 September, she had left.


Figures 168.1 (up), and 168.2 (down)

***Kasra-3* at Shahid Rajae Eastern Anchorage on 24 September 2024**



Source: MIRS

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Table 2
Kasra-3 possible dark activities

According to MIRS, there are possible suspicious activities until she shows up on 29 September 2023 near the coast of Oman (23.034483N / 59.58823E).

Report produced by S&P Global on: 21 May 2024 17:53

Mmsi	Imo	Name	LastUpdateReceived	Latitude	Longitude	Speed	Draught	AisDraught	Narrative	Destination
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-06 00:45:31	26.982058	56.305763	6.8	3	3	4.372 Dark activity end of alert \n06 Sep 2023\nNo AIS signal for extended period worldwide	
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-06 05:18:11	26.532143	56.045997	7.2	3	3	4.372 Transit\nTransit Straits of Hormuz W\n06 Sep 2023	Bandar Abbas
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-06 15:34:23	25.511865	55.400895	0	3	3	4.372 Waiting at \nHamriyah C Anchorage\n06 Sep 2023 375 hours	Bandar Abbas
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-08 17:24:32	25.511697	55.400928	0	3	3	4.372 No AIS signal for extended period worldwide\nfrom 08 Sep 2023\nto 22 Sep 2023	Bandar Abbas
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-22 06:28:13	27.108512	56.065292	0	3	3	4.372 Dark activity end of alert \n22 Sep 2023\nNo AIS signal for extended period worldwide	
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-22 06:28:13	27.108512	56.065292	0	3	3	4.372 Berth call\n8, Bandar Abbas\n22 Sep 2023	
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-22 06:28:13	27.108512	56.065292	0	3	3	4.372 Port call\nShahid Rajae Eastern Anchorage\n22 Sep 2023 39 hours	Bandar Abbas
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-23 23:17:50	27.137633	56.257238	0	3	3	4.372 Waiting at \nShahid Rajae Eastern Anchorage\n23 Sep 2023 9 hours	Bandar Abbas
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-24 11:35:37	27.138113	56.257842	0	3	3	4.372 Waiting at \nShahid Rajae Eastern Anchorage\n24 Sep 2023 69 hours	Bandar Abbas
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-27 08:10:45	27.215957	56.378168	58.2	3	3	4.372 Port call possible during dark period\nfrom 27 Sep 2023\nto 29 Sep 2023	Bandar Abbas
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-29 17:52:00	23.034483	59.58823	10	3	3	4.372 Dark activity end of alert \n29 Sep 2023\nPort call possible during dark period	MASQAT
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-29 17:52:00	23.034483	59.58823	10	3	3	0 Destination Change To\nMASQAT \n29 Sep 2023 05:52	MASQAT
613516310	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-29 23:45:45	22.344059	59.998278	8.8	3	3	4.372 Position anomalous for extended period in sensitive area\nfrom 29 Sep 2023\nto 01 Oct 2023	MASQAT
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-05 20:13:27	12.812277	43.281718	9.8	3	3	4.372 Transit\nTransit Bab El Mandeb NW\n05 Oct 2023	
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-06 15:50:58	15.315775	42.669287	0	3	3	4.372 Port call\nSaleef\n06 Oct 2023 236 hours	
613516310	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-06 16:09:56	15.3157	42.669347	0	3	3	4.372 Berth call\nGeneral Cargo Berth, Saleef\n06 Oct 2023	
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-16 17:52:24	14.00358	42.830675	8.5	3	3	4.372 Destination Change To\nJebel Ali\n16 Oct 2023 05:52	Jebel Ali
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-17 03:11:30	12.81569	43.229825	7.8	3	3	4.372 Transit\nTransit Bab El Mandeb SE\n17 Oct 2023	Jebel Ali
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-23 08:54:46	24.948057	57.593728	10.2	3	3	4.372 Destination Change To\nBandar Abbas\n23 Oct 2023 08:54	Bandar Abbas
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-24 11:01:16	27.102805	56.196993	0	3	3	4.372 Waiting at \nBandar Abbas Merchant Anchorage\n24 Oct 2023 0 hours	Bandar Abbas
613516310	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-24 16:33:38	27.214282	56.377413	58.2	3	3	4.372 Dark for extended period in watched area\nfrom 24 Oct 2023	Bandar Abbas
613516310	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-24 16:33:38	27.214282	56.377413	58.2	3	3	4.372 No AIS signal for extended period worldwide\nfrom 24 Oct 2023\nto 08 Nov 2023	Bandar Abbas
613516310	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-24 16:33:38	27.214282	56.377413	58.2	3	3	0 Destination Change To\nBandar Abbas\n24 Oct 2023 04:33	Bandar Abbas

Source: MIRS

According to the table above, the *Kasra-3* then sails to the Port of Saleef in Yemen, arriving there on 6 October at 15:50:58 hrs. On satellite imagery of 6 October 07.31 UTC, she is not visible, but she is visible on satellite imagery from 7 October 06:50 UTC and continues to be visible till 15 October 2023 07.49 UTC. On the next available satellite imagery (17 October 06.50 UTC) she is gone. According to MIRS, she went back to Iran.

Figure 168.4
Port of Saleef, Yemen – undated overview photo



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Figure 168.5
***Kasra-3* at the Port of Saleef on 11 October 2023**



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Part 2: Whereabouts of *Kasra-3* in October/November 2023


For a long period of time from the second half of October 2023 and the first half of November 2023, there is no AIS location data available for *Kasra-3*. According to MIRS, she was at the Bandar Abbas Merchant Anchorage on 24 October. On satellite imagery of this location on 24 October, *Kasra-3* is possibly visible. On the next available image of 25 October, she had left.

Figures 168.6 (up) and 168.7 (down)

***Kasra-3* at Bandar Abbas Merchant Anchorage on 24 October 2023**



Source: MIRS




Source: Planet satellite imagery

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

According to MIRS, *Kasra-3* arrives on 22 November at the Saleef anchorage point and stays there till 30 November.


Figures 168.8 (up), 168.9 (lower left), and 168.10 (lower right)
***Kasra-3* at Saleef anchorage, on 23 and 24 November 2023**



Source: MIRS

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


As per the satellite imagery of the Saleef anchorage point of 21 November *Kasra-3* is no visible but on 23 November she is present (NB: no imagery available for 22 November) and on 24 November she is also visible (even on 0.5-meter resolution image).



Source: Planet satellite imagery

On the next available satellite image (26 November 2023), it looks like *Kasra-3* was heading south. As per the satellite image of 27 November, there are some clouds, but it looks like a ship is docked in the Port of Saleef (same location where *Kasra-3* was docked in October 2023). It is hard to say whether the ship was there on 28 and 30 November, but on 1 December she had, most likely, gone. Although this hypothesis cannot be 100 percent confirmed, based on the available satellite imagery, it is the most likely analysis. It would be unrealistic to say that that *Kasra-3* would have sailed from Iran to the Saleef anchorage point and then would have sailed back without visiting a port in Yemen. There is also no evidence of ship-to-ship transfer.

Figure 168.11
Kasra-3 at Saleef anchorage, on 26 November 2023



Source: Planet satellite imagery


Figure 168.12
Kasra-3 at Port of Saleef, on 27 November 2023



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Annex 169: *Dubai-1* anchored on 23 March 2024 at Port Saleef

Figure 169.1
Port Saleef terminal



Source: MIRS

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Table 1
Suspicious maritime activities by *Dubai-1*.

In and out, suspicious movements between Somalia, Oman, Djibouti, Iran, and Yemen are highlighted

Repeatedly turning off and turning on the Automatic Identification System (AIS) of the aforementioned ship prevented it from being able to be followed accurately, and its sailing along the Yemeni coast raises suspicion of that ship. The above-mentioned activities may enhance the possibility of the ship transporting prohibited materiel for the Houthis, and the possibility of transferring materials from one ship to another is not excluded, as the ship's entry was monitored twice, and it docked in the port of Saleef.

29 March to 04 April 2024	Yemen with its AIS switched off for 6 days
22 to 27 March 2024	Yemen with its AIS switched off for 5 days
09 to 19 March 2024	Djibouti with its AIS switched off for 10 days
08 March 2024	Yemen with its AIS switched off
29 February to 08 March 2024	Somalia with its AIS switched off for 8 days
6 to 17 February 2024	Yemen with its AIS switched off for 12 days
5 February 2024	Yemen with its AIS switched off for 16 hours
14 January to 05 February 2024	Yemen with its AIS switched off for 22 days (prior she was in Djibouti)
17 December 2023 to 13 January 2024	Djibouti with its AIS switched off for 26 days
17 November to 9 December 2023	Djibouti with its AIS switched off for 22 days
9 December 2023	Arrived in Hudaydah without UNVIM inspection
9 to 16 November 2023	Oman with its AIS switched off for 7 days Dark activities ended in Djibouti

5 to 17 October 2023	Oman with its AIS switched off for 12 days
18 June to 20 July 2023	Oman with its AIS switched off for 32 days Prior she accosted UAE
22 April to 18 June 2023	UAE with its AIS switched off for 58 days
31 March to 20 April 2023	Oman with its AIS switched off for 20 days
9 January to 16 February 2023	UAE with its AIS switched off for 36 days
19 December 2022 to 9 January 2023	Oman with its AIS switched off for 20 days
24 October to 11 November 2022	Oman with its AIS switched off for 18 days
16 September to 2 October 2022	Iran with its AIS switched off for 16 days
5 to 24 August 2022	Oman with its AIS switched off for 19 days
25 July to 5 August 2022	Oman with its AIS switched off for 11 days
24 May to 27 July 2022	UAE with its AIS switched off for 62 days
5 April to 23 May 2022	Oman with its AIS switched off for 47 days
3 to 15 March 2022	Yemen with its AIS switched off for 12 days
13 to 31 January 2022	Oman with its AIS switched off for 18 days Prior she was in Iran for 4 hours (8 Jan 2022)
16 November to 11 December 2021	Oman with its AIS switched off for 24 days Prior she was in Iran for 2 days (15-16 Nov 21)
25 to 29 October 2021	Oman with its AIS switched off for 3 days Dark activities ended in Iran
5 May to 24 October 2021	Oman with its AIS switched off for 171 days
27 September to 20 November 2020	Oman with its AIS switched off for 54 days
18 to 27 September 2020	Oman with its AIS switched off for 8 days

Annex 170: Copy of the letter from the Director-General of Passports



to whom it may concern

Based on the approach approved by the General Command to work on the principle of (self-sufficiency), We would like to inform you that Messrs. Company /Azal Tech. for Printing - One of our approved suppliers in the implementation and supply of security publications Therefore we ask the competent authorities to facilitate their tasks with regard to requesting and purchasing security papers and inks and their accessories from the raw materials related this aspect

Thank you for your cooperation

Director General of Passports
Major General/Ismael Al-Muaid

Source: Confidential

Annex 172: Issuance of YR100 coin by CBY, Sana'a

Figure 172.1

Press Release by CBY, Aden


 البنك المركزي اليمني
 CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN

بيان صحفي

تابع البنك المركزي اليمني إعلان مليشيا الحوثي الإرهابية المستولية على فرع البنك المركزي بصنعاء إعلانها سك عملة معدنية فئة مائة ريال وإعلان طرحها للتداول بدلاً من العملة القانونية فئة المائة ريال الورقية ، وان البنك المركزي اليمني إذ يرفض هذا الفعل التصعيدي الخطير وغير القانوني والذي لا يأخذ بنظر الإعتبار بأي شكل من الأشكال مصالح المواطنين ، فإن البنك المركزي يؤكد على ماسبق وأن حذر منه بشكل واضح بمنع كل الجهات والمؤسسات والأفراد من قبول أو تداول أي عملة مزورة صادرة من كيان غير قانوني بالمخالفة لكل القوانين والأعراف المالية والمصرفية وانه يحتفظ بحقه القانوني في إتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية الإحترازية لحماية الأصول المالية للمواطنين والمؤسسات المالية والمصرفية .

وتنحمل المليشيات تبعات هذا التصعيد اللامسؤول وما يترتب عليه من تعقيد وإرباك في تعاملات المواطنين والمؤسسات المالية والمصرفية داخلياً وخارجياً.

صادر عن
 البنك المركزي اليمني
 المركز الرئيسي عدن

Source: CBY, Aden

*Appendix A***Unofficial translation of the Press Release by CBY, Aden****Press Release**

The Central Bank of Yemen followed up on the terrorist Houthi militia's announcement of responsibility on the branch of the Central Bank in Sana'a, announcing the issuance of a one-hundred- riyal coin and announcing that it would be put into circulation instead of the legal one-hundred- riyal paper currency. The Central Bank of Yemen rejects this dangerous and illegal escalatory act that does not take it into consideration. In any way, in the interests of citizens, the Central Bank affirms the above and clearly warned of it by preventing all parties, institutions and individuals from accepting or trading any counterfeit currency issued by an illegal entity in violation of all financial and banking laws and customs, and that it reserves its legal right to take precautionary legal measures. To protect the financial assets of citizens and financial and banking institutions.

The militias bear the consequences of this irresponsible escalation and the resulting complexity and confusion in the dealings of citizens and financial and banking institutions internally and externally.

Issued by

Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

Annex 173: Screenshots of messages for collection of funds for the UAV Force

Figure 173. 1
Screenshot of text messages for funds for the Air Force from the public



Source: Panel

Unofficial translation of the Screenshot of text messages for funds for the Air Force from the public

7:08 PM

Sunday, 24 December 2023

Support the Air Force
via the following accounts:
Central Bank No.
1128 - 10262 (riyals)
01-1019 - 10262 (dollars)

Figure 173.2
Screenshots of messages for collection of funds for the UAV Force



Source: Panel

Appendix A

Unofficial Translation of the Receipt of payment from schools for Drones (UAVs)

Convoys and Expenditure m/ Secretariat (right)

In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful

“O you who have believed, shall I guide you to a trade that will save you from a painful punishment? That you believe in God and His Messenger and strive in the cause of God with your possessions and your lives. That is better for you, if you only knew.” (Among)

Date: 9/2/1445

Corresponding to: 12/3/2024

Document No.: 0161 (left)

Supply (receipt) bill

Document content:

I received from the Office of Education, the Secretariat branch, the handling the Director-General of the Office of Education, Abdul Qadir Al Mahdi

The amount is 20,956,250 twenty million nine hundred and fifty-six thousand two hundred and fifty riyals.

The purpose of this money is for the convoy provided by the schools of the capital secretariat in support of the drones.

Document footer:

Recipient's name: Abdul Karim Muhammad ~~Fadael~~

The entity/secretariat

Signature 12/3/2024

For inquiries

Phone: 777890086 - 736875849

Annex 175: Houthi revenue from customs, taxes, fees, and other illegal fees

The Panel received information that the amount of revenue collected and controlled by the Houthis during 2023 was approximately YR3.392 trillion. By illegally collecting fees in the name of customs and other taxes from the traders sending their goods from the GoY area to the Houthi-controlled area, the Houthis have been treating the GoY area as a separate country. Panel's sources estimate the Houthis' revenues from these illegal land collection points to be approximately YR300 billion in 2023. Sources affirm that these illegal collections go to the top Houthi leaders and used for payment of salaries to its combatants and for other military purposes.

The Houthi-appointed authority in Sana'a, collects illegal fees from airlines flying over Yemen, estimated at approximately \$32,850,000. When contacted, some airlines officials informed the Panel of their reluctance to stop paying to the Houthis to avoid any possible attacks on their aircrafts.

'khums' tax

The revenue from the 'khums' tax ("one-fifth", or 20 percent), imposed a few years ago by the Houthis by a Decree signed by Mehdi al-Mashat, president of the Houthi-appointed Supreme Political Council (SPC), benefit the Al-Houthi family and a large number of Houthi loyalists. This tax, on natural resources and economic activities carried out in areas under the control of the Houthis, is estimated to be a few billion YRs, is a clear violation of the financial sanctions regime.

Collections from the merchants in Ibb in the name of those killed by the Houthis

The Panel was informed that the Houthis recently had imposed new levies by force on the merchants in the Ibb Governorate. The Panel interviewed a few of these merchants, who requested anonymity. Purportedly, these new levies are intended to assist families of individuals who have been killed by the Houthis, obligating merchants to contribute food baskets. Merchants were presented with the choice of providing specific quantities of food baskets or paying an equivalent amount of money for them, while threatening violators with penalties. These taxes are part of a larger set of levies imposed by the Houthis, taking advantage of the month of Ramadan as a significant period for tax collection by the Houthis

Water Tax

Recently, the Houthis resorted to another method of collecting money by levying water tax in the name of "Teacher support and education Fund". The Panel's sources in the education department, who requested to remain anonymous, informed that the Houthi authorities are collecting money in the name of education but the same is mostly used for their military purposes. The authorities are not paying any salaries to the teachers because of which the teachers association announced an open strike until payment of their salaries pending since 2016. On 8 October 2024, Houthis arrested Abu Zaid al-Kumaim, head of the Yemeni Teachers Club, for organizing protests demanding the payment of teachers' salaries.

Arbitrary cancellation and transfer of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)

To enhance their financial gains, the Houthis have adopted an arbitrary and illegal policy of withdrawing trademarks from legitimate commercial entities and transferring them to entities

under their control. There have been several reports concerning violations of IPRs, especially commercial trademarks of companies and merchants in Sana'a. The Panel has received information that several lawsuits have been filed in the Commercial Court of First Instance, Sana'a against the Houthi-appointed Ministry of Industry and Trade for alleged violations of IPRs and the revocation of trademarks registered under their names. There have been reports of cancellations of the registrations of specific commercial entities, some of which have been subsequently transferred to others, affiliated to the Houthis. The Panel is in possession of some documents and is investigating the matter.

Collection of illegal fees from civil aviation sector

Exploiting the ongoing presence of the air traffic control centre at Sana'a airport, the Houthi-appointed authority in Sana'a, collects illegal fees from airlines flying over Yemen. Following the relocation of the General Authority for Civil Aviation and Meteorology to Aden, several airlines were notified by the GoY to redirect their overflight fees to the authority in Aden. Panel's investigation revealed that approximately 150 aircrafts traverse Yemen's airspace daily, each paying approximately \$600 as an overflight fee. The annual collection of overflight fees by the Houthis, deemed unlawful by the GoY, is estimated at approximately \$32,850,000. When contacted, some airlines officials informed the Panel of their reluctance to stop paying to the Houthis to avoid any possible attacks on their aircrafts. In addition to overflight fees, the Houthi-appointed authority also collects various airport service charges, including those for landing and take-off, passenger fees, airfreight fees, ground services, and all other airport-related fees.

Annex 176: Financing the purchase of military materiel

1. The Panel is investigating a case involving procurement of weapons by the Houthis using a Yemeni businessman. For the sake of the safety of the concerned person and his family members, his name and other details are not being disclosed. He was in the profession of doing customs clearance work in Yemen for the importers/traders for over 10 years.
2. Investigations revealed that in the past he had travelled to various countries including China, Djibouti, India, Iran, Lebanon, Oman, Somalia, Syria, and the UAE. His last foreign visit was reportedly in March 2023, after a shipment of missile components, which he was trying to clear, was intercepted by the Yemeni customs. He had also reportedly met the officials of the Houthi-controlled telecom company 'Tele Yemen', some whose telecom consignments were allegedly seized by Yemeni customs a few years ago.
3. Confidential sources informed the Panel that he is being investigated by the authorities for his alleged role in procuring/clearing missiles and missile components, weapons and other military materiel, including dual-use items for the Houthis by smuggling these weapons into Houthi-controlled areas. One such consignment was seized by the Yemeni customs, in which the components of missiles were concealed inside commercial cargo. He allegedly received funds arranged by the Houthis, both by cash and through transfers from various exchange companies in Yemen and Djibouti. The authorities reportedly seized cash amounting to \$198,000 from him, when he was arrested in February 2024 in Djibouti.
4. The Panel learnt that after the seizure of the aforesaid consignment, on the instructions of Major-General Muhammad Ahmad Al-Talibi, a Yemeni national operating from Iran, he went to Djibouti in August 2023 to start a business of importing military materiel from Iran and other countries. He changed his name and got a new passport to avoid any identification as a Houthi. He also set up a company in Djibouti. (para. 77 and case study 6).
5. The Panel's sources informed that, while in Djibouti, he received payments from various sources, arranged by the Houthis, including from exchange companies in Yemen and made payments to various suppliers of military materiel procured through Djibouti, before transferring these materiel to Houthi-controlled areas.
6. Investigations by the Panel, including scrutiny of some of the documents made available, revealed that he maintained accounts in Sana'a, Yemen in:
 - Al-Radwan Exchange and Transfers Co. Sana'a, and
 - Al-Hazmi Exchange Co. Sa'ana, Yemen.
7. He also maintained accounts in Djibouti in:
 - Djibouti Exp. Exchange Co
 - Al-Khaleel Exchange Co
 - CAC Bank

The Panel's investigation relating to his accounts revealed the following:

1. Djibouti Express Exchange Co. Djibouti

Sl. No	Date of transaction	Amount	Remarks
i	26 September 2023	\$ 6,490	Amount deposited
ii	8 October 2023	\$ 27,300	Amount deposited
iii	8 October 2023	\$33,000	Amount deposited
iv	11 October 2023	\$50,000	Amount deposited
v	14 October 2023	\$217,533	Amount deposited

vi	14 October 2023	\$ 50,000	Amount received from Al Dhya Co.
vii	14 October 2023	\$ 60,720	Amount received from Nabil Ahmed Ali Ali
viii	17 October 2023	\$ 60,720	Amount transferred to Mohammed bin Mohammed Abdo Hassan
ix	19 October 2023	\$2000	deposited Djiboutian Franc 354,000 (DJF) and purchased \$2000
x	12 November 2023	\$ 50,000	deposited DJF 8,850,000 and purchased \$ 50,000
xii	No date	\$ 28,259	received from Radwan Co.

2. Al Mohel Exchange Co. Hqrs in Demt in Yemen

- i. 16 October 2023 - \$30,431 received from Nabil Ahmed Ali Ali

3. Société Africaine Express Co.

- i. 19 November 2023 - transferred by Radwan Express Co. to Ahmed Mahmud Hazza Al Diya Co. - \$55,000

- Further, sources revealed that amount in DJF, equivalent to \$130,000, lying in his account in Al-Khaleel Exchange Co. in Djibouti was reportedly frozen by the authorities.

The matter is under investigation by the Panel.

Annex 177: Misappropriation of the assets of Amran cement factory

The Panel received information from sources indicating that the Houthis have taken control of the management and assets of the largest cement production company of Yemen, Amran. Abdul Fattah Ismail Al-Ashmouri, the newly appointed director of the factory, appointed by the Houthis, allegedly dismissed 30 employees from the factory in July 2023, and appointed Houthi loyalists. The Houthi leaders are accused of engaging in financial misconduct, obtaining large loans from banks in the company's name and embezzling substantial funds. Moreover, it is alleged that cement, disguised as humanitarian aid, was provided free of charge to the Ministry of Defence and other Houthi-affiliated entities for construction projects. Bricks were also reportedly taken by the Houthis in the name of initiatives undertaken by select charitable organizations. The company reportedly borrowed YR40 billion with high interest rate, leading to a debt exceeding YR60 billion and bankruptcy, halting production. These funds have been allegedly misappropriated by the Houthis. The Panel is investigating the matter.

Annex 178: Ministry of Endowment regarding threats from the Houthis not to deposit ticket amount for Haj pilgrims in other accounts

Date: 11/15/1445 AH
 corresponding to 23/5/2024
 AD Number: (p. 27 27)

I smell the limit now.



Republic of Yemen Ministry
 of Endowments and Guidance

Respected
 His Excellency Dr. Ahmed Awad bin
 Mubarak, Prime Minister

Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings be upon you ..

Topic: This year's transfer of pilgrims from Sana'a International Airport and the abuse of the Houthi terrorist group

We offer you our best regards and wish you continued success in your duties.

With reference to the above topic, we would like to clarify that we have completed all necessary procedures to send pilgrims to the Holy House of God for this year 1445 AH from all of our country's international airports, including Sana'a International Airport, for the purpose of alleviating the burden of travel between Sana'a and other Yemeni international airports.

Accordingly, Hajj and Umrah agencies were notified to deposit the value of tickets for all pilgrims from all governorates of the Republic, without exception, into the company's accounts at the Qutaibi Bank or the Saudi Fransi Bank.

However, the Houthi rebel and terrorist group took arbitrary measures by preventing Hajj agencies

The decision to supply the value of tickets for pilgrims traveling by air through Sana'a International Airport to the bank accounts of the company, Yemen Airways, and this problem raised the concerns of the leadership of the Ministry of Endowments and Guidance and the Ministry of Transport in

The temporary capital, Aden, highlights the danger of these criminal practices by these rebel militias, which do not take into account any... Custom or system in all its actions and these

illegal procedures regarding Hajj agents who were arrested and threatened with imprisonment and confiscation of their money if they deposited the value of pilgrims' tickets in the company's account outside our country.

As a result, Yemeni pilgrims traveling through Sana'a International Airport, who number more than eight thousand pilgrims, are at risk of obstructing the performance of the religious obligation and losing their services for which they paid hundreds of millions in Saudi riyals.

You will forward this to your state, which will kindly inform you and provide guidance on what you deem appropriate to deal with this situation as it is a problem.

It is an emergency that requires an urgent solution and cannot tolerate delay, especially since there are only 72 hours remaining until the first of the pilgrims' flights by air.

We are grateful for your continued follow-up and keenness to provide the best services and provide them to the Yemeni pilgrim with ease and ease.

Please accept my sincere greetings and appreciation

Ya Shayban
 Muhammad bin.
 Minister of Endowments and Guidance



To death
 Dr. Peacemaker Hamid Al-Asheri
 Ministry of Point

Scanned longitudinally with CamScanner

Annex 179: Yemenia Chairman's letter to the PM regarding seizure of aircrafts

Yemenia Pulp
Chairman of the Board of Directors / Follow

26 JUN 2024
(104) Issued by
Chairman's Office

Yemenia Yemeni

Yemen Airways Yemenia Airlines

Office of the President

Date: June 26, 2024 AD
24/104. Reference R.M.

Factor
Computer

Respected Brother / His Excellency the
Minister of Transport, Dr. Abdul Salam

Prime Minister Chan's State Memorandum specifies the detention of aircraft

“ Saleh Hamid, best regards

Topic: Reservation of Yemenia planes arriving from Jeddah to Sanaa


Yemen Airways extends its sincere greetings to you, wishing you continued success in all your practical work tasks

reference to the above topic, we inform you that Yemeni aircraft departing from Jeddah to With
Sanaa to transport pilgrims according to 20) the schedule and the commitment agreed upon with the Ministry of Endowments and the Saudi side, were detained
by the Houthi militias for three A320 aircraft in addition to the A330 aircraft, and we explain to you The flight schedule for the three aircraft is as follows:-


1. The first plane, Jeddah / Sana'a, A320-70, flight number IX5555, arriving at Sana'a Airport, time.
Local time: 22:30 pm, date 6/25/2024
- AD. 2 The second plane, Jeddah / Sana'a, A320-C-70FC, flight number IY5547, arrival at Sana'a Airport, local time,
23:00 pm, date 6/25/2024 AD.
- Third plane Jeddah / Sanaa A320-F-70FF Flight number IX5559 Arrival Sanaa Airport with time
Local 00:30 AM 6/26/2024 3
- 4 In addition to the Airbus A330-E-70AFE plane that has been reserved in Sanaa for a while and needs an engine change and has
so far refused to pay to buy the engine and maintain the plane, in addition to continuing to freeze its Yemeni
assets in Sanaa banks since March 8, 2023 AD.

This is what had to be raised to Your Excellency due to the necessity and importance of taking the necessary measures regarding the issue of the detention
of Yemeni aircraft at Sanaa Airport by the Houthi militias.

with all gratitude and appreciation



Member Of Int'l. Air Transport Association
Tel.: +967 2 234 045/125
P.O.BOX: 6006
Khormakser, Airport Street
Aden, Republic Of Yemen
Email: iy@yemenia.com
www.yemenia.com



Member of the International Aviation Organization (IATA)
+967 2 234 045/125 :تلفون
Yemen: صنع
Khor Maksar - Airport Road
Aden - Republic of
6006 Sub iy@yemenia.com Email
www.yemenia.com

Source: Panel

Annex 180: Yemenia's excess war liability for flying in Houthi-areas

The Panel was informed that, on 23 January 2024, Yemenia received the notice of cancellation of coverage, from its insurance company in respect of excess war liability, 'Extended Coverage Endorsement (Aviation Liabilities - AVN52E' in relation to the geographical location of Yemen (only in respect of Houthi-occupied airports and Houthi-controlled airspace)).

This notice expired on 30 January 2024, after which excess war liability coverage of Yemenia in Houthi-occupied airports and Houthi-controlled airspace has reduced to 81.02581 percent. As a result, Yemenia is obligated to pay up 19 per cent of the compensation amount, which would be in the range of \$35-65 million, in the event their aircraft meets any accident within the Houthi-controlled area or airspace.

This had placed Yemenia in a challenging predicament. If the company complied with the directives, it would have severely impacted the air services in Yemen and invited the wrath of the Houthis. Since Yemenia continues to operate in Houthi-controlled airports and airspace, in the event of any untoward incident, it could incur hefty penalties, leading to significant financial strain, damage to its reputation, legal battles, and even potential closure or bankruptcy. This will also hinder the future plans of Yemenia to expand air services from Sana'a to other destinations, including for humanitarian purposes.

Annex 181: Freezing of the assets of pharmaceutical companies

According to the Panel's sources, armed forces, under the direction of the Houthis leader, Saleh Dabish, raided office and factory premises, kidnapped some employees, and confiscated the funds and assets of these companies and the personal accounts of their directors and employees, mostly in Al-Kuraimi Bank. They also took away, \$240,000, 13% of the company's total profits, in the name of two shareholders, who were subject to court rulings and made additional demands for others. Earlier, responding to the threats, CBY, Aden had issued a circular dated 7 April 2024 to all banks and financial institutions not to comply with the illegal order of the Houthis.

Figure 181.1

CBY, Aden circular dated 7 April 2024 prohibiting banks from seizing and disposing of bank balances of two pharma companies based on orders from the Houthis

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN Head Office - Aden		البنك المركزي اليمني المركز الرئيسي - عدن
Date: 7/4/2024 No: CBY// 289/2024	قطاع الرقابة على البنوك Banking Supervision Sector مكتب الوكيل	التاريخ: الرقم:
تعمير موجه الى كافة البنوك والمصارف العاملة في الجمهورية		
المحترم	الاخ/ المدير العام/ المدير الاقليمي بنك "السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته"	
الموضوع // الشركة الدوائية الحديثة والشركة العالمية لصناعة الادوية		
<p>بالإشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه، والى المذكرات المقدمة من الشركة الدوائية الحديثة والشركة العالمية لصناعة الادوية، بشأن الاستيلاء على مقرات الشركتين في صنعاء من قبل مليشيا الحوثي، وقيام المليشيا بتسمية اشخاص من قبلهم لانتحال صفة إدارة الشركتين بصورة غير قانونية، والسعي للاستحواذ على ارصدة واموال الشركتين، وعليه واستنادا الى القوانين والتعليمات التنظيمية النافذة، فإنه يتوجب عليكم الالتزام بالاتي:</p> <p>(أ) يكون التعامل بشأن أي معاملات مالية ومصرفية تتعلق بالشركتين المشار اليها أعلاه، مع الإدارة القانونية للشركة المعنية، المخولة بذلك والممثلة في التالية أسمائهم:</p> <p>1- وليد محمد سعيد الشطفة - المدير العام 2- انور حميد عبد السلام - المدير المالي</p> <p>(ب) عدم جواز الحجز على أي ارصدة او حسابات خاصة بالشركتين المذكورتين، أو التصرف بها بناء على أي أوامر او طلبات تصلكم من قبل أي جهة غير قانونية.</p> <p>يتم الالتزام بما ورد أعلاه، وتحملون مسؤولية المخالفة. وتقبلوا تحياتنا،</p>		
		
الجمهورية اليمنية عدن، ص.ب.رقم 452، تلفون: 253225 - 02 - 256513 - 02، فاكس: 290252 Republic Of Yemen - Aden, P.O.BOX 452, TEL: 253225- 02 & 256513 - 02, FAX: 290252 - 02		

Source: CBY, Aden

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of CBY, Aden circular dated 7 April 2024 prohibiting banks from seizing and disposing of bank balances of two pharma companies based on orders from the Houthis

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN Head Office-Aden

Date:7/4/2024, No: CBY/A/289/2024

Banking Supervision Sector Office

A circular addressed to all banks and banks operating in the Republic

Brother/General Manager/Regional Director of the Bank

Respected

May the peace, blessings, and mercy of God be upon you

Topic // The Modern Pharmaceutical Company and the International Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company

With reference to the above topic, and to the memorandums submitted by the Modern Pharmaceutical Company and the International Pharmaceutical Industry Company, regarding the seizure of the two companies' headquarters in Sana'a by the Al-Houthi militia, and the militia's naming of people by them to illegally impersonate the management of the two companies, and seeking to seize the assets and funds of the two companies, Accordingly, and based on the applicable laws and regulatory instructions.

You must commit to the following:

(1) Any financial and banking transactions related to the two companies referred to above shall be dealt with the legal department of the concerned company authorized to do so, represented by the following:

1 Walid Muhammad Saeed Al Shatfa - General Manager

2 Anwar Hamid Abdel Salam - Financial Director

(2) It is not permissible to seize or dispose of any account balances of the two aforementioned companies based on any orders or requests you receive from any illegal party.

The above will be adhered to, and you will bear responsibility for any violation.

Please accept our greeting

Figure 181.2

Copy of the Memorandum dated 10 June 2024 issued by the Specialized Criminal Prosecution of the Houthis in Sana'a regarding freezing of the assets of pharmaceutical companies

الرقم: ٢٢٤٢
التاريخ: ١٠/٦/٢٤ هـ
المرفقات:

العدل أساس الحكم
الجمهورية اليمنية
النيابة العامة
لنيابة الجزائية المتخصصة

الأخ / رئيس وحدة جمع المعلومات بالبنك المركزي
المحترم

تعبير طيبة وبعد،،،

وبناء على مذكرة لجنة حصر واستلام مستندات العقود رقم (243/39838) وتاريخ 1445/12/3 هـ الموافق 2024/6/9 م والمتضمن طلب حجز أرصدة وحسابات كلاً من:

الصفة	الاسم	أ
	الشركتة الدوائية الحديثة	1
	الشركتة العالمية لمستحضرات الأدوية	2
المدير العام للشركتتين	وليد محمد سعيد الشطفت	3
نائب المدير للشؤون التجارية	فهد فاسر عبد الله الطليدي	4
المدير المالي	أنور حميد عبد السلام محمد الأشعري	5
مدير الموارد	مختار علي احمد المخلافي	6
مدير البحث والتطوير	جبران عبد الوارث سعيد الأشعري	7
مدير الحسابات	علي عبد الجليل عبد الوهاب علي	8
مدير المطابق	طله عبد الله محمد الطليدي	9
مدير المشتريات	فاطمة احمد حسن مقبل عيشان	10
رئيس قسم الحسابات	عبد الرقيب عبد الله محمد الهجري	11
أمين الصندوق	محمد احمد صالح هادي المعصري	12

وعليه /
يتم التعميم على جميع البنوك وشركات الصرافة بحجز وتجميد كافة أرصدة وحسابات وحالات المذكورين أعلاه وموافقتنا بما تم وبصورة عاجلة.

والله الموفق،

القصاصي / حصارم الدين مقفل
وكيل النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة بالأمانة

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية
المسؤولة
التاريخ: 10/6/24 هـ

Source: Confidential

*Appendix A***Unofficial translation of the memorandum dated 10 June 2024 issued by the Specialized Criminal Prosecution of the Houthis in Sana'a regarding freezing of the assets of pharmaceutical companies**

Based on a memorandum of the committee for inventorying and receiving traitors' property No. (243/39838) dated 9 June 2024, which includes a request to seize the balances and accounts of:

- 1- Modern Pharmaceutical Company
- 2- International Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company
- 3- Walid Muhammad Saeed Al-Shattafa - General Manager of the two companies
- 4- Fahim Qasim Abdullah Al-Khalidi - Deputy Director for Commercial Affairs
- 5- Anwar Hamid Abdel Salam Muhammad Al-Ashmouri - Financial Director
- 6- Mukhtar Ali Ahmed Al-Mekhlafi - Resources Director
- 7- Safwan Abdel-Wareth Saeed Al-Aghbry - Director of Research and Development
- 8- Ali Abdul Jalil Abdul Wahab Ali - Accounts Manager
- 9- Taha Abdullah Muhammad Al-Khalidi - Warehouse Manager
- 10- Fatima Ahmed Hassan Muqbil Aishan - Purchasing Manager
- 11- Abdulraqueeb Abdullah Muhammad Al-Hajri - Head of the Accounts Department
- 12- Muhammad Ahmed Saleh Hadi Al-Maamari - Treasurer

All banks and exchange companies are directed to seize and freeze all the balances, accounts and transfers of those mentioned above, and to inform us of what has been done urgently.

Judge: Sarem al-Din Mufaddal

Deputy Specialized Criminal Prosecutor

Annex 182: Smuggling of telecom equipment

The Houthis have been indulging in organised smuggling of various telecom items and the illegal sale proceeds of the same are utilised for its military purposes. The Houthi-controlled telecom companies have changed their procurement process by engaging suppliers to sale them equipment. These suppliers invariably smuggle the telecom equipment but in case of any seizure by the customs, the names of the telecom companies do not come out openly. Panel's sources have stated that the Ministry of Telecommunication of the GoY has prohibited imports of telecom equipment without its specific permission, and they have not issued any such permission to any Sana'a-based telecom companies to import the equipment. But the recent upgrade of telecom services to 4G and expansion of the subscriber base by these Houthi-controlled companies and the regular seizures by the Yemeni customs, clearly demonstrate that telecom equipment, including the dual-use items used for UAVs and other military and surveillance purposes are being smuggled into Houthi-controlled areas through an organised smuggling network operated by the Houthis.

Annex 183: Smuggling of prohibited pesticides

Several sources revealed that Houthis regularly facilitate smuggling of carcinogenic and toxic pesticides like 'mancozeb', 'methyl bromide', and 'durspan.' These are sold at high prices in their areas, especially in Saada Governorate, with proceeds used for military purposes.

Sources informed the Panel that a consignment of banned toxic pesticides (methyl bromide) was allegedly imported by Saba International Company, belonging to Abdul Azim Daghshan, without any permission from the Houthi-appointed Ministry of Agriculture. The consignment was loaded in two vehicles with license plate Nos. (6/23536) and No. (479609). However, on the night of 28 November 2023, two officers from the Battalion of the Rescue Forces, Abdullah Al-Barda and Nabil Lutfullah, acting under the rescue commander, Abu Badr Al-Marani, came in two vehicles, a Hilux bearing license plate No. 691 Police, a bus bearing license plate No. 5121 Police, along with a truck with armed personnel. They forcibly entered the customs area and took away the vehicles loaded with the pesticides, without payment of customs duty. The commander reportedly told the Director-General of Sana'a Customs Office and Control that they were acting under the directives from the top Houthi leaders. The Sana'a customs is reported to have lodged a complaint. The matter is under investigation by the Panel.

Annex 184: Smuggling of medicines

The Panel received information that similar syndicates, supported by the Houthis, involved in smuggling of medicines through the GoY ports and land borders and transporting the same to the Houthi-controlled areas. In one incident under investigation by the Panel, on 3 March 2024, several gunmen in military uniforms came in military vehicles, forcibly entered the office of the Supreme Medicines Authority in the city of Tai'zz and took away a consignment of smuggled medicines that the Al-Misrakh District police had seized on 23 February 2024 from one Hisham Ghazi Hassan Saif. The Panel's sources stated that the smuggled consignment, worth about YR180 million, was received in Aden and was on its way to Houthi-controlled areas, when the police intercepted it, and handed over to the office of the Supreme Authority for Medicines in Tai'zz. Investigations by the Panel revealed that medicines are regularly being smuggled into Aden and thereafter transported to "Al-Hawban" for further distribution in Houthi-controlled areas.

Figure 184.1

Letter from the Ministry of Health and Population



Source: Confidential

Figure 184.2
Copy of the investigation report

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

ادارة شرطة مدينة العسراخ
ادارة عام شرطة م/ع
ادارة شرطة مديرية العسراخ

المهنة تاجر العمل تاجر
العنوان قنصل جمهورية المملكه الاجتماعية صتورج المودل ثانوية
رقم الهاتف 0118 449 449 في تمام الساعة الثالثة عشر يومنا هذا الجمعة الموافق 20/04/2024

محضرة استدلالات وتحريات

تم فتح هذا المحضر مع المذكور اعلاه بمسقطه صاحب الزعمية المصنوعة حول
وقد اجاب بالاتي:

1- كما سببنا اتصالنا الى ادارة شرطة اسراف في
2- ما فروع البضاعة التي تم ضبطها وايصالها الى ادارة شرطة اسراف ولتأنيدها
3- هل البضاعة من مزرعة ريفية وفيه ضوابط
4- هل البضاعة من مزرعة ريفية وفيه ضوابط
5- هل البضاعة من مزرعة ريفية وفيه ضوابط
6- هل البضاعة من مزرعة ريفية وفيه ضوابط
7- هل البضاعة من مزرعة ريفية وفيه ضوابط
8- هل البضاعة من مزرعة ريفية وفيه ضوابط
9- هل البضاعة من مزرعة ريفية وفيه ضوابط
10- هل البضاعة من مزرعة ريفية وفيه ضوابط

صاحب الاقوال
الاسم هشام غازي
التوقيع

كاتب المحضر
الاسم
التوقيع

مأمور الضبط
الاسم
التوقيع


Source: Confidential

Annex 185: Seizure of cultural properties

The Panel received information from various sources that the Houthis have been indulging in smuggling and trafficking of antiques and antiquities, which form part of the cultural heritage of Yemen, and selling them abroad. The Panel's interview of a few experts on Yemeni cultural heritage, dealers in artefacts, intelligence and enforcement officials, customs clearance agents, and its confidential sources revealed the existence of a Houthi-backed organised network that smuggles these items from Yemen to different countries in the region and abroad and the sale proceeds are utilised for funding their war efforts in Yemen. The Panel is continuing to investigate these cases.

During the discussions with the Antiquities Authority officials of the GoY, the Panel was informed about the seizure of various such items by the authorities in Yemen and abroad, some of which are mentioned below. The Panel has not received any information linking these cases with the Houthis and is investigating these cases:

1. The authorities in the Sultanate of Oman seized 52 artefacts on 22 August 2017.




Source: GoY

2. The Department of Protection and Monitoring of Antiquities and Artifacts at the Heritage Authority in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia received 14 artefacts dating back to the Kingdom of Qataban (4th century BC) from a Yemeni resident in Jeddah in September 2022.




Source: GoY

3. The authorities in Spain informed the GoY on 24 June 2022 about five Yemeni artefacts being offered for sale in Madrid. A case of theft has been registered and referred to the court.



Source: GoY

4. About 16 Yemeni artefacts have been seized in France, which were exhibited alongside pieces from Syria, Iraq, and Libya. GoY representatives have reportedly provided the French authorities with precise information about the origin of these artefacts.













Source: GoY






5. In London, an Auction House had offered, from 20 November to December 2022, for sale many items from different countries including 40 ancient items from Yemen. The GoY representative objected to the sale of these Yemeni artefacts, supported by reports from experts on Yemeni artefacts. The British authorities stopped the display of the specified Yemeni items and handed over the matter to the Metropolitan Police. Although most of these items were reportedly taken out of Yemen prior to the current conflict, such large-scale seizure of items outside Yemen point towards the existence of an organised market for artefacts that provide significant amount of opportunity for money.






6. **Items Seized by Yemeni customs and Border Security:**




- a. **List of Seizures at Al-Mualla Port – Aden:** The items were seized on 9 August 2023 under case number (4) 2023 and the matter is with the Public Funds court.





No.	Item Description:	Photos
1	Decorated wooden panels (crafted) with window shapes	
2	Large wooden box	
3	Medium-sized wooden box	
4	Small wooden boxes of various shapes	







No.	Item Description:	Photos
5	Small wooden box shaped like a cupboard with six compartments	
6	Small rectangular wooden box with four compartments	
7	Decorative wooden items (Zeenah)	
8	Small wooden box with a specific shape	
9	Decorative boxes with silver colouring in dome shapes	
10	Various small wooden items (cigarette holders)	


No.	Item Description:	Photos
11	Small decorative boxes with drawings	
12	Large rectangular boxes lined with red velvet (for swords)	
13	Brass box with a velvet-lined interior	
14	Medium-sized brass vessel with a lid shaped like a "mattock" and a handle	
15	Decorative swords, three with gold inlays	

No.	Item Description:	Photos
16	Old swords with scabbards (one wooden)	
17	Jambiyas with scabbards	
18	Small jambiyas with scabbards and some with wooden scabbards (new)	
19	Brass plates of various sizes with designs	
20	Decorative mirror with a silver frame (one broken after sorting)	

No.	Item Description:	Photos
21	Old-style electric lantern with coloured glass	
22	Coloured glassware (blue – green) with lids	
23	Small orange glass bottle (for decoration)	

No.	Item Description:	Photos
24	Orange-coloured sprayer	
25	Decorative items shaped like lamps, green glass with brass tops	
26	Blue vase	
27	Coloured glass jar for decoration	




No.	Item Description:	Photos
28	Oval-shaped brass item with an egg-shaped marble inside	
29	Brass mortar or pestle	
30	Bag containing chains, a necklace, and one earring	
31	Bag with a collection of beads	
32	Decorated coloured bead bracelets Wooden locks	
33	Wooden board with a handle	


No.	Item Description:	Photos
34	Bag containing small white beads (Chinese type)	

Source: GoY

b. **List of artifacts seized by the Appeals Public Funds Prosecution:**

- **Case Number:** (10) 2023
- **Defendant:** Ahmed Ali Muthana Abdullah and others
- **Date of arrival of Memorandum from the Head of Appeals Prosecution:** 26 February 2024
- **Current Status:** The case is pending before the Appeals Court.

No.	Description:	Photos
1	<p>Upper half of a statue of a woman: The statue is broken with damaged arms, legs, and head. It features a necklace made of carved sandstone around the neck.</p>	
2	<p>Limestone seal: This seal has a tapered handle.</p>	
3	<p>Bronze horse statue: The statue is inscribed with Musnad script (horse of the Mukarreb).</p>	

4	Hollow bronze elephant: The elephant is hollow inside.	 A black and white photograph showing a hollow bronze elephant sculpture. The elephant is positioned on the right side of the image. To its left, the various components of the sculpture are laid out on a dark surface, including the trunk, legs, and body sections, demonstrating that the elephant is hollow.
---	---	---

Source: GoY

Annex 186: LPG Tankers

The Department of the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Palau-flagged LPG tanker *Raha Gas* (IMO: 8818219, MMSI 511101405), and its owner Arafat Shipping Company, set up on 19 January 2024, and registered in Marshall Islands (number 12831), for shipping millions of dollars of LPG falsely identified as having loaded in the UAE to Yemen on behalf of the al-Jamal network. Arif Ibrahim Khot, the captain of *Raha Gas* was also sanctioned for directing the LPG shipment to Yemen. OFAC also sanctioned the Palau-flagged LPG tanker *LPG OM* (IMO: 9160475, MMSI 511101151), and its owner and operator KDS Shipping Limited, set up on 27 Jun 2023, and registered in Marshall Islands (Number 120646) for carrying multiple shipments on behalf of Sa'id al-Jamal.

The Panel's investigations revealed that during the period from 1 January 2023 to July 2024, 44 requests for inspections of LPG vessels were received by the UNVIM from the vessels, out of which one request was rejected. Investigation further revealed that as per the UNVIM's records, for the shipment of 18 October 2023 of *LPG OM* and for the shipment of 8 June 2024 of *Raha Gas*, Mina Khalid port, UAE, was shown as the port of origin.

Annex 187: Landmines locally produced by the Houthis

1. The following figures display landmines produced locally by the Houthis, highlighting their specific features in terms of triggering mechanism and effects, e.g. bonding, horizontal effect.
2. According to a specialist, the Houthis' production of landmines is conducted in an artisanal manner, resulting in explosive contents that are less stable compared to those produced by specialized industries. This results in significant risks to both the local population residing near production and storage sites and to the EOD personnel tasked with clearing these areas.
3. The Panel notes that many of the anti-tank mines deployed by the Houthis are coupled with trigger mechanisms typically used for anti-personnel mines. Given the quantity of explosive contents, their explosion can have particularly severe consequences.
4. Additionally, the Houthis' failure to adhere to a mine-laying plan further complicates and increases the risks associated with the decontamination of affected areas, thereby exacerbating the dangers faced by both civilians and demining teams.

Antipersonnel mine of local production (Model 1)

Contains an average 450 g of TNT explosive

Figures 187.1 (up), and 187.2. (down)



Source: Project Masam

Antipersonnel mine of local production (Model 2)

Contains an average 550 g of TNT explosive and a maximum 700 g

Figures 187.3 (up), and 187.4 (down)



Source: [Project Masam](#)

Improvised bounding fragmentation device (regular model, 101mm diameter) of local production

Contains an estimated 300 g of TNT explosive

Figures 187.5



Source: Project Masam

Improvised bounding fragmentation device (medium model, 180mm diameter) of local production

Contains an estimated 1.75 kg of TNT explosive

Figure 187.6 (up) Figure 187.7 (down)



Source: Project Masam



المشاهد الكاملة للعرض العسكري "وعد الأخرة" - المنطقة الخامسة والوية النصر والقوات البحرية والجوية

Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>

Improvised bounding fragmentation device (large model, 325mm diameter) of local production

Contains an estimated 10 kg of TNT explosive

Figures 187.8



Source: Project Masam

Initiation systems associated with the improvised bounding fragmentation device

Figures 187.9 (left), and 187.10 (right)



Configured with an electric initiator
Victim-operated IED



Configured as a tripwire-initiated
Victim-operated IED

Figures 187.11 (left), and 187.12 (right)



Configured with a pressure plate
Victim-operated IED



Configured as a radio-command initiated IED

Source: Project Masam

Small directional mine of local production


Contains an estimated 500 g of TNT explosive

Figure 187.13



Source: Project Masam

Figures 187.14 (left), and 187.15 (right)



Source: <https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-yemens-west-coast/>

Figures 187.16 (up)

Comparison between a small directional mine of local production (left) and a GLD-150A directional mine similar to a production by China



Source: <https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-yemens-west-coast/>

Large directional mine of local production


Contains approximately 3 kg of TNT explosive

Figure 187.17



Source: <https://iedawareness.com/2018/04/12/houthi-directional-mines-captured-in-midi-yemen/>

Figures 187.18 (left), and 187.19 (right)



Source: <https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-yemens-west-coast/>

Figure 187.20

Similar characteristics with the M18A2, a large directional mine of Iranian production



Source: <https://armamentresearch.com/iranian-directional-anti-personnel-mines-in-syria/>

Large directional mine of local production

Figures 187.21 (up), and 187.22 (down)



المشاهد الكاملة للعرض العسكري "وعد الأخرة" - المنطقة الخامسة والوية النصر والقوات البحرية والجوية



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>

Fragmentation charge (Rock bomb) of local production (Model 1)

Contains 1 - 1.25 kg of probable C4 explosive

Figures 187.23 (up), and 187.24 (down)



Probable C4 explosive filling with ballbearing fragmentation

Source: Project Masam

Fragmentation charge (Rock bomb) of local production (Model 2)

Contains an estimated 500 g (small directional mine) of TNT explosive

Figures 187.25 (up), and 187.26 (down)



Source: Project Masam

Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP), concealed as rock bombs of local production (Model 3)

Likely contain different EFPs and charge configurations, 2-4 kg of TNT per rock mine

Figures 187.27 (up), and 187.28 (down)



Source: <https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-yemens-west-coast/>

Landmine of local production (2nd generation, in service in 2016 or earlier)

Contains approximately 5 kg of TNT explosive

Figures 187.29 (up) and 187.30 (down)



Source: Project Masam

Landmine of local production (3rd generation, in service in 2016 or earlier)

Contains approximately 3.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figure 187.31



Source: Project Masam

Landmine of local production (4th generation, probably in service from 2016)

Contains approximately 3.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figure 187.32



Source: Project Masam

Landmine of local production (5th generation, from 2017)

Contains approximately 3.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figures 187.33 (up), and 187.34 (down)



Source: Project Masam

Landmine of local production (6th generation, from 2020)

Contains approximately 3.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figure 187.35



Source: <https://observers.france24.com/en/middle-east/20220921-yemen-truce-houthi-rebels-landmines-civilians>

Blast main charge of local production (Model 1)

Contains approximately 6.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figures 187.36 (up), and 187.37 (down)



Source: Project Masam




Source: <https://cat-uxo.com/explosive-hazards/ied/houthi-main-charge-plastic-main-charge>

Blast main charge of local production (Model 2)

Contains approximately 37 kg of homemade explosive

Figures 187.38 (up), and 187.39 (down)




Source: Project Masam



Source: <https://www.khabaragency.net/news182980.html>

Pressure plate of local production

Figures 187.40 (up), and 187.41 (down)



Source: Project Masam

Anti-lift mechanism attached to the underside of a common style of improvised landmine

Figure 187.42



Source: Project Masam

EFP of local production (single charge)

Figures 187.43 (up), and 187.44 (down)



المشاهد الكاملة للعرض العسكري "وعد الأخرة" - المنطقة الخامسة والوية النصر والقوات البحرية والجوية




Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>

EFP of local production (multiple charges)

Figures 187.45 (up), and 187.46 (down)



المشاهد الكاملة للعرض العسكري "وعد الأخرة" - المنطقة الخامسة والوية النصر والقوات البحرية والجوية



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>

Annex 188: Attacks on civilians

1. The Panel's sources informed on individual cases of civilians killed and injured during indiscriminate attacks carried out by the Houthis. These include:

- On 19 March 2024, in Rada'a, Al-Bayda Governorate, a Houthi convoy of 14 heavily armed vehicles entered a residential area, and planted explosives in a residence. The explosion led to the destruction of neighbouring houses, resulting in the deaths of at least 13 civilians, including nine members of the same family, and four children.

Figure 188.1

Damage caused in Rada's by explosives planted by the Houthis



Source:

GoY

- On 3 February 2024, in the Sabr Al-Mawadim District of Ta'izz Governorate, a 17-year-old boy was killed by sniper fire when he was in the vicinity of his residence.
- On 9 April 2024, in the Sahara District of Amran Governorate, a 35-year-old man was killed for reportedly performing the Maghrib prayer seven minutes after the prescribed time.
- On 24 April 2024, in the Salah District of Ta'izz Governorate, a seven-year-old girl was injured by sniper fire
- On 27 April 2024, a boy was shot by a guard at the entrance of a summer camp in Aflah Al-Yemen District, Hajjah Governorate.
- On July 20, 2024, Houthi armed men stormed into a mosque in the village of Minjarah, in the Al-Sawar district of Al-Mahwit Governorate, and fired live ammunition indiscriminately, resulting in the deaths of a man and a woman and injuring three other women.

2. Furthermore, sources indicated that during the reporting period:

- The Houthis targeted homes in Al-Mashareeh, in the densely populated northern part of Al-Dhale' Governorate. A 40-year-old woman reportedly sustained various injuries from a shell which struck her home. She had shrapnel lodged in her neck and other parts of her body. This incident occurred two days after a similar attack resulted in the death of an infant and injury to his father, following the shelling of their home in the Sulaim area, northwest of the Qatabah District.
- A 15-year-old girl was injured by Houthi-sniper fire on the outskirts of Wadi Al-Kharazah, west of Qatabah, Al-Dhale' governorate. The child was hit when she was reportedly heading to a relative's house.
- Two children aged 3 and 5 were killed and five children and one adult were injured during an attack on residential houses in the village of Habour in Sabir Al-Mawadim District, southwest of Ta'izz.

Annex 189: Attacks on civilian objects

1. The Panel was informed that, on 20 July 2024, a mosque in Manjara (Tyre District, Amran Governorate) was attacked by the Houthis. Live munitions were reportedly shot indiscriminately, resulting in two civilians killed (one male and one female) and three women injured.

2. On 2 January 2024, in the Shamila area of Al-Sabeen District (Amanat Al-Asimah), a building owned by a lawyer and human rights activist was seized. Residents received eviction orders issued by the Houthi-led specialized criminal court. It reportedly read that “the specialised criminal court was imposing a precautionary quarantine on all funds and property owned by” the activist, who was accused of committing “crimes against the security of the State, aiding the enemy and communicating with a foreign state”. It further reportedly advised that “other measures would be taken”, if the instructions were not followed.⁷³

3. The Panel is further investigating alleged attacks against cultural property in Yemen, including damages caused to the Military Museum of Aden and the Sultan’s Palace, in the same city.

Figure 189.1

Military Museum, Aden



Figure 189.2

Sultan’s Palace, Aden



Figure 189.3

Sultan’s Palace, Aden




Source: Panel

⁷³ [https://acjus.org/?l=e/2/A/c/1/4/4/4100/\(ACJ\):-Confiscating-the-property-of-citizens-and-activists-by-the-Houthi-group-is-a-violation-that-affects-fundamental-rights,-and-we-call-for-the-cessation-of-this-violation](https://acjus.org/?l=e/2/A/c/1/4/4/4100/(ACJ):-Confiscating-the-property-of-citizens-and-activists-by-the-Houthi-group-is-a-violation-that-affects-fundamental-rights,-and-we-call-for-the-cessation-of-this-violation)

4. The Houthis have significantly disrupted crucial transportation routes, impeding the smooth flow of individuals and goods across Yemen. Among these routes are major highways linking Sana'a and Aden, such as the Aden-Dali-Sana'a road, the Aden-Ta'iz-Al-Houban road, the Aden-Yafa-Al Bayda-Sana'a road, and the Aden-Tor Al-Baha-Ta'iz-Sana'a road. Additionally, the road connecting the north-eastern governorates from Ma'rib to Sana'a, which is essential due to Ma'rib Governorate's role as a primary supplier of petroleum products, has been affected. Specifically, the road was obstructed at the Nihm crossroads, necessitating a detour through Al Bayda Governorate before reaching Sana'a. The closure of roads have resulted in prolonged travel time by land, consequently driving up the expenses associated with goods transportation due to heightened operational costs and a twofold increase in fuel consumption. For instance, the expense of hiring a truck for transporting a 40-foot container between Aden and Sana'a previously ranged from YR250,000 to YR280,000 but has now surged to YR1,600,000. This, in turn, also impacts the provision of humanitarian services and aid delivery.

5. However, recently, the GoY has taken some steps in repairing and relaying the roads and opening up of some roads and obstructions within its area.

Figure 189.4
Road map of Yemen with indication of blocked roads



Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Source: Government - Republic of Yemen

Figure 189.5
Impact of the disruption of roads by the Houthis

The Blocked Main Road	length (km)	Duration in hours	Blocked location	Alternative route	Length (in KMs)	Duration (in hours)	Remarks
Aden - Al Dhalea – Sana'a	365	6 (for cars) 18 (for trucks)	Al Dhali	Aden - Yafa - Al Bayda - Dhamar - Sana'a	566	13 (for cars) 15 days (for trucks)	The road is narrow, of one lane, and passes through rugged terrain, leading to delays.
				Aden - Tur Al-Baha - Haijat Al-Abd (southwest of Ta'iz Governorate) – Sana'a	466	12 (for cars)	Not suitable for trucks
Aden – Ta'iz	160	2 (for cars) 4 (for trucks)	Ta'iz city	Aden - Tur Al-Baha (southwest of Lahj) - Al-Maqtara - Al-Turbah (west of Ta'iz)	190	8 (for cars)	Not suitable for trucks
Sana'a – Ma'rib	173	3 (for cars)	Fardhat Nahm	Ma'rib – Al Bayda – Dhamar – Sana'a	418	9 (for cars)	
Western International route (Aden - Al-Twai port)	445	6 (for cars) 9 (for trucks)	Al-Hudaydah	Aden – Abyan – Shabwa – Hadramaut (Al Wadia Port):	600	12 (for cars) 18 (for trucks)	About 60 km on an unpaved desert road

Source: GoY

Annex 190: Critique of Houthis' attacks on the Red Sea followed by arbitrary detention of its author

1. According to sources, in January 2024, Yemeni judge Abdulwahab Mohammad Qatran, who criticized the Houthis for human rights violations and the attacks on the Red Sea, was detained along with his family. They were questioned for hours without legal representation, and the judge was held incommunicado for three days, reportedly in solitary confinement at a Houthi detention centre in Sana'a. The judge was released in June 2024.

Figure 190.1

Message of Judge Qatran on X criticising Houthi attacks on the Red Sea



Unofficial translation

Enough of the antics and muscle building of the Yemeni people. Thirty million people did not delegate you to fight America. Fight hunger, poverty, ignorance, disease, begging. May God bless you abundantly.

Fight corruption and injustice in your courts, department and prisons.

Fight racism in the performance of your state, your group and your faction.

31 December 2024

2. The case of Judge Qatran has been documented by different legal and human rights organisations and entities, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde31/7728/2024/en/>, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/30/yemen-judge-arrested-after-criticizing-houthis> and <https://cihrs.org/yemen-qatran-judgeimmediately-release-arbitrarily-detained-judge-qatran/?lang=en>

Annex 191: Arbitrary detention of teachers and education experts

1. Different sources, including from the GoY, informed the Panel about a distinguishable trend of abducting teachers and education experts who oppose the politicization of the education system and academic curricula.
2. There follow the details, as reported by sources and corroborated by open-source material,⁷⁵ of a case which appears to integrate said trend.

Case Study: Death of Education Expert Sabri Abdullah Ali Al-Hakimi

Overview

Sabri Abdullah Ali Al-Hakimi was a 56-year-old education expert working in the Ministry of Education, in Sana'a. He was reportedly detained and tortured by the Houthi militia and died in detention, on 23 March 2024.

Background and Detention

Al-Hakimi, along with a colleague professor, was abducted by the Houthis at Yaslah point six months prior to his death while traveling to Dhamar Governorate.

As per reports, their homes were subsequently raided, and equipment and books were looted. Both were imprisoned without formal charges.

Al-Hakimi had been in dispute with Houthi authorities over primary and middle school curricula, advocating for educational materials free from sectarian and political biases. The Houthis opposed this view, preferring curricula that supported sectarian mobilization.

Conditions of detention

During his six-month detention, Al-Hakimi was reportedly subjected to torture and ill-treatment. His health deteriorated significantly due to the lack of medical care. He was denied communication with the outside world except for a single visitation where signs of torture were evident.

Release of the Body

Following prolonged delays, the Houthis reportedly released Al-Hakimi's body on 28 March 2024, under the condition that his family bury him swiftly without forensic examination or public disclosure. The family was reportedly threatened with retaliation if they disobeyed, and other male family members were arrested.

Aftermath

Ahmed Saif Hashid, a parliamentarian, is reported to have publicly questioned the official account of Al-Hakimi's death. He reported seeing visible injuries on Al-Hakimi's face and criticized the restricted view of the body, which was not allowed to be photographed. On 25 March 2024, a group of activists, university professors and Member of Parliament Saif Hashid published a letter demanding that authorities conduct an impartial and transparent investigation.⁷⁶ The letter reads that "*deaths in detention in the prisons of the intelligence services have increased*".⁷⁷ In late April 2024, Saif Hashid was reportedly the target of an attempted killing.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ <https://www.sabanew.net/story/en/108804>, <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/292429>, https://justice4yemenpact.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Incident-Report-9-Deaths-in-Detention_English.pdf

⁷⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/hommed.fhdh/posts/pfbid02URtHAXtjVbQFjED6sGZS8aQeyh26pwDHLCK5wyLowqqV4dSSrr8p8h6jys1PdI>

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ <https://x.com/ERYANIM/status/1784663096738316712>

Annex 192: Prosecution Office documents relating to the death sentences issued by the Houthi-appointed specialised criminal court

1. The excerpts from the Houthi Prosecution Office contain, among others, the identity of individuals held in custody and sentenced to death by the Houthi-led specialised criminal court.

Figure 192.1
Excerpts of list of individuals sentenced to death by the Houthi appointed specialised criminal court

The image shows two pages of a document from the Houthi Prosecution Office. Both pages are headed 'النيابة العامة المتخصصة' (Specialized Prosecution Office) and 'العدل أساس الحكم' (Justice is the basis of judgment). The document lists individuals sentenced to death, with columns for name, age, date of sentencing, and location. The text is in Arabic and includes official stamps and signatures.

رقم	اسم المتهم	العمر	محل الإقامة	حالته
١٥	زايد سلطان صالح العديوي المكنى (صاحب-بوجيد)	٢٥ سنة	مزارع	وجه الدالة
١٦	جيل علي هادي محمد خالد المكنى (الغري-البراه)	٢٤ سنة	جندي، وزارة الدفاع	وجه الدالة
١٧	ابراهيم صالح محمد الناصري المكنى (خسام)	٢٦ سنة	ش/ رداغ م/ ذمار	وجه الدالة
١٨	عقدان علي عبد الله الرومي المكنى (صالح)	٢٧ سنة	طالب جامعي	وجه الدالة
١٩	اسامة محمد الغزي محمد فهد المكنى (فهد - عبد الله)	٢٦ سنة	طالب جامعي	وجه الدالة
٢٠	احمد احمد عبدربه ناصر الحدبجي المكنى (ابو ياسين)	٤٢ سنة	مدرس	وجه الدالة
٢١	بيهان محمد علي الضويبي	٣٨ سنة	مزارع	وجه الدالة
٢٢	شاداد جبر عبد الله محمد الجعفي المكنى (ابو حيدر-ابو همام)	٤٠ سنة	عامل بناء	وجه الدالة
٢٣	طه محمد احمد سعد السامري المكنى (ابو بكر)	٢٤ سنة	مهندس	وجه الدالة
٢٤	عبد الكريم حسين علي الشافعي المكنى (ابو شادي)	٣٠ سنة	طالب جامعي	وجه الدالة
٢٥	علي احمد علي محمد العمري	٣٩ سنة	مدير مستشفى المصلي	وجه الدالة
٢٦	علي حسين صالح معذل المكنى (معين)	٣٥ سنة	طالب جامعي	وجه الدالة
٢٧	علي عبد الله احمد علي الحاشدي	٢٧ سنة	طالب جامعي	وجه الدالة
٢٨	محمد عبد التكليف محمد الزترابي المكنى (ابو ليث)	٣٦ سنة	مقوت	وجه الدالة
٢٩	محمد عبد الله سعيد المسقر المكنى (ابو ابراهيم)	٤٥ سنة	موظف في التربية م/ ذمار	وجه الدالة
٣٠	محمد عبد الله عزيز شادي الجعوري المكنى (عبدالله)	٣٠ سنة	موظف في التربية م/ ذمار	وجه الدالة

Source: GoY

2. Death sentences issued by the specialized criminal court appear to often follow prolonged arbitrary detentions and years of enforced disappearance. For instance, in late July 2024, three men (one with a physical disability) who had been convicted to death nine years prior, saw their sentences confirmed. The men are reported to have been kept incommunicado for years, denied legal representation and tortured. Reportedly, according to the National Authority for Prisoners and Abductees, there are 70 civilians under Houthi custody facing execution.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ <https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2558856/middle-east>

Annex 193: Reported influence of Hezbollah on the Houthis' summer camps and the alteration of curricula in Houthi-Controlled Areas

1. Some sources informed the Panel that members of Hezbollah operate in Sana'a, providing assistance to the Houthis, including in running summer camps and in the revision of academic curricula. Houthi-run summer camps are reportedly very similar to those carried out by Hezbollah. Children's uniform and the hijab worn by girls in Houthi summer camps present similarities with those in Hezbollah-run summer camps.

2. The figures that follow show similarities between Houthi and Hezbollah summer camps (uniforms and salute)

Figure 193.1
Houthi summer camp



Figure 193.2
Hezbollah summer camp



Source Figure 193.1: https://x.com/Jehad_mag/status/1783051115551973472

Source Figure 193.2: <https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/hezbollah-and-lebanon-an-in-depth-examination-under-hassan-nasrallah-s-leadership/hezbollah-s-youth-movement-of-terror/>

Annex 194: Indoctrination and Promotion of Hatred, Violence and Discrimination among Children

1. The Houthis use multiple resources to indoctrinate children, promote hatred, violence and discrimination. For instance, sources informed the Panel that in Houthi-controlled areas, children initiate their school day with the following prayer rather than the national anthem:

“Oh God, we entrust you, we entrust you, your Messenger, we entrust Imam Ali, and we entrust whomever you commanded us to appoint, my master and lord, Abdul Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi. Oh God, we disavow your enemy, the enemy of your Prophet, the enemy of Imam Ali, and the enemy of whomever you commanded us to appoint, my master and lord, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi. Humiliation is far from us... Humiliation is far from us... Humiliation is far from us!!”

2. ‘Jehad mag’ is a Houthi open-source tool used to spread sectarian and discriminatory messages among children. Some examples of its content are as follows.

Figure 194.1

Screenshots taken by the Panel from ‘Jehad Mag’s on X



Unofficial translation

Jehad Magazine for Children

The generation of pride and dignity, the generation of knowledge and knowledge



Unofficial translation

Millions of Yemeni children “are steadfast with Gaza and will confront America and those involved with it



Unofficial translation

Participation of Yemeni children in the “Our path with Gaza... forward until victory”

reposted
 شبكة الفرقان - Network Al-Furqan
 @alforqannet

أطفال اليمن للعدو السعودي
 لا تختبروا صبر قائدنا

#معركة_الفتح_الموعود_والجهاد_المقدس
 @Jehad_mag - مجلة جهاد

Translated from Arabic by Google
 Yemeni children for the Saudi enemy
 Don't test our leader's patience.

#معركة_الفتح_الموعود_والجهاد_المقدس
 @Jehad_mag - Jihad Magazine

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



7:03 PM · Jul 13, 2024 · 5,326 Views

مجلة جهاد للأطفال
 @Jehad_mag

#الصورة_تحتكي
 جبل الصرخة
 تصوير / كزار الموييد
 #مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Translated from Arabic by Google
 #الصورة_تحتكي
 Generation of scream
 Photography / Karar Al-Moayyad
 #مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



6:11 PM · May 9, 2023 · 144 Views

Translated from Arabic by Google
 From the messages #أطفال_اليمن of the million-man march "In victory for Gaza, we are proceeding with the fifth stage of escalation"

#أطفال_اليمن With Gaza until victory

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



6:00 PM · Jul 27, 2024 · 45 Views

Translated from Arabic by Google
 From the messages #أطفال_اليمن of the million-man march "Loyalty to the blood of the martyrs.. With Gaza until victory"

#أطفال_اليمن With Gaza until victory
 #مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:

مجلة جهاد
 من رسائل #أطفال_اليمن من مليونية "وفاء لدماء الشهداء.. مع غزة حتى النصر"
 #أطفال_اليمن مع غزة حتى النصر
 #مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Translated from Arabic by Google
 From the messages #أطفال_اليمن of the million-man march "Loyalty to the blood of the martyrs.. With Gaza until victory"

#أطفال_اليمن With Gaza until victory
 #مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:

11:16 AM · Aug 4, 2024 · 63 Views

11:16 AM · Aug 4, 2024 · 63 Views

المراكز الصيفية

إعداد: إبراهيم العتيبه
 تصوير: أبو القحطان المريني

وتنفيذ برامج هناك المرشحة
 الصيفية التي يتعلم فيها الآلاف من الشفاعة القرآنية التي
 يحسنون من الأفكار الصالحة
 وفيها النظرة والحب حديد، تستور اليوم أحد هذه
 الأوساط بتأدية المناسبة

صباح استنفون
 مصلحتكم الصيفية؟

تعب و تلهو

يتلقى على طالب
 بالمستوى الدراسي الذي
 يناسب العمر

منه حتى لا يستغل التلاميذ
 الذين يتعلمون بالسرعة
 ويتم تسخيرهم

يتم التعليم ثلاث
 الشرائح وحلقات

جهاد

Unofficial translation
 Flyer for summer camps

Excerpts:

There are summer camps where children learn Quranic culture, which frees them from stray thoughts, and in which there are useful activities and games... Each student enrolls in the appropriate education level...

مجلة جهاد للأطفال @Jehad_mag

من رسائل #أطفال_اليمن من مسيرة ثابتون مع غزة رغم أنف كل عميل

#أطفال_اليمن مع غزة حتى النصر


#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Translated from Arabic by Google
From the messages #أطفال_اليمن from the march of steadfastness with Gaza in spite of every agent

#أطفال_اليمن with Gaza until victory

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



4:51 PM · Jul 23, 2024 · 63 Views

مجلة جهاد للأطفال @Jehad_mag

من رسائل #أطفال_اليمن من مسيرة ثابتون مع غزة رغم أنف كل عميل

#أطفال_اليمن مع غزة حتى النصر


#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Translated from Arabic by Google
From the messages #أطفال_اليمن from the march of steadfastness with Gaza in spite of every agent

#أطفال_اليمن with Gaza until victory

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



4:51 PM · Jul 23, 2024 · 63 Views

مجلة جهاد للأطفال @Jehad_mag · Aug 4

من رسائل #أطفال_اليمن من مليونية "وفاء لدماء الشهداء" مع غزة حتى النصر

#أطفال_اليمن مع غزة حتى النصر

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال



0:40 / 0:52

2 49



Unofficial translation

Yes, the Jews:

- Are the dangerous hostility of the nation that God warned us about and warned us against;
- The children of Israel, who God chose and favoured, bore His message and religion, but when they rejected His guidance and disobeyed Him, He cursed them and became angry with them;
- The Prophet abandoned them where the stone of the books of God were; they deviate from the line of His message;
- No matter how much we try to please them and make concessions to them. We will never achieve peace with them, nor will they be satisfied with us;
- They do not love us and do not wish us any good;
- Those who occupy Palestine and Al-Aqsa Mosque and those who desecrate our sanctity and want to enslave us.



Faith is Yaman - Yemeni proverb.

What a Jew

Muslim advised

The meaning is that no matter how friendly the Jew pretends to be to the Muslim, he harbours evil for him and does not sincerely seek his good. It refers to not relying on someone who disagrees with you in your religion, or sometimes in your belief.

37 Old Jihad (20)

Source: https://x.com/Jehad_mag/status/1754146318560252218

3. Influencers are reportedly heavily involved in mobilizing the masses, rallying thousands of individuals, including children, and disseminating violent and sectarian messages. The following images, taken from a documentary, illustrate a day of demonstrations, in Sana'a, in support of Houthi authorities. Every Friday, after prayer, the Ansar Allah is reported to gather hundreds of thousands of supporters in the main square of the city. Everyone, including the youngest children, is urged to think of Palestine.

Figures 194.2

Screenshots captured by the Panel from a 2024 documentary filmed in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen







Source: <https://www.arte.tv/en/videos/118760-000-A/arte-reportage/>

The following images depict moments in daily life in summer camps. These are powerful tools for promoting violence, hatred, and discrimination among children and youth.

Figure 194.3
Screenshots captured by the Panel from a 2024 documentary filmed in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen



Source: <https://www.arte.tv/en/videos/118760-000-A/arte-reportage/>

Unofficial Translation

Presidency of the Republic

Supreme Council for the Administration and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation

General Secretariat

Date:

1/12/11

Number: 26

Subject: Functional Structure of International Organizations

Dear Representatives of International Organizations Working in Yemen,

The General Secretariat of the Supreme Council for the Administration and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation extends its sincere appreciation to you.

In reference to the above subject and in accordance with Article 5 of the basic agreement signed with your organization, which stipulates that organizations must employ local or foreign staff as needed, in consultation with and with prior approval from the government represented by the General Secretariat of the Supreme Council, we kindly request the following:

Please provide us with the job structure for your organization, including job titles and names of employees, while adhering to the requirement to obtain prior approval from the General Secretariat before completing the hiring process for any local or foreign staff. This request is in line with the provisions of the agreement and is essential for ensuring compliance with the agreement's terms and conditions.

We request that you submit the organization's functional structure within one week from the receipt of this circular. This is crucial for implementing the terms, conditions, and obligations outlined in the basic agreement, which governs the working relationship between the Yemeni government and international organizations operating in Yemen.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

[...]

[...]

General Secretariat

Supreme Council for the Administration and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation

Annex 196: Facebook accounts identified by the Panel of arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas

<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100069181991038>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100090419695269>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100073339084079>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100070385013748>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100009144795696>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100085644177040>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068910739101>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100076394770544>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100078946869864>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100082336645878>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100089367654514>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100005781396817>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100092376588133>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100084214463531>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100041980124439>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100055912167214>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100057138244853>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100013658930714>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100023464780757>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100085179506808>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100090858711000>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100093471751991>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100092491582012>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100084899035091>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088443758434>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100078672855133>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100064081843519>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100042798436449>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100022593847599>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100022615670487>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088847108170>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100043843201985>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100049455045023>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100078112421619>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100051918248750>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100095010057378>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100087821389404>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100072535674559>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068448654609>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088804448849>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100094432729023>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100053185149582>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100076279654300>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100016548902262>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100090392468856>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100090003906493>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088816089895>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091434221975>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100092078379984>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088576837558>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100089113144631>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100086756592360>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100093708284555>

Figures extracted from the related accounts



<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100054499128426>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100081039384059>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091504976127>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100078564827663>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100071818337321>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100006749950951>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100065120104780>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088976470569>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100066451894179>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100029741229295>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100021774343294>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091374281039>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100016090207826>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100092680670244>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100081286797981>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100017622091203>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100026950784654>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100015692440375>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100034788863769>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100041726862891>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100010730499222>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100034759011738>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100017187336988>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088305317681>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100089036797123>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100005860776176>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100007550204853>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100015340982387>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100074198676901>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100005505005626>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100079048570418>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091985026918>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088479603310>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100095482298185>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100008296422491>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100063530207923>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100093551756316>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61553642951391>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61551679636123>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61551676585606>
<https://www.facebook.com/alimuhammad.alyemini>
<https://www.facebook.com/aslahslahk>
<https://www.facebook.com/ibnmuaamar>
<https://www.facebook.com/sdyq.hsynmsbqaan>
<https://www.facebook.com/nagi.gapan>
<https://www.facebook.com/jalal.alsowadi>
<https://www.facebook.com/aboskhr.alyemne>
<https://www.facebook.com/ali.alsaiane>



Annex 197: WhatsApp accounts identified by the Panel of arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas

https://chat.whatsapp.com/LBvTP7htTgDBYwBPDF6qlt?fbclid=IwY2xjawE2i0VleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHXUNBnOn_E1jHHGUqYsJb4VHewNdC1e1GH_2kEE_3LiD7ixZQ67uwwmUJg_aem_xyybBPCoo7G5eiMLsi_6HQ

<https://chat.whatsapp.com/Cot0atBaQjD4Ejd2iZsICi>

Figures extracted from the related accounts



Annex 198: "X" accounts identified by the Panel of arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas

<https://twitter.com/AlTalhi2tradin>
<https://twitter.com/yosefalmtri>
https://twitter.com/sadq_wsh8046
<https://twitter.com/DergamAlawsh>
<https://twitter.com/mwsam3271>
<https://twitter.com/LslahBn29379>
<https://twitter.com/qkmGAD6akr6vHhz>
<https://twitter.com/abwnshw64747731>
<https://twitter.com/rshydhady3>
<https://twitter.com/mmdlsybry5>
<https://twitter.com/aammss04796954>
<https://twitter.com/almotiaee>
<https://twitter.com/ali772167832>
<https://twitter.com/Alsadrea0313kmn>
<https://twitter.com/NoxEhBjBBRHHwu9>
<https://twitter.com/yaser84779686>
<https://twitter.com/hamadqadr50>
<https://twitter.com/mdljbr201>
<https://twitter.com/almtry772101>
<https://twitter.com/KydIshmakh>
<https://twitter.com/ysylqy7>
https://twitter.com/ywsf_mnyf
<https://twitter.com/MAljayah41025>
<https://twitter.com/bdalslamun>
<https://twitter.com/Samname9>
<https://twitter.com/AldbyanAsm>
<https://twitter.com/alaslht30514>
<https://twitter.com/HASHAS348623>
<https://twitter.com/eNDYXpXk92Sfe90>
<https://twitter.com/mwsam3271>
<https://twitter.com/AbdelSalamQat>
<https://twitter.com/TbyNasr>
<https://twitter.com/MustfeAlDhabial>
<https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinmF0uL2>
https://twitter.com/hdwan_ly
<https://twitter.com/rshydhady3>
<https://twitter.com/c2sXAYxqmYMzhon>
<https://twitter.com/mslslnsln1>
https://twitter.com/snan_as20
https://twitter.com/Ashraf_Muneef
<https://twitter.com/AdelHormos>
<https://twitter.com/NhMsv0WM2E8tCtM>
<https://twitter.com/bwmmdlqby3>
https://twitter.com/igg_04
<https://twitter.com/RwfySltn>
<https://twitter.com/YSKLMDIbkCTvUwO>
<https://twitter.com/lyrby44932777>
<https://twitter.com/mhm99445>
<https://twitter.com/bdallhalnhmy3>
https://twitter.com/aldbyany_rshad
<https://twitter.com/AlrwhanyAsma>
<https://twitter.com/f489086a52d84b5>
https://twitter.com/hybt_k_slahk

Figures extracted from the related accounts



<https://twitter.com/TahaArms>
<https://twitter.com/MshtryM>
<https://twitter.com/MohammedRiyadhe>
<https://twitter.com/k01mup442MDxa5H>
<https://twitter.com/rfatmhm97368979>
<https://twitter.com/TayfAbn50085>
<https://twitter.com/MuhammadAlTab>
<https://twitter.com/778238427M>
<https://twitter.com/bwmmdlqby3>
<https://twitter.com/AhmedAh11388275>
<https://twitter.com/mtmljfy1>
<https://twitter.com/ybuwZPadLPEft2x>
<https://twitter.com/mansour7737331>
<https://twitter.com/bdllhmn81>
<https://twitter.com/Bs023uFPINwYLJL>
<https://twitter.com/alyashrms29>
<https://twitter.com/lyjmnljmn1>
<https://twitter.com/m777344073>
<https://twitter.com/yhyyalhd73>
<https://twitter.com/Hassan771413103>
<https://twitter.com/kheeryy>
<https://twitter.com/DhiaaArms>
<https://twitter.com/AlkynAbrahym>
<https://twitter.com/Amerali20321067>
<https://x.com/WjihAl>



Annex 199: Telegram accounts identified by the Panel as belonging to arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas

<https://t.me/amaramar711>
<https://t.me/aleaqil711>
<https://t.me/+azpllrRi3gzYmQ0>
<https://t.me/Hkblbh>
<https://t.me/tahaarms>
<https://t.me/Abwalyas>
<https://t.me/DhiaaArms>
<https://t.me/shehab5b>
<https://t.me/aleaqil711>
<https://t.me/ffegehhheh>

Figure extracted from one of the related accounts



Annex 200: “X” accounts identified by the Panel of Houthi political and military leadership, and/or of media associated, and/or of activists promoting their ideology

<https://x.com/army21ye>
<https://x.com/army21yemen>
https://x.com/Yahya_Saree
<https://x.com/yemenis111>
<https://x.com/yemenis112>
<https://x.com/yemenis113>
<https://x.com/ameenhayan>
https://x.com/Nasr_Amer1
https://x.com/Moh_Alhouthi
<https://x.com/abdusalamsalah>
<https://x.com/alialqhoom>
https://x.com/ansarallah_1111
https://x.com/ansarallah_iraq
https://x.com/ansarallah_kurd
https://x.com/Ansarullah_info
<https://x.com/Ansarullahinfo>
https://x.com/Presidency_Ye
<https://x.com/AhmaaddHamed>
https://x.com/Zaid_garsyy
<https://x.com/MMY1444>
<https://x.com/SecYemen>
<https://x.com/drahmedalshami>
<https://x.com/DhaifAlShami650>
<https://x.com/MohammedAlfrah>
<https://x.com/hamedrizq01>
<https://x.com/AlJawfiAmin>
<https://x.com/alsyasiah>
<https://x.com/BadrSharaf22>
<https://x.com/PopularMedia8>
<https://x.com/AhmdAlrzamy>
<https://x.com/TvAlmasirah>
<https://x.com/ShahidAlmasirah>
<https://x.com/Almasirahbrk>
<https://x.com/almasirahturkey>
<https://x.com/najeebalashmory>
https://x.com/YEMEN_RMC_21
<https://x.com/alyemenv1>
<https://x.com/ameenhayan>
<https://x.com/mtahir2>
https://x.com/Houthi_1446_
<https://x.com/almonawer202323>
<https://x.com/AlthawahNews>
<https://x.com/aliazzehri>
<https://x.com/yemensmc2000>
<https://x.com/albayynaten>

Figures extracted from the related accounts



Annex 201: "X" accounts identified by the Panel as used by the Houthis to indoctrinate the youth

https://x.com/Jehad_mag

Figures extracted from the related account



List of Acronyms

ADNOC	Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
AIS	Automatic Identification Signal
AQAP	Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
AMR	Anti-Materiel Rifle
ARES	Armament Research Services
ASBM	Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
ASCM	Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
ATGM	Anti-Tank Guided Missile
AT	Anti-Tank (Mine)
BC	Before (Jesus) Christ
C2	Command and Control (center)
CAR	Conflict Armament Research
CBY	Central Bank of Yemen
CENTCOM	Central Command (US)
CIDT	Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
COC	Country of Origin Certificate
CRSV	Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
CTU	Counter-Terrorism Unit (GoY)
DIO	Defence Industries Organization (Iran)
DPV	Diver Propulsion Vehicle
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Device
EOSS	Electro-Optical Surveillance Systems
EUC	End User Certificate
FSA	Free Syrian Army
FSO	Floating Storage and Offloading
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GIS	Geographic Information Systems

GI-TOC	Global Initiative against Trans Organized Crime
GoY	Government of Yemen
GPS	Global Positioning System
HMG	Heavy Machinegun
HOCC	Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (Houthi)
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IR	Iranian Riyal
HRL	Human Rights Law
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IPR	Individual Property Rights
IRGC	Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
IRGC-QF	Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force
IRI	Islamic Resistance in Iraq
IRIAF	Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces
IRIN	Islamic Republic of Iran Navy
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KH	Kata'ib Hizballah (Iraq)
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
LACM	Land Attack Cruise Missile
LMG	Light Machinegun
LPG	Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air Defence System
MIRS	Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite
MMSI	Maritime Mobile Service Identity
MR	Military Region
MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MSC	Mediterranean Shipping Vessel

MV	Maritime Vessel
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
nm	Nautical Mile
NSF	National Shield Forces
OFAC	Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (US)
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSV	Offshore Support Vessel
OWA-UAV	One-Way Attack-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
PIJ	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PLC	Presidential Leadership Council
PMF	Popular Mobilization Forces (Iraq)
PoES	Panel of Experts on Al-Shabaab (Somalia)
PoEY	Panel of Experts on Yemen
RPG	Rocket-propelled Grenade
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SDGT	Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group
SEPOC	<i>Safer</i> Exploration & Production Operations Company
SESGY	Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SMG	Sub-Machine Gun
SR	Saudi Riyal
SRBM	Short Range Ballistic Missile
SWIFT	Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
STC	Southern Transitional Council
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UKMTO	United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations
UN	United Nations
UNMHA	United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement
UNVIM	United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism
US	United States of America
USD	United States Dollars
UUV	Unmanned Underwater Vehicle
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VHF	Very High Frequency (radio)
WBIED	Water-borne improvised explosive device
WFP	World Food Programme
YR	Yemeni Riyal