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Letter dated 11 October 2024 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts on Yemen have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel, prepared in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution [2707 \(2023\)](#).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) on 6 September 2024 and was considered by the Committee on 19 September 2024.

We would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)

Summary

The conflict in Yemen, which began a decade ago as an internal armed conflict and expanded into a regional confrontation, has now escalated into a major international crisis. The Gaza war marked a turning point in the regional dynamics, and its subsequent spillover effect brought the Yemeni peace process to a halt. The road map agreement can only be signed when the regional situation is conducive and the Houthis cease attacking the vessels in the Red Sea.

The Houthis exploited the regional situation and enhanced cooperation with the “axis of resistance”, in violation of the sanctions regime pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014). Information gathered by the Panel indicates that they have been receiving technical assistance, training, weapons and financial support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraqi armed groups and Hizbullah. Furthermore, joint operational centres have been set up in Iraq and Lebanon, with Houthi representation, aimed at coordinating joint military actions of the axis of resistance.

Moreover, the increasing collaboration between the Houthis and terrorist groups like Al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula is concerning. Both have agreed to cease internal conflict, transfer weapons and coordinate on attacks against the forces of the Government of Yemen. In addition, increased smuggling activities involving small arms and light weapons are observed between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, with indications of shared military supplies or a common supplier. The sanctions imposed on the Houthis would be of limited impact unless appropriate measures are taken against all the violators of the sanctions regime.

The scale, nature and extent of transfers of diverse military materiel and technology provided to the Houthis from external sources, including financial support and training of its combatants, is unprecedented.

During the military parade held in Sana’a in September 2023, the Houthis displayed several ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, uncrewed aerial vehicles, one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles, fast attack craft, uncrewed surface vehicles, electro-optical surveillance systems, land mines and sea mines. The Houthis do not possess the capacity to develop and produce most of the above-mentioned equipment without external assistance. Since January 2023, the Government of Yemen has intercepted numerous military and dual-purpose items. In January 2024, the United States of America intercepted two vessels in international waters carrying lethal equipment, including components of missiles and uncrewed underwater vehicles, which were reportedly on their way to Houthi-controlled areas.

The Houthis adopted a phased escalation strategy by targeting merchant and naval vessels in the Red Sea. The hijacking of the vessel *Galaxy Leader* occurred on 19 November 2023, and, to date, its 25 crew members of various nationalities remain detained. In response, different international naval coalition forces were formed, with the aim of deterring the Houthis and securing the freedom of navigation. However, the Houthis remain undeterred and continue attacking the vessels. At least 134 attacks have been launched from Houthi-controlled areas against vessels, including warships from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States, using some new models of missiles.

Internally, the Houthis have been intensifying their operations against the Government of Yemen, attempting to make advancements on several fronts. The Houthis have also been recruiting large numbers of Yemeni youth and children, irregular migrants and mercenaries from Ethiopian tribes. The internal military situation is fragile, and any internal or external trigger could lead to the resumption of military confrontations.

To support their military activities, the Houthis continue to adopt various illegal measures to generate significant resources for their military purposes. Using their controlling power over the telecommunications sector, they solicit public funds for their uncrewed aerial vehicle “air force” and “coastal defence forces” by sending millions of messages to subscribers. The Houthis use various networks operating from multiple jurisdictions, including shell companies and exchange companies, to finance their activities, especially from the oil and liquefied petroleum gas sector. The Houthi networks use faked documents such as country-of-origin certificates, resort to ship-to-ship transfers and deploy vessels that regularly turn off the automatic identification system during voyages, in order to avoid detection of the ports that are visited and the routes that are taken or to avoid inspections by the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism. The Houthis also continue to be involved in the widespread and unlawful use of armed personnel to freeze or confiscate assets of individuals and entities, take over the management of companies and indulge in widespread smuggling of weapons, drugs, dual-use telecommunications equipment, pesticides, medicines and Yemeni cultural objects.

Individuals designated under the sanctions regime, those acting on their behalf or at their direction, and the entities owned or controlled by them, continue to receive, own or control, directly or indirectly, funds, other financial assets and economic resources. The effectiveness of the financial sanctions has been limited. This is partly due to the approach adopted by the international community to prevent any unwanted adverse humanitarian impact of the financial sanctions, and partly due to the Government’s lack of capacity to freeze assets that are under the effective control of authorities appointed by the Houthis and located in Houthi-controlled areas.

There have been several attempts by the Houthis at printing currency notes abroad. The rivalry intensified, with the Central Bank of Yemen, Sana’a, issuing a new 100-rial coin, on 30 March 2024, which was later declared as counterfeit by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden. Recently, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, revoked the licences of six leading Sana’a-based banks and threatened to delink them from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system. These banks carry out significant number of international funds transfers, especially on behalf of several Houthi-controlled entities. The ban thus affected the economic interests of the Houthis, who then threatened to return to war and launch cross-border attacks against vital economic infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. The house of the Governor of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, located in Sana’a, was also attacked, and the Houthi-appointed court seized his property.

However, with serious and timely mediation efforts by the stakeholders, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, reportedly withdrew its revocation orders against the banks. The conflict was de-escalated, and the war averted. However, this left the Government of Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council highly dissatisfied with the response of the international community. The incident highlights how an economic issue can potentially spiral into a full-blown war, underlining the importance and urgency of addressing the long-standing economic challenges that threaten the peace, security and stability of Yemen. The interplay between economic interests, political power struggles and military actions underscores the complexity of the situation in Yemen. The Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea

triggered a ripple effect, Yemen being the most affected. The significant rise in transportation and insurance costs led to a rise in the prices of essential goods globally. The adverse effect of the continuing ban by the Houthis on the export of crude oil, which depleted the foreign exchange reserves and devalued the Yemeni rial, severely affected the delivery of public services in Government-controlled areas. That gave rise to regular protests, public unrest and bickering between the Southern Transitional Council and the Government, threatening political and economic stability in the country.

Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, especially by the Houthis, continue to persist. These comprise indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects, conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based violence, including violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity, as well as torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. There are numerous instances of arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances and the obstruction of access to and the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance. There are several reports of serious violations of due process, often resulting in death sentences, seemingly to suppress dissent.

The arbitrary detention by the Houthis of humanitarian personnel, who have been held incommunicado, and the seizure of property belonging to humanitarian actors are particularly alarming. These actions impede the fulfilment of humanitarian mandates and obstruct efforts by the United Nations to promote peace and security in Yemen. In addition, the recruitment and use of children in the conflict threaten the future stability of Yemeni society and prospects for sustainable peace and security.

Summer camps are being utilized by the Houthis to propagate hatred, violence and discrimination. Education professionals who resist the politicization of the education system face severe retaliation, including arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance. Furthermore, it is concerning to note the Houthis' local production of landmines, involving the placement of specific triggering mechanisms to increase the potential for human harm. The deactivation of landmines has become more hazardous for deminers, notably because the Houthis do not follow a mine-laying plan.

These intertwined political, economic, security and humanitarian violations need to be comprehensively addressed.

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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

1. The present report, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 2707 (2023), covers the period from 1 September 2023 to 31 July 2024¹ and includes updated findings from some of the cases investigated in the framework of the Panel's final report of 2 November 2023 (S/2023/833).

2. The mandate of the Panel was extended on 14 November 2023 by the Security Council in its resolution 2707 (2023) until 15 December 2024. Of the five members of the Panel appointed by the Secretary-General (see S/2024/50 and S/2024/418), the contracts of the arms expert, the finance expert and the regional affairs expert commenced on 19 January 2024, and the contracts of the armed groups expert and the international humanitarian law expert commenced on 5 June 2024 and 15 July 2024, respectively. Consequently, the investigations on international humanitarian law and human rights law violations for the reporting period are in their early stages.

3. The Panel adopted the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). It placed emphasis on adherence to standards relating to transparency, objectivity and sources, documentary evidence, corroboration of independent verifiable sources, and providing the opportunity to reply.² The Panel maintained cooperation with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) and worked closely with the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023).

4. In 2024, Panel members travelled to France, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Yemen (Aden and Mukalla).³ The Panel sent a request to the Islamic Republic of Iran for an opportunity to visit Tehran from 28 to 30 July 2024. However, due to the ongoing presidential election process, the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed its inability to host the delegation on the proposed date. The Panel thereafter proposed another date, 24 August 2024, for a meeting in Tehran. The Panel is awaiting a response. The Panel conducted physical inspections of materiel, including components of missiles and ammunition seized by Saudi Arabia, the United States and the Government of Yemen. It held in-person meetings and engaged remotely with a wide array of interlocutors, including various Member States. The Panel also met with the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other officials of the Government of Yemen during its visits to Aden and Riyadh in March and July 2024.

5. The Panel sent 204 official letters, of which 161 were addressed to 46 Member States and 43 to organizations, entities and companies, to which 128 replies were still pending as at 15 August 2024 (see annex 3). The non-response rate corresponds to 62 per cent of the correspondences sent.

¹ The period covered in the final report of the Panel (S/2023/833) ended on 31 August 2023; the present report therefore covers the period from 1 September 2023 to 31 July 2024. The last date for consideration of responses from Member States and entities to the Panel's questions was 15 August 2024.

² Additional information on the Panel's methodology and the opportunity to reply is provided in annex 1.

³ All major locations in Yemen are spelled in accordance with the United Nations geographic information system map in annex 2.

II. Acts affecting peace, security and stability in Yemen

A. Regional dynamics

6. Complex and fast changing regional developments during the reporting period overshadowed the progress made in the peace process in Yemen in 2023.⁴ The Gaza war marked a turning point in the regional politics, and the Yemeni conflict was affected by the Houthi participation in that war,⁵ the Red Sea attacks⁶ and the air strikes against the group by the United States and the United Kingdom.⁷

7. The Houthis exploited the regional situation to strengthen the stability of their regime, particularly amid the worsening economic conditions and widespread discontent in their areas. They also aimed to enhance their status in the “axis of resistance”⁸ and gain popularity in the region.

8. The attempt by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen to push the peace process forward by making an announcement about the road map for peace in Yemen in December 2023 could not overcome the adverse impact of the regional developments. Furthermore, the military escalation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel in April and the Israeli attack on Hudaydah port in July 2024, following a Houthi drone strike on Tel Aviv, Israel, raised serious doubts about the resumption of the peace process.

9. The recent measures taken by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, against six Sana’a-based banks were perceived by the Houthis as an economic war against them. Escalating the situation to the brink of war, the Houthi leader, Abdulmalik al-Houthi (Y.Ei.004), accused Saudi Arabia of being behind these measures and threatened to attack Saudi airports, seaports, oil installations and banks if the situation persisted.⁹ However, with timely mediation efforts by the stakeholders, the situation is currently de-escalated (see para. 42).

10. The road map agreement¹⁰ can only be signed when the regional context is convenient and the Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea come to a halt. However, the Houthis continue to remain undeterred, and the peace process remains stalled.

11. Meanwhile, the Houthis have been enhancing cooperation with other members in the axis of resistance and receiving support from armed groups in Iraq, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Gaza. The Panel investigated the relationships between the Houthis and Iraqi and Lebanese armed groups as case studies, on the basis of the recent intensification of joint activities among these groups. The Panel notes that the

⁴ The Houthi visit to Riyadh in September 2023 was indicative of tangible progress made in the Yemeni peace process.

⁵ As members of the axis of resistance, the Houthis threatened to attack Israel in response to its air strikes on Gaza. Since 19 October 2023, the Houthis have launched several missiles and one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles against Israel and attacked commercial vessels in the Red Sea that were “owned by or destined for Israel”.

⁶ On 10 January 2024, the Security Council adopted resolution [2722 \(2024\)](#), in which it demanded that the Houthis immediately cease all attacks on merchant and commercial vessels and took note of the right of Member States, in accordance with international law, to defend their vessels from attacks, including those that undermined navigational rights and freedoms.

⁷ The United States and the European Union formed naval coalitions to secure the shipping lanes in the Red Sea, and the United States employed incremental escalatory measures against the Houthis.

⁸ The term “axis of resistance” refers to a geopolitical alliance in the Middle East of those who oppose so-called Western influence and support each other in various conflicts and struggles against perceived common enemies. The concept of “collective action and the unity of battle fields” among the parties to the axis of resistance would suggest Houthi participation in any future regional conflict.

⁹ Houthi-affiliated media outlets published aerial images of important Saudi sites (see annex 4).

¹⁰ High-level officials expressed concern that the Houthis might implement only the first phase of the road map, in order to get the financial benefits.

sanctions imposed on the Houthis will be of limited impact as long as the group's network with regional armed groups remains unaddressed.

Case study 1: Houthi cooperation with Iraqi armed groups

12. Investigations by the Panel revealed an increasing presence by the Houthis in Iraq in the last few years. The war in Gaza increased political and military ties between the Houthis and Iraqi armed groups. The Houthi leader, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, confirmed in June 2024 that the Houthis were coordinating military activities with the so-called Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI).¹¹ Kata'ib Hezbollah, one of the main groups of IRI, issued a joint statement with the Houthis regarding their role in the axis of resistance.¹² Kata'ib Hezbollah affirmed that it would attack American and British targets with everything in its power if Yemen were attacked (see annexes 5 and 6).

13. Different sources affirmed that fundraising campaigns were launched in Iraq to support the Houthis, especially by Kata'ib Hezbollah.¹³ In January 2022, the fundraising operation by Kata'ib Hezbollah was conducted by Amir al-Musawi, spokesperson for Tajammu' Shabab al-Shari'ah (Sharia Youth Gathering), an umbrella organization under their control (see annex 7). The Panel could not estimate the amount of financial support provided to the Houthis. Other confidential sources conveyed that the Houthis also received financial support from Iraq through the provision of oil shipments.

14. According to reports received by the Panel, Iraqi armed groups have been dispatching their experts and combatants to Yemen since 2015, to oversee Houthi training sessions, transfer military technology and fight alongside Houthi combatants. Confidential sources informed the Panel that the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, which have become an integral part of the Iraqi armed forces in 2019,¹⁴ recently provided training to about 80 Houthi combatants in the Bahbahan training centre¹⁵ in the Jurf al-Sakhr area.¹⁶ The combatants included leaders from the Al-Nasr (Victory) brigades, which are deployed in the coastal governorates, such as Hajjah and Hudaydah, and affiliated with the Houthis. Sources indicated that the combatants travelled to Iraq on counterfeit passports and that such visits increased after the opening of Sana'a airport in April 2022 (see annex 9). The sources conveyed that the main purpose of the more recent training sessions was to enhance Houthi capabilities to target vessels in the Red Sea with accuracy.

15. In addition, the Houthis have coordinated joint military operations with Iraqi armed groups against Israel in the last few months. In June 2024, IRI and the Houthi spokesperson confirmed launching joint attacks against Israeli cities like Haifa and Ashdod (see annex 10).¹⁷ Abdulmalik al-Houthi also claimed, in a televised statement in June 2024, that his group was planning to launch attacks jointly with IRI against Israel from the Golan Heights (see annex 11). For such operations, sources affirmed that a situation room had been established in Iraq, comprising representatives of several armed groups, including the Houthis.

¹¹ According to sources, IRI comprises Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada', Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya and Harakat Hizbullah al-Nujaba'.

¹² The secretary-general of Kata'ib Hezbollah, Hajj Abu Hussein Al-Hamidawi, spoke to Abdulmalik al-Houthi, stressing the importance of maintaining readiness and a high level of coordination between the axis powers (see annex 6).

¹³ Other Shiite armed groups, such as Harakat Hizbullah al-Nujaba', Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada', Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Organization, declared their support for the Houthis.

¹⁴ See <https://x.com/IraqiPMO/status/1145735482518724608>.

¹⁵ Sources said that the Houthis also received training in another camp in Iraq, near the Saudi border.

¹⁶ Several Houthi combatants, including a high-ranking officer, were killed in the air strike by the United States on this area in August 2024 (see annex 8).

¹⁷ Brigadier-general Yahya Saree, the military spokesperson for the Houthis, said: "The first joint operation targeted two ships that were carrying military equipment in the port of Haifa. The second operation targeted a ship that violated the decision to ban entry to the port of Haifa in occupied Palestine." He added that "the two joint operations were carried out with several drones and the hit was accurate".

16. Houthi activities in Iraq are carried out by Ahmed al-Sharafi, also known as Abu Idris, who was the founder of the first Houthi military factory in Sa‘dah, in 2010. Multiple confidential sources confirmed that he also oversees the procurement of materiel for the Houthis, arranges training sessions with armed groups for the Houthis combatants and organizes visits by Houthi leaders to Baghdad (see annex 12).

17. Al-Sharafi has been active in meeting with different heads of armed groups, tribal leaders and officials, with the aim of increasing Houthi influence in Iraq (see annex 13). The Panel notes that he recently started meeting with high-ranking Iraqi officials. In June, Al-Sharafi met with the national security adviser of Iraq, Qasim al-Araji, in the first declared meeting with such a high-ranking Iraqi official (see annex 14). According to confidential sources, Al-Sharafi also moved the group’s activities from clandestine offices in the Jadriyah and Arasat al-Hindiyah districts in Baghdad to an officially recognized representation office. Confidential sources conveyed that the Houthis also use another office in Najaf city.

18. Senior officials of the Government of Yemen informed the Panel that the Government’s Minister of Interior was to discuss Houthi activities in Iraq with his Iraqi counterpart.

19. The training, military assistance and financial support provided by Iraqi armed groups to the Houthis constitute a violation of the arms embargo and financial sanctions. The Panel is awaiting the response of the Government of Iraq to its request for information on the aforesaid matter.

Case study 2: Houthi cooperation with Hizbullah

20. The Panel considers that Hizbullah is one of the most important supporters of the Houthis and is involved in:

- (a) Decision-making structure of the Houthis (see para. 72);
- (b) Operational support, through military training (either on infantry technique or on weapon systems) provided in Yemen and in southern Lebanon (see annex 15);
- (c) Technical support, such as the assembly of weapon systems;
- (d) Financial support, including resource mobilization and use for military purposes (see para. 108);
- (e) Ideological guidance, especially in the indoctrination of youth conducted during so-called summer camps (see para. 149);
- (f) Support for the management of media propaganda, including the preparation of content for military campaigns.¹⁸

21. Between October 2023 and April 2024, Houthi representatives and spokespersons made numerous statements, through media outlets located in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon, in which they referred to the existence of a joint coordination mechanism among all the armed groups belonging to the axis of resistance. Analysis by the Panel of these statements and the videos aired suggests an alliance of these groups at the political and military levels, with a certain degree of operational coordination under a joint command, and the purported existence of a so-called command and control centre or a network mechanism, which jointly coordinates the operations (see annexes 16–22).¹⁹

¹⁸ The offices of Al-Masirah, the Houthi media outlet, and Al-Manar, the Hizbullah media outlet, are located near each other.

¹⁹ The conduct of a large-scale attack on Israel on 14 April 2024, through the simultaneous launch of missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles from Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, seems to confirm the existence of such a mechanism.

22. According to confidential sources, this command and control centre is based in Beirut and is led by Mohammad Said Izadi, the head of the Quds Force branch for Palestinian affairs of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Case study 3: Houthi presence in other countries

23. According to confidential sources, since at least 2018, the Houthis have been running “liaison offices” in several countries to facilitate the reinforcement of their capabilities, through training and material and financial support, in violation of resolution 2216 (2015). The Houthis had a liaison office in the Syrian Arab Republic, which was reportedly closed in 2023 (see annexes 23 and 24).

B. Domestic dynamics

1. Acts of armed groups that threaten peace and security in Yemen

(a) Houthi military escalation

24. Deviating from the near-truce conditions prevailing since April 2022, the Houthis have been strengthening their capabilities on the front lines by transferring arms, equipment and new combatants. The Houthis have intensified their military operations against the Government’s forces and have attempted to make advancements on several fronts, such as Hajjah, Shabwah, Dali’, Ma’rib, Karish, Jawf, Ta’izz, Sa’dah and Hudaydah. In these operations, they have used missiles, drones, artillery, snipers, improvised explosive devices and landmines. According to the Panel’s sources, the Government of Yemen lost 329 soldiers, and 883 were injured, during the first half of 2024 (see annex 25).

25. According to sources, the Houthis have used the newly opened roads to enhance military reinforcements, transfer weapons and equipment and fortify their positions. Recently, they have constructed tunnels on the Hawban-Ta’izz road; they have also been constructing new roads along the front lines in Ma’rib, Shabwah, Bayda’, Mukayras, Yafi’, Dali’, Karish and Ta’izz (see annex 25, figure 25.1).

26. In June, the Government of Yemen received information that the Houthis were planning to attack several front lines in Karish, Ma’rib and Ta’izz. In response, the Government has taken many precautionary measures to mobilize its forces.

27. According to a circular obtained by the Panel, the Government’s armed forces were instructed to be prepared for potential Houthi surprise attacks on several fronts and to take the required precautions (see annex 25, figure 25.2).

28. The Government of Yemen believes that the international community should support it politically and militarily to counter the Houthi capability and secure the shipping lanes in the Red Sea.

29. The Panel is of the view that the internal military situation is fragile, especially with the Houthis’ continued attempts at capturing new positions. Any internal or external trigger could potentially lead to the resumption of military confrontation.

(b) Mass recruitment of new combatants

30. The Houthi rhetoric during the Gaza war led to the recruitment of a large number of new combatants to “liberate Palestine from the enemies”. Most Yemeni interlocutors are sceptical that these newly recruited combatants will ever march to Gaza, believing instead that they could be pushed to fight the Government of Yemen.

31. The Houthis have been actively engaged in recruiting and training people in most of the governorates under their control. They launched a large-scale recruitment and

training campaign under the name “Al-Aqsa flood”. Government officials informed the Panel that several thousand people, including children, have been recruited by the Houthis since November 2023. Estimates ranged from 220,000 fighters in 2022 to 350,000 as at the time of writing, compared with 30,000 in 2015. While the Panel has not been able to independently verify the number of newly recruited fighters, a large-scale mobilization would be a matter of concern (see annex 26).

(c) Recruitment of Ethiopian migrants and mercenaries

32. The Panel was informed that the Houthis have been exploiting Ethiopian irregular migrants, forcing them to join their ranks, to fight against the Government of Yemen and to engage in the trafficking of narcotics. According to confidential sources, there are 92,000 irregular migrants in the southern governorates. Other sources informed the Panel that the Houthis have also recruited mercenaries from the Tigray and Oromo Ethiopian tribes, at salaries ranging from \$80 to \$100. The Panel has not been able to verify that information and continues to investigate.

(d) Relationship between Houthis and the terrorist organizations Al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula and Al-Shabaab

Houthis and Al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula

33. Confidential sources expressed concern about the potential resurgence of Al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129) with Houthi support (see para. 36). Following the death of Khaled Saeed Batarfi, also known as Abū al-Miqdād al-Kindī (S/2019/83, para. 71), on 9 March 2024, AQAP appointed a new leader, Sa’d bin ’Atef al-Awlaki.²⁰ He is a native of Shabwah Governorate (S/2018/594, annex 30) and believed to be a strong military commander. AQAP has reactivated its media channels, purportedly to support recruitment and incite attacks.

34. That opportunistic alliance²¹ is characterized by cooperation in security and intelligence, offering safe havens for each other’s members, reinforcing their respective strongholds and coordinating efforts to target the Government’s forces.

35. Sources informed the Panel that both groups have agreed to cease hostilities and exchange prisoners. The Panel received information from the Government of Yemen that the former AQAP leader, Sami Dayan,²² who was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment in 2014, was released in Sana’a by the Houthis. This incident and the dissolution of the AQAP front in Bayda’ Governorate against the Houthis are indications of collaboration between AQAP and the Houthis.

36. Since the beginning of 2024, the two groups coordinate operations directly with each other. They agreed that the Houthis would transfer four uncrewed aerial vehicles, as well as thermal rockets and explosive devices, and that the Houthis would provide training to AQAP fighters. Furthermore, they discussed potential support by AQAP in attacks against maritime targets. According to government sources, the stockpile of AQAP includes small arms and light weapons and related ammunition, grenades, improvised explosive devices and landmines, as well as thermobaric rockets and man-portable air defence systems.

²⁰ See https://x.com/Dr_E_Kendall/status/1767231710322655630.

²¹ See www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/05/04/houthis-team-up-feared-al-qaeda-branch-new-threat-yemen/. Despite criticizing the Houthis for their attack in Rada’, Bayda’ Governorate, in March 2024, AQAP has not targeted the Houthis in the recent past (see annex 27).

²² According to reports, he was an important leader of AQAP, in the position of deputy to Ayman al-Zawahiri.

37. Recently, AQAP used uncrewed aerial vehicles and improvised explosive devices in attacks against the Government's forces in Abyan and Shabwah.²³ The growing use of uncrewed aerial vehicles by AQAP, especially those of longer range, is a matter of concern.

38. In its fight against government forces, AQAP employs guerrilla tactics and uses children in reconnaissance activities to obtain information on government positions. According to the Government of Yemen, between 2023 and mid-July 2024, the use of improvised explosive devices on 49 occasions caused the killing of 84 soldiers (66 in 2023 and 18 in 2024) and the wounding of 133 soldiers (89 in 2023 and 44 in 2024).

Houthis and Al-Shabaab

39. According to confidential sources, in order to extend their area of operation, the Houthis are evaluating options to carry out attacks at sea from the Somali coast. To that end, they are strengthening ties with the terrorist group Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab) (SOe.001).

40. According to the Government of Yemen, there are increased smuggling activities between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, mostly involving small arms and light weapons.²⁴ The fact that both groups are in possession of weapons of the same models and with serial numbers from the same batches (see annexes 126–151) indicates either the supply and illicit transfer of weapons between the two groups or the existence of a common supplier, or both. The Panel, with the cooperation of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), continues to investigate.

41. The increasing collaborative efforts between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab in the illicit transfer and smuggling of weapons threaten peace and security in Yemen and the region.

2. Impact of economic escalation

42. The interplay between economic, political and military actions continues to pose a serious threat to peace, security and stability in Yemen. Houthi actions directed at the economy in areas governed by the Government of Yemen transcend mere economic ramifications. For example, the continuing attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the prohibition on the export of crude oil, restrictions on domestic trade, interference in the activities of banks and financial institutions (see annex 28), the issuance of coins (see para. 103), the seizure of Yemenia Airways aircraft and the freezing of its funds (see annexes 178–180) have far-reaching effects in the political and security spheres. The ongoing economic tensions, especially after the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, revoked the licenses of six Sana'a-based banks and threatened to ban them from using the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)²⁵ facility, pushed Yemen towards a potential major conflict, as the Houthis threatened to return to war over the issue (see annex 29).

43. Likewise, political and military actions have a direct impact on the economy, exacerbating the cycle of instability in Yemen. Regular threats and attacks by the Houthis on vessels sailing through the Red Sea, especially since mid-November 2023, have disrupted international trade and the Yemeni economy. That has led to an increase in freight and insurance cost and delayed the arrival of goods in Yemen, which has, in turn, translated into an increase in the price of various commodities, notably essential goods. Similarly, the continuing ban on the export of crude oil resulted in a 43 per cent loss of revenue and a consequential foreign exchange loss,

²³ Sources mentioned about five such attacks, employing drones and additional explosive materials.

²⁴ The Panel is verifying names received by the Government of Yemen.

²⁵ SWIFT is a global messaging network used by banks and financial institutions to securely and reliably exchange information about financial transactions.

the devaluation of the Yemeni rial and soaring inflation rates. The exchange rate of the Yemeni rial reached a record 1,900 against the United States dollar in July 2024, as compared with 1,452 in September 2023. All of those factors affected the Government's ability to provide the people with basic services, such as the payment of salaries and the provision of electricity, water and education. The worsening economic conditions often triggered public unrest and conflict.

44. The political parties exploited such deteriorating economic situations, leading to political confrontations within the Presidential Leadership Council, thereby threatening political stability in Yemen (see para. 46). The lack of economic opportunities continues to drive individuals towards illicit activities, including joining armed groups or organized criminal networks, further destabilizing the region.

3. Internal situation

(a) Divergence of views within the Government of Yemen

45. The composition of the Government of Yemen remains incoherent. The Southern Transitional Council has been critical of the Government in several matters, affirming that it will eventually declare an independent State in the south. However, according to sources, the Council is not confident that it could obtain international recognition and meet the economic and political requirements of establishing an independent State.

46. According to sources, the Southern Transitional Council is not satisfied with the performance of the Government²⁶ because of the problems facing the economy²⁷ and the lack of public services. The Council, as a partner in the Government of Yemen and the main power in the south, believes that the Government's "weak performance" will affect the Council's popularity in the south, especially in Aden. Sources revealed that Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, the leader of the Southern Transitional Council, declared recently that his Council would withdraw from the Presidential Leadership Council and the Government, if the current economic situation persists.

47. Politically, the Southern Transitional Council has been rejecting the convention of the Parliament (House of Representatives) in Aden, on the basis of the assumption that it represents the legacy of the old regime. Instead, the Council, according to sources, has been promoting the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission²⁸ as a replacement for the Parliament.

48. Moreover, the Southern Transitional Council is still reluctant to be part of the unified forces under one command,²⁹ as decided by the head of the Presidential Leadership Council,³⁰ and prefers to remain independent. Sources informed the Panel that the Ministry of Defence asked the Southern Transitional Council to provide it

²⁶ The new Prime Minister of Yemen, Ahmed Binmubarak, has taken many initiatives to improve public services and to counter corruption. The Government of Yemen, undoubtedly, requires more financial support to bring in stability.

²⁷ The Southern Transitional Council also insisted that the recent economic decisions of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, should be implemented.

²⁸ The Consultation and Reconciliation Commission is a Yemeni body established by the former President, Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi, to bring together various components to support the Presidential Leadership Council and to unify national forces.

²⁹ The President of the Presidential Leadership Council and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces issued decision No. 40 of 2023 regarding the establishment of the Joint Operations Authority in 2024. The Presidential Leadership Council also issued a directive to merge, within a period of six months, several security and intelligence agencies under the name "Central Agency for State Security". However, sources told the Panel that the merging process was facing challenges. Pursuant to the merger directive, a specialized agency, the Counter-Terrorism Unit, has also been set up, headquartered in Aden and headed by a prominent Southern Transitional Council leader.

³⁰ The reunification process, under the Joint Forces Command and a joint operations room, has made some progress, according to government sources. However, due to lack of resources, the process is slow.

with a list of soldiers affiliated with the group, to equalize the salaries of all soldiers belonging to different factions, but the Council has not shared such a list yet. The sources conveyed that there is a great discrepancy in the salaries of the soldiers and that the lists of some of the groups affiliated with the Government of Yemen require comprehensive revision. To receive more salaries, some groups are increasing the numbers of their soldiers by adding non-existent names or names of employees who work in other ministries.

(b) Security incidents

49. The competition over the exercise of influence in the south led to an incident in Hadramawt between two armed groups of the Government of Yemen. The Elite Forces, supported by the Southern Transitional Council, prevented the National Shield Forces from entering Mukalla city, and the Southern Transitional Council issued a statement suggesting that it would be preferable for National Shield Forces to protect the valley and the desert in the region, while leaving coastal areas to the Elite Forces, which have historically safeguarded them. The Panel was informed by government officials that the issue was easily resolved and that the newly established Joint Forces Command, which comprised representatives of all the forces, would not allow such situations to be repeated.

50. Recently, a serious security incident led to an internal crisis that targeted the status of the Southern Transitional Council in the south. A Yemeni army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Ali Ashal al-Jaadani, was kidnapped against the backdrop of personal disputes over land ownership. Yusran al-Maqtari, the head of the Aden office of the Council-supported Counter-Terrorism Unit, was accused in the case. The Supreme Security Committee, headed by the Minister of Defence, decided to suspend and arrest Al-Maqtari for his involvement in the kidnapping. Although many suspects were arrested, the issue is still pending, and the main suspect has not been arrested yet.

51. The incident triggered demonstrations and riots in Aden and Abyan, where the kidnapped officer's tribe is based. Confidential sources informed the Panel that several individuals belonging to Houthi cells were arrested in Aden, Dali' and Abyan, while attempting to exploit the situation. The persons arrested were planning to incite the crowds against the Government of Yemen, the Southern Transitional Council and the Counter-Terrorism Unit. The sources added that the situation was still volatile and that the president of the Presidential Leadership Council had not returned to Aden until the middle of August because of the tense situation in the city.

III. Maritime security

A. Houthi attacks against merchant and naval vessels

52. The conflict in Yemen extended from land to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, significantly degrading maritime security. The Houthis' escalation of attacks³¹ against merchant and naval vessels in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean disrupted international shipping in this key geopolitical area. The group's shift to actions at sea increased their influence in the region. Such a scale of attacks, using weapon systems on civilian vessels, had never occurred since the Second World War.

³¹ As at 14 November 2023, the Houthis had intensified their attacks on vessels, specifically those bound to or linked to Israel (first and second phases). On 9 December 2023, in the third phase, Houthis vowed to target any vessel en route to Israeli ports. Since 24 May 2024, in the fourth phase, in response to the Rafah offensive by Israel in southern Gaza, the Houthis continue to attack ships of every company related to Israel or carrying goods for Israel. To view a Houthi statement on the topic, see <https://youtu.be/pBfd4W808zk>.

53. Despite the Houthis' claim that they would target "Israeli-linked" vessels, investigation by the Panel revealed that the Houthis have been indiscriminately targeting vessels navigating in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (see annex 100).

54. The Panel's analysis of data made available by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations and the United States Central Command reveals that at least 134 attacks were carried out from Houthi-controlled areas against merchant or commercial vessels and against United States and United Kingdom warships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden between 15 November 2023 and 31 July 2024. The Panel notes that, in their attacks against vessels, the Houthis have used a new and previously undisclosed ballistic missile, the Hatem-2 (see para. 71). Among the merchant vessels targeted, 31 were oil, liquefied petroleum gas or chemical tankers. Seven of those were struck but managed to continue navigation. The attacks resulted in the deaths of at least four seafarers (see annex 30).

55. On 19 November 2023, the vessel *Galaxy Leader* was attacked and hijacked (see annex 31). The vessel and the 25 crew members of different nationalities continue to be detained by the Houthis. According to aeronautics experts, the helicopter crew needed specialized training to land on the *Galaxy Leader* while it was in motion. The manoeuvres of the commandos on the ship suggest the use of techniques not previously associated with the practices of the Houthis. The Panel does not dismiss the possibility of specialized training being provided by foreign trainers to both the helicopter crew and the commandos involved in the operation.

56. On the following day, Hazam al-Assad, a member of the Houthis' political council, stated that, although the axis of resistance had coordinated with and been guided by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the decision to attack the vessel was made by the Houthi leaders. He also stated that it was just the beginning of their naval operations (see annex 32).³²

57. After being struck by the Houthis on 18 February 2024, the bulk carrier *Rubymar* sank, carrying 22,000 tonnes of ammonium phosphate and leaving a fuel slick behind it. That presents a risk for the environment and maritime security, as the Government of Yemen lacks capacity to contain the potential leakage.³³

58. The Panel also observes that about a third of these attacks on vessels occurred in the Gulf of Aden, a location far from the front lines, outside the radar coverage and the line of sight of the Houthis (see annex 30). Moreover, many of the vessels targeted in the area turn off their automatic identification systems before entering, suggesting that the Houthis received external assistance in identifying, locating and targeting the vessels. Responsibility for most of these attacks was claimed by the Houthis. The Panel continues to investigate.

59. According to the Panel's analysis, more than 800 missiles, uncrewed aerial vehicles, uncrewed surface vehicles, uncrewed underwater vehicles and surface-to-air missiles were intercepted or destroyed by the United States and United Kingdom coalition. Moreover, they also neutralized command posts, radars and multiple storage facilities. These strikes have reportedly diminished the Houthis' strategic capabilities, significantly reducing their capacity for large-scale attacks. However, the Panel has been unable to verify their real impact (see annex 33).

³² Statements made in an interview with Al-Araby al-Jadeed, a Qatari media outlet, dated 20 November 2023.

³³ Plans to tow the vessel failed after the port authorities in Aden, in Djibouti and in Saudi Arabia refused to receive the ship, according to the ship's Lebanese operator. To date, three vessels have sunk, posing risks to the environment and navigational safety. See wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/MediaCentre/Documents/Circular%20Letter%20No.4890%20-%20Mv%20Rubymar%20-%20Call%20For%20Contributions%20Of%20Oil%20Pollution.pdf and www.lloydslist.com/LL1148431/Houthis-claim-first-casualty-as-Rubymar-sinks-two-weeks-after-attack.

B. Threats issued by the Houthis against maritime companies

60. The Panel obtained copies of three messages sent to shipping companies by the humanitarian operations coordination centre, established on 17 February 2024 under the offices of Mahdi al-Mashat, the president of the Houthi supreme political council. The messages indicated that those companies were prohibited from transiting the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab strait, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, failing which they would be targeted (see annexes 34–36).

FSO Safer

61. The floating storage and offloading unit (FSO) *Safer* vessel remains moored at the port of Ra's Isa on the Red Sea, alongside the vessel *MOST Yemen* (S/2023/833, paras. 51–54). Approximately 1.1 million barrels of crude oil were transferred from the FSO *Safer* to the *MOST Yemen* between 25 July and 25 August 2023. The *MOST Yemen* had been registered in Liberia under the name *Nautica* and had flown the Liberian flag. However, even after the expiry of the registration, the vessel has not been registered under the Yemeni flag. Ongoing developments in the Red Sea have reportedly prompted the postponement of remaining tasks. This includes deferring the removal of the FSO *Safer* vessel from Yemen for recycling and disposal, as well as delaying the acquisition of the barge and associated equipment necessary to complete the vessel's salvage operation. No decision has been taken yet regarding the utilization of the scrap value of the FSO *Safer* or the proceeds from the sale of oil stored in the *MOST Yemen*. According to information provided to the Panel by the Government of Yemen, the Houthis have assumed full control over the operational area of both ships and have appointed a team to oversee operations on the new vessel, the *MOST Yemen*. The representative of SAFER Exploration & Production Operations Company, the company that owned FSO *Safer*, informed the Panel that they are not involved in the training and overseeing of the team affiliated with the Houthis, emphasizing that they bear no responsibility for any consequences arising from this arrangement.

62. Given the deteriorating situation in the Red Sea region and the fact that the site is controlled by the Houthis, there are significant concerns about the risk of environmental damage. If the two vessels are damaged, there could be oil leakage, with severe consequences for the marine environment and coastal populations, many of whom rely heavily on fishing for their livelihood.

IV. Arms and the implementation of the targeted arms embargo

Unprecedented scale of arms embargo violations

63. Pursuant to paragraphs 14 to 17 of Security Council resolution 2216 (2015), the Panel focuses on a range of monitoring and investigative activities to identify violations of the targeted arms embargo involving the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for the benefit of, individuals and entities designated by the Council and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014). Pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 2624 (2022), the Panel focuses on commercially available components that have been used by designated individuals and the entity to assemble all kind of missiles, drones, maritime offensive vectors, specific weapon systems (such as anti-tank guided missiles, man-portable air defence systems and electro-optical surveillance systems) and spare parts for the aforementioned, as well as technical assistance, training and other assistance related to military activities or to the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel.

1. Weapon systems acquired, assembled and used by the Houthis with foreign support

64. The multiple testimonies gathered by the Panel from military experts, Yemeni officials and even individuals close to the Houthis indicate that, without foreign support, the entity does not have the capacity to develop and produce complex weapon systems such as short-range ballistic missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, uncrewed surveillance aerial vehicles, one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (and their respective launching platforms and command posts), man-portable air defence systems, uncrewed underwater vehicles, anti-tank guided missiles, electro-optical surveillance systems, maritime radars, thermal sights and sniper scopes. Such external support is highlighted by the interceptions of materiel by various Member States and enforcement agencies since 2018 (see annex 37).

65. The Panel observed similarities between multiple units of materiel operated by the Houthis and those produced and operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran or armed groups of the axis of resistance. This indicates that the materiel may not have been developed by the Houthis themselves. Furthermore, the similarities suggest that diagrams and technical know-how for independently manufacturing or assembling these weapon systems might have been transferred to the Houthis by the Islamic Republic of Iran³⁴ or by groups from abroad. Moreover, the transfer of specific components, especially those with complex technicalities, continues to occur. This is demonstrated by the Panel's inspections of the components intercepted at sea and land borders and of the debris of the materiel used by the Houthis, which clearly show the make, models, markings, serial numbers and quality control stickers similar to those produced outside Yemen, especially in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

66. Since 19 October 2023, in response to the Gaza war and the Israeli airstrike on the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, Israeli territory has been targeted by the Houthis (see annex 99), the Islamic Republic of Iran and several armed groups of the axis of resistance. The operation has been carried out with medium-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles and one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles, most of which were intercepted or crashed on their way. In a letter dated 6 November 2023 addressed to the Security Council, Israel indicated that, on 19 October, the Houthis had launched five land-attack cruise missiles and 30 Samad-3 one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles towards its territory, followed by a medium-range ballistic missile on 27 October and by another medium-range ballistic missile and two land-attack cruise missiles on 31 October.

67. During the night of 13 to 14 April 2024, Israeli territory was the target of a massive attack, as more than 300 medium-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles and one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles were launched from Houthi-controlled areas, as well as from Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq and Lebanon.³⁵ That attack, called "True promises" by the Islamic Republic of Iran, illustrates the level of coordination between the Houthis, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the other non-State actors involved (see annex 101).

68. On 5 June 2024, the Houthis presented video footage of the firing of a missile called "Palestine", which would correspond to the medium-range ballistic missile fired against the city of Eilat, Israel (see annex 102). The Panel notes that this missile, not previously documented in the Houthi arsenal, presents similarities to the Kheibar Shekan, a hypersonic medium-range ballistic missile, which is part of the advanced

³⁴ On 29 May 2024, Tasnim News, an Iranian media outlet, reported that Iranian anti-ship missile technology was now in the hands of the Houthis (see annexes 38 and 39).

³⁵ Among those, 220 were launched from Houthi-controlled areas.

arsenal of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and was presented for the first time on 11 February 2022, during the military parade conducted in Tehran (see annex 46).

69. On 19 July 2024, the Houthis conducted an attack directed at the city of Tel Aviv, with a one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicle named “Jaffa”. Information with the Panel suggests that this aerial vehicle is similar to the Houthi Samad-3, with a newer engine and possibly upgraded avionics. The engine mounted on this aerial vehicle is similar to the Iranian MADO MD275 (see annex 103).

70. The Panel observes strong similarities between the documented materiel and those developed or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran (53 items). Similar items are also operated by armed groups in Iraq (20), Lebanon (11), the occupied Palestinian territory (5), Bahrain (1) and Somalia (1) (see annexes 40–83).

Case study 4: large-scale display of military materiel by the Houthis

The large-scale display of military materiel by the Houthis in Sana’a on 21 September 2023 highlights the presence of new materiel, as compared with that displayed during the previous parade, on 21 September 2022 (S/2023/833, paras. 101–103). The new materiel, which is similar in characteristics to those manufactured or produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran, includes two models of medium-range ballistic missiles, one model of land-attack cruise missile, one model of anti-ship cruise missile, two models of anti-ship ballistic missiles, one model of long-range guided rocket, one model of one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicle, two modified models of one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles, three models of surface-to-air missiles and three models of electro-optical surveillance systems. The Panel also observed one model of fast attack craft, two models of uncrewed surface vehicles^a (both equipped with naval radar) and two models of armoured vehicles (see annexes 84–94).

^a Remote-controlled fast attack craft that carries explosives.

Case study 5: statements by Iranian officials

During an interview by Russia Today, a Russian media outlet, on 21 April 2021, General Rostam Qasemi, Assistant Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, announced the presence of Iranian military advisers in Yemen and the supply of Iranian weapons manufacturing technology. The same interview was released by Memri TV, an Iranian media outlet.

On 22 September 2020, Noor News, another Iranian media outlet, reported that Brigadier-General Abolfazl Shakarji, senior spokesperson for the General Staff of the Iranian armed forces, announced on television the transfer of technical expertise in the defence sphere and the sharing of experience and knowledge with the people of Yemen.

On 1 October 2019, Tasnim News reported that, during a visit to Beijing, Major General Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed forces, stated the following to Phoenix TV of China: “We are giving Yemen’s popular Army advisory and intellectual assistance, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is in charge of this” (see annexes 95–98).


2. Missile of a new model used to attack a merchant vessel

71. On 25 June 2024, the Houthis claimed attacking the vessel *MSC Sarah V* in the Arabian Sea, using a new and previously undisclosed missile (see annex 104). A day later, they released a video showing the launch of the missile, identifying it as a Hatem-2, a hypersonic ballistic missile purportedly manufactured in Yemen. The Panel observes that the appearance of this missile is also similar to the Iranian Kheibar Shekan (see para. 68).

3. Role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah in the Houthi decision-making process

72. Several confidential sources mentioned the predominant role played by General Abdulreza Shalai of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force and his deputy, a senior Hezbollah cadre, in the Houthi command and control structure. The role of General Shalai, operating under the title “jihad assistant”,³⁶ is to advise and assist Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004) on strategic, jihadist and military activities. General Shalai allegedly supervises the aerospace forces (missiles and drones), the naval forces and all military regions, along with mobilization and logistics.

Figure I
Houthi organization chart



Source: Confidential.

Abbreviation: MR, military regions.

4. Assistance and training provided to the Houthis by foreign specialists and technicians

73. The Panel observes the transformation of the Houthis from a localized armed group with limited capabilities to a powerful military organization, extending their operational capabilities well beyond the territories under their control. This transformation has been possible due to the transfer of materiel (see paras. 64–66) and to the assistance and training provided by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

³⁶ The senior liaison officer for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, seconded to Kata'ib Hezbollah, is also operating under the title of jihad assistant and has a Hezbollah cadre as deputy.

Quds Force, Hezbollah and Iraqi specialists and technicians to the Houthis. This is confirmed to the Panel by multiple sources, highlighted in various media reports and conveyed in statements made by Iranian officials.

74. Sources informed the Panel that, for several years, Houthi combatants have been receiving tactical and/or technical training outside Yemen. The sources also affirmed that the combatants travelled from Sana'a to the following locations abroad on counterfeit passports (see para. 14 and annex 9):

(a) *Islamic Republic of Iran*. In early 2020, 200 combatants were trained at the Imam Khamenei University of Marine Science and Technology, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps training facility located in Ziba Kenar, on the Caspian Sea. In late 2022, 54 combatants were trained at the Imam Ali barracks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, located in Bagh-e Bakhshi, west of Tehran;

(b) *Lebanon*. Since at least 2020, combatants were trained at Hezbollah training grounds in Qalaat Jabbur, in southern Lebanon;³⁷

(c) *Iraq*. Several training sessions have been conducted by the Popular Mobilization Forces (see paras. 12–19).

5. Procurement of materiel and assistance through Houthi representation in the Islamic Republic of Iran

75. In 2019, Ibrahim Mohammed al-Dailami was appointed, by a decree issued by the Houthis,³⁸ as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Yemen to the Islamic Republic of Iran,³⁹ a move that amounted to State recognition of the Houthis' authority (see annexes 105 and 106; see also [S/2020/326](#), para. 42).

76. According to a confidential source, until late 2022, Adnan Qasim Ali Qaflah, the current director general of human resources at the Houthi-appointed ministry of interior, held a senior position at the Houthi office in Tehran, where he received intelligence training from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force.

77. Sources informed the Panel that major general Muhammad Ahmad al-Talibi, ([S/2021/79](#), annex 27), director of procurement at the Houthi-appointed ministry of defence, attached to their office in Tehran, is in charge of the illicit shipment of materiel to the Houthis through a network of individuals and entities. He also makes arrangements for Houthi combatants to receive training in the Islamic Republic of Iran (see para. 79 and case studies 6 and 11).

Case study 6: supply mechanism led by major general Al-Talibi

According to confidential sources, in 2022, Al-Talibi ordered the relocation to Djibouti of a Yemeni customs broker who was facilitating clearance of smuggled materiel intended for the Houthis.

After the seizure of 52 Dehlavieh anti-tank missiles on 10 March 2022, at the Shihan border post by Yemeni customs ([S/2023/130](#), paras. 54–56), the broker was exposed. He was reportedly arrested in February 2024 in Djibouti.

³⁷ On 21 May 2023, three Houthi journalists working with the Houthi media outlet, Al-Masirah, were present at an exercise demonstrating a simulated attack against an Israeli settlement conducted by Hezbollah (see annex 15). The Panel notes that Houthi combatants often conduct similar training sessions (see annex 16).

³⁸ See <https://en.yagency.net/125613>.

³⁹ In 2011, Hezbollah helped the Houthis to establish Al-Masirah in the Dahiyah suburb of Beirut.

6. Maritime smuggling of small arms and light weapons from naval bases in the Islamic Republic of Iran

78. Confidential sources informed the Panel about the smuggling, by sea, of three shipments of significant quantities of small arms and light weapons, from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Houthis, between July and September 2022. These small arms and light weapons were transferred in a dhow, supplied to a Yemeni crew by the Iranian authorities. The first transfer included 9,000 assault rifles. The second and third transfers had assault rifles and light and heavy machine guns. The weapons were packaged in green bags, as observed during previous interceptions (S/2019/83, annex 16; S/2021/79, annex 14, figure 14.6; S/2022/50, figure XI and annex 20; and S/2023/130, figure IV). The first transfer was made from the Iranian naval port of Sarkhur Tahruyi, Hormozgan Province, while the subsequent two were made from the Iranian naval port of Chabahar, where arms transfers were previously reported by the Panel (S/2017/924, paras. 112–114; and S/2018/193, para. 70). The crew members were accommodated in an apartment at this port. During these transfers, weapons were unloaded into smaller boats, 12 nautical miles off the coast, near the Yemen-Oman border.

79. The planning of this operation was allegedly carried out by a Houthi official Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim, also known as Abu Ali (YEi.002). In the Islamic Republic of Iran, Al-Talibi (see para. 77) and Abu Laith monitored the transfers. The two officers are allegedly part of the liaison cell that coordinates and monitors transfers of materiel to Houthi-controlled area.

80. The assault rifles, identified as type 56-1, were found to be similar to those intercepted between 2018 and 2023 (S/2023/833, annexes 24–27).

7. Maritime smuggling of missile components and surveillance equipment

81. On 11 January 2024, a stateless dhow carrying missile components intended for the Houthis was interdicted by the United States near the coast of Somalia. The seized items included anti-ship cruise missile propulsion systems, guidance systems and warheads, five liquid-propellant engines, four turbo-pump assemblies, various short-range ballistic missile components and 14 thermal cameras (see annexes 107–109). The components for the anti-ship cruise missiles display characteristics similar to those of the Iranian Ghadir and “351” land-attack cruise missile (see annex 110).

82. According to the United States, the captain, who had resided in the Islamic Republic of Iran for about two years, and the owner of the dhow and his brother, who were Iranian citizens, were allegedly working for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The dhow allegedly left Konarak, Islamic Republic of Iran, after being inspected by the Iranian Navy, and proceeded to the Iranian naval base in Chabahar (see para. 78; see also S/2017/924, paras. 112–114; and S/2018/193, para. 70) for refuelling and was intercepted after about six days of sailing.

8. Maritime smuggling of lethal materiel and electronic devices

83. On 28 January 2024, a stateless dhow was interdicted by the United States in the Arabian Sea. The seized items included 200 bags containing explosives, 17 Iranian Dehlahieh anti-tank guided missile launching posts, components for an uncrewed underwater vehicle, components for three electro-optical surveillance systems (S/2023/833, annexes 29 and 63) and machining tools for locally manufacturing tripod-mounted man-portable recoilless gun (SPG) and 120 and 81 mm mortars (see annex 111).

84. The Panel observes that:

(a) Some of the seized materiel was concealed in packaging similar to that of the materiel intercepted at sea by the United States on 6 May 2021⁴⁰ (S/2022/50, para. 65 and figure XII);

(b) Some of the components are similar to those of the Borkan-3 short-range ballistic missiles launched by the Houthis on 7 March 2021 against Dammam, Saudi Arabia (S/2023/833, annex 36, figure 36.5);

(c) Jet vane control systems, guidance, control-related components and affixed stickers are similar to the Qiam-2 short-range ballistic missile launched on 8 January 2021 by the Islamic Republic of Iran against a United States base in Erbil, Iraq,⁴¹ as claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2023/833, para. 75 and annexes 30–37);

(d) Markings and stickers on several units of materiel are consistent with the aforesaid materiel intercepted on 11 January 2024 (see para. 83 and annexes 112–114) and with some of the materiel intercepted by the United Kingdom, on 25 February 2023, from a vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2023/833, paras. 74–76 and annexes 30–37);

(e) The uncrewed underwater vehicle nose cone is similar to those of new materiel presented in early 2022 by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps navy (see annex 114, figures 114.23–114.26);


(f) There are similarities with several units of materiel produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran (see annex 114).

85. The seizure of uncrewed underwater vehicle components by the United States and the recent destruction of two such vehicles, allegedly used by the Houthis, were reported by the United States Central Command (see figure II). This implies the availability and use of this weapon system and the Houthis' capability to use it. This poses a new and serious threat to maritime security, as it can cause severe damage to the targeted vessels.

⁴⁰ The Panel obtained coordinates from a navigational device allegedly found on board this dhow, indicating that two days prior to its interception, the dhow had been at a location close to the port of Jask, Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2022/50, annex 20, figure 20.44).

⁴¹ See www.memri.org/tv/general-hajizadeh-irgac-aerospace-missile-attack-us-iraq-beginning-revenge-casualties-arab-countries-expel-region-else.

Figure II
Red Sea activities, 17 February 2024



Source: United States Central Command.

9. Military and dual-use materiel seized by the Government of Yemen

86. Since January 2023, significant quantities of materiel have been seized at the Shiha border post, by Yemeni customs, or in Aden, by the Counter-Terrorism Unit, allegedly on their way to Houthi-controlled areas (see annexes 115–121).

10. Sale of materiel in Houthi-controlled areas

(a) Small arms and light weapons and associated materiel

87. The Panel notes that many weapons being trafficked in Houthi-controlled areas are similar to those used by the Houthis and those seized at sea since 2018.

88. The Panel also observes that 26 different models of small arms and light weapons, documented in Somalia, bear serial numbers consistent with the batches of those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled area or intercepted since 2018 on their way to the Houthis. This indicates that either there was a common supplier or that some of the small arms and light weapons were transferred to the Houthis through Somalia or were transferred from Yemen to Somalia (see annexes 126–144 and 147–151).⁴² The Panel also documented one model of small arm or light weapon and one model of thermal vision device bearing serial numbers consistent with those documented in Afghanistan (see annexes 146 and 152).

89. According to sources, the Houthis are organizing and controlling the illegal procurement and sale of arms in areas under their control, potentially in contravention of the targeted arms embargo and assets freeze provisions. Several Houthi leaders collaborate with arms dealers or operate arms shops and earn significant revenue, including taxes, from this trade. The Panel has identified hundreds of sellers, operating mainly in Sana'a, Sa'dah and Hudaydah, and notes that, in February 2024, an arms exhibition was held in Sana'a, displaying recently manufactured small arms and light weapons (see annexes 122–125).

⁴² Some of the small arms and light weapons documented have also been observed in several other countries.

90. Among the small arms and light weapons exhibited for sale on the black market, the Panel has documented over 11,000⁴³ (S/2023/833, para. 104), of which several hundred bear markings suggesting recent manufacture, thereby indicating recent transfers. The significant volume and diverse range of materiel underscore the ease with which the Houthis have been able to circumvent the arms embargo.

91. Of the aforesaid small arms and light weapons, 31 display characteristics and markings similar to those produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran communicated to the Panel that the characteristics of the said materiel differed from what they produced (see annexes 144–145 and 151).

92. The Panel's investigations revealed that, of the 73 pistols produced in Brazil and presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, 2 had been legally transferred between 2021 and 2023 to Saudi Arabia, 37 were covered under an end-user certificate issued in December 2022 by the Tanzanian authorities and 20 had been legally transferred in 2015 to Djibouti, which could be part of the consignment diverted in 2015 by Fares Mohammed Mana'a (SOi.008) and which was later illegally transferred to Houthi-controlled areas (see annexes 153–157).

93. Furthermore, of the 255 pistols produced in Türkiye, the Panel documented the transfer of 2 to Iraqi authorities in 2015, and of 184 as follows, between 2022–2023: 1 to an arms seller in Czechia; 2 to two arms sellers in Saudi Arabia; 180 to two arms sellers in the Sudan; and 1 to an arms seller in the United States (see annexes 158–164).

94. The Panel documented the transfer of one pistol produced in Czechia and one produced in Slovakia, between 2022 and 2023, to one of the aforesaid sellers in Saudi Arabia (see annexes 165–166).

95. The Panel has requested information from the Member States concerned regarding the further transfer of these items to Houthi-controlled areas. The Panel is awaiting responses from Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania

11. Suspicious naval activities

96. The Panel obtained information from a confidential source that Hudaydah and Salif port facilities are being used to unload significant quantities of military materiel. The Panel's investigations revealed that six vessels reached Houthi-controlled ports without obtaining clearance from the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism. The Panel continues to investigate the potential involvement of the identified vessels in the illegal transfer of prohibited goods to the Houthis.

97. Vessels bound for Houthi-controlled ports undergo inspections by the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism in Djibouti. The Mechanism is not responsible for granting final clearance for onward travel by the vessels to the Red Sea ports. Since February 2023, all restrictions on the import of goods, except those deemed prohibited, through ports under Houthi control have been lifted. In addition, there has been a notable surge in both the number of vessels and the variety of cargo destined for those ports. However, the Mechanism has faced significant challenges relating to funding availability and sustainability over recent years.

98. The Panel's investigations concerning the aforesaid six vessels revealed the following:

(a) *Almas* (IMO-8864957), Comorian flag: before arriving at the Houthi-controlled anchorage of Ra's al-Khatib, Hudaydah Governorate, on 18 October 2023,

⁴³ The Panel analysed social media accounts of the sellers and assessed the consistency among the models and serial numbers of the materiel displayed.

the vessel was docked in Bandar Abbas, Islamic Republic of Iran, between 20 September and early October 2023 (see annex 167);

(b) *Kasra-3* (IMO-9109184), Tanzanian flag: before arriving at the Houthi-controlled anchorage of Salif on 6 October 2023, the vessel was docked in Bandar Abbas, Islamic Republic of Iran, on 25 September 2023. The vessel then proceeded to the Islamic Republic of Iran and returned to Salif anchorage on 22 November 2023, where it stayed until 30 November 2023 (see annex 168);

(c) *AH-Union* (IMO-9109005), Panamanian flag: the vessel arrived at Salif port on 5 December 2023;

(d) *Dubai-1*: the vessel arrived at Salif port on 9 December 2023 and on 23 March 2024, reportedly sailing under the Sri Lankan flag. However, Sri Lankan authorities denied any such registration and indicated that the IMO number (988850) was incorrect. The Panel notes that, since 2020, the *Dubai-1* has been navigating between Djibouti, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Oman, Somalia and Yemen, and its automatic identification system is frequently being turned off, suggesting suspicious activities (see annex 169);

(e) *Alakh Shakti* (IMO-419956818), Indian flag: the vessel arrived at Salif port on 27 September 2023;

(f) *Mahdar* (IMO-417898786): the vessel arrived at Salif port on 25 April 2024, reportedly sailing under the Sri Lankan flag. However, Sri Lankan authorities denied any such registration.

99. The Panel's investigations revealed that documents showing the fake registration of vessels in Sri Lanka are being used by different vessels carrying prohibited or restricted goods.

100. The Comorian, Indian, Iranian and Tanzanian authorities have not yet responded to the letters sent by the Panel.

Case study 7: use of forged Sri Lankan vessel registration documents

On 18 January 2022, the United States interdicted a stateless dhow in the Gulf of Oman and seized 40 tonnes of urea fertilizer. This was the same vessel that had previously been seized on 11 February 2021 with a cargo of small arms and light weapons off the coast of Somalia (S/2022/50, paras. 62 and 63 and annex 19). According to documents found on board, including a forged Sri Lankan ship registration certificate, the dhow is called *Al-Etihad* (S/2023/130, para. 44 and annex 15, figure 15.8).

The Panel investigated the ship registration document of the vessel *Bari-2*, which was intercepted at sea by Saudi Arabia on 24 June 2020, while carrying a large shipment of small arms and light weapons of similar models to those already intercepted on their way to the Houthis. Although the ship was allegedly registered in Sri Lanka, the Panel assessed that the registration document was forged (S/2021/79, para. 74 and annex 15, figure 15.19).

In 2017, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea also reported information about a vessel involved in the illegal traffic of charcoal. Here also, the Group discovered the use of falsified Sri Lankan ship registration documents used by the traffickers (S/2017/924, para. 208, annexes 12.2.1 and 12.2.3).

V. Implementation of the financial sanctions

Violations of the assets freeze provisions

101. Individuals designated under resolution 2140 (2014), those acting on their behalf or at their direction, and the entities owned or controlled by them, continue to receive, own or control, directly or indirectly, funds, other financial assets and economic resources, as detailed below, in violation of the financial sanctions regime.

102. A stricter interpretation of the aforesaid resolution would encompass, under the assets freezing provisions, all forms of funds, financial assets and economic resources obtained by the authorities appointed by the Houthis. While some portion of the customs and tax revenues, the fees from telecommunications services and the proceeds from the sale of fuel and gas are allegedly diverted by the Houthis for military purposes, a portion of these resources must be utilized by the Sana'a-based authorities to provide essential services to the population. The effectiveness of the financial sanctions has been limited. This is partly due to the approach adopted by the international community to prevent any unwanted adverse humanitarian impact of the financial sanctions, and partly due to the Government's lack of capacity to freeze assets that are under the effective control of authorities appointed by the Houthis and located in Houthi-controlled areas. The Panel's investigations, therefore, are concentrated on financial benefits unlawfully obtained or controlled by the Houthis for military purposes.

1. Minting of coins and alleged printing of currencies by the Houthis

103. Apart from sending a strong message about their claim of the sovereign economic right to issue their own currency, the Houthis adopted this measure to generate funds without any dependence on external sources. This money can be easily utilized by them for their military purposes without any fear of detection.

Case study 8: counterfeiting of notes and passports

The Panel observed three attempts made by the Houthis to illegally bring in currency notes and passports printed abroad, as follows:

- The Panel previously reported on the seizure of counterfeit promissory notes worth 35 billion Yemeni rials and passports, which had been illegally printed abroad and smuggled into Yemen (S/2018/594, paras. 142–144 and annex 53; S/2019/83, para. 125; and S/2022/50, paras. 90 and 91).
- In its previous report, the Panel reported on another attempt by the Houthis in August 2023 to print counterfeit currency notes, through a printing press in China (S/2023/833, para. 175 and 176). Further investigation by the Panel revealed that Mahmood Saeed Hezam al-Ameri, who had approached the aforesaid printing company, did not represent the Government of Yemen and that the passport (No. 07865754) in his name had been issued by the Houthis in Sana'a (see annexes 170–171).

- The Panel recently received information that the Houthi-appointed authorities, through their representatives, allegedly approached a company in Indonesia for the supply of security paper, ink and other accessories for printing bank currency notes, promissory notes, financial stamps and passports. The Panel requested Indonesia to conduct the necessary investigations. The Panel also wrote to the company concerned, requesting that it provide relevant information. However, the Panel has not yet received any response from either of them. The Panel's investigations revealed that neither the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, nor the Government of Yemen placed any such order with the company. Sources informed the Panel that the Houthis had allegedly acquired blank passports printed through the company in 2016. The Panel could not verify these allegations. However, investigations revealed that some individuals had travelled abroad for military training on faked passports issued by the Houthis (see annex 9). The Panel continues to investigate.

Case study 9: new Houthi coin

On 30 March 2024, the Central Bank of Yemen, Sana'a announced the issuance of coins in a denomination of 100 rials, on the pretext of replacing the damaged paper currency notes. Investigations by the Panel revealed that old 100-rial paper notes worth 12 billion Yemeni rials are in circulation. Sources informed the Panel that the Houthis had them minted locally, as they lacked the capacity to print currency notes in Yemen, which required, inter alia, security paper, thread and special ink, all of which they found difficult to procure from abroad. The sources informed the Panel that the Houthis would issue more such coins or currency notes to fund their war activities and to position themselves as the power centre of an independent economy.

The Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, representing the internationally recognized Government, considers itself the sole legal entity with the authority to issue Yemeni currency. The move by the Houthis undermines the legitimacy of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, which treats its notes as counterfeit. The Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, therefore promptly issued a press release declaring the Houthi coins as counterfeit (see annex 172).

2. Collection of money for the uncrewed aerial vehicle “air force” and “coastal defence forces”

104. The telecommunications sector continues to serve as a significant revenue source for the Houthis. The deployment of 4G services by Houthi-controlled telecommunications companies significantly increased revenue. Sources informed the Panel that a major part of the revenue is used for military purposes, including for the procurement of dual-use telecommunications equipment.

105. Exploiting the potential of this sector, the Houthis have effectively been soliciting public funds, including through millions of messages, to bolster their military activities (see annex 173).

Case study 10: messages for the “air force”

The Panel’s investigation revealed that the Houthis launched a mass text message fundraising campaign for their uncrewed aerial vehicle “air force”. They designated specific accounts at the Central Bank of Yemen, Sana’a, to collect donations in both Yemeni rials and United States dollars (account Nos. 10262-1128 and 10262-1019-01) (see figure).

Unofficial translation of screenshot of text message for funds for the air force from the public

7:08 PM

Sunday, 24 December 2023

Support the Air Force
via the following accounts:
Central Bank No.
1128 - 10262 (riyals)
01-1019 - 10262 (dollars)

Source: Panel of Experts.

The Panel’s sources revealed that, in one of the latest messages, support was sought for the “coastal defence forces”.

3. Collection of funds for uncrewed aerial vehicles from the education department

106. The Panel learned from its sources that the Houthi-appointed education office in Sana’a regularly compels the schools in Houthi-controlled areas to make payments for uncrewed aerial vehicles. The Panel received a copy of the receipt evidencing the collection of an amount of 20,956,250 Yemeni rials by the Houthis (see annex 174). The matter is under investigation.

4. Financial support for the Houthis from outside Yemen

107. The Panel’s investigation revealed that the Houthis use various networks of individuals and entities operating from multiple jurisdictions, including Djibouti, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Türkiye and Yemen, to finance their activities. They employ various banks, shell companies, exchange companies, shipping companies and financial facilitators. The Panel interviewed the officials of a few exchange and shipping companies and banks, who, requesting anonymity, confirmed this *modus operandi*.

108. The Panel was informed that a special committee has recently been set up to augment the Houthis’ revenue, and to plan military spending, including on weapons, allegedly under the guidance of a high-profile expert, known as Abu Radwan, linked to the Radwan forces of Hizbullah. He reportedly provides advice on increasing customs duties, taxes, levies and telecommunications tariffs. Recently, the Houthis increased customs duties on some commodities, imposed new levies and enhanced collections from telecommunications companies by almost 35 per cent (see annex 175).

109. According to the sources, a substantial amount of money is being illegally transferred under the direction of Sa’id al-Jamal, allegedly affiliated with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, to support the Houthis. Confidential sources, requesting anonymity, also mentioned the alleged involvement of several individuals,

including top Houthi leaders, and entities who facilitated financial support to the Houthis, namely, Nabil Ali Ahmed al-Hadha, Abdallah Najib Ahmad al-Jamal, a Yemen-based relative of Sa'id al-Jamal, Abdi Nasir Ali Mahamud, a Houthi affiliate and business partner of Sa'id al-Jamal, and Ibrahim al-Nashiri, a Houthi member, as well as some of the leading companies owned or controlled by Mohamed Salah Falitah and Mohammed Abdulsalam. The foreign exchange requirements of the Houthi-affiliated companies for imports were allegedly facilitated by the Houthi economic payments committee.

110. During the investigations, the Panel received reports about the alleged involvement of the following entities in the illegal transfer of funds for the benefit of the Houthis, both in Yemen and abroad:

- (a) Al Aman Kargo Ithalat Ihracat Ve Nakliyat Limited Sirketi;
- (b) Al Alamiyah Express Company for Exchange and Remittance;
- (c) Nabco Money Exchange and Remittance Co.;
- (d) Al-Rawda Exchange and Money Transfers Company;
- (e) Al Radwan for Exchange Co.

111. The Panel could not independently verify the alleged involvement of the aforesaid individuals and entities. The Panel has received several documents, and the investigation is ongoing.

Case study 11: Yemeni businessman involved in procurement and payments for the Houthis

The Panel is investigating a case in which a Yemeni businessman, related to the top Houthi leadership, was allegedly involved in the procurement of weapons for the Houthis by using funds routed through several exchange companies. The Panel was informed that this person worked as a customs clearing agent and tried to facilitate the clearance of a consignment that was seized by Yemeni customs on 10 March 2022 at the Shihan border post, which included 52 Dehlavieh anti-tank missiles or missile parts for the benefit of the Houthis (see case study 6).

He was reportedly involved in the procurement of and payments for various military items acquired by the Houthis. He set up a company in Djibouti and lived there under a different name, using a false passport, a copy of which is with the Panel. The Panel also scrutinized copies of several documents showing cash deposits and funds transfers in the name of three exchange companies in Djibouti and Yemen (see annex 176).

(a) Alleged financial support from the Islamic Republic of Iran for the smuggling of weapons

Case study 12: financing the smuggling of weapons

During its ongoing investigation, the Panel scrutinized several documents. General Rostam Qasemi, Assistant Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, informed the media that “all the weapons the Yemenis possess are a result of our aid” (see case study 5 and annex 95). An indictment document dated 7 August 2024,^a filed by United States officials in a United States District Court in Virginia, contains details of alleged payments made by two Iranian nationals, Mir’Kazei, also known as Shahab Regi, and his brother, Yunus Mir’Kazei, to the captain of the dhow *Yunus*. It was alleged that these brothers, who owned the *Yunus* and worked for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, had employed the captain, who lived in the Islamic Republic of Iran, to smuggle military materiel from that country to other recipients, including the Houthis. From August 2023 to the end of January 2024, the captain allegedly completed multiple smuggling voyages, coordinated and funded by the brothers, Shahab and Yunus. The details of the financial transactions are as follows:

- *August 2023*. Approximately 100 million Iranian rials paid by Shahab to the captain from his bank account.
- *September–October 2023*. The captain received payments from Shahab and Yunus through hawala^b and distributed the money to his family and others.
- *26 October 2023*. Approximately 800 million Iranian rials paid by Yunus to the captain from his bank account through hawala.
- *26 November 2023*. Approximately 300 million Iranian rials paid by Shahab to the captain from his bank account.
- *3 January 2024*. Approximately 800 million Iranian rials paid by Yunus to the captain from his bank account through hawala. Afterwards, the captain, through various hawaladars, distributed portions of the money to the families of crew employed by him on the *Yunus*. The captain also communicated with his family about purchasing property and building a new home.

^a See www.justice.gov/d9/2024-08/mirkazei_superseding_indictment.pdf.

^b Informal money transfer system outside of traditional banking systems.

(b) Financial support from Iraq

112. The Panel received information from various sources about financial support received by the Houthis from Iraq. Iraqi youth have been regularly launching campaigns soliciting financial support for the Houthis in Yemen (see para. 13).

5. Alleged collection of illegal transit fees for safe maritime passage

113. The Panel’s sources conveyed that the Houthis allegedly collected illegal fees from a few shipping agencies to allow their ships to sail through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden without being attacked. Sources further informed the Panel that these shipping agencies coordinate with a company affiliated with a top-ranking Houthi leader and that the fees are deposited in various accounts in multiple jurisdictions

through the hawala network and through adjustments involving trade-based money-laundering. The sources estimate the Houthis' earnings from these illegal safe-transit fees to be about \$180 million per month. The Panel has not been able to independently verify this information.

6. Confiscation of assets

114. The “judicial guard” system, set up by the Houthis in 2017 to manage the funds and properties of opponents accused of treason, continues to be involved in the widespread and unlawful appropriation of assets, using armed force. Previously, Saleh Mesfer Saleh al-Shaer (YEi.007) had been the “judicial custodian” under this mechanism. The Houthis continue to target business entities and individuals opposed to them, by regularly freezing, confiscating and taking control of their assets, including the house of the Governor of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, and by taking over the management of the companies, in complete disregard for the rule of law (see annexes 177–180).

(a) Taking control of the funds, assets and management of Yemenia Airways

115. The Panel's investigation revealed that, pursuant to instructions from the Houthi-appointed ministry of finance, the Central Bank of Yemen, Sana'a, instructed all commercial banks to suspend the disbursement of the funds of Yemenia from all of its bank accounts in all currencies (see annexes 178–180). An amount of \$100 million has remained under the control of the Houthis for over a year.

116. Furthermore, on 25 and 26 June 2024, the Houthis detained the following Yemenia aircraft at Sana'a airport, upon their return from Jeddah carrying pilgrims:

<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>Flight number</i>	<i>Route</i>	<i>Date of arrival</i>
A320-A-70AFC	IY 5555	Jeddah – Sana'a	25 June 2024
A320-C-70AFC	IY 5547	Jeddah – Sana'a	26 June 2024
A320-F-70AFF	IY 5559	Jeddah – Sana'a	26 June 2024

117. Another aircraft, an Airbus A330-3-F70AFE, was also detained in Sana'a. Yemenia is prohibited from using spare parts lying in its maintenance hangar in Sana'a.

118. The Panel's investigations revealed that the Houthis wanted Yemenia to operate three weekly flights from Sana'a to Amman, as well as to other international destinations. Yemenia was also prohibited from operating bank accounts in Government-controlled areas. When Yemenia expressed its inability to accede to these demands, given the lack of access to its funds, the Houthis seized the aforementioned aircraft. The Houthis also took control of the operational management of the company in Sana'a through people loyal to them and refused to recognize the Board of Directors operating from Aden.⁴⁴ This is therefore a case of the Houthis taking control of the assets, funds and management of a Government-owned airline by the use of force, with the aim of gaining further financial benefits by increasing the frequency and destinations of international flights, at the cost of Yemenia.

119. Although the Government of Yemen and the Houthis have come to an understanding to solve this problem, the funds remain under the control of the Houthis.

⁴⁴ See <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3346352.htm>.

(b) **Confiscation of the assets of pharmaceutical companies**

120. On 10 June 2024, the specialized criminal court of the Houthis in Sana'a issued a memorandum addressed to the Central Bank of Yemen, Sana'a, directing all banks and exchange companies to seize and freeze all the balances, accounts and transfers of two of the largest pharmaceutical companies in Yemen, namely, the Modern Pharmaceutical Company and the International Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company, and of their directors and employees (see annex 181).

Figure III

Copy of the memorandum dated 10 June 2024 issued by the specialized criminal court of the Houthis in Sana'a



Source: Confidential.

7. **Smuggling**

121. The Houthis have been amassing substantial illegal resources through the organized smuggling of various items such as weapons, drugs, telecommunications equipment (see annex 182), prohibited goods such as banned pesticides (see annex 183), non-permissible medicines (see annex 184) and cultural heritage property (see para. 123 and annex 185).

(a) **Smuggling and trafficking of drugs**

122. There has been a rising trend in the smuggling and trafficking of narcotic drugs within Yemen, with authorities in Yemen reporting seizures of drug consignments and the interception of dhows carrying such cargo by international naval forces. The Houthis also collect taxes and illegal fees from farmers growing khat (*Catha edulis*). Recently, they imposed new levies on khat farmers in Ibb Governorate that exceeded 300 per cent.

Case study 13: drugs seized from sugar containers in Aden port

The Panel was informed by the Counter-Terrorism Unit about the seizure of a significant quantity of drugs at the Aden port from one of the sugar containers (No. 536854) carried by the ship *Vanesa MSC* from Brazil. The case ended in the conviction of Muhammad Ibrahim Ahmed al-Matari to 25 years of imprisonment, which was reduced on appeal to 12 years. The Panel scrutinized the case records and interviewed the officials of the Counter-Terrorism Unit in Aden in March and July 2024, revealing the involvement of the Houthis in the smuggling of the drugs seized.

(b) Funding from the smuggling and trafficking of cultural objects

123. Various sources informed the Panel that the Houthis have been indulging in the smuggling and trafficking of antiques and antiquities, which form part of the cultural heritage of Yemen, and selling them abroad.

124. On 26 October 2023, Yemeni customs officials seized an antique book containing 19 pages made of leather and written in gold (in Hebrew) (see figure IV).

Figure IV

Antique Hebrew book seized by Yemeni customs



Source: Yemeni customs.

8. Import of oil and liquefied petroleum gas using faked documents

125. The Panel received information from several sources that Houthi-controlled companies are importing oil and liquefied petroleum gas using false country-of-origin certificates, through Hudaydah and Ra's Isa ports, sometimes bypassing inspections by the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism. This occurs in two ways: some vessels travel to the specified country, turning off their automatic identification system transponders to avoid detection, while others conduct ship-to-ship transfers at sea without visiting the ports indicated in the country-of-origin certificates.

126. The Panel's ongoing investigations revealed that, during the period from 1 January 2023 to July 2024, 44 requests for inspections of liquefied petroleum gas vessels were received by the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism from the vessels. Of those requests, one was rejected. Investigations further revealed that, for the shipment of 18 October 2023 on the *LPG OM* and for the shipment of

8 June 2024 on the *Raha Gas*, Port Khalid, United Arab Emirates, was indicated as the port of origin.⁴⁵

127. The Panel is investigating vessels linked to Hizbullah and high-ranking Houthi leaders and has gathered information on several individuals, entities and routes. However, due to incomplete evidence linking the entire supply chain and to potential risk to some confidential sources, the Panel did not disclose these details at this stage.

128. The Panel's investigations revealed that Houthi-appointed authorities collected approximately 994 billion Yemeni rials in the name of customs duties on imports of fuel through ports under their control during the period from 1 April 2022 to 30 June 2024, in accordance with the exchange rate prevailing in Government-controlled areas. Considering other illegal fees and the margin of profit on that, the Houthis' total income from this sector alone is estimated at 1.34 trillion Yemeni rials during the aforesaid period. The Panel's sources mentioned that a significant portion of this amount was diverted towards military purposes. The Panel, however, could not independently verify the amount of diversion.

9. Collection of money against fake telecommunications equipment purchases

129. Sources informed the Panel that Houthi-controlled entities adopted another modus operandi and transferred about \$132 million towards the purchase of telecommunications devices and equipment and the building of towers to expand the telecommunications network. A significant portion of that money allegedly reached top Houthi leaders through various accounts. The telecommunications companies write off these amounts as losses, claiming that the equipment was seized by the Government of Yemen at the borders, but no purchases were made or construction done.

130. The Panel received information that, in another instance, the Houthis sold the modems to subscribers at a rate of \$75, purchased at \$56 (compared with the actual cost of \$8) from a company connected to the Houthi leader, Ahmed Hamed. A confidential telecommunications source, requesting anonymity, mentioned that the alleged recipients included top Houthi leaders or their associates, namely, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim, Ahmed Hamed, Mesfer al-Numair and Ismail Hamid al-Din. The Panel could not independently verify these allegations. The matter is under investigation.

VI. Acts that violate international humanitarian law and international human rights law

131. Investigations, including information gathered from sources and analysis of documents,⁴⁶ indicate widespread violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture, conflict-related sexual violence, gender-based violence and breaches of the right to a fair trial. Additional concerns relate to the recruitment and use of children in the conflict in Yemen and obstructions to humanitarian access and aid delivery.

⁴⁵ Both these vessels and their owners, namely, Arafat Shipping Company and KDS Shipping Limited, respectively have been sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United States Department of the Treasury (see annex 186). See also <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240815>.

⁴⁶ The international humanitarian law expert has not yet participated in missions to Yemen and the region (see para. 2).

A. Indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects


132. For the period from 1 January to 30 June 2024, government sources indicate that 128 civilians were killed (including 33 children and 6 women) and 93 injured (including 35 children and 8 women). Bayda' Governorate has been the most affected, followed by Amran, Jawf and Tai'zz.⁴⁷ In addition, there were 101 attacks on civilian objects, including places of worship, schools, medical facilities and private property. These attacks have impeded access to essential services and undermined the rights to health, education, adequate standard of living and freedom of religion (see paras. 136, 137 and 139). Confidential sources informed the Panel that at least 13 civilians had been killed and 26 injured in two air strikes led by the United States-United Kingdom coalition on 8 April and 30 May 2024 in Hudaydah Governorate. The attack by Israel on the port of Hudaydah on 20 July 2024 resulted in at least 9 civilians being killed and 83 injured. The Panel will continue to investigate the impact of international air strikes on civilians.

1. Civilian casualties from landmines, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance

133. Civilian casualties, including women and children, from landmines, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance remain high.

Figure V

Exploded ordnance incidents and civilian casualties in Hudaydah, 1 June 2023–31 May 2024



Source: UNMHA, "Mine action update for May 2024".

Note: Numbers in this figure are as reported by multiple sources and have not been independently verified by UNMHA.

Abbreviations: EO, explosive ordnance; UNMHA, United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement.

134. From 17 September 2023 to 28 July 2024, Project Masam neutralized 37,804 items in Government-controlled areas, including: 232 anti-personnel mines, 3,097 anti-tank mines, 33,488 units of unexploded ordnance and 177 improvised explosive

⁴⁷ Open-source information indicates at least 393 attacks on civilians between September 2023 and March 2024, which allegedly resulted in 367 fatalities and 44 injuries. See <https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/>.

devices.⁴⁸ In July alone, the teams eliminated some 4,230 of those items.⁴⁹ Government officials informed the Panel that, during the first half of 2024, at least 61 civilians were killed and 119 were injured by landmines, sea mines and other remnants of war. Investigations indicate that the Houthis locally produce landmines, placing specific triggering mechanisms to increase the potential for human harm. Moreover, landmine deactivation has also become more hazardous for deminers (see annex 187; see also [S/2023/833](#), para. 84).

2. Attacks on civilians and civilian objects

135. The Panel collected information on the killing and injury of civilians, including women and children (see annex 188). The Houthis have reportedly launched indiscriminate attacks on residential neighbourhoods, using rocket-propelled grenades, artillery, uncrewed aerial vehicles and snipers. There are accounts of at least 153 fatalities and 180 injuries (including women, children and older persons) during the reporting period. Ta'izz, Dali', Ma'rib, Hudaydah and Bayda' Governorates were particularly affected in the first half of 2024.

136. The Panel is investigating attacks on civilian objects, including schools, medical facilities and religious buildings. As at late July 2024, at least 35 schools and medical facilities were reportedly occupied by armed forces or groups. Four schools were occupied and three religious buildings were attacked during the reporting period.⁵⁰ Government sources reported on systematic attacks on media establishments (lootings, closures and the confiscation of equipment and materials) during the first half of 2024, in breach of freedom of expression. The Houthis reportedly placed explosives in agricultural and grazing areas and near water wells, playgrounds and previously abandoned civilian houses. They disrupted critical transportation routes, affecting the movement of individuals and the flow of goods across Yemen, causing prolonged travel times and increased transportation costs for goods (see annex 189).

137. The Houthis continue to systematically seize or confiscate private property without due process, in order to suppress dissent and finance war activities (see paras. 114–120). For example, during the first half of 2024, at least 108 residences were reportedly looted and seized. Dispossessing individuals of their property or assets contributes to the increase in internally displaced persons and heightens the demand for humanitarian assistance in a context where access and distribution are highly challenging (see annex 189, para. 2).

138. The Panel is also investigating alleged attacks against cultural property in Yemen (see paras. 123 and 124, annex 185 and annex 189, para. 3).

139. Houthi strikes on commercial ships in the Red Sea since November 2023 constitute unlawful attacks on civilian objects (see paras. 52–59). The arbitrary detention of ship crews, such as that of the *Galaxy Leader*, is equally proscribed under international humanitarian law and human rights law (see paras. 55 and 56). Given that the vessels attacked often carry high-risk cargo, such as oil, there is the danger of severe environmental damage, in breach of the right to a healthy environment (see paras. 54 and 57).

⁴⁸ Project Masam is engaged in the clearance of landmines and other explosive devices in Yemen. See www.projectmasam.com/eng/news/.

⁴⁹ See www.projectmasam.com/eng/project-masam-clears-4230-landmines-unexploded-ordnance-and-improvised-explosive-devices/.

⁵⁰ According to confidential sources, there were at least the following attacks by the Houthis: 20 on sites of worship, 10 on educational facilities, 5 on medical facilities and 80 on residential areas, among other incidents.

B. Arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance

140. The Panel accessed information on arbitrary detentions perpetrated by some parties to the conflict. Individuals perceived as opponents of the Houthi regime, including members of the Baha'i and Ismaili communities, human rights defenders, journalists, judges and businessmen, are reportedly systematically targeted. The situation has purportedly deteriorated following strained relations with some Western Governments over Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. As criticism of the Houthis' policies increased, so did the regime's repression of dissent. Critics were accused of espionage and of undermining State security (see annex 190). Entire families, including children, have reportedly been detained and held incommunicado, with some televised confessions suspected to have been obtained under duress.

141. Officials of the Government of Yemen informed the Panel of a pattern of targeting teachers and education experts, mostly in Sana'a. Victims, who opposed revisions of academic curricula aimed at politicizing the education system, have reportedly been arbitrarily detained, subjected to torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment or kept incommunicado. At least seven education professionals have purportedly been detained since September 2023, and one died in detention. His body reportedly showed signs of facial injuries. Five of those individuals were collaborating with international organizations on education initiatives (see annex 191).

142. In June 2024, 13 United Nations staff members and several workers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations, including 8 women, were arbitrarily detained by the Houthis.⁵¹ Despite calls from the international community for their immediate and unconditional release, all detainees remain incommunicado, without due process or access to their families and respective organizations. The detainees face accusations of espionage for the United States and Israeli intelligence services, among others. The alleged confessions of some detainees have been broadcast⁵² to portray the Houthis as being compelled into conflict with the United States and Israel, thereby justifying the adoption of repressive policies and legislation (see para. 156).

1. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

143. The Houthis continue to subject detainees to torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (S/2023/833, paras. 124–131). Victims reportedly endure nail extraction, electric shocks, hanging by the feet, mock executions, beatings, starvation and deprivation of toilet use. Detainees are placed in dark solitary cells for extended periods, leading to severe physical and psychological effects, such as paralysis, amnesia, permanent physical impairments and blindness. Access to medical care is frequently denied, sometimes resulting in death. Investigations indicate that women have been sexually assaulted as a form of torture. The Panel received details on the identities of five individuals who reportedly died during the reporting period because of torture endured during years of enforced disappearance. A Yemeni model, detained in November 2021, remains in detention and is reported to have been tortured into signing pre-written confessions and subjected to virginity tests, with ongoing reports of further sexual violence.

⁵¹ Sources informed the Panel that a total of 67 individuals were arbitrarily detained during the operation, including relatives and children, who were later released.

⁵² See www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240613-houthis-publish-confessions-of-us-israel-spy-network/.

2. Violations of the right to a fair trial

144. Government officials informed the Panel that the Houthi-led specialized criminal court in Sana'a issued numerous death sentences, in breach of due process. There are concerns regarding the court's independence and impartiality, with judges reportedly being appointed for their allegiance to the Houthis. According to reports, victims have been detained for years without charges, denied access to counsel and families and kept in solitary confinement for months. When lawyers are permitted, they are often denied access to evidence. The presumption of innocence is disregarded. The court has reportedly issued death sentences by stoning and crucifixion. The Panel was informed of at least 67 death sentences issued by the specialized criminal court in the first half of 2024 (see annex 192). On 1 June 2024, the court sentenced 44 individuals to death, most for espionage. Victims were detained in April and May 2020, primarily in Sana'a, Dhamar and Amran Governorates, and kept incommunicado. In December 2023, a human rights activist and former head of the Yemeni branch of the Union of Women Leaders of the League of Arab States was sentenced to death. According to reports, she was not allowed access to family and legal representation. On 14 October 2023, Houthi forces purportedly gathered 30 convicted men to execute them by stoning. The execution was halted for fears of public backlash (see para. 148).⁵³

C. Conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence

145. Information provided to the Panel indicates that conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based violence remain pervasive. There are numerous reports of sexual violence, including as a form of torture, perpetrated in detention against women, children and men.

146. According to Government sources, the Zaynabiyat⁵⁴ has been implicated in the abduction, enforced disappearance and extortion of women and girls, including during demonstrations and other public gatherings. Numerous female activists have reportedly been beaten and arbitrarily detained, with their release often contingent upon the presentation of a pledge from a male guardian (*mahram*).

147. Sexual violence against women is particularly devastating in Yemeni society, where women's sexual purity is highly valued and affects the reputation of entire families. The Panel continues to investigate whether the Houthis are using sexual violence as a strategic tool of war against dissidents.

148. Information accessed by the Panel suggests that the Houthi specialized criminal court discriminates against individuals on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. For example, on 23 June 2024, in Sana'a, the Houthis sentenced 9 men to death by stoning and crucifixion and 23 men to up to 10 years of imprisonment for engaging in same-sex relations. Three men were sentenced to public flogging. The victims were reportedly subjected to a mass trial and deprived of due process guarantees.⁵⁵ In February 2024, in Ibb, 13 men were sentenced to death, 3 were sentenced to imprisonment and 35 were detained on homosexuality-related charges. The stigma associated with such charges, even if fabricated, is highly detrimental in Yemeni society. The families of the accused often flee their hometowns.

⁵³ See also https://x.com/mashhadyemeni/status/1757656074801332480?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Eembeddedtimeline%7Ctwterm%5Escreen-name%3Amashhadyemeni%7Ctwcon%5Esl.

⁵⁴ The Zaynabiyat refers to the female security wing of the Houthis. Their roles include intelligence gathering, participation in combat and the enforcement of the Houthi interpretation of Islamic law (e.g. regarding dress codes and acceptable social behaviours).

⁵⁵ See <https://x.com/mashhadyemeni/status/1749604938630521164>.

D. Violations of children's rights

149. Information received by the Panel reveals ongoing violations of children's rights. The Houthis adopted measures that undermine the right to education, including altering academic curricula (S/2023/833, annex 85), enforcing segregation, freezing teachers' salaries and imposing taxes on the education department to finance military ends (see para. 106). Schools have been destroyed, damaged or occupied. Teachers and education experts have been arbitrarily detained. Through so-called summer camps, the Houthis continue to promote hatred, violence and discrimination, jeopardizing the future of Yemeni society and prospects for international peace and security (S/2023/833, annex 86). Some sources reported that Hizbullah advisers are assisting the Houthis in revising academic curricula and running summer camps (see annex 193).

Recruitment and use of children

150. The recruitment and use of children by the Houthis reportedly increased following the outbreak of the Gaza war and strikes by the United States and the United Kingdom in Yemen. Those events, especially the former, have been used to advance recruitment policies. The Houthis have employed extremist religious discourse through the media, in mosques and in other public forums (see annex 194). Exploiting high illiteracy rates, particularly in tribal areas, they have reportedly mobilized boys as young as 10 or 11, often despite parental opposition. Recruitment sermons and weekly classes on jihad are purportedly delivered in schools.

151. Some children join summer camps for promised monetary benefits or food rations, which are highly appealing in times of extreme poverty. Others are abducted, threatened or coerced. According to accounts, children in "closed" summer camps are isolated from their families and the outside world for two weeks. They are indoctrinated with jihad ideology and trained in combat skills. There are reports of children being shot by Houthi forces in or near summer camps and of incidents of sexual violence, including rape, against children in these camps. Child, early and forced marriage is reportedly incentivized to secure loyalty to the Houthis' cause. The Government of Yemen informed the Panel that, on 4 April 2024, the Houthi authorities in Amran Governorate issued a directive to all the education departments, mandating the rapid establishment of additional summer camps. According to reports, by June 2024, the Governorate had at least 696 open and 5 closed summer camps, with 15,000 students enrolled.

152. Confidential sources informed the Panel of an increase in the recruitment and integration of girls by the Zaynabiyat, often through abduction and threats. Some abductees are reportedly exploited for forced domestic labour, while others fall victim to sexual violence.

153. The Government of Yemen informed the Panel of 3,298 reports of child recruitment by the Houthis in the first half of 2024. They were reportedly used as human shields, as spies, for planting landmines and other explosive devices, for reconnaissance, as cooks and in combat. For the period from 15 September 2023 to 31 July 2024, confidential sources reported on: (a) 142 verified cases of the recruitment and use of children; and (b) 75 mobilized children killed and 1 injured.

E. Obstruction of access to, and delivery and distribution of, humanitarian assistance

154. The humanitarian situation in Yemen continues to be of deep concern, with several factors undermining humanitarian access and the distribution of aid.

155. The physical integrity of humanitarian workers is worrying in both Government- and Houthi-controlled areas. In the former, abductions by armed groups and fragmented control over the use of force create uncertainty and fear, with a resulting impact on humanitarian services.

156. The arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance of humanitarian workers by the Houthis (see para. 142) compromised humanitarian services. Humanitarian service providers informed the Panel that some humanitarian workers avoid Houthi-controlled areas for safety concerns. The Houthis have allegedly coerced some of the detained humanitarian staff into “confessions” implicating their colleagues. The threat of death sentences and the freezing of bank accounts has further compelled humanitarian workers to leave. In addition, in early August 2024, the Houthis took control of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights branch in Sana’a and seized property, including documents. Targeting United Nations staff and property jeopardizes their ability to fulfil humanitarian mandates. It further undermines the Organization’s political efforts towards international peace and security. On 17 July 2024, the Houthis mandated that international organizations obtain approval before hiring staff and that they submit their detailed organizational structure, with the job titles of employees (see annex 195). With this measure, the Houthis could exert greater control over humanitarian actors, including as regards beneficiaries of humanitarian aid.

157. According to humanitarian service providers, there were 260 incidents that led to impacts on humanitarian access and delivery in the second quarter of 2024, compared with 140 incidents in the first quarter. These include administrative delays in approving agreements for the operation of NGOs. The prolonged approval process remains a major concern across Yemen,⁵⁶ due to the critical role played by NGOs in improving the humanitarian situation. Data collection activities, such as assessments and surveys, are frequently opposed by authorities, particularly in Houthi-controlled areas, with professionals involved often being targeted. Misinformation about the work of the United Nations and NGOs, along with perceived inefficiencies in the aid delivery process, reportedly fosters suspicion among authorities and the public. Restrictions on women’s freedom of movement imposed by the Houthis create specific obstacles regarding services that traditionally cannot be performed by men, such as prenatal care. Female humanitarian workers have reportedly reduced their field operations. The situation in Sana’a is particularly concerning compared with other areas, such as Ibb.

158. Sources informed the Panel that the bombing of petroleum storage tanks and of a power station near the port of Hudaydah by Israel in July 2024 destroyed the fuel supplies of humanitarian actors, a portion of which was intended for medical facilities. Assessments of the impact of the attack are ongoing. The continued operation of the port of Hudaydah is critical to preventing further deterioration of the humanitarian situation, particularly in Houthi-controlled areas.

159. Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea (see para. 43) led to increased prices of goods and delays in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

160. Houthi attacks on essential transportation links have further compromised Yemeni access to humanitarian aid (see para. 136 and annex 189, para. 4).

Use of social media platforms by the Houthis

161. The Panel also observed that the Houthis were using social media platforms, in violation of the sanctions regime pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), to sell arms,

⁵⁶ In the first quarter of 2024, there were 42 NGO agreements approved by Government- and Houthi-appointed authorities, compared with 19 agreements approved in the second quarter.

solicit financial and ideological support and advocate for national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence (see paras. 13, 90 and 112 and annexes 194 and 196–201).

VII. Recommendations

162. The Panel recommends that the Security Council:

(a) Condemn the use of social media platforms by the Houthis in violation of the sanctions regime pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) (see paras. 150 and 161);

(b) Call upon the relevant social media entities to take urgent and appropriate measures to ensure that their platforms are not used by any individual or entity in violation of the sanctions regime (see paras. 150 and 161);

(c) Call upon the Houthis to refrain from freezing and confiscating, arbitrarily and with the use of force, the property of individuals and entities and to release, without further delay, the seized or confiscated property and to compensate the rightful owners for their losses, if any (see paras. 114 and 137);

(d) Call upon the regional armed groups to refrain from providing military and financial assistance to the Houthis in violation of the sanctions regime, and express its intention to impose sanctions on those who undertake such acts (see paras. 11–22);

(e) Consider enlarging the Panel of Experts on Yemen with an additional expert to monitor maritime activities, including smuggling, that threaten peace and security in Yemen;

(f) Call upon all Member States to provide adequate resources to strengthen the capacity of United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism, which will help in facilitating the clearance of commercial cargo and monitoring for potential infringements of the arms embargo and financial sanctions measures (see para. 97);

(g) Urge all Member States to provide adequate resources to strengthen the capacity of the Government of Yemen to prevent and respond to potential oil spills in the Red Sea (see para. 57);

(h) Encourage Member States to support international cooperation to enhance mine action efforts in Yemen and to provide sustained financial support to NGOs working in the area of mine clearance (see para. 134);

(i) Encourage Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations to strengthen collaborative efforts to counter the increasing trends of child recruitment and use in Houthi-controlled areas (see paras. 150–153), notably by:

(i) Fostering community-based interventions focused on the mid- to long-term consequences of children's involvement in armed conflict, thus promoting community-led social change;

(ii) Developing sustainable strategies of revenue generation for families of children who are particularly vulnerable;

(iii) Implementing effective reintegration strategies for demobilized children, with a focus on preventing re-mobilization;

(j) Urge the international community to assist the authorities of Yemen, as appropriate (see para. 144), in:

(i) Intensifying their monitoring and investigative activities to ensure thorough examination and documentation of violations of the right to a fair trial in Houthi-controlled areas, which often culminate in death sentences;

(ii) Reinforcing their investigative and judicial infrastructure and their human and material resources.

163. The Panel recommends that the Committee consider issuing a press release condemning the use of misinformation and propaganda to enable international humanitarian law and human rights law violations in Yemen, including the arbitrary detention of humanitarian personnel and political dissidents, and urging all stakeholders to actively engage in and support efforts to counter misinformation (see paras. 142 and 150).

**Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)**

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Annex 1: Methodology

1. The Panel uses satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also uses commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone records. Public statements by officials through their official media channels are accepted as factual unless contrary facts are established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would expose these sources or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel does not include identifying information.
2. The Panel reviews social media, but no information gathered is used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
3. The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update.
4. The Panel places importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agrees that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions, and recommendations by a majority of the members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
5. The Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in most incidents that are covered in this report. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix A.

Appendix A ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity⁵⁷ in a Panel’s public report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.
2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
 - (a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
 - (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
 - (i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
 - (iii) Endanger Panel sources or their relatives or Panel members;
 - (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field;
 - (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.
4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
6. In no circumstances the third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, can determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.
7. The individuals, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or their government) to communicate on their behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

⁵⁷ Hereinafter, the term individual will be used to reflect both individuals and entities.

Appendix B: Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses

1. The Panel adopts the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations meet the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting places in Yemen. In doing so it pays particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, (S/2006/997), on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as per paragraph 14 of resolution 2564 (2021).

2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning alleged IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is as set out below:

(a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.

(b) In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at least three or more of the following sources of information:

(i) At least two eyewitnesses or victims;

(ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;

(iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel will endeavour to obtain copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations;

(iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixilation distortion:

a. In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and

b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other sources of information.

(v) The utilization of open source or purchased satellite imagery, wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident;

(vi) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;

(vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced;

(viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area;

(ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident;

(x) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.

(c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations, the Panel relies on the following sources of information:

(i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview;

(ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody;

(iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;

(iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates;

(v) Documentation issued by prison authorities;

(vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible;

(vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim;

(viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates;

(ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;

(x) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings;

(xi) Detainees do not have always access to medical care, nor is it always possible to obtain medical reports, especially in cases of prolonged detention. Therefore, the Panel accepts testimonies received from detainees alleging that violence was used against them during detention by the detaining parties as prima facie evidence of torture;

(xii) For the same reasons, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place.

(d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement human rights violations and abuses against migrants, or threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:

(i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview;

(ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;

(iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained;

(iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;

(v) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.

(e) In carrying out its investigation in respect to the recruitment of children by parties to the conflict, the Panel is particularly mindful of the risk pose by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel also refrains from interviewing directly the victim, unless it is sure that this will not have a negative impact on them. Therefore, the Panel often relies on sources such as:

(i) Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;

(ii) Interviews with people and organizations providing assistance to these children;

(iii) Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.

(f) The standard of proof is met when the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt”.

(g) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel’s findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel’s standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information in any opportunity to respond, including geo-locations. However, detailed information on incidents are not provided when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel’s sources, for example, in violations related to deprivation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian home, or in violations associated with children.

(h) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, the Panel will consider whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non-compliance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2624 (2022) and thus consideration for reporting to the Committee.

3. The Panel does not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel deposits such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.

4. The Panel does not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result of such disclosure of information. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to support the Panel’s findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will, however, be taken to protect the anonymity of its sources.

Annex 3: Summary of Panel correspondence (up to 15 August 2024)

Table 3.1

Correspondence with Member States

Member states	Number of letters sent by the Panel	Number of unanswered letters by Member State	Number of letters where the deadline is after 15 August 2024
Austria	2	2	
Barbados	1	1	
Belize	2		
Brazil	1		
Bulgaria	1	1	
China	12	11	
Comoros	6	6	
Czechia	5	1	
Djibouti	6	2	
France	3	1	
Germany	2		
Greece	1	1	
Guinea Bissau	1	1	
Hungary	1		
India	1	1	
Indonesia	1	1	
Iraq	1	1	
Iran	4	2	1
Israel	2	2	
Jordan	1	1	
Lebanon	1	1	
Liberia	2	2	
Lithuania	1		
Marshall Islands	3	3	
KSA	8	6	
Oman	2	1	
Palau	6	3	
Panama	18	18	
Poland	2	2	
Portugal	2	2	
Romania	2		
Russia	11		
Serbia	2	1	
Singapore	6	3	
Slovak Republic	1		
Somalia	2	1	
Spain	2	2	
Sri Lanka	2	1	
Syria	2	2	
Tanzania	2	2	
The Sudan	3	3	
Togo	1	1	
UAE	4	4	
UK	3	2	
USA	8	4	
Yemen	11	7	
Total	161	104	1

Table 3.2

Correspondence with armed groups and other non-governmental entities

<i>Commercial Company/Government Entity</i>	Number of letters sent by the Panel	Number of unanswered letters by Government Entity	Number of letters where the deadline is after 15 August 2024
Sana'a-based Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2	2	
Total	2	2	

Table 3.3

Correspondence with commercial companies/governmental entities

<i>Commercial Company/Government Entity</i>	Number of letters sent by the Panel	Number of unanswered letters by Commercial Company	Number of letters where the deadline is after 15 August 2024
Adler Firearms	1	1	
AHSS	1		
AirTronic USA	1	1	
Barrett Firearms Mfg Corporation	1		
Beretta USA	1	1	
Canik Arms	1		
Caracal International LLC	1	1	
Česká zbrojovka a.s.	1		
Colt's Manufacturing Company	1	1	
DPMS Panther Arms	1	1	
Girsan Firearms	1		
European Union	3	1	
FN America LLC	1	1	
Glock USA Inc	1	1	
Grand Power Ltd.	1	1	
IMO	1		
Kahr Firearms Group	1	1	
Lipsley Guns.Com	1	1	
Lloyd's	1		
LWRC International LLC	1	1	
North Sylva sports	1	1	
ParkWest Arms	1		
Remington Arms Co. LLC	1	1	
RM Equipment Inc.	1		
Safir Arms Industrial	1		
Sarsilmaz	1		
Shadow System LLC	1	1	
Sig Sauer USA	1	1	
Smith & Wesson Brands Inc.	1	1	
Stamco Ship Management Co Ltd	1		
Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc	1	1	

Springfield Armory	1	1
System Defence Firearms	1	1
Taurus Armas S.A.	1	
Tisaş Trabzon Silah Sanayi	1	
Zaffiri Precision	1	
Zastava Arms	1	1
Total	41	21

Annex 4: the Houthi threats to KSA

On 7 July 2024, the Houthis released video footage showing Aramco oil facilities located in Jizan, KSA. The content of the message accompanying these videos is unambiguously a threat to these installations (“*The coordinates are ready, the missile force, and the unmanned air force are ready to deliver a fatal blow to the Saudi enemy*”).

Figure 4.1

Houthis affiliated media threatening to target Saudi refineries in Jizan



Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

On 25 March 2024, in an interview with the Houthi-run Al-Masirah television channel, ahead of the ninth anniversary of the Saudi-led military campaign against Yemen, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, a member of the group’s Supreme Political Council warned KSA that the country “*would be a target for us if they provided aid and support to the US-British aggression against Yemen*”.⁵⁸

Following the Houthi leader's threats to escalate military action against KSA, the Houthi-affiliated Yemeni military media has started posting posters of key Saudi sea and airports with a hashtag “Try it”.

Following the Houthi leader's threats to escalate military action against KSA, the Houthi-affiliated Yemeni military media has started posting posters of key Saudi sea and airports with a hashtag “Try it”.

⁵⁸ <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/houthis-warn-saudi-arabia-would-be-target-if-it-backs-us-uk-strikes#ixzz8fMB8s8Ep>

Figure 4.2:

Photos of vital Saudi installations

Source: <https://x.com/zy08fv82LGn4dH3/status/1810016373877494252>

Saudi Aramco installations have already been targeted by the Houthis in June 2021 (S/2022/50, paras. 47, 59, and annex 16), in September 2019 (S/2020/326, para. 54., and annex 14), and in December 2015 (S/2018/193, table 42.1). In the immediate aftermath of the September 2019 attack, Saudi Aramco's daily oil production fell from 9.8 million barrels to about 4.1 million barrels, which is a production loss of almost 60 percent overnight. This reduction represents about five percent of global oil production.

Annex 6: Kata'ib Hizballah Press Release on the phone call between its Secretary General and the Houthi leader

Iraq's Kata'ib Hizballah vows resolute support for Yemen after US-British aggression

Press TV (Iran), Saturday, 01 June 2024 4:02 PM

Iraq's anti-terror group Kata'ib Hizballah has assured Yemeni people and fellow Ansarullah resistance movement that it will continue to give its unwavering support for the Arab nation in the struggle against the US-British maritime coalition.

In a statement, the group highlighted the failure of colonial powers in preventing Yemeni strikes from continuing military operations against Israeli-owned merchant vessels or commercial ships affiliated to the Tel Aviv regime in support of Palestine.

“The latest US-British aggression against the Yemeni nation came in light of the arrogant powers’ disappointment at breaking the maritime blockade of Israel [in the Red Sea and the Arab Sea].

“We reiterate that enemies will receive many blows from us. We will not hesitate to give unwavering support to our Yemeni brethren in the battle between the truth and falsehood,” Kata'ib Hezbollah pointed out.

The spokesman for the Yemeni Armed Forces announced on Friday that the country’s naval units had launched a missile attack on a United States aircraft carrier in the Red Sea in response to deadly US and British strikes on Yemen.

Brigadier General Yahya Sarea said in a statement that the attack was “in response to last night's multiple airstrikes launched by the US-British coalition” against positions in the Yemeni Red Sea port city of Hudaydah, the capital Sana'a, and the southwestern province of Ta'izz.

He added that Yemeni forces “will not hesitate to respond directly and immediately to every new aggression on Yemeni territory by targeting all sources of threat and all hostile American and British targets in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea.”

Source: <https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/06/01/726656/Iraq's-Kata'ib-Hezbollah-vows-resolute-support-for-Yemen-after-US-British-aggression>

Annex 7: Fund-raising by the PMF to support the Houthis

Figure 7.1

Abu Ali Alaskari, Kata'ib Hezbollah, launches fundraising campaign for Houthis



Appendix A

Unofficial translation for Abu Ali Alaskari's Tweet

Abu Ali Al-Askari

In His name Almighty

The victories achieved by the axis of goodness and faith over the axis of evil and tyranny, especially over the rivals of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, is a matter of pride and pride. As we see the cracking of these evil states, and the clear signs of their imminent disintegration and collapse, we must be fully prepared in anticipation of any emergency or surprise in the region, and from here we emphasize the following:

First: The policy of mixing the cards adopted by the election riggers and the corrupt will not work, the latest of which is targeting Baghdad Airport with missiles, which requires the loyal leaders of the security services, and the security services of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Reveal these mercenaries and who standing behind them.

Second: The hostile actions that have begun to be repeated in the western provinces, and which target most of the Iraqi security services, are behind senior leaders in the current government, and the loyal ones must expose them to public opinion and bring them to justice.

Third: In fulfilment of the legitimate duty and in support of the oppressed, the Islamic Resistance/Hezbollah Brigades donated an amount of one billion Iraqi dinars in support of the "Your Money" campaign, marches against Al Zayed and Al Salul, which is led by a group of zealous Iraqi youth. An invitation to all honorable people to contribute by donating to this blessed campaign in order to clear their conscience and support the oppressed Yemeni people.

t.me/abualaskary

28 January 2022

Source: <https://justpaste.it/b11p9>

Article published on 1 February 2022 by the Washington Institute stating that Kata'ib Hizballah (KH) launched a fundraising campaign purporting to help the Yemeni Houthi movement acquire more drones

The Iran-backed militia tried to make its solo effort to boost the Houthi drone arsenal look like a widely coordinated and highly popular campaign, whereas it was anything but

On January 23, **Kataib Hezbollah (KH) launched a fundraising campaign purporting to help the Yemeni Houthi movement acquire more drones** intended for attacks against the United Arab Emirates. The campaign was advertised as a "grassroots" initiative and named *hamlat shabab al-Iraq* (Iraqi youth campaign). But clear and convincing evidence suggests it was in fact a KH-organized initiative and not that successful.

The campaign was launched by Amir al-Musawi, the spokesman for Sharia Youth Gathering (Tajamma Shabab al-Sharia, or TSS), an umbrella organization controlled by KH. In a video clip circulated on Iraqi *muqawama* (resistance) social media, Musawi stated: "After a series of continuous assaults by those who made the Zionist dream come true [referring to the Emiratis] against the oppressed and victorious Yemeni people, the honorable sons of Iraq had to...support their Yemeni brothers. Therefore, we will launch a big campaign under the slogan *amwalokum mosayarat* [your money will turn to drones]...to gather money for the Yemeni people to buy drones—drones that will be *Ababil* and whips to punish...*al-Salul* and the House of Zayed [the UAE ruling family]." ("*Al-Salul*" is a derogatory term used to describe the rulers of Saudi Arabia. "*Ababil*" refers to the miraculous flock of birds described in the Quran as protecting the Kaaba by dropping stones on an army invading Mecca. The Musawi clip was posted with two mobile numbers for people to donate money.

Source: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/kataib-hezbollah-behind-grassroots-iraqi-fundraising-yemen>

Figure 7.2

Musawi announcing the launch of the campaign, on 23 January 2022 channel promoting fundraising



#Iraq_Youth_Campaign

#Your_money_marches

Source: <https://t.me/qodsana/6201>

Although TSS social media accounts did not post the clip itself, the organization's Telegram channel was the most active in the campaign. TSS also produced video clips showing young men erecting stands in the street with boxes for people to donate (Figure 7.3).

Figure 7.3
TSS video clips promoting the fundraising campaign, 27 January 2022



Other KH social media channels actively advertised the campaign as well. Tahalof Thawrat al-Ishrin al-Thaniyah (Alliance of the Second Revolt of 1920) — a tribal group that appears to be tied to KH based on the content of its material) — was among the small number of Telegram channels posting video clips promoting the fundraising campaign. Some of these clips were reposted by TSS (Figure 7.4).

Figure 7.4
TSS reposts Tahalof Thorat al-Ishrin al-Thaniya video clip, 30 January 2022



Source: <https://t.me/sayhgg/228>

Additionally, some of the graphics used in the campaign clearly indicate that KH was the organizer. Mido, the tag name for one of the main *muqawama* graphic designers, posted an image featuring a fighter wearing a uniform that resembles KH's signature attire: a boonie hat and a military chest name tape showing the "313" nomenclature, a practice that is closely and almost exclusively associated with KH personnel (Figure 7.5).

Figure 7.5

Mido's graphic featuring a KH fighter next to a Houthi fighter, 31 January 2022



Source: <https://t.me/Alimido13/687>

Figures 7.6 (up), 7.7 (middle), and 7.8 (down)
Fund raising to support the purchase of UAVs for the Houthis (visible on figure 7.8)




Source: <https://t.me/Alimido13/695>

Annex 8: List of Houthis combatants who were killed in the US airstrike in Iraq

An Iraqi journalist revealed a list of 11 dead people who were killed in the US raid that targeted a building in the Jurf al-Sakhr area south of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad.

Figure 8.1 (left), and 8.2 (right)

List of names of Houthi soldiers who were allegedly killed in the US airstrike



The list published by Iraqi journalist Othman al-Mukhtar includes the names of four of the dead who are Iraqi nationals, while seven are members of the Houthi militia who were sent to Iraq as militia delegates in the joint operations room between the Shiite militias affiliated with Iran.

While sources had revealed a few days ago the killing of the Houthi leader (Brigadier General) Hussein Abdullah Mastour al-Shaabal, the list includes six other militia members alongside him.

According to the Iraqi journalist "al-Mukhtar", who is interested in tracking the movements of the armed Shiite militias, the seven Houthi members "died with the Hezbollah Brigades militia affiliated with Iran, which occupies Jurf al-Sakhr and displaced about 200,000 Sunni Iraqis from its people."

Al-Mukhtar quoted his sources as saying that the dead were buried in the "Wadi al-Salam" cemetery in Najaf the day before yesterday, Monday. Most of the Houthi dead are from Saada Governorate/Haydan District. He pointed out that the dead were in the coordination room between several Iraqi militias, most notably "Kata'ib Hezbollah", "Al-Nujaba", and "Ansar Allah Al-Awfiya", and the Houthi militia.

In more details he mentioned about the nature of the group that the Houthi militia delegated to Iraq, he stated that the Houthi group that was killed in the American strike works in the field of fixed-wing suicide drones (operation and location determination) GPS.

He pointed out that they do not reside in the targeted location, but in the Al-Jadriya neighborhood, but the strike was timed shortly after they arrived at the building. The names of the Houthi militia members who were killed in the "Jurf Al-Sakhr" raid according to the document published by Othman Al-Mukhtar, which is a handwritten list:

Hussein Abdullah Mastour Al-Shaabal
 Ahmed Bashir Kazem Al-Shaabal
 Ali Al-Muathra Al-Houthi
 Hassan Mohsen Al-Youssef
 Ali Sayyah Alaa Al-Din
 Abdullah Hussein Al-Astar
 Abdulmalik Ismail

Source: https://almasdaronline.com/articles/299764?fbclid=IwY2xjawEgZENleHRuA2FibQIxMAABHYT74SkS__zIdhLIHTiw6iYW1v3wPxgdkTeuu2Qetv2eqBib01Eh5xheOA_aem_zFNJaXvNIFNBt1wW4UCaUQ

The Iranian Tasnim News Agency confirmed that Houthi commander (Brigadier general) Hussein Mastoor was killed while on a mission outside Yemen. The agency reported that Mastoor died during the recent U.S. airstrikes in Iraq.
He was initially announced killed while fighting alongside Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.

Martyr Brigadier General Abu Jihad Hussein Abdullah Mastur Al-Shaabal
Martyrdom of a Yemeni commander
Yemeni sources of the martyrdom of one of the commanders of Ansarullah named "Hussein Abdullah Mastoor al-Shabal" in the mission reported outside Yemen.
This Yemeni commander in the recent US attack on Iraq has been martyred.
@TasnimNews

Source: https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1820040251005706352?fbclid=IwY2xjawEckApleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHWMmZJBFJPIO8LJHrsM-dSDrF-XMJIF8I9Yopu-nbmyXvjZ0nwp09oPaxg_aem_vcdhElrOtmR9URGYcxGIFQ

Source: <https://x.com/Osint613/status/1819895986774282372>

Martyr Mujahid
Abu Jihad
Hussein Abdullah Mastur Al-Shaabal
Saada Governorate - Haidan District

The battle of the promised friendship and the holy jihad
Death to America, death to Israel, curse on the Jews, victory for Islam

Source: <https://x.com/BabakTaghvaeel/status/1820007354055680006/photo/2>
Source: <https://x.com/YemAware/status/1820524174328410422>

Annex 9: Issuance of passports by the Houthis

The Panel's investigations revealed that the Houthis issue counterfeit⁵⁹ passports to people who act on their behalf, for their support or under their control. These people are tasked with the procurement and/or transfer of illicit goods or weapons or they travel abroad to participate in military training (para. 103 and para. 111). Foreign trainers and advisors travelling to Yemen are purportedly also provided with Yemeni passports (para. 14).


According to GoY sources, the opening of the Sana'a airport in connection with Houthis' issuing of passports is a factor aggravating the security situation in Yemen. According to GoY sources, the passports issued by the Houthis are not printed in accordance with standards adopted by the GoY.

The Panel received information from relevant GoY sources that ten Yemeni nationals allegedly belonging to the Houthis were arrested on 3 August 2023 at Shehen border post. According to confidential sources, these detainees are on the list of Houthis' prisoners list, and negotiations on a possible prisoner swap are underway. The verification of the passports, in connection with investigations carried out by the relevant GoY authorities, indicates that the passports were issued by the Houthis in Sana'a, and fake identities were mentioned in the passports. According to the analysis carried out by the Panel from the passports and visa stamps, they travelled purportedly from Yemen to Jordan, then to Oman, from where they returned and then were arrested by the GoY border authorities on 3 August 2023.

However, Yemeni authorities consider that these individuals received military trainings in Iran. The detainees, however, stated that the purpose of their travel to Iran was to receive a 40-day long training on aviation safety and regulations, such as passengers and inspection procedures, while admitting to travelling with fake, Houthi-issued passports. Notably, two passports seized from two detained persons also had visa stamps indicating their travel to Syria, and surprisingly, both had the same visa number. Further, there were entry and exit stamps of Omani and Jordanian authorities. The Panel sent a letter to the Syrian Arab Republic, requesting verification of the discrepancies noticed by the Panel, including the authenticity of the visas, and related travel dates.

Figures 9.1 (upper-left), 9.2 (lower-left), 9.3 (upper-right), and 9.4 (lower-right)

Analysis of the passports of two individuals arrested by GoY on their way back from Syria




Source: Panel

⁵⁹ The Panel reported on the printing of passports (S/2023/833, para. 175) and on allegations concerning printing of passports in Indonesia (para. 103).

Annex 10: Military cooperation between the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq

Figure 10.1

Statement posted on 22 June 2024 in which the Houthi military spokesperson claims that the attacks on Haifa, Israel, resulted from cooperation with the Iraqi Islamic Resistance.



Yemeni Armed Forces
2024
22 June

Triumphing for the oppression of the Palestinian people and in response to the crimes committed against our brothers in the Gaza Strip.

The Yemeni Armed Forces, alongside the Iraqi Islamic Resistance, carried out two joint military operations as follows:


- ▶ **The first operation targeted four ships in the port of Haifa, in which two of them are cement tanker ships, and the other two were general cargo ships that belong to companies violated the ban decision of entry to the ports of occupied Palestine, using a number of drones.**
- ▶ **The other operation targeted the (Shorthorn Express) ship in the Mediterranean Sea while was on its way to the port of Haifa, using a number of drones.**

- Both operations have achieved their objectives successfully, and the strikes were accurate and direct.
- The Yemeni Armed Forces will continue to carry out their joint military operations with the Iraqi Islamic Resistance in support and solidarity with the Palestinian people until the aggression stops and the siege on the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip is lifted.

WWW.SABA.YE
وكالة الأنباء اليمنية سبأ

Source: <https://x.com/army21ye/status/1804630348481118300/photo/2>

Figure 10.2
IRI statement on 12 June 2024 claiming two joint attacks with the Houthis



Source: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/aljmaat-alraqyt-walhwthywn-fy-alyln-ylnwn-mswwlythm-n-almzyd-mn-alhjmatalmshtkrkt>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the IRI statement on 12 June 2024 claiming two joint attacks with the Houthis

Islamic resistance in Iraq

2024-6-12

In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful

[Indeed, God loves those who fight in His cause in array, as if they were a solid building.]

In continuation of our approach to resisting the occupation and supporting our people in Palestine, and in response to the massacres committed by the usurping entity against civilians, including children, women and the elderly, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq carried out two joint military operations with the Yemeni armed forces. The first targeted a vital target in the city of Ashdod with missiles, and the second targeted an important

target in the city of Haifa by drone. The Islamic Resistance confirms that operations are continuing to destroy enemy strongholds at an increasing pace.

(And victory is only from God. Indeed, God is Mighty, All-Wise)

Islamic resistance in Iraq

Wednesday 5 - Dhu al-Hijja - 1445 AH

Source : <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqi-groups-and-yemens-houthis-claim-more-joint-attacks-israel>

Annex 11: The Houthis' Al Masirah TV on 13 June 2024 quoting the movement's leader talking about collaboration with the IRI to attack Israel from Golan Heights



Source: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/aljmaat-alraqyt-walhwthywn-fy-alymn-ylnwn-mswwlythm-n-almzyd-mn-alhjmat-almshtrkt>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the Houthis' Al Masirah TV on 13 June 2024 quoting the movement's leader talking about collaboration with the IRI to attack Israel from Golan Heights

Al-Masdarah

Al Masirah Channel

Mr. Commander Abdul Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi: In Golan Heights there is also the important track that is within the framework of the fourth stage of escalation, which is joint operations between our dear brothers, the Mujahideen in the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Yemeni army.

Mr. Commander Abdul Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi

07- Dhul-Hijjah - 1445 AH

almasirah.net.ye

Source: <https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1801246804995936458>

Annex 12: The Houthi representative in Iraq

Figure: 12.1

Abu Idris al-Sharafi (2nd from left) is a close associate of Mohammed Ali al-Houthi. In Iraq, he is reportedly building up the Houthi network: finance, procurement, etc.



12:57 AM · Jan 30, 2024 · 2,846 Views

Source: <https://x.com/ariheist/status/1752118718073802962>

Annex 13: The Houthi representative's activities in Iraq

Figure 13.1:

Meeting held on 17 May 2023 with the Secretary-General of the Sayyid Martyrs Brigades (PMF), Hajj Abu Alaa al-Wala'i, the envoy of Mr. Abdul Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi and the representative of the Houthis in Iraq, Mr. Ahmed al-Sharafi.




Al-Sharafi conveyed the greetings of the Commander-in-Chief of the Yemeni Ansar Allah movement, Mr. Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi, and expressed his interest in the issues in the region, and the two parties discussed the latest developments related to the Syrian and Sudanese events. Iraqis on social media welcomed Al-Sharafi's visit to Iraq, and the importance of strengthening ties between the parties of the axis of resistance in the region and the world.

Source: <https://www.infoplusnetwork.com/news/ادر-أبو-اليمان-غرب-شمال-في-الله-أنصار-قائد-بزيارة-عراقي-ترحيب>

Figure 13.2

Al-Sharafi visit on 7 July 2024 visits a tribe in Dhi Qar Governorate, Iraq



Source: <https://www.newarab.com/news/yemens-houthis-open-office-baghdad-amid-regional-tensions>

Figure 13.3

Article by Mandab press dated 9 July 2024 on Al-Sharafi visiting a PMF headquarters north of Baghdad



Source: <https://mandabpress.com/news68145.html>

Annex 14: Al-Sharafi in Iraq meets high ranking officials

Figure: 14.1

Ahmed Al-Sharafi meets the Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassim Al-Araji



Source: <https://www.ajnet.me/politics/2024/7/13>

Annex 15: Training provided to the Houthis in southern Lebanon by Hezbollah

Confidential sources also informed the Panel about military training provided to the Houthi combatants by Hezbollah in their training ground located in Qalaat Jabour, southern Lebanon. The Panel notes that on 21 May 2023, three Houthi journalists, allegedly working with the Houthi media *Al-Masirah*, were present during the demonstration of an exercise simulating an attack against an Israeli settlement conducted by the Hezbollah. The Panel notes that Houthi combatants often conduct similar trainings.

Trainings, as well as other support provided by the Hezbollah, are supervised by the Houthis' liaison office, located in Beirut. Ammar al-Hamzi, who is the general manager of the Beirut-based Houthi media *al-Masirah* and who works as the Houthi representative in Lebanon. He is reportedly in direct contact with Hezbollah's political and military leadership.

Figure 15.1

Presence of three Houthi representatives in December 2023 during a military demonstration held in southern Lebanon by Hezbollah



Source: Confidential

The link below illustrates the military exercise held in December 2023 in southern Lebanon where the three Houthi representatives were present as observers

Source: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/22/hezbollah-conducts-wargames-near-lebanons-border-with-israel>

Figures 15.2 (left) 15.3 (middle), 15.4 (right)
Live-firing exercises conducted in January 2024 by the Houthis



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mxyZKIAfmkw>

Figures 15.5 (left), and 15.6 (right)
Live-firing exercises conducted in March 2024 by the Houthis



Figures 15.7 (left), and 15.8 (right)



Figures 15.9 (left), and 15.10 (right)



Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2QDWa-_zak0

Annex 16: Houthi cooperation with Hezbollah

Figure 16.1

A confidential Hezbollah document indicates its involvement in the fighting with the Houthis



Source: <https://al-omana.net/news163996.html>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the confidential Hezbollah document indicating its involvement in the fighting with the Houthis

Hezbollah - General Secretariat

In the name of God the most Merciful, the most Compassionate

Subject / Suspension of the memorial of the martyrs

Mr. Media Relations Manager

Mr. Director of the Martyrs' Families Affairs

According to the directives of His Eminence the Secretary-General, Mr. Hassan Nasrallah, may God protect him.

We inform you that the memorial service for the martyrs who were martyred in Yemen has been suspended. The ceremony is limited to holding a funeral for relatives of the first and second degree only without clarifying the place of martyrdom. These directives shall be effective until further notice is received.

Annex 17: Video released by the “Axis of Resistance” military media, on 13 April 2023, showing representatives from all the members of the Axis in the joint situation room



13/04/2023

بالفيديو: من غرفة عمليات محور المقاومة.. جاهزون

فاصل من إنتاج الإعلام الحربي في محور المقاومة بعنوان "جاهزون"، يحاكي جوهزية المحور، بكل فصائله، للدفاع عن القدس وفلسطين، حتى بلوغ اليوم الموعود لتحرير فلسطين.

Source: <https://www.alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=52859&cid=141>

Figures 17.1-17.6

Screenshots of the video illustrating the joint situation room



Screenshots of armed groups' arm patches visible in the video



Figures 17.7 (left), and 17.8 (right)
Houthis, Yemen



Figure 17.9
IRGC, Iran



Figure 17.10
Hamas, Gaza strip, Palestinian occupied territory, Lebanon



Figure 17.11
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Gaza strip, Palestinian occupied territory, Lebanon



Figure 17.12
Abi Ali Mustapha Brigades, Palestinian occupied territories, Lebanon



Figure 17.13
Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria




Figure 17.14
Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq



Figure 17.15
Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq



Figure 17.16
Asa'ib Hal Al Haq, Iraq



Figure 17.17
Liwa Zainebeyoun, Syria



Figure 17.18
Liwa Fatmiyoun, Syria

Annex 18: Article published on 9 June 2024 by the Iranian media Mehr News Agency, in which the Houthi Brigadier-General Hamid Abdul Qader Antar, advisor to the Houthi Prime Minister, mentions about the coordination with the 'Axis of Resistance'

الرئيسية / غرب آسيا / دول الجوار

الأقضية / غرب آسيا

من ٣١/٥/٢٠٢٤ - ٧/٦/٢٠٢٤

العميد اليمني حميد عبد القادر عنتر لوكالة مهر:

لا تستطيع أي قوة في العالم ان تكسر شوكة اليمن... نُنسّق مع محور المقاومة و تم تغيير قواعد الاشتباك



أكد مستشار رئاسة الوزراء، العميد اليمني حميد عبد القادر عنتر " أنه هناك تنسيق بين اليمن ودول المحور وتم تشكيل غرف عمليات مشتركة من أجل ان تكون الضربات العسكرية في وقت واحد للكيان الصهيوني، مما يجبره على وقف العدوان على غزة، وتم تغيير قواعد الاشتباك من أجل فرض واقع جديد ومعادله عسكرية جديدة".

وكالة مهر للأخبار وردة سعد: يواجه اليمن معارك مستمرة مع قوى الاستكبار العالمي، ضمن اطار المساندة للمقاومة الفلسطينية ودعمًا لاهالي غزة، فحقق اليمن انتاجات وبطولات ادهشت العالم بالتنسيق مع محور المقاومة، والملفت في الأونة الأخيرة تنفيذ عملية مشتركة مع المقاومة العراقية ضد اهداف في كيان العدو.

حول هذه العناوين، أجرت مراسلة وكالة مهر للأخبار، الأستاذة وردة سعد، حواراً صحفياً مع مستشار رئاسة الوزراء ورئيس الحملة الدولية لكسر الحصار عن مطار صنعاء الدولي العميد "حميد عبد القادر عنتر"، وجاء نص الحوار على النحو التالي:

منذ أشهر عديدة يواصل الجيش اليمني عمليات الاسناد للمقاومة الفلسطينية واهالي غزة بالضغط على الاحتلال ومحاصرته اقتصادياً.. ولا يزال الجدل قائماً حول الاثر الفعلي لهذا الجهد العسكري المميز.. فبتقديركم كيف اثرت هذه العمليات ضد السفن المتجهة لموانئ الاحتلال على الكيان الاسرائيلي ؟

اليمن أعلن التدخل العسكري مناصرة واسناد لعملية طوفان الاقصى، فمنذ اندلاع معركة طوفان الاقصى تم التدخل عسكريا مع فلسطين وتم اطلاق عدد من الصواريخ الباليستية والمسيرات الى فلسطين المحتلة وفرض الجيش اليمني والقوه الصاروخية حصار خانق على الكيان الصهيوني في البحر الاحمر والبحر العربي والمحيط الهندي وتوسعت خارطة بنك الاهداف الى البحر الابيض المتوسط وتم استهداف السفن الصهيونية والأمريكية والبريطانية في البحر الاحمر والمحيط الهندي المساندة للكيان اللقيط ومن خلال الحصار الخانق في البحر الاحمر تم افراغ السفن في ميناء ابلات وتم محاصرة الكيان اقتصادياً.

الى جانب القرار اليمني بمنع مرور السفن المتوجهة الى موانئ الاحتلال ردا على العدوان الوحشي على غزة، يواصل الشعب اليمني مظاهراته الملونة، لإبداء الدعم والتأييد والتضامن مع الشعب الفلسطيني، كيف نفهم هذا الحراك الذي ليس له مثيل عند الشعوب العربية الأخرى؟ ولماذا الشعب اليمني تحديداً؟

بالاضافة الى التدخل العسكري من خلال جبهة الاسناد في اليمن لفلسطين المحتلة هناك حراك سياسي وجماهيري يخرج ابناء الشعب اليمني ملايين في كل جمعه في كافة المحافظات رافعين اعلام فلسطين وشعار الصرخه في وجه قوى الاستكبار هذا الحراك الجماهيري اعطى زخم ثوري لشعوب واحرار العالم وانتفض الملايين في كافة شعوب واحرار العالم لمناصرة فلسطين الذين اتخذوا من اليمن مصدر الهام.

في خطوة جريئة اضافية اعلنت القيادة اليمنية الشجاعة عن توسيع مدى عملياتها لحصار الموانئ الصهيونية الى البحر المتوسط.. بينما يفتح بعض العرب والمسلمين الابواب الخلفية للتعويض على الاحتلال وتزويده بحاجاته الاقتصادية.. هل وصلت الامة الى هذا الحد من الانقسام؟ ولماذا برأيكم ؟

نعم اليمن وسع من خارطة بنك الاهداف من خلال عمليات العسكرية في البحر الاحمر والمحيط الهندي والبحر الابيض المتوسط واعلن حرب كبرى شاملة على الكيان الصهيوني وقوى الاستكبار حتى يتم وقف العدوان على غزة ودخول المساعدات الى قطاع غزة، هذا التحرك الكبير لليمن هو من واجب وطني واخلاقي وقومي وديني لمناصرة فلسطين خصوصا عندما نشاهد الجرائم الذي يرتكبها الكيان بحق المدنيين والاطفال والنساء وهدم المنازل على ساكنيها وتدمير البنية التحتية في ظل صمت عربي ودولي واممي مطبق من المجتمع الدولي والعالم فكان من واجب اليمن التحرك واسناد ومناصرة شعب فلسطين.

في اخر انجازاته الثورية والعملية لتشديد الخناق على كيان الاحتلال اعلن اليمن عن عمليات مشتركة مع المقاومة العراقية لضرب مواقع داخل كيان الاحتلال.. كيف تنظرون الى هذه الخطوة المتقدمة من التنسيق بين قوى محور المقاومة؟ وكيف يمكن ان تؤثر هذه الخطوة على كيان الاحتلال؟

نعم هناك تنسيق بين اليمن ودول المحور وتم تشكيل غرف عمليات مشتركة من اجل ان تكون الضربات العسكرية في وقت واحد للكيان الصهيوني تسبب له شلل وارباك وهذا يشكل ضغط على الكيان الصهيوني مما يجبره على وقف العدوان على غزة وتم تغيير قواعد الاشتباك من اجل فرض واقع جديد ومعادله عسكرية جديدة.

بعض اليمنيين في المناطق المحتلة والخاصين لادارة المخابرات الاجنبية، يخرجون بين الحين والآخر للتشويش على ما يقوم به الجيش اليمني والموقف القومي والاسلامي المتقدم لقيادة السيد عبد الملك الحكيم.. كيف تنظرون الى استجابة الشعب اليمني في كل المناطق لمواقف صنعاء؟ وما الذي يخشاه اولئك المعارضون من نصره شعب فلسطين؟

بالنسبة للمرتقة هم ادوات لصالح قوى العدوان واتخذت منهم دول العدوان مطيه من اجل شرعته واحتلال اليمن وكي لا تتم ملاحقه قوى العدوان واعتبارهم مجرمي حرب امام المحاكم الدولي، كذلك دول العدوان هم ادوات لقوى الاستكبار وهم من ينفذ المشاريع الامريكية في دول المنطقة، لذلك ليس غريب عليهم التشويش والتقليل من القدرات العسكرية اليمنية التي فرضت واقع جديد ومعادله عسكرية جديدة سببت للعدو شلل وارباك.

اليمن بمواقفه المتقدمة لنصرة الشعب الفلسطيني ومساندة مقاومته، يضع نفسه في مواجهة القوة البحرية الاميركية وحلفائها الغربيين، فهل تعتقدون ان الامر قد يعرض اليمن وشعبه لمخاطر اضافية؟ وهل يمكن للجيش اليمني وانصار الله ان يواجهوا قوة بحجم القوة الاميركية ؟

اليمن يواجه معركة عسكرية مباشر مع قوى الاستكبار العالمي، لكن اليمن استطاع ان يكسر شوكة قوى الاستكبار في البحر الاحمر والمحيط الهندي والبحر المتوسط وكسر هيمنة وغطرسة قوى الاستكبار، لا تستطيع اي قوة في العالم ان تكسر شوكة اليمن او تلي ذراعه لان ثورة اليمن هي امتداد لثورة ابا الاحرار ابي عبد الله الحسين الذي قاد اعظم ثورة في تاريخ الحياة البشرية واسقط عروش الطغاة والظالمين والمستبدين والمستكبرين وانتصر الدم على السيف من اليمن سيتم تغير وجه المنطقة والعالم، ومن اليمن ستخرج راية اليماني، ومن يتخذ من الامام الحسين عليه السلام مصدر الهام لا يعرف الهزيمة اطلاقاً.

Source: <https://ar.mehrnews.com/news/194527>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the article published on 9 June 2024 by the Iranian media Mehr News Agency, in which the Houthi Brigadier-General Hamid Abdul Qader Antar, advisor to the Houthi Prime Minister, mentions about the coordination with the ‘Axis of Resistance’

Yemeni Brigadier-General Hamid Abdul Qader Antar told, “No force in the world can break the power of Yemen... we coordinate with the axis of resistance and the rules of engagement have been changed”



The advisor to the Prime Minister, Yemeni Brigadier General Hamid Abdul Qadir Antar, confirmed that “there is coordination between Yemen and the Axis countries and joint operations rooms have been formed in order for military strikes to be carried out simultaneously against the Zionist entity, forcing it to stop the aggression against Gaza, and the rules of engagement have been changed.” In order to impose a new reality and a new military equation.”

Mehr News Agency - Warda Saad: Yemen faces ongoing battles with the forces of global arrogance, within the framework of support for the Palestinian resistance and in support of the people of Gaza. Yemen achieved achievements and heroism that astonished the world in coordination with the axis of resistance, and what is striking recently is the implementation of a joint operation with the Iraqi resistance against targets in the enemy entity. .

Regarding these headlines, Mehr News Agency correspondent, Ms. Warda Saad, conducted a press interview with the advisor to the Prime Minister and head of the international campaign to break the siege of Sana’a International Airport, Brigadier General Hamid Abdul Qadir Antar. The text of the interview was as follows:

For many months, the Yemeni army has continued its support operations for the Palestinian resistance and the people of Gaza by pressuring the occupation and besieging it economically. Controversy still exists about the actual impact of this distinguished military effort. In your estimation, how did these operations against ships heading to the occupation’s ports affect the Israeli entity?

Yemen announced military intervention in support of and support for the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation. Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Flood Battle, there has been military intervention with Palestine, and a number of ballistic missiles and marches were launched into occupied Palestine. The Yemeni army and missile force imposed a stifling siege on the Zionist entity in the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, and the bank’s map expanded. The targets reached the Mediterranean Sea, and Zionist, American, and British ships were targeted in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, which supported the bastard entity. Through the stifling siege in the Red Sea, the ships were emptied in the port of Eilat, and the entity was besieged economically.

In addition to the Yemeni decision to prevent the passage of ships heading to the occupation ports in response to the brutal aggression against Gaza, the Yemeni people continue their million-man demonstrations, to express support, support and solidarity with the Palestinian people. How do we understand this movement that has no parallel among other Arab peoples? Why the Yemeni people specifically?

In addition to the military intervention through the Support Front in Yemen for occupied Palestine, there is a political and mass movement that brings out millions of Yemeni people every Friday in all governorates, raising the flags of Palestine and the slogan of screaming in the face of the forces of arrogance. This mass movement gave revolutionary momentum to the peoples and free people of the world, and millions rose up in all peoples. And the free people of the world to support Palestine, who took Yemen as a source of inspiration.

In an additional bold step, the courageous Yemeni leadership announced the expansion of the scope of its operations to blockade Zionist ports to the Mediterranean. While some Arabs and Muslims are opening the back doors to compensate the occupation and provide it with its economic needs. Has the nation reached this point of division? Why do you think?

Yes, Yemen has expanded its map of the target bank through military operations in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea, and has declared a major comprehensive war against the Zionist entity and the forces of arrogance until the aggression against Gaza is stopped and aid enters the Gaza Strip. This major move by Yemen is a national, moral, and national duty. My religion is to support Palestine, especially when we see the crimes committed by the entity against civilians, children, and women, the demolition of homes for their residents, and the destruction of infrastructure, in light of the deafening Arab, international, and international silence of the international community and the world. It was Yemen's duty to move, support, and advocate for the people of Palestine.

In its latest revolutionary and practical achievements to tighten the noose on the occupying entity, Yemen announced joint operations with the Iraqi resistance to strike sites within the occupying entity. How do you view this advanced step of coordination between the forces of the axis of resistance? How might this step affect the occupation entity?

Yes, there is coordination between Yemen and the Axis countries, and joint operations rooms were formed in order for simultaneous military strikes on the Zionist entity to cause it paralysis and confusion. This puts pressure on the Zionist entity, forcing it to stop the aggression against Gaza, and the rules of engagement were changed in order to impose a new reality and its equation. New military.

Some Yemenis in the occupied areas, who are under the administration of foreign intelligence, come out from time to time to confuse what the Yemeni army is doing and the advanced national and Islamic position of the wise leadership of Mr. Abdul Malik. How do you view the response of the Yemeni people in all regions to Sana'a's positions? What do those who oppose supporting the people of Palestine fear?

As for the mercenaries, they are tools for the forces of aggression, and the aggression countries took them as a vehicle in order to legitimize and occupy Yemen, so that the forces of aggression would not be pursued and considered war criminals before international courts. Likewise, the aggression countries are tools for the forces of arrogance, and they are the ones who implement American projects in the countries of the region, so it is not strange for them to cause confusion. Reducing the Yemeni military capabilities imposed a new reality and a new military equation that caused the enemy paralysis and confusion.

Yemen, with its advanced positions to support the Palestinian people and support their resistance, is putting itself in the face of the American naval force and its Western allies. Do you think that the matter might expose Yemen and its people to additional risks? Can the Yemeni army and Ansar Allah confront a force the size of the American force?

Yemen is facing a direct military battle with the forces of global arrogance, but Yemen was able to break the strength of the forces of arrogance in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean and break the dominance and arrogance of the forces of arrogance. No force in the world can break the strength of Yemen or bend its arm because the Yemen revolution is an extension of the revolution. The father of the free, Abu Abdullah Al-Hussein, who led the greatest revolution in the history of human life and brought down the thrones of tyrants, oppressors, tyrants and arrogant people, and blood triumphed over the sword. From Yemen, the face of the region and the world will be changed, and from Yemen the banner of Yamani will emerge, and whoever takes Imam Hussein, peace be upon him, as a source of inspiration will never know defeat. .

The Yemeni flag is the foundation for the establishment of a state of divine justice under which the world will enjoy peace.

Annex 19: Interview conducted on 20 June 2024 by Al Mayadeen with Muhammad Abdulsalam, official spokesman for the Houthis, during which he acknowledged operational coordination with the Iraqi factions, Hezbollah and other parties



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jBjWmJ79yxo>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of a segment of the interview

Presenter: Also, there is a new topic brother Mohamed about the joint operations between the Yemeni Armed Forces and the Islamic resistance in Iraq. Two statements were issued about joint operations. What is the goal of this statements and will be there any horizon for this cooperation? Shall we see any joint operation between the Yemeni Armed Forces and Hizbullah or with Alqassam Brigades? Will these operations have a goal and what is the aim? Why do you have operation on two frontlines at the same time?

Mohamed Abdul Salam: The joint operations are already taking place as you mentioned between the Yemeni Armed Forces and Iraqi factions and other groups. The main aim of these operations is to cooperate in righteousness and piety and in that right and just project that is important to all. The enemy is making this kind of alliances and cooperation. The US, the UK, Germany, and France are cooperating to target Yemen. Also, the US, Israel, the UK, France, and some regional countries cooperated to obstruct the drones and the missiles launched from Iran. They are allying and cooperating... isn't it more important for us to cooperate and we believe that we defend our cause, aggrievance, children and women. The aim of this cooperation is to exert more pressure on the Israeli entity. First because of the geographical nature in Iraq and the proximity to the Israeli entity and to cause more disturbance and distraction to Israel so as not to know from where the strikes will come. It is not excluded that there will be joint operations and today we have already a joint situation room that is coordinating the operation coming from Iraq, Lebanon. It is true that each party in the 'Axis of Resistance' has its own conditions, nature and assessments as a result of its conditions and capabilities but overall, there arrangements that could be done directly as happened with Iraqis or in indirect way that harmonizes with the general spirit with which the Axis is acting today, and the Axis started to shape in a more powerful and tough manner. We think the Axis today, despite all the challenges, is in a more developed and shaped stage which will make it a strong and effective Axis. We think that these operations are honorable and do not target any regional countries or any Arab or Islamic countries, but it targets the Israeli entity only. So, it is likely yes that this situation room might coordinate joint operations with Hizbullah and Iraqi brothers and with all liberals and in the fore with our brothers in Palestine including Alqassam Brigades, Saraya Alquds and all other Palestinian factions.

Annex 20: Article published on 29 October 2024 in the Iranian media ABNA news, in which Mahdi Al-Mashat, President of the Houthis' Supreme Political Council, was quoted discussing about the "joint operations rooms"



وكالة أهل البيت (ع) للأنباء

العربية > المرجعية الدينية الحج والعمرة > كلام القائد المجمع العالمي لأهل البيت(ع) > الوسائط المتعددة > أقسام أخرى > إينا بلس > ملفات خاصة

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اختيار الجزيرة العربية

صنعاء: لدينا غرف عمليات مشتركة وسنواجه أي حماقة إسرائيلية باقتحام غزة



قال رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، مهدي المشاط، إنّ "الطرف الأميركي يهدد بعودة الحرب في اليمن، لمنع الشعب اليمني من القيام بمسؤولياته تجاه شعب فلسطيني".

وفقاً لما أفادته وكالة أنباء أهل البيت (ع) الدولية – أبنا – رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، مهدي المشاط يكشف أنّ هناك غرف عمليات تراقب عن كثب في حال ارتكبت "إسرائيل" حماقة واقتحمت غزة برياً.

قال رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، مهدي المشاط، إنّ "الطرف الأميركي يهدد بعودة الحرب في اليمن، لمنع الشعب اليمني من القيام بمسؤولياته تجاه شعب فلسطيني".

وأكد المشاط أنّ موقف الجمهورية اليمنية واضح وهو إقامة الدولة الفلسطينية كاملة السيادة، على كامل التراب الوطني الفلسطيني، مشيراً إلى أنه "لا يوجد لدينا شيء اسمه أراضي 48 أو 67".

وكشف أنّ "هناك غرف عمليات مشتركة وجهوداً تراقب وتعمل لمواجهة أي حماقة صهيونية إذا اقتحمت برياً غزة، ونحن نراقب الوضع عن كثب".

وأشار إلى أنّ "ما يقوم به الشعب اليمني هو أقل واجب إيماني وديني وأخلاقي وإنساني"، مشدداً على أنّ "المسؤولية الدينية والأخلاقية والإنسانية تحتم على الجميع التحرك".

وأكد المشاط أنّ "الحرب في فلسطين أصبحت حراً على الإسلام، يتحشد فيها الغرب والولايات المتحدة إلى جانب العدو الصهيوني"، مستهجنًا في الوقت نفسه "من بقاء الموقف العربي والإسلامي دون المستوى المطلوب في هذه المواجهة والهجمة الشرسة".

وقال إنّ "معركة طوفان الأقصى انطلقت وستدمر كل ما بنته قوى الاحتلال والإمبريالية العالمية"، مشدداً على أنه "لا يوجد في المنطقة العربية شيء اسمه إسرائيل".

وتوجه المشاط إلى الفلسطينيين قائلاً: "الكل معكم، الشعوب وحركات المقاومة معكم، حتى تنهزم هذه الهجمة الشرسة"، مشيراً إلى أنّ "رفع العدو لسفوفه مجرد عتريات فارغة".

وأشار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن إلى أنّ "الغرب هرب من مشاكله وحروبهم بتصدير اليهود إلى الوطن العربي، وأوجد كياناً لهم خارج طبروغرافيا المنطقة".

ويواصل اليمنيون التظاهرات المؤيدة لفلسطين. وشاركت أمس الجمعة، حشود يمنية في "جمعة الفضب" في ميدان السبعين في صنعاء، وفي المحافظات تضامناً مع فلسطين وتنديداً بالمجازر الإسرائيلية في غزة.

وقبل أيام أكد المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، في بيان، أنّ "صنعاء تراقب الوضع عن كثب، ولن تقف مكتوفة الأيدي تجاه حرب الإبادة الجماعية ضد أهلنا في غزة"، مشدداً على أنّ "تجاوز الخطوط الحمر يحتم على صنعاء القيام بواجبها الديني والمبدي تجاه ذلك".

وقال عضو المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، محمد علي الحوثي، إنّ "المعركة ضد العدو الإسرائيلي قائمة"، مؤكداً أنّ حركة "أنصار الله" على تنسيق دائم مع كل جهات محور المقاومة.

وكانت وسائل إعلام إسرائيلية، تحدثت عن صواريخ برؤوس حربية تنز ما "مجموعه 1.6 طن" أطلقتها حركة "أنصار الله" على ما يبدو نحو منطقة الفنادق في "إيلات".

وقبل أيام، أفاد مسؤول عسكري أميركي، لشبكة "سي أن أن"، بأنّ السفينة البحرية الأميركية "يو أس أس كارني"، اعترضت 4 صواريخ "كروز" و15 طائرة مسيرة، قبالة سواحل اليمن، مضيفاً أنّ عملية الاعتراض هذه استغرقت 9 ساعات.

وكان رئيس الوزراء في حكومة تصريف الأعمال في صنعاء، عبد العزيز بن حبتور، قد هدّد، بأنّ سفن الاحتلال ستتعرض للاستهداف في البحر الأحمر في حال استمرّ العدوان الإسرائيلي على غزة.

.....

انتهى/185

Source: <https://ar.abna24.com/story/1406447>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the article published on 29 October 2024 by the Iranian media ABNA news, in which Mahdi Al-Mashat, President of the Houthis' Supreme Political Council, was quoted discussing about the "joint operations rooms"



Sanaa: We have joint operations rooms and we will confront any Israeli foolishness by storming Gaza



The head of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, Mahdi Al-Mashat, said, "The American side threatens the return of war in Yemen, to prevent the Yemeni people from carrying out their responsibilities towards the Palestinian people."

According to what was reported by Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon him) International News Agency - ABNNA - the head of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, Mahdi Al-Mashat, reveals that there are operations rooms that are closely monitored in case "Israel" commits foolishness and storms Gaza by land.

The head of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, Mahdi Al-Mashat, said, "The American side threatens the return of war in Yemen, to prevent the Yemeni people from carrying out their responsibilities towards the Palestinian people."

Al-Mashat stressed that the position of the Republic of Yemen is clear, which is to establish a Palestinian state with full sovereignty, over the entire Palestinian national territory, noting that "we do not have such a thing as the lands of 48 or 67." He revealed, "There are joint operations rooms and efforts that monitor and work to confront any Zionist foolishness if it invades Gaza by land, and we are monitoring the situation closely."

He pointed out that "what the Yemeni people are doing is the minimum duty of faith, religion, morals and humanity," stressing that "religious, moral and humanitarian responsibility requires everyone to take action."

Al-Mashat stressed that "the war in Palestine has become a war against Islam, in which the West and the United States are mobilizing alongside the Zionist enemy," deploring at the same time "that the Arab and Islamic position remains below the required level in this confrontation and fierce attack."

He said, "The Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood has begun and will destroy everything that the occupation forces and global imperialism have built," stressing that "there is no such thing in the Arab region as Israel."

Al-Mashat addressed the Palestinians, saying: "Everyone is with you...the peoples and the resistance movements are with you...until this fierce attack is defeated," noting that "the enemy raising its roofs is just empty ramblings."

The head of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen pointed out that "the West escaped from its problems and wars by exporting the Jews to the Arab world, and created an entity for them outside the topography of the region."

Yemenis continue demonstrations in support of Palestine. Yesterday, Friday, Yemeni crowds participated in the “Friday of Anger” in Sabeen Square in Sanaa, and in the governorates, in solidarity with Palestine and denouncing the Israeli massacres in Gaza.

A few days ago, the Supreme Political Council in Yemen confirmed, in a statement, that “Sanaa is closely monitoring the situation, and will not stand idly by in the genocidal war against our people in Gaza,” stressing that “crossing the red lines requires Sanaa to carry out its religious and principled duty regarding this matter.”

A member of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, Muhammad Ali Al-Houthi, said, “The battle against the Israeli enemy is ongoing,” stressing that the “Ansar Allah” movement is in constant coordination with all sides of the axis of resistance.

Israeli media reported about missiles with warheads weighing “a total of 1.6 tons,” apparently launched by the “Ansar Allah” movement towards the hotel area in “Eilat.”

A few days ago, an American military official told CNN that the US Navy ship USS Carney intercepted 4 cruise missiles and 15 drones off the coast of Yemen, adding that this interception took 9 hours.

The Prime Minister of the caretaker government in Sanaa, Abdul Aziz bin Habtoor, had threatened that the occupation ships would be targeted in the Red Sea if the Israeli aggression against Gaza continued.

Annex 21: Article published on 9 November 2023 by the Iranian media PressTV in which Abdulaziz bin Hattour, Houthi Prime Minister is quoted as saying that “It is one axis and there is coordination taking place, a joint operations room, and a joint command for all these operations”



Yemen’s Ansarullah resistance movement has vowed to continue operations in support of the innocent people of the Gaza Strip until Israel ends its bloody onslaught on the besieged Palestinian territory.

Ansarullah spokesman Mohammed Abdul-Salam made the pledge in a post shared on social media on Wednesday, after Yemen’s Armed Forces shot down an American MQ-9 Reaper drone which was conducting a “hostile espionage” operation in support of the Israeli regime.

“The downing of the American drone shows that our armed forces will continue their operations in support of Gaza until the Israeli acts of aggression stop,” he said.

Abdul-Salam also noted that the Yemeni armed forces had reaffirmed their readiness to counter all hostile manoeuvres against Yemen’s national sovereignty by bringing down the American UAV over the country’s territorial waters.

Over the past month, the Yemeni Army has carried out several missile and drone strikes against Israeli targets in response to the occupying regime’s war crimes in Gaza.

The prime minister of Yemen’s National Salvation Government announced recently that Ansarullah fighters are “part of the Axis of Resistance” against Israel.

“It is one axis and there is coordination taking place, a joint operations room, and a joint command for all these operations,” Abdulaziz bin Hattour said. “We cannot allow this arrogant Zionist enemy to kill our people.”

Israel waged the war on Gaza on October 7 after the Palestinian Hamas resistance group conducted Operation Al-Aqsa Storm against the occupying entity in retaliation for its intensified atrocities against the Palestinian people.

Since the start of the aggression, the Tel Aviv regime has killed at least 10,569 Palestinians, mostly women and children, and injured 26,475 others.

It has also imposed a “complete siege” on the coastal sliver, cutting off fuel, electricity, food and water to the more than two million Palestinians living there.

Yemen prioritizes confronting Israel over peace talks: PM

In an interview with Iran’s Arabic-language news channel Al-Alam on Wednesday, bin Hattour said that confronting the Israeli aggression is a major issue for Yemen even if it causes a setback in the peace process with the Saudi-led coalition.

“This is a sacred duty for us and all Muslims and Arabs. However, it is primarily the task of the Arab countries,” he added.

The Yemeni premier further said that millions of Yemenis participated in nationwide rallies in a show of solidarity with Ansarullah leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi who called for using all capabilities to counter the Israeli regime.

Source: <https://www.presstv.ir/doc/Detail/2023/11/09/714284/Yemen-vows-keep-up-operations-until-Israel-ends-Gaza-war>

Annex 22: Interview conducted on 1 March 2024 by the Qatari media Al Jazeera of Abdulmalik al-Ajri, member of the Houthi political council, during which he acknowledged the existence of a coordination mechanism between the armed groups comprising the ‘Axis of Resistance’



Figure 22.1



Figure 22.2



Figure 22.3



Figure 22.4



Figure 22.5



Figure 22.6



Figure 22.7



Figure 22.8



Figure 22.9



Figure 22.10



Figure 22.11



Figure 22.12



Figure 22.13



Figure 22.14



Figure 22.15



Figure 22.16



Figure 22.17



Figure 22.18



Figure 22.19



Figure 22.20



Figure 22.21



Figure 22.22



Figure 22.23

Source: <https://youtu.be/c63OAX6pAIY?si=-Yh7nYjdQ7P-0NZH>

Annex 23: Press article dated 11 November 2020 from the Houthi media reporting that Abdullah Sabri was appointed by decree as the Ambassador to the Arab Republic of Syria

The screenshot shows a news article from the website www.ansarollah.com.ye. The article is titled "Republican Decision To Appoint Abdullah Sabri As Yemen's Ambassador To Syria" and is dated "Nov 11, 2020". The article text states: "A decree No. (62) for 2020 appointing a new ambassador of Yemen to Syria was issued by the President of the Supreme Political Council, Madi al-Mashat on Wednesday . He appointed Abdullah Ali Saleh Sabri as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Yemen to Arab Republic of Syria." The article is signed "Y.A". The website header includes the slogan "مننا الذلّة هيكرات" and "عاشوراء ١٤٤٢" (Ashura 1442).

Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com.ye/archives/387108>

Annexes 24: Press article dated 18 October 2021 in the Syrian media North Press Agency, related to a meeting between Colonel Sharaf al-Mawri, Houthi military attaché at the Yemeni “embassy” in Damascus, Syria, and the head of the Military Intelligence Division of the Syrian Ministry of Defence



Oct 18, 2021

The military attaché of the Houthis meets head of the Syrian Military Intelligence in Damascus.

QAMISHLI, Syria (North Press) – Military attaché of Houthi Movement in Damascus, met with the head of the Military Intelligence Division of the Syrian Ministry of Defense, embassy of the Movement in Damascus said on Monday.



“During the meeting that brought together Colonel Sharaf al-Mawri and Major-General Kifah al-Milhem, they discussed cooperation with Syria in relevant fields,” Embassy of the Houthi Movement said in a statement.

“Colonel Sharaf al-Mawri conveyed greetings of the head of the Yemeni Military Intelligence Authority (affiliated with the Houthis), Major General Abdullah al-Hakim to his Syrian counterpart, military commands, and all officials of the Ministry of Defense,” the statement added.

The meeting “addressed the latest field development and military confrontations in Yemen,” according to the same sources.

Major-General Milhem stressed, “the importance of cooperation between Yemen and Syria in fighting organizations (al-Qaeda and ISIS) and exchanging information and experiences that can reduce the practices of Takfiri groups in the two countries.”

In 2016, Houthis appointed the leader of National Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party – Yemen Region, the Syrian wing, Nayef Ahmed al-Qans, as their ambassador to Damascus.

Source: <https://npasyria.com/en/66309/>

Annex 25: Houthi military escalation

Table 25.1:

Ceasefire Violations/Fire Incidents from January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024:

Region	Ceasefire / Truce Violations					
	Infiltrations	Attacks	Artillery	Missiles	Drones	
					Reconnaissance + Combat	Shot Down by Our Forces
Total	1019	48	3566	232	4527	15

Table 25.2

Statistical Report of Human Losses from 1 Jan. 2024 to 30 Jun. 2024:

Cases	Martyrs	Injured	Total
Total	329	883	1212

Table 25.3:


Statistical Report of Material Losses for Government Forces and Allied Formations from 1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024:

Category	Total Destruction	Partial Destruction
Equipment and Vehicles	15	18
Cars and Trucks	33	103
Weapons	21	38
Weapon Accessories	5	
Communication Accessories	13	
Communication Equipment		8
Technical and Administrative		13

Source: Panel

Figure 25.1


One of the new roads being constructed by the Houthi terrorist militias on the Shaqab - Hayfan - Taiz front



Source: Panel

Figure 25.2


Circular from the GoY asking the armed forces to be prepared for a potential Houthi attack on several fronts



Source: Confidential

Annex 26: Large-scale Recruitment and Training Conducted by the Houthis

Figure 26.1
Graduation ceremony in February 2024 held in Hudaydah



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1759604731331203177/photo/1

Figure 26.2
Graduation ceremony held in February 2024 in Arhab, Sana'a



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1754176438750568927

Figure 26.3
Graduation ceremony held in February 2024 in Dawran Anss, Dhamar Governorate



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1754181369066856575

Figure 26.4
Graduation ceremony held in February 2024 in Jahran, Dhamar Governorate



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1755398350105440549

Figures 26.5 (up), 26.6 (middle), and 26.7 (down)
Graduation ceremony held in January 2024 in Manakhah, Sana'a

The following SALWs are displayed: AK-47/Type 56 assault rifles, PKM/M80 LMG, M240 LMG, M249 LMG, RPG-7/Type 59-1 rocket launcher, AM-50 AMR, and a 9M133 "Konkurs" ATGM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1754268618785685609

Annex 27: Statement released on 23 March 2024 by AQAP

Figure 27.1

Statement released on 23 March 2024 by AQAP

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

قَاعَةُ الْجَاهِلِيَّةِ

فِي جَزِيرَةِ الْعَرَبِ

.....

(بَيَانٌ بِشَأْنِ تَفْجِيرِ الْخَوَاتِمِ لِمَنْزِلِ الْمُسْلِمِينَ فِي رَدَاعٍ - الْبَيْضَاءِ)

الحمد لله رب العالمين، ولا عدوان إلا على الظالمين، والصلاة والسلام على إمام المجاهدين وقائد الغر المحجلين، صل الله عليه وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين، أما بعد:

في ذات الوقت الذي يستمر فيه العدو الصهيوني في عمليات التنكيل بالمسلمين في فلسطين المحتلة، يستمر أيضاً العدو الرافضي في التنكيل بالمسلمين في اليمن؛ في جريمة جديدة ارتكبتها جماعة الحوثي -مليشيا إيران الرافضية- في اليمن، وذلك بتفجير عدد من المنازل الأهلّة بالسكان في حي الحفرة بمدينة رداغ، مما أدى لمقتل وإصابة أكثر من (٢٥) من عوام المسلمين، في استهتار صارخ في سفك دماء المسلمين، وظهور سافر لحقد الرافضة الدفين على أهل الإسلام، من خلال تكرار مثل هذه الجرائم البشعة، في الوقت الذي تدعي فيه تلك المليشيا نصرته للمسلمين في غزة، الأمر الذي يدل دلالة واضحة أن استخدام الحوثي للقضية الفلسطينية ليس إلا لحشد أكبر عدد من المقاتلين في صفوفهم لبيسط نفوذهم في اليمن، وإلا فما هو الفرق بين دم المسلم في اليمن، ودم المسلم في غزة؟

بل إن الجريمة الوثوية هي أمرٌ من جرائم اليهود في فلسطين؛ فاليهودي يُفجر بيوت المسلمين في غزة باسم اليهودية، أما الحوثي فإنه يفجر بيوت المسلمين باسم الإسلام، وحسبنا الله ونعم الوكيل.

وتأتي هذه العملية الإجرامية ضمن سلسلة جرائم الحوثي بحق الشعب اليمني المسلم، فمن قبل فُجر الحوثي منزل الخبيثي بأطفاله ونساته في صعدة، وتوالت التفجيرات للمنازل والمساجد ودور القرآن ولا يزال الحوثي يمارس إلى اليوم جرائمه البشعة المشابهة لجرائم الصهاينة، وما هذه الجريمة التكرار التي لم يراع فيها دماء المسلمين الصائمين في شهر رمضان المبارك إلا واحدة من بين عدة جرائم ارتكبتها في عدة مناطق باليمن، وربما يوصلها بغيرها من الجرائم البشعة، ثم يقف مضطراً على بعض طوامه التي عجزت أساطين دجله ونفاقه عن ترقيعها ليدعي خبثاً ومكراً وفجوراً بأنها أعمال فردية حتى يصدقه السذج من الناس.

وأخراً دعوانا أن الحمد لله رب العالمين



تنظيم قاعدة الجهاد في جزيرة العرب
12 رمضان 1445 هـ الموافق 23 مارس 2024 م

Source: <https://twitter.com/G88Daniele/status/1771542623209115966>

Annex 28: Rivalry between central banks: Economic stability under threat

Punitive measures taken by CBY, Aden, against banks and exchange companies.

The Panel was informed by its sources that some of the leading banks were under pressure by the Houthis not to comply with the instructions of CBY, Aden, and out of fear of reprisal, many of them did not comply. Getting irked by this non-compliance, CBY, Aden, tightened its grip on violating banks and issued a circular Ref. No 159/CBY/2024 dated 19 March 2024 addressed to all banks, exchange companies and facilities, and remittance agents, informing them of suspension of dealings with the following banks that violated its instructions:

- i. Tadamon Bank
- ii. Bank of Yemen and Kuwait
- iii. Al-Amal Microfinance Bank
- iv. Shamil Bank of Yemen and Bahrain
- v. Al-Kuraimi Islamic Microfinance Bank

Figure 28.1
Circular Ref. No 159/CBY/2024 dated 19 March 2024 issued by CBY, Aden

<p>Republic Of Yemen CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN Head Office Aden Ref: 159/CBY/2024 Date 19/3/2024</p>		<p>الجمهورية اليمنية البنك المركزي اليمني المركز الرئيسي / عدن</p> 
<p>تعميم موجه الى كافة شركات ومنشآت الصرافة ووكلاء الحوالات</p>		
<p>الاخوة/ شركات ومنشآت الصرافة ووكلاء الحوالات المحترمون</p> <p>تحية طيبة وبعد،</p>		
<p>الموضوع/ إيقاف التعامل مع البنوك المخالفة لتعليمات البنك المركزي</p>		
<p>بالإشارة للموضوع أعلاه، يتم إيقاف التعامل الكامل مع البنوك المدرجة أدناه بما في ذلك الشبكات التابعة لها:</p>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. بنك التضامن 2. بنك اليمن والكويت 3. بنك الامل للتمويل الأصغر 4. مصرف اليمن والبحرين الشامل 5. بنك الكرمي للتمويل الأصغر الإسلامي 		
<p>وذلك لمخالفاتها التعليمات الصادرة عن البنك المركزي اليمني وسيتم إتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة حيال المخالفين لهذا التعميم.</p>		
<div style="display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;">  <div style="margin-left: 10px;"> <p>أحمد أحمد عادي المحافظ</p> </div> </div>		
		
<p>www.cby-ye.com governor.office@cby-ye.com 02 264401 02 264450 المركز الرئيسي - عدن - الجمهورية اليمنية</p>		

Source: CBY, Aden

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the Circular Ref. No 159/CBY/2024 dated 19 March 2024 issued by CBY, Aden

Republic of Yemen

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN

Head Office, Aden

Ref. No 159/CBY/2024

Date: 19 March 2024

A circular addressed to all exchange companies, establishments, and remittance agents

Brothers/companies, exchange facilities and remittance agents, best regards

Subject: Stop dealing with banks that violate the instructions of the Central Bank

With reference to the above topic, all dealings with the banks listed below, including their affiliated networks, are suspended:

- 1 Tadamon Bank
- 2 Bank of Yemen and Kuwait
- 3 Al-Amal Microfinance Bank
- 4 Shamil Bank of Yemen and Bahrain
- 5 Al-Kuraimi Islamic Microfinance Bank

This is due to their violations of the instructions issued by the Central Bank of Yemen, and deterrent measures will be taken regarding those who violate this circular.

Governor

However, on 26 March 2024, CBY, Sana'a issued the Circular No. 14 resuming dealings with the following two exchange companies, which were banned earlier vide Circular No. 13 dated 14 March 2024:

- i. Al-Qutaybi Exchange Company
- ii. Al-Bassiri Exchange Company

In response to this, on the very next day on 27 March 2024, CBY, Aden issued another Circular Ref. No. 179/CBY/2024 lifting the ban imposed on 19 March 2024, and resuming dealings with the aforesaid five banks.

The CBY, Aden also issued directions to stop dealings with 13 exchange companies in the Ma'rib Governorate for violating its instructions. The CBY, Aden informed the Panel that it will conduct intensive inspection campaigns to ensure compliance, and penal measures would be taken against those who violated the provisions of its circulars.

During the period from January to December 2023 and from January to February 2024, CBY, Aden took punitive measures against 156 and 29 exchange companies and institutions respectively. These measures were taken for not providing the required data or for violating its instructions and included imposition of financial penalties, temporary suspension of licenses, and freezing of assets.

The table 2 below shows the total amount of fines and penalties imposed by CBY, Aden on banks and money exchange companies during the period from January to December 2023 and from January to February 2024.

Table 1

Fines and penalties imposed by CBY, Aden

Period	Total amount of Fines imposed on banks (in YR)	Total amount of Fines imposed on exchange companies (in YR)
January – December 2023	337,386,000	921,000,000
January – June 2024	294,093,125	174,940,000

Such actions of the central banks underscore the politically driven and volatile regulatory policies in Yemen, highlighting how banking institutions have become casualties in this rivalry. By instructing banking and financial institutions not to comply with directives of the central bank operating in GoY-controlled areas, the Houthis impede the effectiveness of monetary and banking regulatory policies aimed at stabilizing Yemen's economy. Such interference undermines investor confidence, leading to economic instability.

Circular Ref. No 159/CBY/2024 dated 19 March 2024 issued by CBY, Aden

Control over financial transfers mechanism

The confrontation to exercise control over the financial transactions between the GoY-controlled areas and the Houthi-controlled areas reached a critical juncture when CBY, Aden established a unified network for such transfers. The Unified Money Network (UMN) is a closed joint stock company, established in 2021 with 47 shareholder members, who represent exchange companies licensed by the CBY, Aden. The network obtained the final license from the CBY, Aden in January 2024 as a payment service provider and operator. UMN obliges the exchange companies to stop transfers through other companies, and transfer only through this network. The aim of the UMN is to merge the internal transfer networks owned by exchange companies, which number more than 40, into one network.

In response, based on directives from CBY, Sana'a, the Yemeni Exchange Association, affiliated with the Houthis, issued a circular on 4 March 2024 prohibiting the exchange companies and local financial transfer networks, from dealing with:

- i. The UMN set up by CBY, Aden,
- ii. The Al Basiri Exchange Company,
- iii. The Al Qutaibi Exchange Company, and
- iv. any banks not licensed by the CBY, Sana'a.

The CBY, Sana'a issued an order disallowing the acceptance of external transfers in USDs or YRs.

Banking sources reveal that customers encounter significant challenges in sending remittances to areas under Houthi control, or receiving remittances sent from those regions to areas governed by the GoY. These measures have already exacerbated the severity of the financial divide enforced by the Houthis in 2021, when they banned the circulation of the new edition of the currency notes issued by CBY, Aden, and imposed hefty fees on transfers from GoY-controlled regions to other areas.

Circular No 14 dated 26 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

Figure 28.2

Circular No 14 dated 26 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
HEAD OFFICE
Sana'a

التاريخ: 16 / 09 / 1445 هـ
الرقم: (٥٢٠٠)

البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي
صنعاء

قطاع الرقابة على البنوك
الإدارة العامة للرقابة على البنوك

Date: 26/ 03/ 2024
NO:

CBY

تعميم رقم (14) موجه إلى كافة البنوك العاملة في الجمهورية اليمنية

الأخ/ مدير عام/ المدير الاقليمي/ لبنك ...
المحترم

تحية طيبة وبعد...

بالإشارة إلى التعميم رقم (13) بتاريخ 4 رمضان 1445 هـ الموافق 14 مارس 2024 م، وبناءً على توجيهات الأخ المحافظ، يتم إعادة التعامل مع شركات الصرافة التالية:

1. شركة القطبي للصرافة.
2. شركة البسميري للصرافة.

وتقبلوا تحياتنا...

فواز قاسم البناء
وكيل قطاع الرقابة على البنوك
26 MARCH 2024

نسخة مع التحية:
- للأخ/ المحافظ
- للأخ/ نائب المحافظ
المحترم
المحترم

١٤٤٥
١٦

Source: Panel

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the circular dated 26 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
HEAD OFFICE
Sana'a
Date: 26/03/2024
NO:

Central Bank of Yemen, head office
Sana'a
09/16/1445/ date
Number: Qur'an (520)

CBY - Banking Supervision Sector, General Administration of Banking Supervision

Circular No. (14) addressed to all banks operating in the Republic of Yemen

Respected

Brother / General Manager / Regional Director / Bank....

After Greetings...

With reference to Circular No. (13) dated 4 Ramadan 1445 AH corresponding to 14 March 2024 AD, and based on the directives of the Governor, dealing with the following exchange companies will be resumed:

1 Al-Qutaybi Exchange Company.

2 Al-Bassiri Exchange Company.

Please accept our regards....

|

For the Governor

Circular Ref. No. 179/CBY/2024 dated 27 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

Figure 28.3

Copy of the Circular Ref. No. 179/CBY/2024 dated 27 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a



Source: Panel

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the circular dated 27 March 2024 issued by CBY, Aden

Republic Of Yemen
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Head Office Aden

Ref: 179/CBY/2024

Date: 27/3/2024

Brothers/General Manager/Regional Manager of the Bank.
After Greetings

Topic: Resuming dealings with suspended banks

Respected people

A reference to the above topic, and to the circular issued on 3/19/2024 No. (2024 C160 C) regarding stopping dealings with a number of banks due to their violation of the instructions of the Central Bank. Given the disappearance of the violation and the pledge not to repeat it, it was decided to lift the ban and resume dealing With the following banks:

- 1 Tadhamon Bank
- 2 Bank of Yemen and Kuwait
- 3 Al-Amal Microfinance Bank
- 4 Shamil Bank of Yemen and Bahrain
- 5 Al-Kuraimi Islamic Microfinance Bank

Sent for implementation as of today, 3/27/2024.

Governor

Annex 29: Recent conflict between the CBY, Aden and the Houthis

So far, the conflict involving the control over the banking system in Yemen was witnessed between the two central banks - CBY, Sana' a, and CBY, Aden. However, the developments in the last two months not only shook the entire banking sector in Yemen, but it escalated the conflict to a different level. It became a war between the CBY, Aden and the Houthis.

On 30 May 2024, the CBY, Aden issued its circular no. 20 threatening to stop dealings with the following six banks for not complying with its instructions:

- 1- Tadamon Bank
- 2- International Bank of Yemen
- 3- Yemen and Kuwait Bank
- 4- Shamil Bank of Yemen and Bahrain
- 5- AlAmal Microfinance Bank
- 6- Alkuraimi Islamic Microfinance Bank

Figure 29:1

Circular No. 20 dated 30 May 2024 of CBY, Aden

Republic Of Yemen
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Head Office Aden
Ref: 294/CBY/2024
Date: 30/5/2024

البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي عدن

**قرار محافظ البنك المركزي رقم (20) لسنة 2024م
بشأن إيقاف التعامل مع عدد من البنوك والمصارف**

محافظ البنك المركزي
بعد الإطلاع على القانون رقم (14) لسنة 2000م، بشأن البنك المركزي اليمني وتعديلاته، وعلى القانون رقم (38) لسنة 1998م، بشأن البنوك، وعلى القانون رقم (21) لسنة 1996 م بشأن المصارف الإسلامية وتعديلاته، وعلى القانون رقم (15) لسنة 2009 م بشأن بنوك التمويل الأصغر، وعلى القانون رقم (1) لسنة 2010م، بشأن مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب والمعدل بالقانون رقم (17) لسنة 2013م، ولائحته التنفيذية وتعديلاتها، وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (119) لسنة 2016م بشأن نقل المقر الرئيسي للبنك المركزي اليمني إلى العاصمة المؤقتة عدن، وعلى قرار محافظ البنك المركزي اليمني رقم (17) لسنة 2024م بشأن نقل المراكز الرئيسية للبنوك التجارية والمصارف الإسلامية وبنوك التمويل الأصغر إلى العاصمة المؤقتة عدن، ونظراً لفشل البنوك المشار إليها أدناه في الالتزام بأحكام القانون وتعليمات البنك المركزي وعدم الإمتثال لمخططات مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، وإستمرارها في التعامل مع جماعة جبهة إرهابية وتنفيذ تعليماتها بالمخالفة لقواعد العمل المصرفي وأحكام القانون وتعليمات البنك المركزي، بالأمر الذي يتطلب التدخل ووضع القيود اللازمة على أنشطة البنوك المخالفة لإجبارها على الإمتثال لأحكام لقانون وحرصاً على سلامة القطاع المصرفي، ولما تقتضيه المصلحة العامة

www.cby.ye 02 264401 02 264450 - من - الجمهورية اليمنية - المركز الرئيسي - عدن

المادة (1): على كافة البنوك والمصارف وشركات ومنشآت الصرافة ووكلاء الحوالات العاملة في الجمهورية وقف التعامل مع البنوك والمصارف المدرجة أدناه:

- 1- بنك التضامن
- 2- بنك اليمن والتكوين
- 3- مصرف اليمن والبحرين الشامل
- 4- بنك الأمل للتمويل الأصغر
- 5- بنك الكريمة للتمويل الأصغر الإسلامي
- 6- بنك اليمن الدولي

المادة (2): على البنوك والمصارف المذكورة الإستمرار بتقديم خدماتها المصرفية لتجمهر والوفاء بالتزاماتها تجاه عملائها حتى إشعار آخر.

المادة (3): يعمل هذا القرار من تاريخ 2024/6/2م وعلى جميع الجهات المعنية العمل بموجبه ويبلغ به من بلام محلياً ودولياً.

صدر بالمركز الرئيسي - عدن
22 ذو الحجة 1445هـ
الموافق: 30 مايو 2024م

أحمد محمد
المحافظ

Source: Panel

However, since, these banks did not comply with the directions of the CBY, Aden, the bank issued circular no.30, on 8 July 2024, communicating its intention to revoke the licenses of the above-mentioned six banks. The CBY, Aden also decided to get these six banks delinked from the society for worldwide interbank financial telecommunications (SWIFT) system. SWIFT is an international messaging network used by the financial institutions to quickly, accurately, and securely send and receive information, such as money transfer instructions.

Since the aforesaid six banks are the leading banks in Yemen and engage in significant amount of international funds transfers, including for the Houthi-controlled entities, cancellation of the SWIFT facility would have seriously impacted the interests of the Houthis and also of the banking system in the Houthi-controlled areas. Taking this action of the CBY, Aden as an act of economic war launched by the GoY against it, the Houthis threatened to attack the assets in the KSA and to return to war, if the CBY, Aden did not revoke its decision. The house of the Governor of the CBY, Aden in Sana'a was allegedly attacked by the Houthis and they have seized the house.

Figure 29.2

House of the Governor of the CBY, Aden, in Sana'a which has been seized by the Houthis. The writings on the boundary wall of the house says, "The house is seized by the court".



Source: Panel

This led to serious mediation efforts by the stakeholders to de-escalate the situation. Consequently, the CBY, Aden issued circular no. 35 dated 22 July 2024, cancelling the circular nos. 20 and 30, withdrawing the revocation orders against the aforesaid six banks. Although, the conflict was deescalated, and the war averted, it left the CBY management, the GoY, and the STC highly dissatisfied with the developments. The Governor and the Deputy Governor of the CBY, Aden reportedly sent their letters of resignation to the GoY.

This incident highlights how an economic issue could spiral into a full-blown war, underlining importance and urgency of addressing the long-standing economic challenges that threaten Yemen's peace, security, and stability.

Annex 30: Information on Houthi attacks and suspicious activities towards merchant and military vessels from 19 November 2023 to 1 August 2024

Nature/impact	Number
Attack on merchant vessels	118
Attack on military vessels	16
Attack on oil/chemical tankers	31
Vessels hit	30
Tankers hit	7
Vessels abandoned	3
Vessels sunken	3
Seafarer killed	4

Reported date of attack	Targeted merchant and military vessel	Information on the attack	Gulf of Aden
			Red sea
			Indian ocean
20/07/24	<i>MV Pumba</i> , container ship with Liberia flag	UAV attack followed by USV attack, minor damages reported. Later, the explosion of a missile at close vicinity of the vessel was reported	
19/07/24	<i>Lobivia</i> , container ship with Singapore flag	Direct hit by unidentified projectile	
15/07/24	<i>MT Chios Lion</i> , oil tanker with Liberia flag	Attack by USV, damage reported	
15/07/24	<i>MT Bentley</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Attack with two small boats and one USV followed by three ASBMs	
11/07/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Two explosions at close vicinity of the vessel	
10/07/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Explosion at close vicinity of the vessel	
09/07/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Explosion at close vicinity of the vessel	
30/06/24	<i>Summer Lady</i> , bulk carrier with Marshal Islands flag	Suspicious approach by 12 crafts, included some uncrewed.	
28/06/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO (probably <i>Delonix</i> , chemical tanker with Liberia flag)	Five missiles hit the water near the vessel	
27/06/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO (probably <i>Seajoy</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag)	Attack with WBIED	
26/06/24	<i>MSC Sarah V</i> , container ship with Liberia flag	A missile hit the water near the vessel	
25/06/24	<i>Lila Lisbon</i> , bulk carrier with Kitts and Navis flag	A missile hit the water near the vessel	
23/06/24	<i>MV Transworld Navigator</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag	Direct hit by OWA-UAV. Vessel suffered minor damage. Several seafarers suffered minor injuries.	
23/06/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Hit by OWA-UAV. Vessel suffered flooding that could not be contained, and vessel was abandoned	
21/06/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO (probably <i>MV Transworld Navigator</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag which has been attacked twice)	Explosions at the vicinity of the vessel	
16/06/24	<i>Captain Paris</i> , oil tanker with Malta flag	Two explosions in close proximity of the vessel	
13/06/24	<i>MV Verbena</i> , general cargo ship with Palau flag	Targeted with three ASCMs, fire on board. One seafarer heavily wounded.	
13/06/24	<i>MV Seaguardian</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag	Explosion at close vicinity of the vessel, no damage	

12/06/24	<i>MV Tutor</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag	Targeted by one WBIED impact under the stern. Later in the day, the vessel was hit by an OWA-UAV. One seafarer killed. Vessel was abandoned by the crew, and sunk on 18/06/24.
09/06/24	<i>MV Tavvishi</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag	Targeted by one ASBM and one ASCM, one direct hit
08/06/24	<i>MV Norderney</i> , bulk carrier with Antigua and Barbados flag	Targeted by two ASBMs, one direct hit, one intercepted
06/06/24	<i>AAL Genoa</i> , bulk carrier with Cyprus flag	Two explosions at close distance of the vessel
01/06/24	US Navy <i>USS Gravelly</i> (DDG107)	Targeted by one ASBM, intercepted by US Navy
01/06/24	<i>Al Salam</i> , LNG tanker with Liberia flag	Explosion at distance from the vessel
28/05/24	<i>MV Laax</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Targeted by five ASBMs, one direct hit
23/05/24	<i>MV Yannis</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag	Impact of a missile at close vicinity, no damage
17/05/24	<i>Wind</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Targeted with one ASBM, one direct hit
07/05/24	<i>MSC Gina</i> , container ship, with Panama flag	Two explosions at close vicinity of the vessels, no damage
07/05/24	<i>MSC Diego</i> , container ship with Panama flag	
29/04/24	<i>Cyclades</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag	Targeted with three ASBMs and three OWA-UAVs, minor damage reported
29/04/24	US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG58) or <i>USS Philippine sea</i> (CG58)	Targeted with one OWA-UAV, intercepted by US Navy
26/04/24	<i>MV Maisha</i> , oil tanker with Antigua and Barbuda flag	No precision
26/04/24	<i>MV Andromeda Star</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Targeted with three ASBMs, minor damage reported
24/04/24	<i>MSC Darwin VI</i> , container ship with Liberia flag	One explosion ahead of the vessel, no damage
24/04/24	<i>MV Yorktown</i> , container ship with US flag	Targeted by one ASBM, intercepted by US Navy
09/04/24	<i>MV Yorktown</i> , container ship with US flag	Targeted by one missile, intercepted by US Navy
07/04/24	<i>Hope Island</i> , container ship with Marshall Islands flag	Targeted by one missile, no direct hit
06/04/24	<i>Hope Island</i> , container ship with Marshall Islands flag	Targeted by two missiles. The first was intercepted by the coalition and the second hit the water
03/04/24	US Navy <i>USS Gravelly</i> (DDG 107)	Targeted by one ASBM and two UWA-OAVs, no direct hit
01/04/24	<i>Crystal Symphony</i> , cruise ship with Bahamas flag	Suspicious approach followed by gun shots
28/03/24	Names of the targeted US and Coalition warships not mentioned by CENTCOM	Targeted by four OWA-UAVs, no direct hit
27/03/24	Name of the targeted US warship not mentioned by CENTCOM	Targeted by four OWA-UAVs, no direct hit
23/03/24	<i>MV Huang Pu</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Targeted by five ASBMs, one direct hit
17/03/24	<i>MV Mado</i> , LPG tanker with Marshall Islands flag	Targeted by a missile, no direct hit
15/03/24	<i>MV Mado</i> , LPG tanker with Marshall Islands flag	One explosion ahead of the vessel, no damage
15/03/24	<i>Pacific-01</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Targeted by a missile, no direct hit
14/03/24	<i>Fuxing V</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag	Targeted by two missiles, no direct hit
12/03/24	US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG58)	Targeted by one SRBM, no direct hit

10/03/24	<i>Pinocchio</i> , container ship with Liberian flag	Targeted by two ASBMs, no direct hit
08/03/24	<i>MV Propel Fortune</i> , ship carrier with Singapore flag	Targeted by two ASBMs, no direct hit
06/03/24	<i>True Confidence</i> , bulk carrier with Barbados flag	Targeted by one ASBM, one direct hit Three fatalities, at least four injuries, of which three are in critical condition, and significant damage to the ship
05/03/24	US Navy <i>USS Carney</i> (DDG64)	Targeted by one ASBM and three OWA-UAVs. Missile and OWA-UAVs intercepted
04/03/24	<i>MSC SKY II</i> , container ship with Liberian flag	Targeted by two missiles. One direct hit
27/02/24	<i>Jolly Vanadio</i> , container ship with Marshall Islands flag	Attack by two UAVs
27/02/24	<i>Lady Youmna</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Panama flag	Targeted by a missile, no direct hit
24/02/24	<i>MV Torm Thor</i> , oil/chemical tanker with US flag	Targeted by one ASBM. Missile intercepted
22/02/24	<i>MV Islander</i> , cargo with Palau flag	Targeted by two missiles, fire onboard
20/02/24	US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG58)	Targeted by one ASCM. Missile intercepted
19/02/24	<i>Navis Fortuna</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Hit by missile
19/02/24	<i>Sea Champion</i> , grain carrier with Greek flag	Targeted by one OWA-UAV, one direct hit , minor damage
18/02/24	<i>Rubymar</i> , bulk carrier with Belize flag	Targeted by two ASBM, one direct hit , crew abandoned the vessel. The vessel sunk.
17/02/24	<i>MT Pollux</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Targeted by three ASBMs, one direct hit
15/02/24	<i>MV Lycavitos</i> , bulk carrier with Barbados flag	Targeted by one ASBM, one direct hit
12/02/24	<i>MV Star Iris</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Targeted by two missiles
06/02/24	<i>MV Star Nasia</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Targeted by three ASBMs, no direct hit, minor damage. One ASBM intercepted by US Navy
06/02/24	<i>MV Morning Star</i> , cargo ship with undetermined flag	Targeted by three ASBMs, no direct hit
06/02/24	<i>Morning Tide</i> , cargo ship with Barbados flag	Explosion in close vicinity of a merchant vessel, no damage
06/02/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Rounds fired from a small craft, slight damage on the merchant vessel
02/02/24	<i>Daffodil</i> , oil tanker with Saudi Arabia flag	UAV attack, no direct hit
02/02/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	Seven suspicious UAVs intercepted by US Navy
01/02/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	One suspicious UAV intercepted by US Navy
01/02/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	One suspicious USV intercepted by US Navy
01/02/24	<i>MV Koi</i> , cargo ship with Liberia flag	Targeted by two ASBMs, no direct hit. ASBMs intercepted by US Navy
01/02/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Explosion at distance of a merchant vessel, no damage
31/01/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	One ASBM intercepted by US Navy
31/01/24	US Navy <i>USS Carney</i> (DDG64)	Three UAVs intercepted by US Navy
30/01/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	One ASBM intercepted by US Navy
30/01/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	Approached by three small crafts, one of these crafts has a front mounted weapon

27/01/24	Royal British Navy <i>HMS Diamond</i>	One UAV intercepted
26/01/24	<i>Marlin Luanda</i> , oil tanker with Marshall Islands flag	One ASBM, direct hit
26/01/24	<i>Achilles</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Explosion at close vicinity
26/01/24	US Navy <i>USS Carney</i> (DDG64)	One ASBM intercepted by US Navy
24/01/24	<i>Maersk Chesapeake</i> , container ship with USA flag	Two ASBMs intercepted by US Navy, one impacted the sea
24/01/24	<i>Maersk Detroit</i> , container ship with USA flag	Missile attack, no direct hit
24/01/24	<i>Tomahawk</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag	UAV attack, no direct hit
18/01/24	<i>Chem Ranger</i> , chemical tanker with Marshall Islands flag	Two ASBMs impacted the sea near the ship
17/01/24	<i>MV Genco Picardy</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	One UAV, direct hit
16/01/24	<i>MV Zografia</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag	One ASBM, direct hit
16/01/24	<i>Panda</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Suspicious approach
15/01/24	<i>MV Gibraltar Eagle</i> , bulk carrier with	Possible missile attack
14/01/24	US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG 58)	One ASBM intercepted by US Navy
14/01/24	<i>Khalissa</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	One ASBM, impacted the sea
14/01/24	<i>Orchid Rising</i> , bulk carrier with Panama flag	Suspicious approach
12/01/24	<i>Khalissa</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag	Kinetic attack, vector not identified
11/01/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM	One ASBM, impacted the sea
09/01/24	<i>Federal Masamune</i> , bulk carrier with Singapore flag	Approached by three small crafts which opened fire with two missiles
09/01/24	<i>Caravos Harmony</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Two UAVs dropped each one bomb, impacted the sea
06/01/24	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Six small crafts approached a merchant vessel
06/01/24	US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG 58)	One UAV intercepted
02/01/24	<i>CMA CGM Tage</i> , container ship with Malta flag	Two ASBMs, impacted the sea
01/01/24	<i>Advantage Life</i> , oil tanker with Marshall Islands flag	Threat over radio
31/12/23	<i>Maersk Hangzhou</i> , container ship with Singapore flag	Boarding attempt by four small crafts. Attack repelled by US Navy
31/12/23	<i>Maersk Hangzhou</i> , container ship with Singapore flag	Three ASBMs, one direct hit and two intercepted by US Navy
25/12/23	<i>MSC United VIII</i> , container ship with Liberian flag	One way attack UAV, attack missed
25/12/23	<i>Navig8 Montel</i> , oil tanker with Liberian flag	One way attack UAV, attack missed
25/12/23	<i>MV Mariona</i> , livestock carrier with Tanzanian flag	Threat over radio
23/12/23	<i>Sai Baba</i> , oil tanker with Gabonese flag	One way attack UAV, one direct hit
23/12/23	<i>Blaamanen</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Norwegian flag	One way attack UAV, attack missed
23/12/23	<i>Fassa</i> , bulk carrier with Cayman Islands flag	One way attack UAV attack missed

18/12/23	<i>MSC Clara</i> , container ship with Panama flag	One way attack UAV, attack missed
18/12/23	<i>Swan Atlantic</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Cayman Islands flag	One way attack UAV, one direct hit
18/12/23	<i>Magic Vela</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag	Attempted hijack
18/12/23	<i>Green Trader</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Marshall Islands flag	Suspicious approach
15/12/23	<i>Palatium III</i> , container ship with Liberia flag	Explosion onboard
15/12/23	<i>Al Jasrah</i> , container ship with Liberia flag	Direct hit
15/12/23	<i>MSC Alanya</i> , container ship with Liberian flag	Threat over radio
14/12/23	<i>Maersk Gibraltar</i> , container ship with Hong Kong flag	Targeted by ASBM
13/12/23	<i>Lady Tramp</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag	Suspicious approach
13/12/23	US Navy <i>USS Mason</i> (DDG 87)	UAV attack
12/12/23	<i>Ardmore Encounter</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Marshall Islands flag	Boarding attempt
11/12/23	<i>Strinda</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Norwegian flag	Missile attack, one direct hit
11/12/23	<i>Icarius</i> , cargo ship with Vanuatu flag	UAV attack
10/12/23	<i>Centaurus Leader</i> , vehicle carrier with Singapore flag	Two missed UAV attacks
09/12/23	Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO	Threat over radio
06/12/23	<i>Dianella</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Liberian flag	UAV incident
03/12/23	<i>AOM Sophie II</i> , bulk carrier with Panama flag	Missile attack, one direct hit
03/12/23	<i>Number 9</i> , container ship with Panama flag	Threat over radio
03/12/23	<i>Unity Explorer</i> , bulk carrier with Bahamas flag	Missile attack, one direct hit
03/12/23	<i>CGenuine</i> , oil tanker with Liberian flag	Missed UAV attack
27/11/23	US Navy <i>USS Mason</i> (DDG 87)	Two ASBMs intercepted
29/11/23	US Navy <i>USS Carney</i> (DDG 64)	UAV intercepted
26/11/23	<i>MV Central Park</i> , chemical tanker with Liberian flag	Boarding attempt
19/11/23	<i>Galaxy Leader</i> , vehicle carrier with Bahamas flag	Attackers used a helicopter to hijack the vessel

Source: CENTCOM and UKMTO

Annex 31: Hijacking by the Houthis of the *Galaxy Leader* on 19 November 2023

Video of the attack presented by the Houthis: <https://gcaptain.com/watch-houthis-release-video-of-galaxy-leader-seizure/>

On 19 November 2023 Houthi commandos were dropped by a Mi-171Sh helicopter onto the deck of the *Galaxy Leader*, a vehicle carrier with Bahamas flag sailing in the Red Sea.

An analysis of the weaponry carried by some commandos dropped on the ship shows that they were armed with AK-103 assault rifles, observed for the first time in 2022 with Houthi marine commandos, alongside at least one anti-material rifle (AMR) and a Glock pistol.⁶⁰ Similar pistols have been documented as presented for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas.

Figures 31.1 (up) and 31.2 (below)

Mi-171Sh armed with two UBM-57 pods (each with 32 x 57mm rockets)



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1726641438279315476

⁶⁰ Glock pistols have also been observed in the hands of high-ranking Houthi officers.

Figures 31.3 (up), 31.4 (middle), and 31.5 (below)

***Malah & Aseef-1* Fast attack boats as part of the operation**

These boats are generally armed with 14.5mm or 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun (HMG) and 7.62mm LMG.



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1726643889615040591

Figures 31.6 (left) and 31.7 (right)

Houthi boarding team members mainly armed with AK-103, calibre 7.62x39mm



Figure 31.8

Houthi naval commando unit with AK-103, a standard weaponry used by them



Source: <https://www.memri.org/tv/houthis-release-music-video-commando-operation-uae-ship-rawabee-captured-kill-jews-flood>

Figure 31.9

Houthi naval commando unit members equipped with AK-103. Picture taken during the 21 September 2022 military parade held in Sana'a



Source: <https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2022/09/30/ansar-allah-are-switching-to-the-ak-103/>

Figure 31.10

One of the boarding team members was equipped with a 12.7mm *Khatef* Anti Materiel Rifle (AMR)



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1726648786876043496

Figure 31.11

Khatef AMR in the hands of a Houthi fighter



Source: <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1482848987531169797>

Figure 31.12

Member of the boarding team equipped with a Glock pistol



Figures 31.13 (left) and 31.14 (right)

Glock pistol presented for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas

Glock pistols have been largely documented by the Panel as presented for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=810754580785830&set=pb.100055538851439.-2207520000>

Annex 32: Interview conducted on 20 November 2023 by the Qatari media al Araby al-Jadeed with Hazam al-Assad, member of the Houthis political council



قال عضو المكتب السياسي لجماعة الحوثيين (أنصار الله) حزام الأسد، في تصريحات لبرنامج "مواكبة" على "العربي الجديد - بودكاست"، إن السفينة الإسرائيلية، التي أعلنت الجماعة، أمس الأحد، احتجازها في البحر الأحمر قرب اليمن: "ليست إلا باكورة لعمليات بحرية قادمة سواء في استهداف القطع البحرية والبوارج الإسرائيلية أو السفن التجارية"، لافتاً إلى أن المواجهة مع إسرائيل "لم تؤثر على مجريات المحادثات

Source: al Araby al-Jadeed

Appendix A

Summary of the interview

Hazam al-Assad, a member of the Houthi political council, responding to accusations of Iranian involvement in the hijacking of the ship, said the 'Axis of Resistance' had coordinated with and been guided by Iran, but that the decision to attack had been made by the Houthi forces. He also stated that it was just the beginning of their naval operations.

Annex 33: Houthi missiles, UAVs, USVs, UUVs, SAMs, and other weapon systems destroyed during strikes conducted by the coalition, or intercepted on the way

Materiel	Destroyed during strikes	Intercepted on the way	Total
SRMB/MRBM/LACM	15		15
ASCM/ASBM	172	66	238
Missile launcher (without precision)	15		15
OWA-UAV/UAV	382	35	417
Unidentified weapon system		20	20
Patrol boat	6		6
USV	66	5	71
UUV	2		2
SAM	8		8
Radar and air defense sensor	22		22
Command post and ground control	7		7
Ammunition storage	10		10
Helicopter	2		2
Total	707	126	833

Source: CENTCOM

Annex 34: Threatening messages sent on 25 April 2024 by HOCC (Houthis) to the bulk carrier Cyclades, sailing under Liberia flag

From: Director@hocc.gov.ye <Director@hocc.gov.ye>

Sent: Friday, April 26, 2024 1:30 AM To: Emergency Responce <ert@eastmed.gr>; media <media@eastmed.gr>; Chartering Dept - Dry Cargo Division - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <drychartering@eastmed.gr>; Contchartering - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <Contchartering@eastmed.gr>; ops-dry <ops-dry@eastmed.gr>; ops-containers <ops-containers@eastmed.gr>; Technical Dept - Dry Cargo Division - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <tech-dry@eastmed.gr>; Insurance & Claims Dept - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <insur-claim@eastmed.gr>; Office Administration - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <admin@eastmed.gr>

Cc: operations@hocc.gov.ye

Subject: IAA-1C2CF6 Violation of the ship CYCLADES of the ships ban criteria – URGENT.

Importance: High

Subject: Violation of the ship CYCLADES of the ships ban criteria – URGENT. To: EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME, ARMAR SHIPPING LTD

Sent: 25/04/2024.

Importance: High.

Good day, This email is sent to you from the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) which is located in the Republic of Yemen - Sana'a. It is a center affiliated to the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Yemen, which was established with the aim of alleviating the humanitarian effects and repercussions in the theater of military operations, by neutralizing civilians and civilian objects and other humanitarian aspects.

According to the information, we would like to inform you that the ship CYCLADES IMO: 9799616, which is considered to be owned/managed/operated by your company, violated the ships ban criteria: (C) Ships heading to Israel ports. By arriving at the port of Eilat, Israel in 21 Apr. 2024.

Therefore, the mentioned ship will be included in the list of ships that are banned from crossing the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab and the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, unless you respond to this email.

Therefore, as a part of the safety of ships and their crews, the Yemeni Armed Forces warn the ship owned/managed/operated by your company of continuing to violate the ships ban criteria (C) again.

We will consider stopping your ships' voyages to Israeli ports as the first step in your cooperation, and this is a serious matter that requires your immediate attention. If you do not comply and respond, we confirm that you will bear full responsibility.

We strongly urge you to respond to this email without delay.

Best Regards.

Director of HOCC

Source: Confidential

Annex 35: Threatening messages sent on 22 May 2024 by HOCC (Houthis) to the bulk carrier Alexandria, sailing under Liberia flag

Urgent: Inclusion of the vessel ALEXANDRIA IMO (9448889) in the ban list.

To: Island Oil Holdings Ltd, Petronav Ship Management Ltd,

Sending Date: 22/05/2024. Importance: High

This email is sent to you from the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) which is located in the Republic of Yemen - Sana'a.

It is a center affiliated to the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Yemen, which was established with the aim of alleviating the humanitarian effects and repercussions in the theater of military operations, by neutralizing civilians, civilian objects and other humanitarian aspects.

As the vessel ALEXANDRIA IMO:9448889 which is considered to be owned, managed and operated by your company, has violated the ban criteria: (C) Vessels heading to the usurping Israeli entity ports, and entered the port of Haifa on 5/21/2024.

Therefore, we inform you that the vessel ALEXANDRIA has been included in the ban list within "Sanctions program linked to vessels entering the usurping Israeli entity ports", starting from the date of 03/05/2024.

As a result, the vessel is prohibited from transiting the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, and will be directly targeted by the Yemeni Armed Forces in any area they deem appropriate.


The targeting of Israeli vessels by the Yemeni Armed Forces and preventing the entry of other vessels into the ports of the usurping Israeli entity is based on the religious, humanitarian and moral responsibility towards the oppressed Palestinian people and the unjust siege and the continuation of horrific and heinous massacres by the usurping Israeli entity, and within the framework of the sanctions imposed on it as a result of its aggression, siege, and starvation of the Gaza Strip, the crimes of genocide against the Palestinian people, the killing of children and women, and the prevention of medicine and food entry for more than 8 months.

Therefore, you bear the responsibility and consequences of including the vessel in the ban list, and if your vessels continue to violate the ban criteria and enter the ports of the usurping Israeli entity, sanctions will be imposed on your company and the entire fleet of vessels associated with it.

HOCC Director

Source: Confidential

Annex 36: Decree issued on 17 February 2024 by Mahdi al-Mashat, President of the Houthi supreme political council establishing the HOCC




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About President



[President of Political Council issues decree to establish HOCC](#)

President of Political Council issues decree to establish HOCC

[17/February/2024]

SANA'A February 17. 2024 (Saba) - Decree No. (95) of the year 1445 AH was issued today, Saturday, by the President of the Supreme Political Council establishing the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC).

The decree included four articles. The first article stipulated the establishment of a center called the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC), affiliated with the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, subject to his supervision, and enjoying legal personality, with its main center in the capital, Sana'a.

The second article stipulates that "the Center contributes to mitigating the humanitarian effects and repercussions (on civilians and civilian objects) in the theater of military operations (land, sea and air) through adherence to Islamic teachings , compliance with international humanitarian law , other relevant international laws and conventions in a manner that does not conflict with the interests of the Republic." Yemen or harm it.

Article Three stipulates that the Center has the right to carry out its tasks:

- A- Communication and coordination internally and externally with all parties, governmental and non-governmental agencies and relevant international organizations.
- B- Including representatives from the relevant competent authorities as needed.

Article Four stipulates that this decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance and shall be published in the Official Gazette.

J.A

resource : SABA

Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3305712.htm>

Annex 37: Components of weapons systems and various materiel, which have been intercepted, and documented in previous reports of the Panel

Figure 37.1

MRBMs, LACMs, ASCMs, SAMs, OWA-UAVs, UAVs, DPVs, and UUVs

Materiel	Qty	Reference
MRBM Borkan inertial system	1	S/2023/833 , paras. 74-75
MRBM Borkan nose cone	6	S/2023/833 , paras. 74-75
MRBM Borkan jet vane	16	S/2023/833 , paras. 74-75
MRBM (without precision) engine	5	Para. 81 and annexes 107-109 of this report
Quds-1 LACM components	1	S/2021/79 , table 2
“358” SAM components	10	S/2023/130 , paras. 50-53
“358” SAM	3	S/2021/79 , table 2
“358” SAM	2	S/2021/79 , table 2
DLE-170 drone engine	100	S/2023/833 , paras. 91-93
Matrice 300 RTK drone	1	S/2023/130 , para. 52
Surveillance drone (without precision)	200	S/2023/833 , para. 96
DPV Bonex Constellation	2	S/2023/833 , paras. 87-89
UUV components	Multiple	Para. 83 and annex 111 of this report

Figure 37.2

Electronic materiel or component

Materiel	Qty	Reference
EOSS	1	S/2023/833 , para. 74
EOSS component	2	Para. 83 and annex 111 of this report

Figure 37.3

SALWs, ammunition and related materiel

Materiel	Qty	Reference
Type 56-1 assault rifle	1,406	S/2023/130 , para. 42
Type 56-1 assault rifle	3,752	S/2022/50 , para. 62
Type 56-1 assault rifle	1,918	S/2023/833 , para. 68
Type 56-1 assault rifle	2,999	S/2023/833 , para. 69
Type 56-1 assault rifle	2,556	S/2022/50 , para. 65
Type 56-1 assault rifle	4,300	S/2021/79 , para. 86
Type 56-1 assault rifle	2,522	S/2019/83 , para. 95
AKS20U compact assault rifle	198	S/2023/833 , para. 68
AKS20U compact assault rifle	100	S/2023/833 , para. 69
AKSU	35	S/2022/50 , para. 65
Type 85 sniper rifle	100	S/2022/50 , para. 65
Hoshdar-M sniper rifle	64	S/2018/193 , table 2
AM-50 Sayyad AMR	50	S/2022/50 , para. 62
AM-50 Sayyad AMR	52	S/2022/50 , para. 65
AM-50 Sayyad AMR	59	S/2021/79 , para. 85
RG 004-A1 optical sight for AM-50	50	S/2022/50 , para. 62
PSOP optical sight for sniper rifle	35	S/2021/79 , para. 88
Ghadir II optical sight for sniper rifle	37	S/2022/50 , para. 88
Optical sight for sniper rifle	+50	Para. 86 and annex 118 of this report
RU-90/120G thermal sight	56	S/2022/50 , para. 88

RU-100LH laser telemeter	3	S/2022/50, annex 14
PKM LMG	50	S/2023/833, para. 69
PKM LMG	198	S/2022/50, para. 62
PKM LMG	192	S/2022/50, para. 65
PKM LMG	434	S/2021/79, para. 84
DSHK HMG components	82	S/2022/50, para. 62
DSHK HMG Barrel	60	S/2021/79, annex 14
RPG-7	90	S/2022/50, para. 62
RPG-7	194	S/2022/50, para. 65
RPG-7	200	S/2021/79, para. 85
RPG-7	23	S/2020/326, para. 61
PGO7-V3 sight for RPG-7	45	S/2020/326, para. 61
RPG-29	5	S/2020/326, annex 14
Dehlavieh ATGM	23	S/2023/833, para. 69
Dehlavieh ATGM	7	S/2023/833, para. 74
Dehlavieh ATGM	52	S/2023/130, para. 56
Dehlavieh ATGM	191	S/2021/79, para. 84
Dehlavieh ATGM	21	S/2020/326, para. 52
Dehlavieh ATGM	28	S/2018/594, paras. 115-116
ATGM launching post (without precision)	4	S/2023/833, para. 96
ATGM launching post (without precision)	15	S/2023/833, para. 96
9M111/9M113 ATGM	50	S/2022/50, para. 65
9M113 ATGM	19	S/2018/192, annex 12
Toophan ATGM launching post	3	S/2018/192, annex 13
Toophan ATGM	56	S/2018/192, annex 13
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	1,080,000	S/2023/833, para. 67
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	578,400	S/2023/833, para. 69
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	220,000	S/2023/130, para. 42
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	2,640	S/2023/130, para. 42
7.62x54Rmm ammunition	476,000	S/2021/79, para. 75
12.7x99mm ammunition for AMR	25,000	S/2023/833, para. 67
Fuzes for 122mm rocket for BM-21 MRL	6,960	S/2023/833, para. 67
PG-7 strip propellants	870 boxes	S/2023/833, para. 67

Figure 37.4

Others

Matériel	Qty	Reference
Electric detonator	40,000	S/2023/833, paras. 77-78
Reel of detonating cord	100	S/2023/833, paras. 77-78
Explosive precursors	5 tons	S/2023/833, paras. 85-86
Explosive precursors	40 tons	S/2023/130, paras. 44-47
Explosive precursors	170 tons	S/2023/130, para. 48
Explosive precursors	697 bags	S/2021/79, para. 75
Cylinder for scuba diving equipment	200	S/2023/130, para. 96

Annex 38: Article published on 29 May 2024 by the Iranian media Tasnim News stating that the achievement of Shahid Tehrani Moghadam is today in the hands of the Yemeni Mujahideen as an anti-ship weapon

29 May 2024 by Tasnim News (Iranian media)

Modeling Yemeni fighters from Iran's missile technology

Iran's first maritime ballistic missile named "Qadr" was built by Shahid Hassan Tehrani Moghadam, and now, after several years, the same technology is available to the Yemeni Mujahideen.

Defense Group of Tasnim News Agency Seyed Mohammad Taheri: Without a doubt, the missile capability of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force is one of the most important aspects of the Islamic Republic of Iran's deterrence capability, and the achievement of this capability is due to the efforts and efforts of unknown generals and scientists, among them the martyred general Hassan Tehrani Moghadam Nakhshi. It has played an irreplaceable role.

Many of the country's defense products and achievements in the field of missiles were founded by this honorable martyr and today it has become a powerful tool for defense against any threat.

But in the meantime, the achievement of anti-ship ballistic missile technology can be considered a turning point in the country's missile capabilities, which was followed from idea to product by Shahid Tehrani Moghadam.

The sensitive and strategic area of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, together with the Oman Sea, all of whose northern shores are part of our country's territory, is one of the most important economic bottlenecks in the world, especially in the field of energy, which has caused all the powers of the world to have a desire for many years. With the presence of the military in this region, they use their power to secure their sometimes-illegitimate interests. On the other hand, the economic beating heart of our country is also located in this region.

These features have caused extra-regional forces to always threaten the Islamic Republic of Iran with the presence of their military fleet in this region, so that they can impose their policies on Iran and the countries of the region.

The easy movement of extra-regional military vessels in the Persian Gulf continued until our country did not have a suitable weapon to deal with American vessels to drive them away from its shores. The attack of the American forces on Afghanistan and Iraq also caused an increase in the presence of the American fleet and extra-regional forces in the Persian Gulf, and this led to a struggle at the level of senior commanders to obtain a weapon that could keep the American forces away from the shores of Iran.

At this time, Shahid Tehrani Moghadam comes into action without having direct responsibility in the field of naval weapons. Shahid Tehrani Moghadam's idea was to build a naval ballistic missile, even though there was no such weapon in the country's armed forces until then.



Thunder 69

At that time, the IRGC's most accurate operational missile was the Thunder 69 missile. Thunder 69 was actually the Chinese B610 missile that was purchased by the IRGC from China in 1369 (1990). The Chinese missile was actually a surface-to-surface SAM-2 air defense missile and had a range of 150 km.

Shahid Tehrani Moghadam's idea was based on this axis to design an anti-ship ballistic missile by changing the use of Thunder 69 missile. Based on this, a project named "Qadr" is keyed in the self-sufficiency jihad of the IRGC Air Force.

But this project has faced many issues. Anti-ship missiles in that period were mainly cruise missiles that have a straight trajectory, but the ground-to-ground ballistic missile has a curved trajectory and is designed to target fixed targets, and building a ballistic missile that can target moving targets is difficult. It was very difficult. At the same time, the specialists of the Ministry of Defense had also started the construction of the anti-ship cruise missile in the form of the "Yaali" project.

Finally, with the support of Sardar Shahid Ahmed Kazemi, who was in command of the IRGC Air Force at that time, the Tander surface-to-surface missile became an anti-floating missile.

A lot of tests are done for the Qadr anti-submarine missile to be operational, but the final test is done when Shahid Tehrani Moghadam is no longer responsible for the air force's jihad, but he will be present at Lake Urmia for the final test.

On the day of the missile test, the weather in Lake Urmia will be cloudy, and this makes the success of the work doubtful. But by the grace of God, an opening is opened in the clouds and the order to fire is issued. The missile is fired and by passing through the opening between the clouds and locking onto the predetermined target, it hits and destroys it precisely. Later, the achievements of this missile will be used in the design and construction of "Persian Gulf" and "Hormoz" missiles.

In this way, the "Qadr" missile becomes the first Iranian anti-ship ballistic missile. Now years have passed since then, and the achievement of Shahid Tehrani Moghadam is today in the hands of the Yemeni Mujahideen as an anti-ship weapon.

The "Environment" missile of the Yemeni armed forces is actually designed with the exact model of the Iranian Qadr anti-ship missile. The Yemeni army also had a significant number of SAM-2 defense missiles for years. With the start of the Saudi invasion of Yemen, these defense missiles became Qahir 2 and Qahir 2 ground-to-ground missiles, which carried out successful operations against the Saudi army and its allies.

However, during the parade of Ansar Allah's forces, the anti-submarine model of Qahir missiles, which was now equipped with an optical seeker to target enemy ships, like the Iranian Qadr, was displayed under the name "Environment".

This issue indicates that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been able to pursue the level of support for the resistance front higher than before in recent years, and in addition to all-round support for this front, it has put the transfer of technology in order to make the resistance groups more powerful. An issue that has led to the formation of an integrated command and control network in the region, especially in the fields of drones and missiles.

Now, the missile that was once able to keep the Americans away from Iran's shores has turned into a weapon that has been able to face serious challenges to the interests of the United States and its main ally in the region, the Zionist regime.

Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1403/03/09/3094099/>-قدر-اولين-موشك-بالستيک-ضدکشتی-ایران-در-اختیار-انصار-الله-یمن

Annex 39: Article published on 29 May 2024 by the Iranian media Tasnim News stating that Iranian naval ballistic missile's technology is at disposal of Yemen

29 May 2024 by Tasnim News (Iranian media)

Inspired by Iran, the Yemeni military forces have obtained the technology to manufacture anti-ship ballistic missiles.

Iran's first homegrown naval ballistic missile, called 'Qadr', was developed by late Iranian commander Brigadier General Hassan Tehrani-Moqaddam more than a decade ago.

Iran's technical know-how to produce such anti-ship missiles is now at the disposal of the Yemeni military forces.

Patterned after the Iranian missile, Yemen's 'Muhit' (Ocean) missile is capable of detonating naval targets.

The Yemeni Army has been in possession of surface-to-air missiles for many years. After the invasion of Yemen by a Saudi-led coalition in March 2015, the Yemeni forces converted the SAMs into surface-to-surface missiles, known as Qaher-2 and Qaher-2M, which carried out many successful operations against hostile targets.

Source: https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2024/05/29/3094955/iranian-naval-ballistic-missile-s-technology-at-disposal-of-yemen?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAR2s06j6TwTDIi61e7PsDFzEdejmcJfM1By17jlWBkAQxZhne4IgVzN01gE_aem_Acim3z2OWsfiVweSvZuT6ff_dTRhbY3u9Jvx_d0SjamS8YmxuF8TIpOvmTuzea7WylUrib0-n21ZsjTDO05sOwvJ


Annex 40: Table illustrating materiel with similar characteristics documented in the hands of the Houthis, in Iran, and in the hands of several armed groups belonging to the ‘Axis of Resistance’

Documented with the Houthis	Designation by Iran	Documented with an AG	Annex
SRBM			
Borkan-2H	Qiam		41
Borkan-3	Revzan		42
Falaq	Qiam		43
Qarar	Zolfagar	Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq	44
Tankil	Raad 500		45
Hatem	Khaybar Shekan		46
Palestine	Khaybar Shekan		47
Qaher-1	Tondar-69		48
Qaher-M2			49
MRBM			
Toofan	Shahab-3		50
Aqeel	Qiam family		51
LACM			
Quds-1	Similarities with Soumar	Islamic Resistance in Iraq	52
Quds-2		PMF, Iraq	53
Quds-3			54
Quds-4		Islamic Resistance in Iraq	55
ASCM			
C-802	C-802	Hezbollah, Lebanon	56
Al Mandab-1	Similarities with 351		57
Al Mandab-2	Ghadir/Noor		58
ASBM			
Faleq-1	Fadjr-4CL		59
Long range guided rocket			
Badr-2	Fadjr-5		60
UAV			
Mersad-2	Chamrosh-4		61
Waeed-1	Shahed-131		62
Waeed-2	Shahed-136		63
Rased	Chamrosh	Hezbollah, Lebanon, and PMF, Iraq	64
Qasef-2K	Ababil	Hezbollah, Lebanon, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, Liwa al-Ghaliboun, Iraq, and Islamic Resistance in Iraq	65
Samad-1	Sayyad	Lebanon and Iraq	66
Samad-2		PMF, Iraq, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and Al-Ashtar, Bahrain	
Samad-3		Hezbollah, Lebanon	
Khatif-2	Shahed 101	Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, Saraya Ababeel, Iraq, and Islamic Resistance in Iraq	67
Rujum	Observed Denomination unknown		68
SAM			
Saqr-1	SAM-358	Hezbollah, Lebanon, and unidentified AG, Iraq	69
Barq-2	Taer-2B/Khordad-3		70
MANPADS			
Documented with Houthis	Misagh-2	Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq	71
ATGM			
Documented with Houthis	Saegheh-2	Hezbollah, Lebanon, and PMF, Iraq	72
Documented with Houthis	Toophan	Hezbollah, Lebanon, PMF, Iraq, and Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Iraq	73
Documented with Houthis	Dehlavieh	Hezbollah, Lebanon, Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, PMF, Iraq	74

EOSS			
Sadiq	IRSS-I-3 Saadad	PMF, Iraq	75.1
Shafak	EOSS I-103		75.2
Ofok	EOSS I-103		75.3
SALW			
Documented with Houthis	KL assault rifle	Somalia	144
Documented with Houthis	M80 LMG	Al-Shabaab, Somalia	142
Documented with Houthis	AM-50 AMR	Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, Al-Mujahideen brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, Hezbollah, Lebanon, Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq, Saraya al-Salam, Iraq, Sinjar Resistance Units, Iraq, Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq, and Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Iraq	76
Documented with Houthis	Qader 40mm		77
Documented with Houthis	RPG Saegheh	Hezbollah, Lebanon, PMF, Iraq	80
Mortar			
Rujoom 120mm	HM-16	Al-Quds brigades, occupied Palestinian territory, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory	78
Rujoom 60mm	HM-12 or HM-14	Al-Quds brigades, occupied Palestinian territory, Al-Mujahideen brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, and Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory	79
Thermal sight			
Documented with Houthis	RU-60G	PMF, Iraq, Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq, and PKK, Iraq	81
Land mine			
Documented with Houthis	M18A2	Recovered in Syria	82
Sea mine			
Thaqib (MTA)	Limpet mine		83

Annex 41: Comparison between *Borkhan-2H* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Qiam* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 41.1

***Borkhan-2H* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**

Source: <https://weaponsreputation.com/weapons/burkan-2h.php>

References in previous reports: [S/2023/833](https://www.un.org/pressdocs/2023/S/2023/833), Annexes 32-33, 36, [S/2018/594](https://www.un.org/pressdocs/2018/S/2018/594), paras. 80–91, [S/2019/83](https://www.un.org/pressdocs/2019/S/2019/83), para. 89, [S/2018/594](https://www.un.org/pressdocs/2018/S/2018/594), table 34.4, annex 36

Figure 41.2

***Qiam* SRBM produced by Iran**

Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2010/08/iran-test-fires-new-qiam-1-ballistic.html>

Annex 42: Comparison between *Borkhan-3* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Revzan* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 42.1
Borkhan-3 SRBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/1

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, Annex 30, figure 56.2

Figure 42.2
Revzan SRBM produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/476984/Iran-discloses-surface-to-surface-ballistic-missile-with-1400-km>

Annex 43: Comparison between *Falaq* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Qiam* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 43.1
***Falaq* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018084874956885/photo/4>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 56, S/2023/130, figure 10.9

Figure 43.2
***Qiam* SRBM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2010/08/iran-test-fires-new-qiam-1-ballistic.html>

Annex 44: Comparison between *Qarar* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, *Fateh-110* / *Zolfagar* SRBM produced by Iran, *Aqsa-1* SRBM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and *Jamal-69* SRBM operated by Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq

Figure 44.1
Qarar SRBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704893550586991094

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 56.5

Figure 44.2
Zolfagar SRBM produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/09/25/1195645/iran-releases-video-of-launch-of-new-ballistic-missile> <https://www.flickr.com/photos/thisraelproject/11406979775/>

Figure 44.3
Aqsa-1 SRBM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://theaviationist.com/2023/11/14/new-al-aqsa-1-ballistic-missile/>

Figure 44.4
Jamal-69 SRBM operated by Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq



Source: <https://www.taghribnews.com/fa/news/548016/>

Annex 45: Comparison between *Tankil* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Raad 500* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 45.1

Tankil SRBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: https://twitter.com/iranianmil_ar/status/1704996859742408765/photo/1

Figure 45.2

Raad 500 SRBM produced by Iran



Source: <https://en.irna.ir/news/83667792/Iran-unveils-Raad-500-missile>

Annex 46: Comparison between *Hatem* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Khaybar Shekan* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 46.1

***Hatem* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**




Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704891978243088890/photo/1

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 56.4

Figures 46.2 (left) and 46.3 (right)

***Khaybar Shekan* SRBM produced by Iran**




Source figure 46.2: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/186257/Iran-s-latest-ballistic-missiles-unveiled-on-Quds-Day>

Source figure 46.3: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1806261755821121812/photo/2

:


Annex 47: Comparison between *Palestine* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Khaybar Shekan* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 47.1
***Palestine* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://x.com/AmirIGM/status/1798447207080702086/photo/1>

Figures 47.2 (left) and 47.3 (right)
***Khaybar Shekan* SRBM produced by Iran**



Source figure 47.2: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/186257/Iran-s-latest-ballistic-missiles-unveiled-on-Quds-Day>

Source figure 47.3: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1806261755821121812/photo/2

Annex 48: Comparison between *Qaher-1* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Tondar-69* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 48.1

***Qaher-1* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**

Source: https://x.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704917288334328131/photo/1

References in previous reports: S/2018/594, table 34.4, S/2018/193, annex 42, table 42.2

Figure 48.2

***Tondar-69* SRBM produced by Iran**

Source: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1360741334739537921/photo/1

Annex 49: Comparison between *Qaher-M2* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Tondar-69* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 49.1

***Qaher-M2* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/2

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 56.7

Figure 49.2

***Tondar-69* SRBM produced by Iran**



Source: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1360741334739537921/photo/1

Annex 50: Comparison between *Toofan* MRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Shahab-3* MRBM produced by Iran

Figure 50.1
***Toofan* MRBM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/status/1704915482535440407/photo/1


Figure 50.2
***Shahab-3* MRBM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://nuke.fas.org/guide/iran/missile/shahab-3.htm>

Annex 51: Comparison between *Aqeel* MRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Qiam* MRBM produced by Iran

Figure 51.1
Aqeel MRBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/status/1704918186443833561/photo/1

Figure 51.2
MRBM *Qiam* produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/qiam-1-mod-tasnim-2020-01-03.jpg>

Annex 52: Comparison between *Quds-1* LACM displayed by the Houthis, *Soumar* LACM produced by Iran, and a LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq

Figure 52.1
***Quds-1* LACM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1208062/meet-the-quds-1/>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, Annex 61.1, S/2021/79, para.79, and S/2020/326, paras. 13, 16, 58–60, figures 5, 14.7-14.8, 20.10, annex 16

Figure 52.2
***Soumar* LACM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/03/iran-publicly-unveils-soumar-land.html>

Figure 52.3
LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://twitter.com/mhmiranusa/status/177753023784623328/photo/1>

Annex 53: Comparison between *Quds-2* LACM displayed by the Houthis, *Soumar* LACM produced by Iran, and a LACM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq

Figure 53.1
Quds-2 LACM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGfJgU>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, Annex 51-5, figure 61.2, S/2023/130, figures 5.11-5.19, S/2022/50, annex 16, and S/2020/326, footnote 47 of the para. 57

Figure 53.2
***Soumar* LACM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/03/iran-publicly-unveils-soumar-land.html>

Figures 53.3 (left), and 53.4 (right)
LACM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq




Source (left): <https://www.iraqnews.com/iraq/iraqi-police-discover-iranian-cruise-missile-failed-to-launch/>
Source (right): <https://english.almanar.com.lb/2111540>

Annex 54: Comparison between *Quds-3* LACM displayed by the Houthis, and *Soumar* LACM produced by Iran

Figure 54.1

Quds-3 LACM displayed by the Houthis



صواريخ اليمن في عرض العيد الثامن للثورة الـ21 من سبتمبر "اليد الطولى في ردع الأعداء"

Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 61.3

Figure 54.2

Soumar LACM produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/03/iran-publicly-unveils-soumar-land.html>

Annex 55: Comparison between *Quds-4* LACM displayed by the Houthis, *Paveh-04* LACM produced by Iran, and a LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq

Figure 55.1
***Quds-4* LACM displayed by the Houthis**




Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3266848.htm>

Figure 55.2
***Paveh-04* LACM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1705231960598069648/photo/1>

Figure 55.3
LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1720295088083943843/photo/1>

Annex 56: C-802 ASCM operated by the Houthis, the C-802 / Noor ASCM operated by Iran, and C-802 ASCM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon

Figure 56.1

C-802 ASCM operated by the Houthis



Source: Panel

References in previous reports: [S/2020/326](#), para. 52, and annex 20, and [S/2019/83](#), paras. 80-82, annex 11, figure 11.7

Figure 56.2

C-802 / Noor ASCM operated by Iran



Source: <https://asian-defence-news.blogspot.com/2015/11/iranian-mi17-with-c-802-version-of.html>

Figures 56.3 (left) and 56.4 (right)

C-802 ASCM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source figure 56.3: <https://iranpress.com/hezbollah-s-c-802-anti-ship-cruise-missiles>

Source figure 56.4: <https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2019/09/16/hezbollah-se-jacto-de-un-nuevo-misil-capaz-de-destruir-cualquier-buque-de-guerra-y-matar-a-todos-a-bordo/>

Annex 57: Comparison between *Al-Mandab-1* ASCM displayed by the Houthis, and *Ghadir/Noor* ASCM produced by Iran

Figure 57.1
Al-Mandab-1 ASCM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://youtu.be/igDWAJ-QoDA>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 71.1, S/2023/130, figure 10.2, and S/2019/83, para. 81, annex 1

Figure 57.2
Ghadir/Noor ASCM produced by Iran



Source: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/112393/Navy-equipped-with-long-range-cruise-missile-Ghadir>

Annex 58: Comparison between *Mandab-2* ASCM displayed by the Houthis, and *Ghadir/Noor* ASCM produced by Iran

Figure 58.1

***Mandab-2* ASCM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://youtu.be/igDWAJ-QoDA>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 71.2, S/2023/130, figures 10.5-10.6, and S/2019/83, para. 81

Figure 58.2

***Ghadir/Noor* ASCM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/112393/Navy-equipped-with-long-range-cruise-missile-Ghadir>

Annex 59: Comparison between *Faleq-1* ASBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Fadjr-4CL* ASBM produced by Iran

Figure 59.1

Faleq-1 ASBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018166399602805/photo/2>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 71.3, and S/2023/130, annex 10

Figure 59.2

Fadjr-4CL ASBM produced by Iran



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranMilitaryNet/status/1635764125287477256/photo/1>

Annex 60: Comparison between *Badr-2* Long-range guided rocket displayed by the Houthis, and *Fajr-5* Long-range guided rocket produced by Iran

Figure 60.1

***Badr-2* Long-range guided rocket displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/550566>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 57.3

Figure 60.2

***Fajr-5* Long-range guided rocket produced by Iran**



Source: <https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2017/iran-unveils-new-fajr-5-300mm-mlrs-multiple-launch-rocket-system-using-guided-rockets-10702171>

Annex 61: Comparison between Mersad-2 UAV displayed by the Houthis, and Chamrosh-4 UAV produced by Iran

Figure 61.1

Mersad-2 UAV displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/550566>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.2

Figure 61.2

Chamrosh-4 UAV produced by Iran



Source: https://x.com/nasir_military/status/1705189224805462455/photo/3

Annex 62: Comparison between *Waeed-1* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Shahed 131* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, and OWA-UAV similar to *Shahed 131* reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)

Figure 62.1

***Waeed-1* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704953936484970662

Figures 62.2 (left) and 62.3 (right)

***Shahed 131* OWA-UAV produced by Iran**



Source figure 62.2: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2024/02/20/3042241/irgc-ground-force-equipped-with-suicide-combat-drones>

Source figure 62.3: <https://www.shutterstock.com/fr/editorial/image-editorial/veiled-iranian-schoolgirls-stand-front-iran%27s-shahed-131-141468061>

Figures 62.4 (left) and 62.5 (right)

OWA-UAV similar to *Shahed 131* reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/06/the-islamic-resistance-in-iraq-increases-its-drone-attacks-on-israel.php>

Annex 63: Comparison between *Waeed-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Shahed 136* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, and OWA-UAV similar to *Shahed 136* operated by the PMF, Iraq

Figure 63.1

***Waeed-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/550566>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.4, S/2023/130, para. 57, S/2022/50, para. 60, and S/2020/326, paras. 51 and 52

Figures 63.2 (left) and 63.3 (right)

***Shahed 136* OWA-UAV produced by Iran**



Source figure 63.2: <https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2023/11/25/the-drone-index-ai0-hesa-shahed-136/>

Source figure 63.3: <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/12/iran-unveils-new-karrar-drones-upgraded-air-air-missiles>

Figure 63.4

OWA-UAV similar to *Shahed 136* operated by the PMF, Iraq



Source: <https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/iraqi-resistance-attacks-a-vital-israeli-site-in-eilat>

Annex 64: Comparison between *Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Chamrosh* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, *Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by the Hezbollah, Lebanon, and *Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by PMF, Iraq

Figure 64.1

***Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://postimg.cc/ZWvdByVF>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.3, and S/2019/83, para. 83, and S/2018/594, para.102, annex 39

Figures 64.2 (left) and 64.3 (right)

***Chamrosh* OWA-UAV operated by Iran**



Source figure 64.2: <https://sg.news.yahoo.com/finance/news/south-korean-tanker-boarded-armed-052526366.html>

Source figure 64.3: <https://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/8553112/مراسم-رژه-نیروهای-مسلح-به-مناسبت-آغاز-هفته-دفاع-مقدس-استان-ها>

Figures 64.4 (left) and 64.5 (right)

***Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by the Hezbollah, Lebanon**



Source: <https://www.militantwire.com/p/weapons-used-by-hezbollah-during>

Figures 64.6 (left) and 64.7 (right)
Rased OWA-UAV displayed by PMF, Iraq




Source figure 64.6: <https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1408766077396570114/photo/2>

Source figure 64.7: <https://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/25062021>

Annex 65: Comparison between *Qasef-2K* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Ababil-2* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, *Mirsad-1* OWA-UAV operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon, *Shebab* OWA-UAV operated by Hamas, Palestinian occupied territory, OWA-UAV similar to *Ababil-2* operated by Liwa al-Ghaliboun, Iraq, and OWA-UAV similar to *Ababil-2* operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)

Figure 65.1

***Qasef-2K* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://i.postimg.cc/rsxzSj8H/D-4-LBO2-VUAAAn-LNl.jpg>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.7

Figure 65.2

***Ababil-2* OWA-UAV produced by Iran**



Source: <https://en.topwar.ru/213983-mnogocelovoj-bpla-ababil-2-iran.html>

Figures 65.3 (left) and 65.4 (right)

***Mirsad-1* OWA-UAV operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon**



Source figure 65.3: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1800986950356045889/photo/2

Source figure 65.4: <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1806322092788592679>

Figures 65.5 (left) and 65.6 (right)
Shebab OWA-UAV operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory



Source figure 65.5: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-rockets-palestinian-groups>

Source figure 65.6: <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/hamas-bets-locally-made-drones-next-confrontation-israel>

Figure 65.7
OWA-UAV similar to Ababil-2 operated by Liwa al-Ghaliboun, Iraq



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1640345398521786368/photo/1>

Figure 65.8
OWA-UAV similar to Ababil-2 operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://x.com/azelin/status/1744506225008464267/photo/1>

Annex 66: Comparison between *Samad-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Sayyad* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Al-Ashtar, a Bahraini Shia militant group

Figure 66.1

***Samad-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**




Source: <https://twitter.com/IbnSiqilli/status/1574590410894151682/photo/3>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.8, S/2020/326, para. 56, and S/2019/83, paras. 84-85, 87, annex 12

Figures 66.2 (left) and 66.3 (right)

***Sayyad* OWA-UAV produced by Iran**



Source figure 66.2: <https://twitter.com/mhmiranusa/status/1638145845106278400>

Source figure 66.3: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1705232648791052295/photo/4>

Figures 66.4 (left) and 66.5 (right)

OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq



Source figure 66.4: <https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1408766077396570114/photo/1>

Source figure 66.5: <https://t.me/Alimido13/886>

[https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/Sahab drone at Camp Ashraf%2C June 26%2C 2021.jpg](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/Sahab%20drone%20at%20Camp%20Ashraf%20June%2026%202021.jpg)

Figure 66.6
OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian occupied territory



Source: https://x.com/imp_navigator/status/1711308309871943714/photo/2

Figure 66.7
OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source:
https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/1744708216989061132/photo/1 https://x.com/imp_navigator/status/1711308309871943714/photo/2

Figures 66.8 (left) and 66.9 (right)
OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Al-Ashtar, a Bahraini Shia militant group



Figures 66.10 and 66.11
Close-up on the “QC” sticker, similar to those already documented on materiel with similar characteristics to those manufactured in Iran



Source: https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1786082957502841143

Annex 67: Comparison between *Khatif-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Shahed 101* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, *Jenin* OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, *Murad-5* OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Saraya Ababeel, Iraq, and *Murad-5* OWA-UAV reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq

Figure 67.1
***Khatif-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705030787123323174

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.11

Figures 67.2 (left), and 67.3 (right)
***Shahed 101* OWA-UAV produced by Iran**



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1645062026123681795/photo/2>

Figure 67.4
Jenin OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: <https://thecradle.co/articles-id/3960>

Figure 67.5
Murad-5 OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Saraya Ababeel, Iraq



Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3310954.htm>

Figure 67.6
Murad-5 OWA-UAV reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://en.irna.ir/news/85504960/Iraqi-resistance-launches-drone-attack-against-Israeli-base>

Annex 68: Comparison between *Rujum* UAV displayed by the Houthis, and UAV displayed by the Iranian armed forces

Figure 68.1

Rujum UAV displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://x.com/VleckieHond/status/1557346455316271104/photo/1>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figures 59.12, 60.3, and 60.5, S/2022/50, figure 18.4

Figures 68.2 (left) and 68.3 (right)

UAV displayed by the Islamic Republic of Iran armed forces (IRIAF)



Source figure 68.2: <https://english.iswnews.com/27708/iran-army-ground-forces-receive-military-equipment/>

Source figure 68.3: <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/iran-reveals-upgraded-multi-rotor-smart-bomber-drone-in-recent-military-drills-2023-10-31-0/>

Annex 69: Comparison between *Saqr-1* SAM displayed by the Houthis, “358” SAM produced by Iran, “358” SAM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon, and “358” SAM observed in Iraq

Figure 69.1
***Saqr-1* SAM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202302010186>

References in previous reports: [S/2023/833](#), figure 62.1, [S/2023/130](#), paras. 51, 53, figures 18.10-18.18, [S/2022/50](#), para. 61, [S/2021/79](#), table 2, figure 13.7, annexes 19-20, and [S/2020/326](#), para. 52, figures 20.4-20.8

Figure 69.2
“358” SAM produced by Iran



Source: <https://x.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1704477188328665175/photo/2>

Figures 69.3 (left) and 69.4 (right)
“358” SAM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source: <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2023-11-29/ty-article/saqr-358-iran-hezbollah-loitering-missile-israel-us-uavs-yemen-houthis/0000018c-1ac5-d3b6-adeb-bbfd2efd0000>

Figure 69.5
“358” SAM documented in Iraq (near a US base)



Source: <https://x.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1451577368410214408/photo/3>

Annex 70: Similarities of the characteristics of the *Barq-2* SAM operated by the Houthis and the *Khordad-3* SAM produced by Iran

Figure 70.1
***Barq-2* SAM operated by the Houthis**



Source: <https://twitter.com/mamashami/status/1704881294335734060/photo/2>

Figure 70.2
***Khordad-3* SAM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1705234591496167672/photo/1>

Annex 71: *Misgah-2* Manpads displayed by the Houthis, -2 Manpads produced by Iran, and *Misgah-2* Manpads reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq

Figure 71.1
***Misgah-2* Manpads displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://postlmg.cc/8JKf3gYY>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 62.4

Figure 71.2
***Misgah-2* Manpads produced by Iran**



Source: <https://en.topwar.ru/116150-pvo-islamskoy-respubliki-iran-chast-3.html>

Figure 71.3
***Misgah-2* Manpads reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq**



Source: https://x.com/green_lemonn/status/610173400376569858

Annex 72: Saegheh-2 ATGM displayed by the Houthis, Saegheh-2 ATGM produced by Iran, Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by PMF, Iraq

Figures 72.1 (left), and 72.2 (right)
Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by the Houthis



Source figure 72.1: <https://x.com/Mansourtalk/status/897833730508763136/photo/1>
Source figure 72.2: https://x.com/Harry_Boone/status/837943165235695617/photo/1

Figures 72.3 (left), and 72.4 (right)
Saegheh-2 ATGM displayed by Iran



Source figure 72.3: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2008/05/iranian-anti-tank-guided-missiles.html>
Source figure 72.4: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2010/08/irgc-video-documentary-farsi.html>

Figure 72.5
Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1725592679323426980/photo/1>

Figure 72.6
Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by PMF, Iraq



Source: <https://x.com/klkamashiq/status/881446623095685120/photo/3>

Annex 73: *Toophan* ATGM displayed by the Houthis, *Toophan* ATGM produced by Iran, *Toophan* ATGM reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, *Toophan* ATGM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, and *Toophan* ATGM reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Iraq

Figure 73.1
***Toophan* ATGM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://i.postimg.cc/5yNPY8pF/image.jpg>

References in previous reports: S/2018/192, para. 82, annex 12

Figures 73.2 (left) and 73.3 (right)
***Toophan* ATGM produced by Iran**



Source figure 73.2: <https://english.iswnews.com/29718/military-knowledge-toophan-anti-tank-missiles/>

Source figure 73.3:

https://www.reddit.com/r/awesometechnicals/comments/jtwthy/iranian_safir_jeeps_with_toophan_atgms/

Figure 73.4
Toophan ATGM reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source: https://x.com/green_lemonnn/status/682496740143042560

Figure 73.5
Toophan ATGM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq



Source: <https://x.com/IraqiSecurity/status/717053810854793216/photo/1>

Figure 73.6
Toophan ATGM reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Iraq



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/11/soleimani-among-iran-equipped-iraqi.html>

Annex 74: Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by the Houthis, Dehlavieh ATGM produced by Iran, Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Hezbollah, Lebanon, Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, and Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by the PMF, Iraq

Figure 74.1
Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://debrief.net/en/news-30800.html>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, paras. 69 and 74, S/2023/130, para. 56, S/2021/79, para. 84 and annex 13, S/2020/326, para. 52, annex 20, S/2018/193, figure 35.12, figures 37.5-37.6, S/2018/594, paras. 115-116, figures 42.1-42.3, and S/2017/91, table 4

Figure 74.2
Dehlavieh ATGM produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/media/2015/09/26/871344/photos-iran-s-army-ground-force-receives-new-homegrown-equipment - photo=12>

Figures 74.3 (left) and 73.4 (right)
Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source figure 74.3: <https://www.militantwire.com/p/weapons-used-by-hezbollah-during>

Source figure 74.4: <https://www.islamtimes.org/en/news/1137037/when-sayyed-raisi-met-hezbollah-fighters-prayed-for-its-leadership>

Figure 74.5
Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2014/12/izz-ad-din-al-qassam-brigades-parade-at.html>

Figure 74.6
Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by the PMF, Iraq



Source: <https://english.iswnews.com/24403/the-pmu-commemorate-its-8th-anniversary-unveiling-new-weaponry/>

Annex 75.1: Comparison between *Sadiq* EOSS displayed by the Houthis, and *IRSS-I-3 Saadad* EOSS produced by Iran

Figure 75.1.1
Sadiq EOSS displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alidarawani/status/1704866265569882588/photo/4>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 63.1

Figure 75.1.2
IRSS-I-3 Saadad EOSS produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.mindexcenter.ir/node/1015>

Figure 75.1.3
IRSS-I-3 Saadad EOSS reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq



كما شارك في العرض عدة أنواع من عائلة صدد (Stopper) الإيرانية المركبة على المركبات لأنظمة المراقبة الكهروضوئية ، لتشمل طرازتي Sadad-103 و -202 ، وبعضها مجهز بـ RU-1000 يوم / كاميرا حرارية مبردة ليلاً مستخدمة على نطاق واسع من قبل فيلق الحرس الثوري الإسلامي (IRGC) جنباً إلى جنب مع أنظمة الدفاع الجوي على ارتفاعات منخفضة. يتم تسويق هذه الأنظمة البصرية على أنها قادرة على اكتشاف البشر من مسافة تصل إلى 10 كم والمركبات من مسافة تزيد عن 20 كم أثناء النهار أو الليل

Unofficial translation:

Several variants of Iran's vehicle-mounted *Sadad* (Stopper) family of electro-optical surveillance systems also participated in the display, to include the *Sadad*-103 and -202 models, some of which are equipped with the RU-1000 day/night-cooled thermal camera widely used by the IRG combined with low-altitude air defence systems. These optical systems are marketed as being able to detect humans from up to 10 km away and vehicles from over 20 km away during the day or night.

Source: <https://ida2at.org/article/19939>

Annex 75.2: Comparison between *Shafak* EOSS displayed by the Houthis, and *EOSS I-103*, produced by Iran

Figure 75.2.1
***Shafak* EOSS displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleekieHond/status/1705240052878520524/photo/3>

Figure 75.2.2
***I-103* EOSS produced by Iran**



EOSS-I-103
Passive Electro Optical Surveillance System



The EOSS-I 103 is an ideal system for long range surveillance, observation and monitoring of land, air and sea related operations. The system is designed in a modular construction for conversion and adapting system performance to mission parameters. A variety of sensors and control equipment have been integrated, including precise high speed payload, infrared and visible cameras with variable focal length lenses and a laser range finder.

Source: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Annex 75.3: Comparison between *Ofok* EOSS displayed by the Houthis, and *I-103* EOSS produced by Iran

Figure 75.3.1
***Ofok* EOSS displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1705240052878520524>

Figure 75.3.2
***I-103* EOSS produced by Iran**



EOSS-I-103
Passive Electro Optical Surveillance System



The EOSS-I 103 is an ideal system for long range surveillance, observation and monitoring of land, air and sea related operations. The system is designed in a modular construction for conversion and adapting system performance to mission parameters. A variety of sensors and control equipment have been integrated, including precise high speed payload, infrared and visible cameras with variable focal length lenses and a laser range finder.

Source: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Annex 76: *AM-50 “Sayyad”* AMR displayed by the Houthis, *AM-50* AMR produced by Iran, *Ghoul* AMR reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Kata’ib Hizballah, Iraq, *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Saraya al-Salam, Iraq, *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Sinjar Resistance Units, Iraq, *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq, and *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Iraq

Figure 76.1
***AM-50 “Sayyad”* AMR displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://medium.com/@jmkoon2/geolocating-an-iranian-am-50-sayyad-sniper-rifle-in-majaza-battlefront-baqim-district-saada-98bc4bec2c59>

References in previous reports: S/2022/50, paras. 62 and 64, figures 20.19-20.22, S/2021/79, para. 85, table 2, figures 14.10-14.11, and S/2018/193, figures 38.3-38.4

Figures 76.2 (left) and 76.3 (right)
***AM-50* AMR produced by Iran**



Source figure 76.2: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/03/16/1029798/iran-s-army-snipers-equipped-with-homegrown-rifle>

Source figure 76.3: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1705237075081994491/photo/1>

Figures (left) 76.4, and 76.5 (right)
***Ghoul* AMR reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory**



Source figure 76.4: <https://jcpa.org/iran-admits-a-revolutionary-guard-commander-killed-in-an-israeli-attack-in-iraq-on-july-19/>

Source figure 76.5: <https://inf.news/en/military/ec6dd2595eb6cfbc12fcafc1be7bd034.html>

Figure 76.6
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: <https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/resistance-forces-confront-israeli-forces-near-al-shifa-hosp>

Figure 76.7
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon (picture reportedly taken in Syria)



Source: <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/07/hezbollah-issues-ultimatum-to-militants-in-arsal-battle.php>

Figure 76.8
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1420059140618178560/photo/2

Figure 76.9
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Saraya al-Salam, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1564547684844933120

Figure 76.10
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Sinjar Resistance Units, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1567919660703617025/photo/1

Figure 76.11
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1778878987269271806/photo/2

Figure 76.12
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Iraq



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/11/soleimani-among-iran-equipped-iraqi.html>

Annex 77: *Qader* 40mm grenade launcher presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and *Qader* 40mm grenade launcher, produced by Iran

Figure 77.1

***Qader* 40mm grenade launcher presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas**



Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1603087005398835200>

Figure 77.2

***Qader* 40mm grenade launcher produced by Iran**




Source: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1574787070991687681/photo/3>

Annex 78: Comparison between *Rujoom 120mm mortar* displayed by the Houthis, *HM-16, 120mm mortar* produced by Iran, and *HM-16, 120mm mortar* reportedly operated by Al-Quds brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, *HM-16, 120mm mortar* reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and *HM-16, 120mm mortar* reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory

Figures 78.1 (left), and 78.2 (right)

***Rujoom 120mm mortar* displayed by the Houthis**



Source 78.1: <https://postimg.cc/WhNBG3MD>

Source 78.2: <https://x.com/CalibreObscura/status/1370073166861758474/photo/2>

Figure 78.3

***HM-16, 120mm mortar* produced by Iran**

Ministry of Defence and Support for the Armed Forces of I.R. of Iran
 وزارت دفاع و پشتیبانی نیروهای مسلح جمهوری اسلامی ایران
 DIO

www.diomil.ir | 120 mm STANDARD MORTAR LAUNCHER | HM 16

General Specifications:
 The mortar launcher is a kind of smooth-bore and base-loading weapon with a 360° firing field. Due to its high elevation angle, it can be field from behind the shooter. To make it easy to carry, its simple structure enables the erection and rapid deployment by two or three crews. It must be noted that the barrel warms slowly, so it does not produce an effect on the side of fire. Because of its relatively small dimensions, it can be easily fixed in a dug hole on the ground, which protects the mortar launcher as well as the crews.

Technical Specifications:

DESCRIPTION	DATA
Model	HM 16
Caliber	120 mm

Source: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Figure 78.4

***HM-16, 120mm mortar* reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory**



Source: <https://x.com/CalibreObscura/status/1393226932683251713/photo/1>

Figure 78.5

HM-16, 120mm mortar reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1397922160312602624/photo/4

Annex 79: Comparison between *Rujoom 60mm mortar* displayed by the Houthis, *HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* produced by Iran, *HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* reportedly operated by Al-Quds brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, *HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* reportedly operated by Al-Mujahideen brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, and *HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory

Figures 79.1 (left) and 79.2 (right)

***Rujoom 60mm mortar* displayed by the Houthis**



Source figure 79.1: <https://postimg.cc/XBBCbJ94>

Source figure 79.2: <https://x.com/CalibreObscura/status/1370073166861758474/photo/1>

Figure 79.3

***HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* produced by Iran**

www.dio.ir | 60 mm STANDARD MORTAR LAUNCHER | HM 14

□ **General Specifications:**

This mortar launcher is a kind of smooth-bore and base-loading weapon and has a high elevation angle with a 360° firing field. It is usually operated by two crews, but it can be operated by one crew in emergency. Its sight device is simple and accurate and remains in a steady state during firing. This mortar launcher is able to fire with high accuracy.

□ **Technical Specifications:**

DESCRIPTION	DATA
Model	HM 14
Caliber	60 mm
Length of barrel and base	720 mm
Max. range with M60 mortar model M 1	2050 m
Min. range with M60 mortar model M 1	250 m
Elevation range	60°-80°
Rate of fire	25 in the first minute then 7 continues
Weight in firing position	17.5 kg

Source: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Figure 79.4

***HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* reportedly operated by Al-Quds brigade, occupied Palestinian territory**



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1825168518876131578

Figure 79.5

HM-12/14, 60mm mortar reportedly operated by Al-Mujahideen brigade, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: <https://en.yagency.net/313414>

Figure 79.6

HM-12/14, 60mm mortar reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1325510346472349698/photo/1

Annex 80: *Saegheh* rocket launcher displayed by the Houthis, *Saegheh* rocket launcher produced by Iran, *Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, *Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, and *Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq

Figure 80.1

***Saegheh* rocket launcher displayed by the Houthis**




Source: <https://news.sky.com/story/yemen-civil-war-rebel-houthi-fighters-start-to-leave-hodeidah-saleef-and-ras-isa-under-peace-plan-11716868>

References in previous reports: S/2022/50, para. 62, figures 20.17-20.18, S/2021/79, para. 85, annex 14, S/2020/326, para. 61, figures 19.4-19.5, and S/2018/193, tables 2-3, figure 35.5

Figures 80.2 (left) and 80.3 (right)

***Saegheh* rocket launcher produced by Iran**



Source figure 80.2: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Source figure 80.3: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1728394779740827954/photo/3>

Figure 80.4

***Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon**



Source: <https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/estimate-hezbollahs-fatalities-syrian-civil-war-conclusions-arising-analysis-identity/>

Figure 80.5
***Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq**



Source: https://diyaruna.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_di/features/2020/08/12/feature-01

Figure 80.6
***Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hezbollah, Iraq**



Source: <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2308961>

Annex 81: RU-60G thermal sight displayed by the Houthis, RU-60G thermal sight operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces, RU-60G thermal sight reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, RU-60G thermal sight reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq, and RU-60G thermal sight reportedly recovered on Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Iraq

Figure 81.1
RU-60G thermal sight captured on Houthi forces



Source: <https://x.com/LostWeapons/status/978652589456736256/photo/1>

References in previous reports: S/2020/326, figure 20.14


Figures 81.2 (left), and 81.3 (right)
RU-60G thermal sight operated by Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces



Source figure 81.2: https://x.com/green_lemonn/status/617263464466223105/photo/2

Source figure 81.3: <https://armamentresearch.com/arms-diversion-in-iraq-iranian-ru60g-thermal-weapon-sight/>

Figure 81.4
RU-60G thermal sight reportedly diverted from PMF, Iraq




Source: <https://x.com/CalibreObscura/status/1146178495241998336/photo/2>

Figure 81.5
RU-60G thermal sight reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/green_lemonn/status/667430482523607040/photo/1

Figure 81.6
RU-60G thermal sight reportedly recovered from PKK, Iraq



Source: <https://x.com/Acema171/status/885070737303904256/photo/3>

Annex 82: M18A2 horizontal effect land mine documented as used by the Houthis, M18A2 horizontal effect land mine produced by Iran, and M18A2 horizontal effect land mine reportedly recovered in Syria

Figure 82.1
M18A2 horizontal effect land mine documented as used by the Houthis



Source: <https://iedawareness.com/2018/04/12/houthi-directional-mines-captured-in-midi-yemen/>

Figure 82.2
M18A2 horizontal effect land mine produced by Iran



Source: <https://armamentresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/32.jpg>

Figure 82.3
M18A2 horizontal effect land mine reportedly recovered in Syria



Source: <https://armamentresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/25-e1467199584968.jpg>

Annex 83: *Thaqib* (MTA) sea mine displayed by the Houthis, and limpet mine produced by Iran

Figures 83.1 (up), 83.2 (down left), and 83.3 (down right)
***Thaqib* (MTA) sea mine displayed by the Houthis**




Source: <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/03/houthi-rebels-unveil-host-of-weaponry.html>



Source: *Terrogence*

References in previous reports: [S/2023/833](#), figure 74.3, and [S/2018/594](#), para. 111

Figures 83.4 (left) and 83.5 (right)
Limpet mine produced by Iran



Source: *Terrogence*

Annex 84: Large-scale military display on 21 of September of materiel by the Houthis held in Sana'a

Figure 84.1
Description made by the Houthis of the materiel displayed



Source: <https://twitter.com/ainalaqoran2/status/1702481027522822180/photo/1>

Figures 84.2 (left) and 84.3 (right)
Mahdi al-Mashat, President of the Supreme Political Council and military leader from the Houthi movement on 21 September 2023 at the large-scale military display held in Sana'a



Source: https://twitter.com/Presidency_Ye/status/1704869203663110537/photo/2

Figures 84.4 (up), 84.5 (middle), and 84.6 (below)

Large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023



Source: <https://twitter.com/RiyadhAldubai/status/1704824351315366055/photo/1>



Source: <https://twitter.com/mamashami/status/1704881294335734060/photo/4>

Annex 85: MRBMs and SRBMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 85.1 (up), 85.2 (middle), and 85.3 (down)

Toofan MRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/s_m_marandi/status/1704818695623573684/video/2



Source: https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/status/1704915482535440407/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/fab_hinz/status/1704819625727267199/photo/2

Figures 85.4 (up), and 85.5 (down)
Aqeel MRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/status/1704918186443833561/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/s_m_marandi/status/1704818695623573684/video/2

Figures 85.6 (up), and 85.7 (down)
Borkhan-3 SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/1



Source: <https://twitter.com/Sanaa12023/status/1704802768584581210>

Figure 85.8
Falaq MRBM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018084874956885/photo/4>

Figure 85.9
Hatem SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704891978243088890/photo/1

Figure 85.10
Fateh-11 SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704893550586991094

Figures 85.11 (up), and 85.12 (down)
Tankil SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/iranianmil_ar/status/1704996859742408765/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704891978243088890/photo/3

Figure 85.13
Qaher M2 SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/2

Figures 85.14 (up), and 85.15 (down)
SS-21 “Tochka” SRBM



Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1704890941167804820>

Annex 86: Long-distance guided rockets presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display pf materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 86.1

***Badr-1* Long-distance guided rocket**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704901189039489243/photo/2

Figure 86.2

***Badr-P* Long-distance guided rocket**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704899823239831704/photo/2

Figure 86.3

Badr-3 Long-distance guided rocket



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKootz_/status/1704958894806589657/photo/1

Figure 86.4

Badr-4 Long-distance guided rocket



Source: <https://twitter.com/timand2037/status/1705056532679794821/photo/1>

Figure 86.5
Saeer, Long-distance guided rocket



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704947846196166710/photo/1

Figure 86.6
Qasim, Long-distance guided rocket



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017924455403578/photo/4>

Annex 87: LACMs and ASCMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 87.1

Quds-2 LACM



Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1707674493559173185/photo/4>

Figures 87.2 (up), and 87.3 (down)
Quds-3 LACM



Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1707674493559173185/photo/3>




Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018143045783735>

Figure 87.4
Quds-4 LACM



Source: https://twitter.com/iranianmil_ar/status/1704967065260437708/photo/1

Figure 87.5
Announcement of 2,000 kilometre-range *Quds-4* LACM



Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1704874454000570707>

Figures 87.6 (up), and 87.7 (below)
Quds-Z0 ASCM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017842456793113/photo/1>



Source: https://twitter.com/fab_hinz/status/1704838068589478383/photo/2

Figures 87.8 (up), and 87.9 (down)
Sayyad ASCM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018158321430703/photo/4>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Figures 87.10 (up), and 87.11 (below)
Sajil ASCM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018114205798882/photo/1>

21
سبتمبر

الطول الكلي: 3.60 م

سجیل

وزن الرأس الحربي: 100 كجم

سجيك المجنح صاروخ ارض بحر

المميزات

- ❖ قدرته على استهداف الاهداف الثابتة والمتحركة
- ❖ يتميز رأسه الحربي بقدرة تدميرية عالية

المواصفات

- ❖ صاروخ كروز مجنح
- ❖ يصل مداه إلى 180 كم
- ❖ يعمل بالوقود الصلب والسائل

المميزات

- ❖ دقته العالية في إصابة الاهداف
- ❖ لا تستطيع الرادارات إكتشافه
- ❖ يمكن خربه من أي نقطة في الأراضي اليمنية إلى أي نقطة في البحر الأحمر

www.mmy.ye

صنع في اليمن

Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1705492666769691128/photo/1>

Annex 88: ASBMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 88.1
Mayun ASBM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKooztz_/status/1704874118535872639/photo/4

Figure 88.2
Faleq ASBM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018166399602805/photo/2>

Figure 88.3
Al-Bahr Al-Ahmar ASBM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704958894806589657/photo/2

Figure 88.4
Tankil ASBM



Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3266848.htm>

Figure 88.5
Aasif ASBM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018101702484071/photo/4>

Annex 89: SAMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 89.1 (up), and 89.2 (below)

Saqr-1 SAM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017858877485340/photo/1>



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alidarawani/status/1704866265569882588/photo/1>

Figure 89.3
Barq-2 SAM



Source: <https://twitter.com/mamashami/status/1704881294335734060/photo/2>

Figure 89.4
Mi-raj SAM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705024889269170673/photo/2

Annex 90: UAVs and OWA-UAVs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 90.1

***Rujum* UAV (new variant)**



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1704894030910284111/photo/1>

Figures 90.2 (up) and 90.3 (down)
Waeed-1 OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKootz_/status/1704953936484970662

Figures 90.4 (up) and 90.5 (below)
Waeed-2 OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017895137251819/photo/1>

Figures 90.6 (up), and 90.7 (down)
Rased OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282218304655532/photo/3



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787

Figures 90.8 (up), and 90.9 (down)
Khatif-2 (new variant) OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705030787123323174



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705375424229085542/photo/1

Figures 90.10 (up), and 90.11 (below)
Shibab OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705027741349761476



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1704891807274881074/photo/1>

Figures 90.12 (up), and 90.13 (down)
Samad-1 OWA-UAV



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017895137251819/photo/3>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787

Figure 90.14
Samad-2



Source: <https://twitter.com/fj048189/status/1704829978301366539>

Figures 90.15 (up), and 90.16 (down)
Qasef-2K OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704898202451726409



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787

Figure 90.17
Mersad-1 OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787

Figure 90.18
Raqeb OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705396398106030484/photo/3

Annex 91: Armoured vehicles presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 91.1 (up), and 91.2 (down)

Hani 4x4 armoured vehicle



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/4



Source: <https://twitter.com/AlMayadeenNews/status/1704797009952088369>

Figures 91.3 (up), and 91.4 (down)
Unknown make of 4X4 armoured vehicle



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704952787392487682/photo/1



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alkhanadeq2023/status/1704788669226168403>

Annex 92: EOSSs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 92.1 (up), and 92.2 (down)
Shafak EOSS



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1705240052878520524/photo/3>

Figure 92.3
Sadiq EOSS



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alidarawani/status/1704866265569882588/photo/4>

Figures 92.4 (up), and 92.5 (down)
Ofok EOSS



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1705240052878520524>



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704961058689957980/photo/2

Annex 93: Fast attack boats and WBIEDs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 93.1 (up), and 93.2 (down)

Aasef Fast attack boat



Source: <https://twitter.com/mikaelsyrian/status/1704842128151458125>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705281850732609764/photo/4

Figures 93.3 (up), and 93.4 (down)
Aasef-2 Fast attack boat




Source: <https://twitter.com/mikaelsyrian/status/1704842128151458125>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Figures 93.5 (up), and 93.6 (down)
Malah Fast attack boat



Source: <https://twitter.com/mikaelsyrian/status/1704842128151458125>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Figures 93.7 (up), and 93.8 (down)
Nazeer Fast attack boat



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705281850732609764/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKontz_/status/1704946001646162015/photo/1

Figure 93.9
Tawfan-1 USV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705281850732609764/photo/2

Figures 93.10 (up), and 93.11 (down)
Tawfan-2 USV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705281850732609764/photo/3



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Figures 93.12 (up), and 93.13 (down)
Tawfan-3 USV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704899823239831704/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Annex 94: Helicopters and fighter jet displayed by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 94.1

Mi-8, Mi-17 and Mi-171Sh helicopters displayed by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023



Source: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-flex-military-muscle-parade-riyadh-seeks-ceasefire-2023-09-21/>

Figure 94.2

Mi-171sh, Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters (from the left to the right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/MuradAbdo22/status/1704921947975397755/photo/1>

Figures 94.3 (up), 94.4 (middle), and 94.5 (down)
F5 fighter jet



Source: <https://twitter.com/MuradAbdo22/status/1704921947975397755/photo/3>



Source: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-flex-military-muscle-parade-riyadh-seeks-ceasefire-2023-09-21/>



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705656085686726784

Annex 95: Interview of General Rostam Ghasemi, Assistant Commander of the IRGC-QF, by the Russian media Russia Today and released on 21 April 2021 by Memri TV, where he announces the presence of military advisors in Yemen and the supply of weapons manufacturing technology.

Quds Force Official Rostam Ghasemi: Iran's Friends In The Region Have Retaliated Against Israel And Will Continue To Do So; We Have A Few Military Advisors In Yemen And Have Provided Weapon-Manufacturing Technology To The Yemenis



Source: Russia Today TV (Russia)

*Former Iranian Minister of Oil General Rostam Ghasemi, Assistant Commander of the IRGC-QF said that Israel is behind every sabotage operation around the world and in Iran and that Israel's actions will not go unanswered. He made these remarks in an interview with Russia Today TV that aired on April 21, 2021. General Ghasemi said that while Iran has "espoused a policy of patience and restraint," it has retaliated against Israel with the help of its "many friends in the region" and it will continue to do so. **He added that the Yemenis participated in retaliation against Israeli ships.** General Ghasemi continued to say that "all the weapons the Yemenis possess are a result of our aid." For more information about General Ghasemi, see MEMRI TV clip no. 7080.*

Rostam Ghasemi: "We believe that Israel plays a role in every sabotage operation around the world, and in Iran as well. The Zionist entity plays a role in every act of sabotage that is carried out in Iran. The Israelis know, as well they should, that any act will be met with retaliation. So far, Iran has espoused a policy of patience and restraint. Nevertheless, Iran has retaliated, and Israel will be met with more responses. If this entity carries out any action against Iran anywhere in the world, it will be met with retaliation at the appropriate time, and in a manner that will make it regret what it did. Israel should not think that we are necessarily the ones attacking its ships. We have many friends in the region, and they are the ones retaliating against Israel. They retaliated for those attacks. We have many friends in the region. They will not allow the Israeli actions to go unanswered."

Interviewer: "Are they retaliating on behalf of Iran?"

Ghasemi: "We have many friends in the region and the world. Israel knows, as well it should, that its actions will not go unanswered."

Interviewer: "Have the Yemenis retaliated on behalf of Iran in the Gulf of Oman, for example?"

Ghasemi: "The Yemenis are our friends, and they can easily retaliate, and this is what they are doing."

Interviewer: "Have they retaliated so far? And where?"

**Ghasemi: "Yes, they have retaliated, and some of it was published in the media.
[...]"**

"We are providing advisory aid to the Yemenis on a very small scale."

Interviewer: "Military advice?"

Ghasemi: "Limited military advice. All the weapons that the Yemenis possess are the result of our aid. We helped them with weapon-manufacturing technology, but the actual production of the weapons is done in Yemen. They produce the weapons themselves. These drones and missiles are made in Yemen."

Interviewer: "Are there military advisors in Yemen now?"

Ghasemi: "There is a small number. You can count them on the fingers of one hand."

Interviewer: "What is their mission?"

Ghasemi: "To give advice."

Interviewer: "Are you sending weapons to Yemen now?"

Ghasemi: "There is no need to send weapons."

[...]

"We do not feel threatened by some countries' normalization of relations with Israel. We are a strong country with enormous defensive capabilities. Therefore, this does not pose a direct threat to Iran. But we ask these Muslim and other countries to honour the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people. The Palestinians are still suffering from the Israeli persecution and occupation, and they are not happy about this normalization."

Sources:

مساعدة قائد فيلق القدس لـRT: الشعب اليمني يُقتل بأكثر الأسلحة تطورا على يد السعودية

<https://www.memri.org/tv/iran-gen-rostam-ghasemi-israel-knows-actions-not-unanswered-friends-retaliation-weapons-yemen>

Appendix A

Screen shots extracted from the interview of General Rostam Ghasemi, Assistant Commander of the IRGC-QF, by Russia Today









Annex 96: Statement by the Iranian forces' spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji published by the Iranian media Noor News on 22 September 2020 announcing the transfer of experiences in technology in the defence sphere, and sharing their experience and knowledge with the people of Yemen

Iran Has Supplied Yemen with Defence Knowhow

Publication Date: 9/22/2020 9:32:20 PM



NOURNEWS - A senior spokesman for the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces said the Islamic Republic has provided Yemenis with the experience and know-how in the defense sector.

Speaking at a televised program on Tuesday, Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi dismissed the claims that Iran has supplied missiles to Yemen.

“We provided them (Yemenis) with the experiences in technology in the defense sphere, as they have learned how to produce missiles, drones and weapons in Yemen by themselves,” he underlined. **“We have shared our experience and knowledge with the people of Yemen,”** the general added.

Unlike what the enemy is trying to portray, the people of Yemen are smart and sophisticated, as they have managed to manufacture missiles and advanced drones and make great headways in the electronic warfare, Shekarchi noted. The spokesman reiterated that Iran’s assistance for the regional countries is restricted to “spiritual presence and advisory help”.

“The resistance front countries have armies and forces themselves. **We provide them with advisory help. In order to share our experiences with the people of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, our experienced forces go there and give them intellectual assistance,** but this is the people and armies of those countries who stand against the enemies in practice,” he noted. The general finally emphasized that Iran would provide whatever help it can for any country standing against the Zionist regime and the US.

Due to the economic problems, Iran would not give anything to the others for free, he noted, saying the foreigners would make purchases.

In comments in October 2019, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Major General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri had underlined that Iran’s military officers only offer advisory assistance to popular forces in Yemen, rejecting reports that Tehran has supplied missiles to the impoverished Arab country.

Source: <https://nournews.ir/en/news/54058/Iran-Has-Supplied-Yemen-with-Defense-Know-How>

Annex 97: Statement by the Iranian forces' spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji published by the Russian media Russia Today on 22 September 2020 announcing the transfer of military technology to Yemen to make missiles and drones



إيران تعلن عن نقل تكنولوجيا عسكرية إلى اليمن لصناعة الصواريخ والطائرات المسيّرة

تاريخ النشر: 22.09.2020 | GMT 09:44 | آخر تحديث: 22.09.2020 | GMT 10:00 | أخبار العالم



77919 [انسخ الرابط](#)

تابعوا RT على [Google News](#)

قال المتحدث باسم القوات الإيرانية، أبو الفضل شكارجي، إن إيران نقلت تجربتها التكنولوجية في المجال الدفاعي إلى اليمن ليتمكن اليمنيون من صناعة الصواريخ والطائرات المسيّرة بأنفسهم.

وأكد المتحدث باسم القوات الإيرانية: "نحن لا نرسل الصواريخ إلى اليمن لكنهم باتوا يصنعونها بأنفسهم ليطلقوها على رؤوس أعدائهم".

وأضاف أن إيران تدعم الشعب اليمني والشعب الفلسطيني وكل من يصطف في مواجهة أمريكا وإسرائيل.

وأوضح أن الأوضاع الاقتصادية لا تسمح لنا بمنح كل شيء لحلفائنا مجاناً وهم يشترطون منا بعض الأشياء أحياناً، مشيراً إلى أن "الشعب اليمني ذكي ويمتلك خبراء كبار تمكنوا من صناعة طائرات مسيّرة متطورة في زمن قياسي ولم تتمكن جبهة الاستكبار من إخماد صوته".

المصدر: RT

تابعوا RT على [Google News](#)

Source: <https://arabic.rt.com/world/1156338-الصواريخ-و-الطائرات-المسيّرة-من-صناعة-الصواريخ-و-الطائرات-المسيّرة-1156338>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the statement by the Iranian forces' spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji published by the Russian media Russia Today on 22 September 2020 announcing the transfer of military technology to Yemen to make missiles and drones

Iran announces transfer of military technology to Yemen to make missiles and drones

Russia Today

22 September 2020

Iran has transferred its technological experience in the defense field to Yemen so that Yemenis can make their own missiles and drones, said Iranian forces spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji.

"We do not send missiles to Yemen, but they are now making them themselves to launch them on the heads of their enemies," the Iranian forces spokesman emphasized.

He added that Iran supports the Yemeni people, the Palestinian people and all those who stand against America and Israel.

"The economic situation does not allow us to give everything to our allies for free and they buy some things from us sometimes," he said, noting that "the Yemeni people are smart and have great experts who were able to make advanced drones in record time and the front of the oppression has not been able to silence their voice.

Annex 98: Statement by the Iranian Chief of Staff General Mohammad Bagheri published by the Tehran office of the Qatari media Al Jazeera on 2 October 2019 announcing the advisory support of Iran to the Houthis

أخبار الآن | أفريقيا | اقتصاد | ثقافة | رياضة | مقالات | صحة | فيديو | المزيد

سياسة | أسلحة ومعدات حربية | إيران

إيران تقر لأول مرة بدعم الحوثيين



اللواء باقرى يتوعد كل من ينوي تهديد أمن المنطقة (وكالات-أرشيف)

2/10/2019 |

احفظ المقالات لقراءتها لاحقاً وانشئ قائمة قراءتك

Source: <https://www.ajnet.me/politics/2019/10/2/إيران-تقر-لأول-مرة-بعدم-الحوثيين/>

*Appendix A***Unofficial translation of the statement by the Iranian Chief of Staff General Mohammad Bagheri published by the Tehran office of the Qatari media Al Jazeera on 2 October 2019 announcing the advisory support of Iran to the Houthis****Iran admits for the first time to supporting the Houthis**

General Bagheri threatens those who intend to threaten the security of the region (Agencies-Archive)

2/10/2019 by Al Jazeera Net-Tehran

For the first time since the outbreak of the war on Yemen in 2015, Iran has acknowledged that its Revolutionary Guards have provided "advisory and intellectual support" to its Houthi ally.

Iranian Chief of Staff General Mohammad Bagheri revealed his country's support for the Houthis in an interview with the Chinese TV station Phoenix, which was reported by the Iranian press. He emphasized that the situation in Yemen is somewhat different from the Iraqi and Syrian arenas.

"We went to Iraq and Syria at the request of their governments, and we provided advisory support, weapons and equipment, and the Revolutionary Guards were of course responsible for that mission," Bagheri said. He made no secret of the Iranian military's assistance to IRGC forces there.

Bagheri explained that Yemen today is under a blockade and all of its ports are closed, and that for some time there has been no possibility of even sending medicine to the country. He denied that his country had sent missiles to Yemen, asking, "How can large, meter-long missiles be sent to Yemen when medicine cannot be sent to Yemen?"

He emphasized that Iran's assistance to the Houthis is limited to advisory and intellectual aspects, revealing for the first time that the Revolutionary Guards have taken on this task, and stressed that the Islamic Republic will stand by the Yemeni people until they are able to remove this aggression from their country.

Tehran has always denied arming the Houthi group in Yemen, but the United States and Saudi Arabia accuse it of providing military support to the group, which General Bagheri has denied.

Ready for war

Asked about recent developments in Gulf waters and the possibility of a war in the region, the Iranian military commander said that Tehran has not and will not want to start wars in the region, and that it seeks more than others for peace and stability in the region.

He added that the Islamic Republic has not started a war for the past 300 years, and the Iranian people have not attacked any other country. He added that his country's interests in the Gulf region and the Strait of Hormuz are closely linked to the region's security, describing Iran as the most important and strongest country responsible for providing security in the region.

Bagheri said that his country wants security in the Gulf waters more than any other regional country, and that it does not want to participate in any war, but at the same time it will stand strong against anyone who intends to threaten the security of the region, stressing that Iran's enemies will not dare to launch a war against it because they know very well that their losses will outweigh the benefits, he said.

In another matter, the general stressed that his country's military relations with China are developing after the implementation of "strategic consensus" between them, revealing Tehran's intention to hold joint naval military exercises with Russia and China in the northern Indian Ocean and the southern Sea of Oman in December.

Last month, Bagheri paid an official visit to the Chinese capital Beijing at the head of a high-level military delegation at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart, which Iran announced at the time that his visit "comes within the framework of the strategy of defense and military diplomacy, to provide a platform to open a new page in cooperation and relations between the two countries."

Annex 99: Statement of the Houthis' military spokesman issued on 31 October 2023 claiming the attacks on Israel



**Spokesman of Yemeni armed forces
Yahya Sare'e**

Statement of Yemeni armed forces

With the help of God Almighty, our armed forces launched a large number of ballistic and winged missiles, as well as drones at various targets of the #Israeli enemy in the occupied territories.

2-The Yemeni Armed Forces confirm that this is the third operation in support of our oppressed brothers in #Palestine, and that the armed Forces will continue to carry out more qualitative missile and drone attacks until #Israel ceases its aggression.

3-The Yemeni Armed Forces confirm that this is the third operation in support of our oppressed brothers in #Palestine, and that the armed Forces will continue to carry out more qualitative missile and drone attacks until #Israel ceases its aggression.

4-We affirm that our Yemeni people's attitude on the Palestinian issue is firm and ethical, and that the #Palestinian people have the full right to self-defense and legitimate rights.

5-The #Zionist enemy entity's ongoing execution of crimes and killings against the people of #Gaza Strip and all of occupied Palestine destabilizes the region and extends the circle of conflict.

"The victory comes only from Allah"

Tuesday
16 Rabi' al-Thani 1445 AH
October 31, 2023 AD
Issued by the Yemeni Armed Forces

Source: « X » (previously Twitter) page of Yahya Saree, Houthi military spokesman

https://twitter.com/yahya_saree/status/1719356913740095608?s=46&t=DZ_VIGN4tnVNjoReUJutuQ&fbclid=IwAR3xawFqoQRpTY_T7BaNdyeVEPMN1PIWk4LT_vIwIqMrspilD6vvVu1cnk

Annex 100: Media reports/Messages by the Houthis preventing ships linked to, or heading to Israel from crossing the Indian Ocean

Figure 100.1

“X” message: Preventing ships linked to Israel from crossing the Indian Ocean

بيان صادر عن القوات المسلحة اليمنية
ريضان 19 مارس 2024م

قال تعالى: ﴿إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَ فِي سَبِيلِهِ صَفًا كَأَنَّهُمْ بِنَيْنٍ مُرْضُوعُونَ﴾ صدق الله العظيم

انتصاراً لمظلومية الشعب الفلسطيني وضمن الرد على العدوان الأمريكي البريطاني على بلدنا

نفذت القوات البحرية في القوات المسلحة اليمنية بعون الله تعالى عملية استهداف السفينة (Pacific 01) الإسرائيلية في البحر الأحمر وذلك بعدد من الصواريخ البحرية المناسبة.

فيما نفذ سلاح الجو المسمو بعملية استهداف محمزة أمريكية في البحر الأحمر وذلك بعدد من الطائرات المسييرة وقد حققت العملية أهدافها بنجاح بفضل الله.

وتفيداً لتوجيهات السيد القائد عبدالملك بدر الدين الحوثي "يحفظه الله" في الانتصار لمظلومية الشعب الفلسطيني الذي يتعرض للعدوان والحصار في قطاع غزة، واستجابة لنداءات أبناء الشعب اليمني وكل أحرار الأمة

بدأت القوات المسلحة اليمنية وبعون الله تعالى في توسيع نطاق عملياتها ضد السفن الإسرائيلية أو المرتبطة بالإسرائيليين أو المتجهة إلى موانئ فلسطين المحتلة لتشمل المحيط الهندي طريق رأس الرجاء الصالح.

وعليه.. فإن القوات المسلحة اليمنية تحذر كافة السفن الإسرائيلية أو المتجهة إلى موانئ فلسطين المحتلة أو القادمة منها بعدم المرور من طريق رأس الرجاء الصالح، ما لم فإنها ستكون هدفاً مشروعاً لقواتنا المسلحة.

إن القوات المسلحة اليمنية وفي إطار تنفيذ هذه التوجيهات انتصاراً للشعب الفلسطيني في غزة نفذت بعون الله تعالى ثلاث عمليات ضد ثلاث سفن إسرائيلية وأمريكية في المحيط الهندي وذلك بعدد من الصواريخ البحرية المناسبة والطائرات المسييرة وقد حققت العمليات الثلاث أهدافها بنجاح.

إن القوات المسلحة اليمنية تؤكد أنها لن تتوقف عن منع الملاحة الإسرائيلية أو المتجهة إلى موانئ فلسطين المحتلة في البحرين الأحمر والهندي وكذلك المحيط الهندي إلا عند إيقاف العدوان ورفع الحصار عن إخواننا في قطاع غزة.

والله حسبنا ونعم الوكيل، نعم المولى ونعم النصير

www.sabaye

God Almighty said: (Indeed, God loves those who are killed in His cause in rows, as if they were children closely packed together) God Almighty has spoken the truth.

A victory for the oppression of the Palestinian people and a response to the American-British aggression against our country

The naval forces of the Yemeni Armed Forces, with the help of God Almighty, carried out an operation to target the Israeli ship (Pacific-01) in the Red Sea with a number of suitable naval missiles.

Meanwhile, the Air Force carried out an operation to target an American destroyer in the Red Sea with a number of drones, and the operation successfully achieved its goals, thanks to God.

In implementation of the directives of Commander Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, “may God protect him,” to triumph over the oppression of the Palestinian people who are subjected to aggression and siege in the Gaza Strip, and in response to the calls of the people of the Yemeni people and all the free people of the nation.

The Yemeni Armed Forces, with the help of God Almighty, have begun to expand the scope of their operations against Israeli ships, those linked to Israel, or those heading to the ports of occupied Palestine, to include the Indian Ocean Cape of Good Hope Road.

Accordingly, the Yemeni armed forces warn all Israeli ships heading to or coming from the ports of occupied Palestine not to pass through the Cape of Good Hope, unless they will be a target.

A project for our armed forces.

The Yemeni Armed Forces, within the framework of implementing these directives to achieve victory for the Palestinian people in Gaza, carried out, with the help of God Almighty, three operations against three Israeli and American ships in the Indian Ocean, using a number of suitable naval missiles and drones.

The three operations successfully achieved their goals. The Yemeni armed forces confirm that they will not stop preventing navigation Israeli or destined for the ports of occupied Palestine in the Red and Arab Seas, as well as the Indian Ocean, except when the aggression is stopped, and the siege imposed on our brothers in the Gaza Strip.

God is sufficient for us, and He is the best disposer of affairs, the best protector, and the best helper

Source: <https://twitter.com/aminhayyan/status/1768615485011042357>

Figure 100.2

Media report: Preventing ships linked to Israel from crossing the Indian Ocean**Yemen imposes new equation by escalating its operations against enemy ships in Indian Ocean**

[17/March/2024]

SANA'A March 17 2024 (Saba) - With the announcement by the leader of the nation and the man of words and deeds, al-Sayeed Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, preventing ships linked to the Zionist enemy from crossing the Indian Ocean, in the direction adjacent to South Africa and the Good Hope Road, Yemen enters a new phase of confrontation with the American-British-Zionist enemy, which has

crossed all borders with what it is committing of horrific crimes against the Palestinian people.

Yemen's entry into the battle of the "Al-Aqsa Flood", since its launch last October, was not a luxury or absurdity, but imposed by the current stage in order to support and assist the Palestinian people, which subjected to an unprecedented war of annihilation in contemporary history by the forces of hegemony and arrogance led by America, Britain and the Zionist entity.

The Yemeni escalation of preventing the passage of ships linked to the Zionist enemy, even through the Indian Ocean, was previously prefaced by the Commander a few days ago when he affirmed that "there are surprises and the expansion of the circle of operations in places that the enemies do not expect, in an effective manner," and here the surprises being realized today and being translated into In fact, through the operations announced by the armed forces regarding targeting enemy ships in the Indian Ocean.

Based on the religious, moral and humanitarian principle of the Yemeni people, to come to the rescue of the oppressed and to support the nation's issues, foremost among which is the Palestinian issue, it necessary for Yemen to fight the battle of "the promised conquest and holy jihad" launched by the Leader through a progressive strategy to deter the arrogance of the American-British-Zionist enemy and its persistence in committing bloody massacres in Gaza.

As long as the Zionist enemy continues to unjustly shed the blood of children, women and civilians in Gaza, the Yemenis will be more enthusiastic and jealous in revenge and victory for the blood of the Palestinians, which what the leader of the revolution confirmed in his speech on Thursday evening by saying: "Our human conscience, our religion, our morals, our dignity, our pride." Our affiliation to Islam prohibits us from watching the oppression of Palestine or remaining silent about it, the siege and starvation of the people of Gaza must be stopped, and the tragedy of children dying of starvation in the Strip must be stopped."

Al-Sayeed Commander sent clear messages and warnings to the American and British enemy that "Washington and London have no choice but to stop their support for the Zionist entity, end the aggression and starvation of the people of Gaza, and bring medicine and food to the residents of the Gaza Strip, who have been dying of murder and starvation for 160 days."

With the honorable and supportive Yemeni position for the Palestinian people and their just cause, Yemen charts a new history for the region away from guardianship, subordination, and dependence on the forces of hegemony and global arrogance, marking the beginning of a new era in which Yemen becomes an effective regional force on the international scene, unlike what it in previous stages.

M.M

----- SABA

Source: Houthi affiliated media <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3313771.htm>

Annex 101: Article published on 14 April 2024 by the Iranian media Tasnim News stating that the 13 April 2024 attack on Israel was conducted from Iran, Yemen, Hezbollah, and the Iraqi resistance

خبرگزاری تسنیم



حمله چهاروجهی و پیچیده ایران به اسرائیل

۲۶ فروردین ۱۴۰۳ - ۰۲:۱۷ | اخبار سیاسی | اخبار نظامی | دفاعی | امنیتی

- Ti +



عملیات گسترده سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی علیه اسرائیل پاسخی پیچیده چندوجهی و هوشمندانه به جنایات اخیر اسرائیل است.

به گزارش گروه سیاسی خبرگزاری تسنیم، حمله امروز به اسرائیل که در پاسخ به تجاوز این رژیم به سوریه و شهادت چندتن از فرماندهان نظامی ایرانی انجام شده، در نوع خود بسیار پیچیده است.

در این حمله از ترکیبی از صدها پهپاد و تعداد زیادی از موشک از انواع مختلف استفاده شده است، مهمتر اینکه این حمله فقط از ایران صورت نگرفته است و از چهار جهت این رژیم درحال تنبیه است.

بیشتر بخوانید

- اصابت دهها فروند موشک سپاه به اهدافی در سرزمین‌های اشغالی
- شاهد ۱۳۶ پهپاد انتحاری سپاه علیه اسرائیل را بشناسید

غیر از ایران، یمن از جنوب، حزب‌الله لبنان از شمال و مقاومت عراق از شرق سرزمین‌های اشغالی نیز ترکیبی از ابزارهای جنگی خود را به سمت سرزمین‌های اشغالی شلیک کرده‌اند.

رسانه‌های غربی ادعان دارند که سامانه‌های پدافندی رژیم صهیونیستی قادر به خنثی‌کردن این حمله پیچیده نیستند. تنبیه متجاوز در جریان است و در صورتی که اسرائیل حرکت نامعقولی انجام دهد تنبیه تشدید می‌شود.

انتهای پیام/+

Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1403/01/26/3067881>

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Appendix A

Iran's four-pronged and complex attack on Israel (Iranian media Tasnim news, 14 April 2024)

The extensive operation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps against Israel is a complex, multifaceted and intelligent response to Israel's recent crimes.

According to the political group of Tasnim News Agency, today's attack on Israel, which was carried out in response to the aggression of this regime in Syria and the martyrdom of several Iranian military commanders, is very complicated in its kind.

In this attack, a combination of hundreds of UAVs and a large number of missiles of various types were used, more importantly, this attack was not carried out only from Iran, and this regime is being punished from four directions.


Apart from Iran, Yemen from the south, Hezbollah of Lebanon from the north and the Iraqi resistance from the east of the occupied territories have also fired a combination of their war tools towards the occupied territories.

Western media admit that the defense systems of the Zionist regime are not able to neutralize this complex attack. Punishment of the aggressor is ongoing, and if Israel makes an unreasonable move, the punishment will be intensified

Annex 102: Houthi MRBM “Palestine” launched on 3 June 2024 against Israel

Figures 102.1 (top), 102.2 (middle), and 102.3 (down)

Screenshots extracted from a video presented by the Houthis of the launch on 3 June 2024 of an MRBM called “Palestine” against Israel




Source:

https://x.com/amirigm/status/1798447207080702086?s=46&t=DZ_VIGN4tnVNjoReUJutuQ&fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR10CHK5GluNAYWXP37msyOyDatZBnhAUydohdtvF1VPxVP_OLjUtzAGF0_aem_ATZdu8YyY_qv0JJcL_Lts83jIvj4Nr9o6WTDqscv1ImxobBCfNQ82UcLcQtuKPV6jOR6Bm7bPFqA5WVB-Kxt707J

Figure 102.4

3 June 2024 attack against Israel claimed by the Houthis on their military media “MMY.YE”




MMY.YE

Source:

https://x.com/amirigm/status/1798447207080702086?s=46&t=DZ_VIGN4tnVNjoReUJutuQ&fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR10CHK5GluNAYWXP37msyOyDatZBnhAUydohdtvF1VPxVP_OLjUtzAGF0_aem_ATZdu8YyY_qv0JJcL_Lts83jlvj4Nr9o6WTDqscv1ImxobBCfNQ82UcLcQtuKPV6jOR6Bm7bPFqA5WVB-Kxt707J

Appendix A

Unofficial translation



Annex 103: Houthi OWA-UAV “Jaffa” launched on 19 July 2024 against Israel

Figures 103.1 (top), and 103.2 (down)

Display of the OWA-UAV “Jaffa” by the Houthis



Source: <https://english.iswnews.com/35712/yemeni-armed-forces-release-images-of-jaffa-suicide-drone/>


Figure 103.3

Debris of a wing of the OWA-UAV lying on the street of Tel Aviv, Israel




Source: <https://x.com/Mdais/status/1814137740646035588/photo/1>

Figure 103.4
MADO MD275 engine recovered from the impact site



Source: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1814226067818717563/photo/1

Figure 103.5
Amateur picture of a MADO MD275 engine taken during the fifth Iranian National Aerospace Exhibition held in October 2014 at Mehrabad International Airport, Tehran



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2014/11/>

Annex 104: Scenes of the launching of a Hatem 2 hypersonic ballistic missile allegedly targeting the Israeli ship MSC Sarah V presented on “X” by the Houthi military media “MMY.YE”

Figure X.1

Presentation of the *Hatem 2* by the Houthis



Hatem 2 ballistic missile
 Intelligent control system
 Manoeuvrability
 Hypersonic speed
 The fuel type is solid
 It has several generations with different ranges
 Made in Yemen MIC

Figures 104.2 (left), 104.3 (center), 104.4 (right), and 104.5 (below)
Sequence of the launching and close-up of the military warhead



Source: <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1806038330993226140>

Annex 105: Press article dated 19 November 2019 from the Yemeni pro-Houthi media YPA highlighting Ibrahim Al-Dailami's presentation of the credentials as Houthi-affiliated Ambassador to the Iranian President



Yemeni ambassador in Tehran delivers credentials to Iranian President

Last updated Nov 19, 2019 5:49 PM



TEHRAN, Nov. 19 (YPA) – Yemeni Ambassador to Tehran Ibrahim Mohammed al-Dailami on Tuesday delivered his credentials to President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Hassan Rouhani.

At the delivery of credentials, al-Dailami conveyed greetings of President of the Supreme Political Council Mahdi al-Mashat to President Rouhani.

President Rouhani reaffirmed, during the meeting, his country's unwavering stance in support of Yemen and its support for a political solution.

Source: <https://en.yagency.net/142948>

Annex 106: Press article dated 22 December 2019 from the Iranian media Al-Alam regarding a meeting between Ibrahim Al-Dailami, as Houthis-affiliated Ambassador in Iran, and Brigadier-General Amir Hatami, Iranian Defence Minister

فارسى كيف تشاهد العالم قناة العالم الرئيسية آخر الأخبار طوفان الأقصى العالم العربي إيران العالم فيديو مقالات

سفير اليمن بطهران يلتقي وزير الدفاع الإيراني



الادد ٢٢ ديسمبر ٢٠١٩ - ٠٨:٢٣ بتوقيت غرينتش

بحث سفير اليمن لدى طهران إبراهيم الديلمي اليوم مع وزير الدفاع الإيراني العميد أمير حاتمي، سبل تعزيز التعاون المشترك بين البلدين في المجالات العسكرية.

العالم - اليمن

وفي اللقاء نقل سفير اليمن، تحيات وزير الدفاع اللواء الركن محمد العاطفي ورئيس هيئة الأركان اللواء الركن محمد الغماري لوزير الدفاع الإيراني.. مشيداً بعلاقات التعاون التي تربط البلدين على مختلف الأصعدة والموقف الإيراني تجاه العدوان على اليمن.

بدوره حمل العميد حاتمي، السفير الديلمي نقل تحياته لوزير الدفاع ورئيس هيئة الأركان العامة.. مشيراً إلى ضرورة تعزيز وتمتين العلاقة بين الجيشين الإيراني واليمني.

وأكد وزير الدفاع الإيراني، دعم إيران للحل السياسي في اليمن وأن يترك لليمنيين تحديد مستقبل بلادهم.

Source: <https://www.alalam.ir/news/4629456>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation

Today, the Yemeni Ambassador to Tehran, Ibrahim Al-Dailami, discussed with the Iranian Minister of Defence, Brigadier-General Amir Hatami, ways to enhance joint cooperation between the two countries in the military fields.

In the meeting, the Yemeni ambassador conveyed the greetings of the Minister of Defense, Major General Mohammed Al-Atefi and the Chief of Staff, Major General Mohammed Al-Ghamari, to the Iranian Minister of Defense, praising the cooperation relations that bind the two countries at various levels and the Iranian position towards the aggression against Yemen.

In turn, Brigadier General Hatami asked Ambassador Al-Dailami to convey his greetings to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, pointing out the necessity of strengthening the relationship between the Iranian and Yemeni armies.


The Iranian Defense Minister affirmed Iran's support for a political solution in Yemen and that it would be left to the Yemenis to determine the future of their country.

Annex 107: Maritime smuggling of missile components

Figure 107.1
Dhow intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figure 107.2
Intercepted material



Source: <https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1747214405291716688>

Inventory of the materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024

Type of materiel intercepted	Quantity
ASCM air intake cabine	1
ASCM engine	1
ASCM fin	2
ASCM warhead	1
LACM jet engine	1
SRBM engine	5
SRBM turbo pump assemblies	4
SRBM sets	2
SRBM missile parts	1
Radar antenna assembly	2
Surveillance thermal camera	14


Source: US

Figure 107.3

Air intake cabin, *Ghadir* ASCM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figures 107.4 (left), and 107.5 (right)



Figures 107.6 (left), and 107.7 (right)





Figure 107.8

Close-up on the sticker



Source: US

Figure 107.9
Booster, *Ghadir* ASCM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figure 107.10



Figures 107.11 (left), and 107.12 (right)
Markings and sticker on the materiel



Source: US


Figures 107.13 (left), and 107.14 (right)
Fins, Ghadir LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figure 107.15



Figure 107.16
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.17 (up), 107.18 (middle), and 107.19 (down)
Warhead, Ghadir LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024





Figure 107.20
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.21 (up), and 107.22 (down)
Toloue 10 jet engine of « 351 » LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figure 107.23
Rating plate



Model T10-S
S/N: 10278
Manufacturing date: 2022.08 (August 2022)
Take-off power: 110

Figure 107.24
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.25 (up), and 107.26 (down)
Exciter unit of a “351” LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024





Figure 107.27
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.28 (left), and 107.29 (right)
Engines, *Qiam-2* SRBM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figures 107.30 (left), and 107.31 (right)



Figure 107.32
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.33 (left), 107.34 (right), and 107.35 (down)
Turbopump assembly, *Qiam-2* SRBM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024




Figure 107.36
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 107.37
Radar of unidentified model intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figures 107.38 (left), and 107.39 (right)
Close up on the sticker and barcode



Source: US

Figures 107.40 (up), 107.41 (middle), and 107.42 (down)
Radar of unidentified model intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024





Figure 107.43
Marking on the materiel



P.N: PEP.10.06.1
S.N:01040107

Figure 107.44
Sticker on the materiel




Source: US

Annex 108: Dahua DH-TPC-PT8620A-B thermal vision devices intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024

Quantity documented: 14

Figure 108.1



Figures 108.2 (left), and 108.3 (right)



Figure 108.4



Figure 108.5
Factory markings and barcode present on the materiel



Figure 108.6



P/N: 1.0.01.34.11061/0016
MAC: 08 ED ED 2
S/N:
MADE IN CHINA Date: 2019-12
ZHEJIANG DAHUA VISION TECHNOLOGY CO.
LTD

Figure 108.7
Close up of the packaging



Source: US

Figure 108.8

Commercial presentation of the materiel

Ultra Series| DH-TPC-PT8620A-B

**DH-TPC-PT8620A-B**

Thermal Network Hybrid Pan & Tilt Camera



- 640x512 VOx uncooled thermal sensor technology
- Athermalized Lens(thermal), Focus-free
- 1/1.9" 2Megapixel progressive scan Sony CMOS
- Powerful 30x optical zoom
- Support fire detection & alarm
- Max 160°/s pan speed, 360° endless pan rotation
- Up to 300 presets, 5 auto scan, 8 tour, 5 pattern
- 7/2 alarm in/out
- Micro SD memory, IP67



Source: https://www.cctvdahua.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/DH-TPC-PT8620A-B_Datasheet_20180508.pdf

Annex 109: Black plastic tubular container used to hide materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024 by US

Figure 109.1

Black plastic tubular container used to hide materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024 by the US



Source: US


Annex 110: Similarities of the materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024 with materiel produced by Iran

Figure 110.1
Air intake cabin, *Ghadir* ASCM



Source: US

Figure 110.2
Air intake cabin, *Ghadir* ASCM of Iranian production



Source: <https://english.iswnews.com/13279/military-knowledge-ghadir-cruise-missile-images/>

Figure 110.3
Stabilizer, *Ghadir* ASCM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024




Source: US

Figure 110.4
Stabilizer, *Ghadir* ASCM of Iranian production



Source: <https://english.iswnews.com/13279/military-knowledge-ghadir-cruise-missile-images/>

Figure 110.5
War head, *Ghadir* ASCM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 110.6
War head, *Ghadir* ASCM of Iranian production



Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/01/27/2696464>

Figure 110.7

Rating plate of the *Toloue 10* LACM Jet engine intercepted by US on 11 January 2024



**Model T10-S
S/N: 10278
Manufacturing date: 2022.08 (August 2022)
Take-off power: 110**

Source: US

Figure 110.8


Rating plate of the *Toloue 10* LACM Jet engine intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran ([S/2023/833](#), paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37)



**Model T10-S
S/N: 10192
Manufacturing date: 2021.11 (November 2021)
Take-off power: 110**

Source: UK

Figures 110.9 (up), and 110.10 (down)
 Exciter unit of “351” LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 110.11
 Exciter unit of a “351” LACM intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2023/833, paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37)



Source: UK

Figure 110.12

Barcode sticker “MMG 10550”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 110.13

Barcode sticker “MMG 10906”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on a satellite antenna intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2023/833, paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37)



Source: UK

Figure 110.14
Black plastic tubular container intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figure 110.15
Black plastic tubular container used to hide 9M133 ATGM missiles. These missiles were documented on a dhow interdicted on 6 May 2021 (S/2022/50, paras. 64-66, and figures XII, and 20.30)



The Panel notes that among the materiel intercepted, the presence of AM-50 anti-material rifles and the RPG-7 launchers have technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and POSP sights produced in Belarus. Belarus informed the Panel that they had been exported to the Islamic Republic of Iran between June 2016 and April 2018 and that that country had provided an end-user certificate stating that they would be used exclusively for the needs of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics.

Source: US

Annex 111: Maritime smuggling of lethal material and surveillance equipment

Figure 111.1

Dhow intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.2

Intercepted material



Source: <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/IMAGERY/igphoto/2003394784/>


Inventory of the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024

Type of materiel intercepted	Quantity
UUV nose cone	1
UUV propeller	1
UUV fins	4
UUV part with wiring harness	1
UUV components	2
UUV housing cover	1
UUV plastic components	1
UUV battery	7
UUV various cables	7
UUV extender	1
UUV connecting arms	82
UUV hardware	1
UUV lead weight	12
UUV mounting bracket	2
Gold small bracket	20
Tube with mounting bracket	4
Cables	3
Camera	3
Drone DJI Air 2S	1
Three port black connector box	3
Seven connector black box	21
Electrical connector	104
Back connector wire with magnet	100
White box PN: ADC-PLS-002	24
White plastic wire connector box small	240
White box with 4 connector ports	1
White metal box with connector ports and cooling fans	1
Black box PN: SSG 2918	60
Black Levin box	80
Black exciter box	3
Black IMU Connector box	2
Black connector box with wire	1
Black box with low pressure hose	1
Green and white electric box	14
Green connector cylinder APSIN-5	12
Green electric box	2
Green box HP line	8
Large green box with connector ports	2
Silver electric box	4
Apex APhone 6M	80
Satphone	76
GPS box (with 6 components bags in each)	82
Navico Lowrance Broadband radio	14
Electric motor	1
Electric squib	80
Non-electric primer	90
Power station	2
Ground power supply	1
Lithium Ultra cap charging bank black	15
Three stage battery charger	32
HDC 130P charge bank with Laptop	1
S&A tester	8
Black battery unit	20
Zixel charger	218
PTP 50650 integrated ODU	3
Gas transfer tubing	4
Cables	3
Electrical connector	2
Large electrical connector	117
Various connector	85
Pile of various cable	1
Circuit board	2
Hard drive	7
Network box	2

Small electric box	2
Multi connector with HP line	2
Computer server tray	2
Masterview Max computer	1
Green rackmount computer	1
Portable computer with screen	1
Lenovo ThinkPad laptop	1
Machined rings	3
Machining parts of various size	11
120mm machining parts	6
81mm machining parts	6
SPG machining parts	6
Rail mount	7
Explosive packaging	11
Dehlavieh ATGM Safe and fire mount	17
Dehlavieh ATGM Sight	17
Dehlavieh ATGM Bracket	17
Dehlavieh ATGM Mount	17
Dehlavieh ATGM Stand legs	51
Metal pipe with connector cable	13
Motor assembly with bake light	13
Steel components	3
Steel plate with electrical boxes attached	1
Alternator	1
Flange assembly	1
Flange assembly steel and plastic	1
Metal assembly with gear	1

Source: US

Figures 111.3 (left), and 111.4 (right)
Components of Dehlahvieh launching post (ATGM) intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.5 (left), and 111.6 (right)



Figures 111.7 (left), and 111.8 (right)



Figure 111.9
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.10
SPG machining part intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.11 (left), and 111.12 (right)
120mm mortar machining part intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.13
81 mm mortar machining part intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 111.14 (left), 111.15 (right), and 111.16 (down)
23mm machining part intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 111.17
Power bank intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.18 (left), and 111.19 (right)
Stickers on the materiel





Source: US

Figures 111.20 (up), and 111.21 (down)
UUV component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.22 (left), and 111.23 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.24 (up), and 111.25 (down)
UUV component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.26 (left), 111.27 (middle), and 111.28 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.29 (up), and 111.30 (down)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024





Figure 111.31
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.32 (up), and 111.33 (down)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024





Figure 111.34
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.35 (up), and 111.36 (down)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024





Figure 111.37
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.38 (up), and 111.39 (down)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024





Figure 111.40
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.41 (left), and 111.42 (right)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.43 (left), and 111.44 (right)



Figure 111.45
Marking on the materiel



Figures 111.46 (left), and 111.47 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figure 111.48
SRBM pressure switches intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.49 (left), and 111.50 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.51 (up), and 111.52 (down)
SRBM guidance & control related component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.53
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.54
SRBM actuator intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figure 111.55
Sticker on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.56 (up), 111.57 (middle), and 111.58 (down)
SRBM jet vane control system intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.59
Sticker on the materiel




Source: US

Figure 111.60
SRBM jet vane control system component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.61
Sticker apposed on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.62
SRBM Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.63 (left), and 111.64 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.65 (up), and 111.66 (down)
Unidentified materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.67 (left), and 111.68 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figure 111.69
Wooden crate containing GPS antennas intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.70 (left), and 111.71 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.72 (left), and 111.73 (right)
GPS antennas intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.74 (left), and 111.75 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Figures 111.76 (left), 111.77 (center), and 111.78 (right)



Figures 111.79 (left), 111.80 (middle), and 111.81 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US


Figures 111.82 (left),and 111.83 (right)
GPS antennas intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.84 (left),and 11.85 (right)



Figures 111.86 (left), 111.87 (middle), and 111.88 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.89 (left), and 111.90 (right)
Levin connector intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.91 (left), and 111.92 (right)




Figure 111.93
Sticker on the materiel




Source: US


Figures 111.94 (left), and 111.95 (right)
Unidentified materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.96
Marking on the materiel



Figures 111.97 (left), 111.98 (middle), 111.99 (right), and 111.100 (down)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.101
SRBM battery intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.102 (left), and 111.103 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.104
SRBM batteries intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.105
Markings on the materiel



Figure 111.106
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.107
SRBM guidance and control related components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.108 (left), and 111.109 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US


Figures 111.110 (up), and 111.111 (down)
Component of SRBM jet vane control system intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.112 (left), and 111.113 (right)



Figures 111.114 (left), and 111.115 (right)
Stickers on the material




Source: US

Figures 111.116 (up), 111.117 (middle), and 111.118 (down)
Computer intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.119
Sticker on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.120 (up), and 111.121 (down)
S&A tester intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.122 (left), and 111.123 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.124 (up), 111.125 (middle), and 111.126 (down)
EOSS component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.127 (left), and 111.128 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.129
EOSS component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.130
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.131 (up), and 111.132 (down)
Unidentified materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figure 111.133
Marking on the materiel




Figure 111.134
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.135 (up), and 111.136 (down)
USB sampler module intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.137
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.138 (up), and 111.139 (down)
Telephone station intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figure 111.140
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.141 (up), and 111.142 (down)
Lowrance maritime radar intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 111.143 (up), and 111.144 (down)
DJI Air 2 drone intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 111.145 (up), and 111.146 (down)
Bags containing explosive intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.147
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Annex 112: Stickers documented on the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024

Most of the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024 is covered by a sticker containing two lines of information, established on similar mode of sequence.



Figure 112.1: Dehlavieh ATGM



Figure 112.2: S&A tester



Figure 112.3: Component of SRBM




Figure 112.4: SRBM GPS antenna




Figure 112.5: Component of a UUV



Figure 112.6: Explosive



Figure 112.7: Power bank



Figure 112.8: Telephone station

Source: US

Annex 113: Quality control (QC) stickers of four different models observed by the Panel

The stickers presented on figures 113.1, 113.2 and 113.3, have already been documented on materiel previously intercepted.

Figure 113.1
QC model 1



Figure 113.2
QC model 2



Figure 113.3
QC model 3



Figure 113.4
QC model 4



Source: US


Annex 114: Similarities of the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024 with materiel produced by Iran

Figure 114.1
Camouflage cover of the localisator of one of the Dehlavieh ATGM intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 114.2
Camouflage cover with similar pattern on the localisator of a Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Iran



Source: <https://en.topwar.ru/225366-ot-kopirovanija-do-samostojatelnoj-razrabotki-inostrannye-korni-iranskih-ptrk.html> (extracted from the Iranian News Agency *Mizan*)

Figure 114.3
Camouflage cover with similar pattern on the localisator of a Dehlavieh ATGM operated by Hezbollah



Source: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/209264/Hezbollah-strikes-various-Israeli-bases-on-Lebanese-borders> (Iranian News Agency « Mehr News)

Figure 114.4


SRBM pressure switches intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024 (respectively marked “TGU.D036”, JAU.D535”, JAU.D540”, “JAU.D546”, “JAU.D549”, and LOU.D520”)



Source: US

Figure 114.5

Similar markings observed on the pressure switches documented on *Borkan-3* debris from attack on 7 Mar 2021 on Damman, KSA (marked “PDU.L068”)



Source: Confidential

Figure 114.6


Similar pressure switches documented on an Iranian *Qiam-2* debris from the attack on 8 January 2020 on a US base in Erbil, Iraq (respectively marked “GNU.D047” and “GNU.D048”) (S/2018/594, para. 90)



Source: Confidential

Figures 114.7 (left), and 114.8 (right)


“Q.A Passed” sticker apposed on component of SRBM jet vane control system (left) and guidance and control system component (right) intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 114.9 (left), and 114.10 (right)

“Q.A Passed” sticker apposed on SRBM components (left), and IMU (right) intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US


Figure 114.11

Similar “Q.A Passed” sticker on a component of the Iranian *Qiam* SRBM intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2023/833, paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37).



Source: UK

Figures 114.12 (left) and 114.13 (right)
SRBM actuators of jet vane control system component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Source: US

Figure 114.14
SRBM actuators of jet vane control system at the inauguration of the Permanent Exhibition of Achievements and Capabilities of the IRGC's Aerospace Division, Tehran, Iran, on 27 September 2020




Source: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:National_Aerospace_Park_opening_ceremony_\(059\).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:National_Aerospace_Park_opening_ceremony_(059).jpg) (Extracted from the Iranian news agency “Fars”)

Figure 114.15
SRBM guidance and control related components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 114.16
SRBM guidance and control related components-of an Iranian *Qiam-2* debris from the attack on 8 January 2020 on a US base in Erbil, Iraq



Source: Confidential

Figure 114.17
SRBM guidance & control related component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 114.18
SRBM guidance and control related component-of an Iranian *Qiam-2* debris from the attack on 8 January 2020 on a US base in Erbil, Iraq



Source: US

Figure 114.19
Barcode sticker “MMG 10942” observed on the component of an EOSS intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 114.20
Barcode sticker “MMG 10943”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US


Figure 114.21
Barcode sticker “MMG 10978”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 114.22


Barcode sticker “MMG 10906”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on a satellite antenna intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2023/833, paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37)



Source: Panel


Figure 114.23 (left), and 114.24 (right)

Nose cone of an UUV intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 114.25 (up), and 114.26 (down)
UUVs with similar nose cone displayed early 2022 by the IRGC Navy



Source: <https://en.mehrnews.com/photo/184946/IRGC-naval-forces-receive-new-defensive-equipment>

Annex 115: Material seized since 12 March 2023 by the GoY Customs

Figure 115.1

29 drones jamming devices seized at Shahren border post on 1 January 2024




Figure 115.2

Four Starlink satellite dishes and associate material seized at Shahren border post in December 2023



Source: GoY customs

Figure 115.3
 1,560 Kalashnikov spare-parts seized in Aden free zone custom port on 23 November 2023



Figure 115.4
 Two Yamaha motors for boat seized at Al-Wadeeah Customs port on 26 November 2023



Source: GoY customs

Figure 115.5
 20 anti-drone jammers seized at Shahren border post on 22 October 2023



Figure 115.6
 12 military walkie-talkies and 6 cartons of cables and antennas seized at Shahren border post on 12 August 2023



Source: GoY customs

Figure 115.7
 Communication devices and tools seized at Shahan border post on 17 July 2023




Figure 115.8
 4,956 laser devices to be adapted on SALWs seized at Shahan border post on 25 June 2023



Source: GoY customs

Figure 115.9
5,175 pistol holsters and 498 binoculars seized at Aden Free zone customs port on 21 May 2023




Figure 115.10
54 drones seized at Aden Free zone customs port on 12 March 2023



Source: GoY customs

Annex 116: Components of AK-47 and G3 or MP5 intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 116.1 (left) and 116.2 (right)
AK-47 assault rifle parts



Figure 116.3
G3 rifle parts




Source: Panel

Annex 117: Tactical rails and equipment for SALW intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 117.1 (left) and 117.2 (right)
Tactical rails for AK-47 assault rifle



Figures 117.3 (left) and 117.4 (right)
Tactical rails for SALW



Figures 117.5 (left) and 117.6 (right)
Glock pistol customized parts



Source: Panel

Annex 118: Sniper scopes intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 118.1 (up), 118.2 (middle), and 118.3 (down)
CODL 3-9x42 sniper scopes concealed in a metal box



Source: Panel

Annex 119: Rifle scopes intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 119.1 (left), and 119.2 (right)
M9 LS3 3-10x42 Rifle scopes with laser sight



Figures 119.3 (up), and 119.4 (down)
M9 LS3 3-10x42 Rifle scopes with laser sight



Source: Panel

Annex 120: Red dot holographic sights intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 120.1 (left), 120.2 (right), and 120.3 (down)
Model 552 Red dot holographic sights



Source: Panel

Annex 121: Communication devices intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figure 121.1
VHF radio Motorola K9



Source: Panel

Figures 121.2 (left) and 121.3 (right)
VHF radio Motorola MT777R



Source: Panel

Figure 121.4
VHF radio Motorola DP4800



Source: Panel

Figures 121.5 (up), and 121.6 (down)
VHF station Motorola DM4600e



Source: Panel

Figure 121.7
VHF station Hytera RD985



Source: Panel

Annex 122: Case study N° 1, “Glock store” armory located in Sana’a

Figure 122.1

Profile of the “Glock store” visible on “X”

جلوك ستور للمهمات العسكرية

@GlocStore

تعتبر شركة جلوك ستور متجر رائد في توفير الاسلحة الشخصية والفردية في الجمهورية اليمنية وهي شركة مرخصة بشكل رسمي كأول شركة متخصصة 777-754-232

Translated from Arabic by Google

Glock Store is a leading store in the provision of personal and individual weapons in the Republic of Yemen, and it is an officially licensed company as the first Specialized Inc. 232-754-777



جلوك ستور للمهمات العسكرية
@GlocStore

يعتبر السلاح في كثير من الدول خصوصاً بلادنا جزءاً لا يتجزأ من الثقافة والعادات والتقاليد اليمنية فهناك انواع للسلاح أو مايسمى ب السلاح الأبيض و السلاح الشخصي والذي يرتبط بعراقة تاريخنا منذ القدم و الشخصية اليمنية

صور من معرض جلوك ستور اليمن صنعاء شارع الزبيري

Translated from Arabic by Google

Weapons are considered in many countries, especially our country, as an integral part of the Yemeni culture, customs and traditions. There are types of weapons or what is called white weapons and personal weapons, which are linked to the ancient history of our history and the Yemeni character.

Pictures from Glock Store, Yemen, Sana'a, Al-Zubairi Street

Video presenting the “Glock store” armory: <https://twitter.com/GlocStore/status/1629947785729417218>

Figures 122.2 (left) and 123.3 (right)

Some material presented for sale at “Glock store”



Figures 122.4 (left) and 122.5 (right)
Some material presented for sale at “Glock store”



Figures 122.6 (up) and 122.7 (down)
Some material presented for sale at “Glock store”



Source: <https://twitter.com/GlocStore/status/1594090810852925440/photo/1>

SALWs observed by the Panel as presented for sale by the “Glock store” armory in Sana’a⁶¹**Pistols**

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
Glock 17 Gen 4	US (under licence)
Glock 19	Austria
Glock 19 Gen 4	US (under licence)
Glock 19 Gen 5	US (under licence)
Glock 19X	US (under licence)
Glock 21 Gen 4	US (under licence)
Glock 26	Austria
Glock 43X	US (under licence)
Beretta M9	US (under licence)
Beretta M9A4	US (under licence)
Beretta PX4	Italy
Sig Sauer M17	US (under licence)
Smith & Wesson M59	US
Smith & Wesson SD9	US
Smith & Wesson M&P9	US
Ruger 5.7	US
FN 509	US (under licence)
FN GP	Belgium
CZ-75 Automatic	Czech Republic
Taurus G3c	Brazil
Caracal model F	UAE
CF-98	China
Sarsilmaz SAR-9	Turkiye
Canik TP-9	Turkiye
Baikal 442	Russian Federation
TT-33 Tokarev	Russian Federation and/or former Soviet Union

Machine pistols

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
Tondar TK-9	Islamic Republic of Iran

Compact assault rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
AKSU	Russian Federation and/or former Soviet Union
M92	Serbia
AR-SF	Bulgaria
M4 short barrel	US
M4 long barrel	US
HK416	Germany

Assault rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
AK47	Various origin
AK103	Probably of local production
AK74	Former Soviet Union
QLZ-97	China

⁶¹ Presented on Facebook and Twitter: <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100083088382935> and <https://twitter.com/GlocStore>

Steyr AUG	Austria
G3	Germany
FAL	Belgium
SCAR HB	Belgium

Under barrel grenade launchers (UBGL)

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
M203	US

Sniper rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
SVD-1	Russian Federation or former Soviet Union
SVD-S	Russian Federation
Springfield M21	US

LMGs

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
M249/Minimi	Belgium or US
RPK	Not identified

Rocket launchers

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
RPG-7	Not identified

Optics

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
AN/PVS7 NVG	US
EOTech day and night sight	US
1P29	Russian Federation

Annex 123: Case study N° 2, Haider Tayef artisanal store in Sana'a

Figure 123.1
Profile of the Haider Tayef artisanal store visible on “X”



Figure 123.2
Some material presented for sale at Haider Tayef artisanal store



Source: <https://twitter.com/TayfAbn50085>

Figure 123.3 (left), 123.4 (down left), and 123.5 (down right)
Some material presented for sale at Haider Tayef artisanal store



Source: <https://twitter.com/TayfAbn50085>

**Material observed by the Panel as presented for sale by the Haider Tayef artisanal store in Sana'a
Pistols**

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
Glock 19 Gen 5	US (under licence)
Glock 19X	US (under licence)
Sig Sauer M18	US (under licence)

Smith & Wesson SD9	US
Taurus G3c	Brazil
Sarsilmaz SAR-9	Türkiye
AHSS FXS-9	Türkiye
System Defence C9	Türkiye
Baikal 442	Russian Federation
TT-33 Tokarev	Former Soviet Union
TT-33 Tokarev	Bulgaria
Makarov	Former Soviet Union

Compact assault rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
AKSU	Russian Federation and/or former Soviet Union
M92	Serbia
AR-SF	Bulgaria
AK-104	Probably of local production

Assault rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
AK47	Various origin
Type 56-1	China
AMD-65	Hungary
MiPKMS	Former East Germany
AK103	Probably of local production
AK74	Former Soviet Union
Steyr AUG	Austria
G3	Germany

Sniper rifle

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
Tigr-1 ⁶²	Russian Federation

⁶² Civilian version of the SVD-1

Annex 124: Case study N° 3, Abdul Khaleq Al-Masry artisanal store in Sana'a

Figures 124.1 (left) and 124.2 (right)

Profile of the Haider Tayef artisanal store visible on “X” and some material presented for sale in this store



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=863857151814094&set=a.103401481193002>

Material documented by the Panel as presented for sale by the Abdul Khaleq Al-Masry artisanal store in Sana'a

Pistols

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
Tokarev or TTC	Former Soviet Union or Poland
Baikal 442	Russian Federation
NZ-75	China
Colt Commander	USA

Assault rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
G3	Germany, UK, Portugal, or Saudi Arabia
FAL	Belgium
AUG	Austria
AK-47	Former Soviet Union or Russia
AK-63	Hungary
AMD-65	Hungary
Type 56-1	China
Type 56-2	China
MiPKMS	Former East Germany
VZ-58	Former Czechoslovakia
AR-F	Bulgaria

Compact assault rifles

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
M4	USA
AKSU	Former Soviet Union or Russian Federation
AR-SF	Bulgaria

Sub-machine gun

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
MP-5 or TK-9	Germany, UK or Iran

Sniper rifles

Designation	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
SVD-1 or Type 85	Former Soviet Union, Russian Federation or China

Machine-guns

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
SG-43	Various origin
PKM	Various origin

Rocket launchers

Make and Model	Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in
RPG-7	Various origin

Annex 125: Arms exhibition held in Sana'a in February 2024

Figure 125.1
Entrance of one display stand



Source: https://twitter.com/alhashar_mhmd/status/1762047504047120754/photo/1

Figures 125.2 (left), and 125.3 (right)
Military materiel on display



Source: https://twitter.com/alhashar_mhmd/status/1762533688133210339

Figures 125.4 (up), 125.5 (middle), and 125.6 (down)
Military materiel on display



Source: <https://twitter.com/4v4uHANec6Bv1yJ/status/1762476161374843170/photo/1>



Source: <https://twitter.com/Amjdhsh55Lby/status/1762155769149943911/photo/2>



Source: https://twitter.com/alhshar_mhmd/status/1761934151253414067/photo/1

Annex 126: Model 213 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 80

Figures 126.1 (left), and 126.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/TbyNasr/status/1666792974213079040>

Serial numbers

14027752	31009398	32012079	33022065
16034201	31011486	32012642	33023064
19001295	31012118	32013326	33025064
19007887	31012127	32013348	33026326
22010610	31014027	32013365	33026484
22016405	31014068	32013918	34002533
25036249	31018099	32015260	34003417
25045760	31018624	32113547	34003563
29022769	31019508	32313272	34004232
29027026	31022373	32616930	34004518
29031757	31023505	33001235	34005434
29034244	32000008	33002430	34006143
29043863	32000810	33004491	34085557
30005647	32002117	33004725	49000539
30009363	32002300	33006136	49001295
30011004	32004079	33007065	49001846
30316210	32004271	33008147	49002016
31008101	32006388	33021623	49006075
31009320	32006826	33021725	49006226
31009385	32006868	33022064	49007887

Model 213 pistol documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

49002016	Documented by the PoE Somalia
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Reference in previous reports: [S/2019/858](#), annex 2.5

Annex 127: Type 54 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 39

Figure 127.1



Figure 127.2.

Comment made by the seller (Unofficial translation)



مستندات لنا خط نعيم جندد زيروو
مع التوايح وبسعر مناسب جداً
315000 الف يعني او 2250 ريال سعودي
سعر مؤقت
وين المشتري بالخاها فرصه وبثقل من محلات حمد طائف
الخوان صنعاه جولة عمران نهايت الجسر بجاه عمران محلات حمد طائف والحواله
للواصل والاستفسار على 773334779

Tata Pistols Namim Jadid Zeroo line
With accessories at a very, very favourable price 315000 Yemeni
Thousand or 2250 Saudi Riyals
Temporary price

Where is the buyer to take a chance and buy it from Hamad Tayef stores

Address Sana'a, Jawala Amran, the end of the bridge towards
Amran, the shops of Hamad Tayef and his brothers
For contact and inquiries at 773334779

Source: <https://twitter.com/k01mup442MDxa5H/status/1757425644416151630/photo/1>

Serial numbers

60000736	61002024	61016551	69001147	69005418
60001479	61003501	61017517	69002330	69006007
60003378	61008297	61019655	69002398	69006148
60003465	61011211	61019678	69002813	69006909
60003507	61013083	61019842	69003180	69007831
60004130	61015775	61019928	69003194	69007945
60004285	61016104	61029520	69004905	69007952
61001319	61016495	69000125	69005100	

Type 54 pistols documented in Bahrain and Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

60002362	Documented in Bahrain by Atlantic Council ⁶³
60002705	Documented in Bahrain by Atlantic Council
61004595	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC ⁶⁴
61007768	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC

⁶³ <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/about/>

⁶⁴ Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)

Annex 128: Type 59 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 108

Figures 128.1 (left), and 128.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/yaser84779686/status/1234446969789124609>

Serial numbers

Model 1

12A0029	12P2348	12P4355	12P7349
12A0224	12P2600	12P4406	12P7478
12P0804	12P2605	12P4672	12P7549
12P0813	12P2686	12P5254	12P7648
12P1018	12P2773	12P5743	12P7709
12P1323	12P2784	12P5587	12P7824
12P1413	12P2861	12P5892	12P7970
12P1472	12P2940	12P5963	12P8133
12P1484	12P3043	12P6092	12P8179
12P1723	12P3584	12P6118	12P8271
12P1728	12P3693	12P6249	12P8448
12P1734	12P3818	12P6493	12P8590
12P1784	12P3896	12P6777	12P8657
12P1819	12P3919	12P7107	12P9188
12P1851	12P3972	12P7182	12P9300
12P2147	12P4151	12P7217	12P9467
12P2204	12P4165	12P7250	12P9516

Model 2

DO 0085	DO 3406	DI 1466	EO 0531
DO 0661	DO 3431	DI 2208	EO 0931
DO 1151	DO 3710	DI 3984	EO 1205
DO 1299	DO 4246	DI 5416	EO 1620
DO 1666	DO 5298	DI 5956	EO 2105
DO 1989	DO 5863	DI 6190	EO 2114
DO 2044	DO 6940	DI 6419	EO 3312
DO 2137	DO 7209	DI 6462	
DO 2256	DO 8054	DI 6596	
DO 2972	DO 8562	DI 7105	
DO 3090	DO 9466	DI 8235	

Type 59 pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

DI 1243	Documented by the PoE Somalia
EO 3056	Documented by the PoE Somalia

Reference in previous report: [S/2019/858](#), annex 2.5

Annex 129: CF-98 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 24

Figures 129.1 (left), and 129.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=207525905638549&set=pb.100091434221975.-2207520000&type=3>

Serial numbers

15-CN 000548	15-CN 000618	15-CN 007633	15-CN 017542	15-CN 028834
15-CN 000618	15-CN 002914	15-CN 008461	15-CN 023096	15-CN 028943
15-CN 001200	15-CN 003259	15-CN 008772	15-CN 026530	15-CN 030084
15-CN 001694	15-CN 005594	15-CN 008795	15-CN 027724	15-CN 030179
15-CN 001954	15-CN 006313	15-CN 009248	15-CN 028081	15-CN 033211
15-CN 000548	15-CN 006718	15-CN 010840	15-CN 028754	

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/833](#), annex 77

CF-98 pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

006331	Documented by the PoE Somalia
025554	Documented by the PoE Somalia
029336	Documented in Somalia in open source ⁶⁵
030930	Documented by the PoE Somalia

Reference in previous report: [S/2019/858](#), annex 2.5

⁶⁵ <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2019-01-21-three-more-dusit-terror-suspects-arrested/>

Annex 130: NP-34 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 30

Figures 130.1 (left) and 130.2 (right)



Source: https://twitter.com/ywsf_mnyf/status/1662110055787839489

Serial numbers

401109	0200173	B013051	B5000908
401289	0200178	B013191	B5000947
85000468	0200976	B014696	B5002799
86002705	B010102	B015374	B6002290
0100372	B011216	B5000266	B6002344
0101393	B011697	B5000619	B8002300
0101793	B011949	B5000624	
0200125	B012965	B5000861	

NP-34 pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

B011653	Documented by the PoE Somalia as seized on ISIL
B6002488	Documented by the PoE Somalia

Reference in previous report: [S/2017/924](#), annex 2.1

Annex 131: NP-34 pistols with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those commercialized by Norconia GmbH presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the German authorities, conveying the comments of Norconia GmbH, the sole importer for Europe of Chinese arms manufacturer North Industries Corporation (Norinco), the documented NP-34 pistols are not counterfeits. After comparing with the files, Norconia GmbH informed that all of the 16 NP-34 pistols documented cannot be found in their weapons books and that they were not imported by them. They said, “The fact that the pistols still bear the ‘DE NORCONIA’ marking is due to the following fact: back in 2016, Norinco as a supplier pre-produced 200 NP-34 pistols with this marking. From that point until today, however, due to declining demand, Norconia GmbH has only ordered five NP-34 pistols, but marked with totally different serial numbers.” Norconia GmbH assumed that the 16 NP-34 pistols documented, which were originally intended for them, were exported directly from China via other channels.

Quantity documented: 16

Figures 131.1. (left) and 131.2 (right)



Figure 131.3 (left) 22-CN (2022 as the year of production)

Figure 131.4 (right) Norinco factory logo



Source: https://twitter.com/Hassan_Ghayeb2/status/1752692840495263875/photo/2

Serial numbers

B026102	B029607	B030301	B031640
B027157	B029615	B030304	B031653
B029125	B029892	B030308	B031723
B029520	B030028	B030528	B032596

Annex 132: NP-42 Mini pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 16

Figures 132.1 (left), and 132.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/lyrby44932777/status/1636067867882921986>

Serial numbers

000648	002237	003427	009248
001439	003259	003485	010840
001525	003325	007985	028943
001954	003395	008086	011775-23-296

NP-42 Mini pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

003629	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
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Annex 133: FB-83 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Poland presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 43

Figures 133.1 (left), and 133.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinmF0uL2/status/1745499029545369713>

Serial numbers

EF06193	ZU08134	NL00950	NL03416	SF03680
EF07363	ZU08204	NL03355	NL03418	SF03742
EF07426	ZU09166	NL00353	NL03355	SF03751
EF07639	ZU09547	NL00771	NL03524	SF03755
EF09041	ZU09700	NL00981	NL03625	SF03900
EF09123	ZU09767	NL01808	NL03846	MW05959
ZU07715	ZU09806	NL01811	SF08680	MW06124
ZU07443	NL00428	NL02138	SF03083	
ZU07695	NL00490	NL03185	SF03437	


FB-83 pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

ZU08864	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
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Annex 134: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 49

Figures 134.1 (left), and 134.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=479035194412543&set=pb.100069181991038.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

25025413	26018338	26038410	27062180	28006408
25023361	26022476	26039556	27065419	28025788
25024585	26029253	26039773	27105554	28053494
25028608	26030746	26042878	27132734	28081544
25029722	26031111	26072964	27133794	28089548
26009277	26033093	26074596	27183082	28090227
26012778	26035831	26089548	27185674	28100274
26014718	26036101	26108201	27199193	28120521
26015736	26037377	26162017	27205103	28144117
26016445	26037512	26163316	28006802	

Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 26 documented in Bahrain, Iraq, KSA, Niger, Central Africa Republic and Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas


27107135	Documented in Syria
27111509	Documented in Bahrain by Atlantic Council
27138062	Documented in KSA by JSTOR
27144983	Documented in Iraq by JSTOR
27151877	Documented in Iraq by JSTOR
27116626	Documented in Niger by Conflict Armament Research (CAR)
2717018?	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
28168193	Documented in Central Africa Rep by the Panel of experts on RCA
30005215	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11, and [S/2015/936](#), annex 1.13

Annex 135: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 17

Figures 135.1 (left), and 135.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/yaser84779686/status/1216947156009078784/photo/2>

Serial numbers

60001470	62042402	63042319
60025564	62069029	63052870
60035053	62117807	63084326
61036441	62146851	63243537
61063770	62161944	64013638
61131431	63042265	

Reference in previous reports: S/2023/833, paras. 70-71, 73, annexes 24-27, S/2022/754, para. 104, S/2022/50, paras. 62, 64, S/2021/79, para. 86, table 2, S/2020/326, para. 61, and S/2019/83, paras. 95-96

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 26, and production batches 15-CN, 16-CN, 17-CN, 18-CN, and 19-CN, intercepted between 2018 and 2023, which have also been documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Production batch 15-CN

Serial numbers	Comment
60000469	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
60001470	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
60006094	Documented by the PoE Somalia
60003785	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
60006094	Documented by the PoE Somalia
60006170	Documented by the PoE Somalia
60009383	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
60012023	Documented by the PoE Somalia
60012270	Documented by the PoE Somalia (arms from Djibouti)
60013158	Documented by the PoE Somalia (arms from Djibouti)
60013577	Documented by the PoE Somalia
60014293	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
60014768	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabab)
60015612	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
60053925	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
60060687	Documented by the PoE Somalia

Production batch 16-CN

61001920	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61002030	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61002149	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61002515	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61003454	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61003463	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61003807	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61003990	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004235	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004373	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61004386	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004407	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004467	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004586	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004595	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61004620	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61004647	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61005463	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61005490	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61005520	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61005566	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61005588	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61005589	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61005696	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006058	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61006237	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61016589	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61016600	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006614	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61016742	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61016756	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006787	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61006801	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006814	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006852	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006859	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61006910	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61006912	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61007091	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61007494	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61007768	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61007852	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61008170	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61008338	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61008459	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61008749	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61008943	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61008996	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61022748	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61022845	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61022850	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61022854	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61022915	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61026550	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61026562	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen /
61026571	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61026632	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61026638	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61026640	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61032723	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61032991	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61033164	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61037649	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61037796	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61037844	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61038157	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61038225	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61040633	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61040742	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61040869	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61041039	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61041125	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61041256	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61044069	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61044076	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61044080	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61044092	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61044113	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61048624	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61054712	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61055765	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61056959	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61057023	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61060000	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61060324	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61060355	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61060567	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61060593	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61063485	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61063496	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61063543	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61063573	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61063641	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61063681	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61063770	Observed on the black market in Houthi controlled areas
61063879	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61063916	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61069718	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61069749	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61079035	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61080895	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61080994	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61089851	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61089854	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61089885	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61089907	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61089919	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61091409	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61091542	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61091546	Documented in Somalia by CAR
61091556	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61091560	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62096109	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62096303	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61096634	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62096647	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61096657	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62096675	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62096714	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62096761	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62096847	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61096927	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62096929	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62096941	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62098152	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61098408	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62098719	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62098821	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61098882	Documented in Somalia by CAR

62099197	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62099209	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62099322	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61099363	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62099367	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62099375	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61128703	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61129232	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61129414	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
61129726	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61129771	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

61131425	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61131427	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61131431	Observed on the black market in Houthi controlled areas
61131439	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
61131467	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

Production batch 17-CN

62012652	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
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62028884	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62028927	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62029096	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62029309	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62029410	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62030167	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62035280	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62035357	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62035360	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
62035391	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62035512	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62042333	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62042402	Observed on the black market in Houthi- controlled areas
62042662	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
62043136	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62045607	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62046363	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62046797	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62047578	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62047742	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62048096	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62048794	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62048834	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62048904	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62048924	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62049153	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62049424	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62050684	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62050742	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62051887	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62051997	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62052003	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62052225	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62052287	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62052753	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62052790	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62053138	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62053233	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62054562	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62054614	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62056023	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62056447	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62056514	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62056601	Documented in Somalia by CAR
62056918	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62057267	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62068569	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62069029	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled area
62069345	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62069377	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62103376	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62103380	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62103427	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62103507	Documented by the PoE Somalia
62103651	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62103661	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62115236	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62115237	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62115254	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
62115261	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62115287	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62117491	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62117740	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62117807	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas
62117821	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62117823	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62131730	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62131794	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62131917	Documented by the PoE Somalia
62131964	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62131981	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

62135349	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62135350	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
62143358	Documented by the PoE Somalia
62146851	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas
62163358	Documented by the PoE Somalia

Production batch 18-CN

63000597	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63000600	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63000617	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63000620	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63000639	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63000644	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63000765	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces

63001996	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63001998	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63002004	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63002010	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63002016	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63002018	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63002415	Seized in Yemen by UAE forces
63002455	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63002460	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63004051	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63004061	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63004103	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63004132	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63004158	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63006154	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63006152	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63006160	Seized in Yemen by UAE forces
63006178	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63006192	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63008382	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63008401	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63008409	Seized in Yemen by UAE forces
63008411	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63008416	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63008541	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
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63008543	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63008553	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63008595	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63008612	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63010580	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63010582	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63010595	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63010617	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63010627	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63010638	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63012260	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63012265	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63012269	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63012280	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63012286	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63014858	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63014863	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63014866	Captured in Yemen by UAE forces
63014880	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63014922	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63025370	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63025371	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)

63039372	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63039391	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63039468	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63039476	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63039502	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63041883	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63041894	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
63041907	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63041909	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63042228	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63042247	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63042265	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas
63042293	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63042298	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63042315	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63042318	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63042319	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas
63042330	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63042811	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
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63044680	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63044684	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63044712	Captured in Yemen by UAE forces
63044713	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63044715	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63045538	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63045545	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63045561	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63045562	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63045567	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63050942	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63052870	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas
63056702	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63057434	Documented in Somalia by CAR

63006160	Seized in Yemen by UAE forces
63061631	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
63062977	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63069739	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63071650	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
63072304	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63084645	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63088360	Documented in Somalia by CAR
63090647	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
63098435	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

63243537	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas
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Production batch 19-CN

640??253	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas
64030876	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
6408??66	Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

Annex 136: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 and with serial numbers consistent with the batches of those operated by the GoY, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 8

Figures 136.1 (left), and 136.2 (right)



Figure 136.3

GoY markings



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=321850557236163&set=pb.100082336645878.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

66037518	66042206
66037550	66043417
66037647	66043447
66039126	66044685

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 26 and production batch 21-CN, documented in Somalia, consistent with those operated by the GoY


66769998	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
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Reference in previous report: [S/2022/754](#), annex 7

Annex 137: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 2

Figures 137.1 (left), and 137.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/AlshwhtyAhmd/status/1667216435871924232>

Serial numbers

36000181
36009444

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 56 documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

36008966	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
36038858	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

Annex 138: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 66 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 11

Figures 138.1 (left), and 138.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/AhmedAh11388275/status/1565673900524068867>

Serial numbers

2016660	3004215	15121613	17214317	18117943
2036211	15197294	16152478	17249009	18143325
2036419				

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 66 documented in Bahrain, Somalia, and Niger, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

2039297	Documented by the PoE Somalia
12094597	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
14067873	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015 ⁶⁶
14079784	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
14095934	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
15005828	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
15041479	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
15066207	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
15075848	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
17189034	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
18120250	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabab)
18210072	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
18217170	Documented in Niger by CAR
18227023	Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015
20039297	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)


Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

⁶⁶ <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/A-Guide-to-Illicit-Iranian-Weapon-Transfers-in-the-Gulf.pdf>

Annex 139: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 313 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 27

Figures 139.1 (left), and 139.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinnF0uL2/status/1654572263516041224>

Serial numbers

4608015	4912327	5147373	5220591	5566615
4815123	4913503	5215004	5220935	5609746
4862927	4919362	5215084	5240041	5648055
4866277	5003018	5216401	5311772	5648442
4904199	5007172	5220271	5524400	5650567
4901928	5012862			

Reference in previous reports: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11, and [S/2016/254](#), paras. 39-41, and annex 13a

Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 313 documented in Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, and Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

4811827	Documented in Côte d'Ivoire by CAR
4814753	Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire
4815339	Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire
4816062	Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire
4816250	Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire
4851763	Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire
4852923	Documented in Côte d'Ivoire by CAR
5006693	Documented in Niger by CAR
5201355	Documented in Niger by CAR
5212128	Documented in Niger by CAR
5217326	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)

Reference in previous report: [S/2016/254](#), paras. 39-41, and annex 13a

Annex 140: Type 56-2 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 313 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 13

Figure 140.1 (left), and 140.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=227251913639959&set=pb.100090654554764.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

3303707	3507393	3511329	3516991	3530749
3311467	3507870	3512246	3524882	3535499
3322844	3510157	3516837		

Type 56-2 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 313 documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas


3503591	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab)
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Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

Annex 141: Type 56-2 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 386 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 1

Figures 141.1 (left), and 141.2 (right)



Source:

<https://twitter.com/c2sXAyxqmYMzhon/status/1722710128296644985/photo/1https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinmF0uL2/status/1654572263516041224/photo/2>

Serial number

2006211

Type 56-2 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 386 documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

2000998	Documented in Somalia by CAR
2002236	Documented in Somalia by CAR
2008394	Documented in Somalia by CAR
2008667	Documented in Somalia by CAR
2009138	Documented in Somalia by CAR

Annex 142: M80 LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and which are consistent with the model and batch that those intercepted between 2020 and 2023

Quantity documented: 8

Figures 142.1 (left), and 142.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/ShakrTayf/status/1681052084005662720>

Serial numbers

Marking 1

288215
325240
322315
330517
330983
360585

Marking 2

15-CN 07677
17-CN 10684

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/833](#), para. 69, annex 18, [S/2022/50](#), para. 64, and [S/2021/79](#), para. 86

M80 LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China documented in Central Africa Republic, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan, and which are also consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

268317	Documented in South Sudan by Small Arms Survey ⁶⁷
272929	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabab)
288215	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
324690	Documented in Central Africa Republic by the PoE on RCA
325240	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
330517	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
330983	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
400515	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
400805	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
401702	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
402185	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
402813	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces

15-CN 07677	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
-------------	--

16-CN 07403	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
16-CN 07478	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
16-CN 07737	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
16-CN 07969	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
16-CN 08057	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
16-CN 08198	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
16-CN 08311	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
16-CN 08384	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

17-CN 00734	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 02301	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 02415	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 02569	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 03482	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 03564	Documented in Somalia by CAR
17-CN 03579	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 03741	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 03786	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 03805	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
17-CN 03996	Documented in Mali by CAR
17-CN 04591	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
17-CN 05029	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
17-CN 07055	Documented in Somalia by CAR
17-CN 10684	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas
17-CN 24547	Documented in Somalia by CAR

Reference in previous report: S/2023/724, annex 11

⁶⁷ <https://smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/Weapons-seized-from-George-Athor-and-John-Duit-Dec-2012.pdf>

Annex 143: MPiKMS 72 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings, similar to those manufactured in former East Germany, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented:

Figures 143.1 (left), and 143.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/m777344073/status/1644884973600530435>

Serial numbers

58 MX 2785	83 LH 1500	84 ML 5540	86 32 7517	86 36 4037
64 MN 2557	83 LH 2787	84 MN 2997	86 33 1745	86 36 4758
72 F 0385	83 LH 3383	84 MO 0099	86 33 2010	86 36 6059
73 MG 7787	83 LH 7508	84 MO 2284	86 33 2239	86 36 6163
77 FC 5467	83 LL 2478	84 MO 5910	86 33 7902	86 37 5773
80 IL 1212	83 LO 1919	84 MU 1272	86 34 5171	87 31 0299
81 JA 3553	83 LR 3923	84 MX 0613	86 34 6582	87 31 4717
81 JA 3945	83 LT 6716	84 MX 0639	86 35 2211	87 31 7668
81 JD 1129	83 XT 0164	84 MX 2788	86 35 2465	
82 XX 3081	83 XV 1443	85 LR 0893	86 35 3433	
83 LA 7175	83 XV 7903	85 NA 2661	86 35 4549	
83 LD 1919	84 MF 4875	86 32 7344	86 35 5076	

MPiKMS 72 assault rifles documented in Niger, and Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

73 BM 2790	Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabab)
83 LC 7406	Documented by the PoE Somalia
86 35 3140	Documented in Niger by CAR
86 35 4295	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
86 36 2990	Documented in Niger by CAR

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

Annex 144: KL serie assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, similar to those manufactured in Iran, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

The Iranian authorities stated that none of the documented serial numbers correspond to Iranian products. They also stated that dozens of companies in different countries are manufacturing assault rifles of the type described by the Panel.

Quantity documented: 17

Figure 144.1. (Right view)



Figure 144.2. (Left view)



Figure 144.3. (Firing selector)



Figure 144.4. (Serial numbers)



Source: https://twitter.com/muafaq_tayif/status/1458141150154350595

Serial numbers

1801214	2304094	2305179	2329555	2609260
2003682	2304097	2305192	2415094	
2003996	2304902	2326449	2506339	
2107854	2305039	2327129	2506433	

KL series assault rifles documented in Bahrain, Iraq, KSA, Somalia, and Syria, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

1603504	Documented by the PoE Somalia
2003185	Documented in Syria (Open sources) ⁶⁸
2102933	Documented in Syria by WarNoir ⁶⁹
2200914	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
2204527	Documented in Iraq by Calibra Obscura ⁷⁰
2304094	Documented in Bahrain by JSTOR
2304097	Documented in Bahrain by JSTOR
2304376	Documented in Iraq by Calibre Obscura
2304568	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
2305360	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
2306507	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
2315428	Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC
2404106	Documented in the KSA ⁷¹

⁶⁸ <https://www.theakforum.net/threads/iranian-aks.112972/page-3#lg=thread-112972&slide=1>

⁶⁹ https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1412555837814579200

⁷⁰ <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1453273573477556237>

⁷¹ <https://twitter.com/thedixiemauser/status/1658239456053264386/photo/3>

The following features are some of the characteristic of the KL assault rifles manufactured in Iran, and which are visible on those documented by the Panel:

- A seven-digit serial number on the left side of the weapon, usually just above the magazine well;
- “0” digit (often covered by a bar);
- Weapon selector markings are on the right side of the receiver to the right of the selector lever. Markings are as follows: « L » (full automatic fire) and « D » (semi-automatic fire);
- Pistol grip, hand guard, and stock made of red-brown plastic furniture;
- Absence of compensator on the muzzle;
- Enclosed front sight.

Annex 145: TK-9 Tondar sub-machine gun (SMG) with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Iran, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

The Iranian authorities stated to the Panel that none of the documented serial numbers correspond to Iranian products. Iranian authorities also stated that at least similar SMGs manufactured in three countries are very similar to Iranian products.

Quantity documented: 12

Figure 145.1. (Right view)



Figure 145.2. (Left view)



Figure 145.3. (Factory markings)



Figure 145.4. (Serial numbers)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=844312487101894&set=pb.100045694508321.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

7505450	7506514	7506699	7506995
7506097	7506627	7506850	7610389
7506299	7506697	7506856	9710110

On the figure 145.3, the marking of the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), Iran, is present.

Samples of DIO marking

Figure 145.5 (on a G3 rifle)



Figure 145.6 (on a TK-9 SMG)



Source: Conflict Armament Research (CAR)


Source: Armament Research Services (ARES)

Annex 146: FEG AMD-65 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Hungary presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the manufacturer, the AMD-65 assault rifle with serial numbers “DD8807” was exported on 7 October 2007 by MFS2000 Inc to the Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Quantity documented:

Figures 146.1 (up) and 146.2 (down)





Source: https://twitter.com/muafaq_tayif/status/1603798570385260547

Serial numbers

DD8807

End User Certificate (EUC) issued by the Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, dated 17 January 2007, covering the transfer of 10,000 AMD-65 assault rifles.

According to the Hungarian authorities, this EUC is covering the AMD-65 assault rifle bearing the serial numbers DD8807

B2-I-002

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 17 JAN 2007

END USER CERTIFICATE

The Ministry of Interior for Afghanistan certifies that the following items were ordered from Sweet Analysis Services, Inc. (SASI), under Research, Development and Engineering Command Acquisition Center Contract W91CRB-04-D-0024-0007 by the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) for the Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan. The items will be supplied by Fegarmy, Europe, Hungary, 1095 Budapest, Soroksari st 158. Under the Terms and Conditions of Foreign Military Sales Case B2-B-AAE, the Ministry of Interior for Afghanistan also assures that the items are for use in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan by the Afghanistan National Police and will NOT be sold or transferred to any other third party without consent of the exporter and the Government of Hungary.

DESCRIPTION	QTY
AMD-65 Rifle, short barrel, folding stock, To include: 7 magazines per weapon, 7,000 Magazines total. 1 Accessory kit per AMD-65.	10,000

As a United States Foreign Military Sale, no import license is required.

The signature of the authorized senior Ministry of Interior official shown below serves to prove the authenticity of this End Use Certificate.

End Use Certificate is issued in the City of Kabul, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the 17th day of Jan 2007.

On behalf of the Ministry of Interior
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

ABDUL HADI KHALID
Deputy Minister
For Security
Afghanistan Ministry of Interior

Annex 147: HK G3-A3 rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those manufactured under licence in the UK, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 26

Figure 147.1



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=188701320767070&set=pb.100088816089895.-2207520000&type=3>

Serial numbers

6024446	6050901	6642494	6710115
6024950	6542591	6659193	6720468
6025355	6545317	6661940	6722225
6034862	6546226	6680996	6725929
6037329	6553634	6681927	6733841
6047789	6606289	6700730	
6047871	6628069	6703088	

HK G3-A3 rifle with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced under licence in the UK, documented in Somalia, and which is consistent with those observed as presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas


6050185	Documented by the PoE Somalia
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Reference in previous report: [S/2022/754](#), annex 7

Annex 148: PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Romania presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and which are also consistent with the model and batch of those intercepted in 2023

Quantity documented: 4

Figures 148.1 (left), and 149.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=348554747899077&set=pcb.348554851232400>

Serial numbers

V 1589
V 2752
V 3192
V 4590

Reference in previous report: S/2023/833, annex 20

PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Romania documented in Somalia, and which is consistent with those observed as presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

V 2076	Documented in Somalia by CAR
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Annex 150: PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Hungary, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 4

Figure 150.1 (left), and 150.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=840413040825172&set=pb.100045694508321.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

BA 224
BA 233
BA 305
GN 973

PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Hungary documented in Somalia, and which are consistent with those observed as presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

BA 064	Documented in Somalia by CAR
BA 898	Documented in Somalia by CAR
GM 941	Documented in Somalia by CAR

Annex 151: RPG-7 grenade launcher with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Iran presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and which are consistent with the model and batch of those intercepted between 2016 and 2021

Quantity documented: 2

Figure 151.1



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=134483812639506&set=pb.100082336645878.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

Y 00010
9590085

Reference in previous reports: S/2023/833, annex 27, S/2022/50, para. 62, S/2021/79, annex 14, S/2020/326, para. 61, and S/2018/193, tables 2-3

RPG-7 grenade launcher with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Iran documented on their way to Somalia, or seized on the Houthis, and/or also consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

9090074	Documented as seized on its way to Somalia by CAR
9190109	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
9290816	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
9390546	Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces
9490973	Documented in Yemen by CAR
9593295	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
9593325	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
9593466	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen
9594144	Seized on sea, PoE Yemen

Annex 152: Pulsar Trail XQ50 thermal sight with technical characteristics and markings presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, consistent with those produced in Lithuania

Quantity documented: 1

Figure 152.1



Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1705911557228572794>

Serial number

9037521

Pulsar Trail XQ50 thermal sight with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Lithuania documented in Afghanistan consistent with the one presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

9007698	Documented in Afghanistan by CAR
9012188	Documented in Afghanistan by CAR
9013831	Documented in Afghanistan by CAR
9025451	Documented in Afghanistan by CAR
9025621	Documented in Afghanistan by CAR
9032474	Documented in Afghanistan by CAR
9037521	Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas

Annex 153: Taurus G3 pistols manufactured in Brazil, which have been legally transferred between 2021 and 2023 to KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 12

Figure 153.1



Source: <https://twitter.com/yhyyr522/status/1704553568303300684/photo/1>

Serial numbers of Taurus G3 pistols legally transferred to Rammai Najd Hunting Est, KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

AEB084847	ADL869012	ADL869200
AEB084804	ADL869014	ADL869212
AEB084897	ADL869026	ADL872648
ACJ316834	ADL869185	ADL872677

Annex 154: Taurus G3XL pistol manufactured in Brazil, which has been legally transferred in 2022 to KSA, and which has been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 1

Figure 154.1



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=224402820314271&set=pb.100082336645878.-2207520000>

Serial number of Taurus G3XL pistol legally transferred to Rammai Najd Hunting Est, KSA, and which has been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

ADL872535

Annex 155: Taurus TH-9 pistols manufactured in Brazil, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 3

Figure 155.1



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=303455182409034&set=pb.100082336645878.-2207520000>

Serial numbers of Taurus TH-9 pistols legally transferred to Rammai Najd Hunting Est, KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

ADM978875
ADM978876
ADM978879

Appendix A

Document indicating the models, serial numbers, consignee in KSA, and date of sale of the Taurus pistols documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas



AEB084847	G3	15/02/2023	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83525440	21/02/2023
AEB084804	G3	15/02/2023	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83525440	21/02/2023
AEB084897	G3	15/02/2023	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83525440	21/02/2023
ACJ316834	G3	25/08/2021	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	82967325	17/11/2021
ADL869012	G3	04/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
ADL869014	G3	04/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
ADL869026	G3	04/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
ADL869185	G3	04/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022

ADL869200	G3	04/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
ADL869212	G3	04/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
ADL872648	G3	05/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
ADL872677	G3	05/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022

ADL872535	G3XL	05/10/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83397913	17/10/2022
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ADM978875	TH9	05/11/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83442104	21/11/2022
ADM978876	TH9	05/11/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83442104	21/11/2022
ADM978879	TH9	05/11/2022	Brazil	Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968)	83442104	21/11/2022

Source: Confidential

Appendix B

End-User certificate related to the Taurus pistols legally transferred in 2022 and 2023 to Rammai Najd Hunting Est, KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas




المملكة العربية السعودية
وزارة الداخلية
(٢٧٢)
The General
Department of Arms and Explosives

وزارة الداخلية
رقم صفا: ٢٠٣٣٢
تاريخ الصفا: ١٤٤٣/٠١/٢٣
تصاريح:



شهادة مستخدم نهائي
END USER CERTIFICATE

الكمية	الوصف	Description	Quantity
٢٦٠٠	مسدس عيار ٩ ملم شبه أوتوماتيكي	Pistol cal.9mm semi auto	2600
٤٠٠	مسدس عيار ٢٢ إلى ٢٢ شبه أوتوماتيكي	Pistol cal.22 LR semi auto	400

١. تشهد وزارة الداخلية بالمملكة العربية السعودية أن البضائع
الموضح وصفها أعلاه سيتم توريدها من شركة توريد
بالبرازيل بواسطة مؤسسة رماي نجد للصيد سجل تجاري
رقم (١٠١٠٦٠٧٨٢١) وعنوانها: المملكة العربية
السعودية / الرياض.

٢. المواد المراد توريدها لصالح التاجر ولاغراض تجارية
سيتم بيعها في المملكة العربية السعودية للمواطنين
وتسجيلها عليهم تحت إشراف وزارة الداخلية.

٣. لن يعاد تصدير المواد لجهة أخرى غير مصدرها
أو التخلص منها أو التفويض بالتصرف فيها خارج
المملكة بدون أخذ الموافقة المسبقة من الجهة المعنية
لدى حكومة المورد.

٤. هذه الشهادة أعطيت للحصول على شهادات
التصدير الضرورية.

BRIG.GEN. ADEEB BIN SAUD BIN THINYAN AL SAUD

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES
IN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Date: 31 AUGUST 2021


Source: Confidential

Annex 156: Taurus G3c pistols manufactured in Brazil, which have been legally transferred to Tanzania, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 37

Figure 156.1



Source:

<https://www.facebook.com/106950802358384/photos/pb.100091374281039.-2207520000./108029035583894/?type=3><https://twitter.com/DhialArms/status/1758124013597954169/photo/1>

Serial numbers of Taurus G3c pistols legally transferred to Boomslang Logistik East Africa Limited, Tanzania, which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

ADG430680	ADG500858	ADG501445	ADG506587
ADG432528	ADG500921	ADG501739	ADG506630
ADG434270	ADG500923	ADG506087	ADG506862
ADG452187	ADG500959	ADG506163	ADG513901
ADG457983	ADG501032	ADG506255	ADG513905
ADG486791	ADG501235	ADG506261	ADG514296
ADG486856	ADG501288	ADG506311	ADG514463
ADG486882	ADG501300	ADG506367	
ADG487279	ADG501324	ADG506505	
ADG487285	ADG501363	ADG506562	

Appendix A

End-User certificate dated 18 December 2022 by the United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Home Affairs, Tanzania Police Force, related to the documented Taurus G3c pistols transferred to Boomslang Logistics East Africa Limited

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFIARS
TANZANIA POLICE FORCE



The officer incharge
Central Arms Registrar
P.o.box 9141
DAR ES SALAAM.

18th Dec 2020

DSM/CID/HQ/C.5/4/3/79

Boomslang Logistics (EA) Ltd,
P.o.box 11108
Dar es salam,
Tanzania


RE:END USER CERTIFICATE.

1. Name & Address of Final Destination:
Name:BOOMSLANG LOGISTICS EAST AFRICA LIMITED
ADDRESS:Tanzania,Region Dar Es salaam,District Ilala
CBD,Ward Jangwani ,Postal code 11108,Street Mkunguni,Road
Lumumba,Plot number 28,Block number 71,House number 14.
2. Name & Address of the Buyer:
Name:BOOMSLANG LOGISTICS EAST AFRICA LIMITED
ADDRESS:Tanzania,Region Dar es salaam,District Ilala
CBD,Ward Jangwani ,Postal code 11108,Street Mkunguni,Road
Lumumba,Plot number 28,Block number 71,House number 14.
3. Name & Address of the Seller:
Name:TAURUS ARMAS S.A
Address:Avenida Sao Borja,n 2181-Predio-Fazeda Sao Borja-
CEP:93035-411 Sao Leopoldo-RS-Brasil.

4. Descriptions and quantities of the goods:

PRODUCT(S) DESCRIPTION	QUANTITIES
Taurus pistol model G3, 9mm caliber, 17 rounds capacity with two additional mags, cleaning kit and user manual.	12,000
Taurus pistol model G3c, 9mm caliber, 12 rounds capacity with two additional mags, cleaning kit and user manual.	12,000
Taurus pistol model TS9, 9mm caliber, 17 rounds capacity with two additional mags, cleaning kit and user manual.	2000
Taurus revolver model RT85s, 38 spl caliber, 5 shorts, 2" barrel length, cleaning kit and user manual.	12,000
Taurus revolver model RT856, 38spl caliber, 6 shorts, 2" barrel length, cleaning kit and user manual.	12,000

- I. The certificate is used in Tanzania to be presented to the governmental authorities of the Republic of Brazil.
- II. The goods in this End user certificate will be for the exclusive use of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
- III. The final consumer guarantees, by the appropriate signature that the products mentioned in this End User Certificate will not be used for purpose other than for National Security and that it will not be neither sold, nor loaned, nor re-exported, to a third party without prior written agreement from the authorities or Government.

 - SP

For; DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
DAR ES SALAAM
For: DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT

Annex 157: Taurus 24/7 pistols produced in Brazil, which have been legally transferred to the Ministry of Defence of Djibouti, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 20

Figures 157.1 (left), and 157.2 (right)



Source: https://twitter.com/muafaq_tayif/status/1544746309642584064

Serial numbers of the Taurus 24/7 pistols legally sold to the National Security of Ministry of Defence of Djibouti, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

TGZ50697	TGZ51229	TGZ51619	TGZ52047
TGZ50837	TGZ51242	TGZ51653	TGZ52144
TGZ50875	TGZ51470	TGZ51968	TGZ52187
TGZ51072	TGZ51485	TGZ52033	TGZ52366
TGZ51192	TGZ51509	TGZ52040	TGZ52374

Appendix A

Document indicating the models, serial numbers, consignee, and date of sale of the pistols Taurus 24/7 sold to the Ministry of Defence of Djibouti, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas



production and sales details of the firearms. Furthermore, Taurus attaches hereto, in the following annexes, all documents in which data herein provided is substantiated as well as all the certificates and licenses the company was able to collect (all dates are in the "DD/MM/YYYY" standard):

Serial Number	Model	Production date and local		Consignee	Sales Data	
					Invoice number	Date of Sale
TGZ50697	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	124.808	11/03/2014
TGZ50837	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	124.808	11/03/2014
TGZ50875	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	124.808	11/03/2014
TGZ51072	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51192	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51229	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51242	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51470	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51485	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51509	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ51619	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014






TGZ51653	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	126.377	31/03/2014
TGZ52144	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ51968	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ52033	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ52040	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ52047	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ52187	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ52366	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014
TGZ52374	24/7	Dec/2013	Brazil	National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti	122.247	31/01/2014

Source: Confidential

Appendix B

End User Certificate related to the pistols Taurus sold to the Ministry of Defence of Djibouti, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas



Source: Confidential

Annex 158: Canik TP9 Elite Combat pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2023 to KSA and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the manufacturer, the Canik TP9 Elite Combat pistol with serial numbers T6472-22 BN 08888, was transferred in January 2023 to Ben Humaid National Trading Co, Jeddah – KSA.

Quantity documented: 1

Figures 158.1. (left) and 158.2 (right)



Figure 158.3



Serial number

T6472-22 BN 08888

Source: <https://twitter.com/GlocStore/status/1690671378263920640/photo/1>

Appendix A

Customs declaration by the exporter associated to the transfer in KSA of the Canik TP9 Elite Combat pistol with serial numbers T6472-22 BN 08888

T.C. GÜMRÜK BEYANNAMESİ		Seri : GB		1 BEYAN	
2 Dövizci / Recipient	No	19 MAYIS 9870007612	EX	1	
SAMSUN YURT SAVUNMA SANAYİ VE TİCARET A.Ş. ŞABANOĞLU OSB MAHALLESİ ULUBATLI CADESİ NO:2B/B TEKKEKÖY SAMSUN SAMSUN Türkiye 052		İSTANBUL HAVALİMANI GÜMRÜK MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ			
3 Fatura	4 Yük. İstisna	6	23341453EX00005088;09.01.2023		
5 Malın sayı	6 Kap sayısı	33	9 - 0472-1629-0529 9760 2092195		
8 Adis	No	Zincirlikuyu 0920385704			
Ben Humaid National Trading Co. Al Hemdaniya Main Str. Jeddah 23761 SAUDI ARABIA Suudi Arabistan 632		ARGUN YEMNLİ MALİ MÜŞAVRLİK VE DENETİM HİZMETLERİ A.Ş.			
14 İhracat ediliş / Temsilatçı	No	Boğaziçi Kurumlar 7730293569	15 İhracatçı Ülke	16 İhracatçı Ülke Kodu	17 İhracatçı Ülke Kodu
SOLMAZ GÜMRÜK MÜŞAVİRLİĞİ A.Ş. Zincirlikuyu Esentepe Mah Kore Yüzbaşı Kaya Aldoğan No:9 3439 , Esentepe, İstanbul, Türkiye		Türkiye	052	632	
18 İhracatçı Ülke	19 İhracatçı Ülke Kodu	20 İhracatçı Ülke Kodu	17 Ürün Açıklaması		
Uçak -	052	0	CPT S.ARABİSTAN		
21 İhracatçı Ülke	22 İhracatçı Ülke Kodu	23 İhracatçı Ülke Kodu	24 İhracatçı Ülke Kodu	25 İhracatçı Ülke Kodu	
Uçak -	052	USD	76,511.50	18.7498000	11
40 İhracatçı Ülke	30 İhracatçı Ülke	İSTANBUL	11	AKBANK T.A.Ş.,İstanbul,BEYOĞLU/İSTANBUL	
63 İhracatçı Ülke	64 İhracatçı Ülke	G34000016	Peşin Ödeme		
3 Kap, 20 ADET (UNLU); Markası:; Numarası:; Marka Tescilsiz: 91,501.27 TL Ticari Tanımı: TP9 SF MOD2 CAMO 18-18		26 Kuruş	No	93020000	00 00
		34 Birim Ürün Kodu	35 Birim Ürün Kodu	36 Tarih	
		10 00	17.78		
		38 Birim Ürün Kodu	39 Birim Ürün Kodu	40 Tarih	
		10 00	17.78		
		46 Cost beyan Örneği beyan			
Taşıma senedi- Konşimento V 17639488396 09.01.2023 Milli Savunma Bakanlığı İzin Belgesi VE-38100341-545.04-1838390 29.11.2022 TPS-E-Fatura V 23243160110886026995652/1 09.01.2023 Kantar Fişi V G34000016 09.01.2023 TPS-Birlik Onay Kodu V 23153097211086034908028/1 09.01.2023 10:54:00 ; VEK:ÜSKÜDAR 11. NOTERLİĞİ 10010/07.04.2020 *1000 REJİMLİ ÜRÜNLER İMALATÇI KENDİSİDİR.*1040 REJİMLİ ÜRÜNLER İHR YÖNT 11. MAD İSTİNADEN İTHAL EDİLEN MALIN İHRACIDIR * OKSB 2261/OKS/0026-15.12.2022		47 Adet	48 Adet	49 Adet	50 Adet
		4880.12			
		51 Birim Ürün Kodu	52 Birim Ürün Kodu	53 Birim Ürün Kodu	54 Birim Ürün Kodu
		14.700.00			
		56 Anlaşım kodları			
B HESAP DETAYLARI					
C HAREKET GİRESİ					
59 Adis		60 Adis		61 Adis	
62 Adis		63 Adis		64 Adis	
65 Adis		66 Adis		67 Adis	
68 Adis		69 Adis		70 Adis	
71 Adis		72 Adis		73 Adis	
74 Adis		75 Adis		76 Adis	
77 Adis		78 Adis		79 Adis	
80 Adis		81 Adis		82 Adis	
83 Adis		84 Adis		85 Adis	
86 Adis		87 Adis		88 Adis	
89 Adis		90 Adis		91 Adis	
92 Adis		93 Adis		94 Adis	
95 Adis		96 Adis		97 Adis	
98 Adis		99 Adis		100 Adis	
101 Adis		102 Adis		103 Adis	
104 Adis		105 Adis		106 Adis	
107 Adis		108 Adis		109 Adis	
110 Adis		111 Adis		112 Adis	
113 Adis		114 Adis		115 Adis	
116 Adis		117 Adis		118 Adis	
119 Adis		120 Adis		121 Adis	
122 Adis		123 Adis		124 Adis	
125 Adis		126 Adis		127 Adis	
128 Adis		129 Adis		130 Adis	
131 Adis		132 Adis		133 Adis	
134 Adis		135 Adis		136 Adis	
137 Adis		138 Adis		139 Adis	
140 Adis		141 Adis		142 Adis	
143 Adis		144 Adis		145 Adis	
146 Adis		147 Adis		148 Adis	
149 Adis		150 Adis		151 Adis	
152 Adis		153 Adis		154 Adis	
155 Adis		156 Adis		157 Adis	
158 Adis		159 Adis		160 Adis	
161 Adis		162 Adis		163 Adis	
164 Adis		165 Adis		166 Adis	
167 Adis		168 Adis		169 Adis	
170 Adis		171 Adis		172 Adis	
173 Adis		174 Adis		175 Adis	
176 Adis		177 Adis		178 Adis	
179 Adis		180 Adis		181 Adis	
182 Adis		183 Adis		184 Adis	
185 Adis		186 Adis		187 Adis	
188 Adis		189 Adis		190 Adis	
191 Adis		192 Adis		193 Adis	
194 Adis		195 Adis		196 Adis	
197 Adis		198 Adis		199 Adis	
200 Adis		201 Adis		202 Adis	
203 Adis		204 Adis		205 Adis	
206 Adis		207 Adis		208 Adis	
209 Adis		210 Adis		211 Adis	
212 Adis		213 Adis		214 Adis	
215 Adis		216 Adis		217 Adis	
218 Adis		219 Adis		220 Adis	
221 Adis		222 Adis		223 Adis	
224 Adis		225 Adis		226 Adis	
227 Adis		228 Adis		229 Adis	
230 Adis		231 Adis		232 Adis	
233 Adis		234 Adis		235 Adis	
236 Adis		237 Adis		238 Adis	
239 Adis		240 Adis		241 Adis	
242 Adis		243 Adis		244 Adis	
245 Adis		246 Adis		247 Adis	
248 Adis		249 Adis		250 Adis	
251 Adis		252 Adis		253 Adis	
254 Adis		255 Adis		256 Adis	
257 Adis		258 Adis		259 Adis	
260 Adis		261 Adis		262 Adis	
263 Adis		264 Adis		265 Adis	
266 Adis		267 Adis		268 Adis	
269 Adis		270 Adis		271 Adis	
272 Adis		273 Adis		274 Adis	
275 Adis		276 Adis		277 Adis	
278 Adis		279 Adis		280 Adis	
281 Adis		282 Adis		283 Adis	
284 Adis		285 Adis		286 Adis	
287 Adis		288 Adis		289 Adis	
290 Adis		291 Adis		292 Adis	
293 Adis		294 Adis		295 Adis	
296 Adis		297 Adis		298 Adis	
299 Adis		300 Adis		301 Adis	
302 Adis		303 Adis		304 Adis	
305 Adis		306 Adis		307 Adis	
308 Adis		309 Adis		310 Adis	
311 Adis		312 Adis		313 Adis	
314 Adis		315 Adis		316 Adis	
317 Adis		318 Adis		319 Adis	
320 Adis		321 Adis		322 Adis	
323 Adis		324 Adis		325 Adis	
326 Adis		327 Adis		328 Adis	
329 Adis		330 Adis		331 Adis	
332 Adis		333 Adis		334 Adis	
335 Adis		336 Adis		337 Adis	
338 Adis		339 Adis		340 Adis	
341 Adis		342 Adis		343 Adis	
344 Adis		345 Adis		346 Adis	
347 Adis		348 Adis		349 Adis	
350 Adis		351 Adis		352 Adis	
353 Adis		354 Adis		355 Adis	
356 Adis		357 Adis		358 Adis	
359 Adis		360 Adis		361 Adis	
362 Adis		363 Adis		364 Adis	
365 Adis		366 Adis		367 Adis	
368 Adis		369 Adis		370 Adis	
371 Adis		372 Adis		373 Adis	
374 Adis		375 Adis		376 Adis	
377 Adis		378 Adis		379 Adis	
380 Adis		381 Adis		382 Adis	
383 Adis		384 Adis		385 Adis	
386 Adis		387 Adis		388 Adis	
389 Adis		390 Adis		391 Adis	
392 Adis		393 Adis		394 Adis	
395 Adis		396 Adis		397 Adis	
398 Adis		399 Adis		400 Adis	
401 Adis		402 Adis		403 Adis	
404 Adis		405 Adis		406 Adis	
407 Adis		408 Adis		409 Adis	
410 Adis		411 Adis		412 Adis	
413 Adis		414 Adis		415 Adis	
416 Adis		417 Adis		418 Adis	
419 Adis		420 Adis		421 Adis	
422 Adis		423 Adis		424 Adis	
425 Adis		426 Adis		427 Adis	
428 Adis		429 Adis		430 Adis	
431 Adis		432 Adis		433 Adis	
434 Adis		435 Adis		436 Adis	

Annex 159 Canik TP9 Elite SF pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to USA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the manufacturer, the Canik TP9 Elite SF pistol with serial numbers T6472-22 AT 24009, was transferred in September 2022 to Century Arms Inc., Fairfax, USA.

Quantity documented: 1

Figures 159.1. (left) and 159.2 (right)



Figure 159.3



Serial number

T6472-22 AT 24009

Source: https://twitter.com/Ashraf_Muneef/status/1692436654168953146

Appendix A

Air Waybill associated to the transfer of the Canik TP9 SF pistol with serial number T6472-22 AT 24009

235		IST 48992355				235 48992355			
Shipper's Name and Address SAMSUN YURT SAVUNMA SANAYI VE TICARET A.S. ORGANIZE SANAYI BOLG. VALI ERDOGAN CEBECI BLV. NO:28 55300 TEKKEKOY-SAMSUN-TURKEY						Not Negotiable Air Waybill Issued by		TURK HAVA YOLLARI A.O. TURKISH AIRLINES INC. THY GENEL YONETIM BINASI, ATATURK HAVALIMANI 34149 YESILKOY-ISTANBUL-TURKEY	
Copies 1,2 and 3 of this Air Waybill are originals and have the same validity.						E - AWB			
Consignee's Name and Address CENTURY ARMS INC 236 BRYCE BLVD. FAIRFAX, VT 05454 USA PHONE: 802 527 1258 FAX: 802 752 1260 05454 NEW YORK-NEW YORK-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA									
Issuing Carrier's Agent Name and City SOLMAZ GUMRUK MUSAVIRLIGI A.S. ZINCIRLIKUYU ESENTEPE MAH. KORE SEHITLERI CAD. YUZBASI KAYA ALDOGAN NO:9 34394 SISLI-ISTANBUL- TURKEY						Accounting Information FREIGHT PREPAID			
Agent's IATA Code BB 4 727B 0012		Account No.		Airport of Departure (Addr. Of First Carrier) and Requested Routing ISTANBUL / ISTANBUL HAVALIMANI		Reference Number		Optional Shipping Information	
To By First Carrier		To By To By		Currency	CHG/WT/VAL	Other	Declared Value for Carriage	Declared Value for Customs	
JFK TÜRK HAVA YOLLARI A.O.				USD	PK	X	NVD	MCV	
Airport of Destination NEW YORK UNITED STATES		Requested Flight/Date TK 6363 19.09.2022		Amount of Insurance XXX		INSURANCE - If Carrier offers insurance, and such insurance is required in accordance with the conditions thereof, indicate amount to be insured in figures in box marked 'Amount of Insurance'			
Packing Information 64 PALLETS 12062 KG HBA						SCT			
No of Pieces GPC	Gross Weight	kg	Rate Class Commodity	Chargeable Weight	Rate / Charge	Total	Nature and Quantity of Goods (incl. Dimensions or Volume)		
64	12062	K	Q	12062	5.3	63928.60	SEMI AUTOMATIC PISTOLS NOT RESTRICTED DIMS: 26/120X80X100 CM 32/120X80X80 CM 1/123X80X46 CM 2/123X80X55 CM 3/123X80X44 CM		
64	12062	K	Q						
Prepaid		Weight Charge		Collect		Other Charges			
						AWA= 60 MOC: 60.- CGC: 3.00 FSC: 2412.40			
		Valuation Charge							
		Tax							
		Total Other Charges Due Agent				Shipper certifies that the particulars on the face			
60.00						SOLMAZ GUMRUK MUSAVIRLIGI AS AGENT OF CARRIER			
		Total Other Charges Due Carrier				TÜRK HAVA YOLLARI A.O.			
		Total Prepaid		Total Collect		1. 17.09.2022 ISTANBUL / ISTANBUL HAVALIMANI D. LEK OKTAY			
Currency Conversion Rates		CC Charges in Dom. Currency				Executed on (date) At (place)			
						Signature of Shipper or its Agent Signature of Issuing Carrier or its Agent			
For Carrier Use only at Destination		Charges at Destination		Total collect Charges					

Source: Confidential

Annex 160: AHSS FXS-9 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to the Sudan and to Czechia, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 46

Figures 160.1 (left) and 160.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=106430429046706&set=pb.100090392468856.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

TF674-22A01575 (B)	TF674-22A10232 (B)	TF674-22A11575 (C)	TF674-22A13565 (B)	TF674-22A14223 (B)
TF674-22A01981 (B)	TF674-22A10421 (B)	TF674-22A11585 (C)	TF674-22A13807 (B)	TF674-22A14228 (B)
TF674-22A04707 (A)	TF674-22A10558 (B)	TF674-22A11605 (C)	TF674-22A13597 (B)	TF674-22A44380 (A)
TF674-22A04822 (B)	TF674-22A10292 (B)	TF674-22A11723 (C)	TF674-22A13709 (B)	
TF674-22A04933 (A)	TF674-22A10691 (B)	TF674-22A11733 (A)	TF674-22A13781 (B)	
TF674-22A05250 (B)	TF674-22A10700 (A)	TF674-22A11774 (C)	TF674-22A13823 (B)	
TF674-22A08467 (C)	TF674-22A10726 (A)	TF674-22A11802 (C)	TF674-22A13856 (B)	
TF674-22A08518 (C)	TF674-22A10736 (B)	TF674-22A11830 (C)	TF674-22A13860 (B)	
TF674-22A08544 (A)	TF674-22A10740 (B)	TF674-22A12002 (C)	TF674-22A13864 (B)	
TF674-22A08974 (C)	TF674-22A10775 (B)	TF674-22A12503 (D)	TF674-22A13911 (B)	
TF674-22A08999 (C)	TF674-22A11537 (C)	TF674-22A13466 (B)	TF674-22A13956 (A)	
TF674-22A09024 (C)	TF674-22A11556 (C)	TF674-22A13532 (B)	TF674-22A14004 (B)	
TF674-22A10230 (B)	TF674-22A11567 (C)	TF674-22A13550 (B)	TF674-22A14179 (A)	

- (A) Purchaser not identified
- (B) Moataz Abdelrahman weapons ammunition, Sudan
- (C) Albayarg for firearms, Sudan
- (D) Kozap S.R.O, Czechia

Appendix A

Document related to the legal transfer between February 2022 and December 2022 of 47 AHSS FXS-9 pistols into the Republic of Sudan and to Czechia

SERIAL NUMBER	BRAND	MODEL	DELIVERY	EXPORT PERMISSION NO	PRODUCTION TIME	COUNTRY	COMPANY
TF674-22A01575	AHSS	FXS-9	11/02/22	06.01.2021 - 38100341-545.04-5626	10.02.2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A01981	AHSS	FXS-9	11/02/22	06.01.2021 - 38100341-545.04-5626	10.02.2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A04822	AHSS	FXS-9	15/04/22	06.01.2021 - 38100341-545.04-5626	07.04.2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A05250	AHSS	FXS-9	15/04/22	06.01.2021 - 38100341-545.04-5626	12.04.2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A08467	AHSS	FXS-9	28/06/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	28/06/2022	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A08518	AHSS	FXS-9	28/06/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	28/06/2022	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A08974	AHSS	FXS-9	13/07/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	07/07/2022	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A08999	AHSS	FXS-9	13/07/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	07/07/2022	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A09024	AHSS	FXS-9	13/07/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	07/07/2022	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A10230	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10232	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10292	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10421	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10558	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10691	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10736	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10740	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A10775	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A11537	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11556	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11567	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11575	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11585	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11605	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11723	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11774	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11802	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A11830	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A12002	AHSS	FXS-9	14/09/22	01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572	13/09/22	Republic of the Sudan	ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS
TF674-22A12503	AHSS	FXS-9	30/09/22	22.07.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1457899	29/09/2022	Czech Republic	KOZAP S.R.O
TF674-22A13466	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13532	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13550	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13565	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13597	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13709	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13781	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13807	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13823	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13856	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13860	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13864	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A13911	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A14004	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A14223	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A14228	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION
TF674-22A44380	AHSS	FXS-9	6/12/22	08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524	25/11/2022	Republic of the Sudan	MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION

Source: Confidential

Annex 161: Sarsilmaz SAR-9 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to the Sudan, and in 2023 to KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 175

Figures 161.1 (left), and 161.2 (right)



Serial numbers

T1102-22CM00027 (A)	T1102-22BV50524 (B)	T1102-22BV56000 (B)	T1102-22BV59643 (A)
T1102-22BV00592 (A)	T1102-22BV50532 (B)	T1102-22BV56663 (B)	T1102-22BV59650 (C)
T1102-22BV00603 (B)	T1102-22BV50556 (C)	T1102-22BV56718 (B)	T1102-22BV59698 (C)
T1102-22BV00925 (D)	T1102-22BV50557 (A)	T1102-22BV56728 (B)	T1102-22BV59737 (C)
T1102-22BV01329 (A)	T1102-22BV50605 (B)	T1102-22BV56776 (B)	T1102-22BV59749 (C)
T1102-22BV01494 (C)	T1102-22BV50627 (B)	T1102-22BV56797 (B)	T1102-22BV59753 (C)
T1102-22BV02138 (B)	T1102-22BV50642 (C)	T1102-22BV56805 (A)	T1102-22BV59775 (C)
T1102-22BV02973 (C)	T1102-22BV50665 (A)	T1102-22BV56979 (A)	T1102-22BV59880 (C)
T1102-22BV03576 (C)	T1102-22BV50669 (C)	T1102-22BV58171 (B)	T1102-22BV59894 (C)
T1102-22BV03775 (C)	T1102-22BV50702 (C)	T1102-22BV58235 (B)	T1102-22BV59919 (C)
T1102-22BV04258 (C)	T1102-22BV50717 (B)	T1102-22BV58244 (B)	T1102-22BV59977 (C)
T1102-22BV04332 (C)	T1102-22BV50789 (C)	T1102-22BV58259 (B)	T1102-22BV59994 (C)
T1102-22BV04823 (A)	T1102-22BV50827 (C)	T1102-22BV58266 (B)	T1102-22BV60012 (C)
T1102-22BV04833 (A)	T1102-22BV50860 (C)	T1102-22BV58401 (A)	T1102-22BV60013 (C)
T1102-22BV04904 (B)	T1102-22BV50877 (C)	T1102-22BV58413 (B)	T1102-22BV60067 (C)
T1102-22BV04948 (C)	T1102-22BV50882 (C)	T1102-22BV58577 (B)	T1102-22BV60236 (C)
T1102-22BV04975 (C)	T1102-22BV50893 (A)	T1102-22BV58600 (B)	T1102-22BV60339 (B)
T1102-22BV05018 (C)	T1102-22BV50894 (B)	T1102-22BV58606 (A)	T1102-22BV60340 (A)
T1102-22BV05021 (A)	T1102-22BV50921 (B)	T1102-22BV58633 (B)	T1102-22BV60395 (A)
T1102-22BV05043 (A)	T1102-22BV50925 (A)	T1102-22BV58651 (B)	T1102-22BV60427 (B)
T1102-22BV14329 (B)	T1102-22BV50928 (B)	T1102-22BV58763 (B)	T1102-22BV60435 (B)
T1102-22BV50171 (A)	T1102-22BV50939 (B)	T1102-22BV58827 (A)	T1102-22BV60454 (B)
T1102-22BV50173 (B)	T1102-22BV50980 (B)	T1102-22BV58828 (B)	T1102-22BV80288 (A)
T1102-22BV50185 (A)	T1102-22BV51017 (C)	T1102-22BV58908 (A)	T1102-23BV01025 (A)
T1102-22BV50186 (C)	T1102-22BV51049 (C)	T1102-22BV58912 (B)	T1102-23BV01041 (B)
T1102-22BV50211 (B)	T1102-22BV51052 (B)	T1102-22BV58934 (B)	T1102-23BV01082 (B)
T1102-22BV50212 (B)	T1102-22BV55750 (B)	T1102-22BV58942 (A)	T1102-23BV01105 (B)
T1102-22BV50232 (B)	T1102-22BV55763 (B)	T1102-22BV59328 (A)	T1102-23BV01107 (B)
T1102-22BV50242 (A)	T1102-22BV55768 (B)	T1102-22BV59329 (C)	T1102-23BV01121 (A)
T1102-22BV50263 (B)	T1102-22BV55782 (B)	T1102-22BV59342 (C)	T1102-23BV01190 (B)
T1102-22BV50311 (B)	T1102-22BV55790 (B)	T1102-22BV59404 (C)	T1102-23BV01222 (B)
T1102-22BV50328 (B)	T1102-22BV55850 (A)	T1102-22BV59412 (C)	T1102-23BV01233 (B)
T1102-22BV50335 (B)	T1102-22BV55851 (A)	T1102-22BV59440 (C)	T1102-23BV01249 (B)
T1102-22BV50360 (B)	T1102-22BV55852 (B)	T1102-22BV59453 (A)	T1102-23BV01274 (B)
T1102-22BV50365 (B)	T1102-22BV55884 (A)	T1102-22BV59473 (C)	T1102-23BV01276 (B)
T1102-22BV50444 (B)	T1102-22BV55893 (B)	T1102-22BV59504 (C)	T1102-23BV01282 (A)
T1102-22BV50457 (A)	T1102-22BV55894 (B)	T1102-22BV59566 (A)	T1102-23BV01285 (A)
T1102-22BV50480 (C)	T1102-22BV55912 (B)	T1102-22BV59591 (C)	T1102-23BV01294 (A)
T1102-22BV50487 (A)	T1102-22BV55929 (B)	T1102-22BV59621 (C)	T1102-23BV01346 (A)
T1102-22BV50495 (C)	T1102-22BV55932 (B)	T1102-22BV59622 (C)	T1102-23BV02346 (A)
T1102-22BV50496 (B)	T1102-22BV55993 (B)	T1102-22BV59630 (C)	T1102-23BV11762 (A)
T1102-22BV50498 (A)	T1102-22BV55997 (B)	T1102-22BV59642 (C)	

- (A) Purchaser not identified
- (B) Khalid Maki Osman for arms and ammunition, Khartoum, Sudan
- (C) Al Rimala for arms and ammunition and trading, Khartoum, Sudan
- (D) Bin Humaid national trading, KSA

Annex 162: Sarsilmaz SAR-9 SP pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to the Sudan, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 13

Figures 162.1 (left), and 162.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinmF0uL2/status/1690784112443867136/photo/2>

Serial numbers

T1102-23CM00131 (A)
T1102-23CM00177 (B)
T1102-23CM00179 (A)
T1102-23CM00180 (A)
T1102-23CM00223 (B)
T1102-23CM00232 (B)
T1102-23CM00234 (A)
T1102-23CM00460 (B)
T1102-23CM00462 (B)
T1102-23CM00469 (B)
T1102-23CM00474 (B)
T1102-23CM00484 (B)
T1102-23CM00504 (A)

(A) Purchaser not identified

(B) Khalid Maki Osman for arms and ammunition, Khartoum, Sudan

Annex 163: Sarsilmaz B6 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2015 to Iraq, and in 2022 to the Sudan, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 17

Figures 163.1 (left), and 163.2 (right)



Source: https://twitter.com/ramzy_Awsah_/status/1640451562236436480/photo/2

Serial numbers

T1102-13B00325 (A)
T1102-13E16246 (A)

T1102-14E00339 (C)
T1102-14E00914 (C)
T1102-14E01232 (A)

T1102-22E02300 (B)
T1102-22E03166 (B)
T1102-22E03170 (B)
T1102-22E03791 (B)
T1102-22E06124 (B)
T1102-22E52539 (A)
T1102-22E52581 (B)
T1102-22E52591 (B)
T1102-22E52582 (A)
T1102-22E52588 (A)
T1102-22E52581 (A)
T1102-22E52591 (A)

- (A) Purchaser not identified
- (B) Khalid Maki Osman for arms and ammunition, Khartoum, Sudan
- (C) Office of the Prime minister, Iraq

Annex 164: Sarsilmaz Kiliç 2000 Mega pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2015 to Iraq, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 2

Figures 164.1 (left), and 164.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/yhyyr522/status/1713906770391756920>

Serial numbers

T1102-13B00323 (A)
T1102-15U07340 (B)

- (A) Purchaser not identified
- (B) Office of the Prime minister, Iraq

Annex 165: CZ P-07 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Czech Republic, which have been legally transferred in 2023 to KSA and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the manufacturer, the CZ P-07 pistol with serial numbers F374493, was transferred on 3 December 2021 to Ben Humaid National Trading Co, Exit 13/14, Eastern Ring Road, Riyadh – KSA, and the CZ P-07 pistol with serial numbers H011589, was transferred on 6 March 2023 to the same purchaser.

Quantity documented: 2

Figure 165.1



Figure 165.2



Figure 165.3



Source: <https://twitter.com/mdljbr201/status/1736762856048152873>

Serial numbers

F374493
H011589

Annex 166: X-Calibur Mk23 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Slovak Republic, which have been legally transferred to first Czechia and then to KSA and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to KalibrGun Valdy EU Ltd., Czechia, the X-Calibur Mk23 pistol with serial numbers K102358, was part of a sale agreement signed in January 2022 with Ben Humaid National Trading Co, Jeddah, KSA.

Quantity documented: 1

Figure 166.1



Source: https://twitter.com/Ashraf_Muneef/status/1720885902778515477

Serial number

K102358

Appendix A

Commercial agreement between KalibrGun Valdy EU Ltd., Czechia, and Bin Humaid National trading (Arabian Hunter), KSA

Arabian Hunter Est.
For Air Rifles and Hunting Tools
C.R 4030200680



مؤسسة الصياد العربي
للبنادق الهوائية وأدوات الصيد
س.ت 4030200680

Commercial Agreement

On this day 04/01/2022 in Prague City It was agreed between:

1- **KalibrGun Valdy EU LTD** His residence (or his headquarter): Czech Republic Holder of Commercial Register no. (VAT no. CZ24779636) City: Praha
www.kalibrgun.cz

Represented in this contract by :
Mr. Janousek Richard
His nationality: Czech , First Party.

2- **Bin Humaid National Trading (ARABIAN HUNTER)** , His Residence / Headquarter : Jeddah , Saudi Arabia Holder of Commercial Register No. 4030054282 City : Jeddah,

Represented in this contract by :
Mr. Nawaf Bandar Bin Humaid
(second party-Exclusive Agent)

Item (1): The two parties have agreed that the second party will import and sell products of the first party in Saudi Arabia. Second Party will sell these pistols in Firearms trade-fairs held in Saudi Arabia .
Terms of Payment: 50% Advance - 50% before Delivery

Item (2): The subject of this contract is the products and services provided by the first party as hereunder specified:

First supply :

Pistols **Grand Power Cal.9mm Model X-Caliber** at the price of (599) Quantity 200 manufactured by Grand Power / slovakia
Pistols **Grand Power Cal.22LR** at the price of (EUR310) quantity 20 pcs manufactured by Grand Power / slovakia
Pistols **Grand Power Cal.9mm Model Q1** at the price of (EUR 347)quantity 50 pcs manufactured by Grand Power / slovakia
Pistols **Grand Power Cal.9mm Model Q1S** at the price of (EUR 347)quantity 50 pcs manufactured by Grand Power / slovakia

Item (3): The geographic area for the validity of this exclusive agreement is determined by countries of Saudi Arabia

Item (4): The validity of this contract is (5) years starting from 01-11-2019 and ending by 31-10-2024

Item (5): The two parties shall execute the contract according to its provisions and in conformity with the rules of Czech law and in a manner that conforms to the requirements of goodwill.

Item (6): The first party guarantees to sell to the second party minimum quantity of (2100) pieces of firearms per annum in good quality of materials and products subject to this contract.

Item (7): This contract shall be governed by the rules of systems valid in the Czech Republic, ie. by the Laws of the Czech Republic.



Arabian Hunter Est.
For Air Rifles and Hunting Tools
C.R 4030200680



مؤسسة الصياد العربي
للبنادق الهوائية وأدوات الصيد
س.ت 4030200680

First Party

Name: Mr. Janousek Richard

Signature



Second Party

Name: Mr. Nawaf Bandar Ben Humaid

Signature



Scuilar s originalu
Due: 14.12.2022
Ing. Richard Janousek
PROCURISTA



Source: Confidential

Annex 167: Presence of the aggregated carrier *Almas* at the Port of Saleef, Yemen in October 2023

**Table 1
Statute and change of flag**

Owner & Registration				
Ownership	Ownership History	Registration	Flag	Tanzania (Zanzibar)
Port of Registry	Zanzibar	Flag	Sat Com ID	Tanzania (Zanzibar)
Official Number	902204	Sat Com ID	Fishing Number	
Sat Com Ants Black				
Current P&I Club	Unknown			
P&I Club History				
Date				P&I Club
2005-02-20				Unknown
Flag, Call Sign & MMSI History				
Date	Flag	Port of Registry	Call Sign	MMSI
2022-08	Tanzania (Zanzibar)	Zanzibar	5M4257	
2022-05	Unknown	Unknown		
2022-03	Belize	Belize City	VJ23	312973000
2004-03	Japan	W. Nagasaki	JM6170	431600007
1992-08	Japan	Ishida, Nagasaki		

Source: Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite (MIRS)

**Figures 167.1
Almas to the Port of Hudaydah (around 18 October 2023)**

The *Almas* was visible on satellite imagery on 19, 20 and 21 October (the image of 18 October had 100 percent cloud cover) – it was not visible anymore on 22 October imagery, so *Almas* left Hudaydah on 21 or 22 October 2023.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

**Table 2
Almas to the Port of Hudaydah on 18 October 2023**

According to S&P Global MIRS, the position of the ship on 18 October was 14.91335 N / 42.887875 E, which is almost exactly the location of where the ship is docked, as visible on figure 167.2

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
Report produced by S&P Global on 20 May 2024 16:06										
Mmsi	Imo	Name	LastUpdateReceived	Latitude	Longitude	Speed	Draught	AlsDraught	Narrative	Destination
312973000	8864957	ALMAS	2023-10-13 04:48:51	12.995643	43.285073	8.5	3	4.1	Port call possible during dark period\nfrom 13 Oct 2023\nto 18 Oct 2023	NAN TONG SAI YANGCC
0	8864957	ALMAS	2023-10-18 07:15:45	14.913355	42.887875	0	3	4.1	Port call\nRas Alkatheeb\n18 Oct 2023 84 hours	
312973000	8864957	ALMAS	2023-10-18 07:15:45	14.913355	42.887875	0	3	4.1	Dark activity end of alert \n18 Oct 2023\nPort call possible during dark period	NAN TONG SAI YANGCC
312973000	8864957	ALMAS	2023-10-23 20:05:07	14.057623	48.79288	7.4	3	4.1	Port call possible during dark period\nfrom 23 Oct 2023\nto 26 Oct 2023	NAN TONG SAI YANGCC
312973000	8864957	ALMAS	2023-10-26 18:04:51	15.290595	51.738258	9	3	4.1	Dark activity end of alert \n26 Oct 2023\nPort call possible during dark period	NAN TONG SAI YANGCC

Source: MIRS

Table 3

Presence of *Almas* in the civilian port,⁷² near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbor, Iran, between 20-26 September 2023



Source: MIRS

Based on Planet SkySat 0.5-meter resolution satellite imagery, it could be assessed that the *Almas* arrived in the Bandar Abbas Military Harbor (exact location from MIRS: 27.08.47N / 56.12.12E) on 19 or 20 September (not visible on 19 September image, but present on 20 September image) and left the Harbor on 25 or 26 September (still visible on 25 September image but gone on 26 September image).

Table 4

Presence of *Almas* near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbor, Iran, on 3 October 2023, before sailing directly to the Port of Hudaydah



Source: MIRS

On 27 September, the *Almas* is visible on PlanetScope 3-meter resolution satellite imagery at the Shahid Rajaei Eastern Anchorage location (exact location from MIRS: 27.08.17N / 56.14.39E). The *Almas* is also visible on 29 September, 1 and 3 October but gone on 5 October. So, *Almas* left for Yemen on 3, 4 or 5 October 2023.

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

⁷² IRIN vessels have been observed anchored in the civilian part of this port, see <https://maphub.net/Cengiz/bandar-abbas-iran-navy-base>

Figure 167.2

Almas visible on 20 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.3

Almas visible on 21 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.4

Almas visible on 22 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.5

***Almas* visible on 23 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)**



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.6

***Almas* visible on 24 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)**

The image shows one ship docked in parallel to the *Almas* and activity visible on the dock. The Panel does not exclude that the loading of the *Almas* was taking place.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.7

***Almas* visible on 25 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)**

Last image with *Almas* visible in the Bandar Abbas Harbour.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.8
***Almas* visible on 27 September 2023 at the Shahid Rajaei Anchorage (first image)**



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.9
***Almas* visible on 3 October 2023 at the Shahid Rajaei Anchorage (last image before *Almas* was sailing to the Port of Hudaydah)**



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Annex 168: Presence in September and October 2023 of the general cargo ship *Kasra-3* at the Port of Saleef, Yemen

Table 1
Statute and change of flag

Date	Significant Events
202402	Flagged by Comoros, Operator Mohammadi M, Owner Mohammadi M, Ship Manager Mohammadi M
202204	Name changed to KASRA 3, Flagged by Tanzania (Zanzibar), Operator Rptd Sold Undisclosed Interest, Owner Rptd Sold Undisclosed Interest, Ship Manager Rptd Sold Undisclosed Interest
200401	Flagged by Japan
199410	Flagged by Japan, Status changed to In Service/Commission
199409	Status changed to Launched
199408	Status changed to Keel Laid
199400	Name changed to Eiju Maru No. 12, Status changed to On Order/Not Commenced, Operator Eiju Maru, Owner Eiju Maru, Ship Manager Eiju Maru

Source: MIRS


Part 1: Whereabouts of *Kasra-3* in September/October 2023

The *Kasra-3* spends,

According to MIRS, the *Kasra-3* spent sometime in the Port of Shahid Rajae and then waited in the Shahid Rajae Eastern Anchorage for a while. The *Kasra-3* was visible on 24 September 2023 in the Shahid Rajae Eastern Anchorage. On the next available satellite imagery on 29 September, she had left.


Figures 168.1 (up), and 168.2 (down)

***Kasra-3* at Shahid Rajae Eastern Anchorage on 24 September 2024**



Source: MIRS

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Table 2
Kasra-3 possible dark activities

According to MIRS, there are possible suspicious activities until she shows up on 29 September 2023 near the coast of Oman (23.034483N / 59.58823E).

Report produced by S&P Global on 21 May 2024 17:53

Mmsi	Imo	Name	LastUpdateReceived	Latitude	Longitude	Speed	Draught	AisDraught	Narrative	Destination
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-06 00:45:31	26.982068	56.305763	6.8	3		4.372 Dark activity end of alert \n06 Sep 2023\nNo AIS signal for extended period worldwide	
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-06 05:18:11	26.532143	56.045997	7.2	3		4.372 Transit\nTransit Straits of Hormuz W\n06 Sep 2023	Bandar Abbas
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-06 15:34:23	25.511865	55.400895	0	3		4.372 Waiting at \nHamriyah C Anchorage\n06 Sep 2023 375 hours	Bandar Abbas
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-08 17:24:32	25.511697	55.400928	0	3		4.372 No AIS signal for extended period worldwide\nfrom 08 Sep 2023\nto 22 Sep 2023	Bandar Abbas
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-22 06:28:13	27.108512	56.065292	0	3		4.372 Dark activity end of alert \n22 Sep 2023\nNo AIS signal for extended period worldwide	
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-22 06:28:13	27.108512	56.065292	0	3		4.372 Berth call\n8, Bandar Abbas\n22 Sep 2023	
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-22 06:28:13	27.108512	56.065292	0	3		4.372 Port call\nShahid Rajaei\n22 Sep 2023 39 hours	Bandar Abbas
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-23 23:17:50	27.137633	56.257238	0	3		4.372 Waiting at \nShahid Rajaei Eastern Anchorage\n23 Sep 2023 9 hours	Bandar Abbas
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-24 11:35:37	27.138113	56.257842	0	3		4.372 Waiting at \nShahid Rajaei Eastern Anchorage\n24 Sep 2023 69 hours	Bandar Abbas
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-27 08:10:45	27.215957	56.378168	58.2	3		4.372 Port call possible during dark period\nfrom 27 Sep 2023\nto 29 Sep 2023	Bandar Abbas
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-29 17:52:00	23.034483	59.58823	10	3		4.372 Dark activity end of alert \n29 Sep 2023\nPort call possible during dark period	MASQAT
677039500	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-29 17:52:00	23.034483	59.58823	10	3		0 Destination Change To\nMASQAT \n29 Sep 2023 05:52	MASQAT
613516310	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-09-29 23:45:45	22.34409	59.998278	8.8	3		4.372 Position anomalous for extended period in sensitive area\nfrom 29 Sep 2023\nto 01 Oct 2023	MASQAT
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-05 20:13:27	12.812277	43.281718	9.8	3		4.372 Transit\nTransit Bab El Mandeb NW\n05 Oct 2023	
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-06 15:50:58	15.315775	42.669287	0	3		4.372 Port call\nSaleef\n06 Oct 2023 236 hours	
613516310	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-06 16:09:56	15.3157	42.669287	0	3		4.372 Berth call\nGeneral Cargo Berth, Saleef\n06 Oct 2023	
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-16 17:52:24	14.00358	42.830675	8.5	3		4.372 Destination Change To\nJebel Ali\n16 Oct 2023 05:52	Jebel Ali
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-17 03:11:30	12.81569	43.229825	7.8	3		4.372 Transit\nTransit Bab El Mandeb SE\n17 Oct 2023	Jebel Ali
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-23 08:54:46	24.948057	57.593728	10.2	3		4.372 Destination Change To\nBandar Abbas\n23 Oct 2023 08:54	Bandar Abbas
620999432	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-24 11:01:16	27.102805	56.196993	0	3		4.372 Waiting at \nBandar Abbas Merchant Anchorage\n24 Oct 2023 0 hours	Bandar Abbas
613516310	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-24 16:33:38	27.214282	56.377413	58.2	3		4.372 Dark for extended period in watched area\nfrom 24 Oct 2023	Bandar Abbas
613516310	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-24 16:33:38	27.214282	56.377413	58.2	3		4.372 No AIS signal for extended period worldwide\nfrom 24 Oct 2023\nto 08 Nov 2023	Bandar Abbas
613516310	9109184	KASRA 3	2023-10-24 16:33:38	27.214282	56.377413	58.2	3		0 Destination Change To\nBandar Abbas\n24 Oct 2023 04:33	Bandar Abbas

Source: MIRS

According to the table above, the *Kasra-3* then sails to the Port of Saleef in Yemen, arriving there on 6 October at 15:50:58 hrs. On satellite imagery of 6 October 07.31 UTC, she is not visible, but she is visible on satellite imagery from 7 October 06:50 UTC and continues to be visible till 15 October 2023 07.49 UTC. On the next available satellite imagery (17 October 06.50 UTC) she is gone. According to MIRS, she went back to Iran.

Figure 168.4
Port of Saleef, Yemen – undated overview photo



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Figure 168.5
***Kasra-3* at the Port of Saleef on 11 October 2023**



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Part 2: Whereabouts of *Kasra-3* in October/November 2023


For a long period of time from the second half of October 2023 and the first half of November 2023, there is no AIS location data available for *Kasra-3*. According to MIRS, she was at the Bandar Abbas Merchant Anchorage on 24 October. On satellite imagery of this location on 24 October, *Kasra-3* is possibly visible. On the next available image of 25 October, she had left.

Figures 168.6 (up) and 168.7 (down)

***Kasra-3* at Bandar Abbas Merchant Anchorage on 24 October 2023**



Source: MIRS




Source: Planet satellite imagery

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

According to MIRS, *Kasra-3* arrives on 22 November at the Saleef anchorage point and stays there till 30 November.


Figures 168.8 (up), 168.9 (lower left), and 168.10 (lower right)
***Kasra-3* at Saleef anchorage, on 23 and 24 November 2023**



Source: MIRS

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


As per the satellite imagery of the Saleef anchorage point of 21 November *Kasra-3* is no visible but on 23 November she is present (NB: no imagery available for 22 November) and on 24 November she is also visible (even on 0.5-meter resolution image).



Source: Planet satellite imagery

On the next available satellite image (26 November 2023), it looks like *Kasra-3* was heading south. As per the satellite image of 27 November, there are some clouds, but it looks like a ship is docked in the Port of Saleef (same location where *Kasra-3* was docked in October 2023). It is hard to say whether the ship was there on 28 and 30 November, but on 1 December she had, most likely, gone. Although this hypothesis cannot be 100 percent confirmed, based on the available satellite imagery, it is the most likely analysis. It would be unrealistic to say that that *Kasra-3* would have sailed from Iran to the Saleef anchorage point and then would have sailed back without visiting a port in Yemen. There is also no evidence of ship-to-ship transfer.

Figure 168.11
***Kasra-3* at Saleef anchorage, on 26 November 2023**



Source: Planet satellite imagery


Figure 168.12
***Kasra-3* at Port of Saleef, on 27 November 2023**



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Annex 169: *Dubai-1* anchored on 23 March 2024 at Port Saleef

Figure 169.1
Port Saleef terminal



Source: MIRS

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Table 1
Suspicious maritime activities by *Dubai-1*.

In and out, suspicious movements between Somalia, Oman, Djibouti, Iran, and Yemen are highlighted

Repeatedly turning off and turning on the Automatic Identification System (AIS) of the aforementioned ship prevented it from being able to be followed accurately, and its sailing along the Yemeni coast raises suspicion of that ship. The above-mentioned activities may enhance the possibility of the ship transporting prohibited materiel for the Houthis, and the possibility of transferring materials from one ship to another is not excluded, as the ship's entry was monitored twice, and it docked in the port of Saleef.

29 March to 04 April 2024	Yemen with its AIS switched off for 6 days
22 to 27 March 2024	Yemen with its AIS switched off for 5 days
09 to 19 March 2024	Djibouti with its AIS switched off for 10 days
08 March 2024	Yemen with its AIS switched off
29 February to 08 March 2024	Somalia with its AIS switched off for 8 days
6 to 17 February 2024	Yemen with its AIS switched off for 12 days
5 February 2024	Yemen with its AIS switched off for 16 hours
14 January to 05 February 2024	Yemen with its AIS switched off for 22 days (prior she was in Djibouti)
17 December 2023 to 13 January 2024	Djibouti with its AIS switched off for 26 days
17 November to 9 December 2023	Djibouti with its AIS switched off for 22 days
9 December 2023	Arrived in Hudaydah without UNVIM inspection
9 to 16 November 2023	Oman with its AIS switched off for 7 days Dark activities ended in Djibouti

5 to 17 October 2023	Oman with its AIS switched off for 12 days
18 June to 20 July 2023	Oman with its AIS switched off for 32 days Prior she accosted UAE
22 April to 18 June 2023	UAE with its AIS switched off for 58 days
31 March to 20 April 2023	Oman with its AIS switched off for 20 days
9 January to 16 February 2023	UAE with its AIS switched off for 36 days
19 December 2022 to 9 January 2023	Oman with its AIS switched off for 20 days
24 October to 11 November 2022	Oman with its AIS switched off for 18 days
16 September to 2 October 2022	Iran with its AIS switched off for 16 days
5 to 24 August 2022	Oman with its AIS switched off for 19 days
25 July to 5 August 2022	Oman with its AIS switched off for 11 days
24 May to 27 July 2022	UAE with its AIS switched off for 62 days
5 April to 23 May 2022	Oman with its AIS switched off for 47 days
3 to 15 March 2022	Yemen with its AIS switched off for 12 days
13 to 31 January 2022	Oman with its AIS switched off for 18 days Prior she was in Iran for 4 hours (8 Jan 2022)
16 November to 11 December 2021	Oman with its AIS switched off for 24 days Prior she was in Iran for 2 days (15-16 Nov 21)
25 to 29 October 2021	Oman with its AIS switched off for 3 days Dark activities ended in Iran
5 May to 24 October 2021	Oman with its AIS switched off for 171 days
27 September to 20 November 2020	Oman with its AIS switched off for 54 days
18 to 27 September 2020	Oman with its AIS switched off for 8 days

Annex 170: Copy of the letter from the Director-General of Passports



to whom it may concern

Based on the approach approved by the General Command to work on the principle of (self-sufficiency), We would like to inform you that Messrs. Company /Azal Tech. for Printing - One of our approved suppliers in the implementation and supply of security publications Therefore we ask the competent authorities to facilitate their tasks with regard to requesting and purchasing security papers and inks and their accessories from the raw materials related this aspect

Thank you for your cooperation

Director General of Passports
 Major General/Isma'il Al-Muaid

Source: Confidential

Annex 172: Issuance of YR100 coin by CBY, Sana'a

Figure 172.1

Press Release by CBY, Aden

البنك المركزي اليمني
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN 

بيان صحفي

تابع البنك المركزي اليمني إعلان مليشيا الحوثي الإرهابية المستولية على فرع البنك المركزي بصنعاء إعلانها صك عملة معدنية فئة مائة ريال وإعلان طرحها للتداول بدلاً من العملة القانونية فئة المائة ريال الورقية ، وان البنك المركزي اليمني إذ يرفض هذا الفعل التصعيدي الخطير وغير القانوني والذي لايأخذ بنظر الإعتبار بأي شكل من الأشكال مصالح المواطنين ، فإن البنك المركزي يؤكد على ماسبق وأن حذر منه بشكل واضح بمنع كل الجهات والمؤسسات والأفراد من قبول أو تداول أي عملة مزورة صادرة من كيان غير قانوني بالمخالفة لكل القوانين والأعراف المالية والمصرفية وانه يحتفظ بحقه القانوني في إتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية الإحترازية لحماية الأصول المالية للمواطنين والمؤسسات المالية والمصرفية .

وتتحمل المليشيات تبعات هذا التصعيد اللامسؤول وما يترتب عليه من تعقيد وإرباك في تعاملات المواطنين والمؤسسات المالية والمصرفية داخلياً وخارجياً.

صادر عن
البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي عدن

Source: CBY, Aden

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the Press Release by CBY, Aden

Press Release

The Central Bank of Yemen followed up on the terrorist Houthi militia's announcement of responsibility on the branch of the Central Bank in Sana'a, announcing the issuance of a one-hundred- riyal coin and announcing that it would be put into circulation instead of the legal one-hundred- riyal paper currency. The Central Bank of Yemen rejects this dangerous and illegal escalatory act that does not take it into consideration. In any way, in the interests of citizens, the Central Bank affirms the above and clearly warned of it by preventing all parties, institutions and individuals from accepting or trading any counterfeit currency issued by an illegal entity in violation of all financial and banking laws and customs, and that it reserves its legal right to take precautionary legal measures. To protect the financial assets of citizens and financial and banking institutions.

The militias bear the consequences of this irresponsible escalation and the resulting complexity and confusion in the dealings of citizens and financial and banking institutions internally and externally.

Issued by

Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

Annex 173: Screenshots of messages for collection of funds for the UAV Force

Figure 173. 1

Screenshot of text messages for funds for the Air Force from the public

Source: Panel

Unofficial translation of the Screenshot of text messages for funds for the Air Force from the public

7:08 PM

Sunday, 24 December 2023

Support the Air Force
via the following accounts:
Central Bank No.
1128 - 10262 (riyals)
01-1019 - 10262 (dollars)

Figure 173.2
Screenshots of messages for collection of funds for the UAV Force



Source: Panel

Annex 174: Receipt of payment from schools for Drones (UAVs)

Figure 174.1

Copy of the Receipt of payment from schools for Drones (UAVs)

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
(يا أيها الذين آمنوا هل أدلكم على تجارة تصحطكم
من عذاب أليم ۝ لو آمنون بالله ورسوله وجاهدون في سبيل
الله بأموالكم وأنفسكم ذلكم خير لكم إن كنتم تعلمون)

قوافل وانفاق م / الأمانة

التاريخ: ١٩ / ٢ / ٢٠٢٥
الموافق: ٢٠ / ٢٤ / ١٤٤٦
سند رقم: 0161

سند توريد (قبض)

استلمت من الاخ اللادنه/مكتبة الترميم شرح الاما...
العمل نماء الترميم الترميم لاسيما الجرافيك والرسومات

نوع العملة	مبلغ وقدره	ملاحظات
يمني	٢٠,٩٥٦,٢٥٠	كتابتا
دولار		كتابتا
سعودي		كتابتا
عمله اخرى		كتابتا

وذلك مقابل: ما يكتسبه من عمله بمساعدة دعماً لظيانته في...
اسم المستلم: السيد الترميم محمد صالح
الجهة: الامانة
التوقيع: [Signature]

للاستفسار:
هاتف: ٧٣٦٨٧٥٨٤٩ - ٧٧٧٨٩٠٠٨٦

Source: Confidential

Appendix A

Unofficial Translation of the Receipt of payment from schools for Drones (UAVs)

Convoys and Expenditure m/ Secretariat (right)

In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful

“O you who have believed, shall I guide you to a trade that will save you from a painful punishment? That you believe in God and His Messenger and strive in the cause of God with your possessions and your lives. That is better for you, if you only knew.” (Among)

Date: 9/2/1445

Corresponding to: 12/3/2024

Document No.: 0161 (left)

Supply (receipt) bill

Document content:

I received from the Office of Education, the Secretariat branch, the handling the Director-General of the Office of Education, Abdul Qadir Al Mahdi

The amount is 20,956,250 twenty million nine hundred and fifty-six thousand two hundred and fifty riyals.

The purpose of this money is for the convoy provided by the schools of the capital secretariat in support of the drones.

Document footer:

Recipient's name: Abdul Karim Muhammad ~~Fadael~~

The entity/secretariat

Signature 12/3/2024

For inquiries

Phone: 777890086 - 736875849

Annex 175: Houthi revenue from customs, taxes, fees, and other illegal fees

The Panel received information that the amount of revenue collected and controlled by the Houthis during 2023 was approximately YR3.392 trillion. By illegally collecting fees in the name of customs and other taxes from the traders sending their goods from the GoY area to the Houthi-controlled area, the Houthis have been treating the GoY area as a separate country. Panel's sources estimate the Houthis' revenues from these illegal land collection points to be approximately YR300 billion in 2023. Sources affirm that these illegal collections go to the top Houthi leaders and used for payment of salaries to its combatants and for other military purposes.

The Houthi-appointed authority in Sana'a, collects illegal fees from airlines flying over Yemen, estimated at approximately \$32,850,000. When contacted, some airlines officials informed the Panel of their reluctance to stop paying to the Houthis to avoid any possible attacks on their aircrafts.

'khums' tax

The revenue from the 'khums' tax ("one-fifth", or 20 percent), imposed a few years ago by the Houthis by a Decree signed by Mehdi al-Mashat, president of the Houthi-appointed Supreme Political Council (SPC), benefit the Al-Houthi family and a large number of Houthi loyalists. This tax, on natural resources and economic activities carried out in areas under the control of the Houthis, is estimated to be a few billion YRs, is a clear violation of the financial sanctions regime.

Collections from the merchants in Ibb in the name of those killed by the Houthis

The Panel was informed that the Houthis recently had imposed new levies by force on the merchants in the Ibb Governorate. The Panel interviewed a few of these merchants, who requested anonymity. Purportedly, these new levies are intended to assist families of individuals who have been killed by the Houthis, obligating merchants to contribute food baskets. Merchants were presented with the choice of providing specific quantities of food baskets or paying an equivalent amount of money for them, while threatening violators with penalties. These taxes are part of a larger set of levies imposed by the Houthis, taking advantage of the month of Ramadan as a significant period for tax collection by the Houthis

Water Tax

Recently, the Houthis resorted to another method of collecting money by levying water tax in the name of "Teacher support and education Fund". The Panel's sources in the education department, who requested to remain anonymous, informed that the Houthi authorities are collecting money in the name of education but the same is mostly used for their military purposes. The authorities are not paying any salaries to the teachers because of which the teachers association announced an open strike until payment of their salaries pending since 2016. On 8 October 2024, Houthis arrested Abu Zaid al-Kumaim, head of the Yemeni Teachers Club, for organizing protests demanding the payment of teachers' salaries.

Arbitrary cancellation and transfer of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)

To enhance their financial gains, the Houthis have adopted an arbitrary and illegal policy of withdrawing trademarks from legitimate commercial entities and transferring them to entities

under their control. There have been several reports concerning violations of IPRs, especially commercial trademarks of companies and merchants in Sana'a. The Panel has received information that several lawsuits have been filed in the Commercial Court of First Instance, Sana'a against the Houthi-appointed Ministry of Industry and Trade for alleged violations of IPRs and the revocation of trademarks registered under their names. There have been reports of cancellations of the registrations of specific commercial entities, some of which have been subsequently transferred to others, affiliated to the Houthis. The Panel is in possession of some documents and is investigating the matter.

Collection of illegal fees from civil aviation sector

Exploiting the ongoing presence of the air traffic control centre at Sana'a airport, the Houthi-appointed authority in Sana'a, collects illegal fees from airlines flying over Yemen. Following the relocation of the General Authority for Civil Aviation and Meteorology to Aden, several airlines were notified by the GoY to redirect their overflight fees to the authority in Aden. Panel's investigation revealed that approximately 150 aircrafts traverse Yemen's airspace daily, each paying approximately \$600 as an overflight fee. The annual collection of overflight fees by the Houthis, deemed unlawful by the GoY, is estimated at approximately \$32,850,000. When contacted, some airlines officials informed the Panel of their reluctance to stop paying to the Houthis to avoid any possible attacks on their aircrafts. In addition to overflight fees, the Houthi-appointed authority also collects various airport service charges, including those for landing and take-off, passenger fees, airfreight fees, ground services, and all other airport-related fees.

Annex 176: Financing the purchase of military materiel

1. The Panel is investigating a case involving procurement of weapons by the Houthis using a Yemeni businessman. For the sake of the safety of the concerned person and his family members, his name and other details are not being disclosed. He was in the profession of doing customs clearance work in Yemen for the importers/traders for over 10 years.
2. Investigations revealed that in the past he had travelled to various countries including China, Djibouti, India, Iran, Lebanon, Oman, Somalia, Syria, and the UAE. His last foreign visit was reportedly in March 2023, after a shipment of missile components, which he was trying to clear, was intercepted by the Yemeni customs. He had also reportedly met the officials of the Houthi-controlled telecom company 'Tele Yemen', some whose telecom consignments were allegedly seized by Yemeni customs a few years ago.
3. Confidential sources informed the Panel that he is being investigated by the authorities for his alleged role in procuring/clearing missiles and missile components, weapons and other military materiel, including dual-use items for the Houthis by smuggling these weapons into Houthi-controlled areas. One such consignment was seized by the Yemeni customs, in which the components of missiles were concealed inside commercial cargo. He allegedly received funds arranged by the Houthis, both by cash and through transfers from various exchange companies in Yemen and Djibouti. The authorities reportedly seized cash amounting to \$198,000 from him, when he was arrested in February 2024 in Djibouti.
4. The Panel learnt that after the seizure of the aforesaid consignment, on the instructions of Major-General Muhammad Ahmad Al-Talibi, a Yemeni national operating from Iran, he went to Djibouti in August 2023 to start a business of importing military materiel from Iran and other countries. He changed his name and got a new passport to avoid any identification as a Houthi. He also set up a company in Djibouti. (para. 77 and case study 6).
5. The Panel's sources informed that, while in Djibouti, he received payments from various sources, arranged by the Houthis, including from exchange companies in Yemen and made payments to various suppliers of military materiel procured through Djibouti, before transferring these materiel to Houthi-controlled areas.
6. Investigations by the Panel, including scrutiny of some of the documents made available, revealed that he maintained accounts in Sana'a, Yemen in:
 - Al-Radwan Exchange and Transfers Co. Sana'a, and
 - Al-Hazmi Exchange Co. Sa'ana, Yemen.
7. He also maintained accounts in Djibouti in:
 - Djibouti Exp. Exchange Co
 - Al-Khaleel Exchange Co
 - CAC Bank

The Panel's investigation relating to his accounts revealed the following:

1. Djibouti Express Exchange Co. Djibouti

Sl. No	Date of transaction	Amount	Remarks
i	26 September 2023	\$ 6,490	Amount deposited
ii	8 October 2023	\$ 27,300	Amount deposited
iii	8 October 2023	\$33,000	Amount deposited
iv	11 October 2023	\$50,000	Amount deposited
v	14 October 2023	\$217,533	Amount deposited

vi	14 October 2023	\$ 50,000	Amount received from Al Dhya Co.
vii	14 October 2023	\$ 60,720	Amount received from Nabil Ahmed Ali Ali
viii	17 October 2023	\$ 60,720	Amount transferred to Mohammed bin Mohammed Abdo Hassan
ix	19 October 2023	\$2000	deposited Djiboutian Franc 354,000 (DJF) and purchased \$2000
x	12 November 2023	\$ 50,000	deposited DJF 8,850,000 and purchased \$ 50,000
xii	No date	\$ 28,259	received from Radwan Co.

2. Al Mohel Exchange Co. Hqrs in Demt in Yemen

- i. 16 October 2023 - \$30,431 received from Nabil Ahmed Ali Ali

3. Société Africaine Express Co.

- i. 19 November 2023 - transferred by Radwan Express Co. to Ahmed Mahmud Hazza Al Diya Co. - \$55,000

- Further, sources revealed that amount in DJF, equivalent to \$130,000, lying in his account in Al-Khaleel Exchange Co. in Djibouti was reportedly frozen by the authorities.

The matter is under investigation by the Panel.

Annex 177: Misappropriation of the assets of Amran cement factory

The Panel received information from sources indicating that the Houthis have taken control of the management and assets of the largest cement production company of Yemen, Amran. Abdul Fattah Ismail Al-Ashmouri, the newly appointed director of the factory, appointed by the Houthis, allegedly dismissed 30 employees from the factory in July 2023, and appointed Houthi loyalists. The Houthi leaders are accused of engaging in financial misconduct, obtaining large loans from banks in the company's name and embezzling substantial funds. Moreover, it is alleged that cement, disguised as humanitarian aid, was provided free of charge to the Ministry of Defence and other Houthi-affiliated entities for construction projects. Bricks were also reportedly taken by the Houthis in the name of initiatives undertaken by select charitable organizations. The company reportedly borrowed YR40 billion with high interest rate, leading to a debt exceeding YR60 billion and bankruptcy, halting production. These funds have been allegedly misappropriated by the Houthis. The Panel is investigating the matter.

Annex 178: Ministry of Endowment regarding threats from the Houthis not to deposit ticket amount for Haj pilgrims in other accounts

Date: 11/15/1445 AH
 corresponding to 23/5/2024
 AD Number: (p. 27 27)

I smell the limit now.



Republic of Yemen Ministry
 of Endowments and Guidance

Respected His Excellency Dr. Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, Prime Minister

Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings be upon you ..

Topic: This year's transfer of pilgrims from Sana'a International Airport and the abuse of the Houthi terrorist group

We offer you our best regards and wish you continued success in your duties.

With reference to the above topic, we would like to clarify that we have completed all necessary procedures to send pilgrims to the Holy House of God for this year 1445 AH from all of our country's international airports, including Sana'a International Airport, for the purpose of alleviating the burden of travel between Sana'a and other Yemeni international airports.

Accordingly, Hajj and Umrah agencies were notified to deposit the value of tickets for all pilgrims from all governorates of the Republic, without exception, into the company's accounts at the Qutaibi Bank or the Saudi Fransi Bank.

However, the Houthi rebel and terrorist group took arbitrary measures by preventing Hajj agencies

The decision to supply the value of tickets for pilgrims traveling by air through Sana'a International Airport to the bank accounts of the company, Yemen Airways, and this problem raised the concerns of the leadership of the Ministry of Endowments and Guidance and the Ministry of Transport in

The temporary capital, Aden, highlights the danger of these criminal practices by these rebel militias, which do not take into account any... Custom or system in all its actions and these

illegal procedures regarding Hajj agents who were arrested and threatened with imprisonment and confiscation of their money if they

deposited the value of pilgrims' tickets in the company's account outside our country.

As a result, Yemeni pilgrims traveling through Sanaa International Airport, who number more than eight thousand pilgrims, are at risk of obstructing the performance of the religious obligation and losing their services for which they paid hundreds of millions in Saudi riyals.

You will forward this to your state, which will kindly inform you and provide guidance on what you deem appropriate to deal with this situation as it is a problem.

It is an emergency that requires an urgent solution and cannot tolerate delay, especially since there are only 72 hours remaining until the first of the pilgrims' flights by air.

We are grateful for your continued follow-up and keenness to provide the best services and provide them to the Yemeni pilgrim with ease and ease.

Please accept my sincere greetings and appreciation

Ya Shayban
 Muhammad bin
 Minister of Endowments and Guidance



To death
 Dr. Peacemaker Hamid Al-Ghafari
 Ministry of Point

Scanned longitudinally with CamScanner

Annex 179: Yemenia Chairman's letter to the PM regarding seizure of aircrafts

Yemenia Yemeni
Yemen Airways Yemenia Airlines

Chairman of the Board of Directors / Follow-up
26 JUN 2024
(104) Issued by
Chairman's Office

Office of the President

Date: June 26, 2024 AD
24/104. Reference R.M.

Factor
Computer

Respected

Brother / His Excellency the
Minister of Transport, Dr. Abdul Salam

Prime Minister Chan's State Memorandum specifies the detention of aircraft

“ Saleh Hamid, best regards

Topic: Reservation of Yemenia planes arriving from Jeddah to Sanaa

Yemen Airways extends its sincere greetings to you, wishing you continued success in all your practical work tasks

reference to the above topic, we inform you that Yemeni aircraft departing from Jeddah to With Sanaa to transport pilgrims according to 20) the schedule and the commitment agreed upon with the Ministry of Endowments and the Saudi side, were detained by the Houthi militias for three A320 aircraft in addition to the A330 aircraft, and we explain to you The flight schedule for the three aircraft is as follows:-


1. The first plane, Jeddah / Sana'a, A320-70, flight number IX5555, arriving at Sana'a Airport, time. Local time: 22:30 pm, date 6/25/2024
- AD. 2 The second plane, Jeddah / Sana'a, A320-C-70FC, flight number IY5547, arrival at Sana'a Airport, local time, 23:00 pm, date 6/25/2024 AD.
- Third plane Jeddah / Sanaa A320-F-70FF Flight number IX5559 Arrival Sanaa Airport with time Local 00:30 AM 6/26/2024 3
- 4 In addition to the Airbus A330-E-70AFE plane that has been reserved in Sanaa for a while and needs an engine change and has so far refused to pay to buy the engine and maintain the plane, in addition to continuing to freeze its Yemeni assets in Sanaa banks since March 8, 2023 AD.

This is what had to be raised to Your Excellency due to the necessity and importance of taking the necessary measures regarding the issue of the detention of Yemeni aircraft at Sanaa Airport by the Houthi militias.

with all gratitude and appreciation

Cabin
From management

Member Of Int'l. Air Transport Association
Tel.: +967 2 234 045/125
P.O.BOX: 6006
Khormakser, Airport Street
Aden, Republic Of Yemen
Email: iy@yemenia.com
www.yemenia.com


IATA

Member of the International Aviation Organization (IATA)
+967 2 234 045/125 :تلفون
Yemen: ص.ب.
Khor Maksar - Airport Road
Aden - Republic of
6006 Sub iy@yemenia.com Email
www.yemenia.com

Source: Panel

Annex 180: Yemenia's excess war liability for flying in Houthi-areas

The Panel was informed that, on 23 January 2024, Yemenia received the notice of cancellation of coverage, from its insurance company in respect of excess war liability, 'Extended Coverage Endorsement (Aviation Liabilities - AVN52E' in relation to the geographical location of Yemen (only in respect of Houthi-occupied airports and Houthi-controlled airspace)).

This notice expired on 30 January 2024, after which excess war liability coverage of Yemenia in Houthi-occupied airports and Houthi-controlled airspace has reduced to 81.02581 percent. As a result, Yemenia is obligated to pay up 19 per cent of the compensation amount, which would be in the range of \$35-65 million, in the event their aircraft meets any accident within the Houthi-controlled area or airspace.

This had placed Yemenia in a challenging predicament. If the company complied with the directives, it would have severely impacted the air services in Yemen and invited the wrath of the Houthis. Since Yemenia continues to operate in Houthi-controlled airports and airspace, in the event of any untoward incident, it could incur hefty penalties, leading to significant financial strain, damage to its reputation, legal battles, and even potential closure or bankruptcy. This will also hinder the future plans of Yemenia to expand air services from Sana'a to other destinations, including for humanitarian purposes.

Annex 181: Freezing of the assets of pharmaceutical companies

According to the Panel's sources, armed forces, under the direction of the Houthis leader, Saleh Dabish, raided office and factory premises, kidnapped some employees, and confiscated the funds and assets of these companies and the personal accounts of their directors and employees, mostly in Al-Kuraimi Bank. They also took away, \$240,000, 13% of the company's total profits, in the name of two shareholders, who were subject to court rulings and made additional demands for others. Earlier, responding to the threats, CBY, Aden had issued a circular dated 7 April 2024 to all banks and financial institutions not to comply with the illegal order of the Houthis.

Figure 181.1

CBY, Aden circular dated 7 April 2024 prohibiting banks from seizing and disposing of bank balances of two pharma companies based on orders from the Houthis

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN Head Office - Aden		البنك المركزي اليمني المركز الرئيسي - عدن
Date: 7/4/2024 No: CBY/I/ 289/2024	قطاع الرقابة على البنوك Banking Supervision Sector مكتب الوكيل	التاريخ: الرقم:
تعمير موجه الى كافة البنوك والمصارف العاملة في الجمهورية		
المحترم	الاخ/ المدير العام/ المدير الاقليمي بنك..... "السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته"	
الموضوع // الشركة الدوائية الحديثة والشركة العالمية لصناعة الادوية		
<p>بالإشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه، وإلى المذكرات المقدمة من الشركة الدوائية الحديثة والشركة العالمية لصناعة الادوية، بشأن الاستيلاء على مقرات الشركتين في صنعاء من قبل مليشيا الحوثي، وقيام المليشيا بتسمية اشخاص من قبلهم لانتحال صفة إدارة الشركتين بصورة غير قانونية، والسعي للاستحواذ على ارصدة واموال الشركتين، وعليه واستنادا الى القوانين والتعليمات التنظيمية النافذة، فإنه يتوجب عليكم الالتزام بالاتي:</p> <p>(أ) يكون التعامل بشأن أي معاملات مالية ومصرفية تتعلق بالشركتين المشار اليها أعلاه، مع الإدارة القانونية للشركة المعنية، المخولة بذلك والمثلة في التالية أسمائهم:</p> <p>1- وليد محمد سعيد الشطفة - المدير العام 2- انور حميد عبد السلام - المدير المالي</p> <p>(ب) عدم جواز الحجز على أي ارصدة او حسابات خاصة بالشركتين المذكورتين، أو التصرف بها بناء على أي أوامر او طلبات تصلكم من قبل أي جهة غير قانونية.</p> <p>يتم الالتزام بما ورد أعلاه، وتحملون مسؤولية المخالفة. وتقبلوا تحياتنا،</p>		
		
الجمهورية اليمنية عدن، ص.ب.رقم 452، تليفون: 253225 - 02 - 256513 - 02، فاكس: 290252 - 02 Republic Of Yemen - Aden, P.O.BOX 452, TEL: 253225- 02 & 256513 - 02, FAX: 290252 - 02		

Source: CBY, Aden

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of CBY, Aden circular dated 7 April 2024 prohibiting banks from seizing and disposing of bank balances of two pharma companies based on orders from the Houthis

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN Head Office-Aden

Date:7/4/2024, No: CBY/A/289/2024

Banking Supervision Sector Office

A circular addressed to all banks and banks operating in the Republic

Brother/General Manager/Regional Director of the Bank

Respected

May the peace, blessings, and mercy of God be upon you

Topic // The Modern Pharmaceutical Company and the International Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company

With reference to the above topic, and to the memorandums submitted by the Modern Pharmaceutical Company and the International Pharmaceutical Industry Company, regarding the seizure of the two companies' headquarters in Sana'a by the Al-Houthi militia, and the militia's naming of people by them to illegally impersonate the management of the two companies, and seeking to seize the assets and funds of the two companies, Accordingly, and based on the applicable laws and regulatory instructions.

You must commit to the following:

(1) Any financial and banking transactions related to the two companies referred to above shall be dealt with the legal department of the concerned company authorized to do so, represented by the following:

1 Walid Muhammad Saeed Al Shatfa - General Manager

2 Anwar Hamid Abdel Salam - Financial Director

(2) It is not permissible to seize or dispose of any account balances of the two aforementioned companies based on any orders or requests you receive from any illegal party.

The above will be adhered to, and you will bear responsibility for any violation.

Please accept our greeting

Figure 181.2

Copy of the Memorandum dated 10 June 2024 issued by the Specialized Criminal Prosecution of the Houthis in Sana'a regarding freezing of the assets of pharmaceutical companies

الرقم: ٢٢٤٢
التاريخ: ١٠/٦/٢٠٢٤
المرفقات:

العدل أساس الحكم
الجمهورية اليمنية
النيابة العامة
لنيابة الجزائية المتخصصة

الأخ/ رئيس وحدة جمع المعلومات بالمكتب المركزي
للمتهم

تعبير طيبة وبعد،،،

وبناء على مذكرة لجنة حصر واستلام مستندات العقوبة رقم (243/39838) وتاريخ 1445/12/3 هـ الموافق 2024/6/9م والمتضمن طلب حجز أرصدة وحسابات كلاً من:

الصفة	الاسم	م
	الشركتة الدوائية الهندية	1
	الشركتة العالمية لمستحضرات الأدوية	2
المدير العام للشركتتين	وليد محمد سعيد الشقفة	3
مدير المدير لانشون التجاريت	هيم فاسر عبد الله الطيبي	4
المدير المالي	أنور حميد عبد السلام محمد الاشموري	5
مدير الموارد	مختار علي احمد المخلافي	6
مدير البحث والتطوير	معتز عبد الوارث سعيد الاشموري	7
مدير الحسابات	علي عبد الجليل عبد الوهاب علي	8
مدير المطابق	طله عبد الله محمد الطيبي	9
مدير المشتريات	فاطمة احمد حسن مقبل عيشان	10
رئيس قسم الحسابات	عبد الرقيب عبد الله محمد الهجري	11
أمين الصندوق	محمد احمد صالح هادي المعزني	12

وعليه/

يتم التعميم على جميع البنوك وشركات المصارف بحجز وتجميد كافة أرصدة وحسابات وحالات المذكرين أعلاه وموافقتنا بما تم وصورة عاجلة.

والله الموفق،

القصاصي / حصارم الدين مفضل
وكيل النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة بالأمانة

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية
المسودة
التاريخ: 10/6/2024

Source: Confidential

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the memorandum dated 10 June 2024 issued by the Specialized Criminal Prosecution of the Houthis in Sana'a regarding freezing of the assets of pharmaceutical companies

Based on a memorandum of the committee for inventorying and receiving traitors' property No. (243/39838) dated 9 June 2024, which includes a request to seize the balances and accounts of:

- 1- Modern Pharmaceutical Company
- 2- International Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company
- 3- Walid Muhammad Saeed Al-Shattafa - General Manager of the two companies
- 4- Fahim Qasim Abdullah Al-Khalidi - Deputy Director for Commercial Affairs
- 5- Anwar Hamid Abdel Salam Muhammad Al-Ashmouri - Financial Director
- 6- Mukhtar Ali Ahmed Al-Mekhlafi - Resources Director
- 7- Safwan Abdel-Wareth Saeed Al-Aghbry - Director of Research and Development
- 8- Ali Abdul Jalil Abdul Wahab Ali - Accounts Manager
- 9- Taha Abdullah Muhammad Al-Khalidi - Warehouse Manager
- 10- Fatima Ahmed Hassan Muqbil Aishan - Purchasing Manager
- 11- Abdulraqueeb Abdullah Muhammad Al-Hajri - Head of the Accounts Department
- 12- Muhammad Ahmed Saleh Hadi Al-Maamari - Treasurer

All banks and exchange companies are directed to seize and freeze all the balances, accounts and transfers of those mentioned above, and to inform us of what has been done urgently.

Judge: Sarem al-Din Mufaddal

Deputy Specialized Criminal Prosecutor

Annex 182: Smuggling of telecom equipment

The Houthis have been indulging in organised smuggling of various telecom items and the illegal sale proceeds of the same are utilised for its military purposes. The Houthi-controlled telecom companies have changed their procurement process by engaging suppliers to sell them equipment. These suppliers invariably smuggle the telecom equipment but in case of any seizure by the customs, the names of the telecom companies do not come out openly. Panel's sources have stated that the Ministry of Telecommunication of the GoY has prohibited imports of telecom equipment without its specific permission, and they have not issued any such permission to any Sana'a-based telecom companies to import the equipment. But the recent upgrade of telecom services to 4G and expansion of the subscriber base by these Houthi-controlled companies and the regular seizures by the Yemeni customs, clearly demonstrate that telecom equipment, including the dual-use items used for UAVs and other military and surveillance purposes are being smuggled into Houthi-controlled areas through an organised smuggling network operated by the Houthis.

Annex 183: Smuggling of prohibited pesticides

Several sources revealed that Houthis regularly facilitate smuggling of carcinogenic and toxic pesticides like 'mancozeb', 'methyl bromide', and 'dursan.' These are sold at high prices in their areas, especially in Saada Governorate, with proceeds used for military purposes.

Sources informed the Panel that a consignment of banned toxic pesticides (methyl bromide) was allegedly imported by Saba International Company, belonging to Abdul Azim Daghsan, without any permission from the Houthi-appointed Ministry of Agriculture. The consignment was loaded in two vehicles with license plate Nos. (6/23536) and No. (479609). However, on the night of 28 November 2023, two officers from the Battalion of the Rescue Forces, Abdullah Al-Barda and Nabil Lutfullah, acting under the rescue commander, Abu Badr Al-Marani, came in two vehicles, a Hilux bearing license plate No. 691 Police, a bus bearing license plate No. 5121 Police, along with a truck with armed personnel. They forcibly entered the customs area and took away the vehicles loaded with the pesticides, without payment of customs duty. The commander reportedly told the Director-General of Sana'a Customs Office and Control that they were acting under the directives from the top Houthi leaders. The Sana'a customs is reported to have lodged a complaint. The matter is under investigation by the Panel.

Annex 184: Smuggling of medicines

The Panel received information that similar syndicates, supported by the Houthis, involved in smuggling of medicines through the GoY ports and land borders and transporting the same to the Houthi-controlled areas. In one incident under investigation by the Panel, on 3 March 2024, several gunmen in military uniforms came in military vehicles, forcibly entered the office of the Supreme Medicines Authority in the city of Tai'zz and took away a consignment of smuggled medicines that the Al-Misrakh District police had seized on 23 February 2024 from one Hisham Ghazi Hassan Saif. The Panel's sources stated that the smuggled consignment, worth about YR180 million, was received in Aden and was on its way to Houthi-controlled areas, when the police intercepted it, and handed over to the office of the Supreme Authority for Medicines in Tai'zz. Investigations by the Panel revealed that medicines are regularly being smuggled into Aden and thereafter transported to "Al-Hawban" for further distribution in Houthi-controlled areas.

Figure 184.1

Letter from the Ministry of Health and Population



Source: Confidential

Figure 184.2
Copy of the investigation report

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

لدى ادارة شرطة مديرية العمراخ

محضر استدالات وتحريات

وزارة الداخلية
ادارة عام شرطة م/عمر
ادارة شرطة مديرية العمراخ

الاسم عشام غانمي حسن محمد المرع المهنه تاجر العمل تاجر

جهة العمل العنوان فقره الجوزي الحقة الاجتماعية صتروج المودل ثانوية

رقم الهاتف 011 44 44 44 في تمام الساعة الثلاثه عشر يومنا هذا الجمعة الموافق 2024/04/26

تم فتح هذا المحضر مع المذكور اعلاه بمقتضى صاحب الادوية المخبويه.

حول وقد اجاب بالاتي:

عاشا سبعا يصلح الى ادارة شرطة السراخ

في بلغوني اني بضعه تم ضبطها في منزل والدني شرطة السراخ فنزلت الى ادارة شرطة

السراخ لتساعده في قبلي

في ما فوجئني بضعه التي تم ضبطها وايضا الى ادارة شرطة السراخ ولتايده لان

في عن عبارتي عن ادوية التي تم ضبطها في السراخ الحقة

سأهل البضاعة من منار رومية وفيه مشورت

سأهل البضاعة من منار رومية والى البضاعة والى البضاعة من منار رومية

في مناطق سيطرة الحوثه

سأهل البضاعة الحربية والى البضاعة من منار رومية في مناطق الحوثه

يقم ببيعها وتوزيعها في مناطق الحوثه

في تقع اننا اشترينا البضاعة من منار رومية وايضا الى مناطق الحوثه حيث اوصلها واتم

بتوزيعها في مناطق الحوثه

سأهل البضاعة من منار رومية والى البضاعة من منار رومية

في اسبق انتم اسال بضعه من قبل جوالي بشر وبعد ان تم تفقيصها وتحققها اعرضوا

عنها

سأهل البضاعة من منار رومية والى البضاعة من منار رومية

ذلك رشاه اسم السر بيدي

في معي من منار رومية والى البضاعة من منار رومية

الحربية من منار رومية والى البضاعة من منار رومية

في عنده بشكل طبيعي هذا

صاحب الاقوال

الاسم عشام غانمي حسن ككتب المحضر

التوقيع [Signature] الاسم

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
Source: Confidential

Annex 185: Seizure of cultural properties

The Panel received information from various sources that the Houthis have been indulging in smuggling and trafficking of antiques and antiquities, which form part of the cultural heritage of Yemen, and selling them abroad. The Panel's interview of a few experts on Yemeni cultural heritage, dealers in artefacts, intelligence and enforcement officials, customs clearance agents, and its confidential sources revealed the existence of a Houthi-backed organised network that smuggles these items from Yemen to different countries in the region and abroad and the sale proceeds are utilised for funding their war efforts in Yemen. The Panel is continuing to investigate these cases.

During the discussions with the Antiquities Authority officials of the GoY, the Panel was informed about the seizure of various such items by the authorities in Yemen and abroad, some of which are mentioned below. The Panel has not received any information linking these cases with the Houthis and is investigating these cases:

1. The authorities in the Sultanate of Oman seized 52 artefacts on 22 August 2017.




Source: GoY

2. The Department of Protection and Monitoring of Antiquities and Artifacts at the Heritage Authority in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia received 14 artefacts dating back to the Kingdom of Qataban (4th century BC) from a Yemeni resident in Jeddah in September 2022.




Source: GoY

3. The authorities in Spain informed the GoY on 24 June 2022 about five Yemeni artefacts being offered for sale in Madrid. A case of theft has been registered and referred to the court.



Source: GoY

- About 16 Yemeni artefacts have been seized in France, which were exhibited alongside pieces from Syria, Iraq, and Libya. GoY representatives have reportedly provided the French authorities with precise information about the origin of these artefacts.













Source: GoY






5. In London, an Auction House had offered, from 20 November to December 2022, for sale many items from different countries including 40 ancient items from Yemen. The GoY representative objected to the sale of these Yemeni artefacts, supported by reports from experts on Yemeni artefacts. The British authorities stopped the display of the specified Yemeni items and handed over the matter to the Metropolitan Police. Although most of these items were reportedly taken out of Yemen prior to the current conflict, such large-scale seizure of items outside Yemen point towards the existence of an organised market for artefacts that provide significant amount of opportunity for money.






6. Items Seized by Yemeni customs and Border Security:




a. **List of Seizures at Al-Mualla Port – Aden:** The items were seized on 9 August 2023 under case number (4) 2023 and the matter is with the Public Funds court.





No.	Item Description:	Photos
1	Decorated wooden panels (crafted) with window shapes	
2	Large wooden box	
3	Medium-sized wooden box	
4	Small wooden boxes of various shapes	







No.	Item Description:	Photos
5	Small wooden box shaped like a cupboard with six compartments	
6	Small rectangular wooden box with four compartments	
7	Decorative wooden items (Zeenah)	
8	Small wooden box with a specific shape	
9	Decorative boxes with silver colouring in dome shapes	
10	Various small wooden items (cigarette holders)	


No.	Item Description:	Photos
11	Small decorative boxes with drawings	
12	Large rectangular boxes lined with red velvet (for swords)	
13	Brass box with a velvet-lined interior	
14	Medium-sized brass vessel with a lid shaped like a "mattock" and a handle	
15	Decorative swords, three with gold inlays	

No.	Item Description:	Photos
16	Old swords with scabbards (one wooden)	
17	Jambiyas with scabbards	
18	Small jambiyas with scabbards and some with wooden scabbards (new)	
19	Brass plates of various sizes with designs	
20	Decorative mirror with a silver frame (one broken after sorting)	

No.	Item Description:	Photos
21	Old-style electric lantern with coloured glass	
22	Coloured glassware (blue – green) with lids	
23	Small orange glass bottle (for decoration)	

No.	Item Description:	Photos
24	Orange-coloured sprayer	
25	Decorative items shaped like lamps, green glass with brass tops	
26	Blue vase	
27	Coloured glass jar for decoration	




No.	Item Description:	Photos
28	Oval-shaped brass item with an egg-shaped marble inside	
29	Brass mortar or pestle	
30	Bag containing chains, a necklace, and one earring	
31	Bag with a collection of beads	
32	Decorated coloured bead bracelets Wooden locks	
33	Wooden board with a handle	


No.	Item Description:	Photos
34	Bag containing small white beads (Chinese type)	

Source: GoY

b. **List of artifacts seized by the Appeals Public Funds Prosecution:**

- **Case Number:** (10) 2023
- **Defendant:** Ahmed Ali Muthana Abdullah and others
- **Date of arrival of Memorandum from the Head of Appeals Prosecution:** 26 February 2024
- **Current Status:** The case is pending before the Appeals Court.

No.	Description:	Photos
1	<p>Upper half of a statue of a woman: The statue is broken with damaged arms, legs, and head. It features a necklace made of carved sandstone around the neck.</p>	
2	<p>Limestone seal: This seal has a tapered handle.</p>	
3	<p>Bronze horse statue: The statue is inscribed with Musnad script (horse of the Mukarreb).</p>	

4	Hollow bronze elephant: The elephant is hollow inside.	
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Source: GoY

Annex 186: LPG Tankers

The Department of the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Palau-flagged LPG tanker *Raha Gas* (IMO: 8818219, MMSI 511101405), and its owner Arafat Shipping Company, set up on 19 January 2024, and registered in Marshall Islands (number 12831), for shipping millions of dollars of LPG falsely identified as having loaded in the UAE to Yemen on behalf of the al-Jamal network. Arif Ibrahim Khot, the captain of *Raha Gas* was also sanctioned for directing the LPG shipment to Yemen. OFAC also sanctioned the Palau-flagged LPG tanker *LPG OM* (IMO: 9160475, MMSI 511101151), and its owner and operator KDS Shipping Limited, set up on 27 Jun 2023, and registered in Marshall Islands (Number 120646) for carrying multiple shipments on behalf of Sa'id al-Jamal.

The Panel's investigations revealed that during the period from 1 January 2023 to July 2024, 44 requests for inspections of LPG vessels were received by the UNVIM from the vessels, out of which one request was rejected. Investigation further revealed that as per the UNVIM's records, for the shipment of 18 October 2023 of *LPG OM* and for the shipment of 8 June 2024 of *Raha Gas*, Mina Khalid port, UAE, was shown as the port of origin.


Annex 187: Landmines locally produced by the Houthis

1. The following figures display landmines produced locally by the Houthis, highlighting their specific features in terms of triggering mechanism and effects, e.g. bonding, horizontal effect.
2. According to a specialist, the Houthis' production of landmines is conducted in an artisanal manner, resulting in explosive contents that are less stable compared to those produced by specialized industries. This results in significant risks to both the local population residing near production and storage sites and to the EOD personnel tasked with clearing these areas.
3. The Panel notes that many of the anti-tank mines deployed by the Houthis are coupled with trigger mechanisms typically used for anti-personnel mines. Given the quantity of explosive contents, their explosion can have particularly severe consequences.
4. Additionally, the Houthis' failure to adhere to a mine-laying plan further complicates and increases the risks associated with the decontamination of affected areas, thereby exacerbating the dangers faced by both civilians and demining teams.

Antipersonnel mine of local production (Model 1)

Contains an average 450 g of TNT explosive

Figures 187.1 (up), and 187.2. (down)



Source: Project Masam

Antipersonnel mine of local production (Model 2)

Contains an average 550 g of TNT explosive and a maximum 700 g

Figures 187.3 (up), and 187.4 (down)



Source: [Project Masam](#)

Improvised bounding fragmentation device (regular model, 101mm diameter) of local production

Contains an estimated 300 g of TNT explosive

Figures 187.5



Source: Project Masam

Improvised bounding fragmentation device (medium model, 180mm diameter) of local production

Contains an estimated 1.75 kg of TNT explosive

Figure 187.6 (up) Figure 187.7 (down)



Source: Project Masam



المشاهد الكاملة للعرض العسكري "وعد الأخرة" - المنطقة الخامسة والوية النصر والقوات البحرية والجوية

Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKItQ>

Improvised bounding fragmentation device (large model, 325mm diameter) of local production

Contains an estimated 10 kg of TNT explosive

Figures 187.8



Source: Project Masam

Initiation systems associated with the improvised bounding fragmentation device

Figures 187.9 (left), and 187.10 (right)



Configured with an electric initiator
Victim-operated IED



Configured as a tripwire-initiated
Victim-operated IED

Figures 187.11 (left), and 187.12 (right)



Configured with a pressure plate
Victim-operated IED



Configured as a radio-command initiated IED

Source: Project Masam

Small directional mine of local production


Contains an estimated 500 g of TNT explosive

Figure 187.13



Source: Project Masam

Figures 187.14 (left), and 187.15 (right)



Source: <https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-yemens-west-coast/>

Figures 187.16 (up)

Comparison between a small directional mine of local production (left) and a GLD-150A directional mine similar to a production by China



Source: <https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-yemens-west-coast/>

Large directional mine of local production


Contains approximately 3 kg of TNT explosive

Figure 187.17



Source: <https://iedawareness.com/2018/04/12/houthi-directional-mines-captured-in-midi-yemen/>

Figures 187.18 (left), and 187.19 (right)



Source: <https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-yemens-west-coast/>

Figure 187.20

Similar characteristics with the M18A2, a large directional mine of Iranian production



Source: <https://armamentresearch.com/iranian-directional-anti-personnel-mines-in-syria/>

Large directional mine of local production

Figures 187.21 (up), and 187.22 (down)



المشاهد الكاملة للعرض العسكري "وعد الإخرة" - المنطقة الخامسة والوية النص والقوات البحرية والجوية



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKItQ>

Fragmentation charge (Rock bomb) of local production (Model 1)

Contains 1 - 1.25 kg of probable C4 explosive

Figures 187.23 (up), and 187.24 (down)



Probable C4 explosive filling with ballbearing fragmentation

Source: Project Masam

Fragmentation charge (Rock bomb) of local production (Model 2)

Contains an estimated 500 g (small directional mine) of TNT explosive

Figures 187.25 (up), and 187.26 (down)




Source: Project Masam

Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP), concealed as rock bombs of local production (Model 3)

Likely contain different EFPs and charge configurations, 2-4 kg of TNT per rock mine

Figures 187.27 (up), and 187.28 (down)



Source: <https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-yemens-west-coast/>

Landmine of local production (2nd generation, in service in 2016 or earlier)

Contains approximately 5 kg of TNT explosive

Figures 187.29 (up) and 187.30 (down)



Source: Project Masam

Landmine of local production (3rd generation, in service in 2016 or earlier)

Contains approximately 3.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figure 187.31



Source: Project Masam

Landmine of local production (4th generation, probably in service from 2016)

Contains approximately 3.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figure 187.32



Source: Project Masam

Landmine of local production (5th generation, from 2017)

Contains approximately 3.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figures 187.33 (up), and 187.34 (down)



Source: Project Masam

Landmine of local production (6th generation, from 2020)

Contains approximately 3.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figure 187.35



Source: <https://observers.france24.com/en/middle-east/20220921-yemen-truce-houthi-rebels-landmines-civilians>

Blast main charge of local production (Model 1)

Contains approximately 6.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figures 187.36 (up), and 187.37 (down)



Source: Project Masam




Source: <https://cat-uxo.com/explosive-hazards/ied/houthi-main-charge-plastic-main-charge>

Blast main charge of local production (Model 2)

Contains approximately 37 kg of homemade explosive

Figures 187.38 (up), and 187.39 (down)




Source: Project Masam



Source: <https://www.khabaragency.net/news182980.html>

Pressure plate of local production

Figures 187.40 (up), and 187.41 (down)



Source: Project Masam

Anti-lift mechanism attached to the underside of a common style of improvised landmine

Figure 187.42



Source: Project Masam

EFP of local production (single charge)

Figures 187.43 (up), and 187.44 (down)



المشاهد الكاملة للعرض العسكري "وعد الأخرة" - المنطقة الخامسة والوية النصر والقوات البحرية والجوية




Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>

EFP of local production (multiple charges)

Figures 187.45 (up), and 187.46 (down)



المشاهد الكاملة للعرض العسكري "وعد الأخرى" - المنطقة الخامسة والوية النصر والقوات البحرية والجوية



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKItQ>

Annex 188: Attacks on civilians

1. The Panel's sources informed on individual cases of civilians killed and injured during indiscriminate attacks carried out by the Houthis. These include:

- On 19 March 2024, in Rada'a, Al-Bayda Governorate, a Houthi convoy of 14 heavily armed vehicles entered a residential area, and planted explosives in a residence. The explosion led to the destruction of neighbouring houses, resulting in the deaths of at least 13 civilians, including nine members of the same family, and four children.

Figure 188.1

Damage caused in Rada'a by explosives planted by the Houthis



Source:

GoY

- On 3 February 2024, in the Sabr Al-Mawadim District of Ta'izz Governorate, a 17-year-old boy was killed by sniper fire when he was in the vicinity of his residence.
- On 9 April 2024, in the Sahara District of Amran Governorate, a 35-year-old man was killed for reportedly performing the Maghrib prayer seven minutes after the prescribed time.
- On 24 April 2024, in the Salah District of Ta'izz Governorate, a seven-year-old girl was injured by sniper fire
- On 27 April 2024, a boy was shot by a guard at the entrance of a summer camp in Aflah Al-Yemen District, Hajjah Governorate.
- On July 20, 2024, Houthi armed men stormed into a mosque in the village of Minjarah, in the Al-Sawar district of Al-Mahwit Governorate, and fired live ammunition indiscriminately, resulting in the deaths of a man and a woman and injuring three other women.

2. Furthermore, sources indicated that during the reporting period:

- The Houthis targeted homes in Al-Mashareeh, in the densely populated northern part of Al-Dhale' Governorate. A 40-year-old woman reportedly sustained various injuries from a shell which struck her home. She had shrapnel lodged in her neck and other parts of her body. This incident occurred two days after a similar attack resulted in the death of an infant and injury to his father, following the shelling of their home in the Sulaim area, northwest of the Qatabah District.
- A 15-year-old girl was injured by Houthi-sniper fire on the outskirts of Wadi Al-Kharazah, west of Qatabah, Al-Dhale' governorate. The child was hit when she was reportedly heading to a relative's house.
- Two children aged 3 and 5 were killed and five children and one adult were injured during an attack on residential houses in the village of Habour in Sabir Al-Mawadim District, southwest of Ta'izz.

Annex 189: Attacks on civilian objects

1. The Panel was informed that, on 20 July 2024, a mosque in Manjara (Tyre District, Amran Governorate) was attacked by the Houthis. Live munitions were reportedly shot indiscriminately, resulting in two civilians killed (one male and one female) and three women injured.

2. On 2 January 2024, in the Shamila area of Al-Sabeen District (Amanat Al-Asimah), a building owned by a lawyer and human rights activist was seized. Residents received eviction orders issued by the Houthi-led specialized criminal court. It reportedly read that “the specialised criminal court was imposing a precautionary quarantine on all funds and property owned by” the activist, who was accused of committing “crimes against the security of the State, aiding the enemy and communicating with a foreign state”. It further reportedly advised that “other measures would be taken”, if the instructions were not followed.⁷³

3. The Panel is further investigating alleged attacks against cultural property in Yemen, including damages caused to the Military Museum of Aden and the Sultan’s Palace, in the same city.

Figure 189.1

Military Museum, Aden



Figure 189.2

Sultan’s Palace, Aden



Figure 189.3

Sultan’s Palace, Aden




Source: Panel

⁷³ [https://acjus.org/?l=e/2/A/c/1/4/4/4100/\(ACJ\):-Confiscating-the-property-of-citizens-and-activists-by-the-Houthi-group-is-a-violation-that-affects-fundamental-rights,-and-we-call-for-the-cessation-of-this-violation](https://acjus.org/?l=e/2/A/c/1/4/4/4100/(ACJ):-Confiscating-the-property-of-citizens-and-activists-by-the-Houthi-group-is-a-violation-that-affects-fundamental-rights,-and-we-call-for-the-cessation-of-this-violation)

4. The Houthis have significantly disrupted crucial transportation routes, impeding the smooth flow of individuals and goods across Yemen. Among these routes are major highways linking Sana'a and Aden, such as the Aden-Dali-Sana'a road, the Aden-Ta'iz-Al-Houban road, the Aden-Yafa-Al Bayda-Sana'a road, and the Aden-Tor Al-Baha-Ta'iz-Sana'a road. Additionally, the road connecting the north-eastern governorates from Ma'rib to Sana'a, which is essential due to Ma'rib Governorate's role as a primary supplier of petroleum products, has been affected. Specifically, the road was obstructed at the Nihm crossroads, necessitating a detour through Al Bayda Governorate before reaching Sana'a. The closure of roads have resulted in prolonged travel time by land, consequently driving up the expenses associated with goods transportation due to heightened operational costs and a twofold increase in fuel consumption. For instance, the expense of hiring a truck for transporting a 40-foot container between Aden and Sana'a previously ranged from YR250,000 to YR280,000 but has now surged to YR1,600,000. This, in turn, also impacts the provision of humanitarian services and aid delivery.

5. However, recently, the GoY has taken some steps in repairing and relaying the roads and opening up of some roads and obstructions within its area.

Figure 189.4
Road map of Yemen with indication of blocked roads



Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: Government - Republic of Yemen

Figure 189.5
Impact of the disruption of roads by the Houthis

The Blocked Main Road	length (km)	Duration in hours	Blocked location	Alternative route	Length (in KMs)	Duration (in hours)	Remarks
Aden - Al Dhalea – Sana'a	365	6 (for cars) 18 (for trucks)	Al Dhali	Aden - Yafa - Al Bayda - Dhamar - Sana'a	566	13 (for cars) 15 days (for trucks)	The road is narrow, of one lane, and passes through rugged terrain, leading to delays.
				Aden - Tur Al-Baha - Haijat Al-Abd (southwest of Ta'iz Governorate) – Sana'a	466	12 (for cars)	Not suitable for trucks
Aden – Ta'iz	160	2 (for cars) 4 (for trucks)	Ta'iz city	Aden - Tur Al-Baha (southwest of Lahj) - Al-Maqtara - Al-Turbah (west of Ta'iz)	190	8 (for cars)	Not suitable for trucks
Sana'a – Ma'rib	173	3 (for cars)	Fardhat Nahm	Ma'rib – Al Bayda – Dhamar - Sana'a	418	9 (for cars)	
Western International route (Aden - Al-Twal port)	445	6 (for cars) 9 (for trucks)	Al-Hudaydah	Aden – Abyan – Shabwa – Hadramaut (Al Wadia Port):	600	12 (for cars) 18 (for trucks)	About 60 km on an unpaved desert road

Source: GoY

Annex 190: Critique of Houthis' attacks on the Red Sea followed by arbitrary detention of its author

1. According to sources, in January 2024, Yemeni judge Abdulwahab Mohammad Qatran, who criticized the Houthis for human rights violations and the attacks on the Red Sea, was detained along with his family. They were questioned for hours without legal representation, and the judge was held incommunicado for three days, reportedly in solitary confinement at a Houthi detention centre in Sana'a. The judge was released in June 2024.

Figure 190.1

Message of Judge Qatran on X criticising Houthi attacks on the Red Sea



Unofficial translation

Enough of the antics and muscle building of the Yemeni people. Thirty million people did not delegate you to fight America. Fight hunger, poverty, ignorance, disease, begging. May God bless you abundantly.

Fight corruption and injustice in your courts, department and prisons.

Fight racism in the performance of your state, your group and your faction.

31 December 2024

2. The case of Judge Qatran has been documented by different legal and human rights organisations and entities, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde31/7728/2024/en/>, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/30/yemen-judge-arrested-after-criticizing-houthis> and <https://cihrs.org/yemen-qatran-judgeimmediately-release-arbitrarily-detained-judge-qatran/?lang=en>

Annex 191: Arbitrary detention of teachers and education experts

1. Different sources, including from the GoY, informed the Panel about a distinguishable trend of abducting teachers and education experts who oppose the politicization of the education system and academic curricula.
2. There follow the details, as reported by sources and corroborated by open-source material,⁷⁵ of a case which appears to integrate said trend.

Case Study: Death of Education Expert Sabri Abdullah Ali Al-Hakimi

Overview

Sabri Abdullah Ali Al-Hakimi was a 56-year-old education expert working in the Ministry of Education, in Sana'a. He was reportedly detained and tortured by the Houthi militia and died in detention, on 23 March 2024.

Background and Detention

Al-Hakimi, along with a colleague professor, was abducted by the Houthis at Yaslah point six months prior to his death while traveling to Dhamar Governorate.

As per reports, their homes were subsequently raided, and equipment and books were looted. Both were imprisoned without formal charges.

Al-Hakimi had been in dispute with Houthi authorities over primary and middle school curricula, advocating for educational materials free from sectarian and political biases. The Houthis opposed this view, preferring curricula that supported sectarian mobilization.

Conditions of detention

During his six-month detention, Al-Hakimi was reportedly subjected to torture and ill-treatment. His health deteriorated significantly due to the lack of medical care. He was denied communication with the outside world except for a single visitation where signs of torture were evident.

Release of the Body

Following prolonged delays, the Houthis reportedly released Al-Hakimi's body on 28 March 2024, under the condition that his family bury him swiftly without forensic examination or public disclosure. The family was reportedly threatened with retaliation if they disobeyed, and other male family members were arrested.

Aftermath

Ahmed Saif Hashid, a parliamentarian, is reported to have publicly questioned the official account of Al-Hakimi's death. He reported seeing visible injuries on Al-Hakimi's face and criticized the restricted view of the body, which was not allowed to be photographed. On 25 March 2024, a group of activists, university professors and Member of Parliament Saif Hashid published a letter demanding that authorities conduct an impartial and transparent investigation.⁷⁶ The letter reads that "*deaths in detention in the prisons of the intelligence services have increased*".⁷⁷ In late April 2024, Saif Hashid was reportedly the target of an attempted killing.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ <https://www.sabanew.net/story/en/108804>, <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/292429>, https://justice4yemenpact.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Incident-Report-9-Deaths-in-Detention_English.pdf

⁷⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/hommed.fdh/posts/pfbid02URtHAXttijhVbQFjED6sGZS8aQeyh26pwDHLCK5wyLowqqV4dSSrr8p8h6jys1PdI>

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ <https://x.com/ERYANIM/status/1784663096738316712>

Annex 192: Prosecution Office documents relating to the death sentences issued by the Houthi-appointed specialised criminal court

1. The excerpts from the Houthi Prosecution Office contain, among others, the identity of individuals held in custody and sentenced to death by the Houthi-led specialised criminal court.

Figure 192.1
Excerpts of list of individuals sentenced to death by the Houthi appointed specialised criminal court

رقم	اسم المتهم	العمر	العمل	محل الإقامة	حالته
١٥	زايد سلطان صالح العدي المكني (صاحب-جويدي)	٢٥ سنة	مزارع	جنز، الأمانة	محبوس
١٦	جميل علي هادي محمد كندوع المكني (الغزي-الدرام)	٣٤ سنة	جندي، وزارة الدفاع	شعلان، الأمانة	محبوس
١٧	ابراهيم صالح محمد الناصري المكني (حسام)	٢٦ سنة	طالب جامعي	ش/ رداغ /م ذمار	محبوس
١٨	غضدان علي عبد الله الرومي المكني (صالح)	٢٧ سنة	مديرة ذمار	حارة الصلعة	محبوس
١٩	اسامة محمد الغزي محمد قائل المكني (هيثم - عبد الله)	٢٦ سنة	طالب جامعي	مدينة ذمار، جوار كلية التربية	محبوس
٢٠	احمد احمد عبدربه ناصر الدينجي المكني (ابو ياسين)	٤٢ سنة	مدرس	جرف سبيل /م ذمار	محبوس
٢١	بيهان محمد علي الشديبي	٣٨ سنة	مزارع	جهاران /م ذمار	محبوس
٢٢	شاداد جبر عبد الله محمد الجعفي المكني (ابو حسين-ابو همام)	٤٠ سنة	عامل بناء	مبغعة ضوا، /م ذمار	محبوس
٢٣	طه محمد احمد سعد السماوي المكني (ابو بكر)	٣٤ سنة	مهندس	ش/ رداغ، /م ذمار	محبوس
٢٤	عبد القرم حسين علي الشنقي المكني (ابو شادي)	٣٠ سنة	طالب جامعي	مدينة ذمار، جولة المحافظة	محبوس
٢٥	علي احمد علي محمد العبري	٣٩ سنة	مدير مستشفى المصالي	جوار الجامع الكبير /م ذمار	محبوس
٢٦	علي حسين صالح مدحل المكني (امين)	٣٥ سنة	طالب جامعي	جهاران، /م ذمار	محبوس
٢٧	علي عبد الله احمد علي الحاشدي	٢٧ سنة	طالب جامعي	حارة الصلعة، مدينة ذمار	محبوس
٢٨	محمد عبد التكليف محمد الزراري المكني (ابو ليث)	٣٦ سنة	مقوت	مدينة ذمار	محبوس
٢٩	محمد عبد الله سعيد المصطفي المكني (ابو ابراهيم)	٤٥ سنة	موظف في التربية /م ذمار	مبغعة ضوا، /م ذمار	محبوس
٣٠	محمد عبد الله عزيز زايد الجعدي المكني (عبدالله)	٣٠ سنة	موظف في التربية /م ذمار	مبغعة ضوا، /م ذمار	محبوس

رقم	اسم المتهم	العمر	العمل	محل الإقامة	حالته
٣١	محمد علي حسين صالح العسل	٣٦ سنة	مقوت	مدينة ذمار	محبوس
٣٢	مختار مثنى احمد علي الكرماني المكني (ابو عمر)	٢٩ سنة	عامل	حارة الصلعة، مدينة ذمار	محبوس
٣٣	معين محمد قاسم عبد حوقلة	٢٩ سنة	مزارع	قرية الخربة، جهاران /م ذمار	محبوس
٣٤	ناصر محمد علي الشنقي المكني (ابو ناصر)	٤٠ سنة	مزارع	بيت الشنقي	محبوس
٣٥	نسيم محمد مانع محمد المكني (ناصر)	٢٨ سنة	محاسب في مطعم	حارة الصلعة	محبوس
٣٦	هاني محمد علي احمد المنكري (ابو الفاسم)	٢٩ سنة	مزارع	قرية مثنى ضوا، /م ذمار	محبوس
٣٧	يحيى محمد عبد الرزاق العمري	٤٦ سنة	مدرس	الحداد، /م ذمار	محبوس
٣٨	زيد ناصر احمد العريق	٤٥ عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
٣٩	حسين صالح حسين الرشيدى	٢٥ عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
٤٠	خالد صالح احمد علي الحداد	٤٦ عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
٤١	محمد حمود احمد مطيل الغرامى	٤٦ عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
٤٢	سعد سعد عبد الله الهادي	٥٠ عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
٤٣	يوسف محمد احمد دبلج	٢٧ عام	مطبخ الذاري	حراز مشانق، /م صنعاء	محبوس
٤٤	رشاد عبد الله محمد سعيد الشمراني	٤٠ عام	موظف في مكتب التربية /م صنعاء	الذاري، الأمانة	محبوس
٤٥	هلال حمود علي القلبي	٢٧ عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
٤٦	محمد يحيى يحيى الحدمة	٣٠ عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
٤٧	حمدي احمد محمد العمري	٢٥ عام	عامل صناعة	الأمانة	محبوس

رقم	اسم المتهم	العمر	العمل	محل الإقامة	حالته
1	عمار محمد حسين النجار (مختار)	39 عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
2	عبد الرحمن احمد سعيد الرامسى (يوسف)	59 عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
3	ناصر ميخوت، اسماحيل حسين ثامر (سند)	35 عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
4	محمد مطيل حسين الرشيدى (ابو عبيدة)	48 عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
5	عبد العزيز علي احمد الحداد (نور الدين)	46 عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
6	عبد صالح محمد الجابري (عبد السلام الجابري)	33 عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
7	فؤاد محمد حسين قرموس	48 عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
8	مجاهد علي صالح الجدي	48 عام	-	مارب	وجه الدالة
9	سحر حسين محمد العمري المكني (طارق - احمد)	33 سنة	سائق	ش/ تمع الأمانة	محبوس
10	احمد صالح علي صالح الكحل المكني (امين سفيان-ابو محمد)	37 سنة	مزارع	السكنين الشمالي، الأمانة	محبوس
11	صدام علي حسين عايشن العالقي المكني (نوران-عائش-النفوس)	32 سنة	عامل	بني صريم /م جهوران	محبوس
12	امين يحيى علي عبد الله الششمي المكني (فهي-مراد)	30 سنة	تشداد	خمر /م عمران	محبوس
13	سيف محمد احمد المنقضي المكني (عبدالله)	37 سنة	جندي	خمر /م عمران	محبوس
14	سائق يحيى مزارع المصميم المكني (طارق - صالح)	30 سنة	محاسب	تمع الأمانة	محبوس

Source: GoY

2. Death sentences issued by the specialized criminal court appear to often follow prolonged arbitrary detentions and years of enforced disappearance. For instance, in late July 2024, three men (one with a physical disability) who had been convicted to death nine years prior, saw their sentences confirmed. The men are reported to have been kept incommunicado for years, denied legal representation and tortured. Reportedly, according to the National Authority for Prisoners and Abductees, there are 70 civilians under Houthi custody facing execution.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ <https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2558856/middle-east>

Annex 193: Reported influence of Hezbollah on the Houthis' summer camps and the alteration of curricula in Houthi-Controlled Areas

1. Some sources informed the Panel that members of Hezbollah operate in Sana'a, providing assistance to the Houthis, including in running summer camps and in the revision of academic curricula. Houthi-run summer camps are reportedly very similar to those carried out by Hezbollah. Children's uniform and the hijab worn by girls in Houthi summer camps present similarities with those in Hezbollah-run summer camps.

2. The figures that follow show similarities between Houthi and Hezbollah summer camps (uniforms and salute)

Figure 193.1
Houthi summer camp



Figure 193.2
Hezbollah summer camp



Source Figure 193.1: https://x.com/Jehad_mag/status/1783051115551973472

Source Figure 193.2: <https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/hezbollah-and-lebanon-an-in-depth-examination-under-hassan-nasrallah-s-leadership/hezbollah-s-youth-movement-of-terror/>

Annex 194: Indoctrination and Promotion of Hatred, Violence and Discrimination among Children

1. The Houthis use multiple resources to indoctrinate children, promote hatred, violence and discrimination. For instance, sources informed the Panel that in Houthi-controlled areas, children initiate their school day with the following prayer rather than the national anthem:

“Oh God, we entrust you, we entrust you, your Messenger, we entrust Imam Ali, and we entrust whomever you commanded us to appoint, my master and lord, Abdul Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi. Oh God, we disavow your enemy, the enemy of your Prophet, the enemy of Imam Ali, and the enemy of whomever you commanded us to appoint, my master and lord, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi. Humiliation is far from us... Humiliation is far from us... Humiliation is far from us!!”

2. ‘Jehad mag’ is a Houthi open-source tool used to spread sectarian and discriminatory messages among children. Some examples of its content are as follows.

Figure 194.1

Screenshots taken by the Panel from ‘Jehad Mag’s on X



Unofficial translation

Jehad Magazine for Children

The generation of pride and dignity, the generation of knowledge and knowledge



Unofficial translation

Millions of Yemeni children “are steadfast with Gaza and will confront America and those involved with it



Unofficial translation

Participation of Yemeni children in the “Our path with Gaza... forward until victory”

reposted مجلة جهاد للأطفال شبكة الفرقان - Network Al-Furqan @alforqanet

أطفال اليمن للعدو السعودي لا تختبروا صبر قائدنا

#معركة_الفتح_الموعود_والجهاد_المقدس #مجلة_جهاد (@Jehad_mag)

Translated from Arabic by Google Yemeni children for the Saudi enemy Don't test our leader's patience.

#معركة_الفتح_الموعود_والجهاد_المقدس @Jehad_mag - Jihad Magazine

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



7:03 PM · Jul 13, 2024 · 5,326 Views

مجلة جهاد للأطفال @Jehad_mag

#الصورة_تحتوي_جول_الصرخة تصوير / كزار المويذ #مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Translated from Arabic by Google #الصورة_تحتوي_جول_الصرخة Generation of scream Photography / Karar Al-Moayyad

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



6:11 PM · May 9, 2023 · 144 Views

Translated from Arabic by Google From the messages #أطفال_اليمن of the million-man march "in victory for Gaza, we are proceeding with the fifth stage of escalation"

#أطفال_اليمن With Gaza until victory

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



6:00 PM · Jul 27 2024 · 45 Views

مجلة جهاد للأطفال @Jehad_mag

من رسائل #أطفال_اليمن من مليونية "وفاء لدماء الشهداء.. مع غزة حتى النصر"

#أطفال_اليمن مع غزة حتى النصر


#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Translated from Arabic by Google
From the messages #أطفال_اليمن of the million-man march "Loyalty to the blood of the martyrs.. With Gaza until victory"

#أطفال_اليمن With Gaza until victory

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



11:16 AM · Aug 4, 2024 · 63 Views

Translated from Arabic by Google
From the messages #أطفال_اليمن of the million-man march "Loyalty to the blood of the martyrs.. With Gaza until victory"

#أطفال_اليمن With Gaza until victory

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



11:16 AM · Aug 4, 2024 · 63 Views

المراكز الصيفية

إعداد: إبراهيم المشيط
تصوير: أبو الفضل الدريسي

وتنقلنا يا أولاد هناك المرصفر
الصيفية التي يتعلم فيها الآلاف الثقافة العربية التي
تحتضنهم من الأفكار الصالحة
وهيما أنشطة وألعاب ممتعة، تتنورز اليوم أحد هذه
المرصفر بإمامة العاصمة

مفيد لمنقول
مكتبتكم الصيفية!

لنصنع ونلعب

يتحقق على طلب
بالمستوى الدراسي الذي
يناسب العمر

هذا يعبري استبدال التلاميذ
الذين يتعلمون بالمرصفر
ويتم تسجيلاهم

يتم تعليم تلاوة
القرآن وحفظه



جهد

Unofficial translation
Flyer for summer camps

Excerpts:

There are summer camps where children learn Quranic culture, which frees them from stray thoughts, and in which there are useful activities and games... Each student enrolls in the appropriate education level...

مجلة جهاد للأطفال @Jehad_mag

من رسائل #أطفال_اليمن من مسيرة ثابتون مع غزة رغم أنف كل عميل

#أطفال_اليمن مع غزة حتى النصر

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Translated from Arabic by Google
From the messages #أطفال_اليمن from the march of steadfastness with Gaza in spite of every agent

#أطفال_اليمن with Gaza until victory

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



4:51 PM · Jul 23, 2024 · 63 Views

مجلة جهاد للأطفال @Jehad_mag

من رسائل #أطفال_اليمن من مسيرة ثابتون مع غزة رغم أنف كل عميل

#أطفال_اليمن مع غزة حتى النصر

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Translated from Arabic by Google
From the messages #أطفال_اليمن from the march of steadfastness with Gaza in spite of every agent

#أطفال_اليمن with Gaza until victory

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



4:51 PM · Jul 23, 2024 · 63 Views

مجلة جهاد للأطفال @Jehad_mag · Aug 4

من رسائل #أطفال_اليمن من مليونية "وفاء لدماء الشهداء، مع غزة حتى النصر"

#أطفال_اليمن مع غزة حتى النصر

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال



2 49

مجلة جهاد للأطفال @Jehad_mag

علم وجهاد يبقينا جنداً لله موالينا

#علم_وجهاد #مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال t.me/Jehad_mag

Translated from Arabic by Google
Knowledge and Jihad keep us alive
Soldiers of God, our loyalists

#علم_وجهاد #مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال t.me/Jehad_mag

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



10:31 AM · Apr 24, 2024 · 114 Views



Unofficial translation/description

Normalisation versus Boycott

Flyer promoting boycott against the “enemy”, referring to the “Zionist” and “America”



Unofficial translation

Yes, the Jews:

- Are the dangerous hostility of the nation that God warned us about and warned us against;
- The children of Israel, who God chose and favoured, bore His message and religion, but when they rejected His guidance and disobeyed Him, He cursed them and became angry with them;
- The Prophet abandoned them where the stone of the books of God were; they deviate from the line of His message;
- No matter how much we try to please them and make concessions to them. We will never achieve peace with them, nor will they be satisfied with us;
- They do not love us and do not wish us any good;
- Those who occupy Palestine and Al-Aqsa Mosque and those who desecrate our sanctity and want to enslave us.



Faith is Yaman - Yemeni proverb.

What a Jew

Muslim advised

The meaning is that no matter how friendly the Jew pretends to be to the Muslim, he harbours evil for him and does not sincerely seek his good. It refers to not relying on someone who disagrees with you in your religion, or sometimes in your belief.

37 Old Jihad (20)

Source: https://x.com/Jehad_mag/status/1754146318560252218

3. Influencers are reportedly heavily involved in mobilizing the masses, rallying thousands of individuals, including children, and disseminating violent and sectarian messages. The following images, taken from a documentary, illustrate a day of demonstrations, in Sana'a, in support of Houthi authorities. Every Friday, after prayer, the Ansar Allah is reported to gather hundreds of thousands of supporters in the main square of the city. Everyone, including the youngest children, is urged to think of Palestine.

Figures 194.2

Screenshots captured by the Panel from a 2024 documentary filmed in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen







Source: <https://www.arte.tv/en/videos/118760-000-A/arte-reportage/>

The following images depict moments in daily life in summer camps. These are powerful tools for promoting violence, hatred, and discrimination among children and youth.

Figure 194.3
Screenshots captured by the Panel from a 2024 documentary filmed in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen



Source: <https://www.arte.tv/en/videos/118760-000-A/arte-reportage/>

Annex 195: Directive issued by Houthi appointed authority on requirements for the operation of international organisations in Houthis-controlled areas

1. On 17 July 2024, the Houthi-appointed authority issued a directive demanding that international organisations operating in the areas under the group's control obtain its approval prior to hiring any staff, national or international. International organisations are further required to submit their detailed structure with the job title and function of employees.

Republic of Yemen
Presidency of Republic
Supreme Council
For Management and Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs & International cooperation
General Secretariat

التاريخ: ١٤ / / ٢٠٢٤
الموافق: ٢٠ / / ٢٠٢٤



الجمهورية اليمنية
رئاسة الجمهورية
المجلس الأعلى
لإدارة وتنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية والتعاون الدولي
الأمانة العامة

الرقم: ٢٠٢٤/٧٣١

السادة/ ممثلي المنظمات الدولية العاملة في اليمن

"تهديكم الأمانة العامة للمجلس الأعلى لإدارة وتنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية والتعاون الدولي خالص التقدير"

الموضوع: الهيكل الوظيفي للمنظمات الدولية.

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه، واستناداً إلى أحكام المادة رقم (5) من الاتفاقية الأساسية الموقعة معكم، التي نصت على أن تقوم المنظمة بتوظيف كوادر محلية أو أجنبية بحسب احتياجاتها وأنشطتها، وذلك بالتشاور مع الحكومة ممثلة بالأمانة العامة للمجلس الأعلى والحصول مسبقاً على موافقتها... الخ.

في هذا السياق؛ يتم سرعة موافقتنا بالهيكل الوظيفي لكل منظمة موضعاً فيه المسمى الوظيفي، وأسم الموظف، والتفويذ بنص المادة الموضحة أعلاه، بأخذ الموافقة المسبقة من قبل الأمانة العامة للمجلس الأعلى قبل استكمال إجراءات توظيف أي كوادر محلية أو أجنبية، بحسب احتياجات المنظمة ومتطلبات مشاريعها وأنشطتها.

وعليه:

نأمل موافقتنا بالهيكل الوظيفي للمنظمة خلال أسبوع من تاريخ إستلامكم لهذا التعميم، وذلك لما للأمر من أهمية في تطبيق ما ورد في الاتفاقية الأساسية من مواد وشروط والتزامات من شأنها تنظيم آلية العمل بين الحكومة اليمنية والمنظمات الدولية العاملة في اليمن.

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا ...



أمير أحمد الحمدي
الأمين العام

صورة مع التحية لس:
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الهاتف:
البريد الإلكتروني:
العنوان:

Source: GoY

Unofficial Translation

Presidency of the Republic
Supreme Council for the Administration and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation

General Secretariat

Date:

1/12/11

Number: 26

Subject: Functional Structure of International Organizations

Dear Representatives of International Organizations Working in Yemen,

The General Secretariat of the Supreme Council for the Administration and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation extends its sincere appreciation to you.

In reference to the above subject and in accordance with Article 5 of the basic agreement signed with your organization, which stipulates that organizations must employ local or foreign staff as needed, in consultation with and with prior approval from the government represented by the General Secretariat of the Supreme Council, we kindly request the following:

Please provide us with the job structure for your organization, including job titles and names of employees, while adhering to the requirement to obtain prior approval from the General Secretariat before completing the hiring process for any local or foreign staff. This request is in line with the provisions of the agreement and is essential for ensuring compliance with the agreement's terms and conditions.

We request that you submit the organization's functional structure within one week from the receipt of this circular. This is crucial for implementing the terms, conditions, and obligations outlined in the basic agreement, which governs the working relationship between the Yemeni government and international organizations operating in Yemen.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

[...]

[...]

General Secretariat

Supreme Council for the Administration and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation

Annex 196: Facebook accounts identified by the Panel of arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas

<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100069181991038>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100090419695269>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100073339084079>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100070385013748>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100009144795696>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100085644177040>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068910739101>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100076394770544>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100078946869864>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100082336645878>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100089367654514>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100005781396817>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100092376588133>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100084214463531>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100041980124439>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100055912167214>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100057138244853>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100013658930714>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100023464780757>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100085179506808>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100090858711000>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100093471751991>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100092491582012>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100084899035091>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088443758434>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100078672855133>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100064081843519>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100042798436449>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100022593847599>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100022615670487>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088847108170>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100043843201985>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100049455045023>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100078112421619>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100051918248750>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100095010057378>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100087821389404>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100072535674559>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068448654609>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088804448849>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100094432729023>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100053185149582>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100076279654300>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100016548902262>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100090392468856>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100090003906493>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088816089895>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091434221975>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100092078379984>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088576837558>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100089113144631>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100086756592360>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100093708284555>

Figures extracted from the related accounts



<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100054499128426>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100081039384059>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091504976127>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100078564827663>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100071818337321>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100006749950951>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100065120104780>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088976470569>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100066451894179>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100029741229295>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100021774343294>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091374281039>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100016090207826>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100092680670244>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100081286797981>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100017622091203>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100026950784654>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100015692440375>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100034788863769>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100041726862891>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100010730499222>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100034759011738>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100017187336988>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088305317681>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100089036797123>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100005860776176>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100007550204853>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100015340982387>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100074198676901>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100005505005626>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100079048570418>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091985026918>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088479603310>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100095482298185>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100008296422491>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100093551756316>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61553642951391>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61551679636123>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61551676585606>
<https://www.facebook.com/alimuhammad.alyemini>
<https://www.facebook.com/aslahslahk>
<https://www.facebook.com/ibnmuaamar>
<https://www.facebook.com/sdyq.hsynmsbqaan>
<https://www.facebook.com/nagi.gapan>
<https://www.facebook.com/jalal.alsowadi>
<https://www.facebook.com/aboskhr.alymne>
<https://www.facebook.com/ali.alsaiane>



Annex 197: WhatsApp accounts identified by the Panel of arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas

https://chat.whatsapp.com/LBvTP7htTgDBYwBPDF6qlt?fbclid=IwY2xjawE2i0VleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHXUNBnOn_E1jHHGUqYsJb4VHewNdC1e1GH_2kEE_3LiD7ixZQ67uwwmUJg_aem_xyybBPCoo7G5eiMLsi_6HQ

<https://chat.whatsapp.com/Cot0atBaQjD4Ejd2iZsICi>

Figures extracted from the related accounts



Annex 198: "X" accounts identified by the Panel of arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas

<https://twitter.com/AlTalhi2tradin>
<https://twitter.com/yosefalmtri>
https://twitter.com/sadq_wsh8046
<https://twitter.com/DergamAlawsh>
<https://twitter.com/mwsam3271>
<https://twitter.com/LslahBn29379>
<https://twitter.com/qkmGAD6akr6vHhz>
<https://twitter.com/abwnshw64747731>
<https://twitter.com/rshydhady3>
<https://twitter.com/mmdlsybry5>
<https://twitter.com/aammss04796954>
<https://twitter.com/almotiaee>
<https://twitter.com/ali772167832>
<https://twitter.com/Alsadrea0313kmm>
<https://twitter.com/NoxEhBjBBRHHwu9>
<https://twitter.com/yaser84779686>
<https://twitter.com/hamadqadr50>
<https://twitter.com/mdljbr201>
<https://twitter.com/almtry772101>
<https://twitter.com/KydlShmakh>
<https://twitter.com/ysylqy7>
https://twitter.com/ywfsf_mnyf
<https://twitter.com/MAIjayah41025>
<https://twitter.com/bdalslamun>
<https://twitter.com/Samname9>
<https://twitter.com/AldbyanAsm>
<https://twitter.com/alaslht30514>
<https://twitter.com/HASHAS348623>
<https://twitter.com/eNDYXpXk92Sfe9O>
<https://twitter.com/mwsam3271>
<https://twitter.com/AbdelSalamQat>
<https://twitter.com/TbyNasr>
<https://twitter.com/MustfeAlDhabial>
<https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinmF0uL2>
https://twitter.com/hdwan_ly
<https://twitter.com/rshydhady3>
<https://twitter.com/c2sXAYxqmYMzhon>
<https://twitter.com/mslslnslnl>
https://twitter.com/snan_as20
https://twitter.com/Ashraf_Muneef
<https://twitter.com/AdelHormos>
<https://twitter.com/NhMsv0WM2E8tCtM>
<https://twitter.com/bwmmdlqby3>
https://twitter.com/igg_04
<https://twitter.com/RwfySltn>
<https://twitter.com/YSKLMDIbkCTvUwO>
<https://twitter.com/lyrby44932777>
<https://twitter.com/mhm99445>
<https://twitter.com/bdallhalnhmy3>
https://twitter.com/aldbyan_rshad
<https://twitter.com/AlrwhanyAsma>
<https://twitter.com/f489086a52d84b5>
https://twitter.com/hybt_k_slahk

Figures extracted from the related accounts



<https://twitter.com/TahaArms>
<https://twitter.com/MshtryM>
<https://twitter.com/MohammedRiyadhe>
<https://twitter.com/k01mup442MDxa5H>
<https://twitter.com/rfatmhm97368979>
<https://twitter.com/TayfAbn50085>
<https://twitter.com/MuhammadAlTab>
<https://twitter.com/778238427M>
<https://twitter.com/bwmmdlqby3>
<https://twitter.com/AhmedAh11388275>
<https://twitter.com/mtmljfy1>
<https://twitter.com/ybuwZPadLPEft2x>
<https://twitter.com/mansour77373331>
<https://twitter.com/bdllhmnr81>
<https://twitter.com/Bs023uFPINwYLJL>
<https://twitter.com/alyashrms29>
<https://twitter.com/lyjmnljmn1>
<https://twitter.com/m777344073>
<https://twitter.com/yhyyalhd73>
<https://twitter.com/Hassan771413103>
<https://twitter.com/kheeryy>
<https://twitter.com/DhiaaArms>
<https://twitter.com/AlkynAbrahym>
<https://twitter.com/Amerali20321067>
<https://x.com/WjihAl>



Annex 199: Telegram accounts identified by the Panel as belonging to arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas

<https://t.me/amaramar711>
<https://t.me/aleaqil711>
<https://t.me/+azpllrRi3gzYmQ0>
<https://t.me/Hkblbh>
<https://t.me/tahaarms>
<https://t.me/Abwalyas>
<https://t.me/DhiaaArms>
<https://t.me/shehab5b>
<https://t.me/aleaqil711>
<https://t.me/ffegehhheh>

Figure extracted from one of the related accounts



Annex 200: “X” accounts identified by the Panel of Houthi political and military leadership, and/or of media associated, and/or of activists promoting their ideology

<https://x.com/army21ye>
<https://x.com/army21yemen>
https://x.com/Yahya_Saree
<https://x.com/yemenis111>
<https://x.com/yemenis1112>
<https://x.com/yemenis113>
<https://x.com/ameenhayan>
https://x.com/Nasr_Amer1
https://x.com/Moh_Alhouthi
<https://x.com/abdusalamsalah>
<https://x.com/alialqhoom>
https://x.com/ansarallah_1111
https://x.com/ansarallah_iraq
https://x.com/ansarallah_kurd
https://x.com/Ansarullah_info
<https://x.com/Ansarullahinfo>
https://x.com/Presidency_Ye
<https://x.com/AhmaaddHamed>
https://x.com/ZAID_garsyy
<https://x.com/MMY1444>
<https://x.com/SecYemen>
<https://x.com/drahmedalshami>
<https://x.com/DhaifAlShami650>
<https://x.com/MohammedAlfrah>
<https://x.com/hamedrizq01>
<https://x.com/AlJawfiAmin>
<https://x.com/alsyasiah>
<https://x.com/BadrSharaf22>
<https://x.com/PopularMedia8>
<https://x.com/AhmdAlrzamy>
<https://x.com/TvAlmasirah>
<https://x.com/ShahidAlmasirah>
<https://x.com/Almasirahbrk>
<https://x.com/almasirahturkey>
<https://x.com/najeebalashmory>
https://x.com/YEMEN_RMC_21
<https://x.com/alyementv1>
<https://x.com/ameenhayan>
<https://x.com/mtahir2>
https://x.com/Houthi_1446_
<https://x.com/almonawer202323>
<https://x.com/AlthawrahNews>
<https://x.com/aliazzehri>
<https://x.com/yemensmc2000>
<https://x.com/albayynaten>

Figures extracted from the related accounts



العقيد يحيى سريع
@army21ye



مكتب رئاسة الجمهورية اليمنية
@Presidency_Ye



محمد علي الحوثي
@Moh_Alhouthi



سفيرة أنصار الله
@ansarallah_1111



مركز الاعلام الثوري
@YEMEN_RMC_21



قناة المسيرة
@TvAlmasirah

Annex 201: "X" accounts identified by the Panel as used by the Houthis to indoctrinate the youth

https://x.com/Jehad_mag

Figures extracted from the related account



List of Acronyms

ADNOC	Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
AIS	Automatic Identification Signal
AQAP	Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
AMR	Anti-Materiel Rifle
ARES	Armament Research Services
ASBM	Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
ASCM	Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
ATGM	Anti-Tank Guided Missile
AT	Anti-Tank (Mine)
BC	Before (Jesus) Christ
C2	Command and Control (center)
CAR	Conflict Armament Research
CBY	Central Bank of Yemen
CENTCOM	Central Command (US)
CIDT	Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
COC	Country of Origin Certificate
CRSV	Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
CTU	Counter-Terrorism Unit (GoY)
DIO	Defence Industries Organization (Iran)
DPV	Diver Propulsion Vehicle
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Device
EOSS	Electro-Optical Surveillance Systems
EUC	End User Certificate
FSA	Free Syrian Army
FSO	Floating Storage and Offloading
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GIS	Geographic Information Systems

GI-TOC	Global Initiative against Trans Organized Crime
GoY	Government of Yemen
GPS	Global Positioning System
HMG	Heavy Machinegun
HOCC	Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (Houthi)
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IR	Iranian Riyal
HRL	Human Rights Law
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IPR	Individual Property Rights
IRGC	Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
IRGC-QF	Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force
IRI	Islamic Resistance in Iraq
IRIAF	Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces
IRIN	Islamic Republic of Iran Navy
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KH	Kata'ib Hizballah (Iraq)
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
LACM	Land Attack Cruise Missile
LMG	Light Machinegun
LPG	Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air Defence System
MIRS	Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite
MMSI	Maritime Mobile Service Identity
MR	Military Region
MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MSC	Mediterranean Shipping Vessel

MV	Maritime Vessel
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
nm	Nautical Mile
NSF	National Shield Forces
OFAC	Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (US)
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSV	Offshore Support Vessel
OWA-UAV	One-Way Attack-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
PIJ	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PLC	Presidential Leadership Council
PMF	Popular Mobilization Forces (Iraq)
PoES	Panel of Experts on Al-Shabaab (Somalia)
PoEY	Panel of Experts on Yemen
RPG	Rocket-propelled Grenade
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SDGT	Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group
SEPOC	<i>Safer</i> Exploration & Production Operations Company
SESGY	Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SMG	Sub-Machine Gun
SR	Saudi Riyal
SRBM	Short Range Ballistic Missile
SWIFT	Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
STC	Southern Transitional Council
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UKMTO	United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations
UN	United Nations
UNMHA	United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement
UNVIM	United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism
US	United States of America
USD	United States Dollars
UUV	Unmanned Underwater Vehicle
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VHF	Very High Frequency (radio)
WBIED	Water-borne improvised explosive device
WFP	World Food Programme
YR	Yemeni Riyal
