



安全理事会

Distr.: General
30 September 2024
Chinese
Original: English

2024 年 9 月 30 日安全理事会第 2653(2022)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

安全理事会第 2653(2022)号决议所设专家小组成员谨随函转递根据第 2700 (2023)号决议第 20 段提交的最后报告。

报告于 2024 年 8 月 16 日提交给安全理事会关于海地的第 2653 (2022)号决议所设委员会，委员会于 2024 年 9 月 11 日审议了该报告。

专家小组谨请安全理事会成员注意本函及最后报告，并将其作为安理会文件分发给荷。

安全理事会第 2653(2022)号决议
所设海地问题专家小组

* 由于技术原因于 2024 年 10 月 29 日重发。



海地问题专家小组根据第 2700 (2023)号决议提交的最后报告

摘要

在本报告所述期间，即 2023 年 11 月至 2024 年 8 月，海地的政治和安全动态都发生了重大转变。在全国各地持续数周的反政府抗议活动之后，在期待已久的多国安全支助团部署之前，来自两个对立联盟——G9 联盟和 G-Pèp 联盟——的帮派于 2024 年 2 月启动了 Viv Ansanm 联盟，并在太子港发动了一系列协同袭击。

在本报告所述期间，帮派暴力激增。自 2 月下旬以来，各帮派，包括由目前被列入联合国制裁综合名单的五人率领的帮派一再袭击政府设施和关键基础设施，包括海港、机场和警察局，以及银行、企业和私人财产。3 月，该国两所最大的监狱遭袭击，4 600 多名囚犯越狱，其中一些人加入了各帮派的队伍。这些袭击不仅造成了严重的人道主义影响，导致许多人死亡，数千人流离失所，使部分民众无法获得基本商品，而且使经济和金融部门进一步陷入瘫痪。

这一极端暴力促使总理阿里埃尔·亨利于 3 月 11 日在加勒比共同体(加共体)协调的一次会议上宣布辞职，此次会议为政治过渡制定了新路线图。此后，尽管在建立海地各利益攸关方之间的凝聚力方面面临挑战，但仍采取了几项重大步骤以实施过渡安排，包括成立过渡总统委员会，于 5 月 29 日任命加里·科尼耶(前总理和联合国高级官员)担任临时总理，以及于 6 月 12 日成立新政府。

尽管取得了这些进展，但帮派暴力继续困扰海地。首都若干地区仍遭受袭击；在编写本报告时，各帮派控制了大约 85%的太子港城区。各帮派继续积极破坏政治过渡，包括无情地以警察和司法设施以及人员为目标，特别是在西部省和阿蒂博尼特省，从而阻碍恢复国家权力和今后组织选举。在此背景下，自卫团体大量涌现，导致法外处决和暴民私刑显著增加。

6 月，过渡政府成立，与此同时多国安全支助团初步进行部署，标志着有可能恢复国家控制以及更有效地协调应对暴力。作为回应，虽然各帮派呼吁对话，希望获得大赦，但他们以暴力方式证明，他们反对支助团以及对自己霸权的任何威胁。除了一些内讧，六个月之后，Viv Ansanm 联盟依然存在，各帮派扩大了自己的地盘，以增加来自绑架、勒索和贩毒的收入。他们积极开展招募活动，特别是招募儿童，加强对自己据点的保护，并储存了武器和弹药。

尽管加强了军火禁运措施，但武器贩运活动继续有增无减，该国武装暴力程度高以及各帮派所展示的新军用物资就是证明。各帮派越来越多地采购更大口径的武器，从而造成更大破坏，对警察和支助团构成更大挑战。为应对安全真空，更多平民购买武器；一些私营保安公司以及保护区监察队的支队继续非法采购火器，进一步助长了贩运动态。专家小组正在调查区域贩运的若干趋势，先前报告的主要贩运路线仍未变。海地和更广泛区域的会员国有效执行军火禁运，对于实现减少该国武装暴力的目标仍至关重要。

严重侵犯人权的行为继续大规模存在，而且完全不受惩罚。各帮派继续对民众实施无差别袭击，杀害、强奸、折磨和绑架平民，在西部省和阿蒂博尼特省尤其如此。境内流离失所者人数激增，而且其生活条件恶劣，加剧了妇女和女童成为性侵犯和性剥削受害者的风险。专家小组对以下方面尤为关切，即儿童因强行招募、性暴力、营养不良以及被剥夺接受教育和获得保健服务的机会而成为受害者。在编写本报告时，约有 600 000 人在境内流离失所，另有数十万人逃到国外，包括通过与区域有组织犯罪组织有关联的偷运网络逃离。鉴于许多儿童和青年人失学，有技能的人员逃离，因此该国的未来岌岌可危。

最近的危机暴露了各帮派和其他武装行为体的行动与某些政治、经济和安全人员的行动之间的联系，专家小组正在调查其中几个人的活动。此外，安全和治理薄弱的状况继续被涉及帮派成员的跨界贩运网络利用，以便为那些资助各帮派的海地商人走私大量货物入境。这使国家无法收取进口税，而且为武器弹药的贩运和贩毒提供了便利，从而助长了武装暴力。

海地的对话者认为，对那些继续支持各帮派和威胁海地和平与安全而完全不受惩罚的行为体实施制裁，是一个主要优先事项。随着政治进程恢复以及部署多国安全支助团，现在是制裁制度切实支持实现海地稳定的关键时刻。

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一. 导言

A. 任务授权

1. 2023年10月19日,安全理事会通过了第2700(2023)号决议,延长了关于海地的制裁制度,对被安全理事会第2653(2022)号决议所设委员会指认负责、共谋或直接或间接参与威胁海地和平、安全和稳定的行动的个人和(或)实体实施军火禁运、旅行禁令和资产冻结等制裁。目前,制裁名单上有5个人。
2. 安全理事会决定自第2700(2023)号决议通过之日起,将第2653(2022)号决议第21段规定的专家小组任务期限延长13个月,还决定这一任务也适用于第2700(2023)号决议规定的措施。
3. 本最后报告是根据第2700(2023)号决议第20段提交的,述及截至2024年8月9日期间开展的调查。专家小组在本报告附件中提供了一些分析的详情。

B. 方法

4. 专家小组恪守透明、客观、公正、独立的原则,以专业、注重技术的方式开展调查。专家小组的工作方法完全符合安全理事会制裁所涉一般性问题工作组建议的最佳做法和方法(见S/2006/997)。专家小组特别重视透明度和使用可靠来源,包括书面证据、独立可核查来源和答辩机会(见附件1)。考虑到海地的极端不安全状况,专家小组在必要时非常谨慎,不去披露身份识别信息,以保护消息来源。
5. 在2023年9月发布专家小组的最后报告(S/2023/674)后,专家小组和委员会主席收到了报告中提到的一系列行为体自愿提供的信息以及有关这些实体的信息。专家小组审查了这些材料,并与委员会分享了这些材料及专家小组的意见。
6. 自2023年10月获任命以来,专家小组在海地进行了调查,并在比利时、多米尼加共和国、法国、牙买加、洪都拉斯、墨西哥和美利坚合众国开展了实况调查;专家小组感谢各国当局以及非政府行为体提供的支持。由于预算限制以及2024年3月以来海地安全局势严重恶化,因此专家小组开展一些实地调查的能力受到影响。
7. 专家小组欢迎海地当局继续给予合作。在海地期间,专家小组会见了海地各机构包括海地国家警察、海关和金融及反腐败部门的代表、政治和私营部门及民间社会组织代表、前帮派成员、帮派控制区的居民以及性暴力和性别暴力等帮派相关暴力的其他受害者。
8. 专家小组向会员国发出了一系列索取资料的请求。专家小组感谢对其请求作出回应的会员国,并进一步强调这些信息对支持专家小组的工作至关重要(见附件2的来往公文表)。

与其他实体的合作

9. 根据第 2700(2023)号决议，专家小组继续与联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室(毒品和犯罪问题办公室)和联合国海地综合办事处(联海综合办)积极合作，并得到它们的大力支持。此外，专家小组与加共体、包括知名人士小组及犯罪和安全问题执行机构的代表以及加勒比金融行动特别工作组和美洲人权委员会的代表进行了接触。专家小组还会见了多国安全支助团的领导，以便向他们介绍专家小组的工作和制裁制度，建立合作渠道。

10. 根据第 2700(2023)号决议第 25 段，专家小组支持了秘书长对该决议第 24 段所列关键基准的落实进展情况的评估。

C. 联合国海地制裁制度的发展情况

11. 继第 2653(2022)号决议所设委员会于 2023 年 12 月 8 日指认 4 人之后，目前该制裁名单由海地西部省的 5 名帮派头目组成。¹ 虽然这一决定发出了积极信息，但制裁效果仍极为有限，原因是帮派头目及其犯罪团伙的活动并未因这些措施而受到直接影响。所有帮派头目均参与武器贩运和(或)违反军火禁运。专家小组还在监测对这些人实施的资产冻结和旅行禁令的情况，目前正在调查关于可能违反这些措施的行为的报告。

12. 通过大幅扩大军火禁运的范围，从对受制裁个人和实体的定向禁运扩大到领土禁运，安全理事会采取了一项促进解决武器和弹药贩运问题的关键措施。然而，禁运的执行依然薄弱，经常发生违反行为(见第二.B.1 节)。

13. 大多数海地民众对 2023 年 10 月延长制裁制度持正面看法，他们强烈期望制裁更多行为体，特别是那些支持各帮派和参与武器贩运的行为体。

D. 安全局势的演变和政治轨道的发展

14. 在 2024 年 2 月底阿里埃尔·亨利总理宣布选举将不迟于 2025 年 8 月 31 日举行之后，来自两个对立联盟(G9 联盟和 G-Pèp 联盟)的帮派，包括被联合国制裁的 5 个人领导的帮派，宣布他们打算推翻总理。他们重新启动了 Viv Ansanm(“共生”)联盟(见 S/2024/253，附件 1)，以便对关键基础设施发动协同袭击(见第二.A 节)。这些袭击造成大量人员死亡和流离失所，切断了民众的重要供应线(见第二.C 节)。

15. 3 月 3 日，政府宣布进入紧急状态，次日国际航班被取消；各帮派袭击了机场，使亨利先生在访问肯尼亚后无法返回海地。

16. 为了应对帮派暴力的极端爆发，3 月 11 日，加共体在金斯敦与海地利益攸关方和国际合作伙伴召开了一次紧急会议。同一天，亨利先生宣布他将在成立

¹ 见 <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/materials/summaries>。

过渡总统委员会和提名临时总理后辞职。在金斯敦的所有各方都同意建立一个过渡政治安排，以促进通过自由公正的选举实现权力的和平过渡。²

17. 在海地通过的 4 月 3 日促进和平有序过渡政治协议³ 和 4 月 12 日政府发布的行政命令，⁴ 规定了过渡总统委员会的组成和作用；与以往任何过渡协议相比，过渡总统委员会包括了范围更广的利益攸关方，其中 7 名有表决权的成员来自主要政党和领域(蒙大拿小组、拉瓦拉斯之家、德萨林之子党、全国捍卫人权网络/民主协议/历史性妥协、私营部门团体、2022 年 12 月 21 日协议签署方、2023 年 1 月 30 日政党联盟)，还有来自民间社会和宗教间团体的两名观察员。委员会中只有一名妇女，她是两名无表决权成员之一。

18. 亨利先生于 4 月 24 日辞去总理职务，预计次日将成立过渡总统委员会。尽管过渡总统委员会在商定内部决策机制方面遇到困难，但已采取重大步骤，包括 5 月 30 日任命前总理和前联合国高级官员加里·科尼耶为临时总理，以及 6 月 12 日成立新政府。

19. 多国安全支助团于 6 月初部署，为海地当局推动恢复安全的过渡并为全国选举铺平道路提供了重要支持，但过渡的下一个关键步骤，即临时选举委员会成员的提名仍是一项挑战。

政治过渡面临的安全挑战

20. 各帮派继续蓄意破坏政治过渡，包括无休止地以海地国家警察在西部省和阿蒂博尼特省的设施为目标，⁵ 从而阻止任何国家权力和安全的恢复，而这是自由的民主选举的一个重要先决条件。各帮派以公开的暴力方式宣布，他们反对过渡总统委员会和多国安全支助团(见第二.A.4 节)。预计到多国安全支助团即将部署，各帮派开展了积极的招募活动(见第二.A 节)，购买了武器和弹药(见第二.B.1 节和附件 24)，并扩大地盘以获得更多收入并建立“撤退区”(见第二.A.4 节)。

21. 随着 200 名肯尼亚警察抵达，多国安全支助团于 6 月 25 日实现了初步部署，受到非常积极的欢迎；但对于大多数民众而言，其确切目标和范围仍不明确，许多人希望支助团将部署在太子港以外和阿蒂博尼特省，以收复帮派控制的领地。在编写本报告时，海地对话者表示关切的是，多国安全支助团尚待展示其成果。

² CARICOM, “Outcome declaration of CARICOM, international partners and Haitian stakeholders”, 11 March 2024.

³ 可查阅 www.haitilibre.com/docs/accord-politique-pour-une-transition-pacifique-et-ordonnee.pdf。

⁴ 可查阅 www.haitilibre.com/docs/Decret-portant-creation-du-Conseil-presidentiel-de-transition.pdf。

⁵ 截至 2024 年 6 月 30 日，海地国家警察的 74 个警察局没有运作。联合国警察数据。

22. 多国安全支助团的抵达与过渡政府的成立时间相吻合，表明可能恢复治理，并以更具战略性和更加协调一致的方式应对暴力行为。对此，帮派头目在以下两个选择之间摇摆不定：炫耀武力或呼吁对话以期获得大赦。

23. 专家小组的对话者分享了有关今后如何应对帮派现象的关切和挑战。对话者指出，与那些主要以金钱目的为动机的暴力犯罪团伙谈判，极为敏感和危险，而且此种谈判可能被视为给予它们政治承认和助长有罪不罚现象的标志。相反，如果采取纯粹强硬的安全办法，将阻碍海地的恢复。他们还强调，司法和监狱系统(见第二.C 节和附件 32)没有能力应付可能被大批逮捕的帮派成员，而且任何解除武装、复员和重返社会和(或)减少社区暴力方案的构想基本上都处于萌芽阶段。


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A. 帮派态势

24. 在本报告所述期间，帮派态势发生了重大变化，两个敌对联盟(G9 联盟和 G-Pèp 联盟)于 2024 年 2 月 29 日启动了 Viv Ansanm 联盟，以建立反对政府的共同阵线(见附件 3 和 4)。自 2 月下旬以来，首都的暴力达到前所未有的水平，主要政府建筑和关键基础设施遭到帮派的协同袭击(见附件 5 和第二.D.2 节)。

25. 西部省和阿蒂博尼特省继续受到程度令人震惊的暴力行为的困扰。在西部省，各帮派以太阳城、德尔马斯、塔巴尔、太子港和克鲁瓦-德布凯等市镇为目标。在联合国安全支助团行动之前，他们还扩大了对首都郊区的控制，特别是对南部(Carrefour、Gressier 和 Léogâne)、东部(Ganthier)和北部(Cabaret 和 Arcahaie)市镇的控制，以增加收入。据估计，太子港城区 85%的地区目前处于帮派影响和控制之下(见附件 6)。⁶

⁶ 2024 年 6 月和 7 月，与帮派分析人士的访谈。关于帮派控制区和影响区的定义，见 S/2023/674。



资料来源：2024 年 4 月至 6 月联海综合办人权状况季度报告。

注：上图所示边界和名称以及使用的指称表述并不意味着为联合国正式认可或接受。

26. 整个首都的居民的生活深受帮派暴力的影响，妨碍了安全、教育、卫生、文化和交通等重要部门的运作。在阿蒂博尼特省，绑架、强奸、劫持卡车和杀人事件的数目增加⁷ (见第二.C 节)，促使民众再次呼吁向该地区紧急部署多国安全支助团。⁸ 在此背景下，自卫团体成倍增加；法外处决、包括对未成年人的处决，以及暴民私刑也是如此。

27. 被制裁的 5 个人继续领导海地的主要帮派，由约翰逊·安德烈(别名“伊佐”-HTi.002)领导的 5 Segond 和勒内尔·德斯坦纳(别名“Ti Lapli”-HTi.003)领导的 Grand Ravine，目前在地盘控制、人数、火力和收入方面都是最强的。吉米·谢里齐耶(别名“烧烤”-HTi.001)可能是最臭名昭著和嗓门最大的帮派头目(见第二.A 节)，但他并不是最有权势的。他对 G9 联盟的影响力大大减弱(见附件 7)，他的“Delmas 6”帮因警方的持续行动和收入损失而被削弱。值得注意的是，*Viv Ansanm* 抢劫了 Bas Delmas 的大部分企业，这些企业过去常常给“烧烤”钱，以换取“安全”。⁹

28. 与此同时，Kraze Barye 帮的重要性降低，原因是与该帮一个分支多次发生冲突而被削弱；该分支由“Didi”领导，他于 2024 年 5 月被杀，曾反对该帮的头目维特霍姆·因诺森特(HTi.005)。警方的几次行动也削弱了该帮的力量。

⁷ 2024 年 6 月和 7 月，与帮派分析人士和当地民间社会代表的访谈。

⁸ 2024 年 7 月，联合国警察的报告。

⁹ 2024 年 5 月，与帮派分析人士的访谈；2024 年 5 月，联合国机密报告。

Kraze Barye 得到了 5 Segond 帮和 Canaan 帮的支持。后者由 Jeff Larose(别名“Jeff”)领导,其重要性增加,主要是因为它与 5 Segond 帮的关系密切,而且 Canaan 地区没有 Viv Ansanm 的袭击,也没有警察行动。威尔逊·约瑟夫(别名“Lanmo San Jou”-HTi 004)率领的 400 Mawozo 帮反而增强了战斗力并增加了收入,特别是通过勒索进出多米尼加共和国的货车(见附件 8)。¹⁰

1. 太子港市中心及附近地区的帮派暴力

29. 作为首都主要的行政、金融和商业区,太子港市中心一直是帮派扩张野心的核心地带。自 2024 年 2 月下旬以来,该地区已成为战场。最近设立了几个战略检查站,帮派成员可以在那里放哨并扰乱警察行动,而狙击手则在已被破坏的建筑物的楼顶射击。¹¹ 例如,在 2024 年 7 月初从帮派手中夺回海地最大医院的控制权之后,5 Segond 和 Grand Ravine 的帮派成员在临时总理两次访问该医院时开枪,阻止访问。¹²

30. 在本报告所述期间,于 2022 年开始向市中心南部发展的 5 Segond 帮和 Grand Ravine 帮,积极扩展到国家宫周边地区。同时,自 2021 年以来,市中心北部一直处于 Krache Dife 帮、Les Argentins 帮和 La Saline 帮的控制之下。该地区一直是通过勒索、劫持卡车和盗窃货物以及绑架来获取收入的战略要地。这里靠近国家港务局,¹³ 因此也使其成为开展贩毒活动的有利地点(见 S/2024/253)。¹⁴

31. Viv Ansanm 的政治野心通过其对 Guy Philippe 的支持及其反政府立场暴露无遗(见 S/2024/253)。鉴于占领国家宫将是对海地具有象征性的打击,因此自 2024 年 3 月初以来,Viv Ansanm 已对国家宫发动了至少 10 次重大袭击。这些攻势得到了国家宫总安全部门前负责人 Dimitri Hérard(2017-2021 年)的支持,他因涉嫌参与 2021 年暗杀前总统若弗内尔·莫伊兹而被监禁(附件 9),并于 2024 年 3 月与其他 4 600 名囚犯一起越狱。Hérard 先生试图怂恿其他人向抵抗袭击的安全官员开枪,并与 Guy Philippe 勾结;据报,后者试图贿赂警察,以便让各帮派进入国家宫。¹⁵

32. 为了破坏政治过渡,Viv Ansanm 还多次袭击司法部、国防部和内政部、最高审计和行政诉讼法院的前大楼、总医院以及海地国家警察各单位,包括省级治安队和太子港警察局。¹⁶ 在附近的一个社区,由 Kempes Sanon 领导的 Les Argentins 帮(又称 Bel Air 帮)多次试图夺取行动和省级干预队的控制权,原因是

¹⁰ 2024 年,与国内和国际帮派分析人士、海地国家警察官员和帮派控制区居民的访谈。

¹¹ 2024 年 6 月和 7 月,与一名帮派分析人士和一名海地国家警察官员的访谈。

¹² 2024 年 7 月,联合国警察的报告,以及 2024 年 7 月与一名帮派分析人士、一名海地国家警察官员和开展反帮派行动的一名政府代表的访谈。

¹³ 管理海地所有海港的政府当局。见 https://www.mef.gouv.ht/directions/og_autonomes。

¹⁴ 2024 年 6 月和 7 月,与一名帮派分析人士和开展帮派相关问题工作的一名政府代表的访谈。

¹⁵ 2024 年 6 月和 7 月,与保密消息来源的访谈。

¹⁶ 2024 年 7 月,与海地国家警察官员和一名帮派分析人士的访谈。

这支队伍占据国家堡高地的战略位置，因此夺取这里的控制权将使该帮能够控制市中心大部分地区。¹⁷

33. 在邻近的 Solino，自 2024 年 2 月以来，“烧烤”与其曾经的竞争对手 Kempes Sanon 联合起来，以加强突袭，从而获得将其地盘与其他地区连接起来的战略路线的准入权，并从多样化的收入来源中获益(见 S/2023/674)。各帮派与 Solino 自卫团体发生了冲突，导致数人伤亡(见附件 10)。过去，“烧烤”与 Solino 的某些警官之间有某种非正式安排。然而，Viv Ansanm 对警察房地和住宅的持续袭击，以及海地国家警察对“烧烤”的据点所采取的行动，均导致上述关系受损。¹⁸为回应警方压力增加的状况，“烧烤”于 6 月 9 日声称对一次袭击负责；此次袭击造成在下德尔马斯巡逻的海地国家警察反帮派战术股的 3 名警官死亡(见附件 11)。“烧烤”指责这些军官以私人身份进入该地区，以支持 Solino 自卫团体。¹⁹

2. 扩大至西部省南部

34. 各帮派试图扩大自己的领地，以增加来自以下方面的收入，即绑架、勒索、贩毒以及首都至南部的国道(RN2)沿线的非法通行费。在联合国安全支助团开始行动之前，各帮派对西部省南部市镇的控制为其提供了后方基地和通往其他各省的走廊(见附件 12)。²⁰

35. Grand Ravine 在 Mariani 的小分队(2023 年底在 Carrefour 镇设立)(见 S/2024/253)，得到了由 Charlemagne Dorin(别名“Ti Bebe Bougòy”)率领的“103 Zombie”团体的增援，以扩大 Grand Ravine 对邻近的 Gressier 镇的控制范围。²¹此外，设立了更多的非法收费站，而且 2024 年 5 月爆发了残酷的帮派暴力事件。2024 年 6 月 28 日至 7 月 1 日期间，至少有 25 名平民被杀，²²警方于 2024 年 7 月 7 日失去了对 Gressier 警察局的控制权。

36. 目前，Léogâne、Grand Goave 和 Petit Goave 等南部市镇因帮派侵入而受到威胁。7 月 20 日，“103 Zombie”团体发布了一段视频，显示他们已进入毗连 Gressier 镇的 Léogâne 镇的 Laferronay。这里是山区地形，可作为帮派成员的战略后方基地，因为警方只有动用空中能力才能进入这些地区。对此，Léogâne 镇的居民竖起了路障，以防止帮派进一步渗透。

37. 2024 年 2 月以来，Christ-Roi Chery(别名“Chrisla”)率领的 Ti Bwa 帮控制了 Carrefour 镇。自 2024 年 5 月中旬两个警察局遭袭击以来，该地区已没有警察。

¹⁷ 2024 年 6 月，与开展帮派相关问题工作的一名政府代表的访谈。

¹⁸ 2024 年 6 月和 7 月，与一名帮派分析人士和开展帮派相关问题工作的一名政府代表的访谈。

¹⁹ 专家小组存档视频。

²⁰ 联合国机密报告；2024 年 5 月、6 月和 7 月与帮派分析人士和海地国家警察官员的访谈。

²¹ 联合国机密文件；2024 年 7 月与帮派分析人士和海地国家警察官员的访谈。

²² 2024 年 5 月和 7 月，联合国数据。

38. 2024 年 4 月至 6 月，Carrefour 镇和 Gressier 镇的帮派暴力事件导致至少 233 人(包括帮派成员和平民)死亡或受伤。²³

3. 阿蒂博尼特省的持续帮派暴力

39. Luckson Elan 率领的 Gran Grif 帮和 Ferdens Tilus(别名“Meyer”)率领的 Kokorat San Ras 帮，²⁴ 继续使暴力在阿蒂博尼特省、包括在以前未曾发生暴力的北部市镇蔓延(见附件 13 至 15)。²⁵ 为了扩大地盘控制范围，Kokorat San Ras 帮于 2024 年 6 月中旬首次袭击了 Terre Neuve 镇，造成 11 名平民死亡。2024 年 1 月，该帮派在 l'Estère 镇的 Mapou Lagond 设立了一个新的小分队。

40. 上述帮派与在太子港城区开展行动的 *Viv Ansanm* 各帮派，特别是 G-Pèp 有密切联系。在本报告所述期间，他们滥杀无辜，烧毁房屋，并袭击警察局。例如，2024 年 1 月 11 日，一名男子在抵抗 Gran Grif 的袭击后被谋杀并被肢解。绑架事件的程度令人震惊(见附件 33)。2 月 18 日，Kokorat San Ras 帮绑架了 Gros Morne 镇的 20 名乘客，索要 3 500 美元以归还车辆，此外还索要乘客的赎金。如果不支付赎金，人质往往会被折磨和杀害。此外，各帮派一再抢掠农田和偷窃牲畜。作为回应，自卫团体继续处决据称与各帮派有关联或涉嫌实施普通犯罪的人。²⁶

41. 尽管 2024 年 1 月对 Youri Latortue 发出了与谋杀、犯罪阴谋和伪造指控有关的拘传令，但他继续利用 Raboteau 帮和 Kokorat San Ras 帮对戈纳伊夫和更广泛的阿蒂博尼特地区施加控制，完全不受惩罚。Latortue 一直在利用他名为“国家安全”的私营保安公司来获取火器，并一直在向帮派成员提供军用物资。²⁷

42. 阿蒂博尼特地区的警察和司法设施及人员继续受到帮派及其支持者的威胁(见 S/2023/674)。2 月初，在支持 Guy Philippe 的反政府示威中，Raboteau 帮和 Kokorat San Ras 帮的成员洗劫了法庭。在戈纳伊夫的示威之前，这两个帮派的成员在保护区监察队武装人员的陪同下与 Guy Philippe 会面。这次，以招募监察队工作人员为幌子分发了一些武器。²⁸ 值得注意的是，监察队的一些工作人员(被要求持有火器)积极参加了支持 Guy Philippe 的反政府示威(见附件 26)。

²³ 2024 年 4 月至 6 月，联合国海地综合办事处，“海地境内人权状况季度报告”。

²⁴ 这些人最近受到加拿大的制裁。见 Canada, Global Affairs, “Canada imposes sanctions against Haitian gang leaders”, 21 June 2024。

²⁵ 联海综合办，“海地境内人权状况季度报告”。

²⁶ 2024 年联合国机密报告以及 2024 年 6 月和 7 月与民间社会代表的访谈。

²⁷ 2024 年，一个会员国提供的信息以及与保密消息来源的访谈。

²⁸ 2024 年 1 月和 2 月，与保密消息来源的访谈。

4. 应对多国安全支助团行动的策略

43. 各帮派主要集中精力加强对自己区域的保护，以防止安全部队进入，包括为此在通往各自据点的道路上挖掘壕沟，竖起路障，并利用侦察兵和无人机来跟踪警察的动向。各帮派在各自区域内放置了气瓶，并准备了燃烧瓶，以用于在行动期间对抗警察。为了恐吓安全部队，各帮派播放了展示其最近获得的武器和弹药的录像(见附件 16)。²⁹

44. 一些帮派成员逃离了太子港，或迁往难以进入的地区，以期建立新基地和增加犯罪收入。Grand Ravine 帮向西部省南部市镇移动(见第二.A.2 节)，400 Mawozo 帮则对东部的 Ganthier 镇发动了野蛮袭击。³⁰ 在 Lanmo San Jou(HTi.004)吹嘘新获得的武器和弹药的一段视频发布后(见附件 17)，该帮在 7 月 21 日的一次重大袭击中占领了 Ganthier 镇。一些财产被纵火，其中包括 7 月 25 日被进一步摧毁的镇警察局。该帮派设立了一个新的分队，而且 Lanmo San Jou 于 7 月 28 日宣布，Ganthier 镇的 Fond-Parisien 乡将成为该帮派的下一个目标。³¹ 此举旨在完全控制 RN8 线，以勒索在克鲁瓦-德布凯与马尔帕斯(位于与多米尼加共和国边界)之间往来的司机，并为在漏洞百出的海地边界走私武器、弹药和其他违禁品提供便利(见第二.D.3 节)。³² 值得注意的是，随着 *Viv Ansanm* 的出现，非法收费站不仅在连接太子港与其他地区的主要道路上成倍增加，而且在二级公路和太子港城区若干街区的街道上也成倍增加。³³ 8 月 6 日，在首都的北部各社区，5 Segond 帮和 Cannan 帮在对 Arcahaïe 和 Cabaret 社区的袭击中杀害了至少 10 人并烧毁了几所房屋，试图在太子港湾沿线扩大控制，可能是为了方便运送毒品和进入其他地区。

45. 对各帮派扩大其控制区的担心，导致社交网络上散布着鼓励民众购买砍刀的信息，以便对 *Viv Ansanm* 的成员实施暴民正义(附件 18)。私刑行为可能会增加，从而加剧社区暴力。³⁴

46. 各帮派的头目正在利用民众作为“人盾”，包括应对可能即将开展的反帮派行动(见第二.C.3 节)。他们安排发放现金以确保留住居民，³⁵ 禁止民众离开，甚

²⁹ 2024 年，与国际和国家帮派分析人士、一名海地国家警察官员、开展反帮派行动的一名政府代表以及帮派控制区一名居民的访谈。

³⁰ 400 Mawozo 帮开始对该帮控制的克鲁瓦-德布凯镇的邻近地区发动袭击，以扩大领地并增加收入。在控制了这些地区和 Thomazeau 镇的部分乡之后，该帮派于 2023 年 10 月初开始在 Ganthier 镇挺进，并于 2023 年 11 月下旬发动致命袭击，而且自 2024 年 1 月以来加强了攻势。

³¹ 专家小组存档视频。

³² 2024 年 7 月，与一名帮派分析人士的访谈。另见 Jacqueline Charles, “What a gang attack in a rural Haiti town says about the Kenya-led security mission”, Miami Herald, 26 July 2024.

³³ 2024 年 7 月，与交通部门一名代表的访谈。

³⁴ 2024 年 6 月，联合国机密报告；2024 年，与国际和国家帮派分析人士及帮派控制区一名居民的访谈。

³⁵ 2024 年 5 月，与帮派分析人士和帮派控制区一名居民的访谈。

至强迫居民留在他们侵入的房屋内，以便与民众混在一起。³⁶ 妇女和儿童被安置在帮派区入口处，以便在警察行动期间将其用作保护式缓冲。³⁷ 2024 年 7 月 24 日，太阳城社区的帮派，例如 Belekou、Boston 和 Brooklyn 宣布了和平承诺，并拆除了分隔各自区域、限制民众出入的屏障(见附件 18)；据报是为了伪装成平民，以逃避警察的行动。

47. 各帮派还扩大了自己的队伍，使成员人数达到估计 5 500 人(见附件 4)，主要是招募儿童，旨在利用可能针对他们的事件来破坏多国安全支助团的存在。³⁸ 儿童参加了袭击，包括充当侦察兵，搬运武器和弹药，甚至是参加战斗。³⁹ 值得注意的是，目前 Grand Ravine 帮在 Mariani 的头目(Bout Ba)和在 Gressier 的头目(Ti Bebe Bougoy)，在大约 10 年前被招募时还是儿童，从而表明今天的新招募者可能成为日后的帮派头目。⁴⁰

48. 此外，最近大规模越狱的逃犯给他们加入的帮派带来新技能。例如，Dimitri Hérard 在 5 Segond 帮的地区寻求了庇护，帮助开展组织和训练工作，并就协同袭击的策略为该帮成员提供咨询。他为获取火器提供了便利，这些火器在所谓“Unité village de dieu”的宣传视频中得到展示(见附件 24)。⁴¹ 除了参与贩毒外，他还使伊佐与该地区的大型犯罪组织建立起联系。⁴²

49. 尽管犯罪和侵犯人权行为的水平增加，但 *Viv Ansanm* 各帮派加强了对话要求及其媒体存在，可能是旨在改善自己的公众形象，并表达机会主义的社会和政治言论，为其暴力行为做辩护。随着政府宣布将采取坚决行动夺回帮派控制地区，海地国家警察领导层发生变动，以及多国安全支助团进行部署，各帮派的动机是争取获得大赦的机会，而非实现真正的政治愿望。⁴³

50. *Viv Ansanm* 未能使 Guy Philippe 成为过渡时期的领导人，因此先前有关大赦的希望破灭；尽管该联盟一再袭击国家宫(见第二.A.1 节)，但却希望获得大赦。⁴⁴

³⁶ 2024 年 7 月，与一名政治分析人士的访谈。

³⁷ 2024 年 5 月，联合国机密报告；2024 年 7 月，与帮派控制区一名居民的访谈。

³⁸ 2024 年，与政府代表、海地国家警察官员、国家和国际帮派分析人士及帮派控制区一名居民的访谈。

³⁹ 2024 年 6 月，与帮派控制区一名居民的访谈。另见 Jérôme Wendy Norestyl, “Ma vie comme enfant membre de 5 Segonn au Village de Dieu”, 16 June 2024。

⁴⁰ 2024 年 6 月和 7 月，与一名帮派分析人士和帮派控制区一名居民的访谈。

⁴¹ 2024 年，与保密消息来源的访谈。

⁴² 与帮派分析人士、海地国家警察官员、帮派控制区一名居民和一个会员国的一名代表的访谈。另见 Maria Abi-Abib, “Haiti’s gangs grow stronger as Kenyan-led force prepares to deploy”, New York Times, 21 May 2024。

⁴³ 2024 年，与国际和国家帮派分析人士、帮派控制区居民、一名海地国家警察官员和一个会员国的一名代表的访谈。

⁴⁴ 2024 年，与帮派分析人士、帮派控制区居民、海地国家警察官员、开展帮派相关问题工作的一名政府代表的访谈。另见 Stephen Eisenhammer, “Exclusive: Haiti ex-coup leader Guy Philippe demands PM resign, wants presidency”, Reuters, 8 May 2024。

在这方面，6月25日，即肯尼亚部队抵达太子港的同一天，*Viv Ansanm*的发言人“烧烤”(HTi.001)呼吁与总理会谈，“作为恢复国家和平的第一步”。6月28日，临时总理敦促各帮派首先停止犯罪活动，放下武器并承认国家的权威，然后再做出任何其他安排。⁴⁵

51. 尽管各帮派呼吁谈判，但却继续实施犯罪活动，暴力行为达到创纪录的高水平。6月28日，“烧烤”在武装人员包围下现身，表示准备与国际支助团战斗。⁴⁶伊佐(HTi.002)也在社交媒体上发布了7月开始的多国安全支助团巡逻的无人机图像，显然是企图进行恐吓(见附件16)。

52. *Viv Ansanm*联盟的启动表明，各帮派根据其议程来确定、协调和实施战略的能力在不断发展。他们在让亨利先生下台方面所发挥的关键作用就说明了这一点。对于有多国安全支助团支持的新政府来说，重新夺回帮派控制地区将是一项重大挑战，但也是选举道路上的必要一步。

B. 跨国有组织犯罪的动态

1. 违反军火禁运的行为和国内武器贩运行为

53. 武器贩运活动继续有增无减，该国武装暴力程度高以及各帮派展示的新军用物资就是证明。由于存在安全真空，因此一系列非正式的安全规定也助长了对武器的需求。这包括平民越来越多地试图保障自身安全，使用私营保安公司，以及不受政府控制的保护区监察队分队在全国各地成倍增加(见下文)。

54. 专家小组一直在调查源自美国、多米尼加共和国和南美洲的贩运的多起案件，美国仍是海地境内非法武器和弹药的主要来源地(见 [S/2023/674](#))。

(a) 跨国贩运趋势

(一) 源自美国的贩运

a. 海上贩运

55. 从美国至海地的贩运，流程并不复杂。小型贩运网络数目众多，往往以家庭和社会关系为基础。专家小组一直在调查一些案件，其中帮派头目要么依靠在美国的同谋，要么对来自其社区、现住在美国的海地国民施压，让其为获取和转移军用物资提供便利。

56. 这些方法一般包括由代购者购买火器，以及将数量有限的军用物资、包括被拆卸的火器，藏在堆在超载集装箱或散货船内的成堆货物中，以免被发现(见 [S/2023/674](#) 号，附件29)。4月，在北部省海地角缉获了26支火器和999发弹药。这是自实施军火禁运以来，在海地入境口岸缉获的最大一批火器(见附件21)。尽管采用少量入境的方式，但此种经常性的“小规模蚂蚁搬家式贩运”很快就越来越多，使该国充斥着武器。

⁴⁵ 2024年6月，联合国机密文件。

⁴⁶ 专家小组存档视频。

57. 在本报告所述期间，源自美国的贩运路线发生了变化，原因是首都主要海港的活动自 2024 年 3 月初以来几乎停止，因此所有缉获都是在海地角。虽然迈阿密是专家小组以前报告的大多数缉获物资的出发港，但在本报告所述期间实施的缉获行动中，所有物资均来自佛罗里达州的埃弗格雷斯港，那里的一些航运公司提供至海地角的服务。专家小组于 2024 年 6 月访问了迈阿密和埃弗格雷斯港，并与一系列行为体进行了交谈，以更好地了解贩运趋势。

58. 在本报告所述期间，没有关于缉获来自迈阿密河上的军用物资的报告(关于以往缉获情况，见 [S/2023/674](#)，附件 29)。原因可能是迈阿密的控制增加，以及目前在迈阿密河上运营的造船厂数量极少。

b. 空中贩运

59. 源自美国的空中贩运的证据很少(见附件 21)，但专家小组继续调查若干线索。2022 年 5 月，美国当局缉获了在一架从佛罗里达州飞往海地的私人飞机上发现的弹药。⁴⁷ 专家小组已要求提供更多有关此案的信息。

60. 海地境内存在多个非正式或秘密的简易机场，为贩运者提供了真正的机会；这些机场以及私人飞机的航行应当受到严密检查(见 [S/2024/79](#)，第 18-19 段)。然而，海地安全机构的空中监视和空中能力有限，使当局无法有效监测局势。

c. 在美国的出境缉获

61. 在上一份最后报告([S/2023/674](#))中，专家小组已着重指出贩运者利用的一些主要漏洞。正如军备控制专家向专家小组进一步解释的那样，鉴于美国境内对获取和拥有火器的控制有限，因此很难防止或发现恶意行为体、包括代购者购买火器的行为。因此，起诉贩运者和防止非法出口是打击跨国武器贩运的主要切入点。

62. 在出口管制方面，尽管对从南佛罗里达前往海地的集装箱或杂货船进行了更多的资源密集型搜查，⁴⁸ 但在 2023 年 6 月至 2024 年 7 月期间，缉获量很少。缉获物资包括一些手枪和几支步枪，以及数量有限的弹药⁴⁹ (见附件 21)。每周从南佛罗里达到海地的集装箱有 200 个，但绝大多数都未经过检查，贩运活动仍在继续。此外，利用货运代理进行运输，使贩运者得以利用此种管制松散的活动(见 [S/2023/674](#)，附件 29)。为了使军火禁运更加有效，必须加强对运往海地的出境货物的管制。

⁴⁷ 2024 年，美国海关及边境保护局提供的数据。

⁴⁸ 2024 年 6 月，与一家航运公司、一个货运代理和一名执法人员的访谈，佛罗里达州。

⁴⁹ 2024 年 6 月和 7 月，与一名执法人员和一个保密消息来源的访谈；通过向美国海关及边境保护局提出的《信息自由法》请求获得的数据。

d. 在海地缉获的源自美国的入境军用物资

表 1
在海地缉获源自美国的入境军用物资的案件

日期	地点/起源	运输方式	军用物资
2023 年 12 月 2 日	纽约至杜桑·卢维杜尔机场	商业航班	265 发弹药
2023 年 12 月 22 日	埃弗格雷斯港至海地角	商船	1 支 9 毫米手枪 1 支 5.56x45 毫米步枪 179 发弹药
2024 年 4 月 5 日	埃弗格雷斯港至海地角	商船	9 支 5.56x45 毫米步枪 3 支 7.62x39 毫米步枪 14 支手枪 999 发弹药(7.62x39 毫米、 5.56x45 毫米、.40 S&W、9 x19 毫米)
2024 年 4 月 29 日	埃弗格雷斯港至海地角	商船	2 支手枪 13 发弹药
2024 年 6 月 11 日	埃弗格雷斯港至海地角	商船	转换套件 150 发弹药

63. 专家小组正在调查上述各案(见附件 22 和 23)。在调查期间,专家小组约谈了执法、海关和司法官员以及航运公司和货运代理的代表。自 1 月以来,专家小组已向美国当局发出 49 份追查请求,要求提供从帮派成员手中或在海地入境口岸缉获的火器的详情,以便更多地了解保管链并确定所涉贩运网络。在编写本报告时,尚未收到答复。此外,专家小组于 7 月向美国烟酒火器和爆炸物管理局提交了信息自由法请求,以获取有关在海地查获的火器的踪迹的数据。此项请求未获批准。

64. 虽然缉获军用物资有助于了解一些贩运者的概况及其作案手法,但有限的数量并不能反映违反军火禁运规定而进入海地的非法武器和弹药的数量,也不能反映贩运者将武器运入海地的所有各类渠道。与海地海关和警察高级官员的讨论表明,要在该国更好地执行军火禁运,就必须改善安全局势,以便能够在所有入境口岸部署部队并加强侦查和调查能力,打击边境管制机构内部的腐败。

(二) 源自多米尼加共和国的贩运

65. 各帮派以及平民和保护区监察队工作人员(见附件 26)继续非法从多米尼加共和国采购火器,但主要是弹药(见附件 22 所载缉获详情和第二.D.3 节),尽管多米尼加当局努力遏制对本国的武器贩运。2023 年 11 月至 2024 年 6 月,在多米尼

加入港口查获了 94 支火器和 571 798 发弹药，其中 97.8% 来自美国，2.2% 来自欧洲和加勒比地区。⁵⁰

66. 虽然一些以往案件显示，一些有限的军用物资通过多米尼加共和国直接转运给海地的最终用户(见 [S/2023/674](#))，但专家小组调查的大多数案件表明，海地的网络正在从多米尼加共和国境内非法流通的军用物资中进行采购。

(三) 源自南美洲的贩运

67. 4 月 30 日，哥伦比亚总统就哥伦比亚军队库存中的弹药大量流散发表了一份公开声明，并提到其中一些失踪物项可能被运至海地。⁵¹ 在专家小组 5 月提出索取资料的请求后，哥伦比亚当局回复说，在开展调查后，他们迄今也无法证实武器和弹药可能被转移至海地。⁵²

68. 2023 年，一项追查结果显示，在海地查获的几支 AK 型步枪来自委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国。⁵³ 这些步枪要么与毒品一起被带入海地，要么是从多米尼加共和国贩运的；最近在多米尼加共和国开展的缉获行动中发现了来自委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国的武器。⁵⁴ 专家小组已联系委内瑞拉当局，要求提供进一步信息，但尚未收到答复。

69. 专家小组目前正在调查关于源自南美洲的其他贩运活动的报告。

(四) 从海地至牙买加的贩运

70. 在专家小组于 2024 年 5 月访问牙买加期间，当局解释说，海地是在牙买加活动的犯罪集团的非法火器的重要来源。有一个用牙买加的大麻换取海地的小武器的成熟系统，牙买加有超过 25 个极为活跃的“枪支换印度大麻”的辛迪加(见第二.B.2.1 节)。虽然价格与专家小组先前报告的相同(18 公斤大麻换一支手枪，40 公斤大麻换一支半自动步枪)，但由于海地境内必需品缺乏，因此枪支也越来越多地被用来交换肉等食品或者木炭。

71. 虽然几乎无法区分非法地直接从美国转移至牙买加的火器和经海地转运至牙买加的火器，但缉获的带有海地国家警察标识的火器清楚显示，来自海地的武器继续助长牙买加境内的武装暴力。事实上，迄今为止，牙买加已查获有此类标识的 47 件火器，其中大多数是手枪。这些武器是从犯罪现场缴获的，与 13 起谋杀有关。例如，牙买加当局于 2024 年 2 月缉获了来自海地国家警察库存的一支 Galil 步枪和两支 Taurus 手枪。⁵⁵

⁵⁰ 2024 年 7 月，多米尼加当局提供的数据。

⁵¹ 见 www.orfetv.com/2024/05/02/luego-de-inspeccion-en-tolemaida-y-la-guajira-se-encontro-que-hay-mas-de-un-millon-de-municones-explosivos-y-armas-de-las-fuerzas-militares-perdidos-presidente-petro/。

⁵² 哥伦比亚的正式答复(2024 年 7 月 16 日)，专家小组存档(由专家小组翻译)。

⁵³ 2023 年，与一个区域会员国的一名情报官员的访谈。

⁵⁴ 2023 年，与一个区域会员国的一名情报官员的访谈。2023 年，与驻该区域的一名安全专员的访谈。

⁵⁵ 2024 年 5 月，与牙买加官员的访谈。

(b) 武器贩运和非国家武装行为体

(一) 帮派

72. 与目击者的访谈以及对各帮派在线发布的图像和视频的审查表明，他们越来越多地采购更大口径的武器，包括 7.62x39 毫米，其次是 7.62x51 毫米和 12.7x99 毫米，从而造成更大破坏以及更严重的创伤和伤亡，⁵⁶ 并对警察和多国安全支助团构成更大挑战。在军用物资采购能力方面，Grand Ravine、400 Mawowo 和 5 Second 仍是数量最大的帮派，后者得到了 Dimitri Hérard 的支持(见第二.A 节和附件 24)。各帮派越来越多地部署商业无人驾驶航空系统(无人机)，以实施侦察、识别目标和开展协同攻击。关于各帮派使用的新军用物资的更多详情，见附件 24 和 25。

73. 尽管该国的火器流通量大，但需求继续增长，价格仍然很高，反映出各帮派可动用的现金的数额。在太子港，价格高于该国其他地方，因为是那里的需求更强劲，而且军用物资进入首都的物流也增加了成本。

表 2
太子港和海地其他地方军用物资的价格

火器类型	太子港	陆地边界地区/海地北部
枪支		
9 毫米手枪	2 500 美元-4 000 美元	2 000 美元
AR 型半自动步枪(5.56x45 7 000 美元-10 000 美元毫米)		3 000 美元-4 000 美元
AK 型步枪(7.62x39 毫米)	10 000 美元-12 000 美元	5 000 美元-6 000 美元
弹药		
一发 9 毫米弹药	2-3 美元	2-3 美元
一发 5.56x45 毫米弹药	5 美元	
一发 7.62x39 毫米弹药	6 美元	

资料来源：根据 2024 年 6 月和 7 月与私营保安公司、警官和保护区监察队工作人员的访谈得出的估计数。

(二) 私营保安公司

74. 尽管有军火禁运，但在海地运作的一些私营保安公司继续采购武器和弹药。⁵⁷ 此类公司使用的许多军用物资都是非法获得的，没有向国家登记。⁵⁸ 与平民一样，那些愿意向警察登记其武器并获得正式许可的私营保安公司——甚

⁵⁶ 2024 年 7 月，与在太子港工作的医务人员访谈。
⁵⁷ 2024 年与几家大型私营保安公司的客户的访谈。
⁵⁸ 2023 年，与一名海地国家警察官员、一家私营保安公司负责人和一名前政府官员的访谈。

至可以追溯登记——很容易登记，而且不会被问及军用物资的来源。⁵⁹ 专家小组在调查期间注意到，为了绕过美国对向海地转让武器的限制，一些公司往往直接向亚洲的火器生产商采购军用物资。

75. 一个以官方身份查看了几家私营保安公司库存地的消息人士告诉专家小组，库存管理不善，拥有未登记武器、包括半自动步枪(在海地都是非法的)的现象普遍存在，而且火器数量超过核定的限制数量。

76. 专家小组的追踪工作显示，在私营保安公司登记的武器经常出现在犯罪分子手中，从而证实这些公司正在助长非法军用物资的流通。虽然私营保安公司库存的转用，主要是丢失和盗窃导致的，但那些有自己的私营保安公司的知名人士，也可利用其不受管制的库存来武装各帮派。

(c) 武器贩运和政府实体

(一) 挪用海地国家警察的武器储存

77. 过去四年，近 1 000 件火器从海地国家警察相对有限的库存中流散。⁶⁰ 专家小组在先前报告中对以下方面表示关切，即缺乏对属于警察的武器和弹药的控制，以及正在助长武装暴力的定期流散(见 S/2023/674，附件 33)。此外，专家小组强调了与缴获军用物资管理有关的挑战。⁶¹

78. 海地国家警察的弹药管理系统存在缺陷。虽然太子港的主要储存设施实施记录保存，但分发渠道的问责机制不足。警察内部的消息来源以及其他第一手证人告诉专家小组，一些官员在非法市场上出售其弹药。⁶²

(二) 挪用国家宫库存和滥用公职进行非法贩运

79. 若干警察部队驻扎在国家宫，以保护总统和国家宫。⁶³ 这些部队名义上由中央行政警察局管辖，但实际上几乎是自主的，来自警方领导层的监督很少。⁶⁴ 此种自主权还体现在国家宫武器弹药的管理方面，几年来海地国家警察的领导一直无法进行库存检查。国家宫库存过去一直是挪用的一个来源，缺乏监督的问题继续构成风险。

80. 2013 年至 2016 年期间，属于海地国家警察的共计 54 支 Galil 自动步枪被从国家宫库存中挪用；当时，米歇尔·约瑟夫·马尔泰利总统的夫人的一个近亲 Pierre-Leon Junior Saint Rémy 负责国家宫的安全并监督其库存的管理。提供给专家小组的资料显示，这些武器已转让给包括帮派成员在内的人，以换取他们对

⁵⁹ 2023 年和 2024 年与各私营保安公司的客户的访谈；2024 年与海地国家警察官员的访谈。

⁶⁰ 2024 年，保密消息来源。

⁶¹ 2023 年 11 月至 2024 年 6 月，海地国家警察和海地海关共缉获 168 件火器，其中包括 83 支手枪和 41 支步枪。联合国警察数据。

⁶² 2023 年和 2024 年与海地国家警察官员的访谈。

⁶³ 总统安保单位和反伏击小组。

⁶⁴ 2023 年和 2024 年，与海地国家警察高级官员以及国家宫现任和前任雇员的访谈。

总统的支持。此后，在海地和国外的犯罪现场和帮派成员那里发现了一些步枪，这些步枪继续助长暴力行为。⁶⁵

81. 在更近的时期，即 2020 年 11 月，时任国家宫安保协调员的 Laguel Civil 与国家宫总安全部门前负责人 Dimitri Hérard 一起，从亚洲一家生产商进口了 200 多支火器，其中包括 5.56x45 毫米步枪和 9x19 毫米手枪，政府对此没有任何正式监督。⁶⁶ 2020 年，少量步枪被发放给海地国家警察，但其余步枪已转交给未知的最终用户，可能是为了获得经济回报，从而进一步加剧了该国非法武器的扩散水平。⁶⁷

82. 专家小组还收到关于 Hérard 先生在逃匿期间继续参与军火贩运的资料(见第二节.A)。他为伊佐采购新火器提供了便利(见附件 24 和 25)，此外还有报告称他与拉丁美洲国家的贩运网络勾结，专家小组正在对此开展进一步调查。

(三) 保护区监察队

83. 在国家保护区署前主任 Jeantel Joseph(2017 年至 2024 年)的领导下，保护区监察队发展为一个不受政府控制的强大武装实体(见 S/2024/253)。据监察队高级工作人员称，监察队目前在全国约有 6 000 名“成员”，其中 95%不在任何正式的机构薪金单上。⁶⁸ 指挥系统不清楚，位于同一地区的各队负责人之间存在激烈竞争，每个人都声称自己是合法的(见附件 26)。⁶⁹

84. 虽然国家保护区署应当侧重于该国的自然保护区，但许多城市都有保护区监察队的支队，他们经常在那里执行事实上的警察工作，并从事一系列犯罪活动，包括在道路上非法征税和跨界贩运。监察队工作人员装备有一系列火器，其中包括非法获得的 5.56x45 毫米和 7.62x39 毫米步枪。虽然加入监察队的标准包括拥有火器，但当地人士也提供武器，而且一些指挥官用保护费和非法活动所获资金购买武器。

85. 在本报告所述期间，Jeantel Joseph 利用监察队的武装人员来支持 Guy Philippe(见第二.A 节)，以保障他的人身安全，并煽动反政府的暴力示威。Joseph 于 2024 年被从国家保护区署撤职，但仍牢牢控制着监察队的若干支队。⁷⁰ 一方面，监察队的支队往往填补了大量的安全真空，但另一方面，它们在国家控制之外采取行动，因此被许多海地人视为是对国家稳定的主要威胁。

⁶⁵ 2023 年和 2024 年，与保密消息来源的访谈和机密报告。

⁶⁶ 2024 年，与保密消息来源的访谈。

⁶⁷ 2024 年 6 月和 7 月，与海地国家警察两名高级官员的访谈。

⁶⁸ 2024 年 6 月和 7 月，与保护区监察队高级工作人员的访谈。

⁶⁹ 2024 年 6 月和 7 月，与三个省的保护队监察队工作人员和地方当局的访谈。

⁷⁰ 2024 年 6 月和 7 月，与政府代表和保护队监察队工作人员的访谈。海地当局于 2024 年 1 月成立的国家保护区署重组委员会仍未投入运作。

2. 贩毒

86. 据广泛报道，贩毒是该国严重犯罪和暴力水平高的主要根源之一。⁷¹ 各帮派不仅仅是当地的犯罪团伙，而且与更广的非法贩运网络有联系，这些网络的头目是高层级的贩毒者。专家小组获得的资料显示，一些与海地进出口有关的商人以及公务员和前议员参与了贩毒活动。⁷² 鉴于所涉网络复杂，而且当地局势极不安全，因此不可能记录海地境内贩毒活动的全部情况。这一点还反映在以下方面，即本报告所述期间的缉获量较少：2023 年 11 月至 2024 年 7 月，国家当局报告在海地缉获了 262.2 公斤大麻和 10.42 公斤可卡因。⁷³

(a) 大麻

87. 海地不是供出口的毒品的重要生产国，但供当地消费的大麻的生产区越来越多，特别是在阿蒂博尼特地区和该国极北和极南的某些高海拔地区。然而，其中许多地区已被海地缉毒大队(Bureau de lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants)捣毁。⁷⁴ 海地仍是从牙买加贩运的大麻的一个重要过境路线；这些大麻的目的地主要是多米尼加共和国，主要是供游客消费。⁷⁵

(一) 牙买加

88. 大部分大麻从牙买加经海路在海地南部进入海地。⁷⁶ 尽管执法部门开展了行动，但海地与牙买加之间二十多年的“枪支换毒品交易”依然猖獗。⁷⁷

89. 此种交易主要由两国境内的老牌跨国组织犯罪集团和帮派进行。在牙买加，大约有 244 个帮派和超过 45 个“枪支换毒品”辛迪加，其中至少 20 个在 2023 年极为活跃。牙买加境内的有组织贩运集团每月至少两次前往海地，把当地生产的大麻当作通货来换取火器。虽然渔民在推动此种易货模式方面发挥着至关重要的作用，但各帮派依赖渔民进行交易的情况越来越少。⁷⁸

90. “枪支换毒品”是有利可图的交易。在海地，大麻的价值可增加 9 倍。取决于质量和牙买加境内产地的地理位置，一磅“普通大麻”的价格在 1 500 牙买加元至 2 000 牙买加元(约 9.65 美元-12.87 美元)之间，而海地的相同数量大麻的价格是 80 美元至 100 美元。在海地，一把手枪(9 毫米)可换取 40 磅大麻，其价格

⁷¹ 2024 年，与一名海地国家警察官员、地区当局和政治分析人士的访谈。

⁷² 2023 年 1 月至 2024 年 7 月，与一名海地国家警察官员、开展帮派相关问题工作的一名政府代表、一个政治家、帮派和政治分析人士、帮派控制区一名居民和民间社会代表的访谈。

⁷³ 国家警察的数据。

⁷⁴ 2024 年 8 月，与一名海地国家警察官员的访谈。

⁷⁵ 见 S/2024/79；2024 年与区域当局的访谈。

⁷⁶ 2024 年 5 月与区域禁毒官员的访谈；S/2024/79，2023 年。另见毒品和犯罪问题办公室，“海地的犯罪市场：查明枪支和毒品贩运的趋势”，2023 年。

⁷⁷ 2024 年 7 月，一个会员国的机密报告。

⁷⁸ 同上。

在牙买加是 265 000 牙买加元(约 1 520 美元)。从海地走私的步枪可换取 80 至 90 磅大麻，在牙买加可卖到 500 000.00 牙买加元(3 420 美元)。⁷⁹

91. 海地的危机为巩固两国之间的跨国犯罪网络提供了有利条件，原因是两国地理位置接近，而且两个管辖区的边界都漏洞百出。例如，在牙买加，贩运者可利用全岛约 184 个不受控制的港口；据报，其中 51% 的港口是有活动的。据保密消息来源称，从海地转移至牙买加的一些火器已抵达中美洲国家，在那里被用来换可卡因。⁸⁰

(二) 多米尼加共和国

92. 从牙买加运至海地的大麻，主要是由组织严密的小型犯罪集团运往多米尼加共和国，其中一些犯罪集团的头目是海地人；⁸¹ 在多米尼加共和国境内因毒品相关犯罪而被拘留者中，海地人的人数排在第二位，仅次于本国的多米尼加人。2023 年，约有 3 600 名海地人因分销、出售或持有少量大麻而被逮捕；⁸² 在该国街头贩卖的大麻，价格为每磅 5 000 至 6 000 多米尼加比索(约 85 美元至 100 美元)。⁸³

93. 大麻贩运线路主要是多米尼加共和国与海地之间的陆地边界；该边界长度超过 390 多公里，但只有位于达哈翁、埃利亚斯皮尼亚、佩德纳莱斯和瓦纳明特的 4 个正式过境点，非法过境点却多达 90 个。多米尼加当局在 2023 年 9 月 4 日至 2024 年 4 月 31 日期间开展了行动，在边境省份埃利亚斯皮尼亚(172.17 公斤)和佩德纳莱斯(441.48 公斤)缉获了约 614.16 公斤大麻；其他缉获品的详情见附件 27。

94. 大麻经常被隐匿在其他产品中，经卡车运进多米尼加共和国(见第二.D.3 节)。⁸⁴ 例如，2023 年 12 月 27 日，在埃利亚斯皮尼亚的一辆卡车上的柠檬箱中，查获了 167.18 公斤大麻。⁸⁵ 此外，少量的武器和毒品可能与越来越多地被走私入境的香烟、酒精和食品等其他货物一起被贩运。⁸⁶

(b) 可卡因

95. 自 2023 年年中以来，与海地有关的可卡因的缉获次数上升。专家小组对比利时当局于 9 月 29 日开展的一次可卡因重大缉获行动进行了后续调查，该行动

⁷⁹ 2024 年 5 月与区域安全方面消息来源的访谈，以及 2024 年 7 月的机密报告。

⁸⁰ 同上。

⁸¹ 2024 年 1 月和 5 月，与区域禁毒官员的访谈。

⁸² 多米尼加共和国，国家禁毒委员会，“Observatorio Dominicano de drogas: informe estadístico anual 2023”，2024。

⁸³ 2024 年 5 月，与地区当局的访谈。

⁸⁴ 同上。

⁸⁵ 见多米尼加共和国国防部，“CESFronT Y DNCD incautan 368 libras de marihuana en Elías Piña”，27 December 2023。

⁸⁶ 2024 年 5 月，与区域司法官员的访谈。

在比利时安特卫普港发现了 308.7 公斤可卡因；它们被隐匿在一个集装箱内的运动袋中，这个集装箱最初于 8 月 29 日在太子港装载，并于 9 月 4 日至 7 日经金斯敦转运。专家小组前往安特卫普和牙买加，会见了处理此案的执法人员。比利时和牙买加当局告诉专家小组，装载这批毒品的地点可能是太子港、金斯敦，甚至是安特卫普，调查仍在继续。专家小组将适时提供关于此案的最新情况。

96. 6 月 7 日，多米尼加当局在佩德纳莱斯的海岸缉获了 268 包可卡因，⁸⁷ 逮捕了两人。虽然没有与海地之间的确凿关联的报告，但当局告诉专家小组，通常情况是海地不稳定的安全局势和无效的边境管制，吸引那些希望避开多米尼加共和国的更全面管制的贩运者。通过这种方式，贩运者将可卡因从海地东南部边境运至佩德纳莱斯等多米尼加省份。当局还报告了以下情况，即从南美洲出发的飞机和船只，在前往北美洲之前，先绕至海地。⁸⁸

97. 海地当局还报告了东南沿海的两次缉获行动，证实南部各省是毒品的重要入境点。7 月 2 日，在东南省的 Bel-Anse，当局截获了 2.2 公斤可卡因，而这批货物共计 12 公斤，这意味着仍有大约 10 公斤可卡因在流通。7 月 10 日，在东南海岸的雅克梅勒，一名携带大约 1 公斤可卡因的人被逮捕。鉴于两次缉获的日期和地点接近，因此这两起案件中的毒品很可能来自在该地区分销的同一批货物。

98. 在另一起事件中，2024 年 7 月 4 日，在中部省的 Mirebalais 市镇，当局缉获了 7.9 公斤可卡因，是该地区有史以来截获的最大数量之一。包括一名妇女在内的两人被逮捕。⁸⁹ 这名妇女提到，一名前警察是主要的毒品供应者之一。

99. 专家小组还收到多份报告，指出在海地各帮派的队伍中和(或)在海地帮派控制的地区，有加勒比和拉丁美洲国民，其中一些人涉嫌参与贩毒。⁹⁰ 2023 年 10 月 21 日，4 名哥伦比亚人和一名海地国民在中部省 Belladère 市镇被海地国家警察逮捕。这些人涉嫌与 10 月 19 日在南部省 Les Cayes 市镇 Ducis 发现的一架飞机有关，这架飞机可能被用于贩毒。⁹¹

3. 偷运移民⁹²

100. 移民是一项人权，应当以安全、有序和有尊严的方式进行；⁹³ 但对大多数海地移民而言，情况并非如此。

⁸⁷ 见 Hoy, “¡268 paquetes de cocaína y una lancha rápida incautados! Operativo antidrogas en Pedernales”, 7 June 2024.

⁸⁸ 2024 年 1 月，与区域情报官员的访谈。

⁸⁹ 2024 年 7 月，与海地国家警察官员的访谈。

⁹⁰ 2024 年 6 月，与区域情报官员的访谈。

⁹¹ 2024 年，与海地、多米尼加和哥伦比亚当局代表的访谈。

⁹² 专家小组沿用了《关于预防、禁止和惩治贩运人口特别是妇女和儿童行为的议定书》和《关于打击陆、海、空偷运移民的议定书》对贩运人口和偷运移民的定义。

⁹³ 见 <https://rosanjose.iom.int/en/blogs/six-essential-elements-make-migration-safe-orderly-and-regular>。

101. 安全理事会第 2653(2022)号决议第 15 和 16 段规定的制裁指认标准包括，负责、共谋或直接或间接参与威胁海地和平、安全或稳定的行动。这些行动包括但不限于直接或间接参与或支持……助长暴力的犯罪网络的犯罪活动，包括……贩运人口和偷运移民。

102. 偷运移民是一种复杂的多层次犯罪。它涉及一系列行为体，其中包括头目、造假者、陆海空运输者、跨境偷运者⁹⁴和腐败官员等，这些人往往在多个司法管辖区开展活动。

2023 年的“空中桥梁”偷运案

103. 专家小组调查了 2023 年 6 月至 10 月为期五个月的“空中桥梁”案；在此期间，47 000 多名海地移民从海地飞往尼加拉瓜，然后非法前往北美(见附件 28)。

104. 专家小组一直在调查参与偷运的几类行为体，其中包括偷运行动的管理者以及涉案的包机公司。

105. 一个具体的网络涉及两名海地国民(Jean Michel Dorcenat 和 Kenny Beaubrun)，他们在圣多明各和太子港开展大规模偷运活动，与整个区域的当地罪犯都有联系。⁹⁵

106. 据目击者和一个会员国的安全机构称，2023 年 8 月至 10 月，这些人集体或单独行动，为 3 500 多人乘坐 52 架包机从海地前往尼加拉瓜提供了便利；这些人在抵达尼加拉瓜后被偷运至墨西哥和美国。

107. 除包机外，Messrs Dorcena 和 Beaubrun 还依靠该区域的正规和非正规旅行社的网络(见附件 29)。⁹⁶他们还向有需要的移民提供伪造的护照和(或)签证，包括为此向官员行贿。⁹⁷

⁹⁴ 在多米尼加共和国通常被称为“郊狼”或“养鸡户”，在海地被称为“poteas 或 potias”。

⁹⁵ 该区域的偷运移民者经常与当地和国际犯罪网络合作，为跨境流动提供便利。这些犯罪组织的活动范围多样，从事贩毒、贩运人口和偷运移民等非法活动。例如，犯罪组织萨尔瓦杜恰帮(MS-13)在萨尔瓦多、危地马拉、洪都拉斯、墨西哥和美国开展活动，参与墨西哥恰帕斯州的偷运移民活动。较小的偷运团体经常将移民与 Cartel del Golfo 和 Cartel del Noreste 等较大型卡特尔联系起来，这些卡特尔控制着从恰帕斯经墨西哥塔毛利帕斯到美国的偷运路线。2023 年 4 月、3 月和 11 月以及 2024 年 2 月、3 月、4 月和 6 月，与人道主义组织、执法和安全官员的访谈。2024 年 7 月，一个会员国提供的机密资料。另见 Estela Aragón, Monica Barrantes y Larissa Álvarez, *Perfiles y Modos de Operación de Personas Facilitadoras del Tráfico Ilícito de Migrantes en América Central, México y la República Dominicana* (哥斯达黎加圣何塞，国际移民组织(移民组织)以及毒品和犯罪问题办公室，2023 年)。

⁹⁶ 旅行社和社交媒体资料都在积极营销这些旅行。这些广告不仅限于机票；许多实体提供了包括签证、护照和前往墨西哥和美国的后续旅程等综合服务。这些实体大多数都是欺诈性的，从而阻碍了追踪工作。此外，资金交易往往在银行系统外，以无法追踪的小额现金支付进行。2023 年 10 月和 11 月以及 2024 年 4 月和 6 月，保密消息来源。

⁹⁷ 2024 年 4 月，与保密消息来源的访谈。

108. 专家小组获得的证据显示，他们在为移民的流动提供便利的同时，还欺骗旅行社和移民本人，不兑现自己的承诺。⁹⁸

109. 专家小组认为，在海地移民被偷运至中美洲(最终目标是抵达北美)方面，包机公司(见附件 30)发挥了重要作用(见附件 31)。⁹⁹

110. 专家小组查明，有两家包机公司参与了在“空中桥梁”案期间运送海地国民。¹⁰⁰ 秘密消息来源指出，这些公司与偷运计划中的个人和旅行社密切合作，了解自己是用来运送移民、以使其继续被偷运至北美。专家小组联系了这两家公司，但在编写本报告时尚未收到任何答复。

111. 《工商业与人权指导原则》促请各国采取适当措施，通过有效的政策、立法、规章和裁决，预防、调查、惩罚和纠正侵犯人权行为；工商业应当在其整个经营活动期间尊重人权，并特别注意受冲突影响地区，原因是那里发生严重侵犯人权行为的风险可能更高。

112. 关于以下方面的信息很普遍，即海地境内的多层面危机、极其严重的暴力以及近年来横穿中美洲的移民的数量空前。专家小组认为，如果开展了基本的人权尽责程序(见 [A/73/163](#)，第 16 段)，就会凸显出参与移民偷运的高风险。专家小组没有发现任何证据显示，将人员从海地单向运至尼加拉瓜的任何包机公司曾开展过此种尽责程序。

113. 海地人因暴力行为而希望离开该国，但却在另一层面上被利用。例如，专家小组收到的报告称，某些海地民航当局勒索那些做出包机安排的人。¹⁰¹ 这些案例显示，勒索计划以飞机大小为依据，每次飞行的勒索款项从 15 000 美元至 35 000 美元不等。专家小组还收到报告称，一些地勤公司采用了类似的勒索做法，索要的包机服务费为 10 000 美元至 15 000 美元。¹⁰² 专家小组的调查正在继续。

C. 违反国际人权法或构成践踏人权的行为¹⁰³

114. 在海地各地仍普遍存在侵犯人权行为，太子港城区和阿蒂博尼特地区尤其如此。2024 年 1 月至 6 月，共有 3 638 起杀人案，¹⁰⁴ 其中男性 3 241 人(包括 51 名男童)，女性 397 人(包括 13 名女童)。此外，还有 2 211 人受伤，1 162 人被绑

⁹⁸ 2024 年 5 月、6 月和 7 月，与旅行社等保密消息来源的访谈。

⁹⁹ 专家小组认为，在防止偷运移民方面，对航空部门的监管存在法律空白，相关国际组织和有关伙伴可弥补这些空白。

¹⁰⁰ 例如，见 2023 年 8 月至 10 月期间，FLYMEX 的 XA-VBC 飞机在海地太子港与尼加拉瓜马那瓜之间的航行历史(附件 30)。

¹⁰¹ 2023 年 11 月和 2024 年 5 月，与分析人士的访谈。2024 年 7 月，保密消息来源。

¹⁰² 2024 年 7 月，与保密消息来源的访谈。

¹⁰³ 另见关于其他侵犯人权行为的附件 32。

¹⁰⁴ 这是自联合国开始记录海地故意杀人案件以来，杀人案件数目最多的一次。2024 年 7 月，联合国警察数据。

架。¹⁰⁵ 关于绑架案件，专家小组确定了 Meyer 领导的 Kokorat San Ras 帮和 Luckson Elan 领导的 Gran Grif 帮实施的几起“大规模绑架”事件(见附件 33)。¹⁰⁶

115. 根据 2024 年 5 月的粮食安全阶段综合分类，大约有一半的海地人(500 万)正处于 IPC 3 级的粮食不安全状况(危机)，160 万人面临 IPC 4 级的粮食不安全状况(紧急)。¹⁰⁷ 太子港的太阳城社区仍是受影响最严重的地区之一。目前，海地有二分之一的儿童面临严重的粮食不安全状况。¹⁰⁸ 国际机场于 5 月重新开放和多国安全支助团于 6 月抵达，改善了人道主义准入和援助，包括食品分发，但仍存在若干挑战。¹⁰⁹

116. 截至 7 月，自卫团体的数目已增至大约 60 个，而 1 月约为 30 个。¹¹⁰ 截至 6 月，Bwa Kale 运动和各种自卫团体杀害了至少 182 人(见 S/2024/508)。

117. 海地国家警察说，截至 6 月 30 日，国家警察部队由 12 931 名警官组成，其中包括 1 571 名妇女。这相当于每 1 000 名居民有 1.09 名警察。自 1 月以来，已有 23 名警官死亡，48 人受伤。此外，约有 1 000 名警官因擅离职守、辞职和移民而离开。另外，在全国 412 个警察设施中，约有 74 个因帮派暴力而仍无法运作。¹¹¹

118. 截至 7 月 24 日，海地监狱系统仍人满为患，关押囚犯人数达到 7 542 人，其中包括 418 名妇女和 246 名未成年人。大约 83% 的囚犯处于审前羁押阶段，每个囚犯的空间是 0.33 平方米。自 1 月以来，令人震惊的监禁条件已导致超过 111 名囚犯因贫血、胃肠道疾病、结核病和其他传染病而死亡。¹¹²

119. 截至 6 月，海地有 578 074 名境内流离失所者，与 2024 年 3 月(362 551 人)相比增加了近 60%。¹¹³ 这一数字是 2022 年境内流离失所者人数的两倍多，使海地成为世界上因犯罪相关暴力而在境内流离失所的人最多的国家(见附件 34)。¹¹⁴

120. 海地国民继续成为那些利用危险的陆海空线路偷运人口的人的受害者。这些危险的旅程往往导致悲剧。7 月 17 日，一艘前往特克斯和凯科斯群岛、载有

¹⁰⁵ 这一数字包括 724 名男子和 14 名男童以及 409 名妇女和 15 名女童；根据联合国警察 2024 年 7 月的数据，减少了 20%。

¹⁰⁶ 为专家小组报告的目的，“大规模绑架”是指在一起事件中绑架 10 人或 10 人以上。

¹⁰⁷ 世界粮食计划署(粮食署)，“粮食署海地：国家简介”，2024 年 5 月。

¹⁰⁸ 粮食安全阶段综合分类，“海地：IPC 急性粮食不安全状况简介”，2024 年 3 月至 6 月。

¹⁰⁹ 2024 年 7 月，与联合国机构和人道主义行为体的访谈。

¹¹⁰ 2024 年 7 月，与一名帮派分析人士和一名人道主义专家的访谈。

¹¹¹ 2024 年 7 月，联合国警察数据。

¹¹² 有 27 例死亡的原因不明。2024 年 7 月，联合国警察数据。

¹¹³ IOM, “Displacement situation in Haiti: round 7”, June 2024 (2024 年 6 月访问)。

¹¹⁴ 联合国人权事务高级专员办事处(人权高专办)，“海地：联合国专家敦促说，流离失所者人数激增，迫切需要保护和优先援助”，2024 年 6 月 20 日(2024 年 6 月访问)。附件 34 中的数字包括关于境内流离失所者、被驱逐者/返回者(包括海上拦截)和难民的数据。

80 名海地移民的船只起火，造成 40 人死亡，许多人受伤。¹¹⁵ 这一事件突出表明，通过不安全的海上过境办法偷运移民的生意十分兴旺(见 S/2023/674 和附件 35)。

1. 性暴力和性别暴力

121. 妇女和女童仍极易遭受性暴力和性别暴力。¹¹⁶ 境内流离失所者人数激增及其恶劣的生活条件加剧了这一风险，使其特别容易遭受性侵犯和性剥削。¹¹⁷ 例如，3 月 29 日，5 Segond 帮的成员闯入太子港作为境内流离失所者营地的一个体育馆，强奸了两名年龄为 3 岁和 12 岁的女童。¹¹⁸

122. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组约谈了多名强奸和其他性暴力的受害者，包括男女同性恋、双性恋、跨性别者、性别奇异者和间性者等(LGBTQI+)社区的成员。专家小组收到一名 17 岁女童的证词；其中显示，1 月 15 日，当她在太子港 Delmas 的家附近散步时，Delmas 95 帮的两名成员把她带至一座废弃建筑，并在那里将其强奸。她怀孕了，但后来流产了。她害怕再次遭袭击，因此决定逃往多米尼加共和国。¹¹⁹

123. 专家小组约谈了 LGBTQI+社区的两个人，他们报告在太子港遭受了帮派的性暴力。一名 21 岁的男子报告说，由于他的性取向，他受到一个帮派的持续骚扰，该帮派的头目是一个被联合国制裁的人。骚扰最终扩大到他的家人，家人担心进一步遭到暴力，因此强迫他离开家。在短暂的无家可归以及在一个境内流离失所者营地暂时避难之后，他在朋友和亲戚的帮助下得以离开海地。¹²⁰ 一名 25 岁的男子讲述了他和伴侣在太子港机场附近居住的经历。他们不断受到帮派成员的骚扰和勒索。当受害人失业、无法满足勒索要求时，帮派成员闯入他们的家中，袭击了他的伴侣。由于担心生命安全，两人逃离了海地。¹²¹

124. 更多的事件使人们得以窥见海地性暴力的普遍程度。例如，11 月 30 日，一名 22 岁妇女拒绝与 Gran Grif 帮的头目 Luckson Elan 发生性关系，因此在 Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite 由于阴道中两枪而死亡。12 月 8 日，在 Drouillard(太阳城)，由 Jonel Catel 率领的 Terre Noire 帮的成员拦住一辆前往 Brooklyn 街区的满载乘客的客车。该帮成员当着其他乘客的面，集体强奸了 3 名妇女，然后将她们杀害。¹²²

¹¹⁵ 移民组织，“海地沿海悲剧性的船只失火导致 40 名移民丧生”，2024 年 7 月 19 日。

¹¹⁶ 有消息称，2024 年 4 月至 6 月，太子港部分地区每天报告的强奸案多达 40 起。见联海综合办，“海地境内人权状况季度报告”。

¹¹⁷ 人权高专办，“联合国专家称，海地危机中妇女和女童首当其冲”，2024 年 5 月 6 日；联合国新闻，“海地：流离失所的妇女面临‘前所未有’的不安全和性暴力”，2024 年 7 月 17 日。

¹¹⁸ 2024 年 4 月，联合国数据以及与人道主义行为体的访谈。

¹¹⁹ 2024 年 5 月，与一个保密消息来源的访谈。

¹²⁰ 2024 年 5 月，与受害人的访谈，保密消息来源。

¹²¹ 2024 年 5 月，与受害人的访谈，保密消息来源。受害人不愿透露施暴者的身份。

¹²² 2024 年 6 月和 7 月，与非政府组织成员和人权维护者的访谈；2024 年 6 月，联合国数据。

125. 此外，专家小组还收到关于针对未成年人的性暴力的资料。例如，1月15日，一名7岁女童在 Carrefour 镇的 Fontamara 被 Ti Bwa 帮的一名16岁成员强奸。2月18日，一名患有精神残疾的15岁女童，在同一地区被 Ti Bwa 帮的两名成员强奸。1月26日，在 Drouillard(太阳城)，一名17岁女童在离开 Brooklyn 地区去上学时，被 Terre Noire 帮的成员强奸并杀害。2024年7月24日，在几起事件中被绑架并被身份不明的帮派成员强奸的23名妇女，在 Gressier 镇被警察解救。参与这些事件的人数不详的绑架者，要么被警察打死，要么被当地民众处以私刑。¹²³

126. 专家小组还确定了 5 Second、Gran Grif、Canaan、Kraze Barye 和 400 Mawozo 等帮派的成员实施的强奸案。¹²⁴ 专家小组的调查正在继续。

2. 招募儿童

127. 在本报告所述期间，各帮派招募儿童的情况大幅增加，最小的儿童仅有10岁(见 S/2024/384)；目前儿童可能占有所有帮派成员的50%。¹²⁵ 海地的严峻局势使儿童更易被各帮派招募。缺乏获得教育、就业和基本必需品的机会导致以下情况，即加入帮派被视为唯一可行的生存手段。各帮派引诱儿童加入，给他们钱、手机、摩托车或其他物品，并承诺加入后会有更多经济利益，也许还会得到某种社会认可。如果这些策略失败，各帮派就会对儿童或其家人发出死亡威胁，使未成年人别无选择，只能加入帮派(见附件 32.3)。¹²⁶

128. 最常使用招募儿童手段的帮派有 Brooklyn、Grand Ravine、5 Second、Gran Grif、400 Mawozo、Belekou、¹²⁷ Ti Bwa 和 103 Zombie。¹²⁸

129. 儿童招募情况还取决于某帮派能给每个儿童多少钱。但儿童并不能选择他们想为哪个帮派服务，原因是帮派是极具领地性的，任何试图离开其地盘的行为都被视为背叛。任何叛逃或拒绝加入帮派的人都将处死。此外，来自帮派控制区以外的儿童受到怀疑，有可能被贴上间谍标签并可能被杀害。

130. 每名儿童每两周可获得 10 000 古德-15 000 古德(70 美元-110 美元)；但具体数额取决于他们的技能和所执行的任务。例如，在检查站的儿童每两周可拿

¹²³ 2024 年 5 月、6 月和 7 月，与联合国机构官员、非政府组织成员和人权维护者的访谈，以及 2023 年 11 月至 2024 年 6 月的联合国数据。

¹²⁴ 与人权维护者、非政府组织成员、联合国人道主义机构官员的访谈；联合国数据。

¹²⁵ 联合国儿童基金会(儿基会)，“暴力驱使海地儿童加入武装团体，目前一半成员都是儿童——儿基会”，2024 年 5 月 31 日。

¹²⁶ 根据目前暴力侵害儿童行为的情况，可得出以下结论，即六种严重侵害儿童行为仍在继续。另见 S/2023/674。

¹²⁷ 2024 年 7 月，联合国警察数据。另见 S/2024/508。

¹²⁸ 2024 年 7 月，与一名帮派分析人士和两名人道主义人员的访谈。

到 15 000 古德(110 美元), 而参与冲突的儿童每两周可获得 25 000 古德(180 美元)。¹²⁹ 薪饷多少也取决于该帮派的赚钱能力。¹³⁰

131. 儿童根据年龄、性别和技能被分派不同的任务。例如, 女童通常是做家务, 充当间谍并从可能的绑架受害者那里收集信息, 或侦察警察或其他帮派的行动。然而, 有报告称女童携带武器, 可能参与了冲突。¹³¹ 专家小组收到的资料显示, 有未成年人参与了 *Viv Ansanm* 在太子港的袭击, 并管理检查站。¹³²

132. 专家小组还获悉, 儿童在参加冲突时会得到毒品和酒精。¹³³ 一份尤为令人关切的报告指出, Dimitri Hérard 曾训练来自 5 *Segond* 帮的儿童成员如何使用武器和运用军事战术。¹³⁴

133. 还有负责指挥帮派小分队和控制地盘未成年人。例如, Ti Bebe Bougòy 在 2022 年率领 103 *Zombie* 时是未成年人。许多帮派头目是 20 岁出头的年轻人, 因此他们不仅对儿童有吸引力, 而且更愿意招募儿童, 原因是这些儿童更易被其控制。¹³⁵

134. 因此, 政府和联合国系统于 2023 年 10 月签署关于转移、接收和照顾在确保领土安全的行动中发现的、与武装帮派有关联的儿童议定书, 是一个积极步骤; 多国安全支助团开始行动, 强调了全面执行该议定书的迫切需要。

135. 一名未成年人在向专家小组作证时, 讲述了他的苦难经历, 即如何避免加入 *Grand Ravine* 帮, 以及如何为避免被该帮派杀害而不得不逃往多米尼加共和国。¹³⁶ 在另一项证词中, 一名 16 岁女童向专家小组介绍了 5 *Segond* 帮的成员如何迫使她 17 岁的哥哥加入该帮派。最初, 帮派成员邀请她哥哥去喝酒和聚会, 但他因宗教信仰而拒绝了。此举激怒了帮派成员, 他们开始在他每次出门时进行勒索。最后, 他吓得不敢出门。该帮派随后开始盘问他的家人, 了解他的下落, 并索要钱财。一家人决定一个接一个地离开 *Village-de-Dieu* 地区。但她的哥哥在试图逃跑时被该帮派抓住, 并当场被打死。这名证人设法与一名亲戚一起逃走并离开了海地, 但不知道她母亲的下落。¹³⁷

¹²⁹ 2024 年 7 月, 与一名人道主义人员的访谈。货币汇率基于 www.xc.com/ (2024 年 7 月访问)。

¹³⁰ 2024 年 7 月, 与一名人道主义人员的访谈。

¹³¹ 2024 年 5 月和 6 月, 与人权维护者和非政府组织成员的访谈。

¹³² 2024 年 5 月、6 月和 7 月, 与帮派分析人士、联合国机构官员、非政府组织成员和人权维护者的访谈。

¹³³ 2024 年 5 月, 与人权维护者的访谈。

¹³⁴ 2024 年 5 月、6 月和 7 月, 与帮派分析人士、联合国机构官员和人权维护者的访谈。

¹³⁵ 2024 年 7 月, 与两名人道主义人员的访谈。

¹³⁶ 2024 年 5 月, 与一个机密消息来源的访谈。

¹³⁷ 2024 年 5 月, 与一个机密消息来源的访谈。

3. 使用人盾¹³⁸

136. 自 2024 年初以来，专家小组观察到许多帮派利用民众作为人盾。这一新战术包括阻止平民撤离到安全地带，使其困在自己的家中，以及对那些试图逃跑的人实施即决处决。各帮派还呼吁民众回家，承诺这些地区现已安全(另见第二.A 节)。使用人盾是严重侵犯人权的行为。

137. 这一策略可使各帮派在海地国家警察和可能的多国安全支助团的行动中混入平民，从而增加平民的伤亡风险，在人口稠密地区尤其如此。

138. 例如，Grand Ravine 帮在 Carrefour-Feuilles 占领了内有居民的多处房屋，并禁止他们离开。¹³⁹

4. 肆意毁坏和洗劫公私财产¹⁴⁰

139. 2 月至 5 月，*Viv Ansanm* 采取了一种策略，肆意毁坏和洗劫太子港城区的公共和私人基础设施及财产(见第二.A 节)。

140. 国家宫周边地区尤其受到影响。这一具有重要战略意义的地区设有重要机构，例如总医院、数个大学院系、国家官方公报(*Le Moniteur*)和海地历史最悠久的报纸(*Le Nouvelliste*)所在地。大约 130 家企业、650 部车辆、957 所住宅和几座政府大楼被洗劫或烧毁。数千人被迫搬迁。¹⁴¹

141. 3 月 24 日，*Viv Ansanm* 对国家宫周边的几个街区发动了大规模的无差别袭击(见附件 36)。此次袭击旨在清空该地区的居民，并造成尽可能多的破坏。专家小组的调查显示，5 *Segond* 的头目伊佐是此次袭击的主要侵害者之一。¹⁴²

D. 非法资金流动

1. 海地经济面临的挑战

142. 帮派相关暴力加剧了非法资金的流动，原因是各帮派试图在海地国家警察和多国安全支助团采取联合行动之前扩大地盘，从而扩大收入来源。

143. 某些经济行为体继续资助各帮派和有组织的犯罪网络，以保护自己的工商企业和助长非法贸易。正如一些帮派所公开声明的那样，此种关系在助长帮派暴力方面至关重要(见附件 37)。

¹³⁸ 为本报告目的，专家小组使用“人盾”一词来描述战斗派别故意利用平民来阻止对自己的攻击的情况。这种用法并不意味着就可否适用国际人道法作出决定。

¹³⁹ 2024 年 7 月，与帮派分析人士的访谈。

¹⁴⁰ 为本报告目的，专家小组使用“肆意毁坏”一词来描述各战斗派别肆意破坏私人或公共财产的情况。这种用法并不意味着就可否适用国际人道法作出决定。

¹⁴¹ 2024 年 5 月和 6 月，与人权维护者和非政府组织成员的访谈。另见 National Human Right Defense Network, “RNDDH’s position on the chaotic situation in Haiti”, 6 March 2024; 联海综合办, “海地境内人权状况季度报告”, 2024 年 1 月至 3 月。

¹⁴² 2024 年 5 月、6 月和 7 月，与联合国机构官员、非政府组织成员和人权维护者的访谈。

144. 在本报告所述期间，若干企业实体已关闭或撤资以降低风险，从而导致该国经济逐渐萎缩。¹⁴³

145. 海地还继续面临以下情况，即原本用于满足海地人基本需求以及关键基础设施建设和发展的公共资金被挪用。

2. 帮派袭击战略经济中心

146. 随着多国安全支助团即将部署的事实越来越明显，各帮派变得更加咄咄逼人。他们试图最大限度地利用有限的机会之窗，通过夺取新领地(见第二.A 节)以及以海港、公路、私人投资公司和银行等关键经济枢纽为目标来创造更多非法收入。

(a) 袭击海港

(一) 加勒比港口服务公司集装箱码头

147. *Viv Ansanm* 联盟的重新启动(见第二.A 节)对海港造成了前所未有的冲击，原因是各帮派争相赚取非法收入。

148. 为了敛财，*Wharf Jeremie* 帮和 *La Saline* 帮竞相勒索在加勒比港口服务公司集装箱码头往返的卡车，该码头位于太子港拉萨林地区国家港务局的港口。这个集装箱码头处理大约 80% 的进入太子港的货物。¹⁴⁴

149. 4 名货运经营者和两名司机说，货车通常为离开该港口的每个集装箱向两个帮派各支付 200 美元-300 美元的费用。鉴于每天至少有 200 个集装箱离开码头，因此这些帮派获得了巨额收入，使运输商在 3 月初因遭过度勒索而停止运营。

150. 作为替代，各帮派选择抢劫集装箱，以弥补卡车车主罢工所导致的收入减少。该港口被迫关闭(见附件 38)。¹⁴⁵

(二) Varreux 码头

151. 此外，各帮派扩大了对太阳城社区附近海地最大的燃料库 *Varreux* 码头的袭击，进而影响对该国其他地区的燃料供应。该码头储存了海地大约 70% 的散装燃料，¹⁴⁶ 此外还是其他商品的普通货运港。¹⁴⁷

¹⁴³ 2024 年 5 月，与一名银行工作人员、一名金融分析师和政府反腐官员的访谈。另见 United States Department of Agriculture, Grain and feed annual: Haiti, report No. HA2024-003, 17 April 2024.

¹⁴⁴ 见 Philippe Coles, “Caribbean port services: Port-au-Prince, Haiti”, Project Cargo Weekly, 4 October 2018.

¹⁴⁵ Jérémie Tillon, “La compagnie Carribean Port Service suspend toutes ses activités dans le port à la suite de l’attaque perpétrée par les gangs”, 7 March 2024.

¹⁴⁶ iCiHaiti, “Insecurity: the Varreux oil terminal blocked”, 23 April 2024.

¹⁴⁷ 2024 年 3 月，与一名海关官员和国家港务局一名工作人员的访谈。另见 <https://dlca.logcluster.org/211a-haiti-port-terminal-varreux>.

152. 在本报告所述期间, *Viv Ansanm* 联盟发动了袭击, 包括 5 *Segond* 帮成员破坏电力基础设施和抢劫一艘船只。在几次试图闯入港口后, 该帮派于 3 月袭击了海地电力公司运营的 *Varreux* 发电厂, 导致太子港陷入黑暗。¹⁴⁸ 袭击旨在使这家发电厂的业务陷于瘫痪, 然后掠夺石油产品并出售(附件 39)。¹⁴⁹ 海地国家警察的干预阻止了各帮派进入港口。

153. 4 月, 该帮派在太子港海湾袭击了曾在 *Varreux* 码头卸下船上装载的部分大米的“*Magalie*”号, 并在海地国家警察为该船解围之前劫掠了船上的一些剩余货物。¹⁵⁰ 了解劫掠情况的两个消息来源和 5 *Segond* 帮的据点 *Village de Dieu* 的一名交易商告诉专家小组, 该帮派征用卡车将这批大米运至其领地内的社区, 在那里将部分大米免费分发给当地学校, 其余的大米在公开市场上以一半的市场价格出售, 作为一种取悦社区的“善意”姿态。消息人士指出, “该帮派是‘免费’得到这些商品的, 所以用极低价格出售仍给他们带来了‘利润’, 同时也使其赢得了社区的支持”。¹⁵¹

154. 4 月 22 日至 5 月 1 日期间, *Viv Ansanm* 的帮派封锁了通往 *Varreux* 码头和加勒比港口服务公司码头的通道, 切断了对该国的燃料和其他商品供应。具体而言, 5 *Segond* 帮在码头外劫持了卡车, 并用这些卡车封锁道路, 使港口作业停止(见附件 39)。这导致燃料短缺和商品价格上涨, 从而使非法的街头经销商和各帮派手中的加油站获益。¹⁵²

155. 自 6 月起, 国家警察增加了在该码头附近的行动, 以确保燃料的配送。

(b) 袭击道路和企业

156. 专家小组继续调查 *Viv Ansanm* 各帮派如何通过对公共道路和企业征税及开展其他非法活动来敛财。虽然各帮派聚集在 *Viv Ansanm* 的旗帜下, 但他们继续在帮派一级管理创收活动。¹⁵³ 例如, 在本报告所述期间, *Kempes Sanon* 率领的 *Les Argentins* 帮与吉米·谢里齐耶(HTi.001)率领的 *Delmas 6* 帮之间的合作就说明了这一点。

¹⁴⁸ Char Adams and Fredlyn Pierre Louis, “Parts of Haiti left in darkness after armed groups attack power stations”, NBC News, 18 March 2024.

¹⁴⁹ 2024 年 4 月, 与一名安全人员和与 *Varreux* 港有关的一名海关官员的访谈。

¹⁵⁰ Raghieb Raza, “Gangs in Haiti hijack food-carrying ship in Port-au-Prince”, 11 April 2024.

¹⁵¹ 2024 年 5 月, 与 *Village De Dieu* 一名商人的访谈。

¹⁵² 2024 年 6 月, 与两个加油站的老板和一个大米进口商的访谈。另见 iCiHaiti, “Insecurity: the *Varreux* oil terminal blocked”; and Crisis 24, “Haiti: gang violence, heightened security measures likely to continue through at least mid-May/update 16”, 2 May 2024.

¹⁵³ 2024 年 6 月, 与一个出租车集团的一名官员、一名帮派分析人士和两个海港运营商的访谈。

157. 自 2 月以来, 各帮派联合袭击了 Solino 地区, 试图接管该社区(见第二.A.1 节)。他们还共同将 Upper Delmas、Christ Roi、Bourbon 和 Nazon 当作目标, 这里被视为“适合”进行勒索和绑架的中高收入居民区。¹⁵⁴

158. 尽管开展了旨在扩大领地的联合袭击, 但在税收方面, 每个帮派都保持着自己的惯技。例如, Delmas 6 帮一直在抢劫企业, 包括那些每月向其支付“保护”费的“客户”, 而 Les Argentins 帮则参与掠夺和勒索居民。没有协调一致的敛财策略, 在某些情况下, 这两个帮派因领地的经济边界问题而发生了冲突(见附件 41 和第二.A.1 节)。¹⁵⁵

(c) 袭击银行部门

159. 由于合规方面的挑战和风险, 海地银行业在实体(帮派袭击)和财务方面均面临更多挑战。

160. *Viv Ansanm* 联盟成员对银行的袭击在银行业引发恐慌, 导致客户挤兑银行。例如, 3 月初, 各帮派袭击并抢劫了 BNC、海地金融公司和 UNIBANK 在克鲁瓦-德布凯市镇的分行。¹⁵⁶ 3 月 18 日, 位于太子港市中心的中央银行——海地共和国银行, 在一次抢劫银行企图中遭袭击, 导致人员死亡, 银行暂时关闭, 并导致资本外逃引发的外汇短缺等进一步影响。¹⁵⁷ 不久之后, 提供公司服务和代理行业务的 Citbank 关闭了在海地的业务, 一些客户将其资金转移至该区域的海外银行(见附件 42)。

161. 对银行的袭击加剧了客户的恐慌, 导致大量提款, 而一些企业则由于政治不稳定和投资者信心不足而从海地撤资。在随着市场萎缩而撤资的客户中, 包括出口商和酒店经营者等主要企业客户。¹⁵⁸

162. 一位银行分析人士指出, 仅有约 28% 的海地人有银行账户, 低于 2017 年的约 32%。¹⁵⁹ 其余 72% 的人则使用非银行设施, 包括大宗现金。2023 年, 海地是

¹⁵⁴ 2024 年 5 月和 6 月, 与 Upper Delmas 的一家商业零售商和 Delmas 6 所在地的两个出租车运营商的访谈。

¹⁵⁵ 2024 年 5 月和 6 月, 与 Solino 两名商人的访谈, 他们的货亭被抢劫和烧毁, 一名海地国家警察官员了解此案。

¹⁵⁶ Erol Théodore, “Attaque armée contre la mairie de Croix-des-Bouquets: des pertes considérables enregistrées”, 8 March 2024.

¹⁵⁷ 2024 年 4 月, 与一名银行家和两名金融安全人员的访谈。见 Agence France-Presse, “Haïti: une attaque contre la Banque centrale repoussée, plusieurs assaillants tués”, Le Monde, 19 March 2024.

¹⁵⁸ 2024 年 4 月和 5 月, 与一名银行家、一名前政府金融官员和一名金融分析人士的访谈。

¹⁵⁹ 2024 年 5 月, 与一名银行分析师和一名财务顾问的访谈。另见 Alliance for Financial Inclusion, “Haiti: digital financial services (SFD)”, 2018.

在美国境内截获的大宗现金的三大目的地国之一。¹⁶⁰ 海地当局指出，设法进入该国的一些大宗现金流入非法流动网络，包括资助帮派活动。¹⁶¹

163. 海地银行业继续面临熟练劳动力流失的问题，主要原因是帮派相关的不安全状况。¹⁶² 海地共和国银行的行长指出，2023 年约有 250 名训练有素的高管离开银行业和海地，主要原因为不安全状况，称这是阻碍海地经济发展的一个重大损失。¹⁶³ 洗钱等其他因素，以及大量人口无银行账户和合规问题，进一步削弱了对银行部门的信心(见附件 43)。

3. 跨境非法资金流动

164. 海地与多米尼加共和国之间经济关系的特点是既有正式贸易，也有非正式贸易。边境两侧的社区以无缝衔接的方式进行交易，非正式贸易与非法活动交织在一起。¹⁶⁴ 一些精英阶层的经济行为体与各帮派合作，从事非法的跨界金融活动。

165. 专家小组发现，400 Mawozo 帮是参与违禁品走私以及勒索和暗杀的一个犯罪网络的一部分。¹⁶⁵ 该帮派继续重点开展武器弹药的走私(见 S/2023/674，第 104 段)，并将其卖给更大的 *Viv Ansanm* 联盟内的其他帮派(见附件 16)。

166. 鉴于大多数市场在多米尼加共和国境内，因此有组织的犯罪集团在边境两侧活动，并混入跨界社区，让海关和其他执法机关难以对付它们。对付它们的企图往往激怒整个犯罪圈，过去的几次争执就说明了这一点。¹⁶⁶

(a) 资助 400 Mawozo 帮和有组织犯罪网络

167. 一个会员国提供的信息证实了专家小组对 Belladère 边境地区非法金融活动的调查；调查显示，商人兼前海地参议员 Rony Célestin 是 400 Mawozo 帮和一个犯罪网络的资助者之一，该网络怂恿了他的走私活动。

168. 这个跨界犯罪网络由商人、非正规贸易商、运输商、腐败的边境安全和海关人员、当地社区的走私者和帮派成员组成。

169. 专家小组与海地和多米尼加共和国的 18 个保密消息来源进行了交谈，其中一些人是该网络的一部分，另一些人则直接了解此事。其中 5 人独立地向专家小组解释了在 Célestin 知情的情况下，该网络如何为货车的通行提供便利；这些货

¹⁶⁰ 美国财政部，2024 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment (2024)。

¹⁶¹ 2024 年 4 月，与一名反洗钱分析人士、一名金融犯罪问题的官员和一名金融风险分析师的访谈。

¹⁶² 同上。

¹⁶³ Haiti Libre, “Haiti: economy – nearly 250 executives left the banking sector and Haiti in 2023”, 6 January 2024。

¹⁶⁴ Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Cross-border trade and corruption along the Haiti-Dominican Republic border”, March 2019。

¹⁶⁵ 2024 年 6 月，与一名 Polifront 官员、一名海关官员和海地国家警察官员的访谈。

¹⁶⁶ 同上。

车运送他的违禁品，有时藏匿着运送给 400 Mawozo 帮的武器和弹药。该帮成员经常在附近观察运输情况，以确保货物未被检查。¹⁶⁷

170. 消息人士补充说，400 Mawozo 帮控制着通往 Belladère 和 Malpassee 等过境点的道路，从而使该帮成为海地其他帮派的主要弹药供应商。关于 Belladère，消息人士说明了有时如何将 100 至 500 发子弹的小批量弹药以及两支或三支步枪或手枪，藏在 Célestin 先生公司进口的违禁商品和散装食品中。货物抵达海地后，400 Mawozo 帮与他的协调人协调，确保货物的安全运送(见附件 44)。¹⁶⁸

171. 有五个消息来源补充说，Célestin 先生与 400 Mawozo 帮之间的走私网络还涉及一些腐败的边境官员，他们收取费用，为前往多米尼加共和国非正规劳动力市场的移民劳工的流动提供便利，这些劳工中有时包括儿童。消息来源补充说，他们还知道 Célestin 先生的卡车在从海地返回多米尼加共和国时，有时会在隐蔽的隔间内走私毒品，包括大麻。

(一) 逃税、贸易虚开发票和固定价格

172. 专家小组发现，Célestin 先生及其配偶为受益所有人的公司，通过进口违禁品而获取非法资金。他们通过虚开发票和贿赂海关官员等违规贸易行为来逃避关税。了解此事的多米尼加共和国和海地的消息来源向专家小组解释说，Célestin 先生在海关官员中发展了一个网络，这些官员的任务是确保他的货物免交进口税和相关税款。Célestin 先生利用武装人员向海关官员和执法人员施压，以使它们采取对他有利的行动。¹⁶⁹

173. 由于具备大量进口商品和绕过大部分税负的经济优势，因此 Célestin 先生能以较低价格出售商品，从而导致竞争对手关门。他有时也通过参加慈善活动来赢得社区的喜爱。

(二) 清洗非法资金流动所得

174. 消息来源向专家小组解释说，Célestin 先生是海地水泥和铁的主要进口商；¹⁷⁰ 他的配偶是至少 8 家贸易公司的受益所有人，专家小组了解这些公司的运作，它们被用于洗钱活动。

175. Célestin 先生通过投资于旨在美化其形象的合法活动来清洗其非法跨境活动的收益。他利用自己的商业影响力来获得好处，包括使自己中标，以便为政府

¹⁶⁷ 分别于 2024 年 5 月和 6 月，与海地 5 个保密消息来源和多米尼加共和国 3 个保密消息来源的访谈。

¹⁶⁸ 2024 年 6 月与以下人士的访谈：4 个保密消息来源、3 名圣多明各至太子港的货车司机和在圣多明各与太子港之间运营的两名巴士代理。

¹⁶⁹ 2024 年 6 月，保密消息来源。

¹⁷⁰ Gazette Haiti, “Affaires Rony Célestin: Ensemble Contre la Corruption (ECC) recommande la formation d’une commission mixte et un audit financier de la questure de la 49 et 50ème législature”, 25 February 2021.

机构供应建筑材料，主要是违禁的水泥和铁皮，尽管有几次他得到了报酬但并未兑现标书中的承诺。¹⁷¹

176. Célestin 先生因腐败等经济犯罪被一个会员国制裁。¹⁷² 专家小组获得了关于他的财富的资料，发现他持有各种币种的多个银行账户。¹⁷³ 例如，2017 年，他与妻子联合持有的一个账户上有 1 000 825.54 美元；2018 年，另一个联合持有的账户上有 75 315.50 美元。这对夫妇还于 2021 年在加拿大购买了一栋价值 425 万加元(310 万美元)的房屋，¹⁷⁴ 但资金来源不明；财务调查人员认为这是非法所得。¹⁷⁵ 最后，当海地当局在 2020 年要求 Célestin 先生申报其财富时，他并未披露自己的真实净资产。

4. 挪用公款和现有控制措施

177. 本应用于提供基本服务的公共资金继续流入非法网络，使那些负责执行国家政策的个人受益。这种做法继续破坏治理和公众对国家的信任。

178. 加勒比金融行动特别工作组在其 2019 年关于反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为的《相互评估报告》中指出了海地的一些不足之处。在 2024 年 7 月发布的工作组第四次强化后续报告和技术合规重新评级中，进一步强调了这些问题。¹⁷⁶

179. 海地被列入加勒比金融行动特别工作组灰名单，原因是其打击洗钱、资助恐怖主义行为和资助扩散行为的制度存在战略缺陷。¹⁷⁷ 这些方面给国际金融体系带来风险。考虑到海地面临的挑战，工作组允许海地按照自己的速度报告进展情况。¹⁷⁸

180. 不过，在 2024 年《相互评估报告》中，金融经济事务局、反腐败机构和中央金融情报机构在获取和利用金融情报以履行职能方面所作的努力得到了肯定。

181. 截至编写本报告时，海地反腐败部门已准备好 11 起高级别案件供起诉，涉及挪用数百万美元的政府资金。尽管面临挑战，但据报海地正在制定反洗钱的

¹⁷¹ 2024 年，一名前政府官员和一名反腐败官员。

¹⁷² 加拿大根据《特别经济措施法》和《联合国法》制裁了 Rony Célestin，以打击犯罪团伙的活动和那些支持他们煽动暴力和不安全的人的活动。见 www.international.gc.ca/campaign-campagne/haiti-sanction/index.aspx?lang=eng; and Canada, Global Affairs, “Canada imposes additional sanctions against Haitian political elites”, 19 November 2024。

¹⁷³ 2024 年 6 月，专家小组看到的关于非法资金流动的机密报告。

¹⁷⁴ Vincent Larouche, “Une villa de 4,25 millions pour la famille d’un sénateur haïtien”, La Presse, 16 February 2021; and Hugo Joncas, “Les proches d’un sénateur haïtien investissent 6 millions \$ au Québec”, Le Journal de Montréal, 17 February 2021。

¹⁷⁵ 2024 年，保密消息来源。

¹⁷⁶ Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures: Republic of Haiti – 4th Enhanced Follow-Up Report and Technical Compliance Re-Rating (2024)。

¹⁷⁷ Financial Action Task Force, “Jurisdictions under increased monitoring: June 2024”, 28 June 2024。

¹⁷⁸ 2024 年 7 月，与加勒比金融行动特别工作组秘书处的讨论。

监管要求，例如报告可疑活动，进行客户身份识别，开展客户尽职调查以及保留实益所有权登记册。¹⁷⁹

5. 其他相关调查结果

182. 在调查期间，专家小组发现了参与破坏海地稳定的人非法开采和买卖自然资源的案件。专家小组认为，出售这些资源的收益被用于资助各帮派和犯罪网络的活动。

三. 建议

183. 海地问题专家小组向安全理事会提出以下建议：

(a) 请会员国，特别是加勒比区域以及北美、中美和南美区域的会员国，向委员会报告它们为有效执行安理会第 2699(2023)号决议第 14 段规定的军火禁运而采取的行动；

(b) 恢复军火禁运的范围，确保今后安理会相关决议使用第 2653(2022)号决议第 11 段的原文，即“所有类别武器或相关军用物资，包括武器和弹药、军用车辆和装备、准军事装备及上述物项的备件，以及与军事活动有关或与提供、维修或使用任何武器和相关军用物资有关的技术援助、培训、财政及其他援助”，而不是安理会第 2700(2022)号决议第 6 段所载措辞，即“小武器、轻武器和弹药”（见附件 25）；

(c) 更新安理会第 2653(2022)号决议第 15 和 16 段规定的制裁指认标准，将个人或武装团体通过非法开采或买卖自然资源参与破坏海地稳定的活动列入该标准。

184. 海地问题专家小组向委员会提出以下建议：

(a) 继续审议专家小组于 2023 年和 2024 年提交的案件说明和更多相关信息，并更新根据安全理事会第 2653(2022)号决议指认的个人的名单；

(b) 鼓励会员国，特别是加勒比区域以及北美、中美和南美区域的会员国，加强其边境管制机制，以查明和处理贩运人口和偷运移民以及其他跨国犯罪活动，并支持海地当局建设其总体的边境管制能力，包括资助毒品和犯罪问题办公室在海地的方案编制；

(c) 鼓励会员国与国际民用航空组织合作，必要时与相关的联合国人道主义机构和其他组织合作，制定航空部门的国际标准和建议措施，以解决人口贩运和偷运移民问题；

(d) 促请海地政府在国家和国际合作伙伴的支持下，全面执行政府和联合国系统于 2023 年在海地签署的关于转移、接收和照顾在确保领土安全的行动中

¹⁷⁹ 2024 年 6 月和 7 月，与两名财务调查员和风险分析师的访谈。

发现的、与武装帮派有关联的儿童议定书，并加强负责未成年人工作的海地社会福利和研究所的能力；

(e) 敦促会员国继续向多国安全支助团提供财政捐助，以确保支助团在太子港以外地区、特别是阿蒂博尼特省的部署；

(f) 促请会员国支持海地当局及其合作伙伴制定和实施一项处理帮派暴力问题的综合办法。除了多国安全支助团外，该办法中还应当包括解除武装、复员和重返社会 and 减少社区暴力方案以及司法和惩戒能力；

(g) 鼓励会员国建设海地安全机构部署空中和海上资产等战术资产的能力，以应对帮派活动以及武器和毒品贩运；

(h) 鼓励会员国，特别是该区域会员国支持加强海地缉毒大队的能力，并为此提供装备、建立与缉毒大队分享信息的渠道以及酌情开展联合行动；

(i) 鼓励海地政府，在国际伙伴支持下根据加勒比金融行动特别工作组的评估，开展与洗钱和资助恐怖主义行为有关的风险评估，并制定减轻上述风险的国家政策，以此来打击非法资金流动；

(j) 请会员国，包括那些计划以出售或捐赠方式向海地国家警察转让火器、弹药和相关军用物资的会员国，支持国家警察加强其武器和弹药管理能力，以减少可能的转用，包括加强实体安保和库存管理能力，同时实施交付后控制。

Annexes

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Annex 1: Methodology and communications

Methodology and Opportunity to Reply

The Panel adopted a decision rule of consensus, meaning that all members of the Panel were required to agree on the text, findings and recommendations of the report. However, if any member of the Panel had a difference of opinion or reservation, the report could still be adopted by a majority vote of three out of four members.

The Panel reviewed social media and other open sources, but no information was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated by multiple independent sources. This was done to ensure that the information was reliable and met the highest achievable standard of proof.

The Panel provides individuals and entities recommended for sanctioning the opportunity to reply. This gives individuals the opportunity to present an alternative narrative and to provide concrete and specific evidence in their support.

The Panel's methodology for the opportunity to reply is as follows:

1. Providing an individual with an opportunity to reply should be the norm.
2. An individual may not be given the opportunity to reply if the Panel concludes, based on their own assessment, that there is a risk that by doing so it would:
 - a) Result in the individual destroying evidence, tampering with a witness or moving assets if they receive advance notice of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - b) Restrict the Panel's further access to places or vital sources;
 - c) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
 - d) Jeopardise humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field including the United Nations or any other local or international organizations; or
 - e) For any reason that is clearly justified by the circumstances.

After an individual or entity is designated by the Sanctions Committee, it is possible to request a de-listing process through the mechanism established by the Sanctions Committee.¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰See <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653/guidelines> and see also <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/materials/procedures-Delisting>

Annex 2: Table of correspondence sent and received by the Panel from November 2023 to August 2024

Member State	Number of letters sent	Info fully supplied	Info partially supplied	No information provided	No answer	NA/visit accepted
Bahamas	1				1	
Colombia	1			1		
Costa Rica	1				1	
Dominican Republic	5	1		1		3
Ecuador	1				1	
El Salvador	1	1				
Guatemala	2		1			1 Visit pending
Honduras	2		1			1
Jamaica	1					1
Kenya	1		1			
Mexico	2	2				
Nicaragua	1				1	
Panama	3			1		2 Visit pending
Türkiye	1		1			
United States	3		1	2	2	
Venezuela	1				1	

Company	Number of letters sent	Info fully supplied	Info partially supplied	No information provided	No answer	NA
FlyMex	1				1	
Fly-select	1			1		

Annex 3: Reactivation of *Viv Ansanm* alliance



Source: France 24

As mentioned in the Panel's periodic update of March 2024, while Prime Minister Henry was in New York to attend high-level meetings and rally support for the MSS deployment, G9 and G-Pèp gangs¹⁸¹ reactivated the *Viv Ansanm* alliance, which was originally launched late September 2023.

As the Kenyan-led mission prepared to deploy, gangs intensified their offensives and adapted their strategies accordingly. From 29 February 2024, the main gangs from the two rival coalitions (G9 and G-Pèp) formed an unprecedented common front against the government, enabling coordinated attacks against State authority, and critical infrastructure in Port-au-Prince, including police stations, prisons, the main seaport, businesses, banks, as well as the international and domestic airports. Consequently, *Viv Ansanm* not only prevented the Prime Minister Ariel Henry from returning to Haiti but also played a significant role in his ousting¹⁸².

Gangs then continued to deliberately threaten the political transition as well as the MSS, by trying to thwart police operations – e.g by undertaking punctuated attacks against police premises – and committing abuses against the population.

While *Viv Ansanm* has enabled gangs to show improved coordination and tactical operating capabilities, it cannot be disregarded that they have also become more powerful due to the backing of key influential figures, including political, economic and security actors.

Regardless of gangs becoming more autonomous – funding their operations *inter alia* through kidnap for ransoms, hijacking of trucks, illegal tolls, and extortion –, the recent crisis has highlighted connections between the actions of the gangs and that of certain individuals such as Guy Philippe and Dimitri Herard. Other actors were also reportedly tempted to mobilize the *Viv Ansanm* alliance as their 'armed wing', including businessmen involved in competition around seaports, and drug traffickers that wanted to benefit from the union of gangs to facilitate drug-smuggling operations. Moreover, the destruction

¹⁸¹ Including those led by UN sanctioned individuals: Jimmy Cherizier (alias "Barbeque" -HTi.001), Johnson André (alias "Izo" - HTi.002), Renel Destina (alias "Ti Lapli" - HTi.003), Wilson Joseph (alias "Lanmo San Jou"- HTi.004) and Vitelhomme Innocent (HTi.005).

¹⁸² See (S/2024/253), 2024.

of public infrastructures, such as courthouses and prisons, hampering investigations and judicial processes, also reportedly favors a range of alleged criminals, including those involved in President Moise's assassination¹⁸³.

Despite the apparent unity of this alliance of connivence, since April 2024, inter-gang clashes were reported in the areas of La Saline and Wharf Jérémie (leading to the withdrawal of Wharf Jérémie gang from *Viv Ansanm*) as well as in Mariani and Carrefour. Also, the increasing number of kidnappings by certain gangs – despite a previous agreement of non-kidnapping – reveals disagreements within the alliance¹⁸⁴. Although each gang continues to pursue its financial interests (see Annex 41), cohesion holds within the alliance as it is mainly driven by the threats of potential MSS operations¹⁸⁵.

¹⁸³ Interviews with national and international gang analysts, HNP officers, individual living in gang-controlled area, civil society representatives, government representatives working in anti-gang operations, 2024.

¹⁸⁴ UN confidential report, May 2024.

¹⁸⁵ Interviews with international and national gang analysts, 2024 and UN confidential report, June 2024.

Annex 4: Profiles of main gangs within the *Viv Ansanm* alliance, in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area¹⁸⁶

Viv Ansanm					
Gang / Leader		Affiliation	Locality	Headcount	Criminal activity ¹⁸⁷
Delmas 6 Jimmy Cherizier alias Barbeque (HTi.001) Viv Ansanm’s spokesperson		G9	Delmas (4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, airport crossroad)	Around 150 members	Murder, robbery, destruction of property, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion.
Belekou Following the killing of Iskar Andrice, Bendji is the new leader		G9	Belekou	Around 200 members	Murder, robbery, extortion, rape, hijacking of goods and trucks
Ti Bwa Christ-Roi Chery alias Chrisla		G9	Ti Bois, Fontamara and Carrefour (excluding Mariani). Ti Bwa has about 13 cells in Carrefour	Around 400 members	Murder, robbery, rape, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion, targeted assassinations, drug trafficking
La Saline	Krache Dife Jean Gardy alias Pece Pim Pim	G9	Downtown Port-au-Prince, Rues (St-Martin, Tiremasse, des Fronts Fort, des Remparts, Monseigneur Guilloux, du Quai, Pétion, du Peuple, du Centre, Montalais, St Laurent, Houille, Bonne Foi, Dr Aubry, Pavée, Macajou, Borgella, des Césars, des Miracles, des Caserne), St-Joseph, Bas Bel-Air	Around 200 members	Robbery, rape, kidnapping, murder, destruction of property, extortion, hijacking of trucks and goods
	Gang de La Saline Bout Janjan (escaped prison on 2 March 2024)	Initially G9; G-Pèp ally (since 30 Janvier 2024)	La Saline, Aviation, Nan Charbon, part of Grand Rue	Around 100 members	Robbery, murder, hijacking of trucks and goods, rape
Gang de Pierre VI Wilson Pierre alias Sonson		G9	Duvivier, Cité Soleil	Around 150 members	Robbery, ransoming, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion
Simon Pelé Djouma Albert alias Djouma (escaped prison on 2 March 2024)		G9	Simon Pelé	Around 80 members	Murder, arson, rape, robbery, hijacking of goods and trucks
Nan Boston Mathias Sainthil		G9	Boston and Carrefour Drouillard	Around 100 members	Murder, arson, rape, robbery, hijacking of goods and trucks

¹⁸⁶ This Annex is based on interviews conducted in 2023 and 2024 with people living in gang-controlled areas, gang and political analysts, representatives of foreign intelligence agencies, HNP officers and analysts, government representatives and confidential reports.



¹⁸⁷ This column includes main criminal activities that each gang has committed over the years. With *Viv Ansanm*, gangs have, in addition, perpetrated attacks against State institutions and key infrastructures.

Baz Pilate Ezekiel Alexandre alias Ze (escaped prison on 2 March 2024)	G9	1st and 2 nd Avenues, Bolosse to Cite Eternel, 2 nd and 3 rd ruelle Plus (in 3 rd Circumscription), and part of Carrefour-Feuilles	Around 100 members	Murder, robbery, rape, hijacking of goods and trucks, ransoming, targeted assassinations, drug trafficking
Chyen Mechan Claudy Celestin alias Stevenson Pierre alias Chyen Mechan Claudy Célestin is a dismissed civil servant of the Ministry of the Interior	Initially G9 ally; Involved in G9 inter- fighting , (from September 2023 until <i>Viv Ansanm</i> relaunching)	Santo 1 to Santo 19, Marin, and Shadda districts in the commune of Croix-de-Mission and Butte Boyer in the commune of Tabarre. Control parts of RN1 and RN8	Around 100 members	Murder, robberies, extortion Attack against the international airport
Fort Dimanche After Mesidye was killed, Resan is the new chief	Initially G9 ally; G-Pèp ally	Fort Dimanche	Few members who joined La Saline gang	Hijacking, robbery, rape, extortion
Gang de Tokyo Chalè	G9 ally	Tokyo	Around 15 members	Hijacking, robbery, rape, extortion
Terre Noire Jonel Catel (escaped prison on 2 March 2024)	G9 ally	Terre Noire	Around 200 members	Robbery, ransoming, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion, rape of Brooklyn population
Haut Belair / Argentins Kempes Sanon	G-Pèp	Haut Bel-Air, Fort National	Around 250 members	Kidnapping, extortion, hijacking of goods and trucks, theft, rape, murder, violence against civilian populations
Kraze Barye Vitelhomme Innocent (HTi.005)	G-Pèp ally	Tabarre commune (Torcelle, Pernier and Haut Tabarre)	Around 80 members	Murder, political crimes, drug trafficking, kidnapping, rape, robbery, spoliation of land, theft and sale of houses, hijacking of vehicles, extortion, burglaries
5 Segond Johnson André alias Izo (HTi.002) Emmanuel Solomon alias Manno	G-Pèp ally	Bicentenaire, the area from Rue Champs de Mars up to Village-de- Dieu, and part of Martissant (from 2B, in front of the police sub- station up to Martissant 4, until the coast). The bay of Port-au-Prince (port Lafito, Cimenterie and les Moulins d'Haiti, including Source Matelas and Titanyen). Checkpoints in Downtown Port- au-Prince (Rue des Casernes, Rue Pavée, Route de la République, Bicentenaire, Portail Leogane, Route Dehoux, Rue de la Réunion, Rue Monseigneur Guilloux)	Around 1000 members	Murder, drug trafficking, kidnapping, vehicle theft, rape, armed robbery, spoliation, hijacking of trucks and goods

Grand Ravine Bougoy Killik Renel Destina alias Ti Lapli (HTi.003)	G-Pèp ally	From 5th Avenue Bolosse via Martissant (1, 3, 5, 7,9,11,13,15,17,19, 21,23), habitation Le Clerc, Fort-St Clair, Route des Dalles, until Grand Ravine, RN2; Mariani 2 until entry of Leogane, (Carrefour commune); Gressier commune, part of Carrefour Feuilles. Checkpoints in DOWTOWN Port-au-Prince (Cemetery, Carrefour-Feuille, Rue Magloire Ambroise, Rue Edmond Paul, Rue Alerte, Avenue Christophe, Rue Capois, Place Jeremie)	Around 1500 members	Murder, kidnapping, vehicle theft, rape, armed robbery, spoliation, hijacking of trucks and goods.
400 Mawozo Wilson Joseph alias Lanmo San Jou (HTi.004) Germine Joly alias Yonyon (sentenced to 35 years imprisonment in the United States)	G-Pèp ally	Croix-des-Bouquets (except Canaan), La Tremblay, Dargout, Cottard, Papaye, Meyer, Thomazeau, Lilavois (access to Meyer) Also operates along the RN8 that connects Port-au-Prince with the border point of Jimaní.	Around 300 members	Kidnapping, trafficking of drugs and weapons, spoliation, murder, rape, armed robbery, vehicle theft, hijacking of goods, summary executions
Canaan Jeff Larose alias Jeff	G-Pèp ally	Cannan, Onaville, Jerusalem, Corail, Rosemberg, Lilavois, Bon Repos	Around 600 members	Kidnapping, land appropriation, rape, home burglary, hijacking of goods and vehicles, ransoming, murder, drug trafficking

Not part of <i>Viv Ansanm</i>				
Gang and leaders	Affiliation	Territory	Headcount	Criminal activity
Brooklyn Gabriel Jean-Pierre alias Ti Gabriel	G-Pèp	Brooklyn, Soleil 9, 4, 17 and 19, Ti Zile, Wharf	Around 200 members	Extortion, destruction of property, hijacking of goods, violence against civilian populations
Wharf Jérémie Micanor Altès alias Monel Felix	G9	Wharf Jérémie, La Saline, Fort Dimanche	Around 300 members	Robbery hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion

Annex 5: Some of the *Viv Ansanm*'s attacks

29 February: Canaan gang's attack against Bon Repos police station <i>Stills from videos filmed on 29 February and shared with the Panel</i>	
	
The manager of Bon Repos police station killed and cut by Canaan gang members <i>Stills from videos filmed on 29 February and shared with the Panel</i>	
Graphic images with gruesome content	Graphic images with gruesome content

<p>2 March: National prison escapees <i>Stills from videos filmed on 2 March and shared with the Panel</i></p>	<p>Bodies of prisoners in front of the Penitentiary. One of those, eaten by dogs <i>Photo shared with the Panel on 4 March</i></p>
	
<p>The National prison completely empty</p>	<p>2 March: Burning of the Peace Court of Croix-des-Bouquets commune <i>Photo shared with the Panel on 2 March</i></p>



Stills from video shared on:

<https://www.france24.com/fr/video/20240305-spirale-de-violences-en-haïti-l-aéroport-attaqués-par-les-gangs>



3 March: Burning of Cabaret police station by Canaan gang members

Stills from video shared with the Panel on 3 March



3 March: Hospital Saint François de Salle vandalized by Grand Ravine and 5 Second

Source: <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/247070/scenes-de-pillage-a-lhopital-saint-francois-de-sales>



ARCHIDIOCESE DE PORT-AU-PRINCE
CENTRE HOSPITALO-UNIVERSITAIRE SAINT FRANÇOIS DE SALES



Administration de l'Hôpital Saint François de Sales

Communiqué

L'administration de l'Hôpital Saint François de Sales informe le public en général et la communauté médicale en particulier que dans la nuit du 3 au 4 mars, l'ensemble de ses structures de soins et de service a été vandalisé.

L'hôpital saint François de Sales est l'une des institutions les plus importantes de la mission sociale de l'Eglise dans l'Archidiocèse de Port-au-Prince. Après tout ce que sa reconstruction a coûté à l'Eglise après le séisme, cette vandalisation peut être considérée comme un nouveau cataclysme pour notre centre hospitalier. C'est un coup dur porté à la mission sociale de l'Eglise mais aussi à un pays où l'accès aux soins de santé est déjà presque un luxe.

L'accès aux soins est l'aspect le plus exigible du droit à la santé qui doit être interprété, dans la logique de la jouissance des droits fondamentaux de la personne, comme le droit de pouvoir être soigné de manière adaptée. Cet acte de vandalisme qu'a subi l'hôpital saint François de Sales porte, en ce sens, atteinte au droit à la santé qui est un droit fondamental dont chacun doit jouir quelle que soit sa condition sociale. L'administration de l'Hôpital exprime sa désolation devant cet acte qui n'aura pour conséquence que de mettre à genoux un système de santé fonctionnant déjà avec ses faiblesses.

En attendant de faire le bilan des pertes énormes qu'ont occasionnées ces pillages et ces casses, l'administration de l'hôpital Saint François de Sales, espère que reviennent l'ordre et la paix publique dans le pays, dans la Capitale en particulier, afin que la vie reprenne son droit et que les personnes qui souffrent puissent recevoir les soins que requiert leur cas.

Port-au-Prince, le 4 mars 2024



Hôpital Saint François de Sales
Direction Générale

Mgr Jean Théodule Domond

Directeur Général de l'Hôpital Saint François de Sales

Centre Hospitalo-Universitaire St François de Sales: respect de la Vie, Dignité & Excellence.
53, Rue Charéron, Port-au-Prince, Haïti (WI)
Téléphones : (509) 3239-1313 / 3313-3513 / 3227-6379

4 March: gang members attack Port-au-Prince international airport

Stills from video shared on: <https://www.france24.com/fr/vidéo/20240305-spirale-de-violences-en-haïti-l-aéroport-attaqués-par-les-gangs>




6 March: Grand Ravine's attack against Marché Salomon police station*Stills from video shared with the Panel on 7 March***7 March: Looting of containers by gangs and civilians at CPS container terminal***Stills from video shared with the Panel on 7 March***9 March: 400 Mawozo leader at the Croix-des-bouquets police station, mocking former Prime Minister Ariel Henry***Stills from video shared with the Panel on 10 March***14 March: Shootings on the international airport surroundings and against the building of HNP Direction***Source: HNP facebook page*



14 March: Attack against the house of the former HNP General Director (inset) in Croix-des-Bouquets commune


Source: UNPOL, March 2024. See also: <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/247244/la-residence-du-chef-de-la-police-pillee-et-incendiee>



16 March: Looting of containers at the CPS terminal

Still from video posted on social media on 16 March



<p>17 March: Residences burnt by Bel-Air gang <i>Still from video shared with the Panel on 17 March</i></p>	<p>17 March : A 15-year-old girl killed by a stray bullet in Delmas 8 by Delmas 6 gang <i>Still from video shared with the Panel on 17 March</i></p>
	<p>Graphic images with gruesome content</p>
<p>26 and 27 March: looting of Health centers in Delmas 18 and Saint Martin 1 <i>Still from video shared with the Panel on 27 March, showing Delmas 18 Hospital totally destroyed</i></p>	<p>4 April: Canaan gang destroyed Bon Repos police station using heavy equipment <i>Still from video shared with the Panel on 27 March</i></p>



18 May 2024: demolition of the Cabaret civilian prison by Canaan gang

Still from video shared with the Panel on 18 March



17 May 2024: Demolition of the Croix-des-Bouquets police station by 400 Mawozo

Still from video shared with the Panel on 17 March



21 May 2024: 5 Second demolishing the La Saline sub-station

Still from video shared with the Panel on 22 March



21 May 2024: 5 Second destroying and setting fire to Martissant sub-police station


Photograph and still from video shared with the Panel on 22 March

**13 August 2024: Cabaret police station destroyed by Canaan and 5 Sgond gangs**


Still from video shared with the Panel on 14 August 2024



Annex 6: Gang presence in the West department as of June 2024



The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.



The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 7: Fracturing of G9 and weakening of Barbeque since late September 2023

According to the Panel's interim report ([S/24/253](#)), late 2023 - before the re-launching of *Viv Ansanm* in February 2024- , severe fighting both within and between gangs marked not only the fracturing of the G9 coalition, led by Barbeque, but also the aggressive expansion of G-Pèp, including over the main gateways of the capital, in addition to consolidating alliances with Artibonite gangs¹².

As a recall, a key trigger for the growing ruptures within G9 was the death of G9 gang leaders, such as of Tysson, the then G9-affiliated Carrefour Drouillard (punitively executed by G9 for ignoring instructions of G9), and the accidental death of Iskar Andrice¹³ (alias "Iskar"), leader of the Belekou gang and co-founder of G9. These deaths triggered territorial disputes among G9-affiliated gangs and between G9 and G-Pèp. Moreover, G9 gangs also engaged in renewed fighting in La Saline area of the Port-au-Prince commune¹⁸⁸.

Whenever he is weakened, Barbeque strategically either calls for an alliance with other groups, so as not to be attacked, and/or uses a political narrative (such as calling for dialogue) to try to escape police operations¹⁸⁹. Therefore, facing the fragmentation of G9 and the growing threat by G-Pèp to the territory he controls, Barbeque was already increasing his political narrative against the government. In January 2024, Barbeque published videos calling for a revolution to change the existing political system for the benefit of all Haitians¹⁷. At the same time, he instigated the re-launching of *Viv Ansanm*, on 29 February 2024¹⁹⁰. In consequence, G9 and G-Pèp gangs then ceased their inter-fighting.

Currently, Barbeque is weakened by the ongoing police operations over his gang-held area, and the loss of economic resources. Mid-March 2024, after gangs looted and set fire to the vacant private home of former HNP Director-General, in the Cul-de-Sac plain, HNP operations were launched in lower Delmas area, Barbeque's stronghold. Gang members were killed and injured, and Barbeque's residence was burnt. Since then, he has been mobile, seeking refuge with *Viv Ansanm*'s gangs, including 5 Second area, in Village-de-Dieu¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁸ See [S/2-24/253](#).

¹⁸⁹ Interviews with national and international gang analysts, June and July 2024.

¹⁹⁰ Barbeque was one of the instigators of the alliance. Interview with gang analysts, July 2024.

¹⁹¹ UNPOL report, March 2024.









Annex 8: Lanmo San Jou, leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, showing money including from extortion


Still from video shared with the Panel on 17 June 2024



Annex 9: HNP warrant notices against Dimitri Herard and some gang leaders who escaped prison, on 2 March 2024

Source: HNP Facebook page

Dimitri Herard	Leader of Simon Pele gang
<p style="text-align: center;"> POLICE NATIONALE D'HAÏTI</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AVIS DE RECHERCHE</p> <p style="text-align: center;"></p> <p>NOM : HERARD PRENOM : DIMITRY</p> <p>INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HOMICIDE • BRACAGE • VIOL • VOL DE NUIT A MAINS ARMÉES • ACTE DE TERRORISME • EVADE DE PRISON <p>N.B. Dangereux et Armé</p> <p><i>En cas de localisation</i> <i>Prrière d'appeler aux numéros : 3834-1111 / 3836-1111 / 3837-1111 / 3838/1111/ 2817-0545 / 3106-0573</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><small>Mars 2024</small></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"> POLICE NATIONALE D'HAÏTI</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AVIS DE RECHERCHE</p> <p style="text-align: center;"></p> <p>NOM : ALBERT PRENOM : STEEVENSON ALIAS : Djoura</p> <p>INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ENLEVEMENT ET SEQUESTRATION CONTRE RANÇON • ABUS DE CONFIANCE • ENLEVEMENT ET SEQUESTRATION CONTRE RANÇON • DETOURNEMENT DE MARCHANDISES • EVASION DE PRISON <p>N.B. Dangereux et Armé</p> <p><i>En cas de localisation</i> <i>Prrière d'appeler aux numéros : 3834-1111 / 3836-1111 / 3837-1111 / 3838/1111/ 2817-0545 / 3106-0573</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><small>Mars 2024</small></p>
Leader of Baz Pilate gang	Leader of Gang Galil
<p style="text-align: center;"> POLICE NATIONALE D'HAÏTI</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AVIS DE RECHERCHE</p> <p style="text-align: center;"></p> <p>NOM : ALEXANDRE PRENOM : EZECHIEL ALIAS : Ze</p> <p>INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASSASSINAT • TENTATIVE D'ASSASSINAT • VOL A MAINS ARMÉES • ENLEVEMENT ET SEQUESTRATION • EVASION DE PRISON <p>N.B. Dangereux et Armé</p> <p><i>En cas de localisation</i> <i>Prrière d'appeler aux numéros : 3834-1111 / 3836-1111 / 3837-1111 / 3838/1111/ 2817-0545 / 3106-0573</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><small>Mars 2024</small></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"> POLICE NATIONALE D'HAÏTI</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AVIS DE RECHERCHE</p> <p style="text-align: center;"></p> <p>NOM : ETHEARD PRENOM : WOULDLY ALIAS : SONSON LAFAMILIA</p> <p>INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ENLEVEMENT • DETENTION ILLÉGAL D'ARME DE GUERRE • BLANCHIMENT DES AVOIRS • ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS • EVASION DE PRISON <p>N.B. Dangereux et Armé</p> <p><i>En cas de localisation</i> <i>Prrière d'appeler aux numéros : 3834-1111 / 3836-1111 / 3837-1111 / 3838/1111/ 2817-0545 / 3106-0573</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><small>Mars 2024</small></p>
Leader of Terre Noire gang	



Annex 10: Attacks over Solino neighborhood intensified since February 2024

As a former policeman, Barbeque had close relationships with other HNP officers, including certain he accused on social media of trafficking weapons with him. Some policemen residing in Solino neighborhood were his allies in the fight against gangs, notably base 117, in Delmas 2, as well as Krache Dife and Les Argentins (also known as Bel-Air)¹⁹².

When Barbeque became the leader of the G9 coalition and of Delmas 6 gang, he still enjoyed some sort of arrangements with certain police officers. For instance, at the time Barbeque was facing the fracturing of G9, he reportedly requested certain police officers to prevent the Chyen Mechan gang of attacking other G9 gangs, such as Terre Noire and Pierre VI. In addition, policemen and the Solino self-defense group were supported by Barbeque in the fight against Kempes, who wanted to take over Solino neighborhood in order to access other territories¹⁹³.

With *Viv Ansanm* reactivation and the recurrent gang attacks against police premises, the relationship between Barbeque and these police officers strained. Barbeque, together with Krache Dife and Simon Pelé gangs, then joined hands with his once-time rival, Kempes, to attack Solino and Delmas 24 neighborhoods, in view of opening access to the middle-class neighborhoods of Bourdon, Chris Roi, Haut Delmas and Nazon. The aim is to bring in more income from kidnappings and extortion of businesses in this wealthy area¹⁹⁴.

As a result, high levels of violence have been recorded in Solino, with raids intensifying since February 2024, and at least 128 people, including 13 children, killed or injured, since March 2024. More than 5,100 people were displaced to other areas. Several victims were shot while inside their residences or in the streets¹⁹⁵.

The Solino self-defense group, which is particularly well organized with different commissions (logistics, kitchen, security)¹⁹⁶, has barricaded the key arteries surrounding the neighborhood to prevent incursions from the gangs.

¹⁹² Interviews with government official working on gang-related issues and national and international gang analysts, 2024.



¹⁹³ *Idem*.

¹⁹⁴ BINUH Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, April-June 2024 and interview with gang analysts and government representative working in anti-gang operations, 2024.





¹⁹⁵ *Idem*.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with international gang analyst, June 2024.



Annex 11: Attack against UTAG police officers

Weapons recovered from police officers by Barbeque <i>Still from video filmed on 8 June 2024</i>	Armored vehicle burnt <i>Still from video filmed on 8 June 2024</i>
	
Corpses of two police officers <i>Photos shared with the Panel on 9 June 2024</i>	
<p data-bbox="289 1602 708 1633">Graphic images with gruesome content</p>	<p data-bbox="922 1606 1341 1638">Graphic images with gruesome content</p>

Annex 12: Expansion over southern communes of the West department

<p>Partial destruction of Gressier police station by Grand Ravine before the finally takeover on 7 July 2024</p> <p><i>Stills from video shared on 2 July 2024</i></p>	
	
<p>Driver burnt by Grand Ravine gang members in Gressier</p> <p><i>Still from video shared on 1 July 2024</i></p>	<p>103 Zombie group of Grand Ravine invaded Leogane commune, on 20 July 2024</p> <p><i>Still from video shared on 20 July 2024</i></p>
<p>Graphic images with gruesome content</p>	<div>   </div> <p>103 Zombie leader, Ti Bébè Bougòy</p>

Annex 13: Increased violence by Artibonite gangs

Vehicle burnt by Gran Grif at RN1 <i>Still from video shared on 15 July 2024</i>		‘Show of force’ by Gran Grif in Moreau Paye, Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite commune <i>Still form video diffused on 12 July 2024</i>	
			
Farmers killed by Gran Grif in Moreau Drouet locality, Liancourt commune, on 5 April 2024 <i>Stills from video and photos shared on 5 April 2024</i>			
Graphic image with gruesome content	Graphic image with gruesome content	Graphic image with gruesome content	Graphic image with gruesome content


Residents massacred in the commune of Terre Neuve by the Kokorat San Ras gang, on 15 June 2024	
<i>Photos shared with the Panel on 16 June 2024</i>	
Graphic image with gruesome content showing an injured baby	Graphic image with gruesome content showing a dead woman
Graphic image with gruesome content showing a dead woman	Graphic image with gruesome content showing a dead man
07 April 2024: Kokorat San Ras members killed a member of a self-defence group in Joanis locality	
Graphic image with gruesome content showing man cut in pieces and killed	Graphic image with gruesome content showing man cut in pieces and killed

Annex 14: Profile of Gangs in the Artibonite department¹⁹⁷

Gang and Leaders	Locality	Strength	Main criminal activity
Gran Grif (Savien gang) Luckson Elan alias General Luckson	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, Savien, Liancourt, Pont Sondé, Carrefour Paye, Moreau Drouet, Hatte, Patchwal Controls part of RN1, and the secondary road 11, from Pont Sondé to Mirebalais, on Morne Pierre Paul and Chandelle, Liancourt commune	About 300 members	Murder, rape, robbery, destruction of property, hijacking of trucks and goods, violence against civilian population, kidnapping
Kokorat San Ras Ferdens Tilus alias Meyer	La Croix Périssette, Commune de l'Estère, Ti Bwadom, Gros Morne Controls parts of the RN1 and of the RN5, linking the Bassin-Bleu and Gros-Morne communes	Around 100 members	Murder, robbery, rape kidnapping, hijacking of trucks and goods
Coalition des Révolutionnaires pour Sauver l'Artibonite (Jean Denis coalition) Ti-Mepris	Jean Denis	Around 100 members	Violence against gang members and civilian population from gang member areas, murder, destruction of property
Raboteau Wilford Ferdinand alias Ti-Will	Gonaïves	Around 50 members	Murder, extortion, street blocking, drug trafficking, destruction of property
Ti Grif Izolan	Palmis	Around 40 members	Murder, rape, robbery, destruction of property, hijacking of trucks and goods, violence against civilian populations, kidnapping
Decahos Paulda	Gonaïves	Around 50 members	Robbery and drug trafficking

¹⁹⁷ This Annex is based on interviews conducted between February 2023 and July 2024 with people living in gang-controlled areas, gang analysts, HNP analysts, government representatives and confidential reports.

Annex 15: Gang controlled area in the Artibonite department as of August 2024



Source: Map elaborated based on confidential data

The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 16: Gangs adapting their strategy ahead of MSS operations

Blockade of the main road leading to the city center of Croix-des-Bouquets by the 400 Mawozo gang

Photo shared on social media on 8 July 2024



The construction of a wharf by Izo in Village de Dieu neighborhood to facilitate maritime movements

Source: Ayibopost



Image of Izo's drone tracking MSS operations, in June 2024

Stills from video shared in June 2024



400 Mawozo displaying recently acquired arms and ammunition*Stills from video broadcasted on 31 July 2024**Stills from video broadcasted on 5 August 2024*




Annex 17: 400 Mawozo's acquisition of firearms and attacks against Ganthier commune (July 2024)

New acquisition of weapons and ammunition by 400 Mawozo <i>Stills from video shared on 18 July 2024</i>			
			
Ganthier police station burnt by 400 Mawozo <i>Stills from video shared on 20 July 2024</i>		400 Mawozo demolished the Ganthier police station, on 25 July 2024 <i>Stills from video diffused on 25 July 2024</i>	
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			
			

Members of the 400 Mawozo gang set fire to the Ganthier customs office on 04 August 2024

Photo and stills from video broadcasted on 04 August 2024



Lamo San Jou with gang members, including minors, that participated in the attack

Stills from video broadcasted on 04 August 2024



Annex 18: Active campaign calling for Bwa Kale in anticipation of the MSS deployment

Messages from social media shared with the Panel on 28 May 2024

	<p><u>Translation</u> : Donne la main à ton voisin et demande-lui s'il a déjà acheté sa machette !</p> <p>Dis-lui, c'est Bwa Kale qu'il faut privilégier en ce moment.</p> <p><i>Give your neighbor a hand and ask him if he has already bought his machete!</i></p> <p><i>Tell him, it's Bwa Kale who should be the priority at the moment</i></p>
<p>Ke tout ayisyen rele Bwa kale.</p> <p>Di tout moun kap vin pran pòz filozòf yo, pou diw ou padwe aji menm jan ak bandi ya, dil #La_violence_contre #la_violence_n'est_pas_une_violence</p> <p>Dil ou pa janm wè yap achte te gaz, bay moun kap souffri ak maladi kansè,</p> <p>#Gwo_maladi, #gwo_remed.</p> <p>#Wa_abòne_siw_vle #Wa_patajel_siw_vle.</p> <p>@tout le monde</p> 	<p><u>Translation</u> : Que tous les Haïtiens crient : Vive Bwa Kale. A tous ceux qui se mettent dans une posture d'intellectuel et qui disent qu'on ne doit pas agir comme les bandits, on doit les dire la violence contre la violence n'est pas une violence. On n'a jamais acheté du thé pour les personnes souffrant du cancer. Aux grands maux, les grands remèdes.</p> <p><i>Let all Haitians shout: Long live Bwa Kale. To all those who put themselves in the position of an intellectual and who say that we must not act like bandits, we must tell them that violence against violence is not violence. We have never bought tea for people suffering from cancer. Big problems require big solutions.</i></p>

Annex 19: Attempts by gangs to win the sympathy of the population

Canaan gang, led by Jeff, gives presents to women on mothers' day

Stills from video shared with the Panel on 28 May 2024

Cash handouts by gang members



Residents of Cité Soleil go out after the destruction of protective walls separating gang-held areas, following a peace pledge by gangs in the area (24 July 2024)



Annex 20: Anti-MSS demonstration by Delmas 6 gang

26 June 2024: Members of the Delmas 6 gang demonstrated while singing that they were ready to defend themselves against Kenyan police officers

Stills from video diffused on 26 June 2024



Annex 21: Seizures conducted on their way to Haiti or at Haitian ports of entry since the creation of the sanctions regime in October 2022

Table: Seizures conducted at Haiti's ports of entry or on their way to Haiti between the adoption of resolution 2356 on 22 October 2022 and 1st July 2024.

Date	Location/authorities	Firearms	Ammunition	Other materiel	Information
25 October 2022	Miami Airport USA	9mm handgun		1 magazine	The pistol was discovered in a parcel being shipped to Haiti
8 November 2022	Elias Pina, Dominican Republic		12,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm 10,160 rounds of 5.56x45mm		Two Haitian women were arrested while attempting to cross the border into Haiti in a private vehicle.
31 December 2022	Cap Haïtien Haiti		989 rounds of 9x19mm		Seizure from a container coming from the US. One individual was arrested in Haiti.
11 January 2023	Miami port USA	One revolver	41 rounds		The revolver was concealed in a sofa
24 April 2023	Cap Haïtien Haiti	One 9mm handgun	Eight 9mm rounds 4 boxes of 12-gauge cartridges (100 in total)	2 knives	Found in a container transported by the Sara Express coming from the Miami River (Antillean Marine Shipping).
7 June 2023	CPS container park– Port au Prince Haiti	PA-15 5.56mm rifle	340 rounds of 5.56x45mm 115 rounds of 9mm	5 magazines 1 helmet	Container coming from Miami. Some materiel concealed in a popcorn machine. The rifle was purchased for the first time in the US in 2017. Two individuals arrested in Haiti.
2023 (Unknown date between January and June)	Miami USA	2 pistols		1 magazine	
2023 (Unknown date between January and June)	Miami USA			23 vests	
18 October 2023	Dajabon Dominican Republic		1,850 rounds of 9mm		A minor was intercepted while trying to exit the DR
1 November 2023	USA Miami	1 revolver 357 Magnum	5 rounds of S&W .40 cal 36 rounds of 9x19mm		Commercial Vessel

Unknown date	USA South Florida	Several handguns 1 automatic rifle Several semi-automatic rifles	Unknown quantity of ammunition		
30 November 2023	USA Miami			'35 cannon L-1 37mm' [the Panel was not able to identify what exact item it is]	Commercial aircraft
2 December 2023	International Airport Haiti		50 rounds of .45 40 rounds of 5.56x45mm 150 rounds of 9x19mm 25 of 12 gauge cartridges	19,390 USD in cash Six radios One video surveillance system One flak jacket	Passenger arriving from NY on commercial aircraft
22 December 2023	Cap Haitien Haiti	9mm handgun 5.56x45mm rifle	92 rounds of 9mm 9 rounds of .45 78 rounds of 5.56x45mm	3 flak jackets 1 helmet 7 magazines	Seizure from container from Florida Serial number of the handgun was erased
05 April 2024	Cap Haitien Haiti	Nine 5.56x45mm rifles Three 7.62x39mm rifles 14 handguns	999 rounds of ammunition (7.62x39mm, 5.56x45mm, .40 S&W, 9mm, .25 ACP)	34 magazines	Seizures from container, commercial vessel, from Port Everglades
29 April 2024	Cap Haitien Haiti	One .40 handgun One 9x19mm handgun	13 rounds of 9x19mm	2 magazines	
11 June 2024	Cap Haitien Haiti		150 rounds of ammunition	Conversion kit (handgun to rifle)	
TOTAL		>23 handguns >14 semi-automatic rifle	>26, 238 rounds of various calibers		

Table elaborated by the Panel based on data provided by Haitian, Dominican and US law enforcement agencies, 2023 and 2024.

Annex 22: Details of seizures operated on their way or at ports of entry in Haiti during the reporting period.

Seizures from the US

Case 1: On 2 December 2023, the Haitian authorities seized 265 rounds of ammunition of various calibers, six radios, one flak jacket, and a video surveillance system, as well as a 19,390 USD in cash from a US citizen travelling on a commercial flight from New York to Haiti¹⁹⁸.



Source: VBI, 2023

Case 2 : on 22 December 2023, in Cap-Haitien, the Haitian authorities seized a 9mm handgun, a 5.56x45mm semi-automatic rifle, and 179 rounds of ammunition found in a container coming from Port Everglades, as well as one helmet and three flak jackets¹⁹⁹. The Panel has sent a tracing request to the US.



Source: Confidential

Case 3: on 5 April 2024, in Cap-Haitien, Haitian Customs seized 26 firearms and 999 rounds ammunition found in a container originating from Florida²⁰⁰. This is the largest seizure of firearms intercepted at any port of entry in Haiti since the establishment of the sanctions regime. The Panel interviewed Haitian Police and Customs officers, sent a tracing request to the US, and interviewed the freight forwarder and the shipping broker. The results of its inquiries have facilitated a mapping of the criminal network involved. See Annex 23.

¹⁹⁸ Interviews with representative of Customs, December 2023, and with a HNP investigator, February 2024.

¹⁹⁹ Confidential report, 2023 and interview with HNP officer, January 2024.

²⁰⁰ Interviews with Customs and HNP officers, 2024.



Source: HNP, 2024

Case 4: on 29 April 2024, two handguns with two magazines and 13 rounds of 9x19mm ammunition were discovered in a container that arrived into Cap-Haitien from Port Everglades²⁰¹. The firearms had been sent by a Haitian national (who had recently settled in the US) to his wife in Haiti²⁰². A tracing request was sent to the US.



Source: HNP Facebook page, 30.04.24

Case 5: on 11 June 2024, in Cap-Haitien, a conversion kit (used to transform a handgun into a rifle) and a 9mm high capacity magazine – both unusual items for Haiti – as well as 150 rounds of ammunition (100 x 9x19mm and 50 x .38) were discovered in container KOSU-496-108-8 arriving from Port Everglades.

²⁰¹ Interview with a Customs officer, 2024.

²⁰² Interview with a judicial source, July 2024.




Source: Confidential

Seizures in/from the Dominican Republic

The Dominican authorities have made some seizures during the reporting period with two small seizures of 9mm ammunition between September 2023 and April 2024 in Dajabon and Elias Pina, and a larger one of 1,850 rounds of 9mm ammunition in Dajabon, in October 2023, from a minor attempting to cross the border into Haiti²⁰³.

In Haiti, in December 2023, the HNP arrested three individuals in Mirebalais (Centre department) transporting 9,960 rounds of ammunition. Based on the Panel's physical inspection of the seizure, it included 5.56x45mm ammunition produced by various manufacturers in the US and Europe, some as recently as 2022. The ammunition was sent across the border from the Dominican Republic and collected by accomplices on the Haitian side²⁰⁴.



Source: Panel of Experts.

²⁰³ Information provided by the Dominican authorities, June 2024.

²⁰⁴ Interviews with one senior HNP officer and one HNP investigator, January 2024. Interview with Mirebalais local authority, February 2024.

In July 2024, 5000 rounds of 5.56x45mm ammunition were seized by the Police in Mirebalais, Centre department, after the rider of a motorcycle was shot by a self-defense group²⁰⁵. A second motorcyclist escaped. According to the Haitian authorities, the ammunition crossed over from the Dominican Republic. The ammunition was produced by Fiocchi Munizione (Italy) – the Panel sent a tracing request to the Italian authorities in August 2024.



Source: confidential

²⁰⁵ Interview with Mirebalais local authorities, August 2024.

Annex 23: 5 April 2024 seizure in Cap-Haitien

On 5 April 2024, the Haitian authorities seized 26 firearms as well as ammunition found in a container (no. KOSU4514876) that had arrived into Cap-Haitien from Port Everglades, Florida, on 27 March. The container was being transported by the vessel 'Rainer D' operated by Ocean King which routinely serves this route. The seizure is the largest one since the establishment of the sanctions regime in October 2022.

The Panel presents the evidence it has gathered on this case below; however, the Panel withholds the names of individuals and companies involved – either knowingly or unknowingly – as national investigations are ongoing.

This case illustrates the types of networks involved in arms trafficking from the United States, their *modus operandi*, and the challenges associated with effectively enforcing the United Nations arms embargo on Haiti.

Detection

The materiel was brought into Haiti concealed in two separate boxes both bearing the number '75', packed in amongst many other boxes and different kinds of packages. The first box had earlier been picked up by a senior Customs officer, who had put it into his vehicle with the intention of removing it from the port undetected. When the second box was opened during the search of the container and weapons were discovered, the Customs officer removed the box from his vehicle and promptly left the port; he was arrested several days later and was removed from his position in Customs.



Source: Confidential



Source: Confidential

Materiel seized

Full details of the weapons recovered during the seizure are provided below. Specifically, the search yielded 12 rifles, including 5.56x45mm and 7.62x39mm, 14 pistols, and 999 rounds of ammunition (278 x 9x19mm, 36 x .40, 633 x 5.56X45mm, 52 x 7.62x39mm) as well as 34 magazines.

On 15 April 2024, the Panel sent a tracing request to the US authorities in order to identify the chain of custody of the materiel. The Panel also requested the US authorities to share information about the sender and the ship that had transported the materiel, including any related documentary evidence and any information about the network(s) and the intended end-user(s). A response is still pending.

Trafficking network

Senders from the United States

Three Haitian brothers have been identified as being among the primary actors involved in the trafficking ring responsible for bringing these weapons into Haiti, including a former HNP officer who is the leader of the group. While two of the brothers are based in the US and used straw buyers to purchase the materiel, one is based in Haiti and is in charge of selling it on. This was not their first illicit transfer to Haiti.

Corrupt Customs officers facilitating entry of materiel into Haiti.

In Cap-Haitien, Customs officers were paid to facilitate the passage of the illicit goods. Although only one Customs officer was arrested, more officers are implicated and investigations continue²⁰⁶.

Following this seizure, the Customs authorities established a commission to travel from Port-au-Prince to look into the work of the Cap-Haitien office. In addition to the Customs officer who had attempted to remove the materiel from the port and was subsequently fired, one other Customs officer was suspended for four months and two others received cautions²⁰⁷.

²⁰⁶ Confidential source, June 2024.

²⁰⁷ Confidential source, June 2024.

Distribution

Enquiries indicate that the clearing agent who fled the port when he saw that the boxes had been searched acts as an intermediary with one of the three brothers in charge of selling materiel to end-users. The ring seems to sell to anyone and is not attached to any specific gang or other armed actor.

Transportation to Haiti

Freight forwarder

The leader of the network used a freight forwarder who himself used a broker to ship the container to Haiti. The Panel interviewed both the freight forwarder and the shipping broker during a fact-finding mission to Florida in June 2024. The Panel interviewed the freight forwarder who denied being involved and explained that he was not aware of the content of the boxes in which the weapons and ammunition had been found.

As the Panel has already reported in Annex 29 of [S/2023/674](#), there are many Haitian nationals or individuals of Haitian descent who work as freight forwarders in South Florida. The freight forwarder is a US citizen of Haitian origin. As is common practice among freight forwarders, he rented a yard in a warehouse in Port Everglade and rented a container from the shipping broker. His job consists of filling the container with personal effects or relatively small quantities of goods from a range of individuals. The container in question for instance included goods from more than 100 individuals and included food, oil, clothes, and family items.

Freight forwarding is loosely regulated and freight forwarders do not control the merchandise they fill in containers. The freight forwarder explained that, typically, clients arrive at the yard to hand over goods that are already packaged and sealed. He went on to say that the person who had dropped the two boxes was not previously known to him, so he asked him to send a copy of his ID by WhatsApp. This was subsequently deleted from the conversation as a result of which the forwarder said he was not able to recover it. The sender had paid 150 USD cash.

With regards to organizing the shipment and distributions of packages, the freight forwarder uses number codes on parcels and attributed the number '75' to the boxes transporting the arms and ammunition. The consignee who collects the parcels at the port, may not be the final end user and may just be an additional step in the chain of custody.

Shipping broker

The shipping company is charged with renting a container out to a freight forwarder, to bring it to the yard and take it back to the shipping line once it is ready to be shipped. Based on our enquiries, it is unlikely that the shipping company was aware of the transportation of the firearms.

Annex 24: New equipment in the hands of gangs

The Panel has noticed that a number of gangs have acquired new types materiel and larger calibers, particularly the two most powerful gangs, 5 Second and Grand Ravine which, along with 400 Mawozo, continue to be the most prolific in terms of their ability to procure materiel and to supply allied gangs with weapons and ammunition.

7.62x39mm

Although gangs continue to exclusively use small arms, the Panel has noticed a gradual shift towards higher calibers since its first mandate. Historically, gangs have typically used craft weapons, handguns, 12-gauge shotguns, and later 5.56x45mm semi-automatic (AR-type) rifles. Over the past two years, they have increasingly been trying to procure 7.62x39mm semi-automatic, as well as some automatic (AK-type) rifles. Although the caliber of these rifles is not significantly larger than the AR-type, they have more stopping power and result in more damage. While AK-type rifles and/or their ammunition coming from the US and the Dominican Republic have featured in seizures conducted in Haiti (see Annex 21), a very limited number were traced back to Venezuela and the Panel has also received information of transfers from other countries in South America which it is looking into. 7.62x39mm rifles and their ammunition are currently more expensive than the AR-variants and 5.56x45mm ammunition (or .223).

7.62x51mm

During its last mandate, the Panel had already identified that some gangs were in possession of limited amounts of 7.62x51mm rifles (see S/2023/674). Most cases involved firearms diverted from HNP stockpiles including some general-purpose machine guns. This higher caliber materiel remains rare in Haiti, though a quantity of the ammunition was seized previously (see Eglise Episcopale case, S/2023/674) and some has also featured this year in seizures made during Police operations²⁰⁸.

Recent exchanges with HNP officers involved in anti-gang operations indicate that they are seeing increasing amounts of this materiel during operations. Indeed, a video²⁰⁹ posted in March 2024 mimicking the codes of the “special forces” units of Latin American drug cartels shows members of the ‘Unité Village de Dieu’ (UVD) – presented as the ‘tactical corps’ of the 5 Second gang headed by Izo – wearing military uniforms with UVD patches, standing alongside refurbished camouflaged vehicles and carrying newly-procured weapons, including FAL-pattern (7.62x51mm) rifles (see images below).

Confidential sources explained that these rifles along with the uniforms, were retrieved by Dimitri Herard after he escaped prison and took refuge in Village de Dieu. However, the original source of the rifles remains unclear. Originally produced by FN Herstal in Belgium, FAL rifles are among the most common in the world, manufactured in multiple countries (both legally through licenses sold by FN Herstal and reproduced illegally in several locations), including in South America, and are in service in more than 80 states across the globe (the Forces Armées d’Haiti (FADH) have also procured FALs in the past)²¹⁰.

12.7x99mm (.50 cal)

In the previous mandate, the Panel reported on the concerning attempts by gangs to procure 12.7x99mm ammunition, a caliber used for heavy machine guns and anti-materiel rifles. The Panel is aware that Ti Bwa and Grand Ravine have this type of ammunition and that attempts to import .50 cal rifles have been made (one was seized in Miami in 2022 on its way to Haiti and 400 Mawozo also managed to acquire one in the US – See S/2023/674). More recently, interviews with HNP officers from operational units indicate that 12.7x99mm was used in the downtown area of Port-au-Prince in July. One senior anti-gang officer told the Panel that four or five of these weapons are currently owned by gangs, with Izo and Jeff Canaan both having one each²¹¹. .50cal represent a significant risk for HNP officers and their partners during operations.

²⁰⁸ See for instance, HNP official Facebook page, 9 February 2024

²⁰⁹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qx-5DY6lLqo>

²¹⁰ Interview with a FAL expert, June 2024.

²¹¹ Interview with a senior representative of an HNP operational unit, July 2024.

Unité Village de Dieu





Annex 25: The use of uncrewed aerial systems by gangs

Although uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), more commonly referred as drones, are not covered by the UN arms embargo (resolutions 2699 and 2700 - 2023), their acquisition has had a significant impact on the fighting capacity of gangs. The Panel believes that it is important to monitor their transfers and that, in addition to small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, the embargo should cover spare parts, and any other type of military materiel, as well as training, financial and technical assistance as mentioned in the original embargo (see paragraph 11 of [S/RES/2653 – 2022](#)) – see Recommendations. The Panel believes that the provision of drones to gangs, even commercial ones, constitutes an assistance to criminal groups and therefore meets designation criteria - see criteria d), paragraph 16 of resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#).

Gang leaders, including Chrisla, Izo, Jeff Canaan, and Vitelhomme, have increasingly been deploying UAS²¹² which – though they do not yet appear to have been weaponised – have contributed to significantly enhancing their fighting capability.

Evidence collected by the Panel shows, for instance, that both Izo and Vitelhomme have been using UAS since at least early 2023 to conduct reconnaissance, identify targets and coordinate attacks:

- On 2 March 2024, Izo remotely coordinated an attack against the national penitentiary leading to the escape of thousands of prisoners, including gang members, drug traffickers and arms traffickers (see photo below).
- In early 2023, Vitelhomme used a drone in a battle with the HNP swat team (see photo below)

UAS identified by the Panel include ‘quadcopters’ produced by one of the largest manufacturers of commercially available UAS. Exports or imports of these into Haiti are not restricted and are therefore very difficult to control; furthermore, given the general obsolete state of arms control legislation in the country, the use of UAS is not controlled or restricted in Haiti.



Photo: Izo coordinating the attack against the national penitentiary through drone footage, April 2024 (source: Tik Tok)

²¹² Interview with a senior representative of an HNP operational unit, July 2024.



Photo: UAS belonging to Vitelhomme downed by the HNP during an operation in April 2023 (source: confidential)

Annex 26: Brigade de Surveillance des Aires Protégées (BSAP)

The BSAP was created by the Agence Nationale des Aires Protégées (National Agency for Protected Areas - ANAP) whose official mandate is to protect biodiversity and manage the National System of Protected Areas – see 2024 Interim Report S/2024/253²¹³. With the absence of a legal order establishing the Brigade it is difficult to identify its date of creation. Reportedly, the ANAP has had a small group of poorly equipped armed agents composed of former members of the Defence Forces since its creation in 2006. The group's headcounts and scope of tasks developed significantly from 2014 and then from 2017 when the ANAP became a General Directorate of the Ministry of Environment and the appointment of Jeantel Joseph, the former secretary of state for public security under President Jovenel Moïse, as the Director of the ANAP²¹⁴.

While the legal grounds for the creation of the brigade are highly contested – the Haitian constitution mentions that the Police and Army are the only armed bodies that can exist on the national territory²¹⁵ – the Brigade is not under the control of the government and some units largely respond to the orders of its (now dismissed) leader, Jeantel Joseph. He has a close relationship with Guy Philippe as they both belonged to the same political entity in 2015. In 2024, Jeantel Joseph, as the coordinator of the *Reveil National pour la Souveraineté d'Haiti (RNSH)* political coalition openly backed Guy Philippe. On 17 January 2024, Jeantel Joseph was also mentioned in a judicial order in relation to the assassination of President Moïse in 2021 for having provided the necessary logistics to the mercenaries who killed the president²¹⁶.

BSAP agents are mostly based in rural and border areas but have increasingly been seen carrying weapons in urban areas where they often carry out police-like work in the absence of effective State security. Local authorities in a range of departments have relationships on various levels with local BSAP units, with some commending their security work and confirming that there is a degree of ongoing collaboration. Interviews with confidential sources indicate that some local authorities and local stakeholders pay BSAP agents to provide security.

Civil society organizations and local authorities have also raised concerns about members of the BSAP committing crimes, including blocking roads and demanding payment for safe passage²¹⁷. Some BSAP members – some of whom are deployed along the border with the Dominican Republic and southern departments – are reported to be involved in cross-border smuggling of goods, including drugs²¹⁸. Some members of the BSAP have also been involved in kidnappings, gang activities and the illicit trafficking and possession of firearms²¹⁹. Finally, several confidential sources mentioned that some BSAP units are working for local politicians and businessmen, including Rony Célestin in Hinche.

Recent developments

The BSAP recently rose to prominence during the tensions around the construction of the canal off the Massacre River - near the border with the Dominican Republic. Construction of the canal became a question of national pride for many Haitians which BSAP exploited to win the hearts of many through its provision of 'security' to the site²²⁰ with little reaction from the Government. BSAP boosted its ranks at the time of this event.

After his return to the country in November 2023, Guy Philippe was protected by agents of the BSAP who have also participated in anti-government protests he initiated. This led to more volunteers joining the Brigade. Several of the senior members are former acolytes of Guy Philippe from the 2004 coup.

²¹³ [Accueil - ANAP](#)

²¹⁴ Confidential report, February 2024.

²¹⁵ See article 263.1 of the Haitian Constitution.

²¹⁶ République d'Haiti. Ordonnance du 17 Janvier 2024. Assassinat du Président Jovenel Moïse.

²¹⁷ Interviews with local authorities of Plateau Central, February 2024.

²¹⁸ Interview with senior HNP officer, February 2024.

²¹⁹ Confidential report, 2021. Interview with human rights defender, January 2024.

²²⁰ See for instance, Daudier, Valéry. 2023. Canal sur la rivière Massacre : des agents de la BSAP et des membres de la population en protection des travaux. Le Nouvelliste.

Despite very few reactions from political actors throughout the country, civil society organizations and some law enforcement and Army representatives raised concerns at the time, including about the potential for deadly clashes involving the Brigade while the country was experiencing severe anti-government protests²²¹.

Jeantel Joseph did not comply with the order from the government to provide a list of agents and their firearms. On 23 January 2024, Joseph was officially dismissed as Director of ANAP by an *arrete* in the *Moniteur* (Official journal of Haiti) which also created a Technical Restructuring Committee in charge of assessing the ANAP and providing recommendations to improve its management²²². The following day, BSAP agents and other actors attacked the Customs office in Ouanaminthe in reprisal²²³. At the date of drafting, the Committee is still not operational.

On 29 January 2024, the government issued a communique requiring people affiliated with the ANAP to report in and register at the closest Ministry of Environment office and banning any armed BSAP agent from operating within urban areas²²⁴. While some members of the BSAP complied, others did not, and have continued to recognize Joseph as their leader and to carry firearms in urban areas. During the peak of demonstrations on 5, 6 and 7 February 2024, BSAP agents participated in anti-government protests fomented by Guy Philippe in several cities, including Port-au-Prince, Mirebalais²²⁵, and Gonaïves²²⁶. Several armed incidents took place in Port-au-Prince on 7 February where clashes with the HNP resulted in the deaths of five BSAP agents and the arrests of three others²²⁷, while BSAP agents killed two civilians and injured two more in Mirebalais²²⁸. National investigations are ongoing.

Composition and Structure

The composition and structure of the BSAP remains very vague as most agents and units across the country are not registered. Interviews with senior BSAP agents indicate that the Brigade counts around 6000 members²²⁹, the vast majority of whom are ‘volunteers’ given that only 56 individuals are formally appointed by the government (civil servant status) and 82 have a contractual status. Most official BSAP positions were distributed by Jeantel Joseph. The BSAP is mostly composed of men between 20 and 70 years old.

Interviews with BSAP agents and local authorities indicate that volunteers have to join with their firearms and also have to purchase their uniform. Reasons for joining include search for revenues, local prestige and authority, support the community and regularisation of firearms (see below).

Administratively, the BSAP is headed up by a national coordinator who sits in Port-au-Prince and who is a civil servant of the ANAP. However, while some units do respond to this individual, others refuse to recognize his legitimacy²³⁰.

There are currently seven departmental directorates (Central, Ouest, North, North West, North East, South East and South) and another is currently being created in the Nippes. During its interviews with local authorities across the country, the Panel was told that BSAP units continue to multiply across the country, including outside of the departments mentioned above. For instance, most recently a commander requested the local authorities in Petit-Goave to establish a BSAP unit there. Typically, a senior member of an existing BSAP unit would leave the unit to set up a new cell elsewhere.

²²¹ For instance, on 6 February 2024, the Military Association of Haiti released a communique warning of potential armed clashes between BSAP, the HNP, the Army and gangs. Association Militaire d’Haiti. Note. 6 February 2024.

²²² See *le Moniteur*, 23 January 2024.

²²³ Interview with senior Customs officer, February 2024.

²²⁴ [Communiqué de Presse – Communication Haïti](#)

²²⁵ Interview with representative of Mirebalais local authorities, February 2024.

²²⁶ Interview with representative of Gonaïves local authorities, February 2024.

²²⁷ Information provided by UNPOL

²²⁸ Interview with representative of Mirebalais local authorities, February 2024.

²²⁹ Although this number was cited by several senior BSAP agents, the Panel believes that it may be underestimated.

²³⁰ Interviews with BSAP agents, June and July 2024.

A commander the Panel spoke to directly said that he recruits locally, has registered the volunteers and has information on each of them. He, and other BSAP agents, explained that units across the country vary from a few dozen men to over 1000. There are serious rivalries within the BSAP with unit commanders in the same area vying for legitimacy. This will likely be a significant challenge for any effort aiming at managing the Brigade and put it under State control.

Illicit firearms

Analysis of firearms displayed by members of BSAP indicates that they have a range of small arms, including craft weapons, handguns, shotguns and semi-automatic rifles (see image) that they have sourced illicitly. From discussions with BSAP agents and ANAP personnel, firearms are procured from various sources (details below).

In 2017, a limited number of 12 gauge rifles (30-40) were donated to the BSAP headquarter by the Police. In addition, former demobilized members of the Forces Armées d’Haiti (FADH) joined the BSAP and brought their firearms with them. Owning a firearm is often a prerequisite for joining BSAP; some units have also purchased weapons with money they received from local authorities or in exchange services provided to the local population. A BSAP agent also explained that some local business operators join the BSAP with their weapons as they believe the registration process will legalize it. Two BSAP agents told the Panel that a large part of the materiel used by BSAP agents is illicitly imported from the Dominican Republic.



Source: still from video interview with head of BSAP unit of Lascahobas, posted on social media, 2024.

BSAP agents interviewed by the Panel explained that they want recognition and to be officially integrated into the BSAP with a formal status and salary. Discussions with civil society organizations and Haitian security specialists indicate that it is critical that the authorities launch the work of the Restructuring Committee to document agents, vet them and provide them with a formal contract, as well as register firearms and confiscate those that are not required for official forestry work. Some interlocutors suggested that a DDR-type programme could be a solution.

Conclusion

The Panel is of the view that most BSAP units are acting outside the mandate of ANAP and do not protect the environment. They act out of governmental control, are increasing in headcount and actually outnumber gang members in the country. The requirement of registering with a firearm fuels arms trafficking further and potential arms embargo violations.

The Panel is concerned about the likely use of autonomous BSAP units by political actors, particularly during elections, to the detriment of the peace, security and stability of Haiti as well as by criminal networks trafficking arms and drugs. The Panel continues to monitor the involvement of BSAP agents in activities meeting designation criteria, including arms trafficking. Finally, the lack of environmental control exposes natural resources of the country to illicit exploitation and trade, further destabilising Haiti.

Annex 27: Drug seizures by Dominican authorities


On 24 May 2024, four sacks containing 39 packages of cannabis, with approximately 384 pounds, were seized in Elias Piña, coming from Haiti. The sacks were abandoned by four individuals who escaped after noticing the presence of Dominican authorities²³¹.



Source: Confidential report, July 2024

On 16 March 2024, Dominican authorities informed that two individuals were arrested, and 49.5 pounds of cannabis were seized in a vehicle in Puerto Llano, Elias Piña²³².

On 24 January 2024, Dominican authorities seized five packages of cannabis, with an approximate weight of 26.3 pounds, in Pedernales. The individuals involved fled to Haiti²³³.




Source: Confidential report, July 2024

²³¹ Confidential report, July 2024. See also: <https://www.dncd.gob.do/index.php/noticias/noticias/item/2080-cesfront-y-dncd-incautan-384-libras-de-marihuana-en-elias-pina>

²³² Confidential report, July 2024. See also: <https://www.dncd.gob.do/index.php/noticias/noticias/item/2006-arrestan-dos-hombres-y-ocupan-49-libras-de-marihuana-en-elias-pina>

²³³ Confidential report, July 2024. See also: <https://prensaygente.com/cesfront-y-dncd-ocupan-26-libras-de-marihuana-en-pedernales/>

On 27 December 2023, 368.59 pounds of cannabis were seized hidden inside boxes of lemons in a red truck, in Elias Piña²³⁴.



Source: Confidential report, July 2024

²³⁴ Confidential report, July 2024. See also: <https://mide.gob.do/cesfront-y-dncd-incautan-368-libras-de-marihuana-en-elias-pina/>

Annex 28: Comparison of number of Haitian nationals entering Panama and Honduras between June to October 2023

The Panel identified a significant discrepancy between the number of Haitian migrants registered by Panama upon crossing the Darien Gap and the number registered by Honduras entering from Nicaragua. This difference amounts to approximately 47,345 individuals.


The high volume of charter flights transporting Haitian nationals to Nicaragua during the period in question suggests this discrepancy is linked to smuggling activities via those flights that arrived in Managua. It is important to note that these figures only reflect registered migrants in Panama and Honduras. The true number of Haitian nationals transiting Central America is likely much higher.

Country	June	July	August	Sept.	October	Total
Honduras	1,305	1,558	4,051	14,898	35,529	57,341
Panama	1,446	1,226	1,559	2,563	3,202	9,996


Panel's own table based on State's official data

HONDURAS

Irregular migration of Haitians in Honduras per year.



Irregular migration of Haitians in Honduras from June to October 2023.



Statistics from the National Institute of Migration of Honduras. Available at: <https://inm.gob.hn/migracion-irregular.html> Visit 03 July 2024.

PANAMA

Irregular migration of Haitians in Panama. Irregular Transit of Foreigners at the Border with Colombia by Country According to Order of Importance

Cuadro No. 004 TRÁNSITO IRREGULAR DE EXTRANJEROS POR LA FRONTERA CON COLOMBIA POR PAÍS SEGÚN ORDEN DE IMPORTANCIA: AÑO 2023													
País	Total	Ene.	Feb.	Mar.	Abr.	May.	Jun.	Jul.	Ago.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dic.
Total	520,085	24,634	24,657	38,099	40,297	38,962	29,722	55,387	81,946	75,268	49,256	37,231	24,626
Venezuela	328,650	2,337	7,097	20,816	25,395	26,409	18,501	38,033	62,700	58,716	34,594	22,547	11,505
Ecuador	57,250	6,352	5,203	2,772	2,683	3,059	5,052	9,773	8,642	4,744	2,849	2,996	3,125
Haiti	46,422	10,222	6,522	6,896	4,830	3,023	1,446	1,226	1,559	2,563	3,202	2,648	2,285
China	25,565	913	1,285	1,657	1,683	1,497	1,722	1,789	2,433	2,588	2,934	4,090	2,974

Statistics from the National Institute of Migration of Panama. Available at: <https://www.migracion.gob.pa/wp-content/uploads/IRREGULARES-X-DARIEN-2023.pdf>. Visit 03 July 2024.

Annex 29: Posts of travel agencies and social media profiles actively marketing trips to Nicaragua and Mexico

Publicity posts of various travel agencies marketing trips from Haiti or the Dominican Republic to Nicaragua, 2024.



GOAT TRAVEL AGENCY

VOYAGE NICARAGUA
HAITI → PANAMA → NICARAGUA

PACKAGE

- ◆ Visa Panama Inclus
- ◆ Assistance Airport
- ◆ Reservation Hotel
- ◆ Billet Avion Haiti a Nicaragua
- ◆ Carte Covid 19 & Fievre jaune

3500 USD

► PAYEZ EN 2 VERSEMENTS

+509 4641-7501

Delmas 33 rue charboniere # 12
a cote CLUB COIN

Beauduy Travel Agency And More Services
Público

BEAUDUY TRAVEL AGENCY AND MORE SERVICES

Vol Au Cap Haïtien A NICARAGUA.
13 Mai 2024
9 Personnes.

A la bêt sa bêt lèw honnête.
Vol okap Haïtien a NICARAGUA.
13 Mai 2024.... Ver más

Beauduy Travel Agency And More Services - Audio original

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Report

THE BEST TRAVEL AGENCY IN THE WORLD

Service gratuit

- Faire des applications
- Consultation pour application
- Carte de travail.

FULL PACKAGE

BULLET D'AVION
HOTEL
GUIDE
LOCATION DE VOITURE
UN SIM FULL INCHES
DEJUNER

Voyage direct de Haïti à :
-Mexique
-Bresil
-Chili
-Panama

Prix 1800 US

Voyage direct de St. Domingue à :
-Mexique
-Bresil
-Chili
-Panama

Prix 1500 US

A Note : Tois (3) voyage par mois.
Faites le 10, 20, 30 chaque mois.

+1 (754) 255 03 02

754-036 world way, Los Angeles, CA 90045, United States

avocatdeborahlarosilire
Deborah Travel Agency · 2-22

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less

War Worship - Spiritual Warfare Music Epic

28 3 12

<https://www.tiktok.com/@avocatdeborahlarosilire/vid...> Copy link

Comments (3) Creator videos

Ciara Akeelah enterese 4-25 Reply 0

VIP eske nous gen biwo St domeng 2-22 Reply 0

PASSAGE

VOYAGE MEXIQUE PAR NICARAGUA

VOL CHARTER

20 SEPTEMBRE 2023

\$ 2950

Les places sont limitées

344

CE

Angel Travel Agency

6 de septembre de 2023

FULL PACKAGE POUR MEXICO :
VOL HAITI - NICARAGUA
TAXI NICARAGUA - HOTEL NICARAGUA - NOURRITURE -
BUS , HOTEL , MANJE , POU TOUT PEYI WAP PASE YO JISKA TAPATCHULA MEXICO .
FULL ASSISTANCE ,

Ver traducción

ANGEL TRAVEL AGENCY

VOYAGE MEXICO

3500

SPECIAL OFFER


VOL HAITI - NICARAGUA
EPI DE NICARAGUA POU MEXICO ..



Social media post marketing trips to Nicaragua and Mexico 2023. Available: <https://www.instagram.com/p/CvtUIzILslq/> and <https://www.facebook.com/search/posts/?q=travel%20haiti%20full%20package> Visit July 2024







































Annex 30: Flight history for Flymex aircraft XA-VBC, from August to October 2023.

Flymex airline's aircraft XA-VBC flight history between 14 August 2023 and 26 October 2023, showing multiple charter flights departing from Port-au-Prince with destination to Managua.

Flight history for aircraft - XA-VBC									
AIRCRAFT Embraer ERJ-145LR AIRLINE Flymex OPERATOR -		TYPE CODE E145 Code - Code -	MODE S 0D0902 SERIAL NUMBER (MSN) 145098 AGE (Dec 1998) 25 years						
DATE	FROM	TO	FLIGHT	FLIGHT TIME	STD	ATD	STA	STATUS	
26 Oct 2023	Santo Domingo (SDQ)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	2:30	00:30	22:01	23:30	Landed 23:30	KML CSV Play
25 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Santo Domingo (SDQ)	(XAVBC)	3:15	13:45	10:30	15:45	Landed 15:45	KML CSV Play
24 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:19	23:25	21:07	21:25	Landed 21:25	KML CSV Play
24 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:29	18:23	15:54	20:23	Landed 20:23	KML CSV Play
24 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:22	16:46	14:24	14:46	Landed 14:46	KML CSV Play
24 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:07	10:49	08:42	11:49	Landed 11:49	KML CSV Play
23 Oct 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:55	20:23	18:28	21:23	Landed 21:23	KML CSV Play
23 Oct 2023	—	—	(XAVBC)	-	—	—	—	Unknown	KML CSV Play
22 Oct 2023	Cuernavaca (CVJ)	Morelia (MLM)	(XAVBC)	0:35	11:30	10:55	11:30	Landed 11:30	KML CSV Play
21 Oct 2023	Veracruz (VER)	Cuernavaca (CVJ)	(XAVBC)	0:38	10:25	09:42	10:20	Landed 10:20	KML CSV Play
20 Oct 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Veracruz (VER)	(XAVBC)	0:40	09:12	08:32	09:12	Landed 09:12	KML CSV Play
20 Oct 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:26	02:39	01:14	02:39	Landed 02:39	KML CSV Play
20 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:10	00:14	23:04	00:14	Landed 00:14	KML CSV Play
19 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:25	23:35	21:10	21:35	Landed 21:35	KML CSV Play
19 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:17	18:30	16:13	20:30	Landed 20:30	KML CSV Play
19 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:21	16:39	14:18	14:39	Landed 14:39	KML CSV Play
19 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:26	10:46	08:21	12:46	Landed 12:46	KML CSV Play
18 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:23	22:53	20:30	20:53	Landed 20:53	KML CSV Play
18 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:32	17:40	15:08	19:40	Landed 19:40	KML CSV Play
18 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:27	15:24	12:57	13:24	Landed 13:24	KML CSV Play
18 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:07	10:21	08:14	11:21	Landed 11:21	KML CSV Play
17 Oct 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:46	21:53	20:08	22:53	Landed 22:53	KML CSV Play


15 Oct 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:27	20:21	18:54	20:21	Landed 20:21	KML	CSV	Play
15 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:11	18:15	17:04	18:15	Landed 18:15	KML	CSV	Play
15 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:16	18:05	15:49	16:05	Landed 16:05	KML	CSV	Play
15 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:13	12:13	09:59	13:13	Landed 13:13	KML	CSV	Play
13 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:22	21:03	19:41	22:03	Landed 22:03	KML	CSV	Play
13 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:16	20:32	18:16	18:32	Landed 18:32	KML	CSV	Play
13 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:11	16:09	13:58	17:09	Landed 17:09	KML	CSV	Play
13 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:19	00:49	23:31	01:49	Landed 01:49	KML	CSV	Play
13 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:18	00:41	22:23	22:41	Landed 22:41	KML	CSV	Play
12 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:30	19:07	16:37	21:07	Landed 21:07	KML	CSV	Play
10 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	0:16	16:21	16:00	16:16	Landed 16:16	KML	CSV	Play
10 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:17	16:44	14:27	14:44	Landed 14:44	KML	CSV	Play
10 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:11	11:36	09:25	12:36	Landed 12:36	KML	CSV	Play
10 Oct 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:50	06:55	05:05	07:55	Landed 07:55	KML	CSV	Play
07 Oct 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:24	19:38	18:14	19:38	Landed 19:38	KML	CSV	Play
07 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:04	17:24	16:20	17:24	Landed 17:24	KML	CSV	Play
07 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:29	17:17	14:49	15:17	Landed 15:17	KML	CSV	Play
07 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:14	11:37	09:23	12:37	Landed 12:37	KML	CSV	Play
05 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:30	18:45	17:15	19:45	Landed 19:45	KML	CSV	Play
05 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:27	18:14	15:47	16:14	Landed 16:14	KML	CSV	Play
05 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:10	13:05	10:55	14:05	Landed 14:05	KML	CSV	Play
04 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:27	19:06	17:39	20:06	Landed 20:06	KML	CSV	Play
04 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:25	18:13	15:48	16:13	Landed 16:13	KML	CSV	Play
04 Oct 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:08	11:36	09:28	12:36	Landed 12:36	KML	CSV	Play
03 Oct 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:29	18:56	17:26	19:56	Landed 19:56	KML	CSV	Play
03 Oct 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:23	18:18	15:55	16:18	Landed 16:18	KML	CSV	Play
03 Oct 2023	Merida (MID)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:32	12:22	09:50	14:22	Landed 14:22	KML	CSV	Play
03 Oct 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:29	07:42	06:12	07:42	Landed 07:42	KML	CSV	Play
30 Sep 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:28	18:41	17:13	18:41	Landed 18:41	KML	CSV	Play
30 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:07	16:23	15:14	16:21	Landed 16:21	KML	CSV	Play
30 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:19	16:22	14:02	14:22	Landed 14:22	KML	CSV	Play
30 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:16	11:19	09:02	12:19	Landed 12:19	KML	CSV	Play
29 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:25	16:42	15:17	17:42	Landed 17:42	KML	CSV	Play
29 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:15	16:31	14:16	14:31	Landed 14:31	KML	CSV	Play
29 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:20	11:15	08:55	12:15	Landed 12:15	KML	CSV	Play
28 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:26	16:55	15:29	17:55	Landed 17:55	KML	CSV	Play
28 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:18	16:45	14:27	14:45	Landed 14:45	KML	CSV	Play
28 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:09	11:50	09:41	12:50	Landed 12:50	KML	CSV	Play
27 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:25	18:02	16:37	19:02	Landed 19:02	KML	CSV	Play
27 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:20	17:48	15:28	15:48	Landed 15:48	KML	CSV	Play
27 Sep 2023	Merida (MID)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:30	11:28	08:58	13:28	Landed 13:28	KML	CSV	Play
27 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:29	06:55	05:26	06:55	Landed 06:55	KML	CSV	Play
26 Sep 2023	Queretaro (QRO)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	0:20	10:59	10:34	10:54	Landed 10:54	KML	CSV	Play
25 Sep 2023	Ciudad Victoria (CVM)	Queretaro (QRO)	(XAVBC)	0:40	14:02	13:22	14:02	Landed 14:02	KML	CSV	Play

24 Sep 2023	Nuevo Laredo (NLD)	Ciudad Victoria (cvm)	(XAVBC)	0:42	15:25	14:38	14:21	Landed 14:21	KML	CSV	Play
23 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Nuevo Laredo (NLD)	(XAVBC)	1:37	14:26	12:49	15:26	Landed 15:26	KML	CSV	Play
22 Sep 2023	Hermosillo (HMO)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	2:10	13:00	10:50	14:00	Landed 14:00	KML	CSV	Play
21 Sep 2023	Reynosa (REX)	Hermosillo (HMO)	(XAVBC)	1:56	17:28	15:31	15:28	Landed 15:28	KML	CSV	Play
21 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Reynosa (REX)	(XAVBC)	1:10	10:45	09:35	11:45	Landed 11:45	KML	CSV	Play
20 Sep 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:31	20:53	19:22	20:53	Landed 20:53	KML	CSV	Play
20 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:12	16:47	15:34	16:46	Landed 16:46	KML	CSV	Play
20 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:26	16:33	14:07	14:33	Landed 14:33	KML	CSV	Play
20 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:09	11:36	09:28	12:36	Landed 12:36	KML	CSV	Play
19 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:27	17:30	16:03	18:30	Landed 18:30	KML	CSV	Play
19 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:21	16:59	14:37	14:58	Landed 14:58	KML	CSV	Play
19 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:06	12:29	10:23	13:29	Landed 13:29	KML	CSV	Play
18 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:25	19:37	18:12	20:37	Landed 20:37	KML	CSV	Play
18 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:24	19:07	16:43	17:07	Landed 17:07	KML	CSV	Play
18 Sep 2023	Merida (MID)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:31	13:55	11:24	15:55	Landed 15:55	KML	CSV	Play
18 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:30	09:46	08:16	09:46	Landed 09:46	KML	CSV	Play
17 Sep 2023	Reynosa (REX)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:09	11:36	10:27	10:36	Landed 10:36	KML	CSV	Play
17 Sep 2023	Merida (MID)	Reynosa (REX)	(XAVBC)	1:35	08:13	06:37	09:13	Landed 09:13	KML	CSV	Play
16 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:33	13:35	12:01	13:35	Landed 13:35	KML	CSV	Play
16 Sep 2023	Zacatecas (ZCL)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	0:50	09:27	08:36	09:27	Landed 09:27	KML	CSV	Play
15 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Zacatecas (ZCL)	(XAVBC)	0:56	23:34	22:38	23:34	Landed 23:34	KML	CSV	Play
15 Sep 2023	Saltillo (SLW)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:06	02:57	01:51	02:57	Landed 02:57	KML	CSV	Play
15 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Saltillo (SLW)	(XAVBC)	1:18	00:29	23:11	00:29	Landed 00:29	KML	CSV	Play
13 Sep 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:27	18:58	17:31	18:58	Landed 18:58	KML	CSV	Play
13 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:08	16:47	15:37	16:45	Landed 16:45	KML	CSV	Play
13 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:24	16:51	14:27	14:50	Landed 14:50	KML	CSV	Play
13 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:15	12:00	09:44	13:00	Landed 13:00	KML	CSV	Play
12 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:24	13:24	12:00	14:24	Landed 14:24	KML	CSV	Play
12 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:22	13:10	10:48	11:10	Landed 11:10	KML	CSV	Play
12 Sep 2023	Cancun (CUN)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:05	06:42	04:36	07:42	Landed 07:42	KML	CSV	Play
11 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Cancun (CUN)	(XAVBC)	0:17	21:16	20:54	21:11	Landed 21:11	KML	CSV	Play
11 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:22	19:18	17:56	20:18	Landed 20:18	KML	CSV	Play
11 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:21	19:12	16:51	17:12	Landed 17:12	KML	CSV	Play
11 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:04	13:34	11:30	14:34	Landed 14:34	KML	CSV	Play
09 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:26	18:28	17:02	19:28	Landed 19:28	KML	CSV	Play
09 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:23	18:07	15:44	16:07	Landed 16:07	KML	CSV	Play
09 Sep 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:07	13:11	10:59	14:06	Landed 14:06	KML	CSV	Play
06 Sep 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:22	18:33	17:11	19:33	Landed 19:33	KML	CSV	Play
06 Sep 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:23	18:05	15:42	16:05	Landed 16:05	KML	CSV	Play
06 Sep 2023	Merida (MID)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:31	12:42	10:10	14:42	Landed 14:42	KML	CSV	Play
06 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:31	07:58	06:26	07:58	Landed 07:58	KML	CSV	Play
05 Sep 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	0:36	18:52	18:16	18:52	Landed 18:52	KML	CSV	Play
31 Aug 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:27	23:11	21:44	23:11	Landed 23:11	KML	CSV	Play
31 Aug 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:11	21:02	19:48	21:00	Landed 21:00	KML	CSV	Play

31 Aug 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:18	20:00	17:42	18:00	Landed 18:00			
31 Aug 2023	Cozumel (CZM)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:13	14:41	12:28	15:41	Landed 15:41			
30 Aug 2023	Managua (MGA)	Cozumel (CZM)	(XAVBC)	1:22	19:56	18:34	20:56	Landed 20:56			
30 Aug 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:19	18:53	16:33	16:53	Landed 16:53			
30 Aug 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	3:01	13:27	10:26	15:27	Landed 15:27			
29 Aug 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:08	18:45	17:35	18:43	Landed 18:43			
29 Aug 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:29	18:40	16:11	16:40	Landed 16:40			
29 Aug 2023	Merida (MID)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:34	12:56	10:22	14:56	Landed 14:56			
29 Aug 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:27	08:32	07:05	08:32	Landed 08:32			
26 Aug 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:26	19:35	18:09	19:35	Landed 19:35			
26 Aug 2023	Managua (MGA)	Tapachula (TAP)	(XAVBC)	1:06	17:13	16:07	17:13	Landed 17:13			
26 Aug 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:30	17:14	14:44	15:14	Landed 15:14			
26 Aug 2023	Merida (MID)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	2:41	11:21	08:40	13:21	Landed 13:21			
26 Aug 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:29	06:48	05:19	06:48	Landed 06:48			
23 Aug 2023	San Luis Potosi (SLP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	0:40	00:08	23:28	00:08	Landed 00:08			
22 Aug 2023	Merida (MID)	San Luis Potosi (SLP)	(XAVBC)	1:42	22:55	21:14	22:55	Landed 22:55			
22 Aug 2023	Toluca (TLC)	Merida (MID)	(XAVBC)	1:35	19:02	17:27	19:02	Landed 19:02			
19 Aug 2023	Tapachula (TAP)	Toluca (TLC)	(XAVBC)	1:29	14:26	12:57	14:26	Landed 14:26			
19 Aug 2023	Managua (MGA)	—	(XAVBC)	-	11:01	11:00	—	Unknown			
19 Aug 2023	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	Managua (MGA)	(XAVBC)	2:27	12:20	09:53	10:20	Landed 10:20			
18 Aug 2023	Santo Domingo (SDQ)	Port-au-Prince (PAP)	(XAVBC)	0:35	21:53	21:18	21:53	Landed 21:53			
14 Aug 2023	Santo Domingo (SDQ)	Santo Domingo (SDQ)	(XAVBC)	1:42	17:18	15:36	17:18	Landed 17:18			

FlightRadar24, Flight history for aircraft XA-VBC (as of 22 May 2024). Available at <https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/xa-vbc#> visit 22 May 2024.

Annex 31: Map showing main air and land migrant smuggling routes from Haiti to North America



Panel's map own elaboration based on "Clear Map" from United Nations Geospatial services <https://www.un.org/geospatial/mapsgeo/webservices> (Visited July 2024)

The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

For a more detail view of the different migrant routes in Mexico see [S/2023/674](#).

Annex 32: Other violations of human rights

In line with resolution 2653 (2022), the Panel has undertaken a comprehensive investigation approach into human rights violations in Haiti. While gangs are the primary perpetrators, the Panel recognizes the complicity of some public officials, politicians, and economic figures in either supporting these groups or weakening state institutions that could combat them. The Panel is committed to investigating all parties involved.

Haiti faces a critical situation. Gang violence is escalating not only in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area but also in the wider western and Artibonite departments, where their growing power is a major concern. Beyond the specific violations documented in this report – including sexual and gender-based violence, child recruitment, use of human shields, wanton destruction of public and private property and smuggling of migrants – the Panel is particularly concerned about the following additional areas:

Violations to the right to health

Haiti's population health care has been hampered by gang violence. Healthcare facilities are struggling due to supply and staff shortages. Around 40% of hospital beds are unusable due to gang-looting, and the security situation has led almost half of Haiti's medical professionals to migrate.²³⁵ Haitians are unable to access medical care since 21% of healthcare facilities, and nearly half of Port-au-Prince hospitals are in gang-controlled zones.²³⁶ As of July 2024, more than 30 medical centers in Haiti are closed due to gang vandalism, including Haiti's largest hospital.²³⁷

On 29 February 2024, Haiti's State University Hospital was ransacked. It remains non-operational despite being recovered from the gangs by the police on 9 July 2024.²³⁸ (See section II.A.1).

In March 2024, the *Viv Ansanm* alliance destroyed Jude-Anne Hospital (see Annex 32.1) and ransacked the Hospital and Saint Martin Health Center in the Delmas 18 commune.²³⁹

Despite an increase in IDP numbers, health sector interventions remain limited to 23 IDP sites due to lack of resources and staffing.²⁴⁰

From 1 January to 30 June 2024, WHO reported 2,672 cases and 13 deaths of cholera in Haiti.²⁴¹

Violations to the right to education

Gang violence has seriously disrupted and endangered the educational system in Haiti. As of 5 July 2024, 919 schools were closed (515 permanently closed) and more than a dozen schools have been destroyed, affecting nearly 156,000 students mainly in the West and Artibonite departments.²⁴² Moreover, many school teachers and university professors are unable to go to work or have left the country due to violence and economic hardship.²⁴³

Gang violence has caused a significant educational crisis in Haiti. Between 2019 and 2023, children have lost on average, an entire year of schooling. The economic fallout from the violence has also forced many parents into unemployment, further limiting children's access to education across all grade levels.²⁴⁴

Between February and May 2024, members of the *Viv Ansanm* alliance vandalized and set fire to the premises of the Faculty of Science, Faculty of Linguistics, Faculty of Agronomy and Veterinary Medicine, Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy, and the *École Normale Supérieure* at the State University of Haiti, the National School of Arts, the Mixed School Les Frères Nau, National Library in Port-au-Prince, among many other educational sites.²⁴⁵

²³⁵ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haitian-capitals-crippled-health-system-brink>

²³⁶ See <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/haiti-who-health-emergency-appeal-2024>

²³⁷ See United Nations Data, <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-situation-report-4-05-june-2024> and <https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/UNFPA%20Haiti%20Sitrep%20%235.pdf>.

²³⁸ <https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/haitian-police-say-they-have-taken-largest-hospital-back-from-gang-control-1.6957194>

²³⁹ See <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-emergency-situation-report-no-14-2-april-2024>

²⁴⁰ See <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/haiti-who-health-emergency-appeal-2024>

²⁴¹ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/multi-country-outbreak-cholera-external-situation-report-16-published-18-july-2024>

²⁴² See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-emergency-situation-report-no-28-5-july-2024>.

²⁴³ Interviews with NGO's members May 2024.

²⁴⁴ Interviews with humanitarian actors. July 2024.

²⁴⁵ See section on Wanton destruction and ransacking of public and private property.

Around 39 schools are occupied by over 60,000 IDPs, restricting children's attendance to classes.²⁴⁶ Schools' premises and playgrounds are used as temporary shelters as witnessed by the Panel during its visit to the Lycée Jean Marie Vincent, Port-au-Prince. (S/2024/253).

Schools have also been taken by gangs such as Terre Noire, Grand Ravine, Warf Jérémie, Kraze Barye, Charbon and Canaan.²⁴⁷

Obstructions of humanitarian access and assistance

Since late February 2024, escalating gang violence has severely hampered humanitarian efforts in Haiti. *Viv Ansanm* gang members attacked critical infrastructure, robbed containers carrying first aid supplies, and looted hospitals and pharmacies, among other humanitarian aid sites, particularly in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Blockaded roadways and the closure of the main airport and seaport have severely restricted the movement of vital supplies and humanitarian personnel. These disruptions have worsened existing shortages and hindered the delivery of crucial humanitarian aid, thereby risking the Haitian population's well-being. (Annex 32.2)

On 15 June 2024, Ezekiel, a recent escapee from the National prison, leader of the Baze Pilate gang, went to a school in his territory in Carrefour Feuilles and broke in the middle of a WFP food distribution. He threatened everyone and stole around 150 sacks of rice.²⁴⁸

Nonetheless, despite the security crisis, as of June 2024, the WFP has provided critical food assistance to hundreds of thousands of Haitians through its emergency and school meals programs. For example, as of May 2024, over USD 2.7 million in cash-based transfers (CBT) and 1,837 metric tons of food benefited about 735,639 people.²⁴⁹ As of June 2024, more than a million hot meals have been provided to IDPs in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.²⁵⁰ Despite these positive developments, food insecurity remains dire (see Section II.C).

Deficiencies of the justice and prison systems

Gang violence has crippled Haiti's justice system. Many courthouses remain destroyed, non-operational, or located in inaccessible areas, effectively barring judicial personnel and lawyers from accessing them.²⁵¹ Interviews with lawyers reveal the additional loss of crucial case files, legal documents, and identification cards due to these attacks.²⁵² This breakdown affects all legal areas – criminal, civil, and administrative – rendering the administration of justice in Haiti nearly impossible.²⁵³ Furthermore, Haiti's judicial system has been paralyzed by ongoing strikes since last October over labor disputes concerning pay and working conditions.²⁵⁴

Moreover, during April and May 2024 two lawyers, and then a judge and a lawyer were killed by the Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras gangs, respectively, in two separate incidents. A judge investigating drug trafficking reported that he had recently received death threats.²⁵⁵ These attacks on the judiciary aim to create a climate of fear and intimidation and constitute serious threats to the exercise of judicial independence and legal representation. Between January and July 2024, 23 police officers were killed due to gang violence.²⁵⁶

The early March attacks on Haiti's two largest prisons, the national penitentiary of Port-au-Prince and the Croix-des-

²⁴⁶ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-haiti-round-7-june-2024>.

²⁴⁷ Interviews with UN humanitarian officer, May and June 2024 and a NGO member 2024. See also, <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/united-nations-integrated-office-haiti-report-secretary-general-s2024508-enarruzh>

²⁴⁸ Interviews with human rights defenders and NGO's members, July 2024.

²⁴⁹ <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/wfp-haiti-country-brief-may-2024>.

²⁵⁰ <https://x.com/wfp/status/1808406627801833791?s=43&t=3kFgrKDPT9SeorQ5dwAnew>

²⁵¹ The Port-au-Prince, Croix-des-Bouquets, Gonaïves, Trou du Nord, and Petit-Goâve courthouses, to mention a few, have been rendered non-operational by gangs.²⁵¹

²⁵² Interviews with Haitian lawyers, May and June 2024.

²⁵³ See also <https://ayibopost.com/the-legal-profession-is-dying-in-port-au-prince/>

²⁵⁴ See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti.pdf

²⁵⁵ See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti.pdf

²⁵⁶ UN data

Bouquets prison, during which about 4,624 detainees escaped, have significantly weakened the already dysfunctional correctional system. Only 16 prisons remain operational, and overcrowding is severe with a population exceeding capacity by nearly 300%²⁵⁷. Pre-trial detainees make up the vast majority of inmates, raising concerns about fairness and due process.

Despite efforts from the Haitian Government and UN agencies, Haiti's penitentiary system continues to be in crisis. Prisons across the country suffer from severe overcrowding²⁵⁸, shortages of essential resources such as food, medical supplies, and cooking gas, and significant issues with sewage and garbage disposal. Gang attacks on prisons are also a constant threat. Initiatives to reduce overcrowding through special hearings have only free 63 individuals so far this year.²⁵⁹

Particularly worrisome is the *Centre d'éducation et de réinsertion des mineurs en conflit avec la loi* (CERMICOL), original aim at minors, now houses men, women, girls and boys, and it is more than 400% overcrowded²⁶⁰. It is also now the only operational prison in Port-au-Prince.²⁶¹

Forced displacement of population

Gang violence have resulted in a dramatic surge of people being displaced either internally or internationally. Gangs have also used the forced displacement of the population as a tactic to fight against other gangs or to loot property. In a recent interview, Ti Lapli, the leader of the Grand Ravine gang, acknowledged using forced displacement of the population as a fighting tactic (see Annex 32.3)

As of June 2024, there are 578,074 IDPs in Haiti, marking a nearly 60% increase from March 2024 (362,551).²⁶² More than 50% are women and girls.

According to UNICEF, one child is displaced every minute in Haiti as armed violence persists.²⁶³ As of 2 July 2024, the number of internally displaced children in the country exceeded 300,000, representing a 60% increase since March.²⁶⁴

Gang violence in Port-au-Prince led to an exodus of about 95,000 people fleeing the capital between 8 March and 9 April 2024. As of June 2024, nearly 50% of all IDPs in Haiti are in the Great South.²⁶⁵ Among the most serious attacks that led to a high number of IDPs are the following: on 29 February 2024, the *Viv Ansanm* alliance attacked several parts of Port-au-Prince metropolitan area which resulted in the displacement of 14,740 individuals (see Annex 32.4). On 18 February 2024, *Viv Ansanm* attacked the areas of Mirebalais and Saut-d'Eau, Centre department, resulting in 1,590 IDPs (see Annex 32.5). Between 25 April and 5 May 2024, attacks perpetrated by the *Viv Ansanm* alliance in Delmas 24 and Solino resulted in about 5,000 IDPs.²⁶⁶

On 11 May 2024, *Viv Ansanm* caused clashes in the Gressier commune, West department, resulting in 4,463 people displaced to other locations in the West and South departments (see Annex 32.6).

Living conditions at IDP sites continue to be appalling and in need of basic services, as it has been already reported by the Panel (S/2023/674 and S/2024/253).

Finally, many of the Haitian nationals who have been forcibly returned to Haiti, have also become IDPs. In 2023, more than a quarter of a million Haitians were forcibly returned to Haiti, 96% of them from the Dominican Republic.²⁶⁷

²⁵⁷ UN data

²⁵⁸ Overcrowding is rampant, with an average of 0.33 square meters of space per inmate. The most overcrowded prisons include Mirebalais, Les Cayes, Saint-Marc, Anse-à-Veau, Jacmel, Jérémie, Fort Liberté I, Port-de-Paix, Cap-Haïtien, and CERMICOL, with occupancy rates ranging from 347% to 980%. UNPOL Data. July 2024.

²⁵⁹ UNPOL Data. July 2024.

²⁶⁰ United Nations Police data.

²⁶¹ UNPOL Data. July 2024.

²⁶² <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-haiti-round-7-june-2024?close=true> visited June 2024.

²⁶³ See <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/one-child-displaced-every-minute-haiti-armed-violence-persists-unicef>

²⁶⁴ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/one-child-displaced-every-minute-haiti-armed-violence-persists-unicef>

²⁶⁵ Idem.

²⁶⁶ See <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-412-updates-displacement-following-attacks-delmas-25-april-07>

²⁶⁷ See <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-haitians-forcibly-returned-haiti-profiles-migration-experience-and-intentions?close=true>

Violations by the police

From 1 January to 31 March 2024, 590 civilians unrelated to gangs were killed or injured during police operations against gangs.²⁶⁸ There have been also reports of extrajudicial executions by police officers in the areas of Cité Soleil, Drouillard and Vincent in the commune of Port-au-Prince.²⁶⁹

As of 30 June 2024, the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police (IGPNH) opened 23 investigations of alleged human rights violations committed by the police, so far none of those cases have been concluded. Since 3 March 2024, IGPNH has faced several challenges since their offices have remained closed due to continued gang violence in the area, which has seriously halted its performance.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ See Panel's third confidential periodic report.

²⁶⁹ See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti.pdf

²⁷⁰ UNPOL Data. July 2024.

Annex 32.1: Destruction of Jude-Anne Hospital, Port-au-Prince, by Delmas 6 gang members led by Jimmy Chérizier, alias “Barbeque” 18 March 2024.




Pictures from social media

Annex 32.2: Humanitarian access, January – June 2024.

The security situation in Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite department dramatically worsened between February and April 2024, severely hampering humanitarian aid delivery to Haitians in need. Humanitarian workers faced numerous challenges, including armed clashes, movement restrictions, direct interference in their work, and even violence.

Between April 2023 and June 2024, over 1,700 incidents targeting humanitarian personnel and operations were recorded.

The following map and figure show the constraints to access humanitarian aid:



Source: OCHA, Haiti - Aperçu de la sévérité de l'accès humanitaire, janvier à juin 2024 (visited 26 juillet 2024).

<https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-aperçu-de-la-severite-de-laccès-humanitaire-janvier-juin-2024-26-juillet-2024>

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 32.3: Ti Lapli's confessions concerning recruitment of children and forced displacement of the population.

Recruitment of children:



Ti Lapli claims that due to a lack of jobs, children seek him out for assistance, which leads them to fight for him.

Forced displacement of the population






Ti Lapli admits using forced displacement as a tactic during clashes with other gangs. This tactic involves driving people out from their homes and burning houses.

Stills taken from a video: "Reportage exclusif en Haïti : à Port-au Prince, capitale assiégée par les gangs" FRANCE 24. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a5GNZRS9SaM> Visited July 2024.

Annex 32.4: IDPs from Port-au-Prince, 29 February 2024

IDPs following armed clashes between gangs in Port-au-Prince on 29 February 2024.




"IOM. Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 39.1 — Updates on displacement following attacks in the municipality of Port-au-Prince (29 February — 02 March 2024)." Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-391-updates-displacement-following-attacks-municipality-port>. Visited 20 July 2024

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 32.5: IDPs from Mirebalais, Saut-d'Eau and Thomazeau, 18 February 2024

IDP following armed clashes between gangs in Mirebalais, Saut-d'Eau and Thomazeau (18 February 2024)




"IOM. Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 38 — Displacement following attacks in Mirebalais, Thomazeau and Saut-d'Eau (19 — 20 February 2024)." Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-38-displacement-following-attacks-mirebalais-thomazeau-and-saut-d'eau> Visited 20 July 2024

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 32.6: IDPs from Gressier commune, 11 May 2024.

IDPs following armed clashes between gangs in Gressier on 11 May 2024.



“IOM. Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 42 — Displacement following attacks in the municipality of Gressier (11-12 May 2024).” Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-42-displacement-following-attacks-municipality-gressier-11-12?close=true>. Visited 20 July 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 33: Mass kidnappings by Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif gangs (October 2023 - June 2024)

This table summarizes the recorded mass kidnappings incidents carried out by the Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif gangs between October 2023 and June 2024. For the Panel's report purposes "mass kidnappings" are those where 10 or more persons are kidnapped in a single incident.

According to Panel's own account about 500 people were mass kidnapped during the above-mentioned period by those two gangs.

When data was available the number of passengers is disaggregated by sex and age.

Kokorat San Ras gang

Date	Event	# Kidnapped persons	Ransom requested	Location in Artibonite department
27 October 2023	Kidnapping from a pickup truck	13 pax: 9 women, 3 men, 1 adolescent	No ransom; all belongings were taken	Ti Bwadòm, Gros Morne
11 November 2023	Kidnapping from a bus	17 pax	500,000 HTG (\$3788 USD approx.) per hostage	Ti Bwadòm, Gros Morne
17 November 2024	Kidnapping from a merchandise truck	13 pax: 9 adults, 3 adolescents, 1 elderly man	750,000 HTG (\$5682.30 USD approx.) in total	La Croix Périsse
20 November 2023	Kidnapping from a bus	15 pax: 10 men, 5 women	500,000 HTG (\$3788 USD approx.) per hostage	Ti Bwadòm, Gros Morne
20 November 2023	Kidnapping from a pickup truck	10 pax: 6 women, 4 men	N/A	La Croix Périsse
4 December 2023	Kidnapping from a minibus	10 pax: 4 women, 6 men	N/A	La Croix Périsse
5 January 2024	Kidnapping from two pickup trucks	20 pax: 7 women, 13 men	N/A	La Croix Périsse
9 January 2024	Kidnapping from a minibus	10 pax: 6 men, 4 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
20 January 2024	Kidnapping from a pickup truck	10 pax: 6 men, 4 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
17 February 2024	Kidnapping from two trucks	12 pax: 8 women, 4 men	500,000 HTG (\$3788 USD approx.) per truck	Ti Bwadòm, Gros Morne

18 February 2024	Kidnapping from a bus	20 pax: 13 men, 7 women	500,000 HTG (\$3788 USD approx.) per hostage	Ti Bwadòm, Gros Morne
7 April 2024	Kidnapping from a pickup truck	10 pax: 3 men, 7 women	1,000,000 HTG (\$7576 USD approx.) per hostage	La Croix Périsse
24 April 2024	Kidnapping of two pickup trucks	20 pax: 8 men, 12 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
28 May 2024	Kidnapping from two pickup trucks	19 pax: 8 men, 11 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
15 June 2024	Kidnapping from two pickup trucks	15 pax: 8 men, 7 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
16 June 2024	Kidnapping from two pickup trucks	16 pax: 11 men, 5 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
17 June 2024	Kidnapping from a pickup truck	10 pax: 7 men, 3 women	N/A	La Croix Périsse
27 June 2024	Kidnapping from a minibus	12 pax: 7 men, 5 women	1,250,000 HTG (\$9470 USD approx.) per hostage	Ti Bwadòm, Gros Morne

Gran Grif gang

Date	Event	# Kidnapped persons	Ransom	Location in the Artibonite department
01 December 2023	Kidnapping from a bus	18 pax: 4 women, 2 girls (16 years), 12 men	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
12 December 2023	Kidnapping from bus	10 pax: 7 men, 3 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
09 January 2024	Kidnapping from a bus	25 pax: 15 men, 10 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
12 January 2024	Kidnapping from a public transport vehicle	14 pax: 8 men, 6 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
26 April 2024	Kidnapping from a pickup truck	10 pax: 6 men, 4 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
01 May 2024	Kidnapping from two minibuses	15 pax: 5 men, 10 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
04 June 2024	Kidnapping from a bus	32 pax: 22 men, 10 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
23 June 2024	Kidnapping	15 pax: 9 men, 6 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite
04 July 2024	Kidnapping and shooting incident	18 pax: 10 men, 8 women	N/A	Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite

Panel's own table based on UN data.


Annex 34: Migration, Deportees/Returnees, Refugees and IDPs

There is no Haitian official data on the exact number of Haitian nationals that have been forcibly displaced internally or that have fled the country due to the violence and economic situation in Haiti. However, according to the Panel's own assessment, during the reporting period, about half a million persons have left their homes, nearly 300,000 as IDPs and about 200,000 as migrants/refugees.

The following information, collected from different organizations and States' data, provides a glimpse of the impact of such violence.


IOM

As of June 2024, a total of 578,074 Haitian nationals were internally displaced.²⁷¹ More than half of them are women and minors.










According to the IOM from January to July 2024, 89,721 Haitians were deported to Haiti, out of which 96.04% came from the Dominican Republic.

²⁷¹ <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/haiti>



IOM. Displacement Tracking Matrix. Haiti 2024. Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/node/23491>
In 2023, a total of 216,677 Haitians were forcibly returned to Haiti, out of which 96% came from the Dominican Republic.



Figure 1. Haitians forcibly returned to Haiti in 2023 by sending country and number of interviewed among them

		Number of returnees ¹	Number of returnees interviewed
	Dominican Republic	208,169 (96%)	7,409 (83%)
	Turks and Caicos	3,338 (2%)	897 (10%)
	Bahamas	2,021 (1%)	219 (2%)
	United States of America	1,862 (1%)	220 (2%)
	Cuba	751 (<1%)	58 (1%)
	Turkey	463 (<1%)	72 (1%)
	Jamaica	73 (<1%)	24 (<1%)
TOTAL		216,677 (100%)	8,899 (100%)

IOM. Haitians forcibly returned to Haiti — Profiles, migration experience and intentions of Haitians returned in 2023. Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-haitians-forcibly-returned-haiti-profiles-migration-experience-and-intentions?close=true>.

UNCHR


Haitian refugees and asylum seekers from 2018 to 2023.



UNHCR Refugee Data Finder, 16 July 2024. Data as of December 2023. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=3UEuLJ>.

US Customs and Border Protection ²⁷²

U.S. Customs and Border Protection data show a total of 163,781 Haitians encountered in 2023, while a total of 126,175 Haitians were encountered from January through June 2024.



“U.S Custom and Border Protection, Nationwide Encounters, Haiti.” Available at:
<https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters>.

²⁷² Encounter data includes U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Title 8 Apprehensions, Office of Field Operations (OFO) Title 8 Inadmissibles, and Title 42 Expulsions for fiscal years (FY) 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023. Demographics for USBP and OFO include:

- Accompanied Minors (AM)
- Individuals in a Family Unit (FMUA)
- Single Adults
- Unaccompanied Children (UC) / Single Minors

US Customs and Border Protection. <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters>, visited July 2024.

GARR

According to the *Groupe d'Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés* (GARR), an Haitian NGO, there were a total of 92,148 repatriations and a total of 24,351 refoulements to Haiti during the months of April, May and June 2024. Below is the counting for the months of May and June 2024 as examples.

Information for the months of January, February, and March was not available.

Repatriations and Refoulements June and May 2024

RAPATRIEMENTS JUIN 2024


POINTS OFFICIELS

	H	F	Fille	G	Total
Anse-à-Pitres	709	371	4	12	1096
Belladère	6862	1129	84	151	8226
Malpassé	176	24	6	7	213
Ouanaminthe	3654	1605	406	391	6056
Total	11401	3129	500	561	15591

TOTAL
23431

POINTS NON OFFICIELS

	H	F	Fille	G	Total
Anse-à-Pitres (Tête-à-l'eau, Fond Jeannette, Bois d'Orme)	973	613	56	99	1741
Baptiste (Lianne Trompette, Source Rouge)	8	2	1	1	12
Belladère (Emile, Loba, Rocher, Derrière Morne)	862	301	27	111	1301
Cornillon (Drive, Ka Mak, Savanne Bombe)	1419	595	53	94	2161
Fonds-Verettes (Palmitanpe, Twama)	158	39	6	13	216
Las Cahobas (Batelle, Pilon, Locaret)	704	819	281	523	2327
Savanette (Miguel, Grand Jardin, Guayaa)	20	6	0	1	27
Thomasique (Boc Banic, Los Cacaos)	37	17	1	0	55
Total	4181	2392	425	842	7840



REFOULEMENTS JUIN 2024


POINTS OFFICIELS

	H	F	Fille	G	Total
Anse-à-Pitres	138	115	18	28	299
Belladère	1813	325	51	131	2320
Malpassé	10	0	0	0	10
Ouanaminthe	1018	332	87	97	1474
Total	2979	772	156	216	4103

TOTAL
9416

POINTS NON OFFICIELS

	H	F	Fille	G	Total
Anse-à-Pitres (Tête-à-l'eau, Fond Jeannette, Bois d'Orme)	316	190	37	70	613
Baptiste (Lianne Trompette, Source Rouge)	206	50	6	6	268
Belladère (Emile, Loba, Rocher, Derrière Morne)	172	73	28	32	305
Cornillon (Drive, Ka Mak, Savanne Bombe)	550	381	113	217	1261
Fonds-Verettes (Palmitanpe, Twama)	632	507	124	166	1429
Las Cahobas (Batelle, Pilon, Locaret)	462	484	180	301	1427
Thomasique (Boc Banic, Los Cacaos)	4	3	1	2	10
Total	2342	1688	489	794	5313



RAPATRIEMENTS MAI 2024


POINTS OFFICIELS

	H	F	Fille	G	Total
Anse-à-Pitres	621	306	3	1	931
Belladère	11229	1722	91	198	13240
Malpassé	226	55	0	1	282
Ouanaminthe	3249	1324	428	312	5323
Total	15325	3407	522	522	19776

TOTAL
27679

POINTS NON OFFICIELS

	H	F	Fille	G	Total
Anse-à-Pitres (Tête-à-l'eau, Fond Jeannette, Bois d'Orme)	1277	932	55	104	2368
Baptiste (Lianne Trompette, Source Rouge)	49	29	15	16	109
Belladère (Emile, Loba, Rocher, Derrière Morne)	836	324	42	87	1289
Cornillon (Drive, Ka Mak, Savanne Bombe)	588	234	20	33	875
Fonds-Verettes (Palmitanpe, Twama)	150	62	16	14	242
Las Cahobas (Batelle, Pilon, Locaret)	924	842	336	544	2746
Ouanaminthe (TI Machine, Corosse, Capotille, Grand Fon, Pongot, Manquette)	50	56	24	10	140
Savanette (Miguel, Grand Jardin, Guayaa)	62	12	0	0	74
Thomasique (Boc Banic, Los Cacaos)	29	17	5	9	60
Total	3965	2608	513	817	7903



REFOULEMENTS MAI 2024


POINTS OFFICIELS

	H	F	Fille	G	Total
Anse-à-Pitres	92	66	12	13	183
Belladère	1324	265	47	99	1735
Ouanaminthe	471	162	25	22	710
Total	1887	523	84	134	2628

TOTAL
6841

POINTS NON OFFICIELS

	H	F	Fille	G	Total
Anse-à-Pitres (Tête-à-l'eau, Fond Jeannette, Bois d'Orme)	264	169	29	70	532
Baptiste (Lianne Trompette, Source Rouge)	91	16	4	2	113
Belladère (Emile, Loba, Rocher, Derrière Morne)	107	30	5	15	157
Cornillon (Drive, Ka Mak, Savanne Bombe)	276	133	26	45	480
Fonds-Verettes (Palmitanpe, Twama)	621	456	141	169	1387
Las Cahobas (Batelle, Pilon, Locaret)	496	533	204	295	1528
Savanette (Miguel, Grand Jardin, Guayaa)	4	2	0	0	6
Thomasique (Boc Banic, Los Cacaos)	6	3	0	1	10
Total	1865	1342	409	597	4213



“Groupe d'Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés, Rapport Mensuel: Rapatriements, Retours spontanés, Refoulements.” Available at: x.com/GARRHaiti

PANAMA

In 2023, more than half a million migrants (520,085) crossed the Darien Gap, out of which 46,422 were Haitian nationals.²⁷³ From January to June 2024, 10,173 Haitian nationals were recorded to cross the Darien Gap.²⁷⁴

Cuadro No. 001 TRÁNSITO IRREGULAR DE EXTRANJEROS POR LA FRONTERA CON COLOMBIA POR REGIÓN SEGÚN ORDEN DE IMPORTANCIA: AÑO 2023													
Región	Total	Ene.	Feb.	Mar.	Abr.	May.	Jun.	Jul.	Ago.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dic.
Total	520,085	24,634	24,657	38,099	40,297	38,962	29,722	55,387	81,946	75,268	49,256	37,231	24,626
América del Sur	419,197	11,014	14,399	26,623	31,030	32,157	24,976	50,425	75,471	67,358	40,841	28,218	16,685
Antillas	48,246	10,468	6,645	7,005	4,964	3,128	1,539	1,372	1,777	2,766	3,350	2,790	2,442
Asia	42,386	2,134	2,803	3,637	3,357	2,927	2,549	2,830	3,795	4,170	4,349	5,247	4,588
África	10,109	1,010	806	815	925	741	637	756	876	965	708	970	900
Europa	69	3	2	17	16	5	11	3	4	1	3	1	3
América Central	29	1	1	1	1	3	8	-	2	4	5	2	1
Eurasia	25	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	2	-	-	-
América del Norte	23	1	1	1	4	1	2	-	1	2	-	3	7
Oceanía	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-

Cifras preliminares al 31 de diciembre del 2023 sujetas a revisión y actualización.



Cuadro No. 004 TRÁNSITO IRREGULAR DE EXTRANJEROS POR LA FRONTERA CON COLOMBIA POR PAÍS SEGÚN ORDEN DE IMPORTANCIA: AÑO 2023													
País	Total	Ene.	Feb.	Mar.	Abr.	May.	Jun.	Jul.	Ago.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dic.
Total	520,085	24,634	24,657	38,099	40,297	38,962	29,722	55,387	81,946	75,268	49,256	37,231	24,626
Venezuela	328,650	2,337	7,097	20,816	25,395	26,409	18,501	38,033	62,700	58,716	34,594	22,547	11,505
Ecuador	57,250	6,352	5,203	2,772	2,683	3,059	5,052	9,773	8,642	4,744	2,849	2,996	3,125
Haití	46,422	10,222	6,522	6,896	4,830	3,023	1,446	1,226	1,559	2,563	3,202	2,648	2,285
China	25,565	913	1,285	1,657	1,683	1,497	1,722	1,789	2,433	2,588	2,934	4,090	2,974
Colombia	18,841	333	637	1,260	1,634	1,645	894	1,884	2,989	2,570	2,051	1,716	1,228
Chile (1)	5,877	1,076	641	782	561	356	172	167	307	450	578	420	367
Algerián	4,267	291	276	359	386	192	217	321	467	609	400	365	384
Perú	4,093	39	100	261	277	394	209	376	653	667	535	327	255
Brasil (1)	3,838	765	650	657	441	254	125	155	126	163	178	164	160
India	3,736	562	872	1,109	446	161	65	96	27	43	36	113	206
Nepal	2,252	76	56	117	336	533	172	148	221	231	145	118	99
Vietnam	2,102	19	-	31	34	97	28	132	298	260	397	273	533
Bangladesh	1,931	127	132	87	77	148	185	243	159	260	200	125	188
Camerún	1,636	190	168	174	107	158	139	98	104	136	108	180	74
Angola	1,157	171	57	14	8	9	20	185	177	116	77	130	193
Cuba	1,124	142	36	35	59	59	74	123	172	166	97	85	76
Somalia	1,124	123	161	160	248	141	27	41	29	57	29	65	43
Burkina Faso	977	43	21	40	112	59	54	93	122	122	118	106	87
Pakistán	972	55	41	106	254	172	54	25	23	28	28	43	43
Ghana	790	53	51	56	39	24	66	71	60	120	63	82	105
Rep. Dominicana	686	104	87	73	74	43	17	20	45	36	50	56	81
Nigeria	640	77	70	107	51	59	44	46	46	53	45	27	15
Congo	622	80	73	35	29	30	30	25	81	47	45	78	69
Eritrea	457	68	53	65	91	50	27	29	18	17	7	15	17
Sudán	450	8	12	14	88	77	57	33	69	26	21	26	19
Siria	431	4	20	11	32	38	22	17	48	74	77	57	31
Togo	394	8	11	11	4	7	17	25	45	88	48	70	60
Guyana Francesa	368	95	67	54	18	17	7	10	14	19	20	24	23
Guinea	334	67	18	11	15	9	46	37	27	11	35	32	26
Sri Lanka	330	30	65	75	40	55	10	10	7	1	6	5	26
Irán	314	10	6	7	25	6	27	25	45	46	69	13	35
Etiopía	308	38	27	26	34	24	13	13	18	23	30	34	28
Mali	278	15	10	19	29	19	19	17	27	52	25	24	22
Sierra Leona	154	5	18	48	19	10	18	9	4	5	3	4	11
Kirguistán	142	23	39	50	23	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Otros Países	1,673	113	75	104	115	126	146	92	184	161	156	173	228

(1) Hijos de ciudadanos haitianos cuyos registros de nacimiento corresponden a estos países.

“Migration, Panama Republic. Irregular Transit of foreigners through the Colombian border, 2023.” Available at <https://www.migracion.gob.pa/wp-content/uploads/IRREGULARES-X-DARIEN-2023.pdf>.

²⁷³ See <https://www.migracion.gob.pa/wp-content/uploads/IRREGULARES-X-DARIEN-2023.pdf>

²⁷⁴ See <https://www.migracion.gob.pa/mas-de-185-mil-personas-han-transitado-la-selva-del-darien-en-el-2024/#:~:text=2024%20E2%80%9320Migraci%C3%B3n%20Panam%C3%A1,M%C3%81S%20DE%20185%20MIL%20PERSONA S%20HAN%20TRANSITADO,DEL%20DARI%C3%89N%20EN%20EL%202024&text=Panam%C3%A1%20C%202020%20de%20junio%20de,unas%20186%20mil%20969%20personas>


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

In 2023, a total of 251,011 Haitian nationals were returned to their country.²⁷⁵ During the first semester of 2024, the Directorate General of Migration (DGM) reported that a total of 66,227 Haitian nationals were deported from the Dominican Republic.²⁷⁶ According to some humanitarian agencies more than 113,000 have been deported from the Dominican Republic as of July 2024.²⁷⁷

HONDURAS

According to National Institute of Migration of Honduras, from January to May 2024 a total of 13,616 Haitian nationals entered the country.

“Honduras Migration. Irregular migration to Honduras by Haitians throughout January to May 2024.” Available at: <https://inm.gob.hn/migracion-irregular.html>



MEXICO

According to the Mexican Commission for Refugees (Comar), 44,239 Haitian nationals applied for refugee status in 2023.²⁷⁸ In addition, from January to June 2024, a total of 41,427 people requested recognition as refugees in Mexico, of which 8,833 were Haitian nationals.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁵ See <https://www.diariolibre.com/politica/gobierno/2024/03/11/cuanto-deportaciones-de-haitianos-realizo-rd-en-2023/2640029>

²⁷⁶ See <https://migracion.gob.do/en-6-meses-mas-67-mil-extranjeros-de-diferentes-nacionalidades-han-sido-deportados-a-sus-paises-de-origen/>

²⁷⁷ Confidential report. Humanitarian agencies. July 2024

²⁷⁸ See <https://www.gob.mx/comar/articulos/boletin-estadistico-de-solicitantes-de-refugio-en-mexico-182244?idiom=es>.

²⁷⁹ See <https://www.gob.mx/comar/articulos/la-comar-en-numeros-369895?idiom=es>.

SEA INTERDICTIONS

Migrant smuggling operations have been thwarted through sea interdictions by the Bahamas and the United States. On 11 March 2024, 140 Haitian migrants were intercepted by the Royal Bahamas Defense Force (RBDF) in waters off Turks and Caicos Islands.²⁸⁰ Moreover, on 7 April 2024, the RBDF apprehended 257 Haitian migrants, thereby preventing the continuation of an illicit migration operation.²⁸¹ On 10 June 2024, the US Coast Guard returned a total of 305 migrants to the Bahamas and Haiti, after multiple interdictions of unlawful maritime migration.²⁸² As of 1 July 2024, the US Coast Guard has interdicted more than 260 Haitians through sea interdictions.²⁸³ On 17 July 2024, a makeshift boat with 80 Haitian migrants heading to Turks and Caicos Islands caught fire; 40 persons died while many other were injured. The boat had set sail just two days prior from Fort Saint-Michel, Haiti.²⁸⁴

TURKS AND CAICOS

The Acting Assistant Commissioner of Police and Commissioner of police of Turks and Caicos Islands revealed that in 2023 the country interdicted 4,016 irregular migrants from Haiti, while from January to 24 June 2024 a total of 865 Haitians were intercepted. Of these 865 Haitian nationals, 727 were males including 8 minors, and 138 females including also minors.²⁸⁵

BAHAMAS

Each entry in this table provides an overview of incidents related to Haitian migrants according to press releases from the Bahamas Department of Immigration, which can be accessed at: <https://www.immigration.gov.bs/?s=haiti>. A total of 1,474 Haitians were recorded by this authority, with 1,118 in 2023 and 356 in the months of January-March 2024.

Date	Number of Haitians	Description of the Event
1 February 2023	245	Repatriation from Matthew Town, Inagua to Port-au-Prince, Haiti
8 March 2023	134	Repatriation from New Providence, including a flight to Port-au-Prince and another to Cap Haitien.
17 April 2023	259	Repatriation from New Providence to Port-au-Prince in two groups, including adults and minors.
17 July 2023	275	Haitian migrants under custody in New Providence after being discovered by the RBDF.
24 July 2023	143	A woman died during a repatriation process from New Providence.
13 September 2023	44	Repatriation from New Providence to Port-au-Prince.
12 January 2024	18	Haitian migrants apprehended in Matthew Town, Inagua.
15 March 2024	43	Apprehension of Haitians in New Providence during a joint operation.

²⁸⁰ See <https://rbdf.gov.bs/rbdf-intercepts-migrants-in-turks-and-caicos-islands/>

²⁸¹ See <https://rbdf.gov.bs/royal-bahamas-defence-force-secures-bahamas/>.

²⁸² See <https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/3802235/coast-guard-transfers-109-migrants-to-bahamas-repatriates-196-migrants-to-haiti/>.

²⁸³ See <https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/3789058/coast-guard-repatriates-136-migrants-to-dominican-republic-following-3-separate/>, <https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/3802235/coast-guard-transfers-109-migrants-to-bahamas-repatriates-196-migrants-to-haiti/>

²⁸⁴ <https://rosanjose.iom.int/en/news/tragic-boat-fire-claims-40-migrant-lives-haitis-coast>

²⁸⁵ See <https://suntci.com/tci-sees-decrease-in-illegal-migrants-from-haiti-so-far-this-year-p11138-129.htm>

17 March 2024	49	Haitians handed over to the enforcement unit by the RBDF after a patrol.
20 March 2024	264	Repatriation from Matthew Town, Inagua to Cap-Haitien, Haiti
Total	1474	

Panel's own table based on public data.

JAMAICA

Although Jamaica does not have official online open-access databases on immigration, according to information from local newspapers, between July 2023 and May 2024, there were five recorded entries of Haitian migrants, with approximately 80 repatriated and 22 in police custody.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁶ See <https://radiojamaicanewsonline.com/local/more-than-80-haitians-who-arrived-in-jamaica-since-last-year-repatriated>

Annex 35: Building of makeshift boats at Port-de-Paix, Haiti

Satellite imagery at three different sites at Port-de-Paix, North-West department, shows very active building areas for makeshift boats, as already reported by the Panel ([S/2023/674](#)). According to different local confidential sources²⁸⁷ many of these boats are used for migrant smuggling towards the United States.

Circles in orange color indicate boats being built and construction sites.

Stills taken from Google Earth, Visited on June 2024.

Maps Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, Imagery Date: 03162024



²⁸⁷ Confidential sources, May and June 2024.



Annex 36: Wanton destruction and ransacking of public and private infrastructure by gangs in the downtown area of Port-au-Prince.

Between February and May 2024, the gang alliance *Viv Ansanm* adopted as a tactic the wanton destruction of public and private infrastructure; it also included attacks against State symbols, such as the National Palace.

The area surrounding the National Palace was particularly affected. This strategically important zone houses critical institutions like the General Hospital, the city's main medical center; the University Schools of Medicine and Law; the Ministry of Economy and Finance; the National Teachers School; and *Le Nouvelliste* media house. Dozens of small businesses and homes were also destroyed.


Below is a satellite image of the area attacked.



The polygon in yellow indicates the perimeter of the area affected by *Viv Ansanm* wanton destruction and ransacking. Port-au-Prince. Google Earth. Visited June 2024.

Maps Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, Imagery Date: 03162024

On 24 March 2024, the *Viv Ansanm* gang coalition, launched an attack around the National Palace area. Izo's 5 Second gang was the primary aggressor in this assault.²⁸⁸ The wanton attack destroyed two city blocks as shown by the following satellite images.



*Images from Planet.com. Visited June 2024.
Planet Labs PBC*

On the ground pictures taken by online media also showed the destruction of that area.

²⁸⁸ Interviews with human rights defenders and UN humanitarian agencies, April and June 2024.



Picture taken on 25 March 2024. | © Jean Feguens Regala/AyiboPost. Available at: <https://ayibopost.com/photos-les-gangs-ont-defigure-le-bas-de-la-ville-de-port-au-prince/>.

Annex 37: Gangs explain that they receive weapons from economic actors

Gangs regularly mention that economic actors provide them with firearms. This does not preclude the fact that they also procure firearms independently (see [S/2023/674](#)).

The illicit revenue generated by economic actors, when paid to gangs, is used in acquiring arms and ammunition used in attacking economic hubs (such as seaports), extorting road users, looting of public and private properties, kidnapping for ransom and facilitating and protecting cross-border illicit trade. This creates a cycle of interdependence between economic actors and gangs.

Excerpts of a video documentary²⁸⁹ in which Tigres, one of the deputies of Renel Destina alias “Ti Lapli,” leader of the Grand Ravine gang discloses how the weapons the gang has, were bought with money given to them by the rich people in the community. (see, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EMfLTuzEwWQ>).



²⁸⁹ France 24. 2024. Reportage exclusif en Haïti : à Port-au-Prince, capitale assiégée par les gangs.

Below: In an interview in May 2024, Jimmy Chérizier narrated how gangs acquire arms and ammunition through networks linked to elite actors.

See excerpts of the video below²⁹⁰, in which Chérizier responds to question of how his gang gets arms and ammunition. He says that most of the materiel are supplied to the gangs by the rich in society, but it's the less fortunate who are targeted for punishment instead. See, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mo48IeiZJx0>.



²⁹⁰ Brut. 2024. La grande interview : Jimmy Chérizier.

Annex 38: The impact of gang attacks on the CPS container terminal

As the chaos continued at the port, on 15 March, the *Viv Ansanm* alliance, along with civilians, looted a container with humanitarian aid belonging to UNICEF and containing essential supplies for life-saving aid to children.²⁹¹ The closure of the port widely affected the supply chain of basic commodities, leading to shortages. Given the magnitude of cargo that CPS handles, the closure has subsequently inflicted a heavy loss on the Customs revenue collection.²⁹² These paralyzed operations, forcing it to close. Some traders, for fear of losses, paid gangs to get their commodities that were stuck in high seas, smuggled into the country through informal docking sites²⁹³.

The attack on the APN Port by gangs led to global marine insurance companies to caution their clients against docking at CPS and Martissant terminals (which also suffered gang attacks) due to risks of armed robberies and other criminal activities.²⁹⁴ At the time of drafting, the CPS terminal was only partially operational, with a looming risk of further looting.²⁹⁵ Gangs have taken advantage of the situation to offer commodity importers an alternative access to inland at exorbitant fees. For instance, some businessmen pay gangs controlling various informal docking zones between \$5,000USD and \$10,000USD per container depending on the value of goods, to get their cargo delivered on the shores. The most common goods include rice, sugar, cooking, oil and personal effects (referred to as *pèpè* (see, [S/2023/674](#), Annex 24). The items are offloaded from the high seas onto feeder boats which then discharge the items into trucks on the shores, evading Customs.²⁹⁶

²⁹¹ <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/armed-violence-deepening-malnutrition-crisis-children-haiti>

²⁹² Interviews with Customs official, HNP officer and two clearing agents, April 2024.

²⁹³ Interview with the Secteur Transport Terrestre Haitien (STTH), HNP and Customs, May and June 2024.


[https://www.facebook.com/syndicatAPCH?__cft__\[0\]=AZUDGekcdE-vbxBcEb8ofZIBKoo3uYMRKdsDjpMVahpsrLOBWky3mPW01CbBfkCrKZcq5PnOHU3iMgyXWG6MPoNMW0NnqoRAZQXwU_r-KFsm3SDMxv29dK7K2FDDSIDO34z9RXpa3pzmYYs_hL1Ni0sUIsJUC_N-Z8zP_Rcvwm7QxgHmqwh56XK582seE8ozPEuYiEf-3FJg6b1Wm_MVnE6j&__tn__=-UC,P-R](https://www.facebook.com/syndicatAPCH?__cft__[0]=AZUDGekcdE-vbxBcEb8ofZIBKoo3uYMRKdsDjpMVahpsrLOBWky3mPW01CbBfkCrKZcq5PnOHU3iMgyXWG6MPoNMW0NnqoRAZQXwU_r-KFsm3SDMxv29dK7K2FDDSIDO34z9RXpa3pzmYYs_hL1Ni0sUIsJUC_N-Z8zP_Rcvwm7QxgHmqwh56XK582seE8ozPEuYiEf-3FJg6b1Wm_MVnE6j&__tn__=-UC,P-R)

²⁹⁴ <https://north-standard.com/insights/news/haiti-civil-unrest-affecting-port-operations/>.

²⁹⁵ Interviews with two cargo agents and a customs official, July 2024. Also see, <https://www.karibinfo.com/news/haiti-un-mois-sans-navires-aucune-arrivee-prevue-par-les-lignes-maritimes/>.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

Annex 39: A copy of the press statement issued by Electricité D’Haïti (EDH) in March, informing the public of the attack against its facility at the Varreux Power Plant and its impact on electricity supply



Document provided to the Panel by a confidential source.

Annex 40: The blocking of the entrance to Varreux terminal by the 5 Second gang using hijacked trucks (22 April 2024)

During this period, people turned to informal fuel dealers (commonly referred to as “Sur le trottoir,”)²⁹⁷, despite cases of fuel adulteration. At the “Sur le trottoir,” outlets, some which are owned by gang members, a liter of gasoline sold for about 500 GD (\$3.75 USD), up from the normal 200GD (\$1.5 USD) per liter.²⁹⁸ This yielded more revenue for gangs operating “Sur le trottoir,” and contributed to inflation.

A customs official and two port agents informed the Panel that threats on Varreux are persistent and the failure of gangs to seize control of the installation has turned the gang’s focus on kidnaping the Port’s employees for ransom. A confidential report seen by the Panel indicated that on 23 May 2024, three employees were robbed, and their vehicle stolen. Four days later, 10 employees were kidnapped aboard a Varreux terminal vehicle. The port therefore remains at a constant danger of attack by gangs in their quest to maximize their revenue.

²⁹⁷ <https://www.haitiprogres.com/news/2024/04/24/la-penurie-dessence-continue/>.

²⁹⁸ Interview with a gasoline retailer, two drivers, living in Delmas 28 and Gressier suburbs, May 2024.

Annex 41: Some of the strategies used by Les Argentins and Delmas 6 in revenue collection

Since early 2023, Les Argentins gang, a member of the G-Pèp alliance operating from Haut Bel-Air region had been attacking Solino neighbourhoods with the aim of expanding its kidnapping territory. This contributed to the rise of the Solino self-defense group (which, according to a confidential report seen by the Panel, is made up of members of the local population and some active police officers assigned to police stations in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area) to counter Les Argentins. (see also Annex 10).

However, when Les Argentins and Delmas 6 collaborated under *Viv Ansanm*, they invaded Solino. A HNP officer and a resident of Solino stated that whenever police operations intensified along the Route de Delmas and the Avenue John Brown, the two main roads leading into Solino, both Les Argentins and Delmas 6 gangs employed different tactics to guarantee revenue collection, demonstrating resilience and determination to generate revenue. For instance, Les Argentins would place coffins on designated roadside locations, in which residents of the area, including road users (mainly trucks and taxis) would ‘faithfully’ drop the toll fees. Failure to conform would attract the gang’s wrath down the road. Similarly, Delmas 6 gang would burn the house of those who failed to yield to the gang’s demands²⁹⁹.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

Annex 42: A Citibank notice for closing down of its operations in Haiti.

July 8th, 2024

**Important notice – July 8th, 2024
Citibank N.A., Haiti Branch**

Dear Citi client,

Citi is hereby informing you that it will cease its operations in Haiti and pursue the voluntary surrender of its banking license with the regulatory approval of Banque de la Republique d'Haiti (BRH). International and correspondent banking services will continue for existing clients.

In our 53-year history, Citi has played an important role in helping local businesses, institutions, individuals, and communities achieve their financial goals and has contributed to the country's growth. We are proud of the history we have built together, proactively engaging with the community, through our social responsibility programs and disaster relief efforts to support the resilience and inclusion of communities across the country.

Citi will stay in close contact and communication with you to facilitate this transition process, including where applicable, withdrawing your funds, or transferring them from Citi Haiti to other local alternative options. Please be assured our focus is to assist you in a smooth transition for your business during this process.

We very much value having had the opportunity to provide you with our services, and for your loyalty and partnership.

Citi remains committed to Latin America and maintains a strong presence in the market where we have operated for over a century and built an unmatched network for our clients.

Warm regards,

Máximo Vidal
Hispaniola Head

Deborah Stark
Haiti Business Head

Letter provided by a confidential source. Also available at:

<https://x.com/mbduvalier/status/1810416842592461022?s=48&t=2ohpW1VkksMbL54enFPvug>.

Annex 43: Banking and compliance

On the financial compliance front, the fact that the bulk of the country's economy is unbanked adds to the fragility of the banking sector. About 55.5%³⁰⁰ of the country's GDP operates mainly outside the formal banking network. This, to a certain extent poses several risks including those of compliance with international and regional financial bodies.

A member of a recently closed bank in Haiti stated that to ensure the resilience of their operations in the current environment, banks in Haiti will need to implement comprehensive and multi-layered security measures ranging from physical security to due diligence measures such as knowing-your-customer (KYC), fraud prevention, compliance training, cybersecurity, risk management among others. These measures can only be onboarded by a bank when the country's strategic environment shows optimism.

³⁰⁰ See, <https://www.worlddeconomics.com/National-Statistics/Informal-Economy/Haiti.aspx>.

Annex 44: Rony Celestin's way of moving contraband

Four sources highlighted that since 2016, the 400 Mawozo gang has been the dominant gang facilitating smuggling activities at the border, in support of Celestin's businesses.³⁰¹ The sources explained to the Panel Celestin's modus operandi.

The same sources and a former staff of Celestin indicated how Celestin, through his border agents, pays the 400 Mawozo gang, his designated customs officials and other members of the criminal network a total of \$3000-5000 USD per cargo truck of contraband commodities (depending on the nature and value of the goods).

The money is meant to facilitate the circumvention of inspection, payment of duties and safeguarding against looting by other gangs while on transit to the destination in Haiti. Often the cargo is dispatched to Celestin's home in Hinche through Los Palis town, in the Center Department for sorting before they are disseminated to various distribution outlets, among them the eight companies affiliated to him. According to three confidential sources, from Hinche, some BSAP agents take over the escort of the goods (where necessary) to ensure they reach undeterred to Celestin's shops in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.

A judicial official, a former customs officer and an anti-corruption investigator confirmed that Celestin's activities are widely known within the business community, including how he uses his business influence to bribe and frustrate investigations and prosecutions of cases linked to him.

³⁰¹ Interview with a former customs officer, a member of a governmental agency and two former gang members formerly based in Belladère, January and June 2024.