

# Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

5 August 2024

Original: English

---

## Second session

Geneva, 22 July–2 August 2024

### Chair's summary

1. The present paper represents the best attempt of the Chair of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to reflect the proceedings of the second session. The Chair recalls that the present document is not agreed language nor does it reflect consensus, and cannot be viewed as such.
2. States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. States parties emphasized the Treaty's role as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime and its fundamental contribution to international peace, security and stability.
3. States parties stressed the fundamental importance of the full and effective implementation of the Treaty. They emphasized that the three pillars of the Treaty were interdependent and mutually reinforcing, with equal intrinsic value and each contributing in important ways to the Treaty's overarching objectives.
4. In this regard, States parties underlined the validity of past commitments relating to the Treaty and the need to implement fully and effectively the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, including the action plan. States parties regretted that the 2015 and tenth Review Conferences had not been able to reach consensus on substantive final documents.
5. States parties agreed on the importance of achieving a successful conclusion to the 2026 Review Conference.
6. States parties stressed the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty. They called upon those States not party to the Treaty to accede to it without further delay and without preconditions, as non-nuclear-weapon States, and to bring their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, as required by the Treaty.
7. States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the full and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty. States parties noted that implementation of article VI was essential for the maintenance of the Treaty and its credibility and was an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. States parties



recalled past outcomes adopted by the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences and the need for States parties to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their Treaty obligations. It was emphasized that past commitments remained valid and formed the basis for making further progress in fully implementing the Treaty and achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

8. States parties recalled the unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals made in 2000 and reaffirmed in 2010. States parties expressed deep concern regarding the lack of progress in the implementation of disarmament obligations and commitments, including the unequivocal undertakings. Many States parties called upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons. Some States parties requested the establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, at the 2026 Review Conference, to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and on further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.

9. Some States parties noted that efforts in the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear arsenals, both deployed and non-deployed, should be undertaken in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. Some States parties noted the importance of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, within a specified framework of time or with clearly defined time frames and benchmarks, and called for a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction. Some States parties expressed support for a progressive, step-by-step approach as the only practical pathway to nuclear disarmament. Some States parties expressed the view that no effort should be spared to return to the path of nuclear disarmament.

10. Some States parties noted that nuclear disarmament should be considered as an integral part of the process of general and complete disarmament and that steps leading to nuclear disarmament should promote international peace and stability and be based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all. It was also noted that the responsibility for the implementation of article VI of the Treaty lay with both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

11. Some States parties called upon those States with the largest nuclear arsenals to take special responsibility to fulfil their disarmament obligations under the Treaty and continue to make reductions in their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally binding manner. Many States parties urged all the nuclear-weapon States to urgently diminish and ultimately eliminate the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, consistent with the 2010 Review Conference outcome. Many States parties emphasized the importance of applying the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility in relation to the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations.

12. States parties discussed the role of disarmament in promoting international peace and security. States parties expressed concern about the deterioration in the international security environment. Many States parties noted that the security environment should not postpone nuclear disarmament and raised the role of disarmament in reversing the continued deterioration. Some States parties noted the importance of a strong non-proliferation regime to the attainment of a world free of nuclear weapons. Some States parties noted that nuclear disarmament should follow the principle of taking a step-by-step approach and maintaining global peace and

security, with undiminished and increased security for all. Some States parties underlined that the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations “in good faith” under article VI of the Treaty was not tied to any conditions.

13. Many States parties referred to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons of 8 July 1996. In that regard, they recalled the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there was an “obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”. Those States parties also recalled the advisory opinion regarding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

14. Many States parties expressed concern at the qualitative and quantitative expansion and improvement of nuclear weapon arsenals and nuclear modernization programmes. Those States parties expressed the view that such actions were not conducive to nuclear disarmament and suggested the intention of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons, and noted that modernization programmes contributed to arms races and increased tensions. One State party expressed the view that these modernization programmes were necessary in the current strategic environment and fully compatible with existing international commitments. Another State party noted that the purpose of the nuclear modernization was for the safety and security of the nuclear arsenals.

15. Some States parties expressed deep concern regarding increased irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, and condemned threats to use nuclear weapons, including in the context of regional conflicts. They also expressed concern at the use of nuclear weapons as tools of coercion. Some States parties also noted that the threat or use of force would be contrary to Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations and that such threats would be contrary to the general principles of international law and the rules and regulations of international law. Many States parties called upon the nuclear-weapon States to make unequivocal commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and parties to nuclear-weapon-free zones. Some States noted that such commitments were without prejudice to Article 51 of the Charter. Some States parties encouraged States not to resort to rhetoric concerning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in a way that increased international tensions and had an impact on international peace and security.

16. In the context of concerns raised regarding the increased role of nuclear weapons in national and regional military doctrines and increasing nuclear rhetoric, some States parties suggested that a paradigm shift was needed on discussions of nuclear deterrence, which should have a greater focus on such risks versus the perceived security benefits, including the unknown impact of new and disruptive technologies. One State party noted that nuclear deterrence served the objective of peace, security and stability. Another State party noted that nuclear weapons should serve only defensive purposes to deter aggression and prevent war.

17. The nuclear-weapon States outlined efforts to diminish the role that nuclear weapons had been assigned in their security doctrines over the past decades, while also recalling the continuing role of nuclear deterrence in those doctrines. Some nuclear-weapon States provided updates on undertakings in this regard, further to the 13 steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty, as well as the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference. Some nuclear-weapon States referred to the importance of a nuclear policy that balanced the evolving demands of deterrence with the goal of taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies, while other States parties highlighted the need to focus on the legitimate security interests of non-nuclear-weapon states.

18. Many States parties expressed concerns regarding nuclear weapon-sharing arrangements and extended deterrence and the practice of stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States. Some States parties expressed the view that such arrangements had the effect of diminishing the political willingness of States participating in the above arrangements to build nuclear-weapon-free zones or conclude an international legal instrument on security assurances, and that such arrangements increased the risk of nuclear proliferation. Some States parties called upon those States parties participating in nuclear weapon-sharing and extended deterrence arrangements to take concrete measures to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national and collective security doctrines. One State party called upon relevant nuclear-weapon States parties to abandon such arrangements and recall all nuclear weapons deployed abroad to their own territories.

19. Some States parties noted that nuclear burden-sharing arrangements supported articles I and II of the Treaty by disincentivizing proliferation by the relevant non-nuclear-weapon States. Those States parties also noted that such arrangements were addressed in the Treaty negotiations and were fully compliant with articles I and II, and that extended deterrence had contributed to peace and nuclear non-proliferation. Other States parties expressed the view that such arrangements were not consistent with the Treaty.

20. In the light of the international security environment and the acute risk of the use of a nuclear weapon, some States parties called for concrete, credible and practical measures, including those to help avoid escalation as well as inadvertent miscalculation, miscommunication, misperception or accident, namely in the areas of resilient nuclear crisis communication channels, transparency and restraint on doctrines and deployments, negative security assurances and negotiations on nuclear arms control and disarmament. They called for nuclear risk reduction as a means to urgently mitigate risks related to the use of nuclear weapons. Many States parties noted that risk reduction measures, including reductions in deployments and operational status, were not a substitute for disarmament, but rather a complement to ongoing disarmament efforts and advocacy.

21. Some nuclear-weapon States had, in the recent past, highlighted the need to pursue risk reduction measures and substantive bilateral and multilateral dialogues on the subject, as evidenced by the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races of 2022. They called upon all States parties to play an active role in promoting nuclear disarmament and contributing to reducing risks of nuclear weapon use.

22. One State party encouraged the nuclear-weapon States to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies, abandon the nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons, refrain from making tailored nuclear deterrence policies against other countries, refrain from listing any country as the target of a nuclear strike, reduce their alert status and refrain from targeting nuclear weapons at any other country.

23. Some States parties recalled, in this regard, the detailed discussions and recommendations regarding risk reduction elaborated by the 2016 Open-ended Working Group taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, mandated by the General Assembly in its resolution [70/33](#). Some States parties also expressed support for further work by the nuclear-weapon States on risk reduction measures, including to mitigate the potential for emerging technology, such as artificial intelligence and offensive cybercapabilities, to multiply nuclear risks.

24. Some States parties observed that the principles outlined in treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones could serve as fundamental components to be integrated into a common understanding of nuclear risk reduction measures. Many States parties

expressed the view that only the total elimination of nuclear weapons could eliminate all nuclear risks.

25. States parties recalled the 3 January 2022 Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States, in which they, *inter alia*, affirmed that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought, and expressed their commitment to the obligations under the Treaty, including its article VI. States parties called upon the nuclear-weapon States to uphold the principles affirmed in the Joint Statement and the long history of the non-use of nuclear weapons. Some States parties expressed regret that the Joint Statement was not matched by the actions of some of the subscribing nuclear-weapon States.

26. China affirmed its commitment to a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Many States parties called upon the nuclear-weapon States, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to adhere to doctrinal restraint, including in the form of no-first-use policies. Some States parties called for the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty on mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons, or for a political statement to be issued in this regard. Many States parties noted that such undertakings did not substitute for but complemented concrete nuclear disarmament steps. Some States parties noted the value of no-first-use policies as important confidence-building measures. Other States parties noted the lack of verifiability of such policies.

27. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, States parties noted the importance of the provision of negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties. Some States parties made a proposal for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances at the 2026 Review Conference in order to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties. Some States parties expressed the view that negative security assurances should only be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States parties that faithfully complied with the Treaty obligations. All States parties were encouraged to explore ways in which negative security assurances could be strengthened, including through an internationally legally binding instrument, in order to contribute to building confidence in the non-proliferation regime and to make progress in nuclear disarmament. Some States parties noted that the signature and ratification of relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties were a means of providing legally binding negative security assurances to States parties to those treaties. Some States parties proposed the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on negative security assurances under the Conference on Disarmament.

28. States parties called upon all nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm and implement the existing security assurances, of which the Security Council had taken note in its resolution [984 \(1995\)](#) and which it had recalled in resolutions [1887 \(2009\)](#) and [2310 \(2016\)](#). Some States parties expressed concern regarding the violation of the security assurances contained in the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with the Accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum) signed in 1994. Some States parties expressed the view that the violation of the Memorandum on security assurances called into question the effectiveness of existing security assurances and was evidence of the need for a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances. One State party reaffirmed the importance of full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to their existing obligations and commitments related to security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

29. Some States parties acknowledged the importance and contribution of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START

Treaty) to peace and security and nuclear disarmament, while urging all necessary steps be taken to return to and maintain its full implementation. Some States parties expressed regret regarding the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. One State party expressed grave concern over the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region that could undermine global and regional strategic stability.

30. Some States parties encouraged the Russian Federation and the United States to negotiate a follow-on treaty to the New START Treaty or a new nuclear arms control arrangement or treaty without delay, and with the aim of making progress towards deeper, irreversible and verifiable reductions in their nuclear arsenals, including deployed and non-deployed nuclear warheads of any yield and strategic and non-strategic delivery vehicles. Some States parties also encouraged other nuclear-weapon States to engage in arms control-related discussions.

31. Many States parties noted their concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. Some States parties noted the growing scientific evidence supporting this. Other States parties noted the shared responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening. Many States parties reaffirmed the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. Many States parties stressed the importance of providing victim assistance and addressing environmental contamination caused by nuclear weapon use and testing, and invited other States parties to take note of General Assembly resolution [78/240](#), entitled “Addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons: providing victim assistance and environmental remediation to Member States affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons”. Some States parties indicated that they did not consider this matter to be relevant to the review of the Treaty.

32. Some States parties referred to international conferences and the increasing body of scientific research on the humanitarian, environmental and economic consequences, as well as scientific research regarding, inter alia, the impacts on the health of people exposed to large amounts of radiation. In this context, those States parties proposed that nuclear justice discussions should also lead to the development of recommendations on victim assistance and environmental remediation for the 2026 Review Conference, and urged States parties in a position to do so to offer financial, technical and scientific resources to help affected States parties. States parties took note of national policies to provide compensation to second-, third- and fourth-generation victims. Some States parties indicated that they did not consider this matter to be relevant to the review of the Treaty.

33. Many States parties noted the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 January 2021 and the convening of the first and second Meetings of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Vienna on 21 to 23 June 2022 and in New York on 27 November to 1 December 2023. They noted that the third Meeting of States Parties would take place in New York from 3 to 7 March 2025. Those States parties that were also parties or signatories to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons stressed the importance of that Treaty in the total elimination of nuclear weapons and emphasized that it was complementary to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

34. Some States parties noted that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the only viable vehicle to achieve disarmament in the current geopolitical context. They stated that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was not an “effective measure” contributing to the disarmament goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as it failed to address the enormously complex military, political and technical requirements for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

35. Some States parties called for the Conference on Disarmament to immediately begin, and conclude at an early date, negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, based on its comprehensive and balanced programme of work in accordance with the Shannon report (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Some States parties made reference to the value of regional dialogues and initiatives in favour of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Those States parties recalled that States, in their own capacities, had made numerous contributions to the furtherance of this objective. Some States parties expressed various views on the scope of the above negotiations.

36. Pending the negotiations outlined above, some States parties encouraged the nuclear-weapon States to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Some States parties expressed the view that all fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes should be permanently placed under IAEA safeguards and be kept out of military programmes. Some States parties noted that non-nuclear-weapon States had already agreed to a legally binding commitment not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. One State party noted that such a moratorium was undefinable and unverifiable, and served to diminish the political will to negotiate such a treaty.

37. Many States parties noted the urgent importance of bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force, as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Recent ratifications of that Treaty by the Gambia, Tuvalu, Dominica, Timor-Leste, Equatorial Guinea, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe and Solomon Islands were welcomed. In this regard, the significance of achieving the universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was reaffirmed.

38. Many States parties called upon all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay, particularly the nine remaining States whose ratifications were needed for the Treaty to enter into force. Those States parties recalled the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including efforts to encourage other countries listed in annex 2 to the Treaty to sign and ratify the Treaty. Many States parties called upon those nuclear-weapon States who had yet to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to do so without delay.

39. States parties emphasized the importance of upholding the existing de facto moratoriums on nuclear test explosions as an interim measure. It was noted, however, that such moratoriums could not serve as a substitute for ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The importance of refraining from any activities that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was noted.

40. Some States parties called upon the nuclear-weapon States to close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites and laboratories for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and to prohibit nuclear weapon-related research and development and refrain from the use of alternate means of nuclear testing and the use of new technologies to upgrade nuclear weapon systems. One State party indicated that some of these obligations went beyond the obligations of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

41. States parties noted the need to support the important work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Some

States parties welcomed the transmission of International Monitoring System data to the International Data Centre by all States on a testing and provisional operational basis before the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in accordance with the approved guidelines of the nineteenth session of the Preparatory Committee for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. In this context, some States parties also called for support to the work related to the completion, improvement and sustainment of the verification system for the Treaty and encouraged States that had not yet done so to complete the International Monitoring System stations in their territories and send data to the International Data Centre as soon as possible. They called upon State signatories to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to acknowledge the role that the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization played in education on disarmament and non-proliferation through the Group of Eminent Persons of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Youth Group.

42. Some States parties noted the multilateral work and substantive consensus reports of the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament of the United Nations, including the Group's consideration in 2018–2019 of how nuclear disarmament verification could advance nuclear disarmament, and its deliberations in 2022–2023 regarding nuclear disarmament verification issues. Some States parties expressed the view that such work provided a solid conceptual basis for practical work on nuclear verification in a multilateral framework.

43. Some States parties noted other initiatives in the context of nuclear disarmament verification, such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership and the Joint Franco-German exercise on verification of nuclear disarmament to develop credible measures and build global capacity for verifying nuclear disarmament. Those States parties participating in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification recalled its efforts towards identifying and developing practical solutions to the challenges of effective multilateral nuclear disarmament verification. Some States parties noted initiatives to ensure the practical application of the principle of irreversibility. Many States parties reaffirmed the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility in nuclear disarmament.

44. One State party noted that nuclear disarmament verification should be considered within the context of the practical implementation of the relevant provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It expressed the view that the scope of nuclear disarmament verification activities was contingent upon key parameters of a specific treaty, agreement or arrangement and the scope of the parties' commitments. It also noted that deliberations on scientific and technological aspects of nuclear disarmament verification lacked value without a clear and agreed understanding of key treaty provisions and were thus premature.

45. Many States parties called for increased accountability and transparency to enhance disarmament. Some States parties noted the importance of clear, transparent and measurable plans with defined timelines for the fulfilment of disarmament obligations and commitments, including through the submission of standardized implementation reports for discussion and review at the formal sessions of the Treaty's review cycle. Those States parties urged nuclear-weapon States to enhance transparency regarding their arsenals and doctrines and to report to States parties on arsenals and plans for their reduction and/or elimination efforts on a regular basis.

46. Some States parties proposed a number of transparency and accountability measures to be considered in relation to the risks associated with existing nuclear



weapons, including that nuclear-weapon States should provide standardized information at regular intervals. In this context, some States parties noted that they had long reported to the Review Conference on their actions in support of the Treaty, including under the reporting commitment as contained in the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference. Some States parties noted that such reports constituted a transparency measure that was linked to the principles of verifiability and accountability, and would build confidence among States parties.

47. Some nuclear-weapon States noted that they determined the acceptable scope of transparency measures on the basis of strategic realities and their national security interests.

48. Some States parties expressed support for dedicating time in the formal meetings of the Treaty's review cycle for the presentation and interactive discussion of national reports, with the aim of providing an enhanced mechanism for transparency and accountability with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. To this end, some States parties proposed that further qualitative improvements to reporting by nuclear-weapon States could be pursued. Some States parties also suggested that nuclear-weapon States present national reports twice during every review cycle, at appropriate intervals.

49. Some States parties called for the establishment of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.

50. Many States parties called for increased accountability in relation to the implementation of the Treaty, including by nuclear-weapon States regarding their disarmament commitments. They expressed support for an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, including in the form of multilateral dialogues to achieve nuclear disarmament. They noted that such negotiations could help rebuild trust among States. Some States parties indicated that they did not consider this matter to be relevant to the review of the Treaty.

51. Some States parties noted the role of disarmament and non-proliferation education in achieving the goals of the Treaty. In this context, they noted that the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference underscored the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as an effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. States parties highlighted youth capacity-building and disarmament education as a means to disseminate different views and approaches of young people and advance the concepts of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control in doing so.

52. Some States parties expressed the view that disarmament and non-proliferation education should be undertaken in an inclusive and collaborative manner and involve different stakeholders, including educational institutions, academia, research institutes and think tanks, civil society, media and others. There was also reference to the need to pass on to younger and future generations the amassed knowledge and experience of the realities of atomic bombings and nuclear testing and to promote the meaningful and inclusive participation of young people in discussions in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

53. Some States parties emphasized the importance of promoting the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men in the process of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including in decision-making. They stressed the need to integrate gender perspectives and gender analysis across all discussions during the current review process, and to take into account the disproportionate gendered impact of exposure to ionizing radiation.

54. Some States parties noted the value of interaction with non-governmental organizations, research institutes and academic organizations during the review process. In this regard, some States parties called for greater inclusion of civil society in the review process.

55. States parties reaffirmed that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the global regime of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects played a vital role in promoting international peace and security by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

56. States parties remained convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and the full compliance of all parties with all its provisions was the best way to achieve the shared objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. States parties reiterated their calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, to fully comply with the Treaty and not to take any action that could negatively affect prospects for its universality and effective implementation.

57. States parties noted that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, in accordance with article I of the Treaty.

58. States parties noted that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with article II of the Treaty.

59. States parties took note of debates on the long-standing practice of nuclear sharing in the context of the non-proliferation undertakings of articles I and II of the Treaty.

60. States parties emphasized that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter. States parties recognized that breaches of the Treaty's obligations undermined nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

61. States parties emphasized that the safeguards of IAEA were a fundamental component of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and were essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation, and that IAEA safeguards made a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States parties reaffirmed that safeguards should be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the States parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.

62. States parties reaffirmed that IAEA was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its statute and safeguards system, compliance by States parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III (1) of the Treaty, with a view to preventing the

diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States parties reaffirmed their conviction that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in that regard.

63. States parties underscored the importance of compliance by States parties with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty and the importance of addressing all non-compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity. States parties underscored the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in a timely manner in full conformity with the statute of IAEA and the respective legal obligations of States parties. States parties reiterated that concerns regarding non-compliance by other States parties with their safeguards agreements, concluded in connection with the Treaty, should be directed, along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA so it could consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. In this regard, States parties were encouraged to extend their cooperation to IAEA. States parties underscored the importance of resolving such matters in a timely manner in full conformity with the statute of IAEA and the respective legal obligations of States parties.

64. States parties further expressed their concern for cases of non-compliance with the Treaty and with safeguards obligations by States parties, and called upon States to ensure that they remained in or promptly returned to compliance with their obligations.

65. States parties emphasized the importance of access to the Security Council and the General Assembly by IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with article XII.C of the statute of IAEA and paragraph 19 of IAEA document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), and the role of the Council and the Assembly, in accordance with the Charter, in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified by IAEA.

66. States parties welcomed voluntary measures aimed at facilitating and strengthening the implementation of IAEA safeguards and confidence-building, including bilateral and multilateral arrangements for enhanced verification, noting that such arrangements were effective in developing trust, fostering dialogue and facilitating cooperation among parties.

67. Bearing in mind the obligation of States to cooperate with IAEA to facilitate the implementation of safeguards agreements, States parties emphasized that there was a distinction between voluntary, confidence-building measures and the legal obligations of States.

68. States parties recalled the importance of the application of IAEA safeguards pursuant to comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) on all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties, in accordance with the provisions of article III (1) of the Treaty, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material was not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

69. States parties welcomed the fact that 182 States parties had comprehensive safeguards agreements in force with IAEA. States parties urged the four non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty that had yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible and without further delay. States parties expressed support for the Agency's efforts to universalize the comprehensive safeguards agreement legally required in connection with the Treaty.

70. States parties reaffirmed that the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to article III (1) of the Treaty should be designed to provide for

verification by IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State's declaration so that there was credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

71. States parties recognized that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) had been successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and had provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

72. States parties noted that it was the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in force the additional protocol was a legal obligation. States parties underlined that any State applying provisionally the additional protocol must comply with its provisions. States parties noted that, in the case of a State party with a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded pursuant to article III (1) of the Treaty, and supplemented by an additional protocol in force, the measures contained in both instruments represented the enhanced verification standard for that State.

73. States parties noted that the implementation of the measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol (see IAEA document INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) equipped IAEA with broader information and access so that it could provide increased assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole.

74. States parties welcomed the fact that 141 States parties had brought additional protocols into force, noting that a growing number of States implemented the comprehensive safeguards agreement together with the additional protocol as an integral part of the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. States parties encouraged those States parties that had not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol and to support IAEA efforts to encourage broader adherence to the additional protocol.

75. States parties expressed concern that, for States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force with an operative small quantities protocol based on the original standard text, the Agency's ability to draw a credible and sound annual safeguards conclusion was significantly affected. States parties noted the IAEA Director General's statement that, in the light of such limitations and given the significant lapse of time since the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors in 2005 approving the revised standard text of the small quantities protocol, IAEA would no longer be able to continue to draw a safeguards conclusion for such States. States parties accordingly called upon the remaining States with original small quantities protocols to amend or rescind them as a matter of urgency.

76. States parties encouraged IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties upon request with the conclusion, entry into force and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and the amendment or rescission of small quantities protocols, and welcomed the efforts of the IAEA Director General in this regard.

77. States parties noted that bilateral and regional safeguards, such as those implemented by the European Atomic Energy Community and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, played an important role in the further promotion of transparency and mutual confidence among States and supported the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty.

78. States parties expressed support for the continuing efforts of IAEA to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards in line with relevant decisions of its policymaking organs. In this regard, States parties emphasized the importance of close consultation and coordination with States. States parties

expressed support for continued engagement in open and active dialogue between States and IAEA on safeguards matters.

79. States parties recognized IAEA for maintaining high standards of professionalism in ensuring the verification of States' non-proliferation commitments and stressed the importance of the Agency continuing to undertake its responsibilities in an effective, transparent, impartial, technically based, non-discriminatory and objective manner.

80. States parties expressed grave concern regarding military activities conducted near or at nuclear power plants and other facilities and locations under IAEA safeguards, including their negative impact on nuclear safety, security and safeguards, and the implications of loss of control by competent authorities over such facilities and locations. States parties expressed strong support for the efforts of the IAEA Director General to ensure the Agency's continuous presence at such facilities and locations in order to enable IAEA to verify their status and inventories of declared nuclear material and to ensure the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities.

81. States parties expressed continued interest in having a transparent and open dialogue on the topic of naval nuclear propulsion. Some States parties expressed the view that the transfer of nuclear material and technology involved with naval nuclear propulsion to non-nuclear-weapon States raised serious questions under the Treaty and posed concerns for the integrity of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Some States parties expressed the view that the use of such nuclear material in naval nuclear propulsion by non-nuclear-weapon States was fully consistent with the Treaty and safeguards obligations under comprehensive safeguards agreements, and that arrangements between IAEA and States concerned needed to be made in this regard. They took note of the IAEA secretariat's continued engagement with relevant parties in accordance with the safeguards agreements of the parties concerned, and emphasized the Agency's independence and technical authority in safeguards implementation. States parties took note of discussions at the IAEA Board of Governors concerning safeguards arrangements related to this topic.

82. States parties welcomed the efforts of IAEA to assist in strengthening their national legal and regulatory frameworks related to safeguards, including assistance for the establishment and maintenance of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. States parties encouraged IAEA to continue to support capacity-building in research and development and science and technology related to safeguards and welcomed the assistance provided by IAEA member States in this regard.

83. States parties stressed the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with safeguards agreements, the statute of IAEA and its confidentiality regime. States parties took note of steps taken by the IAEA secretariat to protect classified safeguards information and also noted that the secretariat would continue to review and update the established procedures for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.

84. States parties welcomed additional technical and financial contributions by States to help IAEA meet its safeguards responsibilities and to develop and enhance the development and use of safeguards technologies. States parties welcomed the assistance provided by IAEA member States and relevant organizations to IAEA, including through member State support programmes, to facilitate capacity-building, including related research and development, and the implementation of safeguards.

85. States parties recognized that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rested entirely with that State. States parties reaffirmed that nuclear security – including the physical protection of all nuclear material and nuclear facilities against unauthorized access, unauthorized removal and sabotage, and computer security – supported the objectives of the Treaty. States parties acknowledged existing and emerging nuclear security threats, and reaffirmed the need to address such threats.

86. States parties stressed the importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and nuclear facilities. States parties called upon all States, within their responsibility, to achieve and maintain effective and comprehensive nuclear security, including physical protection, of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport, and of the associated facilities at all stages in their life cycle, as well as to protect sensitive information. In this regard, States parties encouraged all States, in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security, to take into account and apply, as appropriate, the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications.

87. States parties took note of the contributions made by the International Conferences on Nuclear Security in 2013, 2016 and 2020, and their related Ministerial Declarations, and of the International Conference on Nuclear Security in 2024. States parties encouraged States to support the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2022–2025 and the organization of the International Conferences on Nuclear Security.

88. States parties encouraged States to make further use of assistance in the field of nuclear security, where such assistance was needed and requested, including through the relevant IAEA services, such as the integrated nuclear security sustainability plans, the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service and the International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions.

89. States parties recognized the importance of the acceptance, approval or ratification by further States of the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, noting the importance of its full implementation and universalization.

90. States parties stressed the importance of all States parties improving their national capabilities to prevent, detect and respond to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their national legislation and, where applicable, international obligations. States parties noted the work of IAEA in support of the efforts of States to combat such trafficking, including IAEA activities undertaken to provide for an enhanced exchange of information and the continued maintenance of its Incident and Trafficking Database. States parties called upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard.

91. States parties called for the establishment and enforcement of effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations. States parties expressed concerns related to the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In this regard, States parties underscored the essential role played by the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), and recalled the obligation of all States to implement binding provisions of those resolutions.

92. States parties recalled paragraph 12 of decision 2, adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (see [NPT/CONF.1995/32 \(Part I\)](#), annex), and indicated that supplier arrangements should continue to promote transparency and ensure that the export guidelines formulated by them did not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States parties in conformity with the Treaty.

93. States parties reaffirmed the importance of the undertakings of all States parties under article III (2) of the Treaty. States parties took note that a number of States parties, which were suppliers of material or equipment, had adopted certain minimum standards for IAEA safeguards in connection with their exports of certain equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/209, as amended.
94. States parties stressed the need to ensure that exports of nuclear-related dual-use items did not support the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States parties took note that a number of States which were suppliers of material or equipment had adopted guidelines and a control list for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software and related technology published in IAEA document INFCIRC/254, as amended.
95. States parties recalled the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.
96. States parties noted the importance of facilitating transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I through IV of the Treaty, and eliminating in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.
97. States parties underscored their support for internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones that were established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, consistent with the principles and guidelines of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
98. States parties reaffirmed their conviction that internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhanced international and regional peace and security, strengthened the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and served as building blocks towards the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.
99. States parties recognized the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk), as well as the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia, were making towards attaining the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.
100. States parties urged further progress towards ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, which included negative security assurances. States parties welcomed the reaffirmation of the member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the readiness of nuclear-weapon States to engage in constructive consultations on the outstanding issues related to the signing and ratification of the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. China noted its readiness to take the lead in signing the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. States parties called upon nuclear-weapon States to review reservations or interpretative statements made in connection with the ratification of the protocols to those treaties and encouraged dialogue in this regard with members of the zones.
101. States parties recalled the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they did not exist, especially in the Middle East.

102. States parties reaffirmed support for the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (1995 Resolution), and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the previous Review Conferences.

103. States parties reaffirmed that the 1995 Resolution remained valid until its goals and objectives were achieved. States parties underscored that the 1995 Resolution, which was co-sponsored by the three depositary States of the Treaty, was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote.

104. States parties recalled the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to the full implementation of the 1995 Resolution.

105. States parties recalled the reaffirmation by previous Review Conferences of the importance of achieving universality of the Treaty, including in the Middle East.

106. States parties reaffirmed the call on India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without conditions, and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms, particularly those States that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. States parties also called upon South Sudan to accede, as soon as possible, to the Treaty.

107. States parties stressed the necessity of strict adherence by all States parties to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty. States parties urged all States in the region to take relevant steps and confidence-building measures to contribute to the realization of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

108. States parties reaffirmed the importance of advancing the full implementation of the 1995 Resolution.

109. States parties acknowledged developments at the first four sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, convened at United Nations Headquarters in New York in November 2019, November and December 2021, November 2022 and November 2023.

110. Many States parties underscored the importance of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), and urged the return to its full implementation by all parties. Some States parties criticized the withdrawal by the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018. Some States parties emphasized the importance of restoring confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran through the immediate and full implementation of the joint statement of 4 March 2023 by the IAEA Director General and the Vice-President and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Some States parties indicated that they did not consider these matters to be relevant to the review of the Treaty.

111. Many States parties took note of the IAEA Director General's efforts to resolve the long-outstanding safeguards issues concerning the Syrian Arab Republic, and emphasized the importance of the effective cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic with IAEA for this purpose. Some States parties indicated that they did not consider this matter to be relevant to the review of the Treaty.

112. States parties expressed unwavering support for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and reiterated their deep concern over the nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which undermined the global nuclear non-proliferation



regime. States parties reaffirmed the importance of the relevant Security Council resolutions and their full implementation.

113. States parties, stressing that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must comply with its international obligations, and recalling relevant Security Council resolutions, condemned the six nuclear tests conducted by that State and stressed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must not conduct any further nuclear tests.

114. Many States parties expressed grave concern regarding continuing advances in the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. States parties stressed that relevant Security Council resolutions called upon States not to provide support for trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea where such support could contribute to its nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related programmes or activities. Some States parties expressed their concern over increasing tensions in the region and military activities by relevant parties in and around the Korean Peninsula. Recalling that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could not have the status of a nuclear-weapon State pursuant to the Treaty, States parties called upon it to return at an early date to and fully comply with the Treaty and IAEA safeguards. States parties further called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to immediately cease all ongoing nuclear activities and to take concrete measures to abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

115. States parties called for the resolution of this issue through negotiations and diplomacy. States parties reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and welcomed efforts by all States parties to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution. States parties urged all parties concerned to make further efforts towards the resumption of dialogue and to work to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

116. States parties expressed concern about other regions in South Asia where nuclear stockpiles of non-parties to the Treaty posed challenges to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, recalling in this regard the reaffirmation by previous Review Conferences of the importance of achieving universality of the Treaty.

117. States parties reaffirmed that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the Treaty.

118. States parties reaffirmed that they undertook to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States parties in a position to do so were encouraged to cooperate in contributing alone, or together with other States or international organizations, such as IAEA, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

119. States parties urged that in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking into account in particular the needs of developing countries. States parties emphasized that transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty should be facilitated, and that any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty should be eliminated.

120. States parties recognized the contribution of nuclear science and technology to meeting global challenges and socioeconomic development needs, and emphasized the important role of nuclear science and technology in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on climate change. States parties emphasized the importance of raising awareness of that role among a wider variety of stakeholders, including government and international development agencies, international financial institutions, non-governmental organizations, medical and research communities, universities, nuclear regulators and operators, nuclear industry and the private sector.

121. States parties acknowledged the importance of providing assistance, in particular to developing countries and least developed countries, in order to enhance their access to nuclear science and technology, through capacity-building, the provision of equipment, the strengthening of regional networking and regional cooperation frameworks and through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation.

122. States parties recognized the need to promote awareness and the upscaling of non-power applications of nuclear science and technology. States parties welcomed several initiatives aimed at expanding access to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, such as the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses and Atoms for Heritage.

123. States parties reiterated that each State party had the right to define its national energy policy, and recognized that, while not all States parties wished to pursue nuclear power, for those that did so, nuclear technologies and innovations, including advanced reactors and small and modular reactors, as well as large-capacity power reactors and fast neutron reactors, could play an important role in facilitating energy security, decarbonization and transitioning to a low-carbon energy economy. Some States parties noted the first-ever Nuclear Energy Summit held in Brussels on 21 March 2024.

124. States parties reiterated that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and the ongoing implementation of IAEA safeguards as well as the highest levels of safety and security, consistent with States parties' national legislation and respective international obligations.

125. States parties stressed the need for ensuring high levels of safety and security in the deployment of new and emerging nuclear technologies globally, noting that the development of advanced reactors, as well as small and modular reactors, for those who may wish to use them, should be done in a safe, secure and safeguarded manner. States parties underlined the important role of IAEA in assisting its member States in the field of new and emerging nuclear technologies.

126. States parties concerned were encouraged, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize high enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.

127. States parties underlined the essential role of IAEA, including through its technical cooperation programme, in assisting member States upon request to build human and institutional capacities, including regulatory capabilities, for the safe, secure and peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology, under the motto "Atoms for peace and development".

128. States parties underlined that IAEA activities in the field of technical cooperation and nuclear applications contributed in an important way to meeting energy needs, improving human and animal health, combating poverty, protecting the environment, developing agriculture, managing the use of water resources,

optimizing industrial processes and preserving cultural heritage, thus helping to improve the quality of life and the well-being of humankind.

129. States parties welcomed the flagship initiatives of the IAEA Director General that cut across different areas of nuclear science and technology, including on cancer control (Rays of Hope), strengthening preparedness for and the capability to respond to outbreaks of zoonotic diseases (the Zoonotic Disease Integrated Action (ZODIAC) initiative), addressing plastic marine pollution (Nuclear Technology for Controlling Plastic Pollution (NUTEC Plastics)), food and nutrition security and safety (Atoms4Food), small modular reactors (the Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative and the Platform on Small Modular Reactors) and women's representation in the nuclear field (the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme and the Lise Meitner Programme), and encouraged support to them through political, financial or in-kind contributions.

130. States parties underlined the importance of the IAEA nuclear applications laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria; at IAEA headquarters in Vienna; and in Monaco, in developing and refining relevant nuclear techniques and in delivering them to member States, and welcomed the progress made in the Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories project.

131. States parties recognized the need to ensure that IAEA had adequate and necessary support to enable it to provide, upon request, the assistance needed by member States, and welcomed the contributions by States parties and groups of States parties in support of IAEA activities.

132. States parties emphasized the importance of the technical cooperation activities of IAEA and the importance of sharing nuclear knowledge and the transferring of nuclear technology to developing countries and least developed countries. States parties stressed that the IAEA technical cooperation programme was the major vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and called upon States parties to contribute to the Technical Cooperation Fund in full and on time and to make every effort and take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities were sufficient, assured and predictable to meet the objectives set out in the IAEA statute.

133. States parties welcomed the upcoming IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science, Technology and Applications and the Technical Cooperation Programme, to be held in Vienna from 26 to 28 November 2024.

134. States parties acknowledged that the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative continued to be instrumental in mobilizing extrabudgetary contributions to support IAEA activities in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While welcoming the contributions that had been made, States parties in a position to do so were encouraged to make additional contributions through the Peaceful Uses Initiative.

135. States parties recognized that regional and cooperative agreements, including under the auspices of IAEA, for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could be an effective means for facilitating technical and technology transfers.

136. States parties welcomed the establishment of an IAEA-owned and -operated low enriched uranium bank located in Kazakhstan, and its full operationalization in 2019, and the voluntary contributions from member States in this regard.

137. States parties stressed the importance of nuclear safety and nuclear security for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While recognizing that the responsibility for safety and security rested with individual States, States parties reaffirmed the central role of IAEA in the development of safety standards and nuclear security guidance and relevant conventions, based on best practices, and in strengthening and

coordinating international cooperation on nuclear safety and security. States parties were encouraged to regularly use the Agency's peer review and advisory services.

138. All relevant States parties were encouraged to become party to and adhere to the relevant conventions and instruments in the field of nuclear safety and security, and to fully implement their provisions.

139. States parties stressed the importance of transporting radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and encouraged continued efforts to improve communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.

140. States parties took note of the IAEA report entitled "Comprehensive report on the safety review of the ALPS-treated water at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station"<sup>1</sup> and expressed support for the Agency's related work, including the continual reviews by its task force after the start of the discharge by Japan of treated water into the sea. States parties emphasized the importance of the Agency's ongoing impartial, independent and objective safety review and monitoring based on relevant safety standards during all phases. States parties acknowledged the need to continue a scientific approach on this matter. One State party underlined the importance of establishing long-term, independent and effective international monitoring arrangements, that involved the substantive participation of all stakeholders, to ensure that all potential risks were adequately analysed, evaluated and mitigated.

141. States parties emphasized the importance of nuclear safety and security regarding peaceful nuclear facilities and materials in all circumstances, including in armed conflict zones, and noted the IAEA Director General's seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict, which were derived from IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance.

142. Many States parties expressed grave concern for the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine in the context of the ongoing armed conflict. Some States parties called for the urgent withdrawal of all unauthorized military and other personnel from the country's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and for the plant to be immediately returned to the full control of the competent Ukrainian authorities. Many States parties expressed appreciation for the efforts of IAEA and its Director General regarding the safety and security of the nuclear facilities and materials of Ukraine, including through the on-site presence of IAEA staff at all its nuclear facilities, as well as the establishment of the Agency's five concrete principles to help ensure nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. One State party expressed the view that there were no unauthorized military forces at the power plant and that the facility belonged to that State party.

143. States parties considered that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardized nuclear safety, had dangerous political, economic and environmental implications and raised serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

144. States parties welcomed the initiatives to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty through the strengthened review process for the Treaty. They emphasized the role of the strengthened review process in ensuring accountability concerning the extent to which all States parties were applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to the implementation of their Treaty obligations, especially in relation to the implementation of article VI and its related commitments.

---

<sup>1</sup> See [https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea\\_comprehensive\\_alps\\_report.pdf](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_comprehensive_alps_report.pdf).

At the same time, some States parties emphasized that the challenges faced by the review process were rooted more in political than procedural issues, in particular the fulfilment of disarmament obligations and the associated lack of progress.

145. While some States parties noted that the meeting in July 2023 of the working group on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty did not reach consensus on recommendations to the Preparatory Committee, other States parties expressed views about the importance of maintaining stability in the current review mechanism, and its consensus-based working methods, and that such work should be carried forward with prudence and evaluated objectively. One State party expressed the view that the discussion of strengthening the review process during the second session of preparatory committee was not the continuation of the working group.

146. Many States parties noted that the deliberations of the 2023 working group had provided an opportunity to deepen discussion among the States parties on measures that would improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the review process of the Treaty.

147. One State party expressed the view that all ideas concerning the strengthening of the Treaty review process deserved to be studied, yet all proposals discussed, including on transparency, reporting and accountability, should be considered in a comprehensive manner and assessed in terms of their influence on the Treaty review process and the Treaty in general.

148. States parties expressed support for improved efficiency in the review process itself, including through more effective use of time and avoidance of duplicate or overlapping discussions. Support was also expressed for interactive debates and the use of a rolling text in Preparatory Committee sessions as well as measures to strengthen coordination between sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference. Some States parties also noted that the Preparatory Committee could focus on compiling and exchanging views and subsequently assigning proposals for structured discussion to one of the main committees or subsidiary bodies of the Review Conference.

149. Some States parties noted measures identified related to accountability on disarmament obligations, including benchmarks; concrete, measurable and time-bound actions with deadlines; and national reporting on the implementation of Treaty obligations and related commitments. Many States parties proposed the use of a standardized national reporting form for nuclear-weapon States. Some States parties welcomed the transparency efforts by some nuclear-weapon States.

150. Some States parties proposed to dedicate time for the presentation and interactive discussion of national reports at Preparatory Committee meetings and Review Conferences. Some States parties also suggested that the reports of non-nuclear-weapon States that are under a nuclear umbrella should also be discussed during these times. However, other States parties noted that there was no third category of States parties. Some States parties suggested that work begin immediately towards a new mechanism for transparency and accountability, with such an exercise being officially included in the work of the third session of the Preparatory Committee.

151. Many States parties suggested items for reporting by nuclear-weapon States, including but not limited to, and without prejudice to national security: (a) the number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads; (b) the number and the type of delivery vehicles; (c) plans related to the modernization of nuclear weapons, and related changes to their nuclear capabilities; (d) current nuclear postures and doctrines; (e) the measures taken to reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts,

doctrines and policies; (f) the measures taken to reduce the risk of unintended, unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons; (g) the measures taken to de-alert or reduce the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems; (h) the number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts; and (i) the amount of fissile material available for military purposes. Some States parties also noted that a standard reporting form would not take into account the distinct differences between nuclear-weapon States regarding these categories.

152. Some States parties also underscored the value of greater involvement by civil society in the reporting cycle. They called for greater inclusivity during the review cycle, including the equal representation of women and men. In this regard, they noted the consideration of gender perspectives within the Treaty, and recalled the joint statement on gender made at the tenth Review Conference.

---