



安全理事会

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2024年3月25日安全理事会第2653(2022)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

安全理事会第2653(2022)号决议所设专家小组成员谨随函转递根据第2700(2023)号决议第20段提交的中期报告。

报告于2024年3月1日提交给安全理事会关于海地的第2653(2022)号决议所设委员会，委员会于2024年3月15日审议了该报告。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本信和中期报告并将其作为安理会文件分发为荷。

安全理事会第2653(2022)号决议所设
海地问题专家小组



海地问题专家小组根据第 2700(2023)号决议提交的中期报告

摘要

在本报告所述 2023 年 11 月 13 日至 2024 年 2 月 15 日期间，海地局势进一步恶化。政治过渡停滞不前，制裁制度迄今为止产生的明显影响有限，多国安全支助团的部署被推迟，这种状况无异于为帮派扩大地盘大开绿灯，并为内乱创造了肥沃的土壤。

帮派暴力达到了前所未有的程度和地域范围，受制裁的帮派头目尽管已被指认，但仍在继续从事激烈的武装暴力活动。在西部省，帮派内部和帮派之间的战斗不仅标志着 G9 联盟的分裂，而且标志着 G-Pèp 联盟的积极扩张，除了巩固与阿蒂博尼特省帮派的联盟外，G-Pèp 联盟还增加了在首都主要出入口的存在。

通往首都的主要道路是民众的战略生命线，也是帮派收入的主要来源之一，随着这些帮派加强对这些道路的控制，帮派的地盘扩张继续使海地的经济和其他活动无法运转和开展。例如，多个行为体最近在 Mariani 的冲突和封锁对该国整个南部地区造成了破坏性影响，切断了供应路线，进一步限制了行动自由。

帮派继续残暴地侵犯人权，包括对民众的不分青红皂白的袭击以及谋杀、强奸、酷刑和绑架，特别是在西部省和阿蒂博尼特省。自 2023 年 11 月以来，帮派暴力已导致该国境内又有 10 万人流离失所，数以万计的人逃往国外。特别是，儿童因流离失所、营养不良、被剥夺受教育的机会以及包括性暴力和强迫招募在内的帮派暴力，饱受危机之苦。

尽管海地国家警察作出了努力，但仍难以恢复和保持对领土的控制并遏制帮派的扩张。警察人数继续下降，主要原因是辞职，但也有因违纪被停职和被杀害的情况；在提交报告之前的几个星期里，海地国家警察设施多次成为帮派袭击的目标。现在部署多国安全支助团是至关重要和迫在眉睫的。

尽管 2023 年 10 月根据安全理事会第 2699(2023)号决议实施了领土武器禁运，但帮派和其他非国家行为体继续非法采购武器和弹药。专家小组目前正在调查几起涉及小武器和弹药的违反武器禁运行为。负责执行武器禁运的海地机构对禁运规定缺乏了解，进一步阻碍了禁运的执行。

在本报告所述期间，一系列行为体参与了抗议和煽动内乱，包括要求总理下台，而有些行为体则呼吁革命，并公开显示得到了保护区监察队成员等武装人员的支持。2024 年 2 月 7 日是 2022 年 12 月 21 日《协议》规定的新当选政府就职的最后期限，在 2 月 7 日之前，这些行为体的势头有所增强。自 2024 年年初以来，该国不同地区爆发了多起大规模示威活动；然而，在编写本报告时，太子港的动员水平仍然相对有限。

除了帮派头目之外，一系列谋求增加财富和影响力的行为体也在利用该国当前的混乱局面，其中包括私营部门行为体、政界人士和前政府官员——这些角色都不是相互排斥的。专家小组继续调查助长海地不稳定的非法资金流动。

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一. 引言

A. 任务规定

1. 2023年10月19日, 安全理事会第2700(2023)号决议延长了对海地的制裁制度, 包括旅行禁令、资产冻结和武器禁运。安理会的这一决议自通过之日起将其第2653(2022)号决议第21段规定的专家小组任务期限延长13个月, 还决定该任务也适用于第2700(2023)号决议规定的措施(见下文第9-11段)。
2. 继安全理事会第2653(2022)号决议所设委员会于2023年12月8日指认4名个人后, 根据第2653(2022)号决议指认的个人和实体名单目前有5名个人, 均为海地西部省的帮派头目。¹
3. 本中期报告是根据第2700(2023)号决议第20段提交的, 涵盖2023年11月13日至2024年2月15日期间进行的调查。由于字数限制, 专家小组在附件中详述了一些分析。

B. 方法

4. 专家小组恪守透明、客观、公正、独立的原则, 以专业、注重技术的方式开展调查(见S/2023/674, 第8-10段和附件1)。鉴于海地的极端不安全状况, 专家小组在必要时非常谨慎地不披露身份信息, 以保护消息来源。
5. 在2023年9月发布最后报告(S/2023/674)后, 专家小组收到了报告中提到的一系列行为体自愿提供的信息以及有关这些实体的信息。专家小组审查了这些材料, 并与委员会分享了这些材料及其意见。
6. 专家小组向会员国发出了索取资料的请求。专家小组感谢对专家小组的请求作出回应的会员国, 并进一步强调这一信息对支持专家小组的工作至关重要。
7. 自2023年10月获得任命以来, 专家小组在海地进行了调查, 在多米尼加共和国和美利坚合众国进行了实况调查, 并根据第2700(2023)号决议第21段, 继续与联合国海地综合办事处(联海综合办)和联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室(毒品和犯罪问题办公室)合作, 并与加勒比共同体(加共体)保持公开接触。专家小组得到了联海综合办的大力支持, 对此专家小组深表感谢。专家小组欢迎海地当局和机构继续给予合作。
8. 专家小组继续调查可能违反制裁制度的行为, 并收集关于符合指认标准的个人和实体的信息。

C. 联合国海地制裁制度的发展情况

9. 绝大多数海地人对延长制裁制度持积极态度, 他们热切期待制裁更多的行为者, 特别是那些支持帮派的人。

¹ 见 www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653/materials/summaries。

10. 虽然委员会于 2023 年 12 月制裁了四名帮派头目，发出了一个积极的信息，但制裁的效果仍然极为有限，因为帮派头目及其帮派的活动基本上不受这些措施的影响。这些帮派头目是该国最有权势的人，尽管对他们实行制裁，但他们继续建立武库，扩大地盘控制，并增加成员人数(见第二节)。鉴于该国的严峻局势，制裁制度必须发挥更有意义的作用，处理继续威胁该国和平与稳定的其他关键行为者。

11. 通过大幅扩大武器禁运的范围，从定向禁运扩大到领土禁运，安理会采取了一项关键措施，以促进解决武器和弹药贩运这一重大问题。然而，这一进程仍处于早期阶段，扩大武器禁运范围的执行工作仍然薄弱，在海地和该区域执行武器禁运的资源有限。预期执行禁运规定的行为体也缺乏对这些规定的认识(见下文第 74 段)。

D. 政治和安全背景

1. 政治进程

12. 自 2023 年 9 月专家小组最后报告(见 S/2023/674，第 12 至 16 段)发布以来，在执行《包容性过渡和透明选举全国共识》(又称“12 月 21 日协议”)方面进展甚微，一系列海地利益攸关方指责政府无所作为。

13. 在报告所述期间，参与支持海地政治调解的加共体知名人士小组多次访问海地，以支持包容各方的对话和促成缔结一项新的协议。虽然各政治行为体继续努力进行对话，但仍存在严重分歧，一些反对派成员坚持将总理辞职作为进行任何谈判的先决条件。

14. 政治过渡进程停滞不前，这仍然是组织选举和改善该国局势的一个重大障碍。

2. 安全形势

15. 在本报告所述期间，帮派暴力和民间动乱增加。安全局势继续恶化，特别是在西部省、阿蒂博尼特省和中部省，导致数以千计的人被杀，人权遭到肆无忌惮的侵犯，其中包括性暴力行为，流离失所现象进一步加剧，许多人离开该国(见下文第三节)。

16. 西部省的帮派继续参与激烈的战斗和对民众的袭击，G9 联盟四分五裂，G-Pèp 联盟获得了新的重要地盘(见下文第二节)。对许多利益攸关方来说，根据安全理事会第 2699 (2023)号决议核准多国安全支助团导致帮派活动进一步加剧，包括夺取太子港大都市区以外的地盘和控制新的进出道路，以及加大招募力度和获取更多武器弹药。延迟部署使帮派得以肆无忌惮地加大活动力度，帮派暴力目前已席卷太子港南部新的地区。

17. 尽管海地国家警察作出了努力并持续开展行动，但仍然无法控制帮派活动的扩大。警察人员和设施经常成为帮派的目标。多国安全支助团的延迟部署对

警察的士气产生了不利影响。2023 年，警察人数减少了 1 665 人，其中 48 人死亡，绝大多数人离开了这个国家。²

18. 由于普遍的暴力、腐败、罢工和政治干预，司法系统在很大程度上仍然运作不良。一些法官，包括一些最近获得认证的法官，仍在等待延长任期，使起诉破坏海地稳定的个人的案件受到严重影响。其他有关人员的工作因其受到威胁和缺乏保护而受到阻碍。此外，已发出的多份逮捕令仍未执行。

19. 帮派暴力，加上国家安全薄弱和有罪不罚现象，导致民团运动得到加强，而民团运动反过来又导致人权受到侵犯(见附件 14)。

3. 最近的反政府动员

20. 不断恶化的局势，再加上缺乏任何可预见的缓解措施——选举、多国安全支助团的部署，或对帮派头目以外其他行为者的制裁——为激进立场获得越来越多的支持和一系列行为者试图煽动内乱创造了肥沃土壤。

21. 2024 年 2 月 7 日是 12 月 21 日《协议》规定的新当选政府就职的最后期限，在 2 月 7 日之前，这些行为体的势头有所增强。³ 自今年年初以来，由政治行为体领导的要求总理下台的大规模示威活动在该国部分地区引发了骚乱，在编写本报告时，太子港的动员活动仍然相对有限。

22. 前国家警察高级专员 Guy Philippe 因密谋清洗贩毒所得钱财而在美国被监禁六年后，⁴ 于 2023 年 11 月返回海地。他曾于 2004 年领导武装叛乱，导致推翻了前总统让·贝特朗·阿里斯蒂德。⁵ 自返回后，他一直在领导公众集会和示威活动，特别是在该国南部，并呼吁革命。⁶

23. Philippe 先生还得到了环境部下属的国家保护区署设立的保护区监察队的支持。尽管如此，现任政府一直无法控制该监察队。政府关于提供监察队工作人员名单及其武装能力的要求仍未得到满足。消息来源告诉专家小组，该监察队的许多人员没有工资，他们付钱加入该监察队，必须自己提供武器，这些武器很可能是非法购买的。

24. 2024 年 1 月下旬，政府发布了几项命令以解决这一问题，包括解除国家保护区署主任 Jeantel Joseph 的职务，他实际上领导着指挥系统。政府还设立了一个委员会，负责对该署进行改组，要求其工作人员在环境部正式登记，并禁止

² 联合国数据，2024 年。

³ 见《包容性过渡和选举透明全国共识》第 20 条，可查阅 <https://www.haitilibre.com/docs/Consensus-National-pour-une-transition-inclusive-et-des-elections-transparentes.pdf>。

⁴ 见 www.justice.gov/opa/pr/haitian-national-pleads-guilty-conspiring-laundry-money-derived-drug-trafficking。

⁵ www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article282500613.html，以及与官方信息来源的访谈，2024 年。

⁶ 例如见 www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1147137756661939。

武装人员在城市地区活动。⁷ 虽然该监察队的一些成员遵守了规定，但其他人没有遵守规定，而是继续承认 Joseph 是他们的领导人，并携带枪支在城镇中四处游荡，包括在 2024 年 2 月一些城市举行示威活动期间。

25. 在 2024 年 2 月 5 日至 8 日的示威高潮期间，全国各地发生了多起暴力行为，包括劫掠私人 and 公共财产、设置路障和侵犯人权，导致经济生活和教育中断。例如，在戈纳伊夫(阿蒂博尼特省)，一些人破坏了海地红十字会办公室、市政厅和民事法庭的部分设施。在太子港，保护区监察队与海地国家警察交火，造成五名监察队人员死亡。此外，还报告了警察过度使用武力的案件，调查正在进行中。在米尔巴莱，监察队人员打死两名平民，另打伤两人。⁸ 1 月 20 日至 2 月 7 日，至少有 16 人死亡，29 人受伤，这主要发生在抗议者与警察之间的对抗中。⁹

二. 帮派态势¹⁰

26. 尽管 G9 和 G-Pèp 打算实现 *Viv Ansam* (“共存”)(见附件 1)，但帮派暴力已达到前所未有的程度，使 2024 年 1 月成为两年来暴力最严重的月份(见下文第 45-47 段)。¹¹

27. 帮派内部和帮派之间的战斗不仅标志着 G9 联盟的分裂，而且标志着 G-Pèp 联盟的积极扩张，G-Pèp 联盟除了巩固与阿蒂博尼特省帮派的联盟外，还增加了对首都主要出入口路口的控制。¹²

A. G9 的分裂和太阳城、太子港两镇暴力升级

28. G9 内部日益分裂的一个关键触发因素是该联盟于 2023 年 9 月 26 日惩罚性地处决了与 G9 有关联的 Carrefour Drouillard 帮派的领导人 Tysson，原因是他无视联盟的指示。他的死亡在太阳城地区引发了与 G9 有关联的各帮派之间的冲突(见附件 3)。后来，2023 年 11 月 12 日，Belekou 帮派头目、G9 共同创始人 Iskar

⁷ 见 <https://communication.gouv.ht/2024/01/communique-de-presse-18/>。

⁸ 在中央平原与政府官员的访谈，2024 年 2 月。

⁹ 见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-turk-warns-deepening-human-rights-crisis-following-most-violent-month-two-years>。

¹⁰ 本节所载资料是在与国家 and 国际帮派分析人士、前帮派成员、政府官员、海地国家警察、居住在帮派控制区的个人和民间社会代表进行访谈的基础上，根据公开和机密材料和经核实的公开信息来源提供的。

¹¹ 机密报告，2024 年。

¹² 虽然没有一个明确的指挥系统，但这一起初由 Ti Gabriel 领导的联盟在很大程度上受到了 5 Segond 和 Grand Ravine 帮派头目的影响，

Andrice (别名“Iskar”)意外死亡,¹³使 G9 联盟再受打击,导致 G9 与 G-Pèp 之间再次出现地盘争端(见附件 4)。

29. 在太子港大都市区的太子港镇,另一个引发 G9 各帮派之间冲突的因素是 La Saline、Fort Tournon 和 Fort Dimanche 帮派在 10 月中旬建造了一堵墙,以防止 Wharf Jérémie 帮派劫持卡车。¹⁴ La Saline 和 Wharf Jérémie 再次发生战斗,其激烈程度在 2024 年 1 月 27 日至 31 日达到顶峰。支持 La Saline 的 Projet de La Saline 帮派成员¹⁵于 2024 年 1 月 30 日杀害了 La Saline 的首领 Marc。¹⁶

30. 与此同时,吉米·谢里齐耶(Jimmy Chérizier, 别名“Barbeque” - HTi.001)面对 G9 的分裂和 G-Pèp 对他所控制地盘构成的日益严重的威胁,越来越多地发出反对政府的政治言论。1 月,Barbeque 发布了一段视频,宣称虽然他与 Philippe 先生不结盟,但他尊重 Philippe 先生的使命,即让国家摆脱总理阿里埃尔·亨利的控制。Barbeque 还呼吁进行一场革命,改变现有的政治制度,造福于所有海地人。¹⁷

31. 尽管最近帮派斗争激增,但各帮派及其各自所属联盟之间的关系是不稳定的。G9 和 G-Pèp 的一些领导人可能试图重新启动“共存”联盟,以此形成反对政府和(或)未来多国安全支助团的共同阵线。¹⁸

B. G-Pèp 活动范围的扩大

1. G-Pèp 对 G9 据点造成的压力

32. G-Pèp 对 G9 在太子港大都市区太阳城、太子港和德尔马斯各镇的据点施加了沉重压力,以便从以下等方面获益:(a) 在瓦勒燃料码头和国家港务局(Autorité portuaire nationale)附近,以及在进出道路和 RN1 国道沿线非法征收通行费;(b) 勒索在工业园区经营的街头小贩、商人和私人行为体;以及(c) 贩毒。¹⁹

33. 在太阳城, Gabriel Jean-Pierre (别名“Ti Gabriel”)利用 G9 的空虚,从被 G9 帮派围困的布鲁克林区出来(见 S/2023/674),试图巩固他在 Boston、Belekou 和 Carrefour Drouillard 等地的据点。他最终于 1 月 30 日成功掌控了 Carrefour Drouillard 和邻近的 Nan Raket 地区。²⁰

¹³ Iskar 被他的副手 David Ganier(别名“Black Alex Mana”)取代,后者于 2023 年 11 月 21 日被一名帮派成员杀害。

¹⁴ 与帮派分析人士和 2023 年生活在帮派控制区的个人以及前帮派成员的访谈,2024 年 1 月。

¹⁵ 与帮派分析人士的访谈,2024 年 1 月和 2 月;以及机密报告,2024 年 1 月。

¹⁶ 机密报告,2024 年;以及与帮派分析人士和前帮派成员的访谈,2024 年 1 月和 2 月。

¹⁷ 保存在专家小组文件中的视频。

¹⁸ 与国内和国际帮派分析人士的访谈,2024 年 2 月。

¹⁹ 专家小组目前正在调查包括大麻和可卡因在内的毒品贩运案件,并将在适当时候就此提出报告。

²⁰ 联合国信息来源和与一名帮派分析人士的访谈,2024 年 2 月。

34. 在太阳城以南几公里处的太子港镇，5 Segond 和 Grand Ravine 帮派试图控制觊觎已久的 La Saline 地区，主要是为了让 5 Segond 的头目约翰逊·安德烈(别名“Izo”-HTi.002)扩大对太子港海湾沿岸的控制，这将有利于他的贩毒活动。²¹ Marc 被杀后，1月30日，Izo 和 Grand Ravine 的头目勒内尔·德斯坦纳(别名“Ti Lapli” - HTi.003)向袭击 Wharf Jérémie 的 Projet de La Saline 帮派提供了包括武器和人员在内的增援。作为交换，Izo 要求控制国家港务局码头和瓦勒燃料码头附近地区，Ti Lapli 要求控制“Croix-des-Bossales”市场。²² 与此同时，Ti Lapli(见附件 5)还将他的控制范围从城市南部(见下文第 37-40 段)扩大到市中心，在国家宫附近的太子港墓地建立了帮派小组。²³

35. 与此同时，在德尔马斯镇，Bel Air 帮派(又称 Les Argentins 帮派)头目 Kempes Sanon (别名“Kempes”)在 Ti Lapli 的支持下，自 1 月 14 日以来，在袭击 Solino 社区(见附件 6)的同时，对 Barbeque 控制区施加压力，以获得运送人质的通道。²⁴

36. 2 月，太子港战神广场和周围地区的狂欢节庆祝活动受到干扰，Kempes 的人用自动武器射击，打伤了参加狂欢节的人，而结盟的 Grand Ravine 帮派则绑架了五人(见附件 7)。

2. 对太子港南部的控制使整个南部窒息

37. 自 2023 年 8 月 Ti Lapli 控制太子港 Carrefour-Feuilles 地区以来(见 S/2023/674)，Grand Ravine 和 5 Segond 将其影响力大幅向南扩展，通过在连接首都和南部的主要道路 RN2 国道沿线实施绑架、贩毒、敲诈勒索、非法收费和劫持卡车等活动攫取更多收入。自 2023 年 10 月 31 日以来，他们在 Carrefour、Gressier 和 Leogane 镇引发了新一轮暴力冲突，造成大量人员死亡和流离失所。2023 年 11 月 1 日，Grand Ravine 在 Carrefour 镇 Mariani 设立了一个小组，²⁵ 由 Beliose Louis Jeune (别名“Bout Ba”)指挥(见附件 8)。

38. 在暴力事件愈演愈烈的背景下，国家港务局码头和小戈阿沃港之间的海上航线被用来绕过帮派控制区和路障(见附件 9)，尽管这条航线费用更高、风险更大(见下文第 84-88 段)。

39. Mariani 封锁影响了西部省和南部省(包括南部省、东南省、大湾省和尼普省，以及西部省的南部市镇)之间的贸易，造成供应短缺和商品价格上涨(见下文第 94 段)，基本服务的提供也受到限制。由于靠近 Mariani，南部地区也处于高度戒备状态，因为暴力可能蔓延。

²¹ 与帮派分析人士和生活在帮派控制区的个人的访谈，2023 年和 2024 年 1 月和 2 月。

²² 机密报告，2024 年；以及与帮派分析人士和前帮派成员的访谈，2024 年 1 月和 2 月。

²³ 机密报告，2024 年；以及 2024 年 1 月和 2 月与帮派分析人士和前帮派成员的访谈。

²⁴ 联合国信息来源和与一名帮派分析人士的访谈，2024 年 2 月。

²⁵ 联合国机密文件，2023 年 11 月 28 日；联合国机密报告，2023 年 11 月 20 日。

40. 与此同时，为了扩大控制范围，以勒索次要道路的使用者，由 Christ-Roi Chery (别名“Chrisla”)领导的 Ti Bois 帮派还对 Carrefour 镇的一些地方进行了武装入侵(见附件 10)。

3. 西部省北部和东部地区

41. 在首都以北，Jeff Larose (别名“Jeff”)的 Canaan 帮派除了在 RN 1 沿线非法收取通行费和在主要经济区周围进行犯罪活动(见附件 11)外，还向 Arcahaie 和 Montrouis 镇的土地掠夺者提供“武装服务”。²⁶ Jeff 还被 Izo 鼓动从事贩毒活动，例如在 2023 年 9 月下旬对中央省 Saut-d’Eau 镇的袭击中，据说是被 Izo 打算追回一大批毒品和枪支的意图所驱动。²⁷

42. 与此同时，在 Morne-à-Cabri，由威尔逊·约瑟夫(别名“Lanmo Sanjou” - HTi.004)领导的 400 Mawozo 帮派不断阻碍交通，绑架乘客。该帮派在得到人员增援后，变得非常活跃，这些人员包括反对维特霍姆·因诺森特(HTi.005)领导地位的 Kraze Barye 帮派的一个分支。²⁸ 自 2023 年 11 月以来，这些帮派在 Pétion-Ville 镇附近地区和 Tabarre 镇的一些地方为争夺地盘而发生了致命冲突(见附件 12)。这些帮派活动的增加使 400 Mawozo 靠近与多米尼加共和国接壤的东部市镇 Malpasse 和 Cornillon，这很危险。²⁹

C. 阿蒂博尼特省

43. Luckson Elan(别名“Luckson 将军”)领导的 Gran Grif 和 Ferdens Tilus(别名“Meyer”)领导的 Kokorat San Ras 等帮派(见 S/2023/674 第三.A 节和本报告附件 14)继续实施谋杀、绑架、强奸和袭击农业财产、牲畜和运输车辆的行为。通过极端暴力(见附件 13)，他们导致耕地减少，成千上万的村民离开家园前往城市中心，改变了当地的态势。他们与 G-Pèp 帮派(5 Segond 和 Canaan)结盟，加强了他们在火力和人员方面的能力，并加强了他们对战略地盘的控制，这有利于他们的犯罪经济。³⁰

44. Raboteau 帮派及其来自 Kokorat San Ras 的盟友参加了 2024 年 2 月初在戈纳伊夫举行的示威活动，并参与了对民事法庭的洗劫。³¹

²⁶ 与帮派分析人士和一名政府官员的访谈，2024 年 1 月和 2 月。

²⁷ 与国家 and 国际帮派分析人士、政府官员、海地国家警察、民间社会代表和卫生保健工作人员的访谈，2023 年和 2024 年 1 月和 2 月。

²⁸ 联合国机密报告，2023 年；以及 2024 年 1 月和 2 月与帮派分析人士的访谈。

²⁹ 与帮派分析人士的访谈，2024 年 1 月和 2 月。

³⁰ 见 www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/criminal-violence-extends-beyond-port-au-prince-situation-lower，以及 2023 年和 2024 年 1 月和 2 月与帮派分析人士和生活在帮派控制区的个人的访谈。

³¹ 与执法人员的访谈，2024 年 2 月。

三. 违反国际人权法或构成践踏人权的行为

A. 关于暴力的一般数据³²

45. 普遍存在的不安全状况继续阻碍行动自由，阻碍获得人道主义援助以及粮食、水、保健和教育等基本商品和服务。

46. 2023 年，报告的凶杀案与前一年相比增加了近 120%，与 2018 年相比增加了 600% 以上，2023 年记录在案的受害者有 4 789 人，其中包括 465 名妇女、93 名男童和 48 名女童。这意味着在每 100 000 名居民中发生 40.9 起凶杀案。此外，绑架受害者人数由 2022 年的 1 359 人上升至 2023 年的 2 490 人，增幅达 83.2%。³³

47. 联合国人权事务高级专员办事处报告说，2024 年 1 月是两年多来暴力事件最多的一个月，至少有 806 名未参与暴力冲突的人被打死、打伤或绑架，还有大约 300 名帮派成员受到影响，受影响的总人数达 1 106 人——是 2023 年 1 月报告人数的三倍多。³⁴

B. 帮派犯罪活动的人道主义影响

48. 帮派暴力导致该国境内流离失所者人数增加。截至 2024 年 1 月，境内流离失所者总数超过 313 000 人。在西部省的 146 584 名境内流离失所者中，有 139 853 人住在太子港大都会地区。³⁵ 60% 以上的被迫流离失所发生在 2023 年，94% 的境内流离失所者来自西部省，首都是主要来源地。³⁶ 该国整个南部也受到太子港大都会地区暴力事件的影响(见附件 16)。

49. 关于上文第二节提到的一些具体事件，所造成的人道主义损失包括：

(a) 2023 年 11 月 1 日，Mariani 地区爆发暴力(见上文第二节)，截至 11 月 6 日，造成 2 487 人境内流离失所(见附件 17)。Mariani 的局势不断演变，其人道主义影响正在扩大到该国其他地区，特别是南部；

(b) 自 2023 年 9 月以来，太阳城的帮派冲突加剧，并扩展到 Belekou、Boston、Brooklyn、Pierre VI 和 Terre Noire 地区，仅在 11 月下半月就造成 268 人死伤，其中包括 9 名儿童，他们大多是狙击手式袭击的目标，冲突还导致 1 000 多人流离失所(见附件 18)；

³² 见附件 14 和 15。

³³ 联合国警察数据，2024 年 1 月。

³⁴ 见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-turk-warns-deepening-human-rights-crisis-following-most-violent-month-two-years>。

³⁵ 见 <https://dtm.iom.int/report-product-series/cumulative-displacement-report>；与人道主义行为体的访谈，2024 年 1 月。

³⁶ 见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-more-60-forced-displacements-happened-2023-year-growing-brutality-0>；在访谈中，人道主义行为体向专家小组证实，2024 年 1 月，境内流离失所者人数不断增加，并广泛分布在整个领土。

(c) 2023 年 11 月 15 日前后，在 Arcahaie 镇(西部省)因土地纠纷发生冲突，导致 53 人死亡，10 000 多人流离失所(见附件 19)；³⁷

(d) 在 2024 年的头两周，由于太子港 Solino 和 Gabelliste 地区的冲突，近 8 000 人流离失所，其中大多数是妇女和儿童；³⁸

(e) 2024 年 2 月 5 日至 13 日，约有 10 000 名境内流离失所者为躲避 Carrefour、Cit  Soleil 和 Tabarre 的帮派之间的武装冲突而逃离(见附件 20)。

50. 以上仅是特定事件的缩影。由于所有这些地区的冲突仍在继续，受害者人数(即被打死、受伤、境内流离失所等状况的人数)可能会增加。

51. 2024 年 1 月 20 日，专家小组访问了太子港 Tabarre 的 Jean Marie Vincent 学校的境内流离失所者营地，该营地收容了 779 个境内流离失所家庭，共计 3 000 多人，其中包括 900 名儿童(见附件 21)，并且粮食和水持续短缺。2023 年 7 月 25 日，大多数境内流离失所者为躲避维特霍姆·因诺森特(HTi.005)领导的 Kraze Barye 帮派与 Lanmo Sanjou (HTi.004)领导的 400 Mawozo 帮派之间的冲突而逃离。新的冲突带来了更多的境内流离失所者(见附件 22)。专家小组获得的证词显示，在帮派冲突中存在不分青红皂白的枪杀以及杀害、殴打和强奸妇女的行为。³⁹

52. 海地回返者的人数也很多。多米尼加共和国当局称，2023 年有 497 692 名海地人返回海地，其中 246 678 人自愿返回。⁴⁰

C. 性暴力和性别暴力

53. 帮派有系统地使用性暴力来控制社区，针对妇女和女童(有的女童年仅 3 岁)⁴¹ 实施伏击和集体强奸(见 S/2023/674)。由于污名化、对警察和司法机构缺乏信任以及害怕报复，案件报告不足。这妨碍了起诉工作。⁴² 此外，数据收集方面的挑战阻碍了对这一情况的了解。⁴³

54. 专家小组会见了海地国家警察打击性暴力股的代表，他们表示，该股一半的人员在过去六个月内离开，这对行动构成重大挑战。他们着重指出，由于当前的安全局势，几乎不可能前往高风险地区进行调查。

³⁷ 与帮派分析人士的访谈，2024 年 2 月。

³⁸ 见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/iom-haiti-situation-report-january-2024>。

³⁹ 与几名受害者的访谈，2024 年 1 月。

⁴⁰ 见 <https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/nacional/2024/01/30/deportaciones-de-haitianos-en-2023-medio-millon-devueltos/2591068>。

⁴¹ 机密消息来源，2024 年 1 月。

⁴² 此外，由于没有任何国家系统，获得应对性别暴力方面的服务(特别是安全和法律服务)似乎不可能做到。见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/addressing-gender-based-violence-haiti-june-2023>。

⁴³ 对海地性别暴力或性暴力的程度进行量化是不可能的。由于没有任何标准化系统记录性别暴力案件，而且许多此类案件被忽视或未被报告，使得现有数据不完整或不可靠。见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/addressing-gender-based-violence-haiti-june-2023>。

55. 在与专家小组的访谈中，一名强奸幸存者表示，2023 年 12 月，维特霍姆·因诺森特帮派(HTi.005)的成员强奸了她，当时她正试图从 Tabarre 地区的家中取回一些财物。⁴⁴

D. 侵犯儿童权利

56. 海地儿童面临严重的侵犯人权和危及生命的情势，这是一场历史性危机，政治不稳定、贫困、疾病爆发、营养不良、自然灾害和武装暴力升级加剧了这场危机。这导致该国境内近 17 万名儿童流离失所，300 多万儿童需要人道主义援助。⁴⁵

57. 2023 年，有 167 名儿童因枪击死亡或受伤(见附件 23 和 24)。有些儿童被帮派或自卫团体因怀疑其支持对手而处决，另一些儿童则被强奸(见附件 14)。⁴⁶

58. 自 2024 年 1 月中旬以来，广泛的社会动荡导致全国 1 000 多所学校暂时关闭，西部省、大湾省、东北省、尼普省和阿蒂博尼特省尤其受到影响。⁴⁷

59. 海地国家警察未成年人保护队向专家小组解释了他们在调查案件时面临的一些挑战，这些挑战涉及人员短缺和全国各地的警察设施受到的频繁袭击。2023 年，未成年人保护队记录了 318 起针对未成年人的犯罪事件，其中 8 起涉及性侵犯。

招募儿童

60. 帮派控制地区的儿童不仅面临在冲突中受到伤害或被杀害的风险，而且由于缺乏社会经济和教育机会，还面临被拉入帮派的风险。来自帮派控制地区的机密消息来源表示，大多数儿童加入帮派是出于经济需要。在试用期间他们会被其他帮派成员观察，试用期后会被分配一些小任务，如监测检查站或侦察和监视潜在的绑架受害者。这些儿童逐渐被分派更重要的责任，包括参与对抗敌对帮派的冲突。一些人指出，离开某些帮派，特别是那些与 G-Pèp 结盟的帮派，根本是不可能的。⁴⁸

61. 据机密消息来源称，儿童一旦被招募，每周最低“工资”为 5 000 古德(约 38 至 40 美元)(见 S/2023/674)。据一些分析人士称，Ti Lapli (HTi.003)领导的 Grand Ravine 帮派和 Izo (HTi.002)领导的 5 Segond 帮派被认为是最积极开展强行

⁴⁴ 机密消息来源，2024 年 1 月。

⁴⁵ 见 www.unicef.org/haiti/en/press-releases/unicef-urges-all-parties-safeguard-children-amid-latest-unrest-haiti。

⁴⁶ 见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-turk-warns-deepening-human-rights-crisis-following-most-violent-month-two-years>。

⁴⁷ 见 www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-impact-civil-unrest-humanitarian-response-flash-update-5-7-february-2024；得到人道主义行动者证实的信息，2024 年 1 月。

⁴⁸ 与机密消息来源的访谈，2024 年 1 月；与一个人道主义行为体的访谈，2024 年 1 月；和与一名人权维护者的访谈，2024 年 1 月和 2 月。

招募儿童活动的帮派。此外，维特霍姆·因诺森特 (HTi.005)的帮派中有大约 40 名儿童。⁴⁹

E. 贩运人口和偷运移民

62. 据报告，2023 年 10 月 16 日，4 名未成年人(皆为女童)被胁迫参与性行为，为一名帮派成员庆生。⁵⁰

63. 专家小组正在调查几起关于海地境内以性剥削为目的贩运人口行为的报告。

64. 2023 年，有 520 085 人穿越哥伦比亚和巴拿马边境的达连地区，创下历史新高。其中近 10%是海地人。⁵¹

65. 专家小组继续调查该区域的偷运移民网络。

四. 武器贩运

A. 跨界武器贩运和违反武器禁运行为

66. 在本报告所述期间，帮派暴力和招募人数不断增加，帮派的地盘控制范围不断扩大，这表明尽管实施了禁运，帮派仍在继续采购武器和弹药。与海地国家警察实地警官的访谈进一步证实，帮派似乎没有弹药短缺的问题。此外，在缺乏适当的国家安全保障的情况下，平民和私营部门实体继续非法获取武器和弹药，以确保自我保护。专家小组正在调查自根据安全理事会第 2699(2023)号决议实施领土武器禁运以来区域贩运活动的若干趋势，与此同时，在美国的出发港和海地的入境港查获了若干武器。

1. 从美国贩运

67. 在美国，2023 年 11 月查获了运往海地途中的小武器和弹药。⁵² 在海地，2023 年 12 月 2 日，当局在杜桑·卢维杜尔国际机场查获了 265 发各种口径的弹药、6 部电台、一件防弹衣和一些监控摄像头，并从一名乘坐从纽约出发的商业航班的乘客身上查获 1 万美元现金。⁵³ 2023 年 12 月 22 日，在海地角，海地当局在一个来自美国的集装箱中查获了一支 9 毫米手枪、一支 5.56 毫米半自动步枪和 223 发弹药，以及一顶头盔和三件防弹衣。⁵⁴

⁴⁹ 机密消息来源，2024 年。

⁵⁰ 机密消息来源，2024 年 1 月和 2 月。

⁵¹ 见 <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/106698>；在墨西哥的海地人的证词证实了该地区的一些路线的存在，特别是通过巴拿马达连地区的路线。

⁵² 来自美国海关和边境保护局的数据，2024 年。

⁵³ 与一位海关代表的访谈，2023 年 12 月；以及与一名调查此案的警察单位代表的访谈，2024 年 2 月。

⁵⁴ 机密报告，2023 年；以及 2024 年 1 月与海地国家警察的访谈。

68. 专家小组目前正在调查上述案件，并与多个执法和边境管制机构进行了联系，向有关会员国发出了追查请求。自建立制裁制度以来，专家小组已要求几个制造国提供支助，以追踪在运往海地途中或在海地境内查获的非法武器。2023年，专家小组向3个会员国发出了74项关于手枪和半自动步枪的追查请求，迄今只有1个会员国作出答复。

2. 从多米尼加共和国贩运

69. 2024年1月专家小组访问多米尼加共和国时，当局自2023年10月实施领土武器禁运以来，没有记录任何武器或弹药在进出海地途中被查获的情况。然而，海地的消息来源表明，贩运网络仍然从多米尼加共和国的非法市场采购物资(见S/2023/674)。⁵⁵

70. 例如，2023年12月，海地国家警察在米尔巴莱(中部省)逮捕了三个人，他们运输了9960发子弹。根据专家小组对查获的弹药进行的实物检查，这些弹药包括5.56 x 45毫米半自动或自动步枪子弹。这些弹药是由美国和欧洲的多家制造商生产的，其中一些是在2022年才生产的。根据警方的调查，这些弹药是从多米尼加共和国越境运来，由海地一侧的个人接收的。⁵⁶

B. 国内贩运

71. 2023年，海地国家警察查获了至少265支枪支，包括155支手枪、62支步枪和38支简易枪支。⁵⁷ 查获的武器表明了流通的非法物资的类型，其中只包括小武器。查获的弹药数量不详。

72. 在本报告所述期间，海地国家警察还逮捕了几名负责为帮派采购和运输弹药的人。例如，2024年1月13日，警方逮捕了一名负责在Ti Lapli (HTi.003)领导的Grand Ravine帮派和Kempes领导的Bel-Air帮派之间运输弹药的人。⁵⁸ 1月19日，在Kempes袭击Solino时，有3人在将一批7.62 x 39毫米弹药从Grand Ravine帮派运往Bel Air时被警方击毙(见上文第二节)。⁵⁹

73. 通过此类查获，可以更好地了解帮派动态、关系和采购能力。⁶⁰ 上述Grand Ravine向Bel Air提供的支持表明，Ti Lapli (HTi.003)尽管已被指认，但仍在参与大量武器和弹药采购(见上文第二节、本报告附件5和S/2023/674)。

⁵⁵ 与海地国家警察官员的访谈，2023年12月和2024年1月；与邻近多米尼加共和国的中央省地方当局代表的访谈，2024年2月。

⁵⁶ 与一名高级警官和一名海地国家警察调查员的访谈，2024年1月；与米尔巴莱地方当局的访谈，2024年2月。另见海地国家警察Facebook官方页面，2024年1月10日。

⁵⁷ 联合国警察数据，2024年。

⁵⁸ 见海地国家警察Facebook官方页面，2024年1月13日。

⁵⁹ 见海地国家警察Facebook官方页面，2024年1月20日。

⁶⁰ 关于帮派间枪支流通的更多资料，见S/2024/79，第三节。

74. 专家小组继续调查帮派武器和弹药的来源，包括涉及政治和私营部门行为体的情况。

C. 缺乏认识妨碍武器禁运的执行

75. 2023 年 11 月，武器禁运范围扩大至全境；然而，专家小组在最近访问海地期间注意到，许多国家当局，包括海地国家警察和海关等负责执行武器禁运的主要机构的成员，都不了解武器禁运的规定。例如，私营保安公司继续违反武器禁运，进口 12 号口径散弹枪。⁶¹ 迫切需要海地当局更多地参与，以提高中央和地方各级所有相关机构对这一问题的认识，并向该国所有相关行为体传播信息。

D. 海地当局的武器和弹药管理能力

76. 在本报告所述期间，为提高海地国家警察的武器和弹药管理能力作出了各种努力，包括在国际伙伴的支持下作出努力，如加强主要警察掩体的实体安保和库存管理，以及为参与武器和弹药管理相关活动的工作人员提供各种培训课程。⁶² 尽管查获了大量武器和弹药，但管理收缴武器和弹药的程序仍然薄弱。

五. 非法资金流动

A. 经济状况

77. 海地的经济和社会发展继续受到日益严重的帮派暴力和政治不稳定的不利影响。截至 2023 年 10 月，消费价格指数的年度百分比变化为 13.4%，是 1980 年以来的第二高的数值(见附件 27)，并且由于持续的帮派暴力，这一情况可能会恶化。

78. 帮派以主要道路网络为目标，扰乱了粮食、燃料和其他基本服务的供应链系统。例如，他们在连接海港、农业区和太子港的公路上设置收费站，扰乱了粮食供应，继而扰乱了粮食生产，导致粮食短缺和价格上涨，超出了普通家庭的承受能力(另见附件 28)。⁶³

79. 目前，近 500 万人(海地人口的一半)面临重度粮食不安全，儿童和妇女受影响最大(见附件 26)。⁶⁴ 根据世界银行的数据，现今，在海地出生的儿童长大后的生产力仅为假设他或她在充分享有优质教育和保健的情况下可能达到的生产力的 45%。⁶⁵

⁶¹ 与一家私人安保公司客户的访谈，2024 年 1 月；与海关官员的访谈，2024 年 2 月。

⁶² 联合国报告，2024 年；与海地国家警察的访谈，2024 年。

⁶³ 与总部设在太子港 Kenscoff 镇的两家零售商的访谈，2024 年。

⁶⁴ 见 www.wfp.org/operations/ht03-haiti-country-strategic-plan-2024-2028。

⁶⁵ 见 www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview。

80. 帮派、私营部门和一些政治行为体之间的长期关系，加上挪用公款的情况，是加剧非法资金流动并对该国和平、安全与稳定构成威胁的其他因素。专家小组继续根据其任务规定调查这些趋势。

B. 挪用公共资金

81. 私营和公共部门的腐败以及公营企业滥用公共资金的现象继续对海地政府向民众提供服务的能力产生负面影响(见 S/2023/674)。

82. 尽管起诉率较低(见 S/2023/674，第 30 段)，但海地政府专门的反腐败单位继续对若干个人进行调查。例如，2023 年 11 月，反腐败股提交了 11 份公职人员调查报告，以供起诉。在待起诉的案件总数中，仅这 11 起案件就据称涉及 40 多亿古德，占 2023-2024 年国家预算的 2%。⁶⁶

83. 专家小组继续调查与挪用公共资金、逃税和犯罪活动有关的非法资金流动案件，这些非法资金流动助长暴力，影响海地的和平、安全与稳定。

C. 帮派、海港和非法融资

84. 虽然如以往报告所述(见 S/2023/674，第 18 段)，各帮派仍保持其多种收入来源，但他们加紧了对其所控制的公路沿线公共交通网络的勒索活动，特别是在 RN2 国道和 Mariani 周围设置了更多收费站(见第 37-40 段和附件 9)。帮派以运输部门为目标，扰乱人们获得粮食和其他商品的渠道，助长通货膨胀，阻碍人们获得基本服务和人道主义援助(见附件 14)。

85. 帮派还争夺对海港和进出海港的道路的控制权，以便进行勒索(见 S/2023/674 和本文件附件 30)。为太子港大都市区服务的三个主要港口码头的运输运营商——加勒比港口服务公司、拉菲托公司和瓦勒公司(见附件 29)——一直是愈演愈烈的帮派活动的目标。帮派使用各种勒索方法(见附件 30)。

86. 与 G9 和 G-Pèp 结盟的帮派一直在争夺对进出国家港务局码头(加勒比港口服务公司所在地)的路线的控制权。在本报告所述期间，国家港务局码头周围的安全局势进一步恶化。⁶⁷ 由于 G9 帮派为阻止 Wharf Jérémie 帮派劫持进出加勒比港口服务公司港口的卡车而修建了一堵有争议的墙，La Saline 地区发生了更多冲突(另见上文第二节)。

87. 勒索费是根据集装箱的大小和数量以及当时的情况确定的(例如，如果一个帮派面临敌对帮派的威胁，“税费”就会增加)。例如，2023 年 11 月，在 G9 内讧期间(见第二节)，离开加勒比港口服务公司集装箱码头的卡车被迫向控制第一个“检查站”的帮派支付事先商定的每集装箱 15 000 至 30 000 古德(114 至 228

⁶⁶ 与海地反腐败机构三名代表和一名经济分析人士的访谈，2024 年 1 月。另见 <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/245391/onze-rapports-denquetes-sur-des-faits-de-corruption-values-a-quatre-milliards-de-gourdes-transmis-a-la-justice>。

⁶⁷ 与一名卡车司机、一名帮派分析人士和一个熟悉此事的港口运营商的访谈，2024 年。

美元)的费用,向随后的“检查站”支付的费用较少。⁶⁸每天至少有 200 个集装箱离开码头,Wharf Jérémie 帮派每天至少可以从这种勒索方式中赚取 22 000 美元。

88. 所有这些成本都转嫁到消费者身上,使商品更加昂贵。瓦勒港和拉菲托港也受到类似影响(见附件 30)。

D. 精英阶层与帮派之间的联系

89. 在海地,政治、公务员和私营部门的职位并不相互排斥,有些人同时担任几种角色。例如,富有的商人也可能是政客,这样做的目的是对政策施加影响,使自身受益,包括逃税——还可能赞助帮派(见 S/2023/674, 第 73 和 76 段)。

90. 随着时间的推移,帮派、经济行为体和政客之间历史上的相互依存关系助长了帮派的活动,帮派扩大了地盘,目的是增加非法收入(见 S/2023/674)。由于帮派对其地盘控制严密,没有他们的授权,几乎做不成任何事情。例如,为了组织公开示威,政客和经济行为体寻求帮派的“帮助”,以便接触和/或动员他们所控制地区的民众。

91. 政界人士或商界人士若想在太子港组织公开示威,要向帮派代表支付 8 000 至 10 000 美元的“协助费”(“frais de facilitation”),才能动员一个人数少至 100 至 200 人的团体进行 4 至 6 小时的示威,但示威的价格和时间长短是很好商量的。对手也可以雇佣同一帮派的示威者来对抗对方的示威。示威者往往来自太子港人口稠密的郊区。⁶⁹反政府抗议和全国封锁局势仍然是各帮派向经济和政治参与者勒索收费的机会(见 S/2023/674, 第 79 段)。

92. 一些私营港口运营商还雇用帮派,以使其竞争对手的活动陷入瘫痪。同样,帮派也被用来阻止海关官员检查属于某些经济行为体的集装箱,以避免支付进口税。⁷⁰

E. 海关贿赂作为商业竞争的一种手段

93. 一些经济行为体贿赂海关官员,使其在不办理必要的海关手续的情况下放行集装箱。2023 年 7 月,太子港一名海关副主任被解职,他在没有适当文件的情况下,在核实货物之前,授权从两个私人港口放行几个集装箱。⁷¹在其他情

⁶⁸ 与港口代理人、卡车司机和海关官员的访谈,2024 年;截至 2024 年 2 月 9 日,15 000 古德相当于 114.0326 美元。

⁶⁹ 与一名海地国家警察、一个太阳城民间社会行为体、一名 La Saline 居民和一名帮派分析人士的访谈,2024 年。

⁷⁰ 与海关官员、一名经济犯罪调查员、一个民间社会行为体和一名帮派分析人士的访谈,2024 年。

⁷¹ 与海关官员、一名经济调查员、一名犯罪调查员和一名海地国家警察的访谈,2024 年。另见 <https://metronomehaiti.com/corruption-nettoyage-a-lagd/#>。

况下，商业竞争者贿赂海关人员，以拦截属于竞争对手的集装箱。⁷² 专家小组继续调查此类案件。

F. Mariani 帮派活动的经济影响

94. 自 2023 年 11 月以来，西部省南部 Carrefour 镇 Mariani 区被 Bout Ba 领导的一个 Grand Ravine 小组控制，该小组沿 RN 2 设置了路障(见第 37-40 段和附件 9)。这阻碍了南部各省(尼普省、南部省、东南省和大湾省)与西部各省之间沿 RN2 的人员、货物和服务流动。据一位消息人士说，“任何在高速公路上移动的东西都可能遭到勒索或劫持。”⁷³ 在太子港和雅克梅勒或莱凯之间行驶的出租车可能要付以下费用：在马尔蒂桑路障处支付 3 500 古德(26 美元)；在 Fontamara 路障处支付 2 000 古德(15 美元)；在 Christophe Chanel 路障处支付 1 500 至 3 000 古德(11 至 22 美元)，金额视出租车的大小而定；在 Mariani 路障处支付 1 500 古德(11 美元)；在 Le Lambi 路障处支付 100 古德(0.75 美元)。有些人选择使用海路绕过这些管控，这带来了严重的财政和安全后果(见附件 31)。雅克梅勒、热雷米和莱凯这些南部港口之间的运输系统中断，进而影响了海关创收，特别是在 2023 年第四季度(见附件 32)。

六. 建议

95. 海地问题专家小组向委员会提出以下建议：

(a) 继续审议专家小组 2023 年提交的案件说明，并更新根据第 2653 (2022) 号决议指认的个人和实体名单；

(b) 向多国安全支助团领导人宣传第 2653 (2022) 号决议所设海地制裁制度，包括安全理事会第 2653 (2022) 号决议所设委员会和专家小组的任务规定，特别是安理会第 2700(2023) 号决议第 14 段的规定；

(c) 鼓励会员国进一步支持加强海地国家警察、司法机构和监狱系统，有效执行解除武装、复员和重返社会及减少社区暴力的国家战略，这对于政治过渡取得成功、多国安全支助团执行任务以及该国的长期稳定至关重要；

(d) 鼓励海地当局按照第 2699 (2023) 号决议第 14 段的规定，通过分享领土武器禁运的详细规定，提高参与执行领土武器禁运的所有相关国家机构领导人对此种禁运的认识。

⁷² 与一名主要货物进口商的访谈，他是这一情况的受害者，2024 年。

⁷³ 与海地业主和司机协会的一名成员的访谈，2024 年。

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Annex 1: Attempt of rapprochement between G9 and G-Pèp

Some of the leaders of the two main gang coalitions, the G9 and the G-Pèp, made several announcements in 2023 indicating a rapprochement and a potential wider alliance, through which they promised to end violence. However, the regrouping did not materialized while gangs engaged in heavy fighting between them and carried out attacks against the civilian population.

First, in July 2023 a peace pledge was broken between Jimmy Chérizier (alias ‘Barbeque’) (HTi.001), Iskar Andrice and Mathias Sainthil of G9 and Ti Gabriel of G-Pèp (see final report [S/2023/674](#) section III.2.1). The gang leaders promised “to work hard to end violence, to bring peace to all people”. Second, on 18 September 2023, Jimmy Chérizier, the leader of the G9 coalition, led a demonstration in Delmas, Port-au-Prince, where he announced that the gangs under his control would be establishing with their hitherto rivals, the G-Pèp coalition, a *Viv Ansam* (Haitian Creole for ‘living together’) movement. He was followed by prominent gang leaders⁷⁴ who voiced a collective message urging the population to move freely and the diaspora to return to the country.

This rapprochement coincided with Haitian and international efforts to establish the Multinational Security Support mission, and was reportedly prompted by the intention of gangs to consolidate their resources and territorial positions, counter future any security offensive, exert control over large constituencies for future elections, and to potentially benefit from amnesty in the future⁷⁵.


The peace pledge and the *Viv Ansam* alliance were quickly thrown into question when gang violence broke out again in the West, Centre and Artibonite departments. However, despite severe fighting both within and between gangs during the reporting period - marking not only the fracturing of the G9 coalition but also the aggressive expansion of G-Pèp -, sources told the Panel that main gang leaders from both alliances continue to communicate with each other, and might be willing to reactivate the *Viv Ansam* framework against the government and the future MSS.

⁷⁴ Those include, from G-Pèp: Izo (5 Segond); Ti Lapli and Kilik (Grand Ravine); Vitelhomme Innocent (Kraze Barye); Lanmo San Jou (400 Mawozo); Luckson Elan (Gran Grif); Jeff (Canaan). From G9: Barbeque (Delmas 6); Matthias (Boston); Chrisla (Ti Bois); Micanor (Wharf Jérémie); Iskar (Belekou) and Chyen Mechan (Chyen Mechan).

⁷⁵ Interviews with national and international gang analysts, and confidential report, 2023.

Annex 2: Gang presence on main access roads in the West and Artibonite departments as of 15 February 2024


West department



Source: Map elaborated based on UN data and information provided to the Panel by civil society representatives, HNP officials and gang analysts.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Artibonite department



Source: Map elaborated based on UN data and information provided to the Panel by civil society representatives, HNP officials and gang analysts.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 3: Killing of Tysson as a key trigger for ruptures within G9⁷⁶

The leader of the G9-affiliated Carrefour Drouillard gang, Tysson, was killed in a G9 plot orchestrated by his allies (Belekou, Boston, Terre Noire and Pierre VI gangs), that aimed also to assassinate Claudy Célestin (alias “Chyen Mechan”), close friend of Tysson and leader of the G9-allied Chyen Mechan gang.

His death has triggered clashes in Cité Soleil commune between two G9 camps (Boston, Belekou, Terre Noire and Pierre VI against Chyen Mechan and Carrefour Drouillard, supported by the G-Pèp-Brooklyn gang)

As Chyen Mechan has vowed to avenge Tysson, since 27 September 2023, he has been regularly attacking his former allies of Terre Noire and Pierre VI. On 9 and 10 February 2024, he attacked Terre Noire and Pierre VI groups in several neighbourhoods, also setting fire to houses, targeting families of rival gang members and executing members of the local population.

⁷⁶ Interviews with former gang members and gang analysts, January 2024.

Annex 4: Brutal execution of Brooklyn gang members by Pierre VI gang led by Wilson Pierre (alias “Ti Sonson”), on 15 November 2023.

Photographs removed due to gruesome content (On file with the Panel)

Annex 5: Ti Lapli announces the beginning of the “Port-au-Prince battle”, while offering arms to those wanting to join them.



Still from video filmed on 19 January 2024

Annex 6: Woman killed on 16 January 2024 by Bel Air gang, led by Kempes Sanon, during its attacks against Solino




Photo showing the body of a dead woman with several bullet wounds

Annex 7: Bel Air and Grand Ravine gangs disrupt Carnival festivities in Champ-de-Mars, Port-au-Prince, on 12 February 2024




Carnival participant shot by Bel Air gang members

Photo shared with the Panel

Haït/Culture
Festivités carnavalesques/
Deuxieme jours gras
Des crépitements d'armes
automatiques entendues dans
l'air du [#ChampsdeMars](#) et dans
quequels artères périphériques. 5
cas d'enlèvements ont été signalés à
l'avenue John Brown et trois à la Rue
Capois .



Annex 8: Bout Ba exhibits “his good life” while mocking most vulnerable and the police.




Stills from a video filmed on 17 January 2024



Stills from video shared on 2 February 2024

Annex 9: Roadblocks mounted by gangs around Mariani along RN2 blocking access to the South as of 15 February 2024



Source: Google Map. Map produced by the Panel based on interviews with gang analysts, police officers and civil society representatives

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Along the RN#2, which connects the capital to southern departments, road users are forced to pay illegal tolls to several gangs. Besides the already existing illegal roadblocks of Grand Ravine, 5 Segond and Ti Bois gangs, Grand Ravine has established a new illegal toll in Mariani city, in Carrefour commune. The insecurity in the area triggered a strong reaction from a Carrefour-based self-defense group popularly known as Caravane gang, made of presumed active and former policemen, which also established roadblocks at the northern and southern ends of Mariani. As a result, since late December 2023, the traffic and the movement through the area has been blocked due to both police operations and the deteriorated insecurity. As an alternative some users – who can afford and are willing to take the risk – have opted to move between the APN and Petit Goave by sea. Mariani’s gang – a Grand Ravine cell -, supported by 5 Segond, has orchestrated attacks on sailboats, killing passengers, beheading captains, and undertaking collective kidnappings (see also Section V.F). Of note, the use of the Thor terminal, which was previously utilized to by-pass gang-controlled areas, has been impracticable, considering the increased gang violence, notably with the illegal tolls of Caravane self-defense group and Grand Ravine gang.

Annex 10: Ti Bois gang members taking over HNP Rivière Froide police station.



Stills from video filmed on 10 February 2024

Annex 11: Canaan gang members stormed, looted, and torched the Cabaret women’s prison.




(The prison was empty, as women inmates had been transferred in May 2023 due to the insecurity)



Stills from video filmed on 30 January 2024


Annex 12: Victims of 400 Mawozo and Kraze Barye in Croix-des-Bouquets commune

Victims of 400 Mawozo's attack on Meyer neighborhood, on 1 November 2023



Photographs of bodies of people who died from gunshots, including women

Pernier schoolteacher, with eyes gouged by Kraze Barye gang members, on 30 January 2024



Attack of Kraze Barye's offshoot over Pernier, on 31 January 2024

(47 victims, including 11 gang members)



Photograph removed due to gruesome content

(on file with the Panel)


Photograph removed due to gruesome content

(on file with the Panel)

Stills from video filmed on 31 January 2024 showing dead bodies, including women and minors


Annex 13: Torture on hostages by Artibonite-based gangs

Torture by Kokorat San Ras





Stills from video shared on 29 January 2024

Torture by Gran Grif (video shared in January 2024)



Stills from video showing severe open wounds inflicted by a blunt weapon

Torture by Gran Grif



Stills from video showing people being burnt, 17 February 2024

Annex 14: Other human rights violations

The Haitian multidimensional crisis is eroding the country's social fabric. Key elements fueling this web of insecurity include: political instability, gang violence, lack of or dysfunctional state institutions, deficient governance, progressive decline of law enforcement capabilities, rampant impunity and illicit financial flows, collusion of political and economic actors to undermine state institutions and profiting from chaos and pervasive poverty.⁷⁷

In the West and Artibonite departments of Haiti, gangs are escalating human rights abuses, including killings, rape, kidnapping, extortion, and public and private property destruction, to expand their control. Many people face dangers like stray bullets and mass shootings, while gangs continue recruiting minors.

In the last quarter of 2023, at least 1,634 people were killed or injured as a result of violence by criminal groups. Most were victims of bullets fired during extremely violent attacks, particularly in the communes of Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Gressier and Port-au-Prince (West Department).⁷⁸

According to an NGO, the humanitarian impact of gang's criminal activities in Mariani since November 2023 until mid-January resulted in 77 deaths, 35 wounded, 9 houses destroyed and more than 427 houses abandoned and widespread looting and destructions⁷⁹. The HNP lost 3 armored vehicles torched by the gangs in the same area.

Mass kidnappings of people travelling in public transport vehicles continue on the main roads as the metropolitan area remains surrounded by gangs.

Gangs deliberately targeted administrative buildings, especially those housing the judiciary and police, in an effort to undermine state institutions. For example, on 7 February, the police station of Gros Morne (Artibonite department) was attacked by Kokorat San Ras gang. On the same day, in Gonaïves, Raboteau gang members attacked the civilian courts and the Office Assurances Véhicules Contre Tiers (Car Insurance Office) were looted.⁸⁰

Civil unrest has also caused damages to public buildings. For example, on 29 January, there were attempts by anti-government protesters to set fire to Jérémie's City Hall (Grand'Anse department). Subsequently, on 31 January, unidentified intruders broke into and looted the city hall, stealing office equipment, solar panels, and batteries. In Ouanaminthe, located in the Northeast department, gunmen stormed the Office National d'Assurance-Vieillesse (ONA), while in Hinche, situated in the Center department, demonstrators tried to set fire to the customs office and issued threats to burn down administration buildings.⁸¹

Justice

During the reporting period the already dysfunctional judicial system also faced the strikes of the Haitian Magistrates organization, the National Association of Haitian Court Clerks and public prosecutors suspended hearings from 20 November to 11 December 2023 demanding higher salaries and improved working conditions.⁸²

⁷⁷ See for instance, <https://www.ijdh.org/news-and-resources/publications/>

⁷⁸ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/rapport-trimestriel-sur-la-situation-des-droits-de-lhomme-en-haiti-octobre-decembre-2023>

⁷⁹ Plateforme Nationale pour le Progrès des Droits Humains (PNPDH), “ Enprise (sic) des Hommes ames(sic) sur la population civil de Mariani depuis 1er Novembre 2023 a 19 Janvier 2024.” On file with the Panel.

⁸⁰ See <https://reznodwes.com/?p=328156&>

⁸¹ UNPOL data, February 2024.

⁸² UNPOL data, December 2023.

In October 2023, the CSPJ certified 16 magistrates, with 4 candidates failing and 3 undergoing further revision⁸³. Nonetheless, human rights organizations raised concerns about some of the certified individuals.⁸⁴ In January and February 2024, the CSPJ examined 60 files of judges, 30 were certified, 12 were not and 18 were held for additional clarifications.⁸⁵

On 15 December 2023, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security admonished the Government Commissioners of Miragoâne and Les Cayes for their involvement in unlawful activities.⁸⁶ Human rights defenders have accused the Miragoâne Government Commissioner of being responsible for the extrajudicial killings of at least 10 individuals suspected of gang ties in 2022 and 2023. They have also highlighted to the Ministry of Justice the disproportionate nature of an admonishment in relation to the severity of the alleged crimes committed by the commissioner.⁸⁷ Despite these accusations, no legal action has been taken against those persons.

Food insecurity

Haiti faces a severe food crisis, ranking among the worst globally in terms of affected population. Over 4.35 million Haitians, approximately 40% of the population, suffer from acute food insecurity (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification - IPC) phase 3 and about 1.4 million people fall under IPC 4 (Emergency). Children are particularly vulnerable, with a 30% increase in severe acute malnutrition cases (see Annex 26). Indeed, the number of Haitians in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) has steadily increased over the past four years.⁸⁸

Human rights defenders

Human rights defenders continue to be at risk, according to an NGO, from January to September 2023 there were 38 incidents (attacks, theft, threats, confines, etc) against NGOs in Haiti.⁸⁹

For example, on 29 October 2023 a staff member of the Centre d'analyse et recherche en droits de l'homme (CARDH), was kidnapped and threats were directed against his director. This situation led to the organization's temporary suspension of activities on 22 November.⁹⁰

Several LGBTIQ+ organizations have indicated that LGBTIQ+ persons are particularly at risk of gang violence as they are stigmatized and discriminated against. The lack of support from State authorities makes them also more vulnerable. Thus, 13 cases of aggression against LGBTIQ+ persons were recorded between January and October 2023.⁹¹

Also, women organizations have suffered threats following demonstration for abortion rights in September 2023.⁹²

⁸³ CSPJ. 2023. Procès-verbal. 9 October.

⁸⁴ See <https://web.rnddh.org/fonctionnement-de-lappareil-judiciaire-haitien-au-cours-de-lannee-2022-2023/> Interviews with humanitarian actors January 2024.

⁸⁵ CSPJ. Procès-verbal des opérations de certification. 2 February. and Interview with human rights defender, January 2024.

⁸⁶ See for example letter from the Ministry of Justice addressed to the Commissaire of Miragoâne on file with the Panel.

⁸⁷ Confidential sources, February 2024. See also <https://haiti.loopnews.com/content/le-mj-sp-blame-les-commissaires-du-gouvernement-de-miragoane-et-cayes>

⁸⁸ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024>

⁸⁹ See <https://ngosafety.org/analysis-reports/> Interview with humanitarian actor, January 2024. Interview with human rights defender January and February 2024.

⁹⁰ See <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-human-rights-group-suspends-operations-after-threats-2023-11-23/>

⁹¹ See a <https://www.negesmawon.org/documents-a-consulter/> visited January 2023. Confidential sources, January 2024.

⁹² See for example Comprehensive Written Submission of Civil Society Hearing on Widespread Sexual Violence Against Women And Girls In Haiti, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 186th Period of Sessions, 2023. Available at <https://cgrs.uclawsf.edu/sites/default/files/IACHR%20Haiti%20SGBV%20Written%20Submission.pdf> visited January 2024.

Bwa Kale and vigilante groups

The Panel expresses concern over ongoing killings perpetrated by the population, either through vigilante groups or mob justice known as Bwa Kale (see S/2023/674). Between October and December 2023, vigilante groups killed at least 76 individuals accused of various crimes or affiliations with gangs. Nearly 80% of those crimes occurred in the West department.⁹³

Between October and December 2023, the Caravane self-defence group popularly known as ‘Caravane gang’, based in Carrefour, composed of civilians, as well as current and former police officers killed and wounded at least 17 individuals accused of gang affiliations.⁹⁴

On 10 December, in Tiburon commune (South department), during a police operation against a local gang resulted in the killing of 19 individuals and at least in three cases vigilante group members participated in such attacks.⁹⁵

On 23 December, four persons were killed for allegedly being part of gang operating in the Sèvre area (South department).⁹⁶

Attacks on public transportation.

On 4 December 2023, in Gonaïves (Artibonite department), the Kokorat San Ras gang members, led by Meyer hijacked several transported goods and kidnapped at least 12 persons.⁹⁷

On 18 December 2023, the Gran Grif gang, ambushed a goods convoy escorted by police en route to St-Marc (Artibonite department). This attack resulted in the deaths of at least five passengers and left a dozen others wounded.⁹⁸

On 19 December 2023, in Liancourt, Artibonite department, Kokorat San Ras gang members assaulted a minibus, killing the driver and one passenger, with three additional passengers sustaining serious injuries.⁹⁹

On 29 December 2023, Gran Grif gang members attacked a mini-bus near Carrefour-Paye (Artibonite department), at least five passengers were wounded.¹⁰⁰

On 14 January 2024, Ti Bois gang members in Gros-Morne (Artibonite department) attacked a public transport bus, kidnapping all 35 passengers.¹⁰¹

On 30 January 2024, in Cité- Soleil, members of the Brooklyn gang, controlled by Ti Gabriel, attacked the Nan Raket area which resulted in at least seven people killed, and 30 others injured. Those attacks resulted in more than 4000 displaced people.¹⁰²

⁹³ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/rapport-trimestriel-sur-la-situation-des-droits-de-lhomme-en-haiti-octobre-decembre-2023>

⁹⁴ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/rapport-trimestriel-sur-la-situation-des-droits-de-lhomme-en-haiti-octobre-decembre-2023>

⁹⁵ UNPOL data, December 2023.

⁹⁶ UNPOL data, December 2023.

⁹⁷ Confidential source, January 2024.

⁹⁸ UNPOL data, December 2023.

⁹⁹ UNPOL data, December 2023.

¹⁰⁰ UNPOL data, January 2024.

¹⁰¹ See <https://vantbefinfo.com/un-bus-transportant-35-passagers-pris-en-otage-a-gros-morne/>

¹⁰² “International Organization for Migration (IOM), January 2024. Emergency Tracking Tool #36.1 at Port-au-Prince, Pétion Ville and Cité Soleil. IOM, Haiti.” Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haiti>.

On 31 January 2024, gang members led by Bout Ba hijacked a boat en route from Port-au-Prince to Grand'Anse.¹⁰³ The boat was carrying goods and nearly 70 passengers, including women and children, all of whom were held hostage.¹⁰⁴

On 12 January 2024, in the Carrefour-Paye area (Artibonite department) members of the Gran Grif gang hijacked a bus transporting an unspecified number of passengers from Port-au-Prince to Gonaïves.¹⁰⁵

Attacks against clerics, worshipers and places of worship

Between 30 November to 1 December 2023, Gran Grif gang members kidnapped an undetermined number of worshippers of a church in Petite-Rivière of the Artibonite. They were released without paying a ransom.¹⁰⁶

On 11 January 2024, four pastors were kidnapped in Croix-des-Bouquets (West department) one of whom was released against the payment of a ransom.¹⁰⁷

On 18 January 2024, Bel Air gang members led by Kempes attacked and looted a church in Delmas 24 (Annex 25).

On 19 January 2024, in Port-au-Prince, members of the 5 Second gang abducted six nuns and two workers from the St. Anne Order. They were released on 24 January, but no details were provided regarding the conditions of their release or whether a ransom was paid.¹⁰⁸

Violations to the right to life and physical integrity of children

Children continue to be victims of gang violence. For example, on 6 November 2023, a ten-year-old boy, was intercepted in Mariani area by Grand Ravine gang members who accused him of being a spy. He was then executed.¹⁰⁹

On 25 December 2023, a family in Croix-des-Bouquets (West department) was assaulted in their residence by 400 Mawozo gang members. The assailants ruthlessly killed four individuals, including two young girls aged 10 and 6 (see Annex 23). Furthermore, the gang kidnapped four members of the same family, including the father of the children, who served as the director of a school. Testimonies collected by the Panel substantiated the involvement of members from the 400 Mawozo gang.¹¹⁰

On 19 January 2024, in Mariani (West department), during clashes between gang members and police officers at least seven children were injured according to a local NGO.¹¹¹

On 17 February 2024, in Carrefour-Feuilles (West department), the body of a child partially burnt was left on the street for several days and partially devoured by dogs. The child was killed during clashed between the HNP and Grand Ravine gang members (see Annex 24).

¹⁰³ Many Haitians have resorted to sailing boats as the only way to travel to the south from Port-au-Prince since gangs have blocked all roads.

¹⁰⁴ See <https://www.tripfoumi.com/blog/2024/02/03/70-personnes-enlevees-a-bord-dun-mini-bateau-a-mariani/>

¹⁰⁵ UNPOL data, January 2024.

¹⁰⁶ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹⁰⁷ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹⁰⁸ Confidential sources, January and February 2024.

¹⁰⁹ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹¹⁰ Confidential sources, January 2024.

¹¹¹ Confidential source, January 2024.

Obstruction to children's right to education

The 2023 Ministry of Education national assessment revealed that, in July 2023, 139 schools were used as shelters for 23 gangs and IDPs. Of these, 108 were in Artibonite and 31 in the West department. Additionally, 755 schools were closed, with 402 in Artibonite and 353 in the West, out of a total of 7,402 schools.¹¹² Moreover, more than 130,000 students are missing out on the school feeding program because of violence¹¹³, sometimes the only meal children receive for the day.

Between 13 and 15 October 2023, more than 400 children as well as teachers and nuns, were trapped inside their catholic school at La Saline, Port-au-Prince due to intense clashes between the gangs of Wharf Jérémie and La Saline. On 14 October, about 200 male students were able to evacuate. However, some 115 students, mostly girls, between the ages of 6 and 15, were forced to spend another night at the school. The last 60 students were rescued on 15 October, thanks to the intervention of UN agencies and governmental institutions.¹¹⁴

Also on 13 October 2023, the Lycée national de la Saline in Cité Soleil, was looted by gangs and forced to close.¹¹⁵

According to an NGO in the Mariani area, between November 2023 and January 2024, at least 29 schools have closed due to gang violence.¹¹⁶

Sexual violence against children

The Panel continues its investigations into incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, including against minors. As impunity is rampant and gangs continue to expand their territorial control, cases in areas such as the Artibonite department continue to rise.

UN agencies indicate that, in the Artibonite department, gangs such as Gran Grif, Kokorat San Ras and Ti Grif use sexual violence, particularly rape, as means to inflict fear and punish local populations during attacks against rival villages. Minors are among the victims of those attacks¹¹⁷

On 3 November 2023, a 13-year-old girl who was raped by Ti Bois gang members in Carrefour, Port-au-Prince.¹¹⁸

Obstruction to humanitarian access

The increasing insecurity has compelled the Haitian Red Cross (HRC) to restrict its ambulance services to specific areas within Port-au-Prince.¹¹⁹

Also, the escalating violence in Mariani has severely constrained WFP from reaching the southern peninsula of Haiti¹²⁰ (see Sections II.B.2 and Annex 9).¹²¹

¹¹² See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/unicef-haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-no-9-november-2023>

¹¹³ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/latin-america-caribbean-weekly-situation-update-18-january-2024>

¹¹⁴ Confidential sources, January 2024. See also <https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/stories/children-trapped-amid-gang-violence-find-safety-and-security>

¹¹⁵ Interview with a humanitarian actor, January 2024.

¹¹⁶ Plateforme Nationale pour le Progrès des Droits Humains (PNPDH), “Enprise (sic) des Hommes ames(sic) sur la population civil de Mariani depuis 1er Novembre 2023 a 19 Janvier 2024.” On file with the Panel.

¹¹⁷ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/criminal-violence-extends-beyond-port-au-prince-situation-lower-artibonite-january-2022-october-2023-november-2023>

¹¹⁸ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹¹⁹ <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/haiti-delivering-health-care-amid-growing-insecurity>

¹²⁰ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/wfp-haiti-country-brief-december-2023>

¹²¹ See <https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-occupied-palestinian-territory-haiti>

According to a humanitarian NGO, to reach Port-de-Paix (Northwest department) it is necessary to pass at least four check points set up by different gangs and pay extortionary fees.¹²²

Between 5 and 7 February 2024, significant civil unrest occurred in various Haitian cities, including Port-au-Prince, Ouanaminthe (North East department), Gonaives (Artibonite department), and Mirebalais (Centre department) which resulted in the suspension of almost all humanitarian activities. Furthermore, the office of an international NGO operating in the South department was looted, severely hindering its future operations.¹²³

3.1.2 Violations to right to health

Attacks against healthcare facilities and workers have major humanitarian repercussions as they serve a large population and can often make the difference between life and death for patients. In late 2023, Haiti faced a widespread cholera outbreak, particularly affecting the southern part of the country. Nationwide, approximately 73,000 confirmed and suspected cases were reported, 80% of cases were women and children. The actual number of cholera cases is likely higher due to limitations in the epidemiological surveillance system, worsened by the country's violence. Access to basic sanitation services remains limited, 55% of households have access to drinking water and 39% to latrines.¹²⁴

On 26 September 2023, the University Hospital of Mirebalais was attacked by members of Izo's and Jeff's gangs resulting in the departure of significant numbers of staff. Insecurity and shortage of personnel has significantly impacted the population seeking healthcare.¹²⁵

On 17 October 2023, criminal activities by armed gangs in Croix-des-Bouquets, notably in Morne-à-Cabri (West department), disrupted the operations of the Sainte Thérèse hospital.¹²⁶

On 20 October 2023, the Saint-Damien Nos Petits Frères et Sœurs hospital (Tabarre Commune) had to close its maternity ward due to security concerns.¹²⁷

On 15 November 2023, the Fontaine Hospital in Cité Soleil¹²⁸ was attacked by members of Ti Gabriel's gang causing patients and staff to relocate to other Port-au-Prince medical centers, reducing healthcare accessibility.¹²⁹ This has especially endangered pregnant women's well-being and hindered the United Nations Population Fund's (UNFPA) assistance to the hospital.¹³⁰

On 12 December 2023, a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) ambulance was taking a seriously wounded patient to a hospital when gang members stopped it, took out the patient and killed him on the road.¹³¹

¹²² Confidential source, January 2024.

¹²³ See <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-impact-civil-unrest-humanitarian-response-flash-update-5-7-february-2024>

¹²⁴ See <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4034480?ln=en>

¹²⁵ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹²⁶ See <https://www.tripfoumi.com/blog/2023/10/18/lhopital-sainte-therese-de-hinche-au-bord-du-precipice-en-raison-de-linsecurite/>

¹²⁷ Interview with humanitarian, January 2024. See also <https://www.medicinssansfrontieres.ca/haiti-la-recrudescence-de-la-violence-a-cite-soleil-affecte-lacces-aux-soins-de-sante/>

¹²⁸ See <https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/video/2024/01/25/haiti-caught-crossfire>

¹²⁹ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-medical-care-severely-affected-clashes-cite-soleil>

¹³⁰ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹³¹ Interview with a humanitarian actor, January 2024. See also MSF Communiqué 14 December 2023, on file with the Panel.

Annex 15: Challenges to the Prison System

As of 8 February 2024, Haiti's prisons held a total of 11,834 inmates, with the vast majority of 9,914 detainees being held in pre-trial detention. This represents 83.78% of inmates being held in pre-trial detention, with a cell occupancy rate of about 307.45%, indicating an average of approximately 0.33 square meters per inmate. Among the prison population are 372 women, 232 boys, and 14 girls.¹³² The National Penitentiary alone had just over 3,700 inmates.¹³³

Despite efforts from the Haitian Government and UN agencies, the penitentiary system in Haiti teeters on the brink of collapse. Prisons across the nation suffer from severe overcrowding, shortages of essential resources such as food, medical supplies, and cooking gas, as well as significant issues with sewage and garbage disposal. Gang attacks on prisons are also a constant threat.

On 30 January 2024, the Canaan gang led by Jeff Larose, attacked the Cabaret women's prison. While the prisoners had already been evacuated in May 2023, the infrastructure was ransacked and burnt. It remains under the control of the gang.¹³⁴ Additionally, prisons such as in Croix-des-Bouquets face threats from multiple armed gangs, while facilities like the Center for the Rehabilitation of Minors in Conflict with the Law struggles with mixed-gender populations and dire resource shortages.

The situation is particularly dire in Jacmel (South-East department), where increased police operations have led to a surge in the prison population, which was built to house 139 inmates but currently holds 738 inmates, an occupancy rate of approximately 531% of the prison space exacerbating already strained living conditions.¹³⁵

Efforts to reduce overcrowding, such as the Humanitarian Program for the Reduction of Prolonged Preventive Detention - "Programme Humanitaire de Réduction de la Détention Préventive Prolongée" (PHRDPP)- resulted in 163 inmates released in December 2023.¹³⁶

Prisons in the south of the country are increasingly suffering from disruptions of the supply of basic goods, medical equipment and food resulting from the blockade in the Mariani area (see Sections II.B.2, V.F and Annex 9). Other problems, include issues with septic tanks and waste disposal, in Jérémie, Hinche, and Croix-des-Bouquets.

Efforts to manage resources and budgets within the prison system have been hampered by inefficiencies and allegations of corruption, as evidenced by the case related to the head of the Cap Haïtien civil prison who faced charges of embezzlement in December 2023.¹³⁷

¹³² UNPOL data, February 2024. Human rights defenders and confidential sources highlighted the dire conditions of Haitian prisons and expressed concerns about how the penitentiary system might cope with the upcoming MSS. Interviews February 2024.

¹³³ Confidential source, January 2024.


¹³⁴ Between 19 and 20 May 2023, all the 84 inmates incarcerated in the facility were transferred to the Centre de Rééducation des Mineurs en Conflit avec la Loi (CERMICOL) due to security concerns.

¹³⁵ UNPOL data, January 2024.

¹³⁶ Confidential source, January 2024.

¹³⁷ Confidential sources, January 2024.

Annex 16: Mobility map in the Great South (departments of the South, South-East, Nippes and Grand’Anse)




Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations (OIM), décembre 2023, Cartographie de mobilité dans le Grand-Sud. OIM, Haïti. Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haïti> visit February 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 17: IDPs from Mariani

IDPs following armed clashes between gangs on 1 November 2023 in the Mariani area.




“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Nov 06 2023. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 27 — Displacement at Mariani in the Municipality of Carrefour (01 — 06 November 2023). IOM, Haiti.” Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haiti> visit January 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 18: IDPs from Belekou, Terre Noire-Blanchard, Duvivier, Bas Fontaine and Sarhe, in the municipality of Cité Soleil

IDPs following armed attacks after the death of Belekou gang leader Iskar Andrice in the municipality of Cité of Soleil on 13 November.




“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Nov 16 2023. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 28 — Displacement following attacks in Cité Soleil (15 — 16 November 2023). IOM, Haiti.” Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haiti> visit January 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 19: IDPs from Arcahaie

IDPs following a land conflict in the Fonds Baptiste section (Municipality of Arcahaie, West department) on 15 November 2023.




“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Nov 29 2023. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 29 — Displacement following clashes due to a land conflict in the municipality of Arcahaie (29 November 2023). IOM, Haiti.” Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haiti> visit January 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 20: IDPs from Carrefour, Cité Soleil and Tabarre, February 2024

IDP following armed clashes between gangs in Carrefour, Cité Soleil and Tabarre (05 — 13 February 2024).



“International Organization for Migration (IOM), February 2024. Emergency Tracking Tool #37.1 at Carrefour, Cité Soleil and Tabarre. IOM, Haiti.” Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haiti> visit February 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


Annex 21 : IDP site located at the Lycee Jean Marie Vincent, Port-au-Prince

All pictures taken by the Panel on 19.01.24.



Annex 22: IDPs from Tabarre


IDPs following armed attacks that occurred on 8 December 2023, in the municipality of Tabarre, particularly in the neighborhoods of HT Monquette, Truitier, Tapage and Dumornay.



“International Organization for Migration (IOM), December 2023. Emergency Tracking Tool #31 at Tabarre. IOM, Haiti.” Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/haiti> visit January 2024.


The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 23: Children killed by 400 Mawozo



Still from a video recording showing the dead bodies of two children, provided by a confidential source, January 2024.

Annex 24: Child killed during clashes between HNP and Grand Ravine gang members.



This child was killed during clashes between the HNP and Grand Ravine gang members. His body was left in the street for several days while dogs fed on his corpse.

Carrefour Feuilles, 17 February 2024.

Picture provided to the Panel by confidential source, February 2024.

Annex 25: Attack on a Church

Stills taken from a video circulating on social media. On 18 January 2024, members of the Bel Air gang wreak havoc on a Church in Delmas 24, Port-au-Prince.¹³⁸



¹³⁸ Confidential sources, January and February 2024.


Annex 26: Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for August 2023 - February 2024

Current Acute Food Insecurity | August 2023 - February 2024




About 4.35 million people analysed are experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) in Haiti between August 2023 - February 2024

44% of the analysed population is in IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse).



Current situation: August 2023 – February 2024



LEGEND

IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification

- 1 - Minimal
- 2 - Stress
- 3 - Crisis
- 4 - Emergency
- 5 - Famine
- Areas not analysed

Area receives significant humanitarian food assistance
(accounted for in Phase classification)


> 25% of households meet 25-50% of caloric needs through assistance

Around 1.4 million people are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and around 2.95 million people are in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). Available at <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156571/?iso3=HTI> visited February 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 27: A graph showing the corresponding relationship between real GDP and inflation over the years.

As shown, the annual percentage change in consumer price index stood at 13.4%, as at October 2023, one of the highest in last about 45 years. Source: <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/HTI>.



Annex 28: Impact of inflation at the household level

Between September 2023 and January 2024, food prices have dramatically increased. For instance, before September 2023, a 25kg (or 55lbs) – (9 “marmites”) of Tchako, Bongu or Mega imported rice-type cost between \$32USD and \$35USD. In January 2024, the price had reached \$40USD minimum, according to traders interviewed by the Panel.¹³⁹ According to them, half of their local customers could no longer afford to buy in cash and had resorted to buying on credit and whenever their debts accumulated, they switched to a different shop, leaving the shopkeepers with the debts. As a result, many shops in Kenscoff commune in Port-au-Prince are virtually empty and operate only on certain days and hours of the week, due to reduced business. This situation is typical of most small-scale businesses in the Port-au-Prince metropole.

The situation is even worse regarding locally produced foodstuff. According to the traders for instance, Haitian rice costs twice as much as the imported one. and the same can be said for the locally produced fruits and Haitian reared chicken, beef, eggs, etc. This is due to the costs of farm inputs and transport from farms to markets, amidst gang violence. As a result, many local farmers have abandoned agriculture, and their market space has been filled with imported products. “In another 5 years Haiti will be completely dependent on imported food,” concluded one of the traders.

¹³⁹ During January 2024, the Panel interviewed economists, policy actors, transporters, port operators and traders on the impact of gang violence on the economy and food supply, and they all provided related responses to these issues, summed here. Of the three traders, two traders are based in Kenscoff commune, and one is based in Pétion-Ville.

Annex 29 : Ports serving Port-au-Prince

CPS is a container terminal located at a public port in Port-au-Prince, called the ‘Autorité Portuaire Nationale (APN) Port’. CPS handles over 80% of the cargo coming into Port-au-Prince;¹⁴⁰ it is privately owned and operated and is used by several shipping agents importing commodities. It was licensed to operate in June 2013¹⁴¹ and is managed under a private-public partnership and receives mostly cargo vessels. Information on ports’ Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA) indicates that although it is classified as private-public partnership, it performs the function of a public port, and is owned by the GB Group.¹⁴² The Port of Varreux, located in Carrefour and Cité Soleil neighbourhoods, is a private terminal, that mainly imports petrochemicals, gas, vegetable oil, grains, cement among other items.¹⁴³ Next to it is Shodecosa, Haiti’s largest industrial park; a warehouse that stores about 93 percent of the country’s imported food.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ See, <https://www.projectcargo-weekly.com/2018/10/04/caribbean-port-services-port-au-prince-haiti/>.

¹⁴¹ A confidential report seen by the Panel.

¹⁴² Haiti Port of Lafito, <https://dlca.logcluster.org/214-haiti-port-lafito>.

¹⁴³ <https://dlca.logcluster.org/211a-haiti-port-terminal-varreux>.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with two wholesale traders. Also see, <https://www.twincities.com/2021/10/27/in-haiti-the-difficult-relationship-of-gangs-and-business/>.

Annex 30: Extortion methods around ports

Gangs use different ways of extorting their targeted victims. The method used depends on the circumstances, the value of the goods, and the imminent threats posed by rival gangs. For instance, most expensive cargo such as oil tanks will require a higher payment (often \$1000USD and above) which is pre-negotiated and paid from a secret location such as someone's premises, away from the tolling area (the road).

This is to prevent any potential disruption or attacks from competing gangs. For instance in the case of the APN Port, before a container truck sets off, either the owner of the container or truck must first pay for the passage, sometimes several days before sending the truck to collect the goods from the port.

This is done by locating the gang representative ("watcher or spotter") who often operates within the vicinity of the road, in the nearest town centre. According to sources, truck owners know what to do and gangs rarely mount roadblocks except in isolated cases of non-payment. In cases of "smaller" amounts and where the threat of attacks from rival gangs or HNP are lower, gangs erect roadblocks and extort on the spot¹⁴⁵.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

Annex 31: A map and pictures showing roadblocks mounted by gangs along the RN2 highway

Source: WFP report see <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/wfp-haiti-impacts-mariani-roadblock-food-prices-grand-sud-january-2024>.

See also Annex 9 which shows the roadblocks in Mariani area.

Gang activities (extortion and hijacking) has led to a shortage of essential supplies between the South department and the West department, hiking prices for the basic commodities and transport. From November 2023 when gangs mounted a roadblock in Mariani to extort transporters, the supply of manufactured goods (vegetable oil, petroleum, etc) coming from the West department, and agricultural products (beef, beans, sugar, etc) coming from the South was disrupted. The gangs also engage in trafficking of drugs and smuggling of counterfeit products.¹⁴⁶ Today, the relationship between gangs and transporters has “...almost ‘normalised’ explained a representative of a transport workers association. Each party knows the dos and don’ts,” and even before reaching Mariani, there are several roadblocks. For the taxis to recover these costs, they levy them on the passengers. A trip that used to cost 425HTG per head before November 2023 (Port-au-Prince to Jacmel) now costs 1,250HTG per head (inclusive of roadblock fees).¹⁴⁷ As an alternative to RN2 route, some cargo transporters and travellers have opted to use maritime transport between other departments and the cities in the South. However, the maritime route is far more costly, with a one-way trip for a container from the APN port in Port-au-Prince to Petit Goave costing between \$500USD and \$700USD compared to roughly \$150USD by road before November 2023.¹⁴⁸ Increasingly, gangs are now also attacking maritime vessels being used by the population as an alternative route. For instance, on 6 January 2024, gangs attacked a boat in Mariani area, killing 7 people.¹⁴⁹




Left to right: A photo of food trucks at Le Lambi roadblock mounted by gangs (9 November 2023); Queue of public taxis and cargo trucks at Le Lambi roadblock (4 January 2024) and a public bus and private cars at Le Lambi roadblock (7 January 2024). The vehicles were waiting to pay the toll fees to the gangs before they could proceed. Video and photos shared by a representative of a transport workers association.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with a truck loader and two traders, 2024.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with a Mariani resident, a member of the Association Propriétaire Chauffeur d’Haiti (APCH), 2024.

¹⁴⁸ Interviews with a Kenscoff-based trader, a customs officer and a government official, 2024.

¹⁴⁹ See, <https://haitiantimes.com/2024/01/10/haiti-insecurity-gangs-mariana-pnh/>.



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 32: Customs revenue based on import duty generated by various ports of entry for the last quarter of 2023

See <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/246192/customs-over-11-billion-gourdes-in-revenue-in-december-2023>. Also verified with a customs official, 2024.

As shown in the table below, the ports of Jacmel, Les Cayes and Jérémie recorded no revenue for the last quarter of 2023. This was partly occasioned by the blockade of the RN2 at Mariani by gangs.


 REPUBLIQUE D'HAÏTI
ADMINISTRATION GENERALE DES DOUANES
TABLEAU ANALYTIQUE DES PERCEPTIONS DOUANIERES A L'IMPORTATION
BASE ENCAISSEMENT
TOUS LES BUREAUX DE DOUANE
Exercices 2022-2023 par Bureau / Mois
(Montants en Gourdes)

Bureau	Oct-23	Nov-23	Dec-22	Total	%
Port de PAP	7,436,177,942.33	9,013,940,033.63	9,762,106,624.70	26,212,224,600.66	88.71
Aéroport de PAP	223,542,928.90	182,633,415.57	215,709,997.11	621,886,341.58	2.10
Sonapi	18,000.00	232,707.19	165,169.33	415,876.52	0.00
Cap-Haitien	432,697,840.34	606,592,280.90	1,107,559,084.35	2,146,849,205.59	7.27
Gonaives	21,513.35	125,281.41	-	146,794.76	0.00
Saint-Marc	26,799,644.76	28,029,197.27	24,595,271.22	79,424,113.25	0.27
Miragoane	21,259,030.30	23,328,256.14	31,575,658.55	76,162,944.99	0.26
Petit-Goave	-	-	18,666,024.42	18,666,024.42	0.06
Port de Paix	4,251,209.69	900,007.45	4,701,184.38	9,852,401.52	0.03
Jacmel	-	-	2,700,173.39	2,700,173.39	0.01
Cayes	-	-	-	-	-
Jérémie	-	-	-	-	-
Malpasse	-	2,051,104.97	5,064,217.16	7,115,322.13	0.02
Ouanaminthe	9,294,813.99	7,310,800.99	10,968,253.44	27,573,868.42	0.09
Belladères	2,952,064.38	138,940,382.65	192,398,761.75	334,291,208.78	1.13
Thomassique	-	2,302,380.65	3,001,050.00	5,303,430.65	0.02
Anse-à-Pitres	1,298,055.65	2,316,052.10	-	3,614,107.75	0.01