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Letter dated 28 November 2023 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015), whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2683 (2023), have the honour to transmit herewith the interim report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 19 of resolution 2683 (2023).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan on 3 November 2023 and was considered by the Committee on 17 November 2023.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the interim report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2683 (2023)

Summary

The leaders of South Sudan are pointing to elections, now scheduled for December 2024, as the way out of the country's transitional morass. Elections will not complete the aspirations of the transitional period, but for the many who have grown tired of a Juba-led political process that has delivered few tangible improvements in their lives, they will at least end it.

Outside the ranks of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) party of the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, however, many are concerned that crucial provisions of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, critical to free and fair polls, are yet to be implemented in the face of numerous challenges.

While many of these challenges are rooted in the country's fractured politics, others, like climate-induced flooding, are external. More recently, on 15 April 2023, conflict broke out between rival factions within the Sudanese security forces. Despite the mediation efforts of President Kiir and other regional leaders, a protracted conflict in the Sudan now looks likely, with serious consequences for South Sudan.

More than 350,000 people have crossed into South Sudan from the Sudan since April 2023, with most seeking refuge in border states that were already facing a humanitarian crisis. Localized food insecurity, further exacerbated by the disruption of critical supply routes from the north, has had catastrophic consequences, while the resulting competition for resources has further frayed intercommunal tensions.

South Sudanese oil has continued to flow, but remains entirely dependent on export routes through the Sudan. Approximately 90 per cent of government revenues thus remain perilously beholden to the strategic interests of rival Sudanese factions, which have each seized portions of this vital infrastructure.

These external challenges have, however, also compounded many of the self-inflicted wounds of South Sudan.

Security sector reforms, notably the deployment of Necessary Unified Forces, remain slow and must now progress without Sudanese mediation, which has been critical to navigating past hurdles. At the same time, ongoing recruitment and the parallel integration of militia groups has eroded cohesion and discipline within SSPDF. Poor pay and working conditions continue to press soldiers into the informal economy, including through the sale of arms and ammunition to civilian communities involved in cattle raiding and other subnational violence. Parallel efforts to disarm civilian communities are often undermined by a lack of trust in national institutions, as targeted communities fear being left vulnerable and unprotected.

Neither elections nor the deployment of Necessary Unified Forces will offer quick solutions to these challenges.

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* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Background

A. Mandate and travel

1. By its resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council imposed a sanctions regime targeting individuals and entities contributing to the conflict in South Sudan and established a sanctions committee (the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan). The Committee designated six individuals for targeted sanctions on 1 July 2015. With the adoption of its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Council imposed an arms embargo on the territory of South Sudan and added two individuals to the list of designated individuals. On 30 May 2023, with the adoption of its resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), the Council renewed the sanctions regime until 31 May 2024.
2. By resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan until 1 July 2024 so that it might provide information and analysis in support of the work of the Committee, including as relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities that might be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 7 of resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#).
3. On 21 July 2023, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, appointed the five members of the Panel (see [S/2023/548](#)).
4. During the reporting period the Panel travelled twice to South Sudan.

B. Cooperation with international organizations and other stakeholders

5. While the Panel operates independently of United Nations agencies and institutions, it wishes to express its gratitude to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and other United Nations staff, including in New York.
6. The Panel is grateful for the cooperation of the government of South Sudan, including for opportunities to meet the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations in New York; representatives of the Ministries of Interior, Mining, Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management and Finance and Planning; senior representatives of the Jonglei state government; senior figures within the South Sudan People's Defence Force (SSPDF); members of the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly representing all parties; and additional government and security officials.
7. From 23 to 27 October 2023, the Coordinator of the Panel travelled to Juba and Malakal in support of a visit by the Chair of the sanctions committee and his delegation and met with the President, Salva Kiir, the First Vice-President, Riek Machar, as well as with a range of cabinet ministers and the Acting Governor of Upper Nile State.
8. In paragraph 18 of its resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council emphasized the importance to the Panel of holding regular consultations with concerned Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations and UNMISS. The Panel was able to consult extensively with United Nations bodies and agencies in South Sudan and elsewhere. It also consulted with most security mechanisms established under the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (peace agreement), as well as with South Sudanese civil society. In addition, the Panel met with numerous diplomatic representations in both New York and Juba.
9. The Panel sent seven official letters to the Government of South Sudan, United Nations bodies and commercial entities, to which it received six substantive

responses. The Panel has also written to the Government of South Sudan with an overview of the key findings of the present report and has offered to include its response as an annex to the report.

C. Methodology

10. The present report was prepared on the basis of the Panel’s research and investigations, largely conducted from August to October 2023. The Panel conducted numerous interviews to gather a body of credible information, obtained from a wide range of sources. The Panel reviewed documentation made available by individuals, commercial entities, confidential sources and the Government of South Sudan. The Panel also drew on its earlier work, including previous reports to the Security Council and the Committee, both public and confidential.

11. The Panel followed the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 (S/2006/997). The Panel has corroborated the information contained in the present report using multiple independent sources to meet the appropriate evidentiary standards.

12. The Panel conducted its research with the greatest transparency possible, while giving priority to confidentiality where necessary.

II. Conflict in the Sudan

13. On 15 April 2023, conflict broke out in the Sudan between the Rapid Support Forces, under the command of Mohamed Hamdan “Hamidti” Dagalo, and the Sudanese Armed Forces, under the command of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. An estimated 7.1 million people have since been displaced and a humanitarian emergency quickly developed.¹ As the conflict expanded, other groups have been drawn into the fighting, including both factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, with Abdelaziz al-Hilu attacking Sudanese Armed Forces positions in the south and Malik Agar siding with Al-Burhan.

14. The prospect of a protracted conflict in the Sudan has serious political and humanitarian consequences for South Sudan, while leaving its economy perilously vulnerable to the evolving military and economic incentives of rival Sudanese factions.

A. Humanitarian impact of conflict in the Sudan

15. The most immediate impact of the conflict on South Sudan has been humanitarian. By October 2023, an estimated 350,000 people had fled into South Sudan, with more likely entering by unofficial crossings.² The majority were South Sudanese, although South Sudan has also accepted large numbers of Sudanese and other nationals displaced by the fighting.

¹ International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Sudan faces world’s largest internal displacement crisis”, 27 October 2023.

² Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), IOM and the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, Population Movement from Sudan to South Sudan, online dashboard; and interviews with humanitarian observers in border states, September to October 2023.

16. Most have entered Upper Nile State³ which, together with neighbouring Jonglei State, was already facing a humanitarian emergency as a result of flooding and sustained subnational violence from August 2022 to March 2023.⁴ Even prior to the conflict in the Sudan, therefore, a third of the population in Jonglei State, and nearly 20 per cent of the population in Upper Nile State, faced “emergency” (phase 4) conditions of food insecurity,⁵ while internally displaced persons already comprised approximately 20 per cent of the populations of the two states.⁶

17. In this context, the arrival of hundreds of thousands of people, often traumatized by an arduous journey through the Sudan, has placed immense pressure on an already stretched humanitarian response. Many who had made the journey from the Sudan reported killings, sexual and gender-based violence and robberies along the main routes to South Sudan.⁷

18. In Upper Nile State, transit centres and reception sites were quickly overwhelmed, resulting in what some humanitarians described as “highly localized catastrophes”.⁸ Despite significant humanitarian efforts, nearly 90 per cent of arrivals face immediate food insecurity.⁹ In some cases, malnutrition levels have exceeded famine thresholds,¹⁰ resulting in hospitalizations and deaths, including among children.¹¹

19. Inevitably, many new arrivals have also settled in areas already afflicted by violence and with little capacity to absorb additional people. In May, displaced persons clashed over access to resources, including water, near Renk, in Upper Nile State, while hundreds forcefully tried to enter the protection of civilians site in Malakal.¹² One member of parliament from Upper Nile State described some population flows as an “existential danger” to local communities.¹³ Similar tensions have been reported between Fallata and Jalhak communities in Melut County.¹⁴

20. Stripped of their belongings, often separated from families, and entirely dependent on aid, many refugees and returnees have also been vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.¹⁵ In one assessment in northern Jonglei State, 13 cases of child abduction and sexual violence against minors from June to August 2023 were

³ UNHCR, IOM and the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, Population Movement from Sudan to South Sudan, online dashboard; and interviews with humanitarian observers in border states, September to October 2023.

⁴ See previous reports of the Panel (S/2022/884 and S/2023/294).

⁵ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, “South Sudan: acute food insecurity situation October–November 2022 and projections for December 2022–March 2023 and April–July 2023”.

⁶ Ibid. See also, displacement data from IOM, South Sudan: baseline locations round 14, 21 September 2023.

⁷ See, for example, REACH Initiative, “Emergency situation overview: Sudan-South Sudan cross border displacement: June 2023”, 21 June 2023; and *The City Review*, “Returnees fleeing war in Sudan accuse soldiers of robbery, rape”, 9 June 2023.

⁸ Interviews with humanitarians in Upper Nile State, September 2023.

⁹ Humanitarian analysis of food insecurity, August 2023, on file with the Panel. See also Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan: response to the Sudan crisis situation, report No. 15, 13 October 2023.

¹⁰ Interviews with humanitarians, September 2023. See also, “REACH Initiative, South Sudan displacement crisis: critical conditions in areas of transit and return threaten health, wellbeing, and sustainable integration”, 5 September 2023.

¹¹ Médecins Sans Frontières, “South Sudan: people returning from Sudan are arriving in alarming health conditions”, 31 August 2023.

¹² Interviews with community leaders, international observers and security personnel, May 2023.

¹³ *The City Review*, “Lawmakers want forces deployed at the border with Sudan”, 12 May 2023.

¹⁴ Interviews with humanitarian and security observers, October 2023.

¹⁵ Nonviolent Peace Force, “From conflict to conflict: protection needs and responses in South Sudan amid the Sudan crisis”, June 2023; and REACH Initiative, “Sudan crisis: cross-border assessment – returnee/refugee household survey” fact sheet, May 2023.

recorded.¹⁶ At least seven children were killed by armed groups, while an additional four children died of hunger.¹⁷ Several adolescent girls were also reportedly forcibly married as a “coping mechanism”.¹⁸ Demands for sexual favours in exchange for humanitarian support were alleged in Renk.¹⁹ As returnees competed for resources and onwards transportation options within South Sudan, the Panel received multiple accounts of extortion and bribery in both Upper Nile and Warrap States.²⁰

21. These humanitarian pressures have been further exacerbated by the economic impacts of the conflict in the Sudan. Despite billions of dollars allocated to road construction,²¹ the northern states of South Sudan remain highly dependent on supply routes from the Sudan. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, these supply routes were seriously disrupted, leading to shortages and price increases that further exacerbated food insecurity.

22. By May 2023, local fuel prices had surged by up to 50 per cent, while food stocks in border regions were seriously depleted.²² The cost of a minimum food basket necessary for survival jumped 28 per cent countrywide, doubling in some border regions.²³ Food prices remain “atypically high” according to humanitarians, although traders have also adapted to new and informal routes to restock supplies, including with food diverted or looted from the ongoing humanitarian response in the Sudan.²⁴

23. As the Panel has previously noted,²⁵ inflation is a persistent challenge that predates the conflict in the Sudan, while government salaries have long failed to keep pace with price increases. A civil servant in Jonglei State told the Panel that her salary was just 3,000 South Sudanese pounds (\$3) a month, but that “money is not coming monthly”. A sack of charcoal, or water for the week, can cost a family as much as 10,000 South Sudanese pounds. “Every year is getting harder.” “The only solution people have is to go to the bushes, hunt, do charcoal.”²⁶ A woman living in Bor told the Panel that she had not received her government salary for three months.²⁷ “The Government pays one month, and then it is arrears.” In the context of rising prices, however, “the money is useless [and has] not any value”. The 2023/24 budget has, since, substantially increased government salaries, although parties disagreed over the size of pay rises.²⁸

B. South Sudanese oil is vulnerable to disruption

24. The conflict in the Sudan also threatens to have a serious economic impact on South Sudan. At the heart of the precarious political economy of South Sudan are oil revenues which rely entirely on Sudanese pipelines and ports. Since the first weeks

¹⁶ Humanitarian assessment report, August 2023, on file with the Panel.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Protection Working Group, IOM, South Sudan NGO Forum, Rapid sexual exploitation and abuse risk assessment in Renk, Upper Nile, June 2023.

²⁰ Ibid.; and interviews with international observers, July 2023. See also, Eye Radio, “MPs accuse security forces of extorting money from returnees in Paloch”, 25 May 2023; and *The City Review*, “Claims of bribery, torture mar evacuation of war victims from Paloch”, 4 May 2023.

²¹ See annex 1 and previous reports of the Panel (S/2020/1141, S/2021/365, S/2022/884 and S/2023/294).

²² Food security and livelihoods cluster presentations, reviewed by the Panel, May 2023.

²³ South Sudan Joint Market Monitoring Initiative, 1–7 May 2023, fact sheet, May 2023.

²⁴ Interview with a humanitarian observer in Renk, September 2023. Corroborated by photographs obtained by the Panel.

²⁵ See the previous report of the Panel (S/2023/294).

²⁶ Interview, civilian 1, Jonglei State, October 2023.

²⁷ Interview, civilian 2, Jonglei State, October 2023.

²⁸ See annex 1.

of the conflict, both the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces have laid claim to various parts of this infrastructure. While oil exports have not been significantly disrupted to date, the prospect of accidental or deliberate destruction of the pipelines remains a critical concern.

25. The 2023/24 budget indicates that 86 per cent of the government revenues of South Sudan will come from oil exports, based on production estimates of 132,000 barrels per day, down from 151,000 barrels the year prior.²⁹ Almost all of this oil is exported through two pipelines that traverse much of the Sudan.³⁰

26. One pipeline runs approximately 1,300 km from Upper Nile State, past the Um-Dabakir power plant in Kosti, then north-east from Khartoum towards Port Sudan.³¹ It carries Dar blend oil to the Bashayer Marine Export Terminal 2, just south of Port Sudan. Dar blend accounts for approximately 76 per cent of South Sudanese production.

27. A second pipeline runs more than 1,600 km from Unity State, north to Khartoum, then alongside the other pipeline to Port Sudan.³² It carries Nile blend produced in both the Sudan³³ and South Sudan to Bashayer Terminal 1.

28. This critical Sudanese oil infrastructure is currently split across Rapid Support Forces and Sudanese Armed Forces control.

29. In April 2023, Rapid Support Forces forces captured the Khartoum Refinery at al-Jaili, north of Khartoum,³⁴ as well as territory through which both pipelines travel. In October 2023, the Rapid Support Forces also captured the pumping station at Al-Aylafoun, linked to the pipeline from the Upper Nile fields,³⁵ while, later in October, Rapid Support Forces forces seized oil fields in Baleela, West Kordofan, linked to the Nile blend pipeline from Unity State.³⁶

30. According to several sources familiar with the oil industry in the Sudan, Rapid Support Forces forces have been drawing fuel from the Khartoum Refinery, which is likely the only functioning refinery in the Sudan.³⁷ It is, however, operating at very significantly reduced capacity.³⁸ It is likely drawing on the Nile blend that the refinery was built to process, which is produced in both the Sudan³⁹ and South Sudan. Pipelines that carry fuel from the refinery to other locations in the Sudan have, however, reportedly been shut off, and the price of fuel on the domestic market has

²⁹ Ministry of Finance and Planning, budget for the 2023/24 financial year. See also annex 1 for additional details.

³⁰ There is little storage or refining capacity in South Sudan beyond a refinery in Bentiu, Unity State, with a capacity of 3,500 barrels per day. See also: Bloomberg, "South Sudan in talks to bypass conflict by trucking oil exports", 30 August 2023.

³¹ Presentations by South Sudanese oil companies, on file with the Panel. Corroborated by interviews with commercial actors, August to October 2023.

³² Presentations by South Sudanese oil companies, on file with the Panel.

³³ The Sudan produces around 50,000 barrels of Nile blend per day. See, for example, S&P Global, "Sudan crude flows stable after 100 days of civil war", 27 July 2023.

³⁴ See annex 2.

³⁵ See annex 3.

³⁶ Statements and videos released by the Rapid Support Forces, corroborated by interviews with international observers, October 2023.

³⁷ Interviews with oil traders, Sudanese businessmen and international observers, August to October 2023. There are smaller refineries in Port Sudan, El-Obeid, Shajirah and Abu Gabra. These are reportedly non-operational.

³⁸ Ibid. See also S&P Global, "Sudan crude flows stable after 100 days of civil war", 27 July 2023.

³⁹ Fighting for control of the Baleela oil field in October 2023 has, reportedly, affected Sudanese production.

increased.⁴⁰ The balance of crude oil passing through Khartoum has continued to flow on to Port Sudan. There is likely no easy way for the Rapid Support Forces to prevent this, while still maintaining its ability to draw fuel from the refinery.⁴¹

31. The Sudanese Armed Forces, for their part, has moved both the Ministry of Petroleum and the Ministry of Finance and Planning to Port Sudan.⁴² The Sudanese Armed Forces thus controls all oil exports from both the Sudan and South Sudan but has also been forced to increase its imports of refined fuel, paid for with foreign currency.⁴³

32. As at October 2023, oil exports have not been significantly affected by the conflict in the Sudan and have, in fact, increased. Traders, corroborated by independent loading data, confirm that Al-Burhan's Ministries have sold several cargos of Nile blend in recent months, while South Sudan has sold more Nile and Dar blend cargos than before the conflict started. From March to May 2023, combined Sudanese and South Sudanese exports more than doubled.⁴⁴

33. These export volumes confirm that oil infrastructure remains largely intact, but also that the domestic refining and power-generating capacity of the Sudan is much diminished, leaving more oil for export. The reported evacuation of the Baleela field in the Sudan in October may, however, reduce the quantity of Nile blend available to both the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces, while underscoring that the parties are actively trying to reshape this fragile economic equilibrium.⁴⁵

34. Historically, South Sudan has been able to use Sudanese infrastructure by paying fees to the Sudan. Further to an agreement first reached in 2012, South Sudan pays combined fees of \$9.1 per barrel for oil transported from Upper Nile State and \$11 per barrel for oil transported from Unity State.⁴⁶

35. In addition, South Sudan paid \$15 per barrel towards the settlement of the \$3.028 billion transitional financial arrangement agreed upon independence. This agreement was renegotiated in 2016 and again in 2018.⁴⁷ At the same time, South Sudan started making its payments through in-kind transfers of approximately 28,000 barrels per day of Dar blend to the Sudan. These transfers were divided between the Khartoum Refinery⁴⁸ and the Kosti power plant.⁴⁹

36. These in-kind transfers to the Sudan are now likely stopped or significantly reduced, as neither the Sudanese Armed Forces nor the Rapid Support Forces have the capacity to refine substantial quantities of Dar blend, as evidenced also by increased South Sudanese exports.⁵⁰ One Sudanese official told the Panel that South Sudan may still pay a small amount of Dar blend to the Sudanese Armed Forces-

⁴⁰ Interviews with international observers and humanitarian agencies active in the Sudan, September and October 2023.

⁴¹ Interviews with commercial actors familiar with the oil industry in the Sudan, October 2023.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid. See also Sudan Tribune, "Finance minister links Sudanese pound's decline to rising demand for dollars in oil imports", 7 October 2023.

⁴⁴ Interviews with commercial actors, September and October 2023. Corroborated by data obtained from TankerTrackers.com. See annex 4.

⁴⁵ Interviews with international observers, South Sudanese officials and with oil traders, September and October 2023.

⁴⁶ See annex 5.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ According to Sudanese oil experts, the Khartoum Refinery can only process Dar Blend if it is first blended with the local Fula blend, which is typically done at a facility in Kosti.

⁴⁹ As the Panel reported previously (see S/2023/294), South Sudan considers that the transitional financial agreement was paid off as at March 2022 and believes that it is owed more than \$658 million in excess fees by the Sudan, according to government documents. See also annex 6.

⁵⁰ See annex 4.

controlled Um-Dabakir power plant,⁵¹ while several individuals within the oil industry also thought that South Sudan might be paying some fees in cash to Sudanese Armed Forces-controlled ministries.⁵² As at June 2023, the Government of South Sudan confirmed ongoing allocations to the Sudan.⁵³

37. South Sudanese opposition groups assume there to be such a financial arrangement, with some interpreting the efforts of the Rapid Support Forces to seize control of the Al-Aylafoun pumping station, used to export South Sudanese Dar blend, as an effort to secure a share of these fees, which they assume are being paid to the Sudanese Armed Forces.⁵⁴ The same non-signatory opposition groups have, consequently, considered securing their own parcel of infrastructure, either in the Sudan or South Sudan, in order to leverage similar concessions for themselves.⁵⁵ Upon taking the Baleela fields in October, the Rapid Support Forces noted in a statement that “we are fully aware that oil revenues do not enter the Sudanese treasury in a manner that serves the best interests of our people”.⁵⁶

38. Beyond the value of drawing fuel from the Khartoum Refinery, the Rapid Support Forces also appears mindful of the potential perceptual and diplomatic implications of disrupting oil flows. Upon capturing the Al-Aylafoun facility in October 2023, for example, Rapid Support Forces fighters appeared in a carefully staged video showing the facility to be intact and promising to guard and protect it for the benefit of the people of both the Sudan and South Sudan.⁵⁷ A second video, from October, shows Rapid Support Forces forces “handing the station over” to engineers, who are asked to attest that it is in good working order.⁵⁸

39. With the exception of the fire that destroyed the landmark Greater Nile Petroleum Oil Company Tower in Khartoum in September 2023, both parties appear eager to present themselves as responsible custodians of the domestic oil industry. This is critical to South Sudan but also potentially welcome to other States with influence in the region, such as the United Arab Emirates, which processes significant quantities of both blends.⁵⁹

40. The South Sudanese oil industry also relies on Port Sudan for the import of materials and equipment critical to maintaining production. These transit routes have been significantly disrupted by the conflict. In June, the Government announced that it would be importing essential products through ports in Kenya and Djibouti, although this has increased costs.⁶⁰

C. South Sudanese mediation efforts

41. In the weeks following the outbreak of the conflict in the Sudan, President Kiir participated in a series of regional and bilateral efforts to resolve and de-escalate the conflict, while urging protection for oil infrastructure.⁶¹ South Sudan is the guarantor

⁵¹ Interview, Sudanese government official, October 2023.

⁵² Interviews with South Sudanese officials and with oil traders, September and October 2023.

⁵³ Confidential documents prepared by the Ministry of Petroleum. In Sudanese budget documents South Sudanese transit fees are estimated at 319 billion Sudanese pounds (\$500 million) in 2023.

⁵⁴ Interview with non-signatory armed group, October 2023.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Rapid Support Forces media statement dated 30 October 2023.

⁵⁷ See annex 3.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Interviews with commodity traders, September and October 2023. See also Mees, “Fujairah bunker market eyes Sudan violence implications”, 28 April 2023. See also annex 7.

⁶⁰ Statements by Nile Petroleum Corporation Limited (NILEPET), on file with the Panel.

⁶¹ See, for example, statements by the Office of the President of South Sudan, issued on 16 April, 18 April, 8 May, 17 May and 4 September 2023.

to the 2021 Juba Peace Agreement of the Sudan and has maintained close relationships with both Al-Burhan and Hamidti in recent years.

42. South Sudan appeared set for a prominent mediation role in April and May 2023, before competing international efforts quickly led to what some observers described as “disarray”.⁶² The President of Kenya, William Ruto, sought to take control of mediation efforts through his leadership of the Quartet Group of Countries for the Resolution of the Situation in the Republic of Sudan of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, but was largely rejected by Al-Burhan over Mr. Ruto’s alleged ties to the Rapid Support Forces leadership.⁶³ The Jeddah talks, led by Saudi Arabia, then emerged as the most prominent mediation venue, largely sidelining South Sudan, but have made limited progress.

43. President Kiir has thus continued to engage bilaterally with the main stakeholders in the Sudan conflict, receiving both Al-Burhan⁶⁴ and prominent Rapid Support Forces⁶⁵ leaders in Juba, while eager to project an image of neutrality despite some alleging sympathy for Al-Burhan.⁶⁶ Such sympathies are, however, partially balanced by the Rapid Support Forces ties of other prominent members of President Kiir’s circle.

III. Limited progress on security sector reforms

44. A broader concern about the impact of the conflict in the Sudan is that it will drain further momentum from the peace process in South Sudan, including much-delayed security sector reforms, where Sudanese leaders have previously played an important mediation role.⁶⁷

A. Necessary Unified Forces

45. The graduation of the first batch of Necessary Unified Forces started more than a year ago. In June 2023 an agreement was reached, in principle, on the unification of the middle command structure, which, together with the arms embargo, had previously been identified as one of the obstacles to the deployment of the graduated forces by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Government (SPLM/A-IG).⁶⁸ Formal appointments are yet to be made, however, with the parties still to agree on the allocations of positions within SSPDF and Police.⁶⁹

46. On 11 September 2023, however, all graduates were ordered to return to their training centres.⁷⁰ The failure to pay, feed and deploy many of the forces had led many graduates to disperse into the community.⁷¹ Officials have acknowledged that it is

⁶² International Crisis Group, “Time to try again to end Sudan’s war”, 21 July 2023.

⁶³ Interviews with international observers and South Sudanese government officials, September and October 2023.

⁶⁴ Al-Burhan met with President Kiir in Juba most recently on 4 September 2023.

⁶⁵ On 17 May 2023, Youssef Izzat, RSF Special Envoy, met with President Kiir in Juba.

⁶⁶ Interviews with government and opposition representatives, August to October 2023.

⁶⁷ Notable examples include the unification of the top command structure in April 2022.

⁶⁸ See annex 8. Interview with SPLA-IO and SPLA-IG leadership, October 2023.

⁶⁹ Interview with SPLA-IO and SPLA-IG leadership, October 2023.

⁷⁰ See annex 9.

⁷¹ See the previous report of the Panel (S/2023/294). Corroborated by interviews with international monitors and members of various security mechanisms, September and October 2023. See also Sudan Post, “Investigative: food crisis at training camps threatens security arrangements as soldiers desert”, 20 October 2023.

uncertain whether all the graduated forces will return, and a “re-verification process” has therefore been initiated to re-evaluate the remaining force.⁷²

47. At the same time, on 7 September 2023, plans were also announced for the training of the second batch of forces. According to these plans, all opposition forces are to be cantoned at 17 new sites, while SSPDF forces will remain at their existing barracks. Thirteen further “assembly areas” have been identified for forces other than the military.⁷³

48. Opposition forces were told they would not be permitted to join the process without a weapon.⁷⁴ Senior security sector personnel also told the Panel that opposition forces would be required to report in appropriate military formation, without excessive numbers of high-ranking officers.⁷⁵ Existing SSPDF forces will not be required to register with a weapon, as these are assumed already to be held within existing stockpiles.⁷⁶ In discussions with SPLM/A-IG leadership, they now primarily frame the Necessary Unified Forces as a means of gathering opposition forces, in preparation for their mixing and integration into the existing ranks of SSPDF.⁷⁷

B. Eroding security sector cohesion

49. Broader cohesion within the South Sudan security forces has also continued to decline as a result of poor pay and conditions, in addition to the fragmentation caused by new recruitment and the parallel integration of other armed groups.

50. In October 2023, for example, officers hastened the integration of Johnson Olony’s forces into SSPDF. Integrating commanders such as Olony, who was central to recent violence in Upper Nile State, has been divisive,⁷⁸ with some questioning perceived ill-discipline within his ranks.⁷⁹ Soon after his integration into SSPDF, Olony’s representatives also joined the SPLM political party at an election rally and mobilization event in the Upper Nile region, where Olony retains significant influence.⁸⁰ This has raised concerns over the politicization of SSPDF.⁸¹ Similarly, in October, several senior SPLA-IO commanders defected to SSPDF in Unity State, also joining SPLM soon after.⁸²

51. New recruitment, sometimes disguised as “refresher trainings”, has also been conducted by both SSPDF and SPLA-IO in several locations, including in Unity,

⁷² Interviews with security sector observers, Juba, September 2023. See annex 10.

⁷³ See annex 10.

⁷⁴ Ibid. SPLA-IO forces were issued a similar order ahead of the first batch of NUF cantonment and training but this order does not appear to have been widely implemented, according to interviews with SPLM/A-IG officials, February 2023 and October 2023.

⁷⁵ Interviews with security sector observers and SPLM/A-IG officials, September 2023.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Interviews with government ministers, Juba, October 2023.

⁷⁸ Eye Radio, “Government, Agwelek form committee to speed up integration of fighters”, 4 October 2023. See the previous report of the Panel (S/2023/294).

⁷⁹ Interview with an Agwelek commander, October 2023.

⁸⁰ Press statement by the Office of the Governor for Unity State, 30 September. See also, *The City Review*, “Upper Nile: Olony joins Kiir’s endorsement team in Malakal”, 2 October 2023.

⁸¹ Correspondence with a journalist, October 2023.

⁸² Interview with a government official in Unity State, October 2023. Press statement by the Office of the Governor of Unity State, 8 October.

Northern Bahr el Ghazal⁸³ and Western Bahr el Ghazal.⁸⁴ Children appear to have been among those recruited by government forces in Western Equatoria.⁸⁵

C. Illicit ammunition sales

52. The failure to pay regular and sufficient salaries has also led to a thriving informal market for weapons and ammunition, as security sector personnel look for ways to supplement their meagre incomes. These ammunition sales, in turn, often find their way to cattle raiders implicated in recent subnational violence.⁸⁶ In Jonglei, the Panel was told that ammunition was often easier to find than potable water.⁸⁷ The Panel identified several items of ammunition likely manufactured after the imposition of the arms embargo by resolution 2428 (2018) in May 2018.⁸⁸

53. The Panel spoke to several lower ranking security service personnel who regularly go months without pay. When they are paid, a private's salary of approximately 2,600 South Sudanese pounds (\$2.5) is insufficient to support a family. Many therefore resort to selling ammunition to civilians on the illicit market.⁸⁹

54. One soldier said "you must understand that I must survive. I do not support war, crime, or cattle raiding, but there is a market for ammunition sales. For example, the cattle herders need ammunition to protect their cattle."⁹⁰

55. He told the Panel that it was easy to sell the ammunition that soldiers carry. Criminals, particularly in Juba, buy pistol ammunition, while cattle keepers and raiders typically sought larger calibres. "The cattle keepers usually come and buy the AKM and PKM."⁹¹ The private told the Panel he could sell AKM ammunition for approximately 800–1,000 South Sudanese pounds, while PKM ammunition sold for approximately 2,500 pounds, equivalent, in some cases, to a soldier's monthly salary at the time.⁹² Larger quantities require the collaboration of officers with access to ammunition stores. "There is no proper record keeping in our armouries, no proper accountability system of what goes in and comes out. Everyone is doing it."⁹³

56. A corporal, interviewed separately, told the Panel that "because of the nature of our job, we have ammunition all the time ... For a short trip, we can request for more ammunition than what we need. Then we sell them in the streets."⁹⁴ He confirmed that there are "no mechanisms" for monitoring the "flow of arms and ammunition from our armouries". "I usually sell pistol ammunition to Juba residents." "The AKM are more popular, because almost every household in the country has an AKM."

⁸³ Interviews with a civil society observer, a local activist and a government official, May and October 2023. Noted also in a report of the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation on 16 May. See also, Eye Radio, "NBGs: 280 officers trained on policing ethics, human rights", 17 May 2023.

⁸⁴ Reports by international monitors, reviewed by the Panel, May 2023.

⁸⁵ Interview with a local monitor and security observers in Western Equatoria, August 2023. See also, UNMISS, "The UN family and partners pool in efforts to release six child soldiers", 28 September 2023.

⁸⁶ See the previous report of the Panel (S/2023/294). See also annex 11.

⁸⁷ Interview with civilian, Jonglei State, October 2023.

⁸⁸ See annex 11.

⁸⁹ See also press statement by the Office of the Commissioner, Yei River County, 10 October 2023, acknowledging the transfer of weapons from local forces to criminal gangs.

⁹⁰ Interview, Central Equatoria State, October 2023.

⁹¹ The AKM is an assault rifle, while the PKM is a belt-fed machine gun, with various models of both common in South Sudan.

⁹² See annex 1.

⁹³ Ibid. See also annex 12.

⁹⁴ Interview, Central Equatoria State, October 2023.

“The cattle keepers usually buy magazines”, which sold for approximately 30,000 South Sudanese pounds.

57. A third junior officer showed the Panel AK-47 ammunition that he was carrying in his pocket.⁹⁵ “Most of these guns are not registered with their serial numbers ... If I go home with a gun, I can leave it there. Next day I come home with another gun.”

D. Violence in Pochalla

58. The continued erosion of cohesion within SSPDF has also been underscored by recent fighting within the ranks of SSPDF in Pochalla in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area.

59. On 17 September 2023, forces under the command of SSPDF Colonel Achuil Ayat Deng executed the former Pochalla SSPDF commander, Colonel Joseph Okony Okwom Othow, allegedly for harbouring an escaped soldier.⁹⁶ A female civilian bystander was also shot during the incident.⁹⁷ The killing of the commander, who is from the local Anyuak community in Pochalla, provoked local armed youth to mobilize.⁹⁸ This, in turn, divided local SSPDF forces as some Anyuak soldiers joined the youth.⁹⁹

60. In response to a subsequent attack on the SSPDF barracks in Pochalla, the Government deployed at least one attack helicopter,¹⁰⁰ which also targeted civilian areas.¹⁰¹ Three days of fighting displaced approximately 12,000 civilians, both internally and into Ethiopia.¹⁰² A number of civilians were killed and 20 humanitarians were evacuated.¹⁰³

61. SSPDF claimed that it was confronting a rebellion by armed youth,¹⁰⁴ but this characterization was contested by civil society groups and the Anyuak community.¹⁰⁵ They explained the violence as the consequence of a fractured political and security landscape in the area, which features an array of armed groups and commanders, often ensnared in their own local conflicts.

62. Some, like the Murle-dominated “Cobra” faction under David Yau Yau, have been formally integrated into SSPDF.¹⁰⁶ Others, like Joshua Konyi, a former

⁹⁵ Interview, Central Equatoria State, October 2023.

⁹⁶ Interviews with an eyewitness and a humanitarian observer in Pochalla, September 2023. See also annex 14; and Radio Tamazuj, “Former Pochalla SSPDF commander shot dead”, 18 September 2023.

⁹⁷ Interviews with an eyewitness and a humanitarian observer in Pochalla, September 2023. See also annex 14.

⁹⁸ Interview with a journalist, September 2023. See also annexes 14 and 15.

⁹⁹ Field investigation conducted by international observers, September 2023, reviewed by the Panel. See also annexes 14 and 15.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with local witness and an SSPDF commander, September and October 2023. Confirmed also in a statement by SSPDF spokesperson, 19 September 2023.

¹⁰¹ Interviews with a local witness and with a humanitarian, September 2023. Photographs also obtained by the Panel. A report containing an analysis of damage in Pochalla conducted by a local analyst in September 2023 is also on file with the Panel.

¹⁰² Interviews with local witness and a humanitarian, September 2023. See also Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot, September 2023.

¹⁰³ Interview with a witness, September 2023. Corroborated by reports by international observers.

¹⁰⁴ Statement by the SSPDF spokesperson, 18 September. See also, Radio Tamazuj, “‘Armed Anyuak youth attacked us in Pochalla’-SSPDF’s Gen. Ruai”, 19 September 2023.

¹⁰⁵ See annexes 15 and 16. See also, Radio Tamazuj, “CEPO urges dialogue to resolve Pochalla crisis”, 23 September 2023.

¹⁰⁶ International Crisis Group, “South Sudan: Jonglei – ‘We have always been at war’”, December 2014.

government official and now SSPDF commander in Pibor, have taken command of local military units through political appointment.¹⁰⁷ These disparate military units retain significant autonomy and local influence, with close ties to local armed youth.¹⁰⁸

63. Few of these military units have participated in the unification process, and appear to mobilize as necessary.¹⁰⁹ They go by names including “Brigade 23”, “Agrab Battalion”, “188 Battalion” and “Special Brigade”,¹¹⁰ and typically bypass the military hierarchy, reporting directly to SSPDF headquarters.

64. The presence of these tribally oriented units, combined with mixed nomenclature, has generated “confusions”¹¹¹ as to the loyalties and composition of the forces, aggravating perceptions of marginalization among the Anyuak.¹¹²

65. Several rocket-propelled grenades used in the fighting were identified by the Panel as part of a pre-arms embargo consignment, confirming the circulation of nearly decade-old stocks.¹¹³ On 11 October, SSPDF again deployed at least one helicopter gunship to Pochalla.¹¹⁴ This is consistent with a recent increase in the use of attack helicopters by SSPDF.¹¹⁵

E. Divisive civilian disarmament campaigns

66. Civilian disarmament campaigns have been a cornerstone of recent government security policy in South Sudan. In March 2023, President Kiir ordered the Minister of Defence to prioritize nationwide civilian disarmament,¹¹⁶ a message that he later reiterated to governors.¹¹⁷

67. A wide range of government officials told the Panel that the proliferation of small arms among the civilian population remained a serious problem, describing how youth militias, for example, could overwhelm security forces. Officials argued that well-armed NUF would, therefore, be critical as elections approach,¹¹⁸ although the Panel’s investigations above also highlight the risks of arms transfers between organized forces and the civilian population.

68. Disarmament campaigns have also often been divisive and can further aggravate intercommunal tensions. Local communities often accuse disarmament forces of bias, as disarmed communities are often left vulnerable to raids and attacks from other communities.¹¹⁹

69. Recent disarmament efforts have focused on Mundari and Bari communities in Central Equatoria. On 30 June 2023, two Presidential Guard soldiers were killed, in a predominantly Bari area near Juba, during a conflict between two Mundari

¹⁰⁷ Small Arms Survey, *Real but Fragile: The Greater Pibor Administrative Area* (Geneva, 2015).

¹⁰⁸ Unpublished paper by an analyst, January 2022.

¹⁰⁹ Interviews with local observers, September 2023. See also annex 16. See also, Sudans Post, “Eyewitnesses say hundreds of army troops and armed youth heading to attack Pochalla”, 1 October 2023.

¹¹⁰ Interviews with local and international observers, September 2023.

¹¹¹ Interview with a humanitarian observer, September 2023.

¹¹² Interview with a witness and a humanitarian observer, September 2023. See also annexes 14 and 15.

¹¹³ Confidential documents.

¹¹⁴ Photographs obtained by the Panel and correspondence with a witness, October 2023.

¹¹⁵ See annex 17 for additional details.

¹¹⁶ Statement by the Office of the President, 30 March 2023.

¹¹⁷ Statement by the Office of the President, 24 July 2023.

¹¹⁸ Interview with government and state-level officials, October 2023.

¹¹⁹ See also report of the Panel (S/2022/884) concerning a 2022 disarmament campaign in Tonj North, Warrap State.

subclans.¹²⁰ In response, approximately 900 government forces¹²¹ were dispatched to the outskirts of Juba and to Terekeka County, although many armed Mundari youth had already opted to leave before the start of the disarmament campaign.¹²² Local communities soon complained of mistreatment,¹²³ as several Mundari civilians were arrested in Terekeka¹²⁴ and at least two women were raped.¹²⁵ Soldiers deployed near Juba were accused of disarming Bari civilians in order to facilitate land grabs.¹²⁶ Local communities claimed that an “information blackout” was imposed by military officials in order to limit reporting.¹²⁷

70. Public pronouncements by Equatorian community representatives suggest that the disarmament campaign has led to an erosion of local trust in the Government. One local representative stressed that they “[no longer] owe [the Government] any respect”.¹²⁸ Others complained that Equatorian communities, such as the Mundari, are selected for disarmament because they are “less controversial”¹²⁹ than the Dinka Bor, who represent an important political and military constituency for the President.

71. Initial reports suggested that at least 4,000 weapons were collected in the disarmament exercise in Terekeka Country,¹³⁰ with a further 1,700 collected in Juba County.¹³¹ These were reportedly taken to government stockpiles, with one senior government official indicating that the weapons may then have been given to police forces.¹³²

F. Conflict with the National Salvation Front

72. Central Equatoria State continues to record significant violence as a consequence of the conflict between the Government and the National Salvation Front (NAS).¹³³ With neither side able to secure a decisive military victory, and negotiations in Rome largely stalled, the conflict has devolved into attacks on civilians, many of whom have been targeted by both sides.

¹²⁰ See annex 18.

¹²¹ South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, “Government deploys forces to quell insecurity in Juba and surrounding areas”, 15 July 2023.

¹²² Interviews with a journalist and a civil society representative, August 2023. Corroborated by reports from international observers, August 2023.

¹²³ Photographs obtained by the Panel, July 2023. See also annex 19.

¹²⁴ Interviews with a youth representative and a senior state-level government official involved in the disarmament exercise, July 2023. Corroborated by interviews with local community representatives by international observers, reviewed by the Panel, August 2023. See also Radio Miraya, “Terekeka MP concerns about disarmament team torturing civilians”, 13 September 2023.

¹²⁵ Interview with a youth representative, July 2023. Corroborated by reports by international monitors, July 2023. See also annex 20.

¹²⁶ Reports by observers, reviewed by the Panel, August 2023. Corroborated by audio recordings of community representatives, on file with the Panel, and interviews with a civil society representative, August 2023. See also, Eye Radio, “Juba Commissioner moves office to Lado Payam over land grabbing”, 28 August 2023.

¹²⁷ Interviews and correspondence with Equatorian civil society representatives, August 2023.

¹²⁸ Audio recording of a community representative, on file with the Panel, August 2023.

¹²⁹ Interview with an international observer, July 2023. See also annex 21.

¹³⁰ Radio Tamazuj, “Close to 4,000 illegal weapons recovered in Terekeka County”, 15 August 2023.

¹³¹ Interview with a journalist, August 2023. See also Eye Radio, “Disarmament force collects 1,700 guns in Juba outskirts”, 15 August 2023.

¹³² Interview with senior government officials, Juba, October 2023.

¹³³ UNMISS, brief on violence affecting civilians, January–March 2023; and brief on violence affecting civilians, April–June 2023.

73. The Panel interviewed one humanitarian worker who was beaten, robbed and threatened by SSPDF, who accused him of colluding with NAS.¹³⁴ A few months earlier, his brother, who remains missing, had been abducted by NAS fighters as part of a larger group of civilians and accused of supporting government forces in the area.¹³⁵

74. Religious leaders have also been targeted. In June 2023, a bishop's car was set on fire following an attack by NAS aligned elements,¹³⁶ while, in August 2023, clergymen and churchgoers in Nyori and Lasu were detained, robbed and mistreated by SSPDF.¹³⁷ Similarly, in June 2023, a local chief and two civilians were allegedly killed inside a government facility in Lainya after being taken in for questioning following an ambush on government forces by NAS.¹³⁸ In September 2023, in Otogo payam, one local chief and two youths were killed by NAS elements after organizing a dialogue between the military and local communities.¹³⁹

75. In October 2023, a major SSPDF operation in Ombasi led to significant civilian displacement.¹⁴⁰

76. Several *boda boda* (motorcycle) drivers have also been killed by NAS and government forces along roads in Yei County since June 2023,¹⁴¹ while others have been detained by the government.¹⁴² Drivers are exposed to the allegation that they have transported opposition forces, and road ambushes are among the most prominent forms of attack.¹⁴³

IV. Elections

77. President Kiir and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Government (SPLM-IG) have repeatedly emphasized that elections will be conducted by December 2024, while leading opposition figures have expressed doubts over this time frame.¹⁴⁴

78. On 18 September 2023, the National Elections Act was adopted by Parliament, over strong objections from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA).¹⁴⁵ Under the terms of the Act, the elected Parliament will comprise 332 Members, with 100 more sitting in the Council of States.¹⁴⁶ Fifty per cent will be elected from geographical constituencies, 35 per cent from a women's list, and 15 per cent from an additional

¹³⁴ Interview with the victim and a local human rights activist, August 2023. Corroborated by reports from observers, reviewed by the Panel, August 2023, and photographs obtained by the Panel.

¹³⁵ Interview with victim, August 2023. Interview with a humanitarian in Yei, December 2022. Reports by local observers, reviewed by the Panel, December 2022.

¹³⁶ See annexes 22, 23 and 24.

¹³⁷ See annex 25. Corroborated by reports from local observers, August 2023. See also Sudan Tribune, "SSPDF accused of torturing religious leaders in Central Equatoria", 26 August 2023.

¹³⁸ Interviews with local civil society representatives, June 2023. Corroborated by social media posts and pictures reviewed by the Panel and by reports from international and civilian observers, June 2023.

¹³⁹ Interview with a human rights activist, September 2023. Corroborated by pictures, reports by local observers and social media posts by journalists reviewed by the Panel, September 2023.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with a local humanitarian and reports by local observers, October 2023.

¹⁴¹ Interviews with local civil society representatives, August 2023. Corroborated by social media posts, reports by local observers and pictures reviewed by the Panel, August 2023. Statement released by the Yei boda boda association dated 24 July 2023.

¹⁴² *The City Review*, "Who is killing boda boda operators in Yei?", 7 August 2023.

¹⁴³ Radio Tamazuj, "Yei County condemns brutal killing of boda-boda rider", 27 July 2023.

¹⁴⁴ Interviews with senior opposition figures, Juba, October 2023.

¹⁴⁵ See annex 26.

¹⁴⁶ See annex 27.

party list. Opposition MPs objected to an addition that gives the President the power to appoint 5 per cent of the Parliament. It is unclear how precisely this will be reconciled with wording elsewhere in the Act.¹⁴⁷

79. More broadly, however, SPLM-IG and opposition groups have increasingly differed on what prior preparations are necessary for the conduct of free and fair elections.

80. President Kiir and SPLM-IG have publicly downplayed the need for substantial institutional and regulatory reforms,¹⁴⁸ arguing that a census, permanent constitution and the return of refugees are not required for an election to take place.¹⁴⁹ In August 2023, the Minister of Information announced that “the current constitution making process ... will continue. But we will continue the election with the ‘current’ constitution.”¹⁵⁰

81. Senior SPLM-IO leaders, concerned in part about their own place in a post-election political landscape, have insisted that a far broader set of preparations are necessary according to the peace agreement, including a population census, a clear demarcation of constituencies and a permanent constitution.¹⁵¹ They also remain concerned about adequately accommodating displaced communities, including many of their own likely constituents.¹⁵²

82. The national police force has also started making preparations, with a very senior officer telling the Panel that they are working on a security plan with the Electoral Commission, despite limited progress towards the deployment of a unified national police force.¹⁵³

V. Conclusion

83. A civil society representative told the Panel that, in South Sudan, “there are those that extinguish fires, and those who gather firewood and fan the flames”.¹⁵⁴ There is an urgent need for President Kiir and First Vice-President Riek Machar to work together to diffuse the tensions that are building around elections, principally by jointly committing to a shared and realistic path towards credible polls.

VI. Recommendations

84. **Encourage the Government of South Sudan to:**

(a) **Promote transparency in public finances by clarifying the quantity of oil and/or funds paid to the Sudan in fees for the use of oil pipelines;**

(b) **Provide a public update on the status of the first batch of Necessary Unified Forces, including their location and number;**

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Interviews with members of opposition political parties and SPLM-IG, September 2023. See also: Sudans Post, “South Sudan to hold elections in 2024 with population census, government says”, 16 August 2023.

¹⁴⁹ Video recording of press statement on file with the Panel. See also, Eye Radio, “SPLM-SG spells out five priorities for elections to take place”, 21 September 2023.

¹⁵⁰ Video recording of press statement on file with the Panel.

¹⁵¹ Interviews with members of opposition political parties, September and October 2023.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Interview with senior member of the national police service, October 2023.

¹⁵⁴ Interview, South Sudan, October 2023.

(c) **Work with United Nations and regional bodies to conduct a weapons and ammunitions management baseline assessment; to develop effective inventory and stockpile management procedures; and to record baseline inventory figures that include any weapons seized or collected during civilian disarmament campaigns;**

(d) **Work with the International Monetary Fund and other appropriate regional and multilateral bodies to develop a contingency plan for the country's public finances in the event of significant disruption to oil exports, including with a view to limiting costly commercial borrowing.**

85. **To the Committee:**

(a) **Encourage the government of national unity to publish a shared road map for elections, including an agreement on the type of election or elections to be conducted and the specific preparations needed for the conduct of such elections;**

(b) **Further to concerns raised by the Government concerning the challenges of applying for an exemption to the arms embargo, consider developing a template exemption request for the supply of lethal military equipment solely in support of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, further to paragraph 5 of resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#);**

(c) **Issue a press release encouraging the Government of South Sudan to ensure unhindered humanitarian access, including by removing all road and river checkpoints, preventing attacks on humanitarians and their assets and seeking immediate condemnation and accountability for all such attacks.**

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Abbreviations

NAS	National Salvation Front
NUF	Necessary Unified Forces
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SPLM/A-IG	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Government
SPLM-IG	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Government
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition
SSOA	South Sudan Opposition Alliance
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defence Forces

Annex 1: Additional information about 2023/24 budget

On 11 August 2023, the 2023/24 budget was adopted by South Sudan's Parliament. It was signed into law by President Kiir on 14 August.¹⁵⁵ The 2023/24 financial year had already started the preceding month, on 1 July 2023. Like the Elections Act, the budget was adopted by the Parliament over the objection of SPLM-IO MPs, who walked out of the vote over a disagreement over the size of salary increases.¹⁵⁶

As the Panel noted in its final report [S/2023/294](#), salary payments to South Sudan's civil servants and security forces have become an increasingly politicised issue, as years of inflation have not been matched by meaningful salary increases or even regular salary payments. This has pushed many on the government's vast payroll into poverty and the informal economy.

The draft 2023/24 budget increased the total payroll for civil servants and organised forces from around South Sudan Pound (SSP)¹⁵⁷ 198 billion to around SSP 457 billion,¹⁵⁸ promising a pay-rise to both civil servants and security sector personnel. This increase gives most civil servants and organised forces a 400 percent pay increase. The overall salary budget, however, has only increased by around 230 percent. This is because certain very highly paid components of the government's overall salary budget, notably Parliament and the Council of States, which have previously secured themselves multiple large salary increases, were not awarded additional increases.

During the Parliament's second reading of the budget, however, its Committee for Finance and Economic Planning recommended that the payroll be increased further still, for a new total of SSP 669 billion.¹⁵⁹ The Committee recommended that most of the increase be funded by the vast oil for roads programme, which is budgeted to consume more than 60 percent of government oil revenues in the coming financial year.

The recommendation for an additional increase in salary payments was, however, rejected by the government as unaffordable. The Minister of Finance and Planning¹⁶⁰ asked, instead, for the opportunity to present a supplementary budget, with the full additional salary increase, in around five months (February 2024).¹⁶¹ SPLM-IG MPs accepted this proposal in sufficient numbers to secure the passage of the budget.

As a result, after the third reading of the budget, the Parliament's Committee for Finance and Economic Planning recommended the approval of the new SSP 457 billion payroll and that spending on roads be maintained.¹⁶² They did, however, secure an additional SSP 44 billion for the Parliament's medical allowances, car loans, recess

¹⁵⁵ See, for example, Sudan Tribune, South Sudan's Kiir approves budget despite opposition boycott, 16 August 2023

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ On 25 September 2023, the Banking and Other Financial Institutions Bill 2023 renamed the 'South Sudanese Pound' the 'South Sudan Pound.'

¹⁵⁸ Of this, SSP 32.5 billion is earmarked to pay foreign mission salary arrears, which may or may not be considered as part of the domestic civil service salary bill.

¹⁵⁹ Budget report documents prepared by the Parliament's Committee for Finance and Economic Planning, on file with the Panel.


¹⁶⁰ On 4 August 2023, President Kiir relieved Dier Tong Ngor as the Minister of Finance and Planning and Bak Barnaba Chol Bak in his place.

¹⁶¹ See, for example, Eye Radio, Finance Minister pledges 600% salary increase in 5 months, September 2023

¹⁶² Budget report documents prepared by the Parliament's Committee for Finance and Economic Planning, on file with the Panel.

and outfit allowances, together with an additional SSP 13.7 billion for the Council of States. This version of the budget was passed, with SPLM-IG support, while most SPLM-IO MPs rejected the proposal and walked out of the vote.¹⁶³ On 23 August 2023, all Members of Parliament also received \$15,000 each to settle arrears against their 2021/22 medical allowances.¹⁶⁴

In some respects, the increased payroll does represent a genuine increase in the amount the government has allocated to salaries. In the 2023/24 budget, the total government payroll equals approximately 21.7 percent of total planned government expenditure. During the previous financial year, it was some 15 percent.¹⁶⁵ Over the same period, however, the SSP has more than halved in its value against the US Dollar, driving up the cost of imports in South Sudan and eroding much of the real value of this salary increase.¹⁶⁶




Source: Official rate posted by Central bank of South Sudan. The parallel rate, accessed by most ordinary South Sudanese, has been significantly higher during many of these periods.

It is unclear whether the government will actually be able meet its new salary commitments, while also meeting other budgeted spending commitments, such as on roads.

According to the Ministry of Finance and Planning, during the previous 2022/23 financial year, the Treasury received \$989,731,680.71 in oil revenues. Of this, \$682,682,560.28 (69 percent) went to the largely off budget road construction programme.

The 2023/24 budget is similarly skewed towards the roads programme (infrastructure), as well as the security sector and key government institutions, such as the Parliament, Council of States,

2023/24 budget spending by sector



¹⁶³ See, for example, City Review South Sudan, MPs pass budget despite protest from SPLM-IO and SSOA, 16 August 2023

¹⁶⁴ See, for example, Eye Radio, National MPs receive 15,000 each as medical allowances, 23 August 2023. It is unclear if these payments were intended to be included in the 2023/24 budget figures, or were considered additional payments.

¹⁶⁵ Approved budget for the 2022/23 financial year, on file with the Panel.

¹⁶⁶ The 2022/23 budget uses an indicative rate of 435 SSP to the US\$. The current rate is 1,027 SSP to the USD.


Office of the President (Public Administration).

Overall 2023/24 budget summary:


Sector (SSP billions)	Capital	Salaries	Goods and Services	State transfers	Other	Total
Accountability	0.23	0.91	2.6			3.74
Economic Functions	17.2	3.97	27.16	41.73		90.06
Education	10.89	68.35	29.29	65.3		173.84
Health	14.74	6.8	20.3	2.41		44.25
Infrastructure	438.52	2.05	5.25			445.82
Natural Resources & Rural Dev.	37.71	6.29	23.4	6.66		74.07
Public Administration	14.47	89.6	76.25		1.63	181.95
Rule of Law (incl. Police)	0.73	50.32	16.22	25.75		93.02
Security	6.84	192.03	24.96			223.83
Social & Humanitarian Affairs	0.48	2.22	6.54			9.23
Total	541.81	422.55	231.97	141.86	1.63	1,339.82

After the oil for roads infrastructure programme, the new and increased salary structure represents the largest area of government spending. This salary budget is also skewed towards these same sectors, with 45 percent of all salary payments going to the security sector.

2023/24 budget by expenditure type:



Share of salary budget by sector:



Detailed breakdown of 2023/24 salary budget:

Government sector and agency	Salary budget (SSP billions)		
	2023/2024	2022/2023	Increase
Accountability	0.91	0.23	400%
Audit Chamber	0.58	0.14	400%
National Bureau of Statistics	0.18	0.04	400%
Anti-Corruption Commission	0.11	0.03	400%
South Sudan Reconstruction & Development Fund	0.02	0.01	400%
South Sudan Fiscal & Financial Allocation & Monitoring Co	0.03	0.01	400%
Economic Functions	3.97	8.96	44%
Ministry of Finance and Planning	0.81	0.2	400%
Ministry of Petroleum	0.29	0.07	400%
Ministry of Mining	0.22	0.06	400%
Ministry of Trade, Industry	0.46	0.11	400%
Ministry of Land, Housing & Urban Development	0.22	0.05	400%
Ministry of Investment	0.24	0.06	400%
Ministry of Water Resources & Irrigation	0.28	0.07	400%
National Revenue Authority	-	8.12	0%
Petroleum and Gas Commission	0.08	0.02	400%
National Bureau of Standards	0.24	0.06	400%
Electricity Corporation	0.31	0.08	400%
South Sudan Urban Water Corporation	0.21	0.05	400%
Public Procurement and Disposal of Asset Authority	0.62	-	---
Education	68.35	19.06	359%
Ministry of General Education & Instruction	5.27	1.32	400%
Ministry of Higher Education, Science & Technology	61.35	17.31	354%
South Sudan National Examination Council	1.73	0.43	400%
Health	6.8	1.7	400%
Ministry of Health	6.62	1.65	400%
HIV/AIDS Commission	0.16	0.04	400%
Drugs & Food Control Authority	0.02	0.01	400%
Infrastructure	2.05	0.47	441%
Ministry of Energy & Dams	0.05	0.01	400%
Ministry of Transport	0.35	0.09	400%
Ministry of Roads & Bridges	0.13	0.03	400%
South Sudan Roads Authority	0.19	-	---
South Sudan Civil Aviation Authority	1.34	0.33	400%
Natural Resources & Rural Development	6.29	1.59	395%
Ministry of Agriculture & Food Security	0.42	0.1	400%
Ministry of Livestock & Fisheries Industry	0.12	0.03	400%
Ministry of Environment & Forestry	0.24	0.06	400%
Wildlife Conservation & Tourism	5.47	1.39	394%
South Sudan Land Commission	0.04	0.01	400%
Security	192.03	48.01	400%
Defense	121.59	30.4	400%
Veteran Affairs	36.12	9.03	400%
National Security Service	33.92	8.48	400%
National Mine Action Authority	0.07	0.02	400%
Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration Commission	0.22	0.06	400%
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)	0.12	0.03	400%


Public Administration	89.6	104.86	85%
Ministry of Presidential Affairs	17.16	4.29	400%
Ministry of Cabinet Affairs	0.77	0.19	400%
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation	48.27	79.15	61%
Ministry of Peace Building	0.08	0.02	400%
Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs	0.14	0.04	400%
Ministry of Federal Affairs	0.08	0.02	400%
Ministry of Information	0.21	0.05	400%
Telecommunication and Postal Services	0.16	0.04	400%
Ministry of East African Affairs	0.08	0.02	400%
Transitional National Legislative Assembly	17.91	17.91	100%
South Sudan Local Government Board	0.03	0.01	400%
National Election Commission	0.18	0.04	400%
Council of States	2.65	2.65	100%
National Constitution Review Commission	0.18	0.05	400%
Northern Corridor Implementation Authority	0.03	0.01	400%
Political Parties Affairs	0.02	0.01	400%
Peace Commission	0.07	0.02	400%
National Communication Authority	0.02	0	400%
South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation	0.33	0.05	661%
Ministry of Public Service & Human Resource Development	0.32	0.08	400%
Ministry of Labour	0.36	0.09	400%
South Sudan Employees Justice Chamber	0.03	0.01	400%
South Sudan Grievances Chamber	0.02	0.01	142%
Access for Information Commission	0.04	0.01	400%
Universal Services Access Fund (USAF)	0.04	0.01	400%
Media Authority	0.02	0	400%
South Sudan Civil Service Commission	0.06	0.01	898%
Parliamentary Service Commission	0.33	0.08	400%
Rule of Law	50.32	12.82	392%
Ministry of Justice & Constitutional Affairs	1.27	0.87	146%
Ministry of Interior	8.27	2.07	400%
Police	31.83	7.82	407%
Prisons	3.55	1.02	348%
Fire Brigade	1.89	0.47	400%
Judiciary of South Sudan	3.26	0.49	658%
Judicial Services Commission	0.01	0.01	100%
South Sudan Law Review Commission	0.02	0.01	203%
Bureau of Community Security & Small Arms Control	0.05	0.01	400%
South Sudan Human Rights Commission	0.07	0.02	400%
Commission for Refugee Affairs	0.11	0.03	400%
Social & Humanitarian Affairs	2.22	0.55	400%
Ministry of Gender, Child & Social Welfare	0.12	0.03	400%
Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs & Disaster Management	1.32	0.33	400%
Ministry of Culture, Museum and National Heritage	0.2	0.05	400%
Ministry of Youth & Support	0.22	0.05	400%
South Sudan Relief & Rehabilitation Commission	0.32	0.08	400%
War Disabled, Widows & Orphans Commission	0.05	0.01	400%
Total government spending agencies	422.55	198.25	213%
Foreign mission areas	32.55	-	---
Total Government Expenditures	455.1	198.25	230%

Data on the composition of the national government payroll is limited. In 2021, however, some data was made available as part of the government's efforts to account for funds received from the IMF's Rapid Credit Facility, as these funds were largely allocated to paying government salaries. According to these figures, in 2021, the national government payroll had 468,030 employees, with many more likely on the payrolls of the ten states. Of these, the vast majority (around 90 percent) worked in the security sector, including Rule of Law (police) sector.

Sector	Type of employees	Employees	% of total
Accountability	Civil Servants	760	0.20%
Economic	Civil Servants	10,772	2.30%
Education	Teachers and other personnel	9,443	2.00%
Health	Health Workers and other personnel	5,597	1.20%
Infrastructure	Civil Servants	1,437	0.30%
Natural Resources	Civil Servants	9,907	2.10%
Public Administration	Civil Servants	7,971	1.70%
Rule of Law (incl. police)	Organized Forces and other personnel	61,991	13.20%
Security	Organized Forces	358,171	76.50%
Humanitarian	Civil Servants	1,981	0.40%
Total		468,030	100%

Source: Preliminary report on Rapid Credit Facility, prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Planning, 25 March 2021

The same data illustrates how some of the salary budget is concentrated in relatively few employees. Assuming the composition of the workforce has not changed substantially since 2021, for example, this data suggests, for example, that the security sector accounts for 76 percent of the workforce, but just 45 percent of the payroll budget, while Public Administration claims 21 percent of the budget for around 2 percent of the workforce.



Annex 2: RSF control of Khartoum Refinery in Garri district

Around 25 April 2023, RSF forces posted a video in which they claimed to have taken control of what is variously described as the al-Jaili or Khartoum Refinery in the Garri industrial district north of Khartoum. This claim has been widely corroborated by testimony and independent reporting.



Imagery analysis conducted by the Panel indicates that the video was likely filmed in front of a large sign near the main entrance to the Garri industrial area at 16.145617°, 32.641385°



Other images, of the same sign, give better context for its location:



Annex 3: RSF control of Al Aylafoun pumping station


On 14 October 2023, a video was circulated by RSF, showing fighters stationed at the al-Aylafoun pumping station, near Khartoum.

In the video, the fighters note that the pumping station controls oil flows from both Sudan and South Sudan to the Bashayer Ports in Port Sudan. They assure viewers that their forces have preserved this “vital” site and equipment for the people of Sudan and South Sudan.



Imagery analysis conducted by the Panel indicates that the video was made at the al-Aylafoun pumping station, located at 15.464680°, 32.747152° a few kilometres east of Khartoum.





On 23 October 2023, a second video was published, also from the Al Aylafoun pumping station, showing engineers surveying the facility, which remained under RSF control.





Annex 4: Oil exports by Sudan and South Sudan

Combined South Sudanese and Sudanese oil exports, by blend, January 2023 to September 2023.

Since the conflict in Sudan started on 15 April 2023, combined Nile blend and Dar blend exports have increased, as Sudanese refining and capacity has reduced. These exports include exports by the Sudan, South Sudan, and private joint venture partners, who take their share of oil and profits in oil, also shipped from Port Sudan.

Source: Documents prepared by the South Sudanese Ministry of Petroleum, supplemented and corroborated by data from TankerTracker.com

	January 2023	February 2023	March 2023	April 2023	May 2023	June 2023	July 2023	August 2023	September 2023
Dar blend cargos	4	3	3	4	5	4	4	3	6
Nile blend cargos	1	1	1	1	3	3	4	3	2
Nile blend bbls	655,654	999,401	569,459	625,125	1,765,978	1,832,101	2,830,112	2,078,681	1,617,418
Dar blend bbls	2,387,933	1,878,190	1,822,010	2,348,445	3,106,915	2,495,501	2,410,285	1,921,186	3,780,709



Annex 5: Overview of fees and TFA payments from South Sudan to Sudan including revised fees table

Fee structure agreed with Sudan since 2012 for the transport of South Sudanese oil through the two Sudanese pipelines:


Fees		
<i>Oil transported from Upper Nile fields</i>		
Transport Fee	6.5	\$/bbl
Processing Fee	1.6	\$/bbl
Transit Fee	1	\$/bbl
Total	9.1	\$/bbl
<i>Oil transported from Unity fields</i>		
Transport Fee	8.4	\$/bbl
Processing Fee	1.6	\$/bbl
Transit Fee	1	\$/bbl
Total	11	\$/bbl

In 2012, South Sudan also agreed to pay an additional \$15 per barrel towards a \$3.028 billion Transitional Financial Agreement (TFA) agreed upon independence. Following a period of low oil prices, however, this was renegotiated in 2016. Rather than a fixed \$15 per barrel fee, contributions towards the TFA were tied to the international oil price, with higher contributions when oil prices are high, according to the following schedule.

Payment towards TFA settlement	
<i>Oil price</i>	<i>TFA payment</i>
\$20-\$30 / bbl	6 \$/bbl
\$30-\$40 / bbl	9 \$/bbl
\$40-\$50 / bbl	10.5 \$/bbl
above \$50 /bbl	15 \$/bbl

Source: Ministry of Petroleum of the Republic of South Sudan and Agreements on oil and related economic matters between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan, 2012, 2016, and 2018.

Also in 2016, South Sudan started paying both fees and TFA contributions through in-kind transfers of crude oil. These transfers were allocated to both the Khartoum Refinery and the Kosti Power Plant. The following chart reflect reported monthly transfers, by South Sudan, in 2020 and 2021. The government of South Sudan maintains the TFA was paid off soon after, by March 2022.



Source: confidential documents produced by the Ministry of Petroleum. These reported figures have not necessarily been agreed or validated by the government of Sudan.

Annex 6: Sorghum transfers from Sudan to South Sudan in exchange for oil

In its final report [S/2023/294](#), the Panel reported that South Sudan has been making in-kind oil transfers in excess of the pipeline fees it owes to Sudan since around March 2022. The government of South Sudan argues it had paid off the \$3.028 billion Transitional Financial Agreement (TFA) debt as of March 2022, but that Sudan has nevertheless continued to receive between 19,000 and 25,000 barrel per day. As a result, as of June 2023, the government of South Sudan believes it is owed in excess of \$658 million in excess in-kind oil allocations.¹⁶⁷

Panel interviews suggest it has been challenging to renegotiate a reduction in in-kind oil transfers to Sudan because the government of Sudan sells refined South Sudanese oil into its domestic market in exchange for Sudanese Pounds.¹⁶⁸ According to interviews conducted by the Panel, Sudan's leaders have been reluctant to pay South Sudan for its oil in foreign currency, or to replace South Sudanese crude with imports from elsewhere, also paid for with foreign currency.

Alternative arrangements have, therefore, been explored. As the Panel noted in its final report [S/2023/294](#), some of these transfers appear to have been offset by food transfers from Sudan to South Sudan.

According to documents reviewed by the Panel, for example, in May 2022, 60,000 tonnes of sorghum was to be provided by the government of Sudan to the government of South Sudan, valued at \$25.8 million and so “deducted from the indebtedness of the government of the Republic of Sudan [to South Sudan] resulting from the sale of crude oil.”¹⁶⁹ According to the documents, the government of South Sudan authorised a company named “Klean and Klear Services Co. Ltd” to receive the goods on its behalf.¹⁷⁰

According to an announcement by the Office of the Governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, on 16 and 17 June 2022, Tong Akeen Ngor, the Governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, visited Sinja and Umruba in Northern Kordofan in Sudan as part of a delegation headed by Presidential Security advisor Tut Gatluak. The delegation dispatched a convoy of 70 trucks loaded with sorghum from Sudan to South Sudan by “Clean and Clear Limited Company.”¹⁷¹ In a photograph of a sign written in Arabic, Clean and Clear Company welcomes the Governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal State to Northern Kordofan.

In a statement delivered on 9 July 2022, the Governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal State had reported that consignments of sorghum had already been delivered to destinations in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, Unity State, Warrap State and Western Bahr El Ghazal State.¹⁷² The Governor's press office has stated that the sorghum was to be sold at the subsidised rate of 20,000 SSP per sack as part of the government's efforts to alleviate food insecurity tied to flooding and other economic factors.¹⁷³ The Governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal has previously announced the arrival of

¹⁶⁷ Documents produced by the Ministry of Petroleum on file with the Panel

¹⁶⁸ Interviews with government officials and commodity traders, July 2022 to May 2023

¹⁶⁹ Confidential document reviewed by the Panel.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ The Panel believes that it is very likely that “Clean and Clear” and “Klean and Klear” are the same company, as the name appears to be written in Arabic scripts in the company's own signs.

¹⁷² Statement by the Office of the Governor of Northern Bah el Ghazal State, dated 10 July 2022

¹⁷³ One Citizen Daily, Over 70 Trucks loaded with sorghum to arrive South Sudan, 10 June 2022

sorghum from Sudan, purchased by the government or Presidency of South Sudan, in January 2021, February 2021 and June 2021.¹⁷⁴

During a recent tour of his home state of Warrap, during which he challenged other parties to nominate their candidates for President for the December 2024 elections, President Kiir reportedly promised to address hunger in Aweil, stressing that "I sent a delegation to Sudan to buy the sorghum under the supervision of Security Advisor Tut Gatluak and we managed to secure the food items. So they are soon to arrive in Aweil and some will be taken to Gogrial."¹⁷⁵



Office of the Governor - Northern Bahr El Ghazal State

June 18, 2022 - 3

...

GOVERNOR OF NORTHERN BAHR EL GHAZAL DISPATCHED FIRST CONSIGNMENT OF SORGHUM FROM SENNAR, BLUE NILE AND NORTHERN KORDOFAN STATES IN THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN TO SOUTH SUDAN:

On date 16th and 17th of June 2022, Governor of Northern Bahr El Ghazal State Honorable Tong Akeen Ngor paid courtesy visits to (Sinja) Sennar State and Umruaba in Northern Kordofan in Sudan to dispatch the first consignment of sorghums to the Republic of South Sudan.

First convoy comprises of over 70 trucks loaded with sorghum (Dura) are expected to arrive in South Sudan territories in one week time and other consignments will follow.

During the visit to Sinja, the Governor was warmly received by the state government officials, Mr. Khalid Muhammad Tom, the Acting Governor, Director General of the Police Forces in Sennar State, Hisham Khalifa, Minister of Production and Economic Resources, Engineer Al-Hadi, Chief Executive Director of Sinja locality, Abdullah Al-Bishr and Director of the Agricultural Bank, Ahmed Ali, in Sennar and Blue Nile states.

Upon his arrival from Sennar to Umruaba, Northern Kordofan state, the Governor was received by the Executive Director of Locality, as his part of short interval supervision to officially oversee the departure of first consignment of food items.

The acting Governors of Sennar And Northern Kordofan states has affirmed that they will fully support the government of South Sudan in all aspects necessarily.

Addressing the Media, Hon. Governor Tong Akeen appreciated and thanks His Excellency Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit President of the Republic of South Sudan for sending the delegation to Sudan headed by Hon. Tut Galuak Advisor for Security Affairs to coordinate and mobilizes the supply of food items to the flood affected areas in South Sudan (particularly states of Bahr El Ghazal and Unity State).

In addition, the Governor expressed his gratitudes to government of Sudan under His Excellency Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhani President of Sudan sovereignty Council for utmost support and cooperation to the government and people of South Sudan.

Furthermore, Hon. Governor Tong Akeen Ngor appreciated the Agricultural Bank for rendering their efforts to complete the processes in smooth manner until the first consignment commenced its journey to the Republic of South Sudan.

Finally, Honorable Tong Akeen Ngor Governor of Northern Bahr El Ghazal State also appreciated the efforts rendered by the Clean and Clear limited company for responding positively to take full responsibility to transport food consignments to South Sudan in shortest time possible.

THE END

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¹⁷⁴ Statements by the Office of the Governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal State

¹⁷⁵ See coverage by Dalwuot Media, 21 March 2023



Source: Official Facebook page of the Office of the Governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal State


Sign welcomes the Governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal State to North Kordofan State on behalf of Clean and Clear Services Co. (Panel translation).

Annex 7: Destinations for South Sudanese oil in 2022


Shipping destinations for South Sudanese crude oil belonging to both the government and private commercial joint venture partners in 2022.

Source: Panel estimates based on industry data and reporting by the Ministry of Petroleum.

Destinations for South Sudanese Dar blend 2022



Destinations for South Sudanese Nile blend 2022



This data reflects only the destination to which the crude oil was shipped. In most cases, the oil was sold to a commodity trader trading from a different jurisdiction, then traded onwards at least once, to further commercial entities. The shipping destination is not, therefore, a reliable indicator of where the purchaser of the oil is located.

Buyers of the government's share of South Sudanese crude in 2022, by blend:

Nile Blend 2022						
Window	Net	Decided Disc	Awarded company	Market price	FOB	Pre-finance values in USD
Jan.26-28, 2022	570,214	-0.88	Litasco	74.10	73.22	41,751,069.08
Feb.26-28, 2022	629,679	0.55	Addax En	87.22	87.77	55,266,925.83
Apr 24-26,2022	570,447	-3.00	Addax En	104.39	101.39	57,837,621.33
May 25-27,2022	570,167	-2.94	Litasco	104.39	101.45	57,843,442.15
Jun, 19-21,2022	570,362	-3.2	BB.Energy	123.70	120.50	68,728,621.00
Jun, 26-28,2022	570,334	-3.23	BB.Energy	112.70	109.47	62,434,462.98
Jul 26-28, 2022	628,050	-3.25	Addax En	112.70	109.45	68,740,072.50
Aug 19-20, 2022	628,768	-9.25	Trinity	99.99	90.74	57,054,408.32
Sept 01-03, 2022	628,270	-1.50	Addax En	89.87	88.37	55,520,219.90
Sept 21-23, 2022	570,477	-3.50	BB.Energy	89.87	86.37	49,272,098.49
Oct 10-12, 2022	570,850	-5.49	Addax En	93.33	87.84	50,143,464.00
Oct 26-28, 2022	571,053	-2.75	BB.Energy	93.33	90.58	51,725,980.74
Nov 26-28, 2022	0.00	0.00	NIL	NIL	0.00	0.00
Dec 10-12, 2022	570,668	-0.65	Trinity	81.115	80.47	45,918,800.62
Total	7,649,339					722,237,186.94

Source: Marketing Reports produced by the Ministry of Petroleum

DAR Blend 2022 Sales.						
Window	Net Qty	Decided Disc	Awarded company	Market Price	FOB	Pre-finance values in USD
Jan. 25-26, 2022	629,197	-2.00	Addax Energy	74.10	72.10	45,365,103.70
Jan.30-31, 2022	629,112	1.75	Euro Am	74.10	75.85	47,718,145.20
Feb.27-28,2022	600,753	3.00	NASDEC	98.19	101.19	60,790,196.07
Mar.05-06,2022	600,497	-1.00	Addax Energy	118.81	117.81	70,744,551.57
Mar.30-31,2022	595,056	-1.35	BB.Energy	104.39	103.04	61,314,570.24
Apr.09-10, 2022	629,531	-0.47	Euro Am	104.39	103.92	65,420,861.52
Apr.29-30, 2022	600,111	3.10	AL Braik	104.39	107.49	64,505,931.39
May 09-10,2022	600,428	-1.15	Euro Am	104.39	103.24	61,988,186.72
May 30-31,2022	617,509	0.35	Euro Am	104.39	104.74	64,677,892.66
Jun.09-10,2022	571,126	-3.50	Addax Energy	123.7	120.20	68,649,345.20
Jun.29-30,2022	582,584	0.50	Sahara	123.70	124.20	72,356,932.80
Jul 07-08,2022	618,441	-3.00	Addax Energy	112.70	109.70	67,842,977.70
Jul 15-16, 2022	600,773	-0.14	Euro Am	99.99	99.85	59,987,184.05
Jul.30-31,2022	570,758	1.01	BB.Energy	99.99	101.00	57,646,558.00
Aug 07-08,2022	570,862	-2.50	Addax Energy	99.99	97.49	55,653,336.38
Aug 27-28,2022	0	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	0
Aug 30-31, 2022	571,198	-3.5	BB.Energy	99.99	96.49	55,114,895.02
Sep 07-08, 2022	571,276	-2.12	Kappak T	89.87	87.75	50,129,469.00
Sept 29-30,2022	571,140	-0.45	Sahara	93.33	92.88	53,047,483.20
Oct 04-05, 2022	570,994	-16.10	Trinity	93.33	77.23	44,097,866.62
Oct 14-15, 2022	571,196	-6.70	Zacosia	93.33	86.63	49,482,709.48
Oct 30-31, 2022	600,473	-4.50	Addax Energy	93.33	88.83	53,340,016.59
Nov 09-10, 2022	570,670	-3.00	BB Energy	91.67	88.67	50,601,308.90
Nov 17-18, 2022	570,679	-1.93	Euro Am	81.12	79.19	45,192,070.01
Dec 30-31, 2022	0	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	0
Total	13,614,364					1,325,667,592.02

Annex 8: Allocation of second tier command positions to SPLA-IO and SSOA

3. Matrix of Allocation of the 2nd Tier Echelon Positions for the SPLA-IO & SSOA

S/N	Units	positions	SSPDF %	SPLA/IO%	SSOA %	SSPDF share	SPLA-IO share	SSOA share
1.	SSPDF IG	13	60%	30%	10%	8	4	1
2.	SSPDF GHQs Admin, Per & Fin	33	60%	30%	10%	20	10	3
3.	SSPDF GHQs OPs	18	60%	30%	10%	11	5	2
4.	SSPDF GHQs Training	19	60%	30%	10%	11	6	2
5.	SSPDF GHQs CMI	17	60%	30%	10%	10	5	2
6.	SSPDF GHQs Logistic	22	60%	30%	10%	13	7	2
7.	SSPDF GHQs MO	19	60%	30%	10%	11	6	2

3. Matrix of Allocation of the 2nd Tier Echelon Positions for the SPLA-IO & SSOA CONT-----

S/N	UNITS	POSITIONS	SSPDF %	SPLA-IO %	SSOA %	SSPDF share	SPLA-IO share	SSOA share
8.	GF Command structure	29	60%	30%	10%	17	9	3
9.	Division level		60%	30%	10%			
	I. Sector One	34	60%	30%	10%	21	10	3
	II. Sector Two	34	60%	30%	10%	21	10	3
	III. Sector Three	26	60%	30%	10%	16	8	2
10.	Air Force & SAD	19	60%	30%	10%	11	6	2
11.	Riverine Command structure	19	60%	30%	10%	11	6	2

3. Matrix of Allocation of the 2nd Tier Echelon Positions for the SPLA-IO & SSOA CONT-----

S/N	Units	positions	SSPDF %	SPLA-IO %	SSOA %	SSPDF share	SPLA-IO share	SSOA share
12.	MO/VA	34	60%	30%	10%	21	10	3
	Veterans Affairs	14	60%	30%	10%	9	4	1
	Total					211	106	33

4. SSDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO and SSOA

1. SSDF GHQS Administration, Personnel & Finance
Thirteen Position (10 IO and 3 SSOA).

S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	Recruitment	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
2	NCOs Personnel Affairs	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
3	Finance SSDF GHQs	Maj-Gen	D/Director		SSOA	1
4	11th Inf Div	Maj-Gen	Head of Adm Dept.	IO		1
5	Military Police	Brig-Gen	D/Dir MP TRG. Sch	IO		1
6	1st Inf Div	Brig-Gen	Admin Staff officer		SSOA	1
7	8th Inf Div	Brig-Gen	Admin Staff officer	IO		2
8	8th Inf Div	Brig-Gen	Admin Staff officer		SSOA	1
9	GHQs Admin BDE.	Col	D/Head of Admin	IO		1
10	Social Welfare	Brig-Gen	Admin Staff officer	IO		1
11	Mratys	Col	Admin Staff officer	IO		1
12	Finance SSDF GHQs	Brig-Gen	Admin Staff officer	IO		1
	Total					13

4. SSDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT -----

2. SSDF GHQS Operations
Seven Positions (5 IO & 2 SSOA).

S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	Administration	Maj Gen	Director	IO		1
2	COC	Maj Gen	Director		SSOA	1
3	Training Dept	Brig Gen	D/Director	IO		1
4	Procurement & Log Dept.	Brig Gen	D/Director	IO		1
5	Education Department	Brig Gen	D/Director	IO		1
6	Planning Department	Brig Gen	D/Director	IO		1
7	Personnel Affairs	Brig Gen	D/Director		SSOA	1
	Total					7

4. SSDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT -----

3. SSDF GHQS Training
Eight Positions (6 IO and 2 SSOA).

S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	Admin, Pers & Fin	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
2	General Training	Maj-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
3	MO	Brig Gen	Head of MO Dept.		SSOA	1
4	DGMMC (SDS)	Brig-Gen	Senior Directing Staff	IO		1
5	DGMMC	Brig Gen	D/Chief Instructor		SSOA	1
6	CSC-Malou	Brig-Gen	Head of Admin Dept	IO		1
7	Nyacigak M A	Brig Gen	Head of Admin Dept	IO		1
8	Military Research	Brig-Gen	Head Admin Dept	IO		1
	Total					8

4. SSDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT ----

4. SSDF GHQS Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence
Seven Positions (5 IO and 2 SSOA).

S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	MI for Riverine	Maj Gen	Director	IO		1
2	MI for Counter Terrorism	Maj Gen	Director	IO		1
3	MI for G/Force	Brig Gen	D/Director	IO		1
4	MI for Strategic Intelligence	Brig Gen	D/Director		SSOA	1
5	MI for EWF	Brig Gen	D/Director	IO		1
6	MI for General Ops	Brig Gen	D/Director	IO		1
7	MI for Defence Health	Col	D/Director		SSOA	1
	Total					7

4. SSDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT ----

5. Inspectorate General
Five Position (4 IO and 1 SSOA).

S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1.	Combat Readiness	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
2.	Anti-Corruption	Brig-Gen	Inspector	IO		1
3.	Admin, Pers & Finance	Brig-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
4.	Safety And Security	Brig-Gen	D/Inspector	IO		1
5.	Monitoring & Evaluation	Brig-Gen	D/Director		SSOA	1
	Total					5

4. SSPDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT ----

6. SSPDF GHQS Logistics

Nine Positions (7 IO and 2 SSOA)

S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	Adm per. & F	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
2	Logistic Support Bde	Maj-Gen	Commander	IO		1
3	Depots & Ordinance	Maj-Gen	Director		SSOA	1
4	Supply	Brig-Gen	D/Director		SSOA	1
	Supply Admin, Pers &					
5	Finance	Brig-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
6	Fuel & Lubricants	Brig-Gen	Manager	IO		1
7	Transport	Col	Manager	IO		1
8	Sector Ratio	Col	Deputy Manager	IO		1
9	Depots & Lubricant	Col	D/Director	IO		1
	Total					9

4. SSPDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT ----

7. SSPDF GHQS Moral Orientation

Eight Positions (6 IO and 2 SSOA)

S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	Admin, Per & Fin	Maj-Gen	Director		SSOA	1
2	Game and Sport	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
3	MO School	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
4	Information	Brig-Gen	Deputy Director	IO		1
5	Education	Brig-Gen	Deputy Director	IO		1
6	Child Protection	Brig-Gen	Deputy Director	IO		1
7	Archive	Brig-Gen	Deputy Director		SSOA	1
8	MO	Brig-Gen	Deputy Director			1
	Total					8

4. SSPDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT ----

8. SSPDF GHQS Ground Force Command Structure

Twelve Positions (9 IO and 3 SSOA)

S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	G.F. Game & Sport	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
2	Ground Force Training	Maj-Gen	Director		SSOA	1
3	G/Force Health Service BDE	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
4	Field Eng. Division	Brig-Gen	D/Dir Eng. T. Inst.	IO		1
5	MO Info & PR	Brig-Gen	D/Director		SSOA	1
6	Ground Force Operations	Brig-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
7	G/Force tact Air Defence	Brig-Gen	Adm Dept.		SSOA	1
8	G/Force Artillery	Brig-Gen	Adm Dept.	IO		1
9	Armour & Anti-Tank Div	Brig-Gen	Adm Dept.	IO		1
10	Active Reserve Force	Brig-Gen	Adm Dept.	IO		1
11	Commando command	Brig-Gen	Adm Dept.	IO		1
12	District Court Martial	Brig-Gen	DCM Member	IO		1
	Total					12

4. SSPDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT ----

9. SSPDF Division Level (i) Sector One

Thirteen Positions (10 IO and 03 SSOA)

S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	Sector -One Logistics	Maj-Gen	Director <i>for Logistics</i>	IO		1
2	Military Production	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
3	Administration	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
4	Operations	Maj-Gen	Director		SSOA	1
5	Education	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
6	Logistics	Brig-Gen	D/Director		SSOA	1
7	M.O	Brig-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
8	Military Police	Brig-Gen	D/Commander	IO		1
9	Personnel Affairs	Brig-Gen	D/Director		SSOA	1
10	Officers' Affairs	Brig-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
11	Base Command	Brig-Gen	D/Commander	IO		1
12	Medical Services	Brig-Gen	D/Commander	IO		1
13	Signal Corps	Brig-Gen	D/Commander	IO		1
	Total					13

4. SSPDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT ----

10. SSPDF Division Level (ii) Sector Two

Thirteen Positions (10 IO and 3 SSOA)

S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	Sector -Two Logistic	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
2	Military Production	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
3	Administration	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
4	Operations	Maj-Gen	Director		SSOA	1
5	Education	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
6	Logistics	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
7	M.O	Brig-Gen	d/Director		SSOA	1
8	Military Police	Brig-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
9	Personnel Affairs	Brig-Gen	D/Director		SSOA	1
10	Officers' Affairs	Brig-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
11	Base Command	Brig-Gen	D/Commander	IO		1
12	Medical Services	Brig-Gen	D/Commander	IO		1
13	Signal Corps	Brig-Gen	D/Commander	IO		1
	Total					13

4. SSPDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT ----

11. SSPDF DIVISION LEVEL (iii) SECTOR THREE

Ten Positions (8 IO and 2 SSOA)

S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	Sector - Three Ops	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
2	Military Production	Maj-Gen	Director		SSOA	1
3	Administration	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
4	Education	Maj-Gen	Director	IO		1
5	Operations	Brig-Gen	D/Director		SSOA	1
6	Logistics	Brig-Gen	Director	IO		1
7	M.O	Brig-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
8	Military Police	Brig-Gen	D/Commander	IO		1
9	Officers' Affairs	Brig-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
10	Base Command	Brig-Gen	D/Commander	IO		1
	Total					10

4. SSPDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT ----

12. SSPDF Air Force and Air Defence Command Structure

Eight Positions (6 IO and 2 SSOA)

S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	Air Force SAD Command HQS	Maj-Gen	Chief Of Staff	IO		1
2	Air Force & SAD Command HQS	Maj-Gen	D/Chief of Staff		SSOA	1
3	Strategic Air Defence Academy	Brig-Gen	Director		SSOA	1
4	AF & SAD Training	Brig-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
5	AF & Sad Logistics	Brig-Gen	Director	IO		1
6	AF & Sad Games & Sport	Brig-Gen	Director	IO		1
7	Air Traffic Control Unit	Brig-Gen	D/CDR	IO		1
8	AF & SAD M. O	Brig-Gen	Director	IO		1
	Total					8

4. SSPDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT ----

13. SSPDF Riverine Command Structure

Eight Positions (6 IO and 2 SSOA)

S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	Revenue Command HQs	Maj-Gen	D/COs	IO		1
2	Operations	Brig-Gen	Director	IO		1
3	Logistics	Brig-Gen	Director		SSOA	1
4	Administration	Brig-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
5	Training	Brig-Gen	D/Director		SSOA	1
6	Production	Brig-Gen	D/CDR	IO		1
7	Revenue BDE HQs	Brig-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
8	Logistics	Brig-Gen	D/Director	IO		1
	Total					8

4. SSPDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT ----						
14. Ministry of Defense & Veteran Affairs						
S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	Office of D/Minister	Maj Gen	Executive Director	IO		1
2	Military Economic	Maj Gen	Director for Projects		SSOA	1
3	Directorate of Policy & Res	Maj Gen	Dir of rese & str. analysis	IO		1
4	Directorate for ex. Relations	Brig Gen	Director for gender	IO		1
5	Directorate of Higher Educ	Brig Gen	Dir for career Devel.		SSOA	1
6	Directorate Higher Ed & colleges	Brig Gen	D/Director	IO		1
7	Directorate for Internal Audit	Col	D/Director	IO		1
8	Directorate for Procurement	Brig Gen	Director for purchase	IO		1
9	Director for Budget & Finance	Brig Gen	D/Director	IO		1
10	Dept for Human Resource	Brig Gen	Dirce for Pers Affairs	IO		1
11	Dept for Adm & general service	Brig Gen	D/Director	IO		1
12	Office of Inspector general	Brig Gen	D/Dirce combat redines		SSOA	1
13	Dept of Physical ex & protocol	Col	D/Director	IO		1
	Total					13

4. SSPDF GHQS POSITIONS (Staff and Command) allocated to the SPLA IO & SSOA CONT ----						
15. Veteran Affairs						
S/No	Unit	Rank	Position	Party	Party	Total
1	Dirce for soc & cul Affairs	Maj Gen	Director General	IO		1
2	Directorate for pers. Affairs	Brig Gen.	D/Director		SSOA	1
3	Directorate for state affairs	Brig Gen.	D/Director	IO		1
4	Directorate for W/Heroes	Brig Gen.	D/Director	IO		1
5	Directorate for Data Base	Brig Gen.	D/Director	IO		1
	Total					5

4. Table showing positions allocated to the SPLA IO and SSOA by Ranks

TABLE SHOWING POSITIONS ALLOCATED TO SPLA IO & SSOA BY RANKS

S/NO	PARTICULARS	MAJOR GENERAL		BRIGADIER GENERAL		COLONEL		REMARKS
		SPLA	SSOA	SPLA	SSOA	SPLA IO	SSOA TOTAL	
1	Personnel & Finance	2	1	5	2	2	13	Staff & Command positions
2	SSPF GHQS Operations	1	1	2	1		7	Staff positions
3	SSPF GHQS Training	2		2	2		8	Staff positions
4	SSPF GHQS Staff of			2	2	1	7	Staff positions
5	Inspectorate General	1		2	1		5	Staff positions
6	SSPF GHQS Logistics	2	1	2	2	2	11	Staff positions
7	SSPF GHQS Moral Orientation	2	1	2	1		8	Staff positions

5. Table showing positions allocated to the SPLA IO and SSOA by Ranks ... Cont.

8	SSPDF GHQS Ground Force Command Structure	2	1	7	2		13	Staff & Command positions
9	SSPDF Division Level (I) Sector One	4	1	6	2		13	Staff & Command positions
10	SSPDF Division Level (II) Sector Two	4	1	6	2		13	Staff & Command positions
11	SSPDF DIVISION LEVEL (III) SECTOR THREE	3	1	5	1		10	Staff & Command positions
12	SSPDF Air Service and Air Defence Command Structure	1	1	5	1		8	Staff & Command positions
13	SSPDF Riverine Command Structure	1		5	2		8	Staff & Command positions
14	Ministry of Defense & Veteran Affairs	2	1	7	2	1	13	Staff positions
15	Veteran Affairs	1		3	1		5	Staff positions
	Total	31	10	69	22	6	139	Staff positions

Source: confidential images obtained by Panel

Annex 9: Joint Defence Board order to return to training centres, dated 11 September 2023

September 11th 2023

Joint Defence Board Media Unit

Joint Statement on Return of NUF to Training Centres

This joint statement serves to inform all graduated NUF to return to their respective training centres within 7 days effective from today (11th, September, 2023)

- ✓ Verification teams will be sent to all training centres as soon as possible.
- ✓ Food items for training centres in Greater Equatoria is already delivered.
- ✓ Food items for training centres in Greater Bahr El Ghazal Region will reach in the next 24 hours.
- ✓ Food items for Training Centres in Greater Upper Nile region will be delivered by boats/barges.

Any member of NUF who misses the forthcoming verification, will not be deployed/redeployed and will not be allowed to joint Phase two.


Specific announcement to ranks and files of SPLA-IO.

- ✓ All are required to report to cantonment centres with their personal weapons for Phase Two.
- ✓ No soldier without a gun will be allowed to enter any of the training centres.

Signed..

1. Major General Lul Ruai Koang "PSC" (ET)
SSPDF Spokesman

2. Colonel Lam Paul Gabriel,
SPLA-IO Spokesman



Annex 10: Joint Defence Board agreement on 'phase 2' cantonments and barracks, dated 7 September 2023



Republic of South Sudan
Joint Military Ceasefire Commission
(JMCC)



7th Sept 2023

Joint Defence Board, JDB
Juba, South Sudan

Notification on the newly agreed Phase Two Cantonments and Barracks.

The Joint Military Ceasefire Commission met on Tuesday 29th August 2023 at South Sudan Hotel and discussed the commencement of phase two cantonments and barracks.

After long discussion on numerous challenges which including; location accessibility, numbers of sites, security and distances.

Therefore, the JMCC agreed for Seventeen (17) cantonments, Eleven (11) SSPDF main barracks and 13 organized force's HQs in 10 States and 3 Administratives Areas as well as Assemblies sites.

JMCC is hereby informing all peace partners (RJMEC, CTSAMVM ..etc) to familiarize with the newly agreed sites.


Therefore, the Commission will assess and verify upon the availability of fund from the National Transitional Committee (NTC).

Attached is the detailed copy of the agreed locations.

Please accept the assurance of our best regards.

Regards





Lt. Gen. Koang Gatkuoth Kerjok,
Chair of JMCC,
Inspector General of SSPDF
Juba, South Sudan

Maj. Gen, Kulang Mayen Kulang
Co-Chair of JMCC
D/CMI, SSPDF
Juba, South Sudan

A handwritten signature in blue ink, likely belonging to Maj. Gen. John Pham Gatjiek.

Maj. Gen, John Pham Gatjiek,
Head Secretariat, JMCC
Juba, South Sudan

CC:

- National Transitional Committee, NTC
- RJMEC
- CTSAMVM
- File



Republic of South Sudan
Joint Military Ceasefire Commission
(JMCC)



AGREEMENT ON CANTONMENT AREAS FOR PHASE TWO (2)

Resolutions:

29th August 2023

Pursuant to Article 2.2.3.3, of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, (R-ARCSS 2018) all forces shall be cantoned under supervision of the current monitoring bodies at their present barracks and cantonment sites. Cantoned forces shall be assembled in accessible areas and in a size of not less than a battalion.

The parties agreed to immediately commence cantonment of opposition forces in seventeen (17) cantonment sites, whereas the SSPDF will be cantoned in eleven (11) main barracks and Other Organized Forces will be cantoned in (10) Ten States HQs plus three (3) Administrative areas HQs for Phase two, as indicate in the table below:

S/NO.	STATE	AREAS OF CANTONMENT (SPLA-IO & SSOA forces)	Assembly areas	Barracks	Police & other Organize Forces
1.	UNITY	1. Rupkong 2. Kuer Deat	Rupkong Assemblies - Panyinjar - Mirmir Kuer Deat Assemblies - Dhorbor - Bong - Man-nyathiang	Division Four (4) HQs, Bentiu	Other Organized Forces HQs, Bentiu



1

2.	WESTERN EQUATORIA	1. Bhari 2. Lirango	- Dumo - Modubayi	Division Six (6) HQs Maridi	Other Organized Forces HQs Yambio
3.	CENTRAL EQUATORIA	1. Kendilla 2. wunliet	Assemblies - Lobojo - Talang Wunliet Assemblies - Dolo	Division Nine (9) HQs, Juba	Other Organized Forces HQs, Juba
4.	EASTERN EQUATORIA	1. Ashwa 2. Irube	Irube Assemblies - Camp 15 - Ngaluma Assemblies - Loyoro - Kalarow	Division Seven (7) HQs, Torit	Other Organized Forces HQs, Torit
5.	JONGLEI (Bieh/Phow/Pibor/Jonglei)	1. Thennet 2. Mat 3. Gatdiang (Laraken)	Assemblies - Laprap - Kissingor - Pochalla - Awawa Mat assemblies - Dor - Langkan	Division Eight (8) HQs, Malual Chat Division Ten (10) HQs, Gatdiang	Other Organized Forces HQs, Bor



2

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Northern Ayod (Mogok) Gatdiang Assemblies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pieri - Walgak - Akoba - Southern Ayod - Gumurok - Duk - Twic East - Bor South 		
6.	UPPER NILE (Nasir/Sobat/Fashoda/Adar)	1. Yomding 2. Mathiang 3. Thorgwang	Yomding assemblies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Turuw - Ulang - Yakuach - Gelachel Mathiang Assemblies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mongok - Buodh - Kewejji Thorgwang Assemblies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adhidhuoye - Amaryai 	Division One (1) HQs, Renk Division Two (2) HQs, Malakal	Other Organized Forces HQs, Malakal



3

7.	WESTERN BAHR EL GAZAL/Warrap/Lake	1. Ngo-Halima 2. Wathalelo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dulu Wathale'lo Assmbles <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ngop - Romich 	Division Five (5) HQs, Wau	Other Organized Forces HQs, Wau
8.	NORTHERN BAHR-EL- GAZAL/WARRAP	1. Pantit		Division Three (3), HQs, Wunyiik	Other Organized Forces HQs, Aweil
9	Warrap Lake			Division Eleven (11) HQs, Majak-Tit	Other Organized Forces HQs, Kuajok Other Organized Forces HQs, Rumbek
10	Abyei Administrative Area				Other Organized Forces HQs, Abyei
11	Ruweng Administrative Area				Other Organized Forces HQs, Parieng



4

13	Pibor Administrative Area				Other Organized Forces HQs, Pibor
14	TOTAL	17 CANTONMENT SITES	41 Assembly Areas	11 Divisions	13

Lt. Gen. Koang Gatkuoth Kerjok,
Chair of JMCC,
Juba, South Sudan



Maj. Gen. Kulang Mayen Kulang,
Co-Chair of JMCC,
Juba, South Sudan

30-8-2023

Maj. Gen. John Pham Gatjiek,
Head Secretariat, JMCC
Juba, South Sudan

Annex 11: Ammunition shown to the Panel

Samples of ammunition shown to the Panel in October 2023 and in October 2022.

Much of the ammunition can be traced to older known government stockpiles. The headstamps on several bullets do, however, indicate that they were likely manufactured in 2018, 2019, and 2020, after the imposition of the arms embargo by resolution 2428 (2018).

The Panel has previously highlighted the import of small arms and ammunition from Sudan in 2019 in its report [S/2020/342](#). Several sources interviewed by the Panel have indicated that ammunition bearing the headstamps ‘40’ are likely to have been manufactured in Sudan, post 2015, potentially corroborating the Panel’s earlier findings.



Source: Panel’s own images

Annex 12: Arms depot explosions

Several explosions have been reported at SSPDF weapons storage facilities over the past year.

On 8 June 2023, there was an explosion at an armoury at SSPDF Division 4 headquarters outside Rubkona, near Bentiu town. This incident reportedly resulted in more than a dozen military and civilian injuries. Debris, including unexploded ordnance, was scattered over a two-kilometre radius.¹⁷⁶ Similar events have been reported in Eastern Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal.¹⁷⁷

Aftermath of explosion at facility near Bentiu in Unity State.



¹⁷⁶ Correspondence with a senior representative of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), June 2023.

¹⁷⁷ Reporting by international monitors on incidents in Eastern Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal, obtained by the Panel, June 2023. See also, Eye Radio, Torit ammunition store bursts in flames, causing explosions, 29 November 2022.

Annex 13: Statement by People’s Coalition for Civil Action on violence in Pochalla, dated 21 September 2023



The People’s Coalition for Civil Action
Juba, South Sudan
Email: thecivilactionssd@gmail.com

September 21, 2023

For Immediate Release

The PCCA Condemns Atrocities in Pochalla

The PCCA condemns strongly, atrocities committed by the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) on Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday in Pochalla. The atrocities followed clashes between SSPDF and armed youth in Pochalla. An eyewitness revealed that a certain commander of the SSPDF, Colonel Achuil Ayat, ordered the assassination of Colonel Joseph Okony Okwom Othow, a Former SSPDF area commander and local citizen of Pochalla. He was shot at 7 am by SSPDF officers as he was coming out of his house.

The eyewitness said when he woke up on Sunday morning (17th September 2023), some minutes to 7 am, he saw about 40 soldiers, commanded by a 1st lieutenant, having surrounded the neighborhood where Col. Joseph’s house is located. The eyewitness said he also saw a local police officer and a local peace volunteer walked to the soldiers to inquire what was happening. While they were trying to calm the soldiers down, Col. Joseph Okony, who was still sleeping, heard the locomotion and jumped out of his house in his pajamas, and the soldiers shot him immediately without asking questions. Col. Joseph was unarmed when he came out of his Tukul. The peace volunteer was screaming at the soldiers not to shoot, but they did not listen. They inspected Col. Joseph and found him dead.

The soldiers also shot and wounded a Former Queen of Anyuak. She was shot in the lower abdomen in the front and the bullet came out from her rear. She is popularly known locally as Nyigoca or Awilli. She was the wife of Late King Odiel Gora of Anywaa. Some soldiers turned their guns at the peace volunteer, but they were ordered not to shoot him. They arrested him instead and took him with them to the barracks. He was released after 3 hours of arbitrary detention.

The residents of Pochalla upon hearing the murder in cold blood of their local hero, Joseph Okony, as they call him, and King’s wife was also shot and wounded, they sent people to Col. Achuil Ayat, the area commander to inquire why the soldiers killed OKony? The commander reportedly told the representatives accompanied by a national security officer, that if there is still someone in the community who is stubborn, that they would deal with him the same way. This response angered residents.

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After burying Col. Okony, the following day, Monday the 18th of September 2023, the youth went on a riot, shooting in the air. The soldiers opened fire on them, and the fighting ensued. Based on the reports, some of the soldiers who felt that fighting with angry civilians was unjustified mutinied and refused to engage in combat and some did not go to the barracks.

In a panic, the Area Commander, Col. Achuil Ayat, who reportedly ordered the assassination of Okony, his perceived rival, called the military headquarters in Juba for reinforcement, basically exaggerating the incident, and calling it a rebellion. The government sent in two helicopters to thwart "the rebellion".

On Tuesday morning, the fighting resumed. This time, the soldiers went on a rampage and the gunships came back and indiscriminately shot at civilians and dropped bombs in residential areas. Based on the report, 21 children have drowned, and 7 others are missing as they tried to flee the violence. We are not able to confirm how many youths and government soldiers have been killed. One of the residents we spoke to reported that about 25 or more houses were burned because of the bombing. A community radio was damaged as well as a solar powered community water pump. A church was also destroyed by bombing. After intensive bombing, the gunships landed and Col. Achuil Ayat and 5 of his bodyguards were evacuated to Juba. It is not clear who is commanding the force right now.

Residents in Pochalla involved in the fighting report that they have not rebelled against the government, they are defending their community from indiscriminate assault by rogue elements of the national army. They reported that some of the SSPDF forces are not involved in the fighting and youth are not fighting them. On Wednesday the situation was calm as the soldiers remain in the barracks and the youths are in their villages. There are reports of some displacement and about 62 refugees are reported to have crossed into Ethiopia and other residents of Pochalla have fled to the bushes or neighboring villages.

These episodes of violence do not have happen in a vacuum. They are part of the broader leadership and state failure in South Sudan. From what we have gathered, this is more a political issue than it is a military issue. On the 31st of March 2022, King Akway Nyigo Akway of Anyuak with his Council, wrote a letter to President Kiir in which they cited continued unprovoked attacks against the Anyuak civilians by armed elements of a neighboring community, political and economic marginalization, and attacks on the long-standing relationship between Anyuak and Ethiopia, plots to take Anyuak land, corruption, and mismanagement of resources. In the letter, they proposed solutions to their grievances.

The President has not responded to this letter based on the report. The grievances addressed to the President then degenerated into a serious administrative matter, and it has gone on for 18 months without definitive political decision. This is what has now turned violent.


This situation is a clear demonstration of leadership and state failure. If one receives a letter from a King of a particular community, that matter ought to be treated with a sense of urgency.



The fact that it is going nearly two years since the letter of the King of Anywak to the President without a response is telling.

The PCCA expresses its support and solidarity with the Anywak people and strongly condemns the government's disproportionate use of force against civilians, especially indiscriminate bombing. We also condemn the assassination of Col. Joseph Okony, a local hero of the Anywak people. Those who ordered his assassination and those who executed the order should be held responsible in the court of law.

We call upon the government to order SSPDF soldiers to ceasefire and to make peace with the residents and further call upon the government to stop the mobilization of allied militia reportedly marching towards Pochalla. We call for an independent UN-led investigation to establish the facts.



...The End...




Annex 14: Press release by Pochalla Youth Association, dated 19 September 2023

PRESS RELEASE:

THE FIGHTING IN POCHALLA, SOUTH SUDAN

We, the Anyuak youth in Pochalla County, would like to inform South Sudanese, the region and the international community about the unfortunate incident that took place on 18th September 2023 in Pochalla town.

On 17th September 2023, Colonel, Joseph Okony O. Okwom who was the SSPDF commander in Pochalla was killed by the orders of Colonel, Achuil Ayat the current SSPDF commander in Pochalla. In fact, a few months ago, Colonel Joseph O. Okwom was relieved from his commanding position as the overall commander in Pochalla and was replaced by Colonel Achuil Ayat. After his removal, Joseph Okwom opted to remain and stay in Pochalla, his hometown, as a private citizen.

However, when Colonel Achuil Ayat arrived in Pochalla, he convened a community meeting and demanded that Colonel Joseph Okwom leave Pochalla town. He was advised by the community that commander Joseph Okwom is living in his hometown as a private citizen and has not committed any crime. Hence, there were no any solid reasons that warrant his removal from the town.

In the morning of 17th September 2023, Colonel Achuil Ayat decided to take law into his own hands. Accompanied by soldiers, he went to Joseph Okwom's house in Pochalla and assassinated him in cold blood in front of his family and the entire community. Also, an Anyuak innocent woman was also killed.

After the tragic incident the perpetrators went into town causing chaos and were shooting randomly. To protect the vulnerable and innocent civilians, our youth organized themselves, and on Monday, 18th September 2023, they pushed perpetrators out of town and back to their base. In the same afternoon, South Sudan Defense Force, SSPDF sent two Helicopter gunship and launched indiscriminate attack on civilians in town of Pochalla. The Helicopters are stationed in Pibor, capital of GPAA. They're scheduled to resume their attacks from Pibor anytime.

It is worth mentioning that other members of SSPDF in Pochalla have distanced themselves from this barbaric and heinous act by their commander and are currently safe with us.

We, would like to assure the people of South Sudan, the region and the international community that what happened in Pochalla is not a rebellion. We are forced to defend our vulnerable and innocent civilians from the barbaric actions by Colonel Achuil Ayat.

Finally, we the Anyuak youth condemn in the strongest terms possible the killing of Colonel Joseph Okony Okwom (Torit) by the commander of SSPDF in Pochalla, Colonel Achuil Ayat, and demand thorough investigation into the matter. We also appeal to SSPDF to stop bombarding civilian infrastructures in Pochalla.

Greater Pochalla Youth, South Sudan

okothowity@yahoo.com

19th September 2023

Annex 15: Statement by Pochalla Youth Association, dated 29 September 2023

POCHALLA YOUTH ASSOCIATION (PYA)

29/09/2023

Lt. Gen. Deng Wol,
Chief of Defense Forces
South Sudan People Defence Forces (SSPDF)
Bilpam, Juba

Reference: The Genesis of Pochalla Fighting: Targeting and Killing of Anyuak Leaders

Dear General and the delegates,

First and foremost, we want to strongly condemn the statement of Maj: Gen: Lul Ruai on the recent conflict in Pochalla, calling the youth and the entire community as rebels. We also want to condemn, in the strongest terms possible, the harsh response of the national government to bombard the civilians with gunships. It is sad that the response was informed by prejudice and lack of good judgment on the side of those who are placed in government positions or working to implement the Pibor agenda. We are greatly shocked to hear irresponsible statements from army leadership. This statement, in our view, originates from Pibor because it is a song they have been singing and the SSPDF Spokesperson sadly danced to the tone.

We also want to dismiss the allegations of the Chief Administrator that there is involvement of Ethiopian forces in the conflict in Pochalla. He should refrain from misinformation and recruiting high level government officials in their de-campaigning rhetoric.

We therefore want to provide a bit of context to what happened in Pochalla. In brief, the GPAA leadership has been trying everything within its power to pit the government against the Anyuak people after the demand for exit.

1. You may recall that the Anyuak community in Pochalla publicly expressed its disappointment with Greater Pibor leadership over the atrocious acts of the Murle community with whom they share one administrative area. In a letter addressed to H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit in March 2022, the community demanded exit from GPAA, and the reasons were clear including but not limited to rampant killings of innocent people, abductions of children, marginalization in political and economic field with Murle claiming the biggest share of the cake, corruption and mismanagement of resources and land encroachment.
2. This demand was not received well in Pibor whose authority has been challenged. It resulted in severe relations between Pibor and Pochalla with Pibor trying all it could to intimidate the civil population in Pochalla. Pibor scaled up attacks on the civilians and detained civil servants' salaries. Pibor abused state powers by weaponizing everything to fight the Anyuak community. Not only that, Pibor labeled the community as rebels and

looked for every opportunity to make the government believe that. Despite these scathing measures, the Anyuak community remains firm in their demand.

3. You may also remember that President Salva Kiir sent a delegation to Pochalla to listen to their grievances around November 2022. However, there was no feedback of any kind, whether good or bad.
4. After realizing they (Pibor leadership) would not achieve their agenda unless SSPDF leadership on the ground is changed, they effected the change of SSPDF leadership using Maj. Gen. Joshua Konyi. They achieved their objectives when Col. Achuil Ayat Deng, was brought in as the new Area Commander replacing the deceased Col. Joseph Okony. According to them, once Achuil settles he would kill all Anyuak leaders who support community demand for exit and facilitate the coming of the rejected commissioners. Thereby, dealing away with the demand for exit from Pibor.

In a quest to achieve these and as a confirmation to this conspiracy, Col. Achuil Ayat Deng did the following that led to the recent and ongoing conflict.

1. Firstly, Col. Achuil Ayat undermines the Acting commissioner, Mr. Owiti Olung, and looks down on him on the pretext that he is not an appointed commissioner. Despite being briefed of the row between Pibor and Pochalla, the community demand for exit and community's rejection of the appointed commissioners from Pibor, Achuil stubbornly continues to push for the coming of the rejected commissioners from Pibor as he keeps on saying, "It is not good for the county to be without an appointed commissioner." After realizing his techniques would not work, he resorted to charming the Acting Commissioners to accept appointments from Pibor-something the youth and the entire community is totally against.
2. Secondly, Col. Achuil carried out arbitrary arrests of soldiers who were seen to have a close relationship with the civilians or former Area commander, Col. Joseph Okony. He tortured officers and treated them badly.
3. Thirdly, Achuil targets intellectuals who are seen to have a voice and influence within the community. For example, he summoned Pochalla Community Radio Manager before the local authority and accused him of incitement.
4. Fourthly, Achuil threatened his predecessor and gave an ultimatum to leave Pochalla for Juba or Otallo, the deceased home village. "Pochalla cannot take both of us," he sternly warned. However, We are aware that Juba and other big towns in South Sudan are full of SSPDF officers with similar ranks, some with government assignments and some without assignments but they can still fit in the same city or town without any problem. But Achuil with his ill intention uttered these inflammatory words that made people wonder what the end results of all these harsh words could be.
5. In his short time in Pochalla, Col. Achuil creates mistrust between the soldiers and the civilians who have been living peacefully for decades. He created SSPDF phobia in the civilians who have been feeding these soldiers for years. For instance, he rarely moves

within the community but whenever Achuil gets outside of the Barracks, he goes with over 20 bodyguards who are armed with every kind of weapon at their disposal. Achuil fired every big artillery over the civilians two weeks before this unfortunate event, for almost an hour, in pretext of trying a gun that was repaired or maintained.

6. On 16/09/2023, Achuil conducted an unauthorized military search within the community for 1st Lt. Makoor who escaped from prison after being put in a military cell for months. Just to provide a bit of context, during the time of arrest Makoor ran to Prince who finally handed him over to Achuil to serve his sentence. In his conversation with the Acting Commissioner over the issue of the escapee and his intention to conduct the such, he was told not to carry out the search within the community as it would create unintended effects. However, he insisted and went on with the exercise.
7. Col. Achuil ordered the killing of his predecessor, Col. Joseph Okony Okwom, an iconic figure in SSPDF and in the community. On 17/09/2023, he sent soldiers to the residence of Col. Joseph Okony allegedly searching for the escapee Makoor. This encounter resulted in the killing of his predecessor, Col. Joseph Okony, without any cause.
8. Achuil refused to bury his predecessor after killing him. He told the relatives of the deceased and the community should bury their own son. He also warned that any person who is stubborn will face the same fate. Hence, Achuil's actions confirm his intention to kill Anyuak leaders one after another to weaken the demand of the people and finally return people to Pibor.
9. Col. Achuil ordered indiscriminate shooting in the residential areas the following morning after killing Col. Joseph Okony. This provoked the youth and led to recent and current fighting that led to the loss of lives from both SSPDF and youth.

All these and many other reasons led to the recent bloodshed. However, we need to note that the Pochalla community has been living peacefully with the soldiers for the last 9-10 years. Some of these SSPDF soldiers have lived in Pochalla for more than 2 decades and have no other place to call home. Today many people have lost their lives due to the greed and selfishness of Achuil who accepted bribes from Pibor to implement their deadly agenda.

Here are short term and long term solutions to the current conflict:

Short terms solutions

1. We are calling on the president to hold to account those who ordered and/or executed the assassination of Col. Joseph Okony.
2. As a short solution to the current problem, we need the following officers and NCOs to leave Pochalla with immediate effect as they are the people behind the ongoing conflict: Col. Achuil Ayat Deng, Achuil Mabior, Bol Kuot, Jacob Manut, Paul Mathiang, Makuach Panchol, Samuel Duot, Peter Deng.

3. The President should constitute a neutral and independent UN-led investigation committee to establish the facts pertaining to the recent conflict that results in loss of lives.
4. We demand the SSPDF spokesperson to retract his inflammatory statement labeling youth and the entire community as rebels. He must also apologize to the family of the slain commander for calling a rebel leader, a dedicated SSPDF commander who remained a loyal SSPDF officer until the time of his demise.
5. The Presidency should release a statement on the deployment of gunships on the Anyuak community.
6. The President should release the findings of the Mark Nyapuoch led committee who came to Pochalla to listen to the grievances of the community and feedback be given to the community on their demand for exit from Pibor.
7. The National Government should provide reparations and reconstruction assistance to the residents of Pochalla whose houses were burned and public infrastructures destroyed.
8. The president should instruct GPAA leadership to release Pochalla civil servants' salaries that have been detained for the last two years as a result of Anyuak's demand for exit.
9. The president should split the GPAA budget between Pochalla and Pibor to avoid further misunderstanding between the two counties and communities.
10. The president should appoint commissioners directly from his office to administer the affairs of the Pochalla community.
11. UNMISS to establish a temporary base in Pochalla to monitor the security situation and de-escalate the tension.

Long terms solutions

12. The SSPDF base in Pochalla should be relocated far away from the community to avoid future similar misunderstanding.
13. The SSPDF base in Pochalla should be led by Anyuak sons and daughter who understand and appreciate the culture
14. The president should administratively separate Pochalla from Greater Pibor Administrative Area as demand by the community

Yours sincerely,

Openyi Atie Opuri
Chairperson,
Pochalla Youth Association-Pochalla




Annex 16: Press statement by NGO Intrepid South Sudan, dated 2 October 2023



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PRESS STATEMENT

2nd October 2023

Reports from Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) indicates an impending continuation of aggression against the Civilians in Pochalla County to be perpetuated by a portion of South Sudan People' Defence Forces in Pibor with a number of civilians mobilized especially from Verteth and Pibor; over 700 armed joint SSPDF and Civilians are reported to be currently trekking in the bushes on their way to Pochalla. The September deadly confrontation between the SSPDF and the armed civilians was a horror that should be accounted for and repetition of the same should be avoided at all costs. Violence should never be an option in any circumstances involving civilians.

This is a worrisome development.

We are appealing to the Commanders of SSPDF and other organized forces in GPAA and Pochalla in Particular to pay the necessary attention to this matter and ensure civilians are protected and their properties safeguarded from such aggressions. This statement equally seeks attention of the South Sudan's Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs to verify, investigate and take necessary measures to prevent a repeat of violent confrontation in Pochalla. They ought to be listened to and their concerns addressed amicably.

Thank you!

For more enquiry, reach us through the above contacts.



INTREPID South Sudan (ISS) is a Nongovernmental, Non-profit Civil Society Organization, focusing on promoting Democratic Governance, Rule of Law, Climate Change and Research – through Capacity building, Emergency Intervention, Early Warning, Advocacy and Activism.

Annex 17: Attack helicopters observed in South Sudan

Over the last year, the government has increasingly turned to using Mi-24 attack helicopters to conduct various military operations, including strikes on civilian areas. In addition to repeated attacks on civilians in Pochalla, attack helicopters were also deployed in December 2022 to provide aerial support for SSPDF forces in the context of large-scale violence in Upper Nile.¹⁷⁸ Similarly, following the violence in June 2022 in Tonj North, Warrap State at least one helicopter gunship was deployed under the direction of several senior security commanders.¹⁷⁹ The use of these gunships has been criticized by some Members of Parliament.¹⁸⁰

As of 2016, the government had at least three operational Mi-24 attack helicopters, and one additional helicopter awaiting delivery.¹⁸¹ In 2019, five Mi-24V and five Mi-24 helicopters were documented, although several of these helicopters were believed to be non-operational.¹⁸²

Satellite imagery analysis conducted by the Panel suggests that the SSPDF had at least five helicopters at its disposal in 2022 and 2023, though these do not all appear to be Mi-24 attack helicopters. These helicopters were largely observed at the military end of Juba International Airport and at the Bilpham military headquarters, near Juba. Two helicopters were observed parked at the Luri airfield until June 2022, though it is unclear where these are now located and whether or not they are airworthy.

¹⁷⁸ Reports obtained from international observers and monitors in Upper Nile, December 2022.

Interview with a Juba-based senior military commander, December 2022. See also, Sudans Post, Fierce fighting erupts near Malakal as SSPDF, Agwelek clash with civilians, 11 December 2023

¹⁷⁹ S/2022/884

¹⁸⁰ Eye Radio, MP to move motion against use of gunship in Pochalla, 21 September 2023:

<https://www.eyeradio.org/mp-to-move-motion-against-use-of-gunship-in-pochalla/>

¹⁸¹ S/2016/70

¹⁸² S/2019/301

Juba International Airport, May 2023




Above: November 2022. Below: September 2022

Bilpham military headquarters, May 2023.

October 2022



Annex 18: SSPDF Directive for Joint Operation Mission, dated 5 July 2023



Annex 19: Statement by Equatoria People's Alliance on SSPDF attacks against civilians in Jebel Lado (north of Juba), dated 12 July 2023

Mundari Twan na Gala under all out attack by Dinka SSPDF

EQUATORIA PEOPLES' ALLIANCE

Government of South Sudan Defense Forces (SSPDF) conducting military attacks on Mundari community of Twan na Gala 30 km towards Jebel Lado in Juba

Press Statement For Immediate Release 12th July 2023

Early today on Wednesday, the Mundari community of Twan na Gala, located North of Juba at 30 km towards Jebel Lado, came under heavy military attack by the SSPDF who deployed heavy weaponry and tanks against Mundari in their villages.

The civilian casualties of today's early morning operations against the Mundari have started to trickle into Juba with eight people brought for urgent hospital treatment.

The youngest of them is a girl of 8 years old and two other girls of 20 years old Hellen Kiden (from Dinjolo) shot in the leg, and Kiden from Jai sustained a shot in the chest, were brought to hospital today.

Poni the youngest of all was shot in the buttocks and sustained fractured pelvic.

A boy, Warnyang of 11 years old has head injuries and Wani lo Mina of 9 years old sustained gunshot wounds on the leg and at the upper arm of his body. There has been no reporting by the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation and other media outlets in Juba on today's SSPDF led military operations against the Mundari.

The Governor of Central Equatoria State, Adil Emmanuel is lip tight and has so far issued no public statement about the heavy military operations near Jebel Lado.

Last year, the SSPDF supplied militia who are marauding in Equatoria in the guise of Dinka cattle herders, have perpetrated a string of massacres visited upon unarmed Equatorian civilians, 10 in Ngangala, 8 in Lokiliri, 27 in Kajokeji, and dozens in Mangalla and Lobonok. These systemic massacres have all met with President Salva Kiir's deafening silence, which signified the President's tacit and implicit approval of Dinka dominated SSPDF systemic, and unabated violence in Equatoria over and over again.

Equatoria Peoples' Alliance and the entire people of EQUATORIA unreservedly condemn Salva Kiir's Government policy and his Dinka SSPDF war against the Mundari community.

EPA calls upon all of Equatoria to stand in solidarity with the Mundari community at their hour of need for support and condemn Salva Kiir unreservedly for ordering the killing of Mundari civilians and seizing their cattle at gunpoint using state resources.

It is time that Equatoria nation knew where it is headed, to transition out of the failed SPLM Jieng state.

The full and sole monopoly of SSPDF Dinka army of the means to commit egregious, systemic, uninterrupted Human Rights violations against Equatorians under Salva Kiir's genocidal and tribal SPLM regime and status quo, should now be too familiar for what it is, a Jieng State that is true to its motto: we liberated you and we Jieng alone fought for this country, and it is our time to eat and rule over Equatoria with impunity, might is right as we are reminded by the systemic massacres against our people under Salva Kiir ethnic Dinka domination at gunpoint.

In the wake of systemic massacres of our people, Equatoria, Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA), Western Bahr el Ghazal and all non-Dinka social groups, unite to disrupt continuation of Jieng state by stealth and might of Kiir's Dinka SSPDF militia now cooking rigging of sham elections in 2024.

EPA urges the TROIKA, EU partners, UNSC and AU to withhold lending of any support to R-TGONU's extension in office under failed President Salva Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar's leadership, and which would risk like now, the EU, AU and TROIKA Governments becoming direct or indirect accomplices to continuing unabated gross Human Rights violations in Equatoria and elsewhere in South Sudan.

EPA holds President Salva Kiir and leaders of R-TGONU responsible for failure as a state to protect civilians.

Robert Ohide,
Spokesperson
Equatoria Peoples Alliance (EPA)

Annex 20: Press release by National Salvation Front/Army (NAS), dated 15 July 2023



SOUTH SUDAN
Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People
National Salvation Front/ Army
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON
General Headquarters

Ref: NAS/OSM/07

15th, July, 2023

FOR IMMEDIATE PRESS RELEASE

The Leadership of National Salvation Front (NAS) is deeply concerned about reports of ongoing operations by the South Sudan People's Defense Forces (SSPDF) against Mundari civilians in Central Equatoria State (CES) at the villages surrounding Jebel Lado.

This operation came as a result of a directive issued by the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), Gen. Santino Deng Wol Chok to the Assistant Chief of Defense Forces for Operations Lt. Gen. James Thoi Chany Reat for a Joint Operation Mission in a letter dated 5th July 2023, referenced RSS/SSPDF/CDF/07/2023/023. Based on the directive contained in the letter, the Joint Operation Mission was to underscore the following objectives:

1. To retrieve two rifles of 2nd Lt. Awur and L/Cpl. Manuer and with the help of Chief to arrest all the criminals and the perpetrators who were involved in killing the two Tiger personnels.
2. Based on the previous order of Hon. Governor of CES and the resolutions of the State Government Peace Conference for the disarmament of civilians in CES that all civilians have to be disarmed. Violators should be disarmed forcefully by whatever means, and if necessary, in case of resistance the forces are permitted to neutralize the violator in self-defense.
3. Repatriate all the cattle camps around Juba suburb to their places of origin.

Following this development on Wednesday 12th July 2023, the SSPDF conducted an operation against the Mundari civilians in the cattle camps, causing displacement, looting of property and injuring 8 civilians including children.

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The Leadership of NAS would like therefore to make the following statements:

1. Condemns in strongest terms possible this heinous and unabated act by the leadership of SSPDF of attacking innocent civilians with the sole objective to implement their usual criminal and tribal agenda. Equally, NAS condemns the government of CES to subject their state citizens to undergo constant brutality, harassment and humiliation without state protection.
2. The language used by the CDF Gen. Santino Deng Wol Chok in his directives was violent, unprofessional, indiscriminate and general, and this directly contributed to the brutal nature of this operation against Mundari people. NAS therefore, holds CDF Gen. Santino Deng Wol Chok responsible for the atrocities against Mundari people.
3. NAS strongly questions this prompt intervention of SSPDF to disarm the Mundari and the civilians in CES, after the death of 2nd Lt. Awur and L/Cpl. Manuer. Yet on 3rd February 2023, 21 civilians were massacred in Kajo-Keji by well armed Dinka Bor cattle keepers and there was no such intervention to disarm the Dinka Bor cattle keepers nor arrest the criminals involved in cold blood massacre. This policy of selective intervention reveals the true nature of the tribal security sector in South Sudan and how this sector is often being used to achieve hegemonic tribal political agenda.
4. According to reliable sources, these two Tiger Division personnels died while on the mission of cattle rustling in the Mundari cattle camps. This, therefore, classifies the case as police matter because of its criminal nature. But the fact that the leadership of SSPDF immediately acted ultra vires indicates how criminal activities in and around Juba are executed in full acquaintance and in total coordination with security agencies.
5. President Salva Kiir has always opposed disarmament in Baher el Gazal arguing that the civilians bought the guns with their money or cows; and therefore, he cannot disarm them without compensation. On the contrary, the regime of Salva Kiir want to disarm the community of Mundari and other communities in South Sudan without compensation and in addition to that by use of force, intimidation and even killings. Double standard practices in disarmament schemes always end up in failure because such programme will not be acceptable to all.
6. Ideally, the use of force and armament is state monopoly, but in South Sudan, where there is State capture, the use of force and weapons has become tribal monopoly where individuals masquerade as state agencies. The Mundari community, being cattle herding and possessing community, and believed to

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have weapons which are used for the protection of their wealth, has become a target for disarmament to render them vulnerable to cattle rustling and finally to dispossess them of their wealth in a long-run.

7. In conclusion, NAS stands in solidarity with the Mundari community in facing this affliction caused by the gruesome and murderous SSPDF and their charlatan leadership. We send our sincere sympathies and condolences to those affected, their families and wish quick recovery to the injured.

Suba Samuel Manase
NAS Spokesperson



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Annex 21: Statement by Equatoria Peoples' Alliance on disarmament efforts, dated 16 October 2023

EQUATORIA PEOPLES' ALLIANCE

EPA



<https://epauf.wordpress.com>

The SSPDF Dinka-Government forces orchestrating unprecedented, massive and selective one-sided disarmament of Equatoria Mundari communities amid indiscriminate atrocities against local natives in Gemeiza, and Terekeka.

Press Statement

For Immediate Release
16th October 2023

Equatoria Peoples' Alliance is appalled that the policy of the government of South Sudan, dominated by one ethnic group, the Dinka, is laying the ground for Ethnic Cleansing and genocide in Equatoria against the non Dinka, especially the Mundari people as their first target in Equatoria among many other tribes and non-Dinka social groups.

As we go to the press, EPA is inundated with unprecedented reports about the indiscriminate beating and torturing of innocent Mundari natives by SSPDF Dinka soldiers across Mundari land, targeting in particular the Eastern Bank Mundari territories in a violent and atrocious disarmament drive. This selective disarmament against Mundari is occurring in Equatoria while the invading Dinka cattle herders roam with automatic weapons in their possession in Mundari land, unfazed, untouched and unscathed by the Dinka SSPDF initiated disarmament campaign.

The SSPDF demanded the locals to hand over PKMs and other types of weapons that the Mundari natives do not possess, and the natives are indiscriminately being penalized by way of beatings, torture and arrest for being suspected of possessing and hiding weapons, and with many innocent locals now thrown into prison in Gemeiza by the SSPDF soldiers as we write. The SSPDF Dinka soldiers, many of who have received no regular salary for over a year, have turned to making money, by charging unlawful fines against innocent Mundari civilians in the form of goats or payments for either possessing any kind of weapon or not complying with the soldiers demands. Torturing of innocent natives and their arrest goes hand in hand with random fines that are unheard of and unprecedented.

The Dinka soldiers led disarmament has also targeting Terekeka community alone, while the Dinka IDPs in Mangalla who are heavily armed with different types of rifles and automatic weapons, are unaffected by the disarmament policy. This is a selective disarmament by a Dinka Government at a time when the Dinka IDPs are the ones responsible for many incidents of insecurity, atrocious attacks and murderers with impunity of unarmed civilians in Equatoria, including on the roads, armed robberies and abductions and cattle rustling which the SSPDF Dinka soldiers have either ignored or participated in as accomplices and beneficiaries of ill-gotten proceeds in the process. The Dinka Bor cattle herders and so-called Dinka IDPs in Equatoria were responsible for scores of massacres of civilians in Kajokeji, Ngangalla, Lokiliri, Lobonok with their victims buried in mass graves, did not prompt the Dinka SSPDF to initiate disarmament against the Dinka IDPs and cattle herders for the crimes and gross human rights violations which they committed against unarmed civilians in Equatoria. The Dinka Government issued no policy for disarmament of the heavily armed Dinka militia in Equatoria as the first target. Instead, the Mundari who carried out not a single massacre of civilians in Equatoria are the target of unprecedented disarmament as a community in Equatoria, while the real culprits, Dinka Bor heavily armed militia in Equatoria who are held responsible for unprecedented massacres of civilians in Equatoria, are unscathed and blameless and against whom the SSPDF did not instigate a disarmament campaign and are still heavily armed with their possession of deadly weapons intact.

This atrocious behavior of SSPDF Dinka soldiers in this uncalled for disarmament drive in Mundari land is causing panic and insecurity in the East Bank of Terekeka towns of Gemeiza and Mangalla payams, specially where there are heavily armed Dinka IDPs from Bor with their cattle, who are unscathed by the disarmament as if they do not cause insecurity to Equatoria and to the Mundari, and do not have heavy weapons in their possession in Mundari land to inflict massacres on civilians like they have done in Ngangala, Lokiliri and Managalla itself.

There is currently ongoing widespread arrest of local natives indiscriminately to pay fines, and the numbers of those released after paying such fines and submitting or providing the demanded rifles from them are not being documented, and the exact number of people detained is not clear as the spate of arrests still continues indefinitely.

EPA notes with dismay that the disarmament started exactly on 11th of July 2023 in Terekeka, there is mounting evidence that most of the cattle camps of Dinka Bor in Central Equatoria are still awash with heavy guns and automatic weapons posing insecurity to the people of Equatoria. The disarmament is thus only targeting the Mundari community, not the Dinka cattle herders and claimed IDPs, while there is ongoing looting of cattle by the IDPs who are Mundari neighbors, Dinka Bor and most of who are in Mundari territory with their guns unperturbed by the risk of being disarmed by the Dinka SSPDF.

It was not long ago that the Mundari community of Twan na Gala, located North of Juba at 30km towards Jebel Lado, came under heavy military attack by the SSPDF who deployed heavy weaponry and tanks against Mundari in their villages. The disarmament of the Mundari is with the intent to render them defenseless in the face of the well and heavily armed Dinka Bor cattle militia disguised as IDPs in in Mundari land. All the massacres of civilians in Equatoria were perpetrated by marauding and heavily armed Dinka Bor cattle herders and militia, not the Mundari. Who then would be the legitimate target of disarmament in Equatoria, the native Mundari or the Dinka Bor heavily armed militia when gauged by the death toll, atrocities and massacres they committed against unarmed civilians in Equatoria? However, President Kiir's Dinka Government policy and Dinka SSPDF initiative is to criminalize and disarm the Mundari on one hand, and exonerate Dinka Bor culprits for their privileged special status as Dinka on the other hand. This is the policy of President Salva Kiir's Dinka Government.

EPA and the people of Equatoria condemn in no uncertain terms the targeting of the Mundari by President Salva Kiir's Dinka Government selective disarmament policy against the Mundari and the execution of it by none other than the Dinka Army, the SSPDF, while Gen Kiir Mayardit is rallying Equatorians to endorse him as Presidential candidate in the doomed 2024 election.

EPA calls on the regional and international community, and Troika Governments to add their voice of condemnation against President Salva Kiir's policy of waging war against the Mundari in the guise of disarmament that is purposed for building a hegemonic, tribal Dinka State in South Sudan, under a tribal Dinka militia (SSPDF) as the country's national army. Equatoria condemns the continuation of this Dinka rule and clearly Dinka ethnic domination in our country, and all the people of Equatoria must stand united against the return of Jieng hegemonic policy, Equatoria must stand for freedom, liberty and unfettered respect for and preservation of Equatoria Peoples and Human Rights without fear or complacency.

Equatoria Peoples' Alliance and the entire people of EQUATORIA unreservedly condemn Salva Kiir's Dinka Government policy and stand in solidarity with the Mundari people in their land. The Dinka Bor cattle herders and IDPs in Equatoria have overstayed their welcome and needed to return to their ancestral lands in Bor in the interest of preservation of peace in Equatoria and Mundari land. No disarmament anywhere in Equatoria under SSPDF and Dinka Bor heavily armed militia and cattle herders occupation.

Dr. Hakim Dario
Chairman,
Equatoria Peoples Alliance (EPA)

Email Contact: EPA.Int@epauf.blog

Annex 22: Statement from the Office of the Archbishop of Central Equatoria, dated 5 June 2023

STATEMENT FROM THE OFFICE OF ARCHBISHOP OF CENTRAL EQUATORIA INTERNAL PROVINCE
HIS GRACE DR. PAUL YUGUSUK,

ON
THE KIDNAPPING OF THE RT. REV. AMOSA DATA ELINOMA OF THE EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF
MOROBO.

On behalf of Central Equatoria Internal Province of the Episcopal Church of South Sudan, I condemn in the strongest terms, the ambush and consequent kidnapping of bishop Amosa Data Elinoma of the Episcopal Diocese of Morobo and his driver - which happened this morning near Morobo at around 10.00 am

We have reliably learnt that this barbaric inhuman act was done by National Salvation Front NAS soldiers. We appeal to the leadership of National Salvation Army to instruct their soldiers to stop harassing servants of God and civilians.

The Rt. Rev. Amosa Data's car was stopped at gun point and kidnapped alongside his driver today a few kilometers from Morobo at around 10:00 am while he was travelling from Koboko to Morobo Diocese to chair a Diocesan Council meeting

The bishop and his driver were ordered to drive the car 100 meters from the main road into the bush - where they joined boda boda riders who had been kidnapped earlier. They were ordered to sit down from where they helplessly saw their bags looted. The Bishops bag had two cellphones, his cross, Bible, prayer book, clerical robe, stamp and church document, including a printed report that he had prepared to present at the diocesan council meeting

While some soldiers were looting the Bishop's car as well as the boda riders property , their other colleagues who were guarding the bishop categorically informed him that they are National Salvation Front soldiers and that they are targeting the church leaders because the church supports of the government.

The soldiers only stopped the barbaric act after realizing that a suspicious boba boda rider who was riding from Morobo turned back. They feared that the rider might have gone to report the matter. The Bishop saw them pour petrol on his car and torch it to ashes before they disappeared into the bushes

In conclusion, we passionately call on all armed groups in South Sudan to give peace a chance by utilizing mediation and other forms of negotiations to settle political disputes.

My the peace of our Lord Jesus Christ Prevail always - Amen

Annex 23: Statement by the Center for Legal Aid and Justice (CLAJ) further to an attack on the church vehicle, dated 6 June 2023



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June 6, 2023

Office of the Governor,
Central Equatoria State

PETITION FOR THE STATE GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS PERSISTENT INSECURITY IN CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE

The incident that occurred at 10:00AM CAT on June 5, 2023 during which the vehicle of His Lordship Amos Data Elinoma, Bishop of the Episcopal Church of Sudan and South Sudan Diocese of Morobo was set ablaze and other personal belongings taken on Yei-Kaya road is a shock and wakeup call to all levels of government to demonstrate sincere commitment in serving the people with lasting peace. There is need for the Government of Central Equatoria State to approach and engage the national government and the guarantors of the revitalized peace agreement to expedite the Rome Peace Talks.

The recent incident clearly indicates lack of commitment to the Rome Peace Talks and must be treated as a threat to peace, security and stability in the country. The press statement issued by the office of the Governor of Central Equatoria State through the Ministry of Information and Communication on June 5th 2023 which is an honest acknowledgement of the level of threat the National Salvation Front poses must be followed by intended action for peace and complete end to all forms of violence. The June 5th incident is a horrible reminder of some of the heinous atrocities committed during the two periods of armed conflict (2013 and 2016) which have the potential to disrupt free movement of people and goods across the country.

As Center for Legal Aid and Justice (CLAJ), we are deeply concerned and strongly condemn the perpetrators of the criminal act and hereby appeal to the Government of Central Equatoria State through the office of the Governor to take immediate steps by approaching the national government, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Verification Mechanism, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the TRIOKA countries to urgently intervene and ensure that such incidents do not recur. We also believe that the perpetrators will be apprehended and held to account for the crimes they committed.

We strongly believe and have confidence in the competence of the Government of Central Equatoria State, the Revitalized Transitional Government of the Republic of South Sudan, CTSAMVM, JMEC, and TRIOKA among others to play an important role not only in investigating the matter but ensuring a complete end to all forms of violence and human rights violations in the country.

Center for Legal Aid & Justice
VICTOR BATAILLILLAS
HRD, Adv. & Director
Center for Legal Aid and Justice (CLAJ South Sudan)
CLAJ-South Sudan
JUN 06 2023

Annex 24: Statement by the Government of Central Equatoria, dated 5 June 2023



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
Central Equatoria State - Juba
Ministry of Information and Communication



**STATEMENT ON THE BARBARIC ATTACK AGAINST THE MAN
OF GOD IN MOROBO COUNTY BY NAS**

His Excellency Emmanuel Adil Anthony Wani, the Governor of Central Equatoria State and his entire Government remorsefully condemns in the strongest terms possible the heartless abortive martyrdom of the Prophet of Peace, Rt. Rev. Amos Data Elinoma, the Bishop of the Episcopal Church of Sudan and South Sudan Diocese of Morobo by elements of the National Salvation Front (NAS) led by Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka.

The Iconic Peace-loving Bishop was ambushed by an armed contingent of NAS at 34 Miles along Yei-Kaya Road today Monday 5th June 2023. In an inhumane action, the Bishop in his divine attires with the consecrated immunities was forcefully removed from his car, subjected to distressful situation with the car set ablaze and property disowned.

H.E The Governor is informing the people of Central Equatoria State and the general Public that the Candid Bishop, who survived martyrdom for his persistent pastoral call for peace is safe with the grace of God.

The Governor, calls upon the Leadership of the NAS to reciprocate the commitment of His Excellency President Salva Kiir Mayardit to PEACE by recommitting themselves to peaceful settlement of their grievances through the ongoing Peace Talks in Rome.

The End.

Annex 25: Press statement by the Central Equatoria Internal Province Anglican Communion, dated 26 August 2023



CENTRAL EQUATORIA INTERNAL PROVINCE ANGLICAN COMMUNION

PRESS STATEMENT

Friday August 26, 2023

Bishopric Statement on the Attack, looting, torture of Christians and arrest of the Clergy of Episcopal Church of South Sudan by SSPDF Mobile Force in Yei River County of Central Equatoria State.

We the bishops, the clergies and the entire Christians of Central Equatoria Internal Province, would like to express our deepest sadness on attacks, torture, looting of Christians and arrest of the Clergy of Episcopal church of South Sudan by Mobile Force of Sudan People's Defence Forces in Nyori and Mongo Payams of Yei River County of Central Equatoria State.



On the 24th and the 25th August 2023 the Mobile Force of SSPDF attacked, looted and tortured Christians of Episcopal Church of South Sudan in Nyori and Mongo Archdeaconries of the Episcopal Diocese of Yei.

The Mobile Force further arrested and tortured Rev. Seme Mawa the pastor of Agonyakiri parish of Nyori archdeaconry and took him captive to Lasu military Barracks. They also looted the belongings including the clerical attires of Rev. Hilary Luete Moses, the Rural Dean of Ombasi Deanery of Mongo Archdeaconry.


We condemned in the strongest term possible the attack, the loot, and the torture of the christians and the arrest of ECSS cleric by Mobile Force of SSPDF in Yei River County of Central Equatoria State.

We call for the immediate release of Rev. Seme Mawa and for the investigation of the incidents and to hold those responsible accountable.



Bishops of Central Equatoria Internal Province.

Annex 26: Press statement by the SPLM-IO on the National Election Act 2012 (Amendment Bill 2023), dated 18 September 2023



18.9.2023

Press Statement on the Violation of the R-ARCSS by the SPLM-IG and its Allies in the passing of the National Election Act, 2012 (Amendment) Bill, 2023

In the Ordinary Sitting No. 25/2023, dated Monday September 18, 2023, the TNLA deliberated on the report of the Standing Specialized Committee on the National Election Act, 2012 (Amendment) Bill, 2023 in its Third and Final Reading stage, where some Members of the august House, particularly from the SPLM-IG and its allies decided to introduce a new Section in the Bill seeking to empower the President of the Republic of South Sudan to appoint, after Elections an additional number of Members of Parliament.

The decision by the SPLM IG and Allies is contrary to the provision of the Revitalized Agreement, Article 1.2.13 which states that the National Election Commission shall conduct free, fair and credible elections before the end of the Transitional Period and shall ensure the outcome reflects the will of the electorates, read together with Article 1.20.5.

In light of the above, the SPLM-IO Parliamentary Caucus would like to state the following:

1. Condemns in the strongest terms possible attempts by the SPLM-IG and its allies to make the process and the conduct of the National elections in South Sudan, undemocratic, unfair and not credible.
2. The proposal that the President be given extra powers to appoint additional number of the members of the Parliament takes away the mandate and sovereignty of the People of the Republic of South Sudan. (Art. 2. TCRSS 2011 (as Amended)).
3. We are concerned of the unfair procedure and the manner the Rt. Hon. Speaker, Jemma Nunu Kumba conducted the sitting by not maintaining the order and decorum of the house to balance participation in the deliberation by the members of the august House. By denying members of SPLM-IO and other Political parties' fair chance to express their views on this critical matter. Moreover, the Rt. Hon speaker decided to proceed without consensus and decided to usher the house into voting despite the lack of consensus on the matter.
4. It is important to note that the National Election Act, 2012 (Amendment) Bill 2023 is one of the critical Bills reviewed and amended by the NCAC pursuant to the Agreement as provided for in Article 1.18.7. which requires that the TNLA shall ratify the Bills coming from the NCAC.
5. In light of the above violations, the SPLM-IO Parliamentary Caucus condemns in no uncertain terms the continuous violation of the Agreement and disregard of the advice of the two Principals, relevant Peace implementation mechanisms, the R-JMEC and the NCAC.
6. We call upon the Principals to the Agreement, R-JMEC and the Separatists to intervene and resolve this matter as soon as possible.



7. We further urge the TNLA and the Parties therein to adhere to the provision of the Agreement, Article 1.14.8 which states *"The reconstituted TNLA shall, in the conduct of its business, support this agreement and enact legislations that enables and assist the transitional processes and reforms described in this Agreement."*

Sign

Oy Nathaniel Pierino
18.9.2023

Rt. Hon. Oyet Nathaniel Pierino
Deputy Chairman and First Deputy Speaker-TNLA
RSS, Juba



Annex 27: National Election Act 2012 (Amendment Bill 2023), composition of Legislative Assembly

CHAPTER THREE COMPOSITION OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES AND ELECTION OF MEMBERS

50. Section 60 is amended by substituting, restructuring, paragraphing subsection (2), (3) (4) and (5) of the Act to read as follows:

60. Composition of the National Legislature and Elections of its Members

(2)

- (a) Fifty percent (50%) of members of the National Legislative Assembly shall be elected to represent geographical constituencies in the Republic of South Sudan;
- (b) Thirty-five percent (35%) of women members shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation at the national level from closed party lists;
- (c) Fifteen percent (15%) of members shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation at the national level from the closed party lists.
- (3) There shall be five representatives from each State and two representatives from each Administrative Area in the Council of States elected by members of the state legislative assembly and the Administrative legislative council respectively
- (4) The elected President shall appoint five percent (5%) of the three hundred and thirty two (332) members of the National Legislative Assembly.
- (5) The total number of members of the National Legislative Assembly shall be three hundred and thirty two (332) representatives.
- (6) The Commission shall establish additional guidelines for matters related to the procedure for election of the members of the Council of States.

Opposition groups have objected to the late addition of article 60.4, which gives the elected President the power to appoint 5 percent of the 332 Member Parliament (See Annex 26).

In addition, it is not clear how this provision is technically compatible with the remaining provisions of article 60. As no Member can both be appointed directly by the President and also “elected” to represent and geographic constituency or from a close party list, the election mechanisms described in 60.a, 60.b. and 60.c, which cumulatively describe the election of 100 percent of the 332 Member Legislative Assembly, do not appear compatible with 60.4.

One South Sudanese legislator familiar with the process told the Panel that the intention is that the elected President will appoint 17 MPs (5 percent), with the remaining 315 MPs then elected through the mechanisms described in 60.a to 60.c. In such a case, however, e.g. only around 48 percent of the 332 Members of the Assembly will have been elected to represent geographic constituencies, contravening article 60.a

Selection mechanism	Number of MPs selected	% of Assembly
Appointed by the elected President (60.4)	5% of 332 = 16.6 ≈ 17 MPs	(17/332) ≈ 5.1%
Elected to represent geographic constituencies (60.a)	50% of (332 – 17) = 157.7 ≈ 158 MPs	(158/332) ≈ 47.6%
Elected from women only list (60.b)	35% of (332 – 17) = 110.4 ≈ 110 MPs	(110/332) ≈ 33.1%
Elected from closed party list (60.c)	15% of (332 – 17) = 47.3 ≈ 47 MPs	(47/332) ≈ 14.2%
Total	332 MPs	100%

See also:

- The Sudd Institute, Operationalizing the 2023 National Elections Act: Opportunities and Challenges, 24 October 2023: <https://www.suddinstitute.org/publications/show/65371bd412bbb>
- James Okuk, What To Do Urgently For Elections To Take Place In South Sudan By 2025?, 26 October 2023