
2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Summary record of the 12th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 22 August 2022, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Zlauvinen (Argentina)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference (*continued*) (NPT/CONF.2020/61)

1. **The President** said that he wished to draw attention to document [NPT/CONF.2020/61](#), containing the schedule of division of costs based on the actual participation of States parties in the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That document should be considered in conjunction with rule 12 of, and the appendix to, the rules of procedure adopted by the Conference on 1 August 2022. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt the schedule of division of costs, as contained in document [NPT/CONF.2020/61](#).

2. *It was so decided.*

3. **The President** said that, on the morning of 22 August 2022, he had participated in a Security Council meeting under the theme “Maintenance of international peace and security: promoting common security through dialogue and cooperation”. At that meeting, he had underscored the role and significance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remained an enduring example of the value of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation measures in promoting international peace and security. He had also stressed the role of the Treaty in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, which had growing benefits, in particular with regard to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. In addition, he had emphasized the need for States parties to engage in a flexible spirit in the discussions to be held during the final week of the Review Conference.

Reports of the Main Committees

4. **The President** invited the Chairs of the three Main Committees to present the reports on the outcomes of their work.

5. **Mr. Aidid** (Malaysia), speaking as Chair of Main Committee I, said that the Committee had held eight meetings, while its subsidiary body had held six meetings. The Committee had completed its discussions of its revised draft substantive report (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.I/SB.1/CRP.1/Rev.1) on 18 August 2022; all proposals submitted by States parties had been carefully considered for incorporation into that draft report. Subsidiary body 1 had held its last meeting on 18 August 2022. Following that meeting, the Chair of subsidiary body 1 had submitted to him the draft substantive report of subsidiary body 1, indicating that, while consensus had not been reached on the draft report, she believed

that, with further work, consensus could be reached in the future.

6. In accordance with past practice and under his authority as Chair, he had merged the draft substantive reports of Main Committee I and subsidiary body 1, taking into consideration the extensive nature of their deliberations, in accordance with their provisional programme of work and indicative timetable. Accordingly, the draft substantive report submitted to him by the Chair of subsidiary body 1 had been reproduced, without amendments, in the section of the merged draft substantive report relating to forward-looking actions. While many paragraphs in the merged draft substantive report had enjoyed broad support among States parties, a number of paragraphs continued to receive mixed responses. At the conclusion of the Committee’s last meeting on 19 August 2022, States parties had not yet reached consensus on the merged draft substantive report. Consequently, he had submitted that draft report to the President of the Review Conference under his own authority, in the hope that it would help him to facilitate consensus. The merged draft substantive report would also be issued as a working paper with the symbol [NPT/CONF.2020/MC.I/WP.1](#).

7. Delegations had also received, through the Secretariat, the draft report setting out the procedural elements of the Committee’s work (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.I/CRP.3). There had been no objections to the circulation of that draft report as an official document of the Review Conference. It would therefore be issued as document [NPT/CONF.2020/MC.I/1](#), and an advance version was already available on the Conference’s website.

8. **Ms. Krois** (Poland), speaking as Chair of Main Committee II, said that the Committee had held 11 meetings between 8 and 22 August 2022, while its subsidiary body had held 4 meetings between 9 and 19 August 2022. After an initial general exchange of views on the agenda items allocated to it, the Committee had considered issues under five thematic clusters, namely, non-proliferation, safeguards, export controls, nuclear security and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Subsidiary body 2 had considered regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

9. At the eleventh meeting of Main Committee II, held on the morning of 22 August 2022, she had put forward for consideration the draft substantive reports

of Main Committee II (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.II/CRP.1/Rev.2) and subsidiary body 2 (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.II/SB.2/CRP.1). Having concluded that there was no consensus on those draft reports, she had issued, under her own authority, a working paper reflecting the discussions of Main Committee II and subsidiary body 2 (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.II/WP.1). She would also share with the President of the Review Conference the proposals received from delegations in the final hours of the Committee's work.

10. The draft substantive reports of Main Committee II and subsidiary body 2, as reflected in her working paper, represented an effort to find common ground on a wide range of issues relating to disarmament. Close attention had been paid to the contributions of States parties, in particular the proposals contained in the working papers submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, and the Vienna Group of Ten.

11. Consensus had been particularly difficult to reach on a number of issues owing to the challenge of finding appropriate wording. For example, while some States considered the measures set out in additional protocols to represent the verification standard under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, others had stressed the voluntary nature of such protocols. A group comprising a significant number of delegations had been formed to discuss the matter and had identified wording that was acceptable to all parties. Many States were of the view that the wording concerning small quantities protocols should be strengthened, and common ground had also been found in that regard. Differences on the issue of non-compliance had been resolved, although the matter of whether that issue should be included in the section of the draft report concerning forward-looking actions remained to be determined. Balanced wording had also been found to reflect the view that export controls should not hamper peaceful nuclear activities. In addition, common ground had nearly been found on the matter of nuclear-weapon-free zones, with only fine-tuning remaining in that regard.

12. The wording on naval nuclear propulsion reflected agreement on the fact that there was interest in the topic, on the need for verification arrangements to be addressed, in particular by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and for continued dialogue on the matter. As naval nuclear propulsion activities would be developed and implemented over many years, the Review Conference should make small advancements in that area that could be built on in the future.

13. All delegations had agreed on the seriousness of situations involving great devastation, threats to safety and security and a loss of control by national authorities that prevented them from fulfilling their safeguards obligations. That was a matter of State responsibility, involving the implementation of safeguards, the fulfilment of non-proliferation obligations and nuclear disaster prevention. As there had been debate over whether the matter should be presented in the draft report as a reflection of a general principle or in relation to the particular situation in Ukraine, both types of references had been included, in order to reflect the mood of the discussion. The goal of States parties, in working towards consensus on an outcome document, should not be to be fully satisfied with the result but to ensure that it would not harm their national interests or the collective security of the planet.

14. **Ms. Denissen** (Netherlands), speaking as Chair of Main Committee III, said that the Committee had held 10 meetings, while its subsidiary body had held 5 meetings. The Committee and its subsidiary body had considered a series of revised draft substantive reports, the latest versions of which had been discussed at their last meetings, held on 19 August 2022. On the basis of discussions among States parties, Main Committee III and subsidiary body 3 had concluded that they were not in a position to reach consensus on their draft reports. As a result, she had merged the draft reports and, under her own authority, had issued the combined draft report as a working paper (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.III/WP.1).

15. Agreement had been reached on many issues, and many delegations had considered the final versions of the draft reports to be a sound basis for future consensus. For issues on which differences remained, she had reflected all views expressed by delegations in the latest versions of the draft reports. There had been divergence on issues such as the relationship between the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, safety and security; the safety and security of nuclear facilities, including in Ukraine; the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station; and withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. She was confident that those differences could be reconciled with the assistance of the President of the Review Conference and the continued engagement of States parties.

16. States parties had put forward many substantive and forward-looking proposals on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, proposals that had been reflected in her summary of the deliberations of Main Committee III and subsidiary body 3, contained in her working paper (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.III/WP.1). In the proposals, States parties had established strong links between the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had identified obstacles and specific ways in which to expand the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy to a broader range of stakeholders. Once incorporated into the final document of the Review Conference, those proposals would have a significant impact on the world.

17. **The President** said that there were no consensus texts from the Main Committees to allow the Drafting Committee to start its work. Under the circumstances, he would prepare a consolidated report, which would be shortly circulated to all States parties. It was his intention to continue working in informal plenary meetings with the aim of achieving consensus on an outcome document that would reflect the positions expressed by States parties. He encouraged delegations to continue to engage in dialogue in different formats, as necessary, to help finalize proposals that would command consensus. He would endeavour to retain the highest possible levels of transparency and visibility with all States parties.

18. **Mr. Takei** (Japan) said that, since the 2015 Review Conference, the path to a nuclear-weapon-free world had become harder. States parties must therefore recommit themselves to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which had served as the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Without that Treaty, the world would be a far more dangerous place; because of the Treaty, a 77-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons had been achieved. During the final week of the current Conference, States parties must demonstrate that, despite their differences, they could still find common ground in order to increase global safety and advance towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. States parties must not abandon their efforts to achieve a world without nuclear weapons; they had a collective responsibility to the next generation to keep the world free of that scourge. Their mission, at the current Conference, was not to achieve a perfect final document, but rather to find consensus on a document that would facilitate progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

19. **Ms. Chan Valverde** (Costa Rica) read out a joint humanitarian statement on behalf of 144 States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.*

20. **Mr. Takht Ravanchi** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation had contributed constructively to the discussions at the Review Conference and to the draft reports of its Main Committees and subsidiary bodies, despite the lack of consensus on the draft reports as a result of their imbalanced content. The Islamic Republic of Iran was deeply concerned at the lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear disarmament

obligations and commitments. The negotiations held during the first three weeks of the Conference had demonstrated that the nuclear-weapon States did not have the determination or political will to accept specific commitments, timetables, benchmarks or targets, steps that were required to achieve progress towards nuclear disarmament. The positions of the nuclear-weapon States, including their attempts to replace nuclear disarmament with nuclear risk reduction, positions that were echoed by so-called nuclear umbrella States, ran counter to their explicit legal obligations concerning nuclear disarmament.

21. The establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons was long overdue after the adoption by consensus of the resolution on the Middle East at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. After initial delays in convening a conference to establish such a zone, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties and regional countries, at the first, second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference, had warned that any further delays would seriously jeopardize the overall implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, and would represent a major setback in that regard.

22. The Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction had been postponed indefinitely owing to the opposition of the United States. It had been the persistent policy of that country to turn a blind eye to the nuclear arsenals of the Israeli regime while failing to support the convening of the Conference. The Review Conference must reject impediments to the convening of the Conference. The failure to convene the Conference in 2012 ran counter to the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference and to the letter and spirit of the 1995 resolution.

23. Although the process of developing the draft report of subsidiary body 2 had lacked the required inclusivity and transparency, he wished to reiterate his delegation's main proposals in that regard, which were fully consistent with the positions of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties. Specifically, his delegation had proposed the inclusion of the following paragraphs, with the understanding that any outcome document that did not reflect the ideas contained in those paragraphs would not be conducive to consensus:

* Subsequently circulated as document [NPT/CONF.2020/63](#).

Expresses concern about the lack of progress towards the implementation of the 1995 resolution and the 2010 action plan on the Middle East, and calls upon Israel to renounce possession of nuclear weapons and eliminate its entire stockpile of nuclear weapons;

Reaffirms that the accession of Israel to the Non-Proliferation Treaty without preconditions or further delay and the placement of all its nuclear activities and facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards is essential in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;

Expresses its strong support for the other process, launched by the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, convened by the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly decision 73/546, to elaborate by consensus a legally binding treaty on the establishment of such a zone.

24. **Ms. Mxakato-Diseko** (South Africa) said that the people of South Africa had high expectations for the outcome of the Review Conference. It was regrettable that consensus had not been reached on the draft reports of the Main Committees. During its final week, the Conference must deliver results, as it had not done so in 2015. As a country that had dismantled its nuclear capabilities through a rigorous regimen, under which it had subjected itself to scrutiny for a long period of time, South Africa supported the adoption of an outcome that contained disarmament commitments that gave confidence to humanity and ensured the balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Any outcome that did not do so would undermine the credibility of the Treaty and the basis for its indefinite extension.

25. States parties' basis for identifying meaningful disarmament outcomes remained weak. The draft report of subsidiary body 1, rather than providing a foundation for general consensus, was mainly conducive to consensus among the nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear umbrella States. The repeated attempts by non-nuclear-weapon States to have their views included in the draft report had been fruitless. Such States must be treated fairly as States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as they were committed to implementing the Treaty for the well-being of humanity.

26. **Mr. Li Song** (China) said that the Review Conference should demonstrate that the common security of States could be ensured through international

cooperation and the maintenance and strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. Although the discussions on the draft reports of the Main Committees had not led to consensus, they had helped to identify differences between States parties and fostered mutual understanding, thus paving the way for consensus. During its final week, the Conference should sustain its efforts to achieve a comprehensive and balanced outcome document. In that document, States parties should reaffirm their support for the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, underpinned by the Treaty, for the concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and for the principle of the indivisibility of security, so as to uphold the authority and effectiveness of the Treaty, promote the balanced implementation of its three pillars and enable it to contribute to peace and development in the twenty-first century.

27. States parties should also reaffirm the basic principles underlying disarmament. As the holders of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, the United States and Russia should continue to fulfil their special responsibilities in that regard. Nuclear risk reduction measures should be included in the outcome document but should take into account countries' specific situations. China had repeatedly stated its views on moratoriums on fissile material production. Some of the wording on nuclear transparency proposed for inclusion in the outcome document of the current Review Conference had been based on the section of the draft outcome document of the 2015 Review Conference relating to nuclear disarmament. However, that section and the other sections of the draft outcome document were interconnected parts of a coherent whole, reflecting a fragile balance among the concerns and interests of States parties. Singling out one part of that document as reflecting consensus among States parties at the current Conference was neither reasonable nor feasible. China was therefore not in favour of reproducing the references to nuclear transparency contained in the draft outcome of the 2015 Review Conference. The outcome document of the current Conference should nevertheless highlight the importance of no-first-use policies and the provision of unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

28. With regard to non-proliferation, nuclear submarine cooperation, nuclear sharing and its expansion across regions through the enhanced trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) had been major new issues at the Review Conference, generating heated discussions. Those issues should be reflected in

the outcome document, in order to demonstrate States parties' commitment to safeguarding the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The comments made by the Chair of Main Committee II concerning AUKUS were consistent with the status of the Committee's discussions on that topic. Through those discussions, the matter had become part of the review process and had been placed on record. China would work with other delegations to ensure that the relevant provisions of the outcome document reflected the positions and proposals of States parties in a balanced manner, in order to pave the way for open and transparent discussions in the future.

29. The situation on the Korean Peninsula was complex and delicate. In the outcome document, States parties should emphasize not only the goal of the denuclearization of the Peninsula but also the urgent need to identify a political and diplomatic solution. With regard to building a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, China supported the positions and aspirations of States parties of the region and hoped that the Review Conference would send a positive and unequivocal message in that regard.

30. With regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, China appreciated the inclusion, in the working paper of the Chair of Main Committee III (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.III/WP.1), of references to the important role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for peace and development in the twenty-first century. China supported all legitimate requests and reasonable proposals of developing countries in that regard. It also supported objectives such as upholding the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, promoting international cooperation and prohibiting excessive restrictions and discriminatory measures.

31. The discharge of nuclear-contaminated water into the sea had transboundary implications, and States parties' legitimate concerns in that regard should not be ignored. References to that issue should be incorporated into the outcome document in order to ensure that nuclear-contaminated water was disposed of in a science-based, safe, transparent and open manner. During the final stages of negotiations, China would be as constructive and flexible as possible in order to achieve an outcome document that promoted the balanced and comprehensive implementation of the Treaty's three pillars. In the meantime, it would maintain its current positions on fundamental principles and security interests.

32. **Mr. Scheinman** (United States of America) said that he would neither respond directly to nor dignify the

false statements of the representative of Iran, as that would divide States parties. The intention of the United States was to play a constructive role at the Review Conference and to preserve the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which had positively contributed to the world for decades. The United States was not seeking to use the Conference as a pretext for promoting its own foreign policy interests. Rather, it sought to advance the multilateral Treaty regime. Consensus on a final document, although not yet in view, was achievable. He therefore urged all States parties to use the time remaining at the Conference to work towards such consensus.

33. **Ms. Narváez Ojeda** (Chile) said that Chile called upon all States parties to recognize the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Without the Treaty, global security conditions would have developed very differently. At the Review Conference, States parties had demonstrated flexibility and sound judgment. Expectations for the achievement of consensus under the Treaty's three pillars were high, and States parties must use the Conference as an opportunity to establish an action plan for the coming years. The working papers submitted by Group of Non-Aligned States Parties provided valuable input in that regard. A significant number of States had acceded to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons which, from the start of its negotiation, had been intended to complement and strengthen the implementation and credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The participation of a critical mass of women in non-proliferation efforts should also be ensured.

34. **Mr. Takht Ravanchi** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that he wished that the representative of the United States had responded directly to his initial statement instead of attempting to politicize the current meeting and distracting States parties' attention from two realities. First, the United States had, since 1970, refused to uphold its obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an indisputable fact that the representative of the United States had not denied in his statement. Second, the United States was not prepared to put pressure on Israel, its closest ally in the Middle East and the only State in the region with nuclear weapons, in order to move towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, a fact that the representative of the United States had likewise not denied. Although the Islamic Republic of Iran was prepared to work constructively and transparently to achieve a successful outcome at the Review Conference, it could not ignore the fact that the United States was shielding the Israeli regime.

35. **Mr. Situmorang** (Indonesia) said that Indonesia attached great importance to nuclear disarmament. States parties' continued efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons would save thousands of lives and protect future generations. The Review Conference must therefore adopt an outcome document that set out clear and specific steps for achieving full nuclear disarmament, did not undermine the progress made towards existing commitments and ensured the balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Those views were shared by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties, whose positions and recommendations should be reflected in the outcome document. The outcome of the Conference would have implications that extended beyond disarmament affairs to multilateralism in general. States parties should therefore be guided by the spirit of multilateralism in their efforts to abolish nuclear weapons.

36. **Mr. Vishnevetskii** (Russian Federation) said that, although the current Review Conference had been delayed by two years, the fact that it was being held was alone significant. States' parties discussions of the aims and objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had reinforced its status as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. Despite the lack of consensus within the Main Committees, States parties must identify a path forward.

37. The Russian Federation was particularly concerned at the emergence of discussions that detracted from the focus on the Treaty. The Review Conference was being held amid the targeting of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant by Ukrainian weaponry, an issue that had been mentioned by many delegations, and on which there was considerable disagreement. The Russian Federation had clearly put forward its position on the matter and found the statements made in that regard to be unacceptable. The Conference should highlight the issue by indicating that military action, even in areas close to nuclear facilities, was unacceptable under all circumstances. It should also highlight the need for close cooperation with IAEA to enable it to perform its safeguarding functions in accordance with its mandate.

38. Despite his delegation's frequent engagement in discussions on the matter, no mutual understanding had been reached. The issue remained one of the most difficult matters before the Review Conference and was likely to complicate its work during its final stages. His delegation was prepared to work with all interested delegations to reach common ground, with the understanding that the situation was complex and should neither be viewed unilaterally nor politicized, as

political issues must not be introduced during the final stages of the Conference. The Russian Federation was prepared to cooperate in a spirit of consensus and trusted that other States parties would do the same.

39. **Mr. Pieris** (Sri Lanka) said that the draft reports before the Review Conference, when compared with the recommendations submitted to the Preparatory Committee for incorporation into the final document of the Conference, elicited a sense of despair. Although the vast majority of States parties were calling for urgent action, the tangible steps that remained to be taken were the responsibility of a small number of States parties.

40. Contrary to the recommendations submitted to the Preparatory Committee, the merged draft report of Main Committee I and subsidiary body 1 (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.I/WP.1) contained no calls for the commencement of negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons and end weapons modernization programmes, or for specific and measurable steps to mitigate risks and reduce the alert status of nuclear-weapon systems. It also contained no timelines or benchmarks other than the expiration of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) in 2026, no calls to put an end to the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons, and no references to the responsibility of States belonging to nuclear alliances or to vertical or horizontal proliferation.

41. Instead of focusing on the nuances of textual rhetoric, the Review Conference must take meaningful action to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. The attempt by the nuclear-weapon States to make the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and subsequent agreements conditional on the international security environment was a step backwards, as that environment had been created, both collectively and individually, by the nuclear-weapon States themselves. Moreover, their overemphasis on nuclear risk reduction at the expense of disarmament undermined the balanced implementation of the Treaty.

42. With regard to the inclusion of the phrases "irrespective of their gender" and "all generations" in the merged draft report of Main Committee I (NPT/CONF.2020/MC.I/WP.1), phrases that many delegations found unacceptable, Sri Lanka remained flexible and hoped that a compromise would be reached. It was nevertheless useful to ask whether such references contributed positively to nuclear disarmament or merely provided a useful distraction for some States parties.

43. **Ms. Bila** (Ukraine) said that she wished to respond to the strange comments of the representative of the Russian terrorist regime, who was merely pretending to be a proper member of the international community. Ukrainians were being taken hostage in the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which was full of Russian military equipment and ammunition. Russian mortar units were moving in and out of the power plant, conducting shelling around it. If Russia thought that its unlawful activities could not be detected, it was mistaken, as they could be observed from satellites. Furthermore, the Ukrainian city of Nikopol, which was still under the control of the Government of Ukraine, had been targeted by Grad multiple-launch rocket systems. The pressure placed on the international community concerning the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant was part of a comprehensive terrorist plan. The reality was that a terrorist State was conducting terrorist activities on the territory of the State that it had attacked. The international community must see the situation clearly and not be on the side of the terrorist regime.

44. **Mr. Tito** (Kiribati) said that the people of Kiribati were still suffering from the hazardous environmental consequences of the nuclear testing to which the country had been subjected by the United Kingdom and the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, and remained fearful about the fate of the next generation. Although those tests had been conducted in the name of world peace at the time, decades had since passed, and action must now be taken to address their consequences. He was grateful to States that had helped to highlight the helplessness and hopelessness of the peoples of the Pacific region, the most beautiful and peaceful place on Earth. Although the majority of countries were willing to take steps towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, the nuclear-weapon States continued to lag behind. They must rethink their position. The United Nations should spend more time taking meaningful action to help victims and less time negotiating textual adjustments while helping weapons manufacturing companies that profited from the suffering of people. If there was no progress in that regard at the Review Conference, he would recommend to the President of Kiribati that he withdraw the country from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

45. **Mr. Fremy** (France) said that, with only a few days remaining before the end of the Review Conference, States parties must reaffirm the centrality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and their commitment to a global order based on international law rather than the exercise of military power, particularly at a time when a war was being fought in Europe. The Treaty was an essential part of the international security architecture and, like many disarmament and non-proliferation

instruments, was being threatened by the actions of certain countries. The Conference provided an opportunity for States parties to get back on track and show that multilateralism was the norm and the only means by which a common vision for a peaceful world could be achieved.

46. After many years of engaging in multilateral discussions, he still failed to understand the meaning of references to the politicization of such discussions. The goal of States parties at the Review Conference was to engage in an open and honest conversation regarding global security concerns, with the understanding that the world constituted an indivisible security community, in which the concerns of all countries must be taken into account. Although much remained to be done to achieve consensus on a final document, States parties could send a positive signal to their peoples by demonstrating that understanding. Despite the emotive nature of the topics under consideration, States parties must engage in calm and objective discussions with realism, diplomatic intelligence and a renewed sense of motivation.

47. **Mr. Vishnevetskii** (Russian Federation) said that he did not intend to respond to the representative of the puppet regime in Kyiv, as nothing that she had said was in line with the truth. His delegation had nevertheless been interested to learn that the Kyiv authorities had satellites and could therefore apparently see the events occurring at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. The situation at the power plant was indeed extremely serious, and there were significant opportunities to clearly determine the origin of the shelling. The fact that some countries remained silent in that regard was astonishing, albeit understandable, as they were protecting the Kyiv regime. The situation concerned the largest nuclear power plant in Europe; it was not trivial, as it could lead to a human-made disaster, a point that his delegation had reiterated many times.

48. He trusted that, in the near future, an agreement would be reached on the details of the international mission to be conducted by the Director General of IAEA to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. His delegation requested countries that had serious influence on the Kyiv authorities to urge them to put an end to the shelling in the lead-up to and during the mission, so that it could be carried out safely. He hoped that the mission would determine the true nature of the situation in order to counterbalance the suppositions put forward by Kyiv, including that military equipment was being placed in the plant and that staff were fearful and not performing their functions. The Russian Federation was prepared to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the conduct of the mission.

49. **Mr. Alqaisi** (Jordan) said that States parties must work hard to achieve consensus on a final document. Jordan looked forward to contributing to that goal.

50. **Mr. Wróblewski** (Poland) said that, as a neighbouring country of the independent and sovereign State of Ukraine, which was currently at war, Poland was extremely concerned about the situation in that country and at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, as it had been during the occupation of Chernobyl by Russian forces. The invasion of a neighbouring country and the occupation of its nuclear power plant was not a trivial technical issue. Rather, it was a political and security issue that could affect the security of Europe and the rest of the world and that had serious implications for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Review Conference should focus not only on the IAEA mission but also on the aggression of Russia against Ukraine.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.