



安全理事会

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2022 年 4 月 28 日南苏丹问题专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

依照安全理事会第 2577(2021)号决议延长任期的专家小组成员谨随函转递根据该决议第 17 段提交的最后报告。

报告于 2022 年 4 月 1 日提交给安全理事会关于南苏丹的第 2206(2015)号决议所设委员会。委员会在 2022 年 4 月 22 日对报告进行了审议。

专家小组谨请安全理事会成员注意本函及最后报告，并将其作为安理会的文件分发为荷。

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南苏丹问题专家小组根据第 2577(2021)号决议提交的最后报告

摘要

2018 年的《解决南苏丹共和国冲突重振协议》(《和平协议》)非但没有打破南苏丹精英政治讨价还价的暴力循环,反而成为其中的一部分。该《和平协议》的几乎每一个组成部分现在都受制于该国军事和安全精英的政治算计,他们综合运用暴力、挪用公共资源和拉帮结派来追求自己的狭隘利益。因此,《和平协议》的大部分内容仍因主要签署方之间的政治争端而陷入僵局。

在国家一级,由于缺乏有吸引力的替代办法,以及对外作出和平承诺带来的好处,《和平协议》得以保留,并为逐步取得进展创造了一些空间。2021 年 9 月重组了过渡期国民议会;公共财政管理监督委员会为不透明的公共财政带来了一些透明度;在预期建立统一的国家军队的情况下,一些部队的训练已经完成。

然而,与此同时,有权势的政府官员试图通过成功拉拢高级指挥官叛逃来削弱主要反对派团体的团结。随着联盟的转移,脆弱的停火一再受到压力,叛逃者和效忠者发生冲突,冲突原因包括进入基地、获得武器以及检查站和河港等有利可图的资产。反过来,地区指挥官又开始了新一轮的招募以扩大其队伍和维护其地位,这违反了《和平协议》的规定。

作为国家政治进程核心的零和政治算计也助长了国家以下各级的对抗和仇恨,推动了致命的国家以下各级暴力浪潮,造成数万平民流离失所,并导致严重侵犯人权行为,包括已成为南苏丹冲突一个悲惨标志的性暴力和性别暴力。

因此,尽管在执行《和平协议》方面取得了一些程序性进展,但当地数百万平民面临的状况正在恶化。国家以下各级暴力、相关的流离失所和洪水加在一起,在该国大部分地区造成了前所未有的粮食不安全状况。数百万人仍然流离失所,约 70%的人口需要人道主义援助。

尽管油价飙升,但部分由全球大流行疫情造成、部分由国内管理不善造成了一场经济危机,导致通货膨胀以及无法支付许多人赖以生存的政府雇员工资,增加了进一步的挑战。相反,领导人试图将公共资源用于昂贵的军事采购,包括进口装甲运兵车,这违反了安全理事会第 2428(2018)号决议对南苏丹全境实施并最近经安理会第 2577(2021)号决议延长的武器禁运。

尽管苏丹和乌干达都试图打破在具体问题上的僵局,但其他区域紧张局势和争端继续制约了对南苏丹和平进程的参与。与尚未签署《和平协议》的团体举行的谈判基本陷入僵局,导致政府与民族拯救阵线之间的军事对峙升级,特别是在中赤道州。

仍然迫切需要加强参与,以挽救《和平协议》确保国家和国家以下各级和平与稳定的前景。

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一. 背景

A. 任务授权和旅行情况

1. 安全理事会第 [2206\(2015\)](#) 号决议对助长南苏丹冲突的个人和实体实施制裁制度,并设立了制裁委员会(安全理事会关于南苏丹的第 [2206\(2015\)](#) 号决议所设委员会)。委员会于 2015 年 7 月 1 日指认了将对其实施定向制裁的 6 名个人。随着第 [2428\(2018\)](#) 号决议的通过,安理会对南苏丹领土实行武器禁运,并在被指认人员名单上增加了两人。安理会于 2021 年 5 月 28 日通过第 [2577\(2021\)](#) 号决议,把制裁制度延长至 2022 年 5 月 31 日。
2. 安全理事会第 [2577\(2021\)](#) 号决议还将南苏丹问题专家小组的任务期限延长至 2022 年 7 月 1 日,使其能够提供信息和分析,支持委员会的工作,包括与将指认可能从事该决议第 11 段所述活动的个人和实体有关的工作。
3. 2022 年 1 月 20 日,秘书长经与委员会协商,任命了专家小组的五名成员(见 [S/2022/42](#))。
4. 由于推迟任命其成员,专家小组无法在 2022 年 3 月起草本次最后报告之前旅行,但打算在其任务后期这样做。

B. 与国际组织和其他利益攸关方的合作

5. 虽然专家小组独立于联合国各机构和机关开展工作,但它要感谢联合国南苏丹特派团(南苏丹特派团)和联合国其他工作人员包括在纽约的工作人员提供的支持。
6. 专家小组申请了前往南苏丹的签证,并申请获准与南苏丹政府若干机构和部委人士举行虚拟会议。所有专家均被发放了签证,但时间赶不及在起草本最后报告之前旅行。专家小组收到了一份对其与政府人士远程会晤请求的答复。因此,专家小组只能与南苏丹常驻联合国代表团进行虚拟会晤,并与国防和退伍军人事务部人士进行通信。
7. 安全理事会在第 [2577\(2021\)](#) 号决议第 16 段中强调,专家小组必须与有关会员国、国际、区域和次区域组织以及南苏丹特派团协商。
8. 专家小组得以在南苏丹和其他地方广泛咨询了联合国机关和机构。专家小组还与根据《解决南苏丹共和国冲突重振协议》(《和平协议》)设立的大多数安全机制进行了协商。
9. 专家小组多次向该区域各会员国发出远程会议请求,但只收到一份答复,只能与该区域各国常驻联合国代表团人士进行虚拟会议。
10. 专家小组向南苏丹政府、区域会员国以及其他个人和实体发出了 28 封公函,在起草本最后报告之前收到了 7 份实质性答复。专家小组随后收到的答复载于本报告附件。

C. 方法

11. 本报告是根据专家小组的研究和调查编写的。专家小组进行了多次访谈，收集了各种来源提供的大量可靠信息。专家小组审查了个人、商业实体、保密消息人士和政府提供的文件。专家小组还借鉴了其先前开展的工作，包括以往提交安全理事会和委员会的公开和机密报告。
12. 专家小组遵循安全理事会制裁的一般性问题非正式工作组 2006 年 12 月报告(S/2006/997)所建议的标准。为达到适当的证据标准，专家小组已通过多个独立消息来源证实了本报告中的信息。
13. 专家小组以尽可能透明的方式开展研究，同时在必要时优先考虑保密。如果披露某个消息来源、某份文件或某个地点可能危及消息人士的人身安全，则此来源、文件或地点被称为机密。
14. 鉴于专家小组自任命以来可用的时间有限，专家小组选择编写一份篇幅比通常较短的最后报告，以确保有更多的时间进行调查。

二. 受精英利益左右的和平进程

15. 南苏丹几乎没有剩下多少乐观的迹象。专家小组访谈揭示了一种对被精英利益绑架且越来越脱离普通民众生活的政治进程的普遍沮丧、不信任和幻灭情绪。
16. 自专家小组 2021 年 4 月发表上一份最后报告(S/2021/365)以来，在执行《和平协议》方面取得了更多进展。然而，成就在很大程度上仍然是程序性和官僚形式主义的。
17. 与此同时，反对派团体四分五裂，加上持续违反停火和广泛的国家以下各级暴力事件，破坏了《和平协议》的核心条款。因此，在报告取得进展的同时，暴力加剧，大多数人道主义指标恶化。与专家小组交谈过的许多平民和政治领导人均表示忧虑该国可能重新陷入冲突。¹

A. 叛逃现象继续分裂反对派

18. 政府成功地继续其拉拢反对派叛逃的战略，特别是来自苏丹人民解放军反对派(苏人解反对派)内部的叛逃者。其许多高级军事指挥官从一开始就对《和平协议》持怀疑态度，随着部队统一的进展放缓，而其物质条件恶化，他们只会越来越沮丧。事实证明，这是朱巴取得进展的肥沃土壤，那里有权有势的官员在《和平协议》框架之外与反对派人物达成了个别协议。²
19. 高级指挥官的叛逃削弱了苏丹人民解放运动/解放军反对派(苏人解运动/解放军反对派)的团结和士气，在其军事和政治两翼之间造成了裂痕，并导致敌对阵营之间的严重暴力。³ 这也削弱了第一副总统里克·马沙尔·泰尼的影响力和

¹ 专家小组对机密消息来源和民间社会领导人的访谈，2022 年 3 月

² 见附件一。

³ 2022 年 2 月和 3 月对苏人解运动/解放军反对派现任和前任高级成员以及国际观察员的访谈。

权威。许多人的叛逃声明中批评他未能将签署《和平协议》的好处分配到自己的核心圈子之外。⁴

20. 2021 年 8 月 3 日，前苏人解反对派总参谋长、受制裁的个人西蒙·加特韦克·迪尤尔(SSi.002)和以上尼罗州为基地的希卢克指挥官约翰逊·奥洛尼脱离副总统，成立了“Kit-Gwang”集团。加特韦克先生和奥洛尼先生后来都前往喀土穆，会见萨尔瓦·基尔·马亚尔迪特总统的安全顾问图特·基尤·加特卢克·马尼米，并就其部队的整编问题谈判达成协议。⁵ Kit-Gwang 集团的成立导致了现在与南苏丹人民国防军结盟的 Kit-Gwang 部队与剩余的亲马沙尔部队之间的严重冲突，特别是在上尼罗州。⁶ 2022 年 3 月，该团体内的一些成员叛逃到南苏丹人民国防军，⁷ 尽管据报其他 Kit-Gwang 部队的整编进展缓慢，据报一些指挥官感到沮丧。⁸

21. 2022 年 2 月，在团结州，苏人解反对派第 4A 师副指挥官蒂托·贝尔·维奇少将在“约克尼扬宣言”中宣布他与副总统决裂。贝尔少将的谈判小组前往朱巴，会见了国防军司令桑蒂诺·邓·沃尔(SSi.004)和加特卢克先生。谈判小组成员获得了制服并获颁南苏丹人民国防军军衔。粮食和武器也很快送到了贝尔少将在团结州的部队，促使更多的人从其他营地涌入他的营地。2022 年 3 月，贝尔少将的部队在团结州与苏人解反对派部队发生冲突。⁹

22. 专家小组已查明，自上次最后报告以来，至少还有 10 名高级指挥官从苏人解反对派和南苏丹联合阵线叛逃到南苏丹人民国防军。

B. 各部队的统一仍有争议

23. 2022 年 2 月，南苏丹联合防务委员会宣布，在 2021 年 12 月至 2022 年 1 月期间，经过培训中心的筛选、重组和统一，5 万名人员已准备毕业。¹⁰ 这是朝着发展必要的联合部队迈出的可能重要的一步。

⁴ 例如，见 Kit-Gwang 宣言(附件一)；叛逃的蒂托·贝尔将军发表的《约克尼扬宣言》(附件二)；2020 年 9 月摩西·洛库霍将军的声明(S/2020/1141，附件七)。

⁵ Sudans Post, “Gen. Gatwech, Tutkew discuss peace process”, 3 October 2021; and The Paradise, “Gatwech dispatches high-level military advance team to Juba”, 1 February 2022。他们发言的视频也可查阅：www.facebook.com/watch/?v=595682031560351&_rdr。

⁶ 对当地社区领导人、苏人解反对派、苏丹人民解放运动政府派、惩教人员和警察以及在该地区活动的民间社会的访谈，2022 年 3 月。另见“苏人解运动/解放军反对派关于《重振和平协议》执行情况的立场”，2022 年 3 月 15 日。

⁷ 见附件三。

⁸ Sudans Post, “Gatwech ‘frustrated’ with stalled re-integration of his forces into SSPDF,” 27 March 2022.

⁹ 对蒂托·贝尔·维奇少将的代表的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。Sudans Post, “Weapons, ammunition shipped to Mayom as Gen. Biel orders attack on SPLA-IO base in Bentiu”, 23 March 2022。另见附件四中约克尼扬集团 2022 年 3 月 16 日的新闻稿。

¹⁰ 联合防务委员会，“关于筛选、重组和统一必要的联合部队的进度报告”，2022 年 2 月 16 日。另见附件五。

24. 然而，一些受训人员告诉专家小组，培训过程主要是基本操练，很少有实质性的军事培训或关于军民关系或性别暴力的培训。¹¹ 在某些情况下，在训练前没有进行筛查，导致一些被拒绝编入联合部队的人感到愤怒。¹²

25. 专家小组还获悉，很少有战斗人员被解除武装，部队基本上仍保留着中远程重型武器。¹³

26. 专家小组还获悉，南苏丹人民国防军老虎师和国家安全署继续抵制登记和整编。据报告，老虎师向要人保卫股派遣了 1 500 人，国家安全署则派出了一些新兵而不是现有的军官接受培训。¹⁴

27. 训练有素的部队毕业方面的进展也因在最高指挥结构问题上继续存在分歧而停滞不前。¹⁵ 高级职位是两位领导人重要的谈判筹码，政府也不愿意接受反对派组织分配的晋升机会。¹⁶ 2021/22 年度预算规定设立 13 591 个上尉或以上职位，反映了这些职位对两位领导人的价值和政治化的军衔通胀的普遍程度。¹⁷

28. 2018 年，双方同意将高级职位平分。¹⁸ 然而，最近，总统以反对派高级指挥官向他投诚为由，要求占此类职位的 60%。

29. 总统在 2022 年 3 月 25 日发布的一项单方面总统令中，向苏人解反对派和南苏丹反对派联盟分配了一些高级指挥职位。¹⁹ 苏人解反对派立即发表新闻稿，称该法令违反了《和平协议》，理由是其违反了该协议第 2.1.11.1 条规定的讨论中商定的 50:50 比例，²⁰ 并敦促《和平协议》的担保人进行干预，制止“南苏丹不断恶化的局势”。²¹

C. 强征兵员用来壮大队伍

30. 与过去一样，安全部门的预期重组也导致了一波新的招募，包括强迫招募，这违反了《和平协议》第 2.1.8 条。政府的招募活动创建了用于前线行动的代理军队，从而加强了地方指挥官的谈判地位，并增加了战略营地的人数。自专家小

¹¹ 对多名受训人员的访谈(通过口译员)和机密来源，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。

¹² 同上。

¹³ 同上。

¹⁴ 同上。

¹⁵ 对政府和苏人解反对派高级官员的访谈，2022 年 2 月。另见 The Paradise, “SPLM-IO says no unified forces before unified command”, 22 February 2022。

¹⁶ 访谈，国际组织和国内安全机制，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。

¹⁷ 南苏丹 2021/22 年度核定预算，按职等分列的人员配置结构

¹⁸ 对政府官员和苏人解反对派代表的访谈，2022 年 3 月。经专家小组看到的机密文件证实。见附件六。

¹⁹ 专家小组获得的总统令。

²⁰ 见附件七。

²¹ 见附件八。

组上次报告以来，最突出的招募活动发生在湖泊州、团结州、中赤道州、西赤道州和瓦拉卜州。

湖泊州

31. 湖泊州州长 Rin Tueny Mabor 延续专家小组在 2020 年 4 月最后报告 (S/2020/342 中首次报告的趋势，自 2021 年 7 月以来开展了一系列招募行动。他的部队在伦拜克、奎贝特和伊罗勒等城镇以及农村地区和牧牛营地胁迫囚犯、青年和临时工，包括未成年人。²²

32. 根据专家小组访谈，新兵被转移到伦拜克的熊猫旅馆和伊罗勒的 Baburzeit 监狱。²³ 在伊罗勒，至少有一处政府住宅也被变成了临时培训中心，而州长的私人房地产则被用作制服和弹药的储存设施。²⁴

33. 许多新兵被从湖泊州空运到中赤道州和上尼罗州。²⁵ 接受访谈者表示，2021 年 7 月至 9 月期间，每架载有 100 至 200 名新兵的飞机从伊罗勒和伦拜克起飞。²⁶

34. 在 2021 年 6 月被罢免军事情报局长一职后，招募加强了 Tueny 先生在地方和全国的政治和军事影响力。

团结州

35. 2022 年 1 月和 2 月，南苏丹人民国防军和苏人解反对派都在团结州进行了招募活动。²⁷ 专家小组证实，招募发生在本提乌镇和路博卡纳镇，动员发生在科奇县。

36. 在负责平民安全的联合警察部队的协助下，在本提乌的境内流离失所者主要营地也进行了强迫招募。包括未成年人在内的青年和逃兵是招募的目标。²⁸

37. 本提乌境内流离失所者营地内的一个青年论坛 2022 年 1 月 25 日的一封公开信谴责“军队在营地内猖狂地逮捕和收养儿童”。²⁹

38. 许多新兵首先被转移到南苏丹人民国防军第四师军营，随后被至少一架南苏丹人民国防军飞机从本提乌运送到朱巴，一些新兵从那里参加了在中赤道州打击民族拯救阵线的前线行动。³⁰

²² 对民间社会代表、国家官员和国际观察员的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。社交媒体上的 Tueny 先生关于湖泊州安全局势的声明部分证实了这一点。

²³ 同上。

²⁴ 对国家官员的访谈，2022 年 3 月。

²⁵ 对民间社会代表、国家官员和国际观察员的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。专家小组获得的照片部分证实了这一点。

²⁶ 同上。见附件九。

²⁷ 对民间社会代表、国家官员和国际观察员的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。专家小组获得的照片部分证实了这一点。

²⁸ 同上。见附件十。

²⁹ 见附件十一。

³⁰ 对民间社会代表、国家官员和国际观察员的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。专家小组获得的照片部分证实了这一点。

瓦拉卜州

39. 南苏丹人民国防军第 11 师在瓦拉卜州进行了招募工作，这是南苏丹人民国防军内一支新的独立的师规模部队。³¹ 在 2018 年 10 月大规模动员努力后，该师首先由南苏丹人民国防军桑蒂诺·邓·沃尔将军(SSi.004)构想，主要作为加扎勒河大区动员的工具。³² 2021 年 5 月，通季州的社区报告说，他们积极招募青年，包括未成年人，这是一种应受制裁的侵权行为。

三. 暴力升级

A. 《协议》签署方之间违反停火的情况

40. 由于叛逃、国家以下各级暴力以及与尚未签署和平协议的团体的谈判陷入僵局，2017 年 12 月的《停止敌对行动协定》一直受到持续压力。

41. 在上尼罗州，忠于副总统的部队与加特维奇先生领导的部队发生冲突。³³ 在隆戈丘克，副总统的效忠者与 2021 年 8 月投奔南苏丹人民国防军的詹姆斯·霍尔·乔尔少将指挥的部队之间发生了更多的冲突。自 2022 年 3 月以来，奥昌将军指挥的帕加克和迈乌特的南苏丹人民国防军部队与上尼罗州杰克乌的苏人解反对派部队发生冲突。³⁴

42. 在团结州，前苏人解反对派指挥官蒂托·贝尔少将在 Biil 与苏人解反对派部队发生冲突。很快又有人试图将苏人解反对派赶出团结州。苏人解反对派部队还在米尔米尔镇³⁵ 的苏人解反对派基地以及莱尔县和梅恩迪特县³⁶ 与科奇县专员支持的武装青年作战。

43. 随着苏人解反对派阵地周围的冲突加剧，苏丹人民解放运动反对派(苏人解运动反对派)于 2022 年 3 月 21 日退出了在朱巴举行的停火和过渡期安全安排监测和核查机制的一次技术委员会会议。随后，2022 年 3 月 22 日，副总统签署了一份新闻稿，宣布苏人解运动/解放军反对派暂停参加所有安全机制，理由是其阵地正在受到袭击。³⁷

B. 与未签署协议方的冲突不断升级

44. 自 2021 年 8 月圣艾智德团体进程暂停以来，民族拯救阵线和南苏丹人民国防军在中赤道州和西赤道州的冲突加剧。

³¹ 访谈，民间社会、国际观察员以及专家小组获得的机密报告和文件。

³² 见附件十二。

³³ Sudans Post, “SPLA-IO rivals clash in Nasir”, 7 October 2021。

³⁴ 对当地社区领导人、苏人解反对派官员、政府官员、惩教人员和警察以及民间社会的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。

³⁵ 对安全部门人员、社区领导人和机密消息来源的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。

³⁶ 见附件十三。

³⁷ 安全机制访谈，2022 年 3 月。见附件十四。

45. 自 2021 年 9 月左右以来，中赤道州的莱尼亚县已成为战斗升级的焦点，标志着军事行动从边境地区转移到一个历史上被视为民族拯救阵线据点的地区。

46. 民族拯救阵线继续在主要城镇以外以半自治指挥结构运作机动小队，政府部队则依靠混合部署来自朱巴的部队、从该国其他地区强行招募的人员以及亲政府民兵，包括丁卡博尔和蒙达里青年。莱尼亚县民事当局在支持军事行动方面发挥了重要作用。³⁸

47. 专家小组收到了几份关于与政府结盟的部队在战斗期间犯下侵犯人权行为的可信报告，这也导致大量平民流离失所，逃离或进入莱尼亚镇。³⁹ 南苏丹人民国防军通过在莱尼亚创建一个半径两英里的圈子来限制行动，任何越过这个圈子的人都有可能被当作民族拯救阵线支持者，成为攻击目标。⁴⁰

C. 国家以下各级暴力加剧：西赤道州

48. 支离破碎的国家安全和精英政治竞争也为南苏丹大部分内陆地区国家以下各级的激烈暴力创造了肥沃的土壤，包括琼莱州、瓦拉卜州、西赤道州和团结州。虽然这种暴力往往被描述为族群间的犯罪行为，但大部分是由地方和国家一级的政治竞争造成的。

西赤道州的暴力事件

49. 从 2021 年 6 月左右开始，西赤道州坦布拉县爆发了一波有组织的政治暴力，造成近 8 万人流离失所，至少 440 名平民死亡，其中包括 60 名妇女和 48 名儿童。⁴¹ 还记录了骇人听闻的侵害人权行为，包括性暴力和暴力侵害儿童行为，⁴² 同时人道主义准入受到阻碍并被政治化。⁴³

50. 冲突的根源可以追溯到巴兰达人和阿赞德人阿文加拉部族精英成员之间在政治代表权和土地权问题上的紧张关系，表现为零星的暴力和虐待事件。例如，2019 年 4 月，时任州长帕特里克·扎莫伊据称下令在其房地内处决 4 名巴兰达人，在许多人看来，这为此后的暴力奠定了基础。⁴⁴

³⁸ 对民族拯救阵线高级指挥官、国际观察员、民间社会的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。专家小组获得的报告和照片证实了这一点。

³⁹ 对民间社会、国际观察员和安全机制的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。

⁴⁰ 对当地酋长、长老、社区、青年团体和境内流离失所者的访谈；通过国际观察员向专家小组通报，2022 年 2 月。

⁴¹ 南苏丹特派团和联合国人权事务高级专员办事处(人权高专办)，“2021 年 6 月至 9 月在坦布拉县对平民的袭击”，2022 年 3 月 1 日。

⁴² 对国际观察员、民间社会、安全机制、政府官员和援助人员的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。经专家小组获得的机密文件、图片和报告的证实。

⁴³ 对国际和人道主义组织的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。

⁴⁴ 对民间社会和政府代表的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。经专家小组获得的机密报告证实。另见 Eye Radio, “Tombura gov. accused of extra-judicial killing,” 29 April 2019。

51. 2020 年 5 月，詹姆斯·南多将军从苏人解反对派叛逃并加入了南苏丹人民国防军，很快就有报道称他的部队以巴兰达平民为攻击目标。⁴⁵ 6 月，他的部队袭击了纳穆蒂纳的一个苏人解反对派基地，引发了苏人解反对派的暴力武装反应，导致 2021 年 6 月至 9 月期间一波又一波的报复性袭击、杀戮和流离失所。南多将军的部队被指控使用儿童兵，攻击人道主义行动，并实施性暴力行为，包括针对援助人员和未成年人。⁴⁶

52. 双方族裔民兵均被动员起来参加战斗。苏人解反对派附属民兵指挥官 Angelo Davido 指挥的部队被控杀害包括未成年人在内的平民和性暴力。⁴⁷ Davido 先生向专家小组否认这些指控，强调他的部队在受到挑衅后采取了自卫行动。⁴⁸

53. 最高酋长姆博里巴姆与南多将军和坦布拉县专员马修·马本格合作，成立了一个以巴兰达平民为攻击目标的武装民兵团体。马本格先生本人也被指控犯有严重侵权行为，包括威胁联合国工作人员和发表基于种族的仇恨言论。⁴⁹

54. 据称，南多将军还得到了国家政治人物的实质支持，包括议长杰玛·努努·昆巴，2021 年 9 月和 10 月，南多将军多次使用其在坦布拉的房产，包括用于会见马本格先生和姆博里巴姆先生。⁵⁰

D. 与镇压瓦拉卜州国家以下各级暴力有关的侵害人权行为

55. 国家以下各级的暴力行为引起了文职和军事领导人的暴力反应，有时为进一步侵犯人权行为创造了借口。

56. 瓦拉卜州州长 Aleu Ayieny Aleu 指挥的部队在瓦拉卜州进行过法外处决。许多处决是在他于 2021 年 2 月被任命为州长后视察瓦拉卜州期间进行的，行刑者为由他的私人保镖、南苏丹人民国防军、国家安全署和当地解除武装部队组成的行刑队。⁵¹

57. 许多受害者来自当地国家安全署监狱，与族群间暴力没有明显联系。2021 年 4 月，在 Nyangakoch，Aleu 先生下令处决五名嫌疑人，其中包括一名老人和两名

⁴⁵ 对国际观察员、民间社会、安全机制、政府官员和援助人员的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。专家小组获得的照片和视频部分证实了这一点。

⁴⁶ 同上。

⁴⁷ 同上。

⁴⁸ 另见附件二十五。专家小组请本节中提到的所有个人发表意见；其收到的答复载于本报告附件。

⁴⁹ 同上。见附件十五。

⁵⁰ 同上。

⁵¹ 人权委员会关于南苏丹的报告，2022 年 2 月 15 日。另见南苏丹特派团，“南苏丹特派团对大量法外处决深感关切”，2021 年 7 月 26 日(可查阅：<https://unmiss.unmissions.org/unmiss-deeply-concerned-spate-extra-judicial-executions>)和人权观察，“南苏丹：北方的即决处决”，2021 年 7 月 29 日(可查阅：www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/29/south-sudan-summary-executions-north#)；Sudans Post, “Governor Aleu of Warrap petitioned over alleged involvement in extrajudicial killings”, 24 November 2021; Eye Radio, “Former Commissioner accuses Governor Aleu of extra judicial killings”, 18 November 2021。

学龄儿童，罪名是他们涉嫌袭击一辆商用车辆。⁵² 在罗米奇，2021 年 4 月，他下令公开处决一名涉嫌与嫁妆有关的谋杀案的男子。⁵³ 2021 年 11 月 9 日，包括两名士兵在内的三人被拘留，并被指控犯有谋杀和盗窃罪。尽管社区呼吁先对这两人进行审判，但 Aleu 先生仍于 2021 年 11 月 12 日下令处决其中两人。⁵⁴

四. 区域接触

58. 正如专家小组在上一份最后报告(S/2021/365)中报告的那样，其他区域争端和紧张局势继续分散区域行为体对南苏丹冲突的注意力，同时损害包括政府间发展组织(伊加特)在内的主要区域机构的效力。然而，苏丹和乌干达都试图调解具体问题的解决。

59. 2022 年 2 月，乌干达总统约韦里·穆塞韦尼邀请南苏丹高级官员参加在坎帕拉举行的务虚会，以解决悬而未决的挑战，包括设计统一的指挥结构和部队比例。⁵⁵ 但务虚会很快被推迟。⁵⁶

60. 2022 年 2 月和 3 月，苏丹主权委员会副主席 Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo 将军和苏丹过渡主权委员会主席 Abdel Fattah al-Burhan 将军分别访问了朱巴，以努力解决同一争端。⁵⁷ 苏丹的提议本应给予政府 27 个职位，给予苏人解运动/解放军反对派 17 个职位，给予南苏丹反对派联盟 4 个职位，但没有得到任何一方的接受。⁵⁸

61. 虽然圣艾智德团体领导的调解努力也在继续，但自 2021 年 8 月政府退出谈判以来，谈判没有取得重大进展，当时政府以其部队和中赤道州和西赤道州的平民受到袭击为由退出谈判，民族拯救阵线否认了这一指控。⁵⁹

62. 谈判也因南苏丹反对派运动联盟的分裂而变得复杂。2021 年 10 月，托马斯·西里洛·斯瓦卡将军与保罗·马龙·阿旺·阿内伊将军(SSi.008)和帕甘·阿穆姆将军决裂，理由是优先事项不同和不信任。⁶⁰

⁵² 对证人和政府官员的访谈，2022 年 3 月。人权观察的补充文件，“瓦拉卜州即决处决的初步调查结果”，2021 年 7 月 19 日；人权委员会关于南苏丹的报告，2022 年 2 月 15 日。

⁵³ 对当地社区成员的访谈，2022 年 3 月；专家小组获得的机密文件：“人权委员会关于南苏丹的报告”，2022 年 2 月 15 日。

⁵⁴ 同上。专家小组获得的音频录音、文件和图片部分证实了这一点。见附件十六。

⁵⁵ Obaj Okuj, “Museveni officially invites Machar to Kampala retreat, says FVP office”, Eye Radio, 1 March 2022; Sudans Post, “African Union welcomes planned Kiir-Machar retreat in Ugandan”, 29 January 2022。见附件十七。

⁵⁶ 对政府代表和机密消息来源的访谈，2022 年 3 月。

⁵⁷ 同上。见附件十八。

⁵⁸ 对机密消息来源的访谈，2022 年 3 月。

⁵⁹ 对民族拯救阵线高级指挥官、政府代表和圣艾智德团体秘书处的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。

⁶⁰ 对圣艾智德团体秘书处的访谈和机密来源，2022 年 3 月。

63. 2021 年 11 月，基尔总统呼吁圣艾智德团体重新开始谈判。⁶¹ 民族拯救阵线发言人 11 月 30 日说，该团体不会参加没有明确谈判议程的和平谈判，理由是政府拖延战术和迄今进展有限。⁶²

五. 违反武器禁运情况

A. 采购装甲运兵车

64. 2022 年 3 月，南苏丹政府在其脸书页面上宣布，已为南苏丹国家警察署购买了 150 辆新车。⁶³ 公告附有照片，描绘了朱巴警察总部大约 25 辆新的装甲运兵车。

65. 已查明朱巴的南苏丹人民国防军老虎营拥有类似车辆，据报告，这些车辆将于 2022 年 2 月部署在瓦拉卜州。⁶⁴ 专家小组还查明，2021 年 12 月下旬，南苏丹人民国防军部队在湖泊州拥有少量类似车辆。⁶⁵

66. 委员会没有接到购买这些军用装甲车的豁免要求。专家小组从访谈中发现，这些车辆的采购始于 2021 年，2021 年和 2022 年初分期交付。⁶⁶

67. 这些装甲运兵车似乎符合“Tygra”型号。⁶⁷ 专家小组未能确定这些车辆的供应商，但一名南苏丹官员的陈述表明，这些车辆来自一家未具名的“私营公司”。⁶⁸

68. 专家小组认为，进口这些车辆违反了安全理事会第 2428(2018)号决议对南苏丹全境实施并最近经第 2577(2021)号决议延长的武器禁运。专家小组注意到，第 2428(2018)号决议第 5 段载有军事装备进口豁免程序。

B. 国家安全署培训

69. 2022 年 2 月 14 日，埃塞俄比亚媒体报道说，大约 50 名国家安全署官员从埃塞俄比亚国家情报和安全局提供的培训方案毕业，⁶⁹ 该国自己网站上的一篇文章证实了这一点。⁷⁰ 据报道，该课程为国家安全署高级成员提供了情报和安全领域的深入培训。据一家媒体报道，在该培训四个月之前举行了另一次培训活动，“南苏丹初级安全官员”参加了培训。⁷¹

⁶¹ 同上。

⁶² 2022 年 3 月对国家安全署高级指挥官的访谈，以及 2021 年 11 月 30 日 Saba Samuel Manase 在接受 Eye Radio 采访时的发言。见附件十九。

⁶³ 南苏丹政府脸书页面上的所作公告。见附件二十。

⁶⁴ 见附件二十一。

⁶⁵ 见附件二十二。

⁶⁶ 对国家安全官员的访谈，2022 年 3 月。另见 Okot Emmanuel, “Police receive 150 vehicles to ease mobility across the country”, Eye Radio, 22 March 2022。

⁶⁷ 见附件二十三。

⁶⁸ Emmanuel, “Police receive 150 vehicles”。经专家小组对政府官员的访谈证实，2022 年 3 月。

⁶⁹ 埃塞俄比亚广播公司脸书页面，2022 年 2 月 14 日。另见 New Business Ethiopia, “Ethiopia trains South Sudanese security officers,” 15 February 2022。

⁷⁰ 见附件二十四。

⁷¹ New Business Ethiopia, “Ethiopia trains South Sudanese”。

70. 埃塞俄比亚国家情报和安全局局长 Temesgen Tiruneh 和南苏丹国家安全署下属的南苏丹国内安全局局长 Akol Koor Kuc 出席了毕业典礼。⁷² 2021 年 1 月 27 日，两位领导人在亚的斯亚贝巴会晤，商定各自的情报机构将就区域问题和能力建设进行合作。⁷³

71. 由于没有向委员会寻求豁免，而且据报培训涵盖“情报和安全”，专家小组认为，这些培训可能构成违反武器禁运，因为依据第 2428(2018)号决议第 4 段，该禁运禁止向南苏丹安全部门提供“与军事活动有关的技术援助、培训、财政或其他援助”。

六. 人道主义指标呈下降趋势

72. 尽管据报在执行《和平协议》方面取得了进展，但由于国家以下各级的暴力和洪水，南苏丹许多关键人道主义指标都面临下降趋势。⁷⁴

73. 针对人道主义工作人员的暴力和业务干预也有所增加。2021 年，更多的援助人员被迫搬迁，被拘留的人道主义人员几乎是 2020 年的三倍，还有 5 名援助人员被杀害。⁷⁵

74. 2022 年 3 月，世界粮食计划署警告说，南苏丹正面临“有史以来最严重的饥饿危机”。⁷⁶ 截至 2021 年 12 月，约有 830 万人仍然需要粮食援助，140 万儿童严重营养不良。

75. 2021 年，专家小组在上一次最后报告中报告的趋势仍在持续，在其工作组未能就六个县粮食不安全的严重程度达成共识后，粮食安全阶段综合分类评估也出现了崩溃。这影响到国际资源的调动和粮食援助的分配。⁷⁷ 专家小组从其访谈中认识到，政府代表不愿意承认南苏丹任何人口应被归入第 5 阶段(饥荒/人道主义灾难)，因为这一指标将使政府更难证明发展筹资请求的理由。⁷⁸

⁷² 见附件二十五。

⁷³ Koang Pal Chang, “Ethiopia security services agree to cooperate in regional issues”, Eye Radio, 29 January 2021; Sudans Post, “S. Sudan, Ethiopian spy agencies to cooperate on regional interests”, 29 January 2021。

⁷⁴ 人道主义事务协调办公室，“南苏丹人道主义掠影，2021 年 12 月”；世界粮食计划署(粮食署)，“南苏丹国家概况”。

⁷⁵ 同上。

⁷⁶ 粮食署，“南苏丹准备应对有史以来最严重的饥饿危机，家庭被推到极限”，2022 年 3 月 11 日(可查阅：www.wfp.org/news/families-pushed-limit-south-sudan-braces-its-worst-hunger-crisis-ever)。

⁷⁷ Margie Buchanan-Smith, Jane Cocking and Sam Sharp, *Independent Review of the IPC South Sudan* (London, Overseas Development Institute, 2021)。

⁷⁸ 专家小组获得的机密文件以及对参与或见证粮食安全阶段综合分类进程的个人进行的访谈，2022 年 3 月。

七. 公共财政被分流向精英

76. 在改革南苏丹公共财政方面取得了一些进展。该国石油生产和债务的透明度得到提高，公共财政管理监督委员会也在发挥作用。2022 年 3 月，议会还在几年来首次正式批准了预算，在可能及时为 2022/23 财政年度编制预算方面也取得了进展。⁷⁹ 南苏丹还承诺与国际货币基金组织、世界银行和金融行动特别工作组合作。⁸⁰ 然而，重大挑战仍然存在。

A. 石油和非石油收入管理混乱，容易被挪用

77. 石油仍然是政府几乎所有收入，占 2021/22 年度预算预计收入的 90% 以上。⁸¹ 由于油井枯竭和洪水造成的破坏，2021/22 财政年度的石油总产量估计为每日 15.6 万桶，低于上一年的每日 17 万桶。⁸² 然而，产量下降被油价上涨所抵消。

78. 南苏丹的公共财政也将受益于 2021 年 12 月成功偿还独立后不久与苏丹商定的 30.28 亿美元的过渡财政安排。⁸³ 这应该可以让南苏丹根据油价情况，每桶石油额外保留 6 至 15 美元。⁸⁴

79. 南苏丹政府继续将其石油产量份额出售给少数国际贸易商的做法。根据石油部的数据，南苏丹在 2021 年 7 月至 12 月期间出售了 12 批(725 万桶)原油，价值约 5.476 亿美元，6 个不同的贸易商接收了货物。⁸⁵ 专家小组确认，在此期间出售的大多数货物在交货后三至六周内以较短期的预付款支付，约为其价值的 70% 至 80%。⁸⁶

80. 然而，如何管理石油收入仍然存在相当大的不确定性，石油收入如何使用仍然存在重大问题。例如，尽管石油价格高于预测，但政府继续拖欠其领薪者的许多部分的大量工资，导致罢工和广泛的愤怒。⁸⁷ 政府还拖欠区域组织成员会费超过 3 900 万美元。⁸⁸

⁷⁹ 财政与规划部，2021/22 财政年度核定预算。

⁸⁰ 见 <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/increased-monitoring-june-2021.html#SouthSudan>。

⁸¹ 南苏丹共和国 2021/22 年度核定预算。

⁸² 财政与规划部，2021/22 财政年度预算演讲。

⁸³ 对议员和外交官的访谈，2022 年 3 月。得到议会 2021/22 年度预算三读的证实。

⁸⁴ 见附件二十六，南苏丹仍向苏丹支付使用其管道和加工设施的费用，达尔混合油共计为每桶 9.1 美元，尼罗混合油为每桶 11 美元。

⁸⁵ 专家小组获得的机密文件。2021 年 7 月至 12 月期间从政府购买石油的贸易商有：撒哈拉能源、阿达克斯能源、三一能源、利塔斯科、太平洋石油和 BB 能源。销售总额约为 725 万桶，其中约 69% 为达尔混合油。

⁸⁶ 专家小组与贸易商的通信。

⁸⁷ 对议员、民间社会和国际外交官的访谈，2022 年 3 月。另见 Obaj Okuj, “UoJ staff receive 3-month salaries, still, demand outstanding arrears”, Eye Radio, 22 March 2022; Sudans Post, “Gov’t owes diplomats 24 months in salary arrears – finance minister”, 20 March 2022。

⁸⁸ 美国之音，“聚焦南苏丹”，音频集，2022 年 3 月 11 日。这些债务包括欠东非共同体、伊加特和北部走廊过境和运输协调局的债务。

B. 以石油做担保的债务挑战经济稳定

81. 以石油做担保的商业债务也继续给南苏丹的预算带来压力。该国的商业债务总额目前超过 17 亿美元，其中许多债务的利率很高。其中包括对卡塔尔国家银行、撒哈拉能源、Nasdec General Trading、非洲进出口银行和中国进出口银行的巨额债务。⁸⁹ 这些债务现在大多重新安排在今后交付石油时偿还，使大量货物从国家预算中转移出去。

82. 专家小组的调查证实了提高以石油做担保的债务透明度的重要性。2019 年，南苏丹政府与阿拉伯联合酋长国的一家名为 Nasdec General Trading 的贸易商签订了贷款协议，该贸易商提供了高达 5.39 亿美元的贷款机制，将通过未来交付原油偿还。⁹⁰ 直到 2022 年 2 月，南苏丹的任何预算文件或支出报告都没有报告这笔贷款。这笔贷款的很大一部分存入阿拉伯联合酋长国第一阿布扎比银行的政府账户，而不是存入指定的石油收入账户。⁹¹

以石油做担保的债务为军事采购融资

83. 专家小组还查明，总统办公室努力积累更多的以石油做担保的债务，以资助授予受青睐的商人的合同。

84. 2021 年 6 月，南苏丹政府与一家名为 Amuk for Trading and Investment Co. Ltd. 的南苏丹公司和一家位于阿拉伯联合酋长国的名为 Silwana Diamond General Trading LLC 的贸易公司签订了一项协议。⁹² 根据该三方协议，Amuk 签订合同，向南苏丹人民国防军供应价值 6.5 亿美元的食品，大大超过 2021/22 年度预算中分配给安全部门货物和服务的 158 亿南苏丹镑(3 900 万美元)。⁹³

85. Silwana Diamond General Trading LLC 公司将以石油为担保的贷款为贸易融资，并在两年宽限期后在三年内偿还。南苏丹银行为贷款提供了一份主权保函。⁹⁴

86. 专家小组已证实，Amuk for Trading and Investment 公司最终控制权在南苏丹著名商人 Kur Ajing Ater 手中。⁹⁵ 专家小组上一份报告(S/2019/301)描述了 Kur Ajing Ater 控制的另一家公司 Lou for Trading and Investment 如何获得南苏丹人民国防军授予的类似超大采购合同，包括食品采购合同。

87. 总统办公室在协议中发挥了突出作用，包括总统本人、他的国家安全顾问和其他高级工作人员，其中几人出席了在阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拜签署协议的过

⁸⁹ 基金组织，工作人员监测方案下的第一次审查；南苏丹 2021/22 年度核定预算。

⁹⁰ 专家小组获得的文件；与 Nasdec General Trading 的信函。

⁹¹ 同上。

⁹² 专家小组获得的机密文件。专家小组还感谢 Silwana Diamond General Trading 公司通过面谈和书面信函提供的合作。

⁹³ 同上和南苏丹 2021/22 年度核定预算。

⁹⁴ 专家小组获得的文件。

⁹⁵ 2022 年 3 月对前政府官员和私营公司进行的访谈，并得到专家小组获得的照片和机密文件证实。另见 The Sentry, “Sanctioned South Sudanese businessmen are skirting US sanctions”, October 2021。

程。⁹⁶ 在审查与 Kur Ajing Ater 2018 年合同的保密会议记录中，一位南苏丹人民国防军高级官员抱怨说，“这份合同存在违规行为”，但“决定出自上级部门，所以我们对此无能为力”。⁹⁷

88. 据 Silwana 公司的代表说，他们最终对政府的担保感到不满，并要求取消交易。在得知该协议后，国际机构也敦促政府取消该协议，因为该协议违反了停止进一步积累以石油做担保的债务的承诺。⁹⁸ 因此，2021 年 9 月，主权保函被取消。⁹⁹ 不过，此后政府一直在探讨与其他贸易商恢复该交易。¹⁰⁰

C. 转移机制扩散

89. 在南苏丹混乱的公共财政体系中，政治和安全官员继续寻找机会利用其权力和影响力，为自己的利益挪用大量公共资源。

90. 专家小组以前曾报告过，在没有适当招标程序的情况下，将数十亿美元的公路建设合同授予非洲资源公司和优胜者建筑公司(见 S/2020/1141)。虽然道路正在建设，但对这一庞大项目的监督仍然有限。2020/21 年和 2021/22 年预算都将预测石油收入的 30% 分配给这些项目，¹⁰¹ 但这一支出没有反映在 2020/21 财政年度的会计核算中，该财政年度的资本支出总额仅为 30 亿南苏丹镑。¹⁰²

91. 此外，在 2021/22 年度预算的最后一读中，议会声称确定了 1 745 亿南苏丹镑的意外盈余。¹⁰³ 议员们认为，向苏丹支付了 1 390 万美元的超额款项用于过渡财政安排，而本财政年度的平均油价可能会调整到每桶 100 美元。议员们将这一盈余中的 347 亿南苏丹镑转用于自己。¹⁰⁴ 然而，这一盈余不太可能实现，因为南苏丹在本财政年度上半年实现的平均油价仅为每桶 75.6 美元。¹⁰⁵

92. 专家小组从访谈中认识到，南苏丹官员利用其权力和影响力，将利润丰厚的 COVID-19 私营检测活动交给据称由政治精英拥有的少数公司。自 2021 年 9 月左右起，有执照的 COVID-19 检测中心被要求收取 6 美元的费用，以支持统一的电子证书系统。根据 COVID-19 工作队的一个调查委员会后来的报告，在没有法律依据或适当会计的情况下收取的费用总额为 158 530 美元和 2 180 万南苏丹镑。¹⁰⁶

⁹⁶ 同上。

⁹⁷ 专家小组获得的机密会议记录。

⁹⁸ 对私营部门公司、前政府官员和国际外交官的访谈，2022 年 3 月。

⁹⁹ 专家小组获得的文件。

¹⁰⁰ 对公司、议员、外交官和民间社会的访谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。

¹⁰¹ 南苏丹 2021/22 年度核定预算。

¹⁰² 财政和规划部，2021/22 财政年度最终数字

¹⁰³ 南苏丹 2021/22 年度核定预算。

¹⁰⁴ 过渡期国民议会，2021/22 财政年度预算三读。

¹⁰⁵ 专家小组获得的机密文件。

¹⁰⁶ COVID-19 国家工作队，“关于 2021 年 9 月 6 日至 12 月 26 日对 COVID-19 私人实验室收取 6 美元费用的起源的报告”，2022 年 1 月 17 日。可查阅：<https://eyeradio.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/COVID-19-PROBE.pdf>。

D. 黄金提供预算外资金

93. 专家小组收到几份报告说，民族拯救阵线部队继续在中赤道州翁杜鲁巴周围的河流系统开采黄金并对非正规采金者征税。¹⁰⁷ 民族拯救阵线代表向专家小组否认系统地参与黄金贸易，同时承认黄金是该区域重要的生计来源。¹⁰⁸

94. 专家小组还证实，2021 年年中，南苏丹人民国防军军事情报人员试图向在戈罗姆附近经营的一家国际金矿公司勒索约 250 000 美元，促使该公司离开该国。¹⁰⁹ 该公司、包括其加工厂，被出售给非洲资源公司，专家小组以前曾在公路建设方面报告过该公司(见 [S/2020/1141](#))。

95. 根据专家小组看到的机密文件，南苏丹人民国防军(包括其军事情报部门)和国家安全署已授权一家名为 Hercules Security Services Ltd 的公司在翁杜鲁巴、图良和卡蒂吉雷周围的金矿地区提供安全保障，这些地区的暴力最近影响了进行更有系统的采矿的努力。¹¹⁰ 根据这份文件，授权包括允许部署武装外籍人和“机密安全设备”。¹¹¹

八. 结论

96. 正如专家小组一贯报告的那样，南苏丹平民及其许多政治、军事和民间社会领导人对《和平协议》在不大幅纠正方向的情况下为南苏丹带来和平与稳定的前景深表怀疑。《和平协议》非但没有为南苏丹的掠夺性政治体系带来转型变革，自身反而成为精英强权政治的有利可图的场所。随着主要反对派签署方的团结受到削弱，在《和平协议》之外订立的个别协议激增，他们的警告变得更加紧迫。

97. 对南苏丹人民的后果现在是明确无误的，因为停火在该国大部分地区一再受到考验，同时暴力加剧，与性别有关的暴力仍然根深蒂固，创建南苏丹混合法院的希望越来越渺茫，¹¹² 关键的人道主义指标朝着错误的方向稳步发展。需要作出紧急努力，确保该国领导人不仅要实现程序性目标的进展负责，而且要对其国家及其人民的命运负责。

九. 建议

98. 考虑到南苏丹持续违反停火和国家以下各级暴力加剧，专家小组重申其建议，即安全理事会维持安理会第 [2428\(2018\)](#) 号决议第 4 至 6 段规定并经第 [2577\(2021\)](#) 号决议延长的对南苏丹领土的武器禁运。

¹⁰⁷ 对政府官员和活动家的访谈和机密消息来源，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。

¹⁰⁸ 对民族拯救阵线高级代表的访谈，2022 年 3 月。

¹⁰⁹ 对南苏丹商人和机密消息来源的访谈，2022 年 2 月。

¹¹⁰ 机密文件。

¹¹¹ 机密文件。

¹¹² 见附件二十七。

99. 专家小组还建议委员会致函与南苏丹接壤的所有会员国，以：(a) 提醒它们根据第 2577(2021)号决议第 8 段检查运往南苏丹的相关货物，并向委员会报告这些检查情况，因为没有任何会员国向委员会报告检查情况；(b) 重申并澄清第 2428(2018)号决议第 5 段概述的豁免程序，重点是第 4 段概述的安保部门培训。

100. 鉴于安理会对挪用和转移公共资源行为的关切，专家小组还建议：

(a) 委员会呼吁南苏丹政府按照《南苏丹石油收入管理法》和和平协议第 4.8.1.2 条的要求，公开指定一个单一的石油收入账户并加以详细说明；

(b) 委员会致函被查明自 2015/16 财政年度以来从南苏丹政府购买原油的所有公司，¹¹³ 鼓励它们根据天然生产业透明度倡议的报告要求，公布今后向南苏丹政府支付的任何与石油有关的款项，包括以石油为担保的贷款；¹¹⁴

(c) 根据第 2577(2021)号决议第 3 段，委员会虚拟听取公共财政管理监督委员会的通报，其中说明其为确保及时向公众提供关于所有收入、支出、赤字和债务的信息所作的努力。

¹¹³ 见附件二十八。

¹¹⁴ 南苏丹《石油收入管理法》和《解决南苏丹共和国冲突重振协议》第 4.8.1.14.11 条中援引了天然生产业透明度倡议标准。见 <https://eiti.org/>。

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Annex I: Agreement Between the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement in Government (SPLM-IG) and the Sudan's Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) Kit-Gwang on Status of Forces

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SUDAN PEOPLES' LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN GOVERNMENT (SPLM-IG) AND THE SUDAN PEOPLES' LIBERATION MOVEMENT /ARMY-IN OPPOSITION (SPLM/A-IO) KIT-GWANG ON STATUS OF FORCES

PREAMBLE

Whereas H.E. President Abdulfatah Elburhan Abdulrahman, Chairman of Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council issued his directions for facilitation of direct meetings between the Representatives of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement-In Government (SPLM-IG) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement /Army –In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) Kit-Gwang to discuss the issues under their mandate;

Whereas H.E President Salva Kiir Mayardit, General Simon Gatwech Dual and all other leaders of South Sudanese are fully cognizant of their historical responsibility at this crucial juncture of their country and determined to work together hand in hand for the sake of the South Sudanese people in pursuit of sustainable peace and stability;

Whereas the Parties shall be bound to all provisions of the Revitalized Agreement for Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS);

Whereas the SPLM-IG and the SPLM/A-IO Kit-Gwang commend the continuous role played by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan in facilitating this process;


Whereas the Parties aware of the suffering of the people of South Sudan and their eagerness for realization of durable peace and stability in the country;

We the undersigned, representatives of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement In Government (SPLM-IG) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement /Army –In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) Kit-Gwang met here in Khartoum- Sudan, thoroughly discussed, agreed and recommit as follows:

1. The Amnesty for SPLM/A-IO Kit-Gwang:

1.1. The President of the Republic of South Sudan shall issue the amnesty to the leadership and forces of SPLM/A-IO Kit-Gwang as previously done on August 8th, 2018.

16/5/2022



2. **Permanent Ceasefire:**

2.1. The Parties recognize and recommit themselves to the ceasefire as per Khartoum Declaration of Agreement of June 27th 2018 which came into effect on July 1st 2018. The parties shall further observe meticulously the said agreement throughout the Republic of South Sudan to ensure sustainable peace, facilitate operationalization of transitional Security Arrangements and the voluntary repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation and reintegration of the returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

3. **Period of Implementation of the Agreement.**

3.1. The parties agreed that the period for implementation of this agreement shall be determined by the respective Joint Security Committee which shall be formed immediately after the signing of this agreement; however it shall not exceed a period of three months. The committee shall meet to agree on its Terms of Reference, identifies the assembly areas at Manyo, Southern Malakal, Eastern Jonglei and other areas and receives lists and parade of SPLM/A-IO Kit-Gwang forces as well.

3.2. After redeployment or relocation of SPLM/A-IO Kit-Gwang forces from Magenit and following completion of the integration, police force shall be immediately deployed to provide protection and security services to the population in the area.

4. **Establishment of Coordination Offices.**

4.1. The SPLM-IG shall facilitate establishment of coordination offices in Juba, Malakal, and Bor towns to assist the processes of assembling and reintegration. These offices shall not be used for mobilization and recruitment purposes by the SPLM/A-IO Kit-Gwang.

5. **Logistics.**

5.1. The SPLM-IG shall provide the necessary logistics (food items and medicines) by the South Sudan Peoples' Defence Forces (SSPDF) through relevant mechanisms.


16/1/2022



6. **SPLM/A-IO Kit-Gwang High-Level Delegation to Juba.**

6.1. The SPLM-IG welcomes the visit of an advance high-level delegation of SPLM/A-IO Kit-Gwang to Juba, to further enhance trust building and ease operationalization of this agreement. SPLM-IG shall be responsible of the logistics involved.


Done Here in Khartoum, Sudan on this day 16th of January 2022 and signed by:


For the SPLM-IG
Hon. TUT GATLUAK MANIME
Presidential Advisor on National Security Affairs


For SPLM/A-IO Kit-Gwang 16 Jan 2022
General Simon Gatwech Dual
SPLM/A-IO KIT-GWANG Interim Chairman & C-in-C

For SPLM/A-IO Kit-Gwang
General Johnson Olony Thubo
SPLM/A-IO KIT-GWANG Deputy Interim Chairman & Deputy C-in-C

For SPLM/A-IO Kit-Gwang
General Thomas Mabor Dhoal
SPLM/A-IO KIT-GWANG Member of Military Supreme Council



Witnessed by:


General (psc) /
Shams-Eldien Kabashi Ibrahim
Member of Sudan's Transitional
Sovereignty Council

Annex II: Joknyang Declaration (unofficial translation)

REF: DECLARATION OF DEFECTION

Date: 04/02/2022

Press release! For immediate release!!!

With effect from today, I Maj. Gen. Tito Biel Wieh luny would like to announce my defection from the SPLM/A-IO. There are quite variety of reasons behind this exercise.

To satisfy the sympathizers, some of the reasons for the exercise are;

1. Nepotism in the SPLM/A-IO leadership. We assert that SPLM/A-IO under the leadership of Dr. Riek Machar Teny lost direction, vision and command of the forces. The movement has transformed itself to a family run-enterprise citing Ziling Kek's denial of the promotion by former chief of staff Gen. Simon Gatwech Dual at varrious cantonment sites.
2. Downgrading. After joining the bush, the movement chief failed to follow the former SPLM protocol as the mean promotion process, many junior officials were promoted and jumped over me through random promotion.
3. Rush to judgement. When several officials defected previously, the haters of peace doubted and suspected me to have also defected without verification and clear evidence.
4. Rivalries over positions. The movement leadership from senior officials aimed at securing positions for self and forgetting all others who help them climb the hills at with them during the struggle. Many are left at the cantonment without being visited by one of the senior party representatives.
5. Political immaturity. Things here are taken personal, everyone has a different point of view in the way they look at things. Politically, even when you alternate someone's decision, you must not go head on head with each other. You must listen to the music even when you don't like the tune.

These are just some of the reasons that made me leave, anyone who reasons the same with my point of view can understand that I left for a reason. You'll have more to read on the official release that'll be posted public on other media groups.

Thanks

Maj. Gen. Tito Biel Wieh. (Chairman and commander in chief of the Joknyang declaration.)

Annex III: 1st Lt. Gen. James Gattiek Diar, Gen Willam Gatjeth Deng and two other Generals meet President Salva Kiir Mayardit in Juba after defection from Kit-Gwang to SSPDF, March 2022



Annex IV: Press release issued by Joknyang Grouping on their Facebook page on 12 March 2022**Joknyang Declaration Notification Chamber**

16 March at 16:04 · 🌐

...

PRESS RELEASE!!! FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE!!!

16/03/2022.

The Joknyang Declaration administration notes with great concern the current escalation of violence in Biel Ganmachar and Tor Abieth. We offer condolences to the families of those killed in the recent fighting.

Joknyang Declaration calls for security monitoring bodies to extend the support of patrol in Biel Ganmachar & Tor Abieth. We call for that mandate authorised peace keepers to use all necessary means which include force when required in order to protect the two sides under the threat of physical violence.

We call on the SPLA-IO high command to order their forces who left Dingding & Chuoor Chiengkuay to Kaljaak in order to wage several verbal attacks against our forces and return them to dialogue.

Finally! We call on the interim government of the Republic of South Sudan to call on SPLA-IO to cease reprisals and lend their SPLM political support to deescalate such premature measures. Peace!!!


I remain;

Col. Sacristan Zol Wal, Joknyang Declaration Spokesperson.

Annex V: Trainees at Maple Training Centre, Western Bahr el Ghazal, March 2022
Sourced from video of news interview



Annex VI: Agreement on type and size of the necessarily unified forces, 27 September 2018
Sourced from the Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism



TYPE AND SIZE OF FORCES

As per Article 2.1.11.4 the PCTSA workshop have agreed on the type and size of forces as tabulated below:

S/N	TYPE OF FORCES	SIZE		TOTAL	
		PHASE 1	PHASE 2		
1	Military	6 Divisions	5 Divisions	11 Divisions	60
2	National Security Service (NSS)	2 Divisions	1 Division	3 Divisions	15
3	National Police	13,000	12,000	25,000	13
4	State Police	45,000	42,000	87,000	43
5	Wildlife	12,500	12,500	25,000	12
6	Prisons	16,500	15,000	31,500	15
7	Fire Brigade	6,500	6,500	13,000	7

Note: Parties to PCTSA workshop recommend the importance of drawing the VIP protection unit from the first phase of the unified trained forces.

MG Rabi Mujung Emmanuel (TGoNU).....

MG Gatkhor Gatluak Koryom (SPLA-IO).....

Simon Archangelo Ngbidigi (SSOA).....

MG Tahir Abdelkarim Ibrahim

CTSAMVM Security Chairman

Khartoum Sudan

27 September 2018

Annex VII: Press release from SPLM/A-IO on the division of top command positions, 26 March 2022



SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
SPLM (IO)
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS



Press Release

On Friday March 25, 2022, President Salva Kiir Mayardit issued a Presidential Decree on the unification of command of the unified forces in which he relinquished three (3) positions of command in the military and two (2) in the National Police Service to the SPLM/A (IO) and SSOA. In his decree, the President also directed the Chief of Defense Forces and the Inspector General of Police to immediately implement his order. However, it is to be noted that this is a unilateral decision.

It is important to recall that on 27th September 2018, the parties agreed in the Khartoum Workshop as stipulated in the Agreement (Art. 2.1.11) that the size and composition of the forces shall be based on the ratio of 50 percent for ITGoNU and 50 percent for the opposition. Following the Khartoum workshop, IGAD and RJMEC convened 2 subsequent workshops of joint Security Mechanisms in Juba on 10th-11th May 2019 and 9th September 2019 which reaffirmed the 50:50 ratio. However, President Salva Kiir Mayardit reneged on these agreements which prompted the guarantors to intervene to resolve the matter. A dialogue is ongoing and the parties have not yet reached an agreement on the unification of command.

In light of the above, the SPLM/SPLA (IO) Political Bureau would like to state the following:

1. The unilateral decision by President Salva Kiir is a violation of the R-ARCSS, and it is a clear rejection of the on-going mediation process by the Republic of the Sudan, Chair of IGAD.
2. The SPLM/A (IO) condemns and rejects the unilateral decision.
3. SPLM/A (IO) is committed to the on-going mediation to resolve the matter.

In conclusion, the SPLM/A (IO) reiterates its commitment to the full implementation of the Agreement in both letter and spirit and looks forward to IGAD mediation to intervene in this matter.

Signed,



Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, PhD
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, SPLM/SPLA (IO) and The First Vice President of the Republic
26th March 2022.

Annex VIII: Appeal from SPLM/A-IO for Guarantors of Peace Agreement to intervene, March 2022



**SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
SPLM/SPLA(IO)
CHAIRMAN AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF**



H.E. Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan

Chairman of Transitional Sovereignty Council and Chair of IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government
Republic of the Sudan
Khartoum

Subject: Request for Intervention of Guarantors on the Deteriorating Security Situation in South Sudan

I am writing to your excellency as chair of IGAD to bring to your attention the deteriorating situation in South Sudan. Attached is SPLM/SPLA(IO) proposal to arrest the situation.

Accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my best regards and highest consideration.

Yours truly,


Chairman
26/3/2022

Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, PhD

Chairman and Commander-In-Chief, SPLM/SPLA(IO) and the First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan
26th March 2022.

CC:

1. H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan
2. H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya
3. H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda
4. H.E. Dr. Abiy Ahmed, Prime Minister of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
5. H.E. Ismail Omer Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti
6. H.E. Mohamed Abdullah Farmaajo, President of Federal Republic of Somalia
7. H.E. Antonio Guterres, Secretary General of the United Nations
8. H.E. Musa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of African Union Commission
9. H.E. Dr. Workneh Gebeheyu, Executive Director, IGAD Secretariat
10. H.E. Dr. Ismail Wais, IGAD Special for South Sudan
11. H.E. Gen. Charles Tai Gituai, Interim Chairman of Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC)
12. Representative of Troika (USA, UK & Norway)
13. Representative of European Union.



**SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
SPLM (IO)
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS**



**SPLM/SPLA(IO) Position on Recommitment to Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and
Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements**

The security situation in South Sudan has been deteriorating for the last few months. The systematic and persistent attacks by the SSPDF on cantonment sites, training centers and other positions of SPLM/A (IO) around the country is evident of such a deterioration and it is now a matter of serious concern. The latest of these attacks took place in Kaljaak and Mirmir in Unity State; Kuer keem, Wangkuerbi and Jiokow in Maiwut County and Wech Lual, Guol and Biot in Longechuk County of Upper Nile State.

On 24th March 2022, the SSPDF through its spokesperson, Maj. General Lul Ruai Koang, declared to its ranks and file and to the general public that the SSPDF is officially at war with the SPLM/A (IO) (press statement attached). Consequently, the SSPDF has intensified its attacks on the SPLM/A (IO) positions following that declaration. It should be noted that these actions, among others, constitute clear violations of the Cessation of Hostilities signed on December 21, 2017 and Permanent Ceasefire Agreement signed on June 27, 2018.

The security arrangements is the backbone of the Agreement and therefore must be fully implemented. The eight (8) month Pre-Transitional Period was extended twice (first by 6 months and then 100 days), bringing it to seventeen (17) months in total. Two years into the transitional period, we still have not implemented the pre-transitional tasks, particularly the security arrangements (the unification and graduation of forces) Article 2.2.1. These were supposed to be the prerequisites for the formation of the RTGoNU. The SPLM/A (IO) reluctantly agreed for the formation of RTGONU before the graduation of the unified forces hoping that once in government, we might help to generate the political will and encourage our partner to prioritize the implementation of the agreement, but this has not been the case.

On Friday March 25, 2022, President Salva Kiir Mayardit issued a Presidential Decree in which he stated to have relinquished three (3) positions of command in the military and two (2) in the National Police Service to the SPLM/A (IO) and SSOA. This was a unilateral decision on his part. [See SPLM/A (IO) press release]. This, coupled with the declaration of war by the Spokesperson of the SSPDF on 24th March (see press release) has clearly demonstrated not only the lack of political will to implement the Agreement but the intention to abrogate it, from the part of our partner, ITGONU.

The SPLM/A (IO) sees no alternative to R-ARCSS to bring stability and peace in the country. The people of South Sudan are already suffering from economic hardships and insecurity. Therefore,

RMTD



we request, as a matter of urgency, the intervention of IGAD and other international partners to prevail on President Salva Kiir not to take this country back to war (Article 1.4.2.).

The SPLM/A (IO) is proposing the following as the way forward, focusing on ending the current escalation of violence;

1. There must be an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of the SSPDF from the areas forcefully taken from the SPLM/A (IO) namely; Mirmir, Wath-Thiech, Joknyang in Unity State, Turu, Jlokow in Upper Nile State and all other areas violently occupied by the SSPDF in violation of the CoHA signed on December 21, 2017 and the Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements. (Article 2.1.)
2. There is an urgent need to investigate all violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, beginning with the most recent ones, and ensure that those responsible are held accountable.
3. The SSPDF must immediately desist from executing its pending planned attacks on SPLM/SPLA(IO) cantonment sites and training centers throughout the country.
4. The ITGoNU must immediately stop facilitation of military defections as these undermine the Security Arrangements in Chapter 2 of the R-ARCSS (Article 2.1.).
5. The SSPDF must refrain from offensive, provocative and hostile propaganda, recruitment from cantonment and training centers, mobilization, deployment and movement of forces.
6. The SSPDF must ensure that all forces under their command or influence should comply with the provisions of CoHA, Permanent Ceasefire, and Transitional Security Arrangements.
7. The SSPDF must ensure that demilitarization of major cities and towns is carried out with immediate effect.
8. IGAD is urged to urgently intervene and resolve the stalemate on the unification of command which should pave way to the graduation of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) that have been under training for the last three years.
9. Graduation of forces that are currently in the training centers must be carried out with immediate effect.
10. Organization of Phase 2 must be carried out as a matter of urgency so that there is no gap between the graduation of the NUF and the commencement of the training of the members of forces in Phase 2.
11. Financial incentives must equally be provided to all the trainees and instructors in the training centers as opposed to the current practice of paying only ITGoNU components.
12. Food, shelter and medicines for the cantonment sites and Training Centers must be sufficiently provided for a decent wellbeing of the forces.
13. National Transitional Committee (NTC) must be revamped and restructured to guarantee its effectiveness in carrying out its mandate of coordination and facilitation of the implementation of the Agreement. It is envisaged that such an overhaul shall ensure that the current role of the leadership of the NTC in recruiting and facilitating defections, using funds meant for the implementation of the Agreement, is halted so as to save the Peace Agreement from collapsing.

RMTD



14. Funding to and disbursement of funds from NTC should be made adequate for the task, regular and transparent.
15. The ITGONU to refrain from the use of state media against other peace partners and avail political and civic space to enable the freedom of expression and association.
16. Last but not least, the ITGoNU must demonstrate political will by actions and respect the R-ARCSS as the roadmap to addressing the root causes of the conflict. It must therefore recommit itself to the implementation of the Agreement in both letter and spirit.

The details of the proposed way forward should be discussed by the parties under the auspices of the IGAD mediation.

Finally, SPLM/SPLA(IO) reiterates its commitment to full implementation to R-ARCSS.

Signed,



Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, PhD
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief, SPLM/SPLA(IO)
Juba, South Sudan
26th March 2022.

Annex IX: Aircraft used for transport of forced recruits in Lakes and Unity States

Confidential first-hand source

Aircraft identified as South Sudanese commercial charter plane operated by South Sudanese company Tor Air Aviation



Lakes State, July 2021



Rubkona airstrip, Unity State, January 2022

Annex X: SPLA-IO letter to Bentiu IDP camp's leadership seeking cooperation in identifying and moving deserters from the camp to Dingdin SPLA-IO cantonment site, 7 February 2022

DATE: 02/02/2022

TO: Hon. THAYAK WICYAK
C-H-C
R/ CAPT. GIATLUOK BOL
R/ CAPT. BOL YOH
BEST REGARDS

1. FOR YOUR INFORMATION THAT, KINDLY ESTEEMED OFFICE TO REQUESTING ABOUT SOLDIERS WERE IN IDP CAMP. ALL WE WANT THEM TO BE REPORT THEMSELVES TO DINGDIN CANTONMENT SITE WHEN THERE IS ANY PERSON WANT TO GO POC FOR HIS WORK SHAW BECA RETURN WITH DOCUMENT NOTED. (2) THE ABOVE IS FOR YOUR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. NB. PLUS THOSE WHO WERE WORKING IN ORGANIZ. AND LET THEM REPORT THEMSELVES TO THIS END.



SIGN.
BRIG. Gen. JAMES KUEN PUOT TOT -
SECTOR-2 CHIEF FOR M-1 SPLA-IO

Annex XI: Open letter from Bentiu IDP Youth Forum, 25 January 2022

**BENTIU IDP YOUTH FORUM**

SECTOR 2 BLOCK 12 (YOUTH CENTRE OFFICE)

Youth forum's office

DATE 25/1/2022

Ref: Press statement on the rampant arrest and child adoptions in IDP camp by the forces

The leadership of the youth forum would like to condemn the rampant arrest and child adoptions by the army forces in IDP camp, pupils, students are being taken out to unknown locations without the notice of their parents therefore we call upon the legal authorities to take precautions in stopping the concern by the youths in IDP camp since it's an ongoing process now for couple of weeks, we also call upon the peace mediators, media houses to explore it out to the authorities concern to be aware of the evil practice exerted on the communities living in IDP camp Bentiu

Youth forum comprises of thirty two youth groups and its establishment in 2016 was aiming at advocacy on the issues facing youth in IDP camp therefore as we continue receiving the complaint from the various groups pertaining the rampant arrest and adoptions of school pupils who are supposed to be concentrating by now at their various studies in IDP is noted as a major threat since most of the students are undergoing through a difficulty moment and others gone missing due to the same reasons so we urge all the youths, Community Leadership, Humanitarian partners, communities themselves to take their time in reporting any case pertaining raise concern by the youths to the center for more documentations and follow up of such cases happening if at all.

The youth leadership are ready for any concern and issues affecting peace and unity in IDP camp and must be raised to the concern authorities without comprises

Thank for reading and advocating as well for this concern threat.

Chairman of the youth forum

Kalany bolies kueth

SIGNATURE.....

CONFIDENTIAL

0929352831

0917078697



Annex XII: Letter from sanctioned individual Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004) outlining request for a previous recruitment drive in Warrap State, 24 October 2018

- 57 -

From: Ground force com Date 24/10/2018

To: ms-Gen manyang nung, mobilization com
warrap states

info: mobilization com GoGrial state

info: Tiger Div- com

info: Governor GoGrial state

info: " Twic state

info: " Tons state

info: SSPBF

045/10/2018 @ But all your team of mobilization
in Greater warrap states and GoGrial state and
Twic state, according to the document I produced
to you, to mobilize all our SSPBF old soldiers
and assemble them in one place @
in this mobilization of our scattered soldiers
over all areas of Greater warrap-elGazal, now
any cow or bull shall be taken from any
soldier found and his home @
regarding recruit, no any young men shall be join
Army except the people must come by himself
to recruited in Army @
regarding problem of food to you, we are
working on it to find a contractor who will
supply your food @

Above is for your information

Toby GH
Noby mnd
Date 25/10/2018

Annex XIII: Letter from Leer County Commissioner, Unity State, on coordinated attacks by armed youth on Koch and Mayendit Counties from 15 and 16 February 2022


Republic of South Sudan
UNITY STATE - BENTIU
LEER COUNTY
 Commissioner's Office
 

Ref: U.S.B.L.C Date: 17/Feb/2022

To: Lt. Gen. Hon. Dr. Joseph Manyitil Wejang
 Governor, Unity State
 Through: Acting Governor and State Minister of Local Government and Laws Enforcement Agencies.

Subject: Coordinated Attacks by Armed Youths from Koch and Mayendit Counties on 15/Feb/2022 and 16/Feb/2022.

On Monday 14/Feb/2022, both commissioners of Koch and Mayendit Counties have held meeting at Mir Mir Payam of Koch County. After their meeting, at late evening of 15/Feb/2022, armed Youths from Koch start attacking villages name; Booth, Lual, Pading. In those areas they burn houses, set Lual hospital into Fire, Rapping Women and Girls, and looted all properties.

On 16/Feb/2022 morning around 4am, armed youths from Mayendit county attacked place called Guat, Tuak, Kur, Gueny, they were Rapping Women and Girls, Burned the houses, and looted all properties for Livelihoods. And at the same day over 200 armed Youths from Koch County attacked Padeah also burned houses, Rapping women and Girls, looting properties. Then those Youths from both Counties advanced toward Bow and Leer Town. After that Youths from Leer County start confronting those Youth of Koch and Mayendit.

The confirmed number of casualties:

- 12 deaths
- 11 wounded
- 4 people missing
- 1 old woman burned inside house at place called Guat.


Reported By  17/2 2022




Hon. Stephen Taker Riak Dong
 Commissioner, Leer County

 +211 912307999 | +211 912549216 | +211 912597777 | +211 928888580
 Leer County - Unity State, RSS  takerriakstephen@gmail.com

Annex XIV: SPLM-IO Press Release suspending participation in security mechanisms, 22 March 2022



Annex XV: Letter by Tambura County Commissioner Mathew Mabenge ordering the release three individuals implicated in Tambura violence, 28 February 2022

 **Republic of South Sudan**
Western Equatoria State
Tambura County

Ref: CO/WES/TC/
Date: 28 / 2 / 2022



TO: SSPDF COMMANDER TAMBURA COUNTY

SUBJECT: 1. CAPT. MARTIN ALFRED BANGBURU
2. PVT. KINOMBORI PETER KUBOLI
3. JACKSON KUMBO BEREWE

I DO HERE BY OFFICIALLY ISSUING THE RELEASE OF THE ABOVE SAID SUBJECT WHICH COMPRISE OF THE THREE SUSPECTED TO BE IN OPEN ARREST WITH EFFECT FROM THE DATE OF THIS DOCUMENT.

THEREFORE, THEY WILL BE UNDER OBSERVATION OF THE COUNTY AUTHORITY AND SECURITY ORGANIZE TILL FURTHER DIRECTIVES FROM ABOVE AND THE LEGAL ADVISORS AT HIGH LEVEL CONCERN.


REGARDS

 
HON. MATHEW EDWARD MABENGE
TAMBURA COUNTY COMMISSIONER


CC: AG/INSPECTOR OF POLICE TAMBURA COUNTY
CC: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNTY DIRECTOR
CC: LEGAL ADVISORS OFFICE W.E.S YAMBIO
CC: FILE

+211-923-950-006 / +211-915-555-443

Annex XVI: Petition from local community to investigate the extrajudicial killing ordered by Warrap Governor Aleu, 20 November 2021



APUK PADOC COMMUNITY IN JUBA



Date: 20th Nov, 2021

To: Acting Chairperson of South Sudan Human Rights Commission (SSHRC)
Hon. Justice Nyuol Justine Yaac.

SUB: PETITION AGAINST GOVERNOR OF WARRAP STATE, HON. ALEU AYIENY ALEU OVER EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING OF TWO INNOCENT PERSONS FROM APUK-PADOC COMMUNITY ON DATE 12TH NOV, 2021.

Dear Hon,

With due respect and honor, we are hereby writing to your esteemed office for the above mentioned subject. Below is the summary of what had transpired:


- On 9th Nov, 2021, three persons by names;
A} Majok Mawan Thuc Lual
B} Dol Manyang Dol
C} Lual Gur Abui

They were found taking tea at Awul market, Tonj North County upon their coming from Akop Payam (Apuk-Padoc area).

An hour later, a notorious officer by name Capt. Madut Akol Lual who is in charge of Special Forces stationed at Awul came in with a Toyota pickup full with soldiers sieged and arrested them, took them to nearby forest according to eyewitness. They were seriously tortured and forced to accept false accusations of being thieves.

Therefore, notorious officer Capt. Madut Akol Lual informed the Governor of Warrap State, that he captured thieves; immediately Governor Aleu gave order to Capt. Madut Akol Lual on phone call while in Juba to execute gubernatorial

1



Tel: +211 925 555 812
+211 911 831 111
Email: apcinjuba@gmail.com

Location: Juba- Soth Sudan

2. On 12th Nov, 2021, Capt. Madut Akol Lual fired squad two persons by names **Majok Mawan Thuc Lual and Dol Manyang Dol**, (their photos are attached in Military Uniforms and nakedness after being killed), but **Lual Gur Abui** was cut-off from rope when these two guys were shot. He still alive but in half dead condition in prison of their custody.

Look, how wrong the procedures were made;

A) The execution of these two innocent citizens was unfair and amounted to extra Judicial killing which is against the supreme law of the country?

B) The victims were not taken to court of law, so that they are convicted based on whatever crime they might committed.

C) Our brothers were being accused of theft yet no materials evidence was found in their hands (**cow, money, goat/sheep, chicken or foodstuff**)

D) Given the fact that these victims were soldiers of **Division 11, based in Majak-Tiit Military Division HQRS**, Warrap State, thus, Division authorities were not informed.

D) The parents and the Executive Chiefs of the victims were not informed.

E) The victims were humiliated at the last minutes of their execution by stripping them naked of their Military Uniforms, thrown at the roadside, the families of victims were also denied the right to take the remains for burial.

Therefore, we believed such actions are inhuman, and sectional oriented policies. This is a small kind of cold war from Governor Aleu by targeting Apuk-Padoc Community using his powers of Governorship. Where in Transitional Constitution of Republic of South Sudan of 2011, which allowed innocent people to be fire squad?

Our recommendations and way forward:

We members of Apuk-Padoc Community within and Diaspora do hereby appealing to your Commission to do the followings;

1. We are requesting your Commission to fully investigate the matter by forming the independence committee of inquiry to visit the area of incidence to witness and investigate the real matter on the ground.
2. We are appealing to your commission to engage the authority concern to lift the immunity of Governor Aleu in order to stand trial.



3. We are appealing to human Rights Commission to rescue the life of remained survivor Mr. Lual Gur Abui to be given legal service i.e. Visitation by family members, arranged him in court of law and counsel him of trauma.
4. We are also appealing to your office to engage authority concerned to apprehend the accused Capt. Madut Akol Lual, who executed the gubernatorial orders on phone.
5. We requested the withdrawal of special forces in Awul Payam of Tonj North County, which is being manipulated and turned sectional against one community of greater Akop – particularly Apuk-Padoc - as **Awul** is the only Payam in Tonj North County with military base.
6. Find the attached photos of the deceases before and after killing.


Therefore, we members of Apuk- Padoc community, kindly appealing to your commission to let justice prevail now; since **“justice delay, justice deny”**.

Below is the list of people who signed this petition.

Thanks.



Annex XVII: Note Verbale issued by the Embassy of Uganda in preparation for a leaders' retreat to discuss and resolve outstanding disputes related to the R-ARCSS, 15 February 2022





THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

Your Excellency,

I extend warm and fraternal greetings to you and the people of South Sudan.

The Government of the United Kingdom, Norway, and Wilton Park are organising a "Leaders Retreat" for the Leaders of the Republic of South Sudan. Accordingly, they have requested me to convene the Leaders Retreat as the Guarantor to the Peace Process.

The Leaders Retreat will help us discuss and resolve the critical outstanding challenges impeding the implementation of the Peace Process.

I, therefore, take this opportunity to invite you to attend in person, the Leaders Retreat that will take place from 3rd to 4th March, 2022 at the Commonwealth Speke Resort Munyonyo, Kampala.

I look forward to receiving you in Kampala.

While wishing you a Prosperous New Year, please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

PO/11

10th February, 2022

Her Excellency Madam Rebecca Nyandeng De Mabior
**VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN FOR
YOUTH AND GENDER CLUSTER**

Annex XVIII: Joint Communiqué on the Visit of H.E. Abdel Fattah Al Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereign Council of Sudan, 18 March 2022



Joint Communiqué on the Visit of H.E. Abdel Fattah Al Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereign Council of Sudan to the Republic of South Sudan

1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan have the honor of issuing this joint communiqué on behalf of their respective Heads of State, H.E. President Salva Kiir Mayardit and H.E. President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, after their meeting in Juba on March 18th, 2022 concerning regional peace and security.
2. As a guarantor of the South Sudan Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), H.E. President Burhan submitted to President Kiir a proposal for the unification of the necessary unified forces, including the command structure, for the SSPDF, SPLA-IO and SSOA. President Kiir welcomed the proposal as reflecting President Burhan's military acumen and his commitment to lasting peace in South Sudan.
3. With this essential security sector issue agreed upon, the Presidents turned to South Sudan and Sudan's bilateral relations. With peace and security as prerequisites to socio-economic advancements, the Heads of State committed to establishing and extending stability nationally and regionally across the Horn of Africa. They expressly agree to focus on cooperation along the borders of our two independent republics.
4. As a starting point for this cooperation, Presidents Salva Kiir and H.E. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan agreed to set a model of peace through the development of unitized oil fields, including in the Abyei area. They have charged their respective Foreign Ministries to operationalize committees for cross-border development that will elaborate the details of this cooperation to rebuild the historic bridges between our countries.
5. The Presidents take this opportunity to encourage the citizens of South Sudan and Sudan to make our diversities become a source of enrichment and strength for both countries. South Sudan and Sudan will revive the ancient economic, political and cultural cooperation that made our Nile Valley civilizations prosperous as far back as the Kushite Kingdom, which unites our people in a common origin.
6. *Done on the 18th of March 2022, in Juba, South Sudan.*

--- End ---

Annex XIX: Outstanding issues relating to the Rome Negotiations and Agreed Agenda of the Rome Initiative

In Panel interviews with leading opposition figures, several key areas of ongoing disagreement were outlined and identified as obstacles to progressing negotiations with the Government.

1. The nature of the conflict: Disagreement on whether the root cause of the South Sudan conflict is political or ethno-political. SSOMA views the conflict in South Sudan as ethno-political and wishes for it to be described in these terms

2. Borders and boundaries: Disagreement over whether 1 January 1956 Administrative Borders (acknowledged in the 2011 constitution) should be used as the reference to resolve internal border disputes, and over the role of chiefs in resolving land and boundary issues

3. The constitution-making process: Disagreement over who should ratify a new permanent constitution. For SSOMA, the Constitution must be subjected to a popular referendum, while the Government wishes for the Transitional National Legislative Assembly to ratify.

4. Security Arrangements: SSOMA wishes to create a new security sector in South Sudan, drawn from all the 64 tribes. The Government wishes to adhere to article 2.2.1 of the peace agreement for security arrangements.

Agreed future agenda for the Rome Initiative

After convening in Rome, under the auspices of the Community of Sant'Egidio, from 15th to 18th of July 2021, the RTGoNU and the SSOMA Real SPLM and SSOMA SSUF/A, agreed as follows:

First meeting – September 2021

Considering that no military solution can bring lasting peace and stability (DOP 1 and 2) to the country, security sector reform (DOP 12 and 13) will be addressed in order to guarantee security for all and enhance the trust among the parties.

Security sector reform:

1. Organization and restructuring of defense, other organized forces, national security, and law enforcement agencies on non-partisan and non-political basis.
2. Division of tasks and responsibilities among the different defense forces, other organized forces, national security service, and law enforcement agencies.
3. Participation to the transitional security architecture and arrangements.

Political and governance (DOP 3)

1. Coexistence in a multi-ethnic state (DOP 4 and 5).
2. Federalism (National, state, and local governance arrangements and physical arrangements).
3. Referendum for the constitution.
4. Addressing the issue of the social contract between the people and the state.
5. Land issues and land grabbing (DOP 9).

Second Meeting – October 2021

Economic and Social Issues

1. Anti-corruption and accountability system of management of national resources (DOP 8)
2. Impact of oil production and other resources and sustainability.
3. Economic recovery plan, resettlement of refugees and IDPs as a peace dividends.
4. Sharing of oil and other resource revenues (DOP 10).
5. Labor, public service, and social justice.

Justice:

1. Truth and reconciliation commission (DOP 11).

2. Amnesty and Transitional justice.
3. National census and elections.

Third Meeting – November 2021

1. Peace agreement between SSOMA SSUF and Real SPLM with R-TGoNU.
2. Implementation matrix of the agreement
3. Constitutional making process

The Community of Sant'Egidio will propose a roadmap about humanitarian issues during one of the aforementioned three sessions.

Done in Rome, Italy on 18th July 2021

For the RTGoNU



For the SSOMA SSUF/A and Real SPLM



For the Community of Sant'Egidio



Annex XX: Government of South Sudan announces purchase of 150 police vehicles, 21 March 2022



Annex XXI: APCs in possession of SSPDF Tiger Division in Juba, February 2022

Retrieved from video of news broadcast announcing their deployment to Warrap State.





Governor Aleu Ayieny Aleu pictured with APCs in Juba, stating in the interview that they are to be deployed to Warrap, February 2022



Annex XXII: Image of APCs under SSPDF control in Lakes State in December 2021

Sourced from video of news broadcast dated December 2021



Annex XXIII: Tygra Armoured Personnel Carriers

The Panel has not been able to determine where the armoured personnel carriers procured by South Sudan in 2021 and 2022 were sourced from. The Panel has assessed, however, that they most closely resemble the “Tygra” model which has also previously been identified in both Libya¹¹⁵ and Kenya.¹¹⁶

There are some minor variations across the vehicles observed in South Sudan, as well as between these and images supplied by various manufacturers. According to manufacturers, however, there are multiple models of the Tygra, which is developed as a modification of the Toyota Landcruiser chassis.

While some minor variations can be identified, the Panel considers that the APCs observed with the South Sudan National Police Service in Juba (annex XX) and with the SSPDF Tiger Division in Juba (annex XXI) are likely the 2017 or 2018 model, while at least one of the vehicles identified in Lakes State (annex XXII) may be an earlier model.



Original Tygra model , as depicted by one manufacturer



2017 Tygra model, as depicted by one manufacturer

¹¹⁵ UN Panel of Experts on Libya, Final Report, June 2017, (S/2017/466)

¹¹⁶ Defence Web, “Kenyan police acquire Tygra APC,” 17 July 2018:

<https://www.defenceweb.co.za/land/land-land/kenyan-police-acquire-tygra-apc/>



2018 Tygra model, as depicted by one manufacturer

Source: Mezcal Security Vehicles: <https://www.mezcalarmor.com/Armored-Personnel-Carriers/> Images are for reference only, as the Panel has not identified the supplier of the vehicles to South Sudan.

Minor variations can be identified between supplier images and vehicles observed in South Sudan



Vehicles identified in South Sudan

Tygra models as depicted by various manufacturers



Lakes State, South Sudan



Manufacturer image

Annex XXIV: National Intelligence and Security Service (Ethiopia), “NISUC Graduates Senior Members of South Sudan Intelligence Officers”



**NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY SERVICES**

[Welcome](#) [About Us](#) [News](#) [Publication](#) [Youth Zone](#) [Archive](#)

NISUC Graduates Senior Members of South Sudan Intelligence Officers



National Intelligence and Security University College (NISUC) has trained and graduated senior Intelligence officers of South Sudan National Security Service in fields of Intelligence and security .

It is part of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and its South Sudan counterpart the National Security Service (NSS) agreement to collaborate in areas of regional security issues and capacity building disclosed during the graduation ceremony.

Director General of NISS, Temsien Tiruneh speaking at the graduation Ceremony that Ethiopian and South Sudanese Intelligence and Security Services were jointly undertaking activities to exchange information, counter terrorism , control trans boundary crimes , protect illicit financial flows and maintaining the regional peace and security based on previous agreement between two organizations.

According to the Director General, NISS has strengthen its cooperation with different regional, continental and International security and intelligence agencies to jointly avert security threats. The successful accomplishment of the training of south Sudanese National Security members indicates the strong cooperation of both countries, the Director General stated. He also calls South Sudanese graduates to make practical the experience acquired during the training.

The Director General also expresses that exerted efforts has continued to make the National Intelligence and Security University College (NISUC) a center of excellence for Intelligence, security and strategic fields of studies in East Africa and whole African Continent. Other african countries also increase their demand to train officers in NISUC , he underscored.

LATEST NEWS

- NISUC Graduates Senior Members of South Sudan Intelligence Officers
- NISS expresses Readiness to Ensure Peaceful Celebration of New Gov't Inauguration Day
- NISS says it has successfully foil National Security Threats targeting on the Ethiopia
- Intelligence and Security Chief vows to eliminate terrorist groups, their creeds from Ethiopia
- Taskforce Apprehends 57 Suspects for Economic Sabotage, Money Laundering to Support Terrorist TPLF, Shene
- NISS says federal, regional governments team up to neutralize TPLF soon
- Security Agencies commend Stakeholders' Contribution for Peaceful Election
- Intelligence, Security organizations underway consultation and pass different resolutions on Current security situations
- Ethiopia, Russia agree to bolster cooperation in Intelligence, Security Sectors

Annex XXV: Training of South Sudan's National Security Service officers in Ethiopia, February 2022

Director General Temsgen Tiruneh (NISS, Ethiopia) and Director General Akol Koor Kuc (National Security Service, South Sudan)







Annex XXVI: Amendment to Agreement on oil and related economic matters between the Republic of South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan, dated 26 December 2016

2. Article 4.4.1 of the Original Agreement shall be amended to read as follows:

The GoRSS shall transfer to the GoS a finite sum of three billion and twenty eight million United States Dollars (USD 3.028 Billion) as a transitional financial arrangement (TFA) which the GoRSS will pay in accordance with the payment procedures in Article 5 of the Original Agreement on Oil and Related Economic Matters on the basis of a rate of fifteen United States Dollars per barrel (USD 15.00/bbl). However,

Page 1 of 2

If the actual sale price of Nile Blend or Dar Blend Crude Oil FOB Port Sudan in any month ranges from USD 20 to USD 30 per barrel then GoRSS shall pay USD 6 per barrel;

If the actual sale price of Nile Blend or Dar Blend Crude Oil FOB Port Sudan in any month is more than USD 30 and up to USD 40 per barrel then GoRSS shall pay USD 9 per barrel;

If the actual sales price of Nile Blend or Dar Blend Crude Oil FOB Port Sudan in any month is more than USD 40 and up to USD 50 per barrel then GoRSS shall pay USD 10.50 per barrel;

If the actual sales price of Nile Blend or Dar Blend FOB Port Sudan in any month is more than USD 50 per barrel, then GoRSS shall pay USD 15 per barrel;

Annex XXVII: Press Statement by H.E. President Salva Kiir, 28 March 2022



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
The President

PRESS STATEMENT

Delivered at Government Secretariat Juba, South Sudan - 28/03/2022

Ladies and gentlemen of the Press

Good afternoon:

I come before you today to affirm my government commitment to peace in our country. In many of my public remarks, I have pledged that I would not deliberately return this country to war and I remain committed to this pledge.

That said, there are challenges we need to confront honestly as a people along with our partners to maintain total peace and bring prosperity to our people.

One challenge that has paralysed our progress is the negative narrative cultivated during the war about the Government. This same negative narrative has depicted many senior government officials in bad light. For those who followed events in our country, they know that this narrative has external dimension, but it is mostly rooted in our internal political competition, which was and still driven by personal ambition that does not factor the best interest of the country into consideration.

We are all aware that in the period between 2013 and 2016, many atrocities were committed by both sides in the war. These unfortunate events were investigated by eminent personalities like President Obasanjo who submitted his report to the African Union. His report found allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Within the country, Justice John Wol Makech and his team also

The President

investigated this dark chapter in our country and came up with the report that contradicted some of President Obasanjo's findings.

Not only that, this situation inflamed by several individuals wrote books on the issue of atrocities committed during the war in our country. While we cannot entirely deny that crimes were committed to some extent, majority of the books in circulation today contain unreliable information that we know is being used when discussing South Sudan.

Ladies and Gentleman of the Press,

I am aware of the fact that for our country to move forward, we as the people must confront what took place during the war by telling the truth about it. That is the reason why I directed the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs in my New Year's address to establish the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing as stipulated in the Revitalized Peace Agreement. The establishment of Truth and Reconciliation is also demanded by our National Human Rights Commission.

The objective of this Truth and Reconciliation Commission is to receive and document complains and eyewitness reports of the victims of the tragic events in both 2013 and 2016.

Personally, it is in my best interest for the people of South Sudan, especially the victims, to know exactly what took place during those two unfortunate events. Having said this, I would like to state that we are aware of, and acknowledge the views of those who see the establishment of Hybrid Court for South Sudan as the priority. However, we also strongly believe prioritizing punitive justice will take away from the goal of reconciliation, which is what is needed the most in our country.

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Press,

The President

The Government do not deny, minimize or shy away from prosecuting those who committed crimes. We have demonstrated this through our actions. We have prosecuted people and imposed considerable prison sentences to those who were found guilty, including our own soldiers.

I am also mindful that what we have done and the position we have taken on issues related to human rights violations are not shared by some of our partners. At times, this creates a situation where our views are misrepresented in the reports compiled by them. This situation cannot serve the interest of the victims who suffer the atrocities, if any, it politicizes their victimhood. For us as the Government, we believe that more can be achieved if we can work collectively with our partners to strengthen the capacity of our institutions. We do not believe that it is helpful for each party to work independently.

Providing capacity building and technical assistance locally in areas related to human rights protection for example, can go a long way in improving the situation. This path can deliver more results than the current reports written independently by our partners and circulated internationally with the sole goal of applying pressure on the Government. The Government is open to genuine partnership that addresses real challenges, but it equally objects to any attempt to undermine its work by those who choose to operate outside established institutions.

With all we are going through, real cooperation with our partners is an ideal path for us. For instance, we are faced with prevailing insecurity in certain parts of the country, driven mostly by cattle-rustling, inter-communal violence, flooding, food security issues induced by climate change. These are areas where we can collaborate to achieve desired results for the people. We also need this real partnership in the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement, which we are committed to implement despite the challenges we face.

Ladies and gentleman of the press,

The Revitalized Peace Agreement we are implementing is an ambitious document. This fact is often discounted by those who think it should be implemented overnight. The full implementation of this agreement cannot be done without having a sustained dialogue among the parties. In the process of dialogue, we as parties to the agreement at times hit minor bumps on the road.

In light of this, I would like our people to consider the recent SPLM-IO Political Bureau Resolution that came out from its meeting held on 11-14 of March 2022, and other communications they have shared with the public as part of sustained dialogue I just mentioned. These kinds of conflicting positions are expected in the implementation of a complex Agreement like ours. To ensure that no one panics from these, I am assuring you that the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement is on track. We all consider this Agreement as the path to our stability and I am committed to working with our partners to implement it.

For the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement to be genuine, we need transparency on the root causes of the conflict. It is for this reason that I am directing the National Security Service and its partner, the BRL Law Firm to declassify all information about the conflict's genesis in their possession (intercepts, audios and personal accounts).


This is very important so that the people of South Sudan know the truth and judge for themselves from the position of this knowledge. We must say the truth, because genuine reconciliation has its basis on it. This will also support the process of healing in our country.

Having said that, I need to state clearly that those who may be implicated by the declassified information that is going to be released are guaranteed presidential

pardon. So, there is no cause for alarm over this. All we are interested in is for the public to know the truth about the background of the conflict in our country.

I hope after the release of this information, we can all move forward with permanent peace building that will create harmony and prosperity in our country. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen of the press.

I am going to take 2 or 3 questions before we end this session.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Kiir', with a large, stylized flourish above it.

Salva Kiir Mayardit
President,
Republic of South Sudan
Juba, South

Annex XXVIII: Companies known to have purchased cargoes of South Sudanese crude oil

Source: Marketing Reports produced by the Ministry of Petroleum of the Republic of South Sudan; correspondence with trading companies; and other confidential documents

		shutdown/no data									
	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22 (partial)
China Oil	15		9	3	2						
Unipet	15		19	39	8				1		
Vitol	8		5	3					1		
PetroNile	4										
Arcadia	1		3								
Tri-Ocean	1										
Glencore			5	3	2			7			
Trafigura			4	5	6	8	3		1		
Zhenhua Oil			1								
Petrodiamond				1							
Sahara Energy								7	5		3
BB Energy							3	2	4	8	2
Litasco									4		1
Addax					2	4			1	1	4
NASDEC									2	1	
Trinity									8	2	1
EuroAmerican										2	
Pacific Petroleum											1

Annex XXIX: Response of Angelo Davido (via interpreter) to Panel, further to allegations in paragraphs 52

**Tambura County
Western Equatoria State
South Sudan**

22nd March 2022

To: David Biggs
Senior Committee Secretary,
Security Council Committee Established
Pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015)
Concerning South Sudan

From: Angelo Davido
The former Head of armed youth formed to
Protect community from forces loyal to Paramount chief and
James Nando

Introduction

Angelo Davido is my name and I am hailed from Azande Community, I am a farmer and a former member of the Arrow boy vigilante group that was formed in 2007 to protect our community from LRA atrocities. Since the defeat of the LRA, I have been engaged in farming, hunting, and honey harvesting to earn living. In January 2020, Tambura Paramount Chief and the current Tambura County Commissioner Hon Mathew Mabenge convened a meeting at the paramount chief house I was in attendance of the meeting. The agenda was to form an armed group made up of brave Azande youth with the intention to mobilize resources through robbery to strengthen the capacity of the Azande community and to one day drive out the Balanda ethnic group from Western Equatoria State.

When I refused to be part of the project citing how Azande and Balanda have lived for many years and have intermarried, they started to target me and my family and subsequently my house was attacked twice between April 2021 to July 2021, they killed my son, my goats and shop looted, they destroyed my honey stored in drums, burnt down my houses as well as of those close to me, all these happened when I was for a hunting and honey harvest mission. When I came from hunting expedition, I mobilized the youth in Sanakpuro Boma and the affected Bomas like Bazande, Bangaru, and Nabiama to protect the community from the aggressive actions of the armed youth loyal to Tambura Paramount Chief and Nando forces.



The conflict in Tambura is caused by the Avungara Azande ruling clan who are the minority but very influential as they control all affairs of Tambura County. My refusal to support their ideas as well as other sections of the Azande community being marginalized by the Avungara loyal clan precipitated the conflict targeting those of us who refused to be part of their project. So, this is how I became the leader of the armed youth and we only engaged in fighting with the forces of Nando and Paramount chief and never targeted civilians. Nando and Paramount chief forces were in civilian dresses and those who lost their lives were seen and counted as civilians, meanwhile, all civilians were displaced before the various attacks and were all hosted at Ministerial Complex, UNMISS camp, St. Mary Catholic Church, and Tambura SSPDF Barracks as well as those we sheltered at our base in Nabiama.

Responses to the enquiry demanded

	Enquiry	Response
1	An attack and burning of the house of an Azande chief in Tambura in July 2021	On the 17 th July 2021, the armed youth loyal to Tambura Paramount Chief, Mr. Mboribamu Baabe Renzi and James Nando attacked Sanakpuro Boma for the second time. Sanakpuro Boma is where, I am hailed from. After the attackers burnt down houses, looted food items and destroyed civilians source of livelihood before they fled the scene, I decided to mobilize youth in the area to persuade the attackers, only to find that the attackers camped at the paramount chief palace with the looted items they looted from Sanakpuro Boma, upon seeing us they immediately begun to exchange fire and the withdrew and ran in disarray from the Paramount chief house. The angry youth started to burn down grass thatched houses on the compound of the Paramount Chief
2	Fighting, on 6 September 2021 near the Ministerial Complex in Tambura, which lead to at least 18 civilian deaths and significant displacement	The fighting near Ministerial Complex in Tambura was an attack on joint forces of Maj Gen James Nando and the armed youth loyal to Tambura Paramount Chief Mr. Mboribamu Baabe Renzi who



		<p>camped at Renzi Primary School and Nando with his deputy Brigadier Justin Binzei were staying at Jemma Nunu's house. The reported 18 civilians to have been killed in the attack is untrue. The Attack was as the result of Nando and paramount chief forces targeted burning of houses and killing of civilians based on their ethnic background on the 2nd and 4th of September at Sananguse and Zangia respectively. Those killed in the fighting near Ministerial Complex were members from the forces of Nando and Paramount Chief not civilians. Civilians were hosted in the Ministerial Complex which was well secured with fence and those killed from that fighting from both sides were killed outside the fence. All our forces that engaged in Tambura violent conflict were in civilian clothes.</p>
3	<p>Fighting, on 21 September 2021, with forces under the command of SSPDF General James Nando, leading to at least five civilian casualties</p>	<p>The fighting that occurred on the 21st September 2021 was the last fighting between our armed youth and the joint forces of Nando and paramount chief, on that day Nando forces went to Andaya Bundu residential areas and begun to demolish houses and vandalize people's property based on their ethnic background and affiliation to Balanda ethnic group as well as targeting civilians in the IDPs camp based on their ethnic background. This act compelled us to engage them to cease from destroying peoples' property. It is not true that some civilians were killed, those who were displaced prior to the violent confrontations were living in the IDPs camp unless the said civilians left the IDPs camp and joined the Nando and</p>



		Paramount Chief forces to fight them since all of us fighting were all in civilians' clothes
4	The rape and killing of a young girl, by forces under your command, on 17 June 2021 in Source Yubu	<p>The alleged raping and killing of a young girl by the armed youth loyal to me is untrue. On the 17th June 2021, the joint armed youth loyal to Nando and Paramount Chief left their base from Source Yubu with an intention to go to attack Namutina the SPLA-iO base, reaching Bangaru and Naita Bomas they started to burn down civilians houses and property and looting goats and chickens. On their way back, they fell in our ambush where they incur losses and were scattered, those who proceeded to Source Yubu begun to burn houses indiscriminately, raping, looting and shoot anyone they would see on the road. The armed youth I commanded never targeted civilians based on their ethnic background unlike Nando and Paramount Chief forces that could not spare any Balanda and their associates as well as some of Azande who did not support the fight. I am hailed from Azande community and many Azande and Balanda took shelter in my area Nabiamma and were being protected by my armed youth. The armed youth under my command never targeted civilians at all and were from both Balanda and Azande who do not support the idea by the Avungara of driving out the Balanda from Tambura.</p>

Angelo Davido 
Tambura County
Western Equatoria State - South Sudan

Annex XXX: Response of Patrick Zamoi to Panel, further to allegations in paragraph 50

Date: 5th April, 2022

Coordinator Michael Gibb
Panel of Expert on South Sudan
Extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2577 (2021)

Dear Coordinator,

Reference is made to your letter dated 23rd/ March, 2022 with Reference: **S/AC.57/2022/PE/OC.27** highlighting about Resolution 2428 (2018) and most recently renewed by resolution 2577 (2021) mandating the Panel to report on the conflict in South Sudan, including by providing information on individuals "responsible for or complicit in, or have engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan" or "have the purpose or effect of expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan." Hence recommending, I confirm and clarify the circumstances of allegations surrounding my name mentioned in the report of Panel of Experts on South Sudan.

I Patrick Raphael Zamoi was the First Governor appointed to establish an infant Western Equatoria State during the time of the CPA (comprehensive Peace Agreement) of 2005 to 2006, and was appointed in 2015 as Governor of WES before States were split into 28 giving birth to Gbudue State where I also served as the first Governor and eventually came the creation of Tambura State where I was assigned to establish the infant State from scratch before the dissolution and reverting back to 10 States in the early 2020s; I governed within the principle of inclusivity, humanity and respect for the rights of the people of the State in general and did my best to prevent bombardments of citizens.

First and foremost, allow me the latitude to register my appreciations to you the UN Coordinator and your Panel of Experts for invoking the renowned doctrine of Common Law referred to as 'Natural Justice' that emphasizes the principle of fair hearing which I believe aligns with the mandate of the Panel to reach out to the persons alleged to be a party to crimes committed. Right to a Fair Hearing is one of the fundamental rights that are guaranteed by the principles of natural justice, as enshrined in the various UN Conventions and Bill of Rights pertinent to Human Rights. I applaud you and your team of Panel of Experts for this noble gesture of reaching out to me for clarity.

Reading Paragraph four (4) of your letter which puts in the context that *'interviews conducted by the Panel and documents obtained by the Panel indicate that I in the capacity of former Governor of defunct Tambura State played a prominent role in the organized violence and abuses that took place in Tambura since June 2021,'* without making available such documents and the so called interviews conducted is a mockery to good conscience that the Panel of Experts reduced their noble principle of neutrality and engaged itself into buying transactional propaganda peddled by the very curtails whose hands are not clean. Prior to receiving this letter; I was already aware through last year's press briefing by the current Governor of WES, his press secretary and his then Minister of Information-WES to media houses to South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation where the Governor made it categorical that the incoming UN Panel report had settled down on five Azande culprits namely; Jemma Nunu Kumba, Tambura current Commissioner, Tambura Paramount Chief, James Nando and myself, and insinuating clearly that the first phased letters shall be directed to three



individual Azande namely Jemma Nunu Kumba, Tambura Paramount Chief and myself Patrick Raphael Zamoi. So the question lingering in one's mind is *"Is it the Panel of Experts who write press briefing for the State Governor, his press secretary and then Minister of Information while the Governor writes a report for the Panel of Experts?"* On observing the report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan conflict and the usual press briefing of the current Governor; there is no difference and on the contrary the two are consistently similar and this raises the question of impartiality on the part of the Panel as the Mischief of bias is clearly demonstrated, and this therefore; entails that the Panel of Experts obtained its report more probably from UNMISS who favors the SPLM-IO as was reported by the British lawyer STEVEN KAY, QC on the evidence of 2013 attempted coup during his press conference in Juba on 1st April 2022. UNMISS has never been impartial in the conflict of South Sudan and this without doubt include the unfortunate events that occurred and continue to occur in Tambura where UNMISS one time back decided unilaterally to withdraw its protection forces from Mabilia and Ezo leaving the ground open for SPLM IO to commit the atrocities in Tambura.

Allow me to remind the Panel of Experts on South Sudan that in February 2020, the President of the Republic of South Sudan reverted 32 defunct States back to the original 10 States and recalled all 32 Governors with me inclusive; and this gesture was done in the spirit of implementing the revitalized peace agreement of 2018, ever since that time I have not had any assignment. Tambura was plunged into turmoil in June 2021 during the regime of IO Governor who should be held accountable not the other way round unless the Panel of Experts on South Sudan has taken side as clearly portrayed by the current Governor in his usual press briefing who happened to have full knowledge and knew the content of the report as early as last year before the report was released officially. How would the Panel of Experts' report categorize my involvement as prominent? This report is a syndicate of falsehood and conspiracy of propaganda choreographed by networks that are obvious against truce and justice. It sounds very unfortunate of the noble mandate of the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan to believe in propaganda which in a good conscience view is clear sign of nurturing impunity and using propaganda as the basic foundation upon which the Panel's report evolve. I did not take direct, indirect or prominent part in the massacre that happened under a different regime who happens to be head of security at state level.

Paragraph five of your (5) letter used the term "alleged" as opposed to paragraph four which used the term "prominent" that on *'13th April 2019, while I was the Governor of the defunct Tambura State, four Balanda men were killed on my order at my residence.'* This grave allegation indicates that the Panel of Experts' on South Sudan unfortunately relied on Eye Radio as its' bases of developing credible and verifiable report instead of going beyond relying on the Eye Radio but the reverse which some of personnel in Panel of Experts' seem to be struggling to accept as fact is that there was an attempted assassination on my life in my own residence by a senior officer with the rank of a Colonel who entered with loaded AK47 and started shooting to my direction though my guards wanted to repulse this renegade Colonel, I made sure he wasn't shot at, UNMISS Officials came and took photographs of the aftermath bullet holes on the wall of my residence and subsequently this renegade Colonel was detained by the National Security service for interrogation; how does this reality get twisted with propaganda translating to killing four balanda men on my order at my residence? The Panel of Expert on South Sudan should have undertaken more research to enrich their report by probably conducting interviews with State established bodies such as the Criminal



Investigation Department (CID), National Security (NS) besides engaging the mobile high court Judge, inquiring with sobriety from this doubting agent UNMISS or even availing the soldier or soldiers to whom such orders were given for execution of the four Balanda men at my residence! There was no such a thing of ordering the killing of four Balanda men at my residence and that is a complete fallacy.

Additionally, there has never been civilian killed by Government forces in the defunct Tambura State during my tenure in office unless those trapped in confrontation with rebels, rebels activities in the outskirts of the defunct Tambura State became rampant that didn't give chance to the citizens who are predominantly farmers to carry out their routine agricultural farming activities and sometimes these rebels committed numerous abuses against the citizens such as rape, looting and killings, though as Government mandated to protect its citizens, before most of confrontation we used to call upon CTSAMM (Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism) to pass messages to the rebels to evacuate and retreat to their bases; but when such calls were not adhered to by the rebels there were operational confrontations of the government forces and that of rebels that resulted into inflicting number of casualties on either sides, if the names mentioned in the letter were the victims of such confrontations, then the Panel of Expert on South Sudan were in hurry with the report it would have gone further to enrich and establish if indeed these persons whose names mentioned in the letter were civilians or rebels. On our side of Government, the Government force too had casualties but we didn't go on publishing names because we understand the rule of engagement in confrontational operations against enemies.

It's obvious that the Panel source of information is one sided and does not reflect any neutrality as demanded of it and has failed dismally to benefit from obtaining information from all sides because of bias and favoritism. The resolution establishing the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan conflict was seen as a blessing to advancing the rights of two categories of victims therefore; the ones whose lives were/unfortunately destroyed and those accused as a result of propaganda, an institution that was entirely conceived and founded on the basis of equality, neutrality shouldn't be seen relying and reproducing some of write-ups appearing in its report is that of political opponents' propaganda write ups once tabled before the National Dialogue Commission for scrutiny. Fiction and propaganda shouldn't be the material evidence in criminal or legal proceedings for accusation and selective persecution.



Hon. Patrick Raphael Zamoi
Former Governor

Cc: President of the Republic of South Sudan;
Cc: Ministry of Justice & Constitutional Affairs;
Cc: Chief of Staff -SSPDF

Annex XXXI: Response of Jemma Nunu Kumba to Panel, further to allegations in paragraph 54

**Republic of South Sudan
Transitional National Legislative Assembly
Office of the Speaker**

11th April, 2022

Mr. David Biggs
Senior Committee Secretary,
Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution
2206 (2015) Concerning South Sudan
United Nations Headquarters
New York, USA

Dear Mr. Biggs,

Subject: Response to the Questions from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan.

It is my utmost pleasure to write to you concerning your questions on the crises in Tombura, Western Equatoria State. I wish to express my gratitude to the Panel of Experts on South Sudan for having given me the opportunity to present my perspective in relation to the allegations. I believe in sustainable Peace and security in my beloved Country South Sudan since peace is a fundamental public good that can benefit both the ruled and the rulers. In light of this I believe it is in the interest of everyone that local communities should coexist in peaceful environment, for the country to prosper. As one of the leaders of the country, it is my responsibility to uphold the above statement.

Please find below my responses to your questions:

Question One.

I have no knowledge what so ever that Gen. James Nando was accommodated in any of my property in Tombura and I am hearing this for the first time. My house in Tombura was being taken care of by a lady who has been a caretaker of the house during my absence for the purposes of keeping it clean. On receipt of your letter, I reached out to the lady to establish the facts related to your questions. According to her "She has no recollection of accommodating Gen. James Nando in the property". She further stated that, "she fled the house for safety in the UN Protection Camp in late August 2021 when rival clashes intensified and the area became unsafe for her to live in". She returned only when the situation became calm. She also reported to me that, during the conflict period the whole area was deserted due to insecurity. All the reports from UNMISS, JDB, IGAD, Faith based group confirmed that Gen. James Nando stayed with his forces at Renzi Primary School. I have also reached out to Gen. James Nando to conform this allegation but he said he never stayed in my house.

Question Two.

In regards to the details about the nature of the alleged meetings that took place in my property between Gen. James Nando, Commissioner Mathew Mabenge and Chief Mboribamu Baabe Renzi, I wish to inform the panel that, the last time I was in Tombura was in June, 2021 when I headed a high level delegation to Tombura as directed by the President to attain to the conflict with the aim of resolving the problem. Therefore, I am not aware of such meetings or its nature. Again, the caretaker of my property has further reported that, 'Gen. James Nando, Commissioner Mabenge and Chief Mboribamu never held any meeting in the house. Since she has been in control of the property and that the area was deserted.

Question Three:

In terms of the alleged material and financial support to a group called Community Patriotic Front, this has come to me as a real surprise. I have no knowledge of such group of its existence. Therefore, I have not supported such group in any form.

Note:

Please allow me to express my concerns and views on these serious allegations in the report associating me with incitement and financial supports to the group of Community Patriotic Front. I have taken these allegations seriously and would wish to understand more how these were associated with my personality. I am always known in the country as Peace loving leader, and this has taken not only me but the country by surprise. Please note that, I was once a governor of Western Equatoria State and during my tenure as state governor, the communities coexisted peacefully. I feel this issue is a witch-hunt and politically motivated with the aim to tarnish my image and reputation as one of the few female leaders at the apex of the leadership of the Country. I also know very well that, my society as well as the global community is highly patriarchal, hence the related chauvinistic attitude will always come to play against any woman who rises to power as this poses great challenge to the male folks. So I am not surprised such concocted allegations are labeled against me.

Incitement by nature refers to an act that encourages another person or group to commit a criminal offence, which could be through hate speeches advocating for violence. I would be pleased if the Security Council Panel of Experts would present some incidences that I have been quoted inciting a group against another one particularly in the case of Tombura to substantiate these malicious claims.

I take these allegations very seriously because they are meant to tarnish my reputation as a female leader in the Country and coerce me into submission. And I also believe the principle of Access to Justice does not segregate but is a right for all. So, I wonder why these allegations were not shared with me to hear my reactions to them or not shared with the national government before they were presented to the Security Council. It is also interesting to note that, the report is partly base on the public statement made by the governor without considering that, the Governor Alfred Futuyo of Western Equatoria himself is a Balanda and an SPLM-IO whose impartiality in the conflict is questionable. Hence, the credibility of the report is also questionable.

In view of this, I request that, members of the Security Council Panel of Experts on South Sudan could consider a face to face meeting with me so to have more

clarifications on those claims in order that all of us including the public at large have a better understanding of the claims.

In conclusion, I urge the, the Panel of Experts to carry out their work with utmost honesty and impartiality. This is for the best interest of the Country and for the reputation of the Security Council. Once again, I am grateful to have this communication with the Security Council Panel of Experts on South Sudan and I look forward to more engagement with the Panel whenever need arises.

Thank you and please accept the assurance of my highest regards



Right Honorable Jemima Nunu Kumba
Speaker,
Transitional National Legislative Assembly
Republic of South Sudan, Juba

Cc: President-Republic of South Sudan
Cc: Minister of Justice & Constitutional Affairs
Cc: File