



Security Council

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Situation in Mali

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2019 and requested me to report on a quarterly basis on its implementation, focusing on progress in taking forward the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and the efforts of MINUSMA to support it.

2. In the statement by the President of the Security Council dated 3 April 2019 ([S/PRST/2019/2](#)), the Council requested me to include in the present report recommendations on concrete measures in three priority areas, including the completion of a constitutional reform following an inclusive and collaborative process, the adoption of a comprehensive plan for the effective redeployment of reconstituted and reformed Malian defence and security forces to northern Mali and the establishment of the northern economic development zone, to be fulfilled by the Malian parties during the course of the upcoming mandate of MINUSMA, as well as recommendations on ways to enhance Mission support in central Mali. It also requested me to provide options for a potential significant adaptation of MINUSMA, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness to support the implementation of the Agreement through a greater focus on priority tasks, without jeopardizing the stability of Mali and the Sahel region, its central role in supporting the implementation of the Agreement and its capacity to interact with other security presences that have the potential to be mutually beneficial instruments to restore peace and stability in Mali and the Sahel region, as recognized in Council resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#).

3. The present report contains updates on major developments in Mali since my previous report ([S/2019/262](#)). It also includes recommendations for concrete measures and ways to enhance MINUSMA support in central Mali, as well as options for a potential adaptation of MINUSMA.



II. Major developments and recommendations for concrete measures

A. Major political developments

Major developments

4. On 5 April, an estimated 15,000 people demonstrated in Bamako against the alleged mismanagement by the Government of Mali of the country's affairs and the escalating violence in central Mali. The demonstration took place at the initiative of religious leaders, political opposition parties and civil society organizations representing civil servants and teachers who had been on strike over their working conditions. On 16 April, the President, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, addressed the nation in an effort to defuse tensions. He announced the payment of teachers' salaries and the deployment of additional national security forces to central Mali, and pledged assistance to the victims of the violence.

5. On 17 April, the president of the parliamentary group of the ruling party, the Rassemblement pour le Mali, together with political opposition parties, presented a non-confidence motion against the Government. On 18 April, in view of a vote on the motion, the Prime Minister, Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga, tendered his resignation and that of his Government to President Keita.

6. On 22 April, President Keita appointed Boubou Cissé, former Minister of Economy and Finance, as his new Prime Minister and tasked him with forming a new, inclusive Government, following consultations with both the ruling coalition and opposition parties. On 2 May, Prime Minister Cissé signed a political agreement with representatives of several opposition parties. The agreement sets out the parameters for the participation of the opposition parties and civil society groups in the new Cabinet. It contains calls for the holding of an inclusive political dialogue to discuss, among other issues, the revision of the Constitution and a reaffirmation of its signatories' commitment to implementing the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. Soumaïla Cissé, the leader of the opposition, chose not to sign the political agreement.

7. On 5 May, the spokesperson for President Keita announced the formation of a new Government, which comprises 38 ministers, including 9 women. The previous Cabinet was composed of 32 ministers, including 11 women. A total of 18 ministers are from the presidential majority, 3 from the political opposition, 7 from civil society groups and 10 are technocrats. The announcement of the Government prompted mixed reactions. The ruling majority and the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad welcomed its formation, while opposition leader Cissé criticized the large number of ministers, arguing that this would add an unnecessary burden to public finances. Women leaders deplored the decrease in women's representation.

Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

8. Political developments during the reporting period, notably the resignation of the Government, slowed down the implementation of the Agreement. The Agreement Monitoring Committee held two sessions, on 18 March and 15 April. Little progress was made on enhancing women's participation in the peace process.

Extension of State authority

9. Since my previous report, the percentage of civil administrators present at their duty stations in northern and central Mali increased marginally, from 29 to 31 per cent, notwithstanding the issuance, on 2 April, of an executive order by the Prime

Minister instructing civil servants appointed to the North and the Centre to redeploy to their relevant duty stations by 30 April.

10. The number of national security forces deployed to the Centre and the North of Mali increased from 3,122 to 3,207. In Mopti region, their presence increased by 50 national guards. In addition, 35 additional police personnel were deployed to Gao region.

11. Regarding the operationalization of district-level interim administrations, a total of \$1.2 million was allocated to the 21 councils installed to support the development of their priority action plans. On 27 March, President Keita signed a decree defining the modalities for the progressive transfer of competencies, including human and financial resources, to regional, *cercle* and municipal councils. This is expected to help to meet the allocation of 30 per cent of the State's budgetary revenue to the territorial collectivities, as stipulated in the Agreement.

Recommendations for concrete measures: constitutional review

12. With regard to the constitutional review, the committee of experts concluded its work and submitted the draft proposal for amendments to the Constitution to President Keita on 1 April. The creation of the committee and a national consultative framework in January provided for both the technical expertise and capacity to analyse previous texts and to ensure that the provisions of the Agreement would be taken into account in the revised draft, as well as a forum in which to consult with a broad range of stakeholders and to ensure the inclusivity of the constitutional review process. The Government also heeded calls by major opposition leaders and decided to restructure the framework to include all 280 political parties in Mali. Various opposition groups, however, continued to boycott consultations.

13. In separate meetings with political parties and civil society organizations, President Keita discussed the proposed amendments, which include the creation of a senate and a court of auditors. The Front pour la sauvegarde de la démocratie, a coalition led by opposition leader Cissé, and the Coalition des forces patriotiques boycotted the meeting with the President.

14. On 16 April, President Keita announced that, in response to calls for a more in-depth debate on the constitutional reform process, national consultations with political and social stakeholders would be held from 23 to 28 April. The recommendations emanating from those consultations would be reflected in the draft proposal for submission to the National Assembly. Following the resignation of the Government on 18 April, the Presidency announced the postponement of the national consultations until further notice.

15. The political agreement signed between key political stakeholders on 2 May sets the framework for an inclusive consultative process on the new Constitution. The completion of the constitutional review should be the immediate priority of the Government, with a view to submitting a consulted draft proposal to the National Assembly as soon as feasible. This will also require an extension of legislators' current mandate, which expires on 30 June.

16. The Government of Mali, the signatory armed groups, the political opposition and civil society should be urged to take concrete measures referenced in the road map for priority benchmarks to be attained, in order to:

- **Complete the constitutional reform through the holding of a nationwide referendum and the promulgation of a revised Constitution reflecting the institutional reforms envisioned in the Agreement following an inclusive consultation process, with the full involvement of the Government, signatory armed groups, the political opposition and civil society.**

B. Major security developments

17. The security situation remained volatile in northern Mali and continued to deteriorate in central Mali and the Koulikoro region.

18. In the Centre, violence across community lines escalated, and clashes between the Dogon and Fulani communities, exacerbated by the presence of extremist groups, resulted in the death of a large number of civilians, including at least 157 who were killed during the massacre of 23 March in Ogossagou, Mopti region.

19. In the North, the security situation in Gao and Ménaka regions was marked by violent incidents targeting local communities, increased acts of banditry, targeted assassinations of signatory and non-signatory armed group members, and attacks on Malian defence and security forces and MINUSMA. On 4 May, tensions between members of the Dawsahak community affiliated with the Mouvement pour le salut de l'Azawad and the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad in Talataye, Gao region, degenerated into violent confrontations. The number of casualties could not be confirmed because both groups issued conflicting statements. The Mission used its good offices to prevent a further escalation. Hostilities resumed between the armed movements on 12 May in Ouellene, outside Talataye, leading to the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad taking control of parts of Talataye.

Asymmetric and other attacks

20. During the period under review, northern Mali recorded the highest number of asymmetric attacks by terrorist groups (34 of 59), but the most lethal attacks took place in the Centre.

21. In the North, attacks took place throughout the regions, including in Gao (15), Timbuktu (11), Ménaka (4) and Kidal (4). By contrast, in the Centre, asymmetric attacks were concentrated in Mopti region (24).

22. Malian defence and security forces remained the primary targets and victims of attacks by terrorist groups. During the period under review, they were the target of 35 attacks, in which 67 soldiers were killed and 51 injured, an increase compared with 37 killed and 47 injured during the previous reporting period. Attacks against the Malian defence and security forces were heavily concentrated in Mopti (20), followed by Timbuktu (8), Gao (4), Ménaka (2) and Koulikoro (1). The complex attack of 17 March against Malian armed forces in Dioura, Mopti region, was the deadliest, with 26 soldiers killed. In an attack against a Malian defence and security forces outpost in Guiré, Koulikoro region, on 21 April, 11 soldiers lost their lives. A total of 12 attacks targeted MINUSMA, 11 targeted signatory armed groups and 1 targeted international forces.

23. During the reporting period, 4 peacekeepers died and 12 were injured, compared with 17 killed and 40 injured during the previous reporting period. In Gao and Ménaka, 43 signatory armed group members were killed and 17 injured.

24. A total of 49 incidents involving the use of improvised explosive devices were recorded, of which 36 incidents (73 per cent) occurred in central Mali. Explosive threat mitigation training for MINUSMA peacekeepers has continued to mitigate the threat, in line with the action plan to improve the security of peacekeepers. (An update on explosive threat mitigation training for MINUSMA personnel is provided in paragraph 62.)

25. In response to the rapidly evolving threat environment, the Mission reprioritized assets, freeing resources for patrolling and enhancing the Mission force's mobility, adaptability and reactivity. The Mission increased the number of patrols by 129 per

cent between October 2018 and February 2019, compared with between October 2017 and February 2018. Only 25 to 30 per cent of the MINUSMA force was assigned to units conducting force protection. The combat convoy companies (totalling 1,000 personnel) are not counted as part of force protection personnel, although these units are focused on escorting and securing MINUSMA convoys.

26. MINUSMA further enhanced efforts to prepare for, respond to and repel attacks on its bases and convoys. As outlined in my previous report (S/2019/262) and as demonstrated during a complex attack on its camp in Aguelhok on 20 January, MINUSMA has significantly increased its capacity to robustly repel attackers, who, in this case, greatly outnumbered MINUSMA peacekeepers. Important efforts were undertaken to address equipment shortfalls (see para. 67) and to enhance coordination with other security presences operating in Mali.

Situation in the Centre/protection of civilians

27. The central region of Mali, where an estimated 30 per cent of the country's 20 million population lives, continued to record the highest number of attacks against civilians and civilian casualties, owing to a further increase in intercommunal clashes and violence, as well as attacks by terrorist groups and self-defence militias. Violence across community lines occurred primarily in Koro and Bankass districts, Mopti region, between the Dogon and Fulani communities, and in Djenne district, Mopti region, between Fulani and Bambara communities.

28. Northern Mali also recorded a deterioration of security, owing mainly to banditry and the activities of terrorist groups and signatory armed groups, mostly in the districts of Gourma-Rharous, Ansongo and Ménaka, in Timbuktu, Gao and Ménaka regions, respectively.

29. Overall, there were 245 incidents in which 333 civilians were killed and 175 injured, as well as 145 reported abductions of civilians, compared with the previous period, which registered 267 incidents, 225 civilian fatalities and 149 injuries. During the reporting period, 10 explosive incidents killed 11 civilians and injured 26 others in the central regions.

30. The raid of 23 March on Ogossagou village, Bankass district, Mopti region, was the deadliest incident since 2012. A group of armed men, allegedly mainly composed of traditional hunters known as Dozos, killed at least 157 members of the Fulani community, including 46 children, injured 65 other civilians and burned 95 per cent of the village. MINUSMA, in coordination with the national armed forces to stabilize the security situation, immediately responded, resulting in the launch of Operation Oryx (see para. 33). On 24 March, President Keita convened an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers, which issued a decree announcing the dismissal of the army Chief of Staff and the dissolution of the Dozo self-defence group Dan Na Ambassagou, presumed to be connected to the attack. The group refused to disband, citing the ongoing insecurity, while others called for the dissolution of all militia and self-defence groups in the region. The prosecutor of Mopti opened an investigation into the incident, which is being carried out with MINUSMA support.

31. On 2 May, the Mission presented the conclusions of its special human rights investigation in Ogossagou to the Minister of Justice, who reported on the arrest of 10 suspects and the opening of a criminal investigation before the Specialized Judicial Unit to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime. MINUSMA provided technical support to the criminal chain entities throughout the country, including on issues specific to violence across community lines in Mopti region.

32. On 30 March, the Government launched Operation Kapigdou, which is aimed at restoring stability and deterring violence in the Bankass and Koro districts of Mopti

region, which includes joint cross-border operations with armed forces from Burkina Faso. On 11 April, Burkinabé counter-terrorist units and Malian defence and security forces apprehended 24 presumed terrorists. Malian armed forces and international forces conducted a joint operation in the Liptako-Gourma region from 11 to 16 April, with the objective of maintaining pressure on armed terrorist groups. From 7 March to 12 April, Malian defence and security forces, Operation Barkhane and the armed forces of Burkina Faso conducted a joint operation in Gao region, with the purpose of detecting and neutralizing terrorist groups and their bases.

33. In response to the deteriorating security situation in the Centre, on 30 March, MINUSMA launched Operation Oryx to provide a deterrent presence in Mopti region, which included Mission force and United Nations police activities carried out in coordination with Operation Kapigdou. MINUSMA is focusing on Bankass, Bandiagara and Koro districts, allowing Malian armed forces to concentrate resources closer to the border area.

Combating impunity for crimes that risk destabilizing the peace process

34. MINUSMA intensified its support for government efforts to combat impunity. It initiated an assessment of the judicial response to violence across community lines since 2017 in the Centre, with a view to formulating recommendations for a prosecutorial strategy aimed at increasing criminal accountability. MINUSMA also continued to support the integrated justice and reconciliation project launched in July 2018 in Koro district, Mopti region.

35. Together with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Mission continued to provide technical assistance to the Specialized Judicial Unit against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime, including through training and mentoring for both magistrates and investigators and support for key investigations. A total of 460 cases are being investigated by the Unit, including 207 on terrorism, 47 on transnational organized crime and 206 on general criminal matters.

36. Notwithstanding the volatile security situation that has led to absenteeism and the relocation of some staff, there have been increased efforts to appoint and deploy judicial and prison officials to northern and central Mali, including the regional director of prison administration in Taoudenni.

Measures to support the redeployment of reconstituted and reformed Malian defence and security forces

37. In the light of the complex security situation, the effective redeployment of the reconstituted and reformed Malian defence and security forces to northern Mali is a prerequisite for the establishment and restoration of State authority. Their effective redeployment will serve as a deterrent to the proliferation of terrorist activity and organized crime and the efforts to combat impunity, but it will also facilitate the return of civilian representatives of the Malian State and consequently increase access to basic social services and access to justice.

38. The accelerated disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and integration process that commenced in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in late 2018 constitutes a first step towards the redeployment of the Malian defence and security forces. The process resulted in the registration of 1,423 combatants who now stand to officially join the ranks of the Malian armed forces and, upon the completion of a three-month training exercise, to redeploy to the North. In recent weeks, the process was stalled by disagreements over medical clearances and the fragmentation of the Plateforme armed group, which suspended some of its participation in the catch-up phase of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and integration process until political reconciliation is achieved.

39. From 20 to 30 April, a catch-up phase of the accelerated disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and integration process targeting an additional caseload of some 417 combatants of the Operational Coordination Mechanism occurred in Gao and Timbuktu. To date, 90 and 234 combatants in Gao and Timbuktu, respectively, have been screened and registered, bringing the total to 324 elements. In addition, 400 elements of the Mechanism, who participated in the process in November 2018 but were initially considered medically unfit, began a re-examination exercise in Kidal. A total of 315 elements were registered.

40. In total, 1,662 Operational Coordination Mechanism combatants from the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad, Plateforme and other compliant armed groups, along with 600 Malian soldiers, are now ready to participate in the three-month training exercise supported by the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian armed forces in national training centres in southern Mali. On completion of the training, their redeployment to the North as part of reconstituted Malian armed forces units is envisaged, with the primary task of providing security for phase two of the accelerated disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and integration process. The training has not yet commenced, owing in part to disagreements over who should provide the transport for the Mechanism elements to the South.

41. Since January, 539 former Malian defence and security forces personnel who had deserted have been registered and transferred to three training centres, in Bamako, Markala and Séguéla, to undergo 45 days of training, supported by the European Union military mission, and to formally reintegrate into the Malian defence and security forces.

42. Further steps were taken to address outstanding issues related to army integration and the broader security sector reform process. On 8 April, the Government and signatory armed movements held a high-level meeting to discuss the draft decree defining the modalities of rank allocation, reclassification and command and control for the former combatants of the signatory movements to be integrated into the Malian armed forces and other security institutions. The Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad refused to sign the draft over disagreement with regard to benefits for the families of deserters who had died before reintegration. Several other outstanding issues will need to be clarified, including the overall numbers of former combatants to be integrated into the Malian security and defence forces; the role and composition of the specialized units to combat terrorism; the establishment of a border guard and the territorial police; and the voluntary disarmament process in the Centre, following its suspension after the resignation of the previous Government.

43. In order to move this critical process forward, I propose the measures outlined below, which can be completed within the next year. While MINUSMA and the United Nations as a whole stand ready to provide support, the Government of Mali must assume its share of responsibility, including providing transport to former combatants to training locations. Progress can be made only if all the signatory parties honour their commitments under the Agreement to:

- **Resolve outstanding issues related to the integration and redeployment of at least 2,000 members of the signatory armed groups in the Malian defence and security forces, including through the adoption of a decree defining the harmonization of ranks and quotas and addressing other outstanding integration criteria following an inclusive consultative process with the full engagement and consensus of the Government, signatory armed groups and other relevant stakeholders.**
- **Develop a comprehensive plan for the progressive redeployment of reconstituted and reformed Malian defence and security forces to central**

and northern Mali in a transparent manner, with the full engagement and consensus of the Government, signatory armed groups and other relevant stakeholders as part of a broader national vision for security sector reform, the related action plan and in line with the forthcoming national defence and security policy.

C. Northern economic development zone

44. Ensuring the lasting stabilization of northern Mali is possible only if the return of State authority is coupled with the provision of basic social services and if the local population can benefit from income-generation activities and economic and employment opportunities. The establishment of a northern economic development zone is an important vehicle to accelerate the delivery of peace dividends to disenfranchised and isolated populations in the North. In order to be effective, it must include, among other things, an interregional governance mechanism based on a development strategy and be financed through a specific trust fund or funding vehicle – a sustainable development fund – to which both the Government and the international community would contribute. The establishment of such a zone must be linked to the decentralization and regionalization processes, given that local authorities and regional development agencies would be tasked with overseeing and implementing development programmes in the North. It would also be important to expedite the design of a subnational taxation model to raise revenue at the subnational level to fund social and pro-poor spending.

45. Although progress has been slow in the area of economic development in northern Mali since the signing of the Agreement, in its meeting held on March with the Agreement Monitoring Committee, the Ministry of Planning presented draft legislation for the creation of the northern economic development zone and the sustainable development fund. Agreement was reached with the signatory groups on both texts, which are aligned with other strategy documents, such as the strategic framework for economic recovery and Vision 2040 of the Government, the Sustainable Development Goals and decentralization reform. The draft bill and the decree for the zone have been prepared for submission to the Council of Ministers. I propose the following measures to advance the establishment of the zone:

- **The creation of the northern economic development zone through the adoption of requisite legislation, the operationalization of the sustainable development fund and related inclusive management mechanisms and the implementation of a pilot project to be jointly designed by the Government, signatory armed groups and civil society, with a view to swiftly delivering peace dividends to the population of northern Mali.**

III. Human rights situation

46. The human rights situation remains of serious concern, especially in the Centre and along the borders with Burkina Faso and the Niger. Grave human rights abuses and violations were reported in the context of violence across communal lines, activities by terrorist groups and national counter-terrorist operations.

47. During the reporting period, there were 74 cases of serious human rights violations and abuses involving at least 410 victims, including at least 30 women and 36 children, compared with the 79 cases and 422 victims reported during the previous period. A total of 58 cases occurred in Mopti region, 6 in Gao region, 4 each in Timbuktu and Ségou regions and 2 in Ménaka region.

48. Community self-defence groups active in the Centre were responsible for the highest number of cases of human rights abuses (44). In addition, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims and other terrorist groups claimed responsibility for 15 cases. In Gao, Timbuktu and Ménaka regions, signatory armed groups were responsible for six cases of abuses and the Operational Coordination Mechanism and Mouvement pour le salut de l'Azawad for one each.

49. The Malian defence and security forces were responsible for six cases of human rights violations, including of the extrajudicial execution of three civilians in Intahaka, Gao region, on 24 April, all in the context of counter-terrorism operations in the Gourma area.

50. MINUSMA continued to support the work of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, which, to date, has received almost 12,000 testimonies. The Commission's national investigation team, which became operational on 19 March, has commenced investigations throughout the country.

51. On 22 March, the Ministry for the Promotion of Women, Children and Family adopted the third national action plan for the period 2019–2023 on women and peace and security to promote women's participation in the peace process and governance. MINUSMA supported the establishment of a citizens' observatory in Ségou, Mopti, Gao, Ménaka, Timbuktu and Kidal regions to monitor the implementation of the Agreement.

52. The national task force on monitoring and reporting verified 145 grave violations against 92 children in Mali. Approximately 96 per cent of those violations occurred in Mopti region (84), followed by Kidal (22), Gao (17), Timbuktu (15), Ménaka (4), Bamako (2) and Ségou (1).

IV. Humanitarian situation

53. The operating environment in Mali is becoming increasingly complex and challenging for humanitarian actors, owing to a combination of increasing violence across community lines, crime, denial of humanitarian access involving abductions and threats to humanitarian personnel, restriction of movement, with the presence of improvised explosive devices placed along access routes, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

54. According to the harmonization framework of March 2019, 3.8 million people will be food insecure during the 2019 lean season (June–August) in Ménaka, Gao, Timbuktu and Mopti regions. Approximately 660,000 children will be at risk of global acute malnutrition in 2019 throughout the country. This situation is further compounded by the serious lack of access to safe water (43 per cent) in the areas affected, representing up to 1.3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.

55. As at 7 May, 106,164 people were displaced inside Mali, 58 per cent of whom are children in need of protection. The largest source of displacement is the Centre, with more than 60,000 internally displaced persons in Mopti (45,660) and Ségou (15,201) regions. Mali is also host to 26,567 refugees, including 8,457 from Burkina Faso and 1,024 from the Niger. Spontaneous and facilitated returns have increased from Mbera camp in Mauritania.

56. School closures affect nearly one third of the 421 communes throughout the country. More than 953 schools are closed in the North and Centre, with more than 60 per cent of closed schools in Mopti region. Consequently, more than 250,000 children do not have access to education in the affected regions. As a result of insecurity, 25 per cent of health facilities are not operational in the North.

57. The 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan for Mali received only \$52.5million of the \$296.5 million requested (17.7 per cent funded).

V. Economic situation

58. The macroeconomic outlook remains broadly positive. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth has rebounded to 5 per cent in 2019. Absent supply shocks, inflation should remain below the West African Economic and Monetary Union threshold. The implementation of tax policy and administrative measures would sustain an annual increase in tax revenue by 0.4 percentage points of GDP to help to stabilize the overall fiscal deficit at 3 per cent of GDP. The current account deficit is projected to improve in 2019, notwithstanding a decline in gold export volume and prices, before gradually narrowing to approximately 7 per cent of GDP over the medium term. The poverty rate, however, remains very high, at 47.2 per cent.

VI. Capacities of the Mission

Military

59. As at 15 May, 12,935 military personnel, including 37 military observers, 448 staff officers and 12,450 contingent personnel, were deployed of an authorized 13,289 personnel, including 40 military observers, 486 staff officers and 12,763 contingent personnel. Women accounted for 3.3 per cent of military personnel. With the full deployment of all manoeuvre units, the quick reaction force in Mopti, the special forces company in Timbuktu and all combat convoy companies in Gao and Mopti, MINUSMA is nearing full operational capacity. The Mission, however, is still missing some critical enablers, such as helicopter units, but efforts are ongoing to fill these shortfalls.

Police

60. As at 15 May, 1,738 police personnel were deployed, including 307 individual police officers (18 per cent women), and 1,431 formed police unit personnel (10 per cent women), of an authorized 1,920 police personnel. Efforts are under way to select additional individual police officers with expertise in the areas of forensics, investigations, criminal intelligence, database management and counter-terrorism and serious organized crime.

Civilian personnel

61. As at 15 May, 88 per cent of all MINUSMA civilian staff had been deployed, including 91 per cent of international staff, 84 per cent of United Nations Volunteers and 86 per cent of national staff. Women held 26 per cent of the international posts, 36 per cent of United Nations Volunteer positions and 19 per cent of national staff posts.

Efforts to optimize performance

62. A total of 13 units (of a total of 45) were evaluated on military performance during the period under review. The units evaluated were four infantry units, two force protection units, one intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance unit, two aviation units, two medical units and one engineering unit. All units were assessed to have performed satisfactorily, with the need for manoeuvre units to continue to improve improvised explosive device awareness. With the support of the light coordination mechanism, two Member States deployed a mobile training team each

to five MINUSMA troop-contributing countries to train trainers on operating in an improvised explosive device environment, in line with Mine Action Service standards. In addition, from November 2018 to April 2019, three mobile training teams deployed to Sectors North, East and West to provide additional training on improvised explosive device threat mitigation, first aid, casualty evacuation, medical evacuations and additional topics requested by the troop-contributing countries. In parallel, since the adoption of Security Council resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), the Secretariat has conducted four enhanced pre-deployment visits to validate individual and collective military skills.

Conduct and discipline

63. One allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse was recorded from the beginning of the reporting period to 8 May. MINUSMA continued to implement the strategy to address sexual exploitation and abuse.

64. MINUSMA forces were responsible for one human rights violation case that led to the death of one man. Nine others (one woman, one boy and seven men) were arbitrarily arrested and detained. All nine persons were later released.

Safety and security of United Nations personnel

65. The reinforcement of the security of the 12 MINUSMA camps outside Bamako continued with the installation of counter-rocket/artillery/mortar alert systems. Closed-circuit surveillance systems became operational in Timbuktu camp on 8 April and in Gao camp on 30 May. The construction of the overhead protected accommodation modules in Kidal, Gao, Tessalit, Ménaka and Timbuktu is progressing, with projected completion in all locations by February 2020.

66. A total of 148 MINUSMA personnel have died as a result of malicious acts since the establishment of the Mission in 2013, including four during the period under review. No individual has yet to be convicted in relation to these acts.

67. Chad, Guinea and Togo increased efforts to bridge critical equipment shortfalls and to deploy the outstanding mine-protected vehicles and/or armoured personnel carriers for contingents, which will greatly increase operational effectiveness.

Financial aspects

68. The budget proposal for the maintenance of MINUSMA for the period 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 amounting to \$1,149.8 million gross is currently under review and consideration by the relevant committees. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Mission beyond 30 June 2019, the cost for maintaining MINUSMA until 30 June 2020 would be limited to the amounts approved by the General Assembly.

VII. Options for a potential significant adaptation of the Mission and recommendations to enhance its support in the Centre of Mali

69. As requested by the Security Council, an evaluation of the current prioritization of the objectives of MINUSMA was carried out and options were developed for the adaptation of MINUSMA, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness to support the implementation of the Agreement through a greater focus on priority tasks. The options factor in the dire security situation, including in central Mali, the threat from terrorist groups and the safety and security of United Nations personnel.

70. With regard to the prioritization of the Mission's objectives, MINUSMA support for the implementation of the Agreement remains paramount and should remain the Mission's most important priority. The good offices of MINUSMA and its presence in northern Mali remain essential in preserving the gains made since the signing of the Agreement. Its full implementation is indispensable to stabilizing the situation in the country and the Sahel region and to achieving the redeployment of reconstituted and reformed Malian defence and security forces to northern Mali, which will be a fundamental pillar of the Mission's exit strategy.

71. More effective mandate implementation is contingent upon several critical factors, including the political will of the Government and the signatory armed movements, as well as performance and adequate resources.

72. Any major reduction in the current capacity of MINUSMA would affect its ability to continue to play its critical role in support of the implementation of the Agreement in a highly complex threat environment. A significant reduction in or withdrawal of the Mission's presence would not only jeopardize the peace process, but also have serious consequences for the overall security situation in Mali and the subregion. It would impede the capacity of MINUSMA to interact with other security presences and have an impact on access to marginalized populations in the North and the Centre. For these reasons, no major changes with regard to the nature of the MINUSMA mandate or the Mission's overall strength are recommended. This, however, does not mean maintaining the status quo. The options to adjust the Mission's footprint and operational and structural measures presented below will contribute to enhancing MINUSMA effectiveness in supporting the implementation of the Agreement.

A. Options for a potential significant adaptation of the Mission

73. While taking into consideration the highly complex and challenging context of Mali, the evaluation of the current prioritization of the objectives of MINUSMA was guided by the principles of avoiding substitution of the functions of the Malian State and increasingly using conditional support as leverage.

74. The potential for adaptation was identified with regard to the MINUSMA task to contribute to the creation of a secure environment through projects. The use of small-scale, low-cost quick-impact projects planned and implemented within a short time frame remains an important tool. Their use should be limited to projects in direct support of the implementation of the Agreement in the North and/or in response to specific needs in the Centre, while keeping in mind the distinct character and confidence-building objective of such projects. The Mission will continue to review the use of its funding mechanism, including the trust fund in support of peace and security in Mali, to ensure coherence of action and the alignment of resources. Stabilization projects in support of the Malian authorities should be financed through other funding sources, including the trust fund.

75. Continued support will be required for the Malian defence and security forces to ensure the safer management of stockpiles of weapons and ammunition in northern and central Mali. Going forward, it is recommended that the country team provide this support instead of MINUSMA. Bilateral donor support is envisaged to fund Mine Action Service weapons and ammunition management activities beginning in the 2020–2021 budget year. Additional relevant tasks will be identified that partners, including the country team, will assume on the basis of their mandates and comparative advantages as part of a transition plan, a mapping of capabilities and gaps, and a resource mobilization strategy. MINUSMA will also review its gender

advisory capacity, with a view to consolidating and streamlining this critical function across all pillars and components.

76. MINUSMA support for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel will remain essential and should continue to go hand in hand with the establishment of the human rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework. The creation of a dedicated support cell within the Mission, which will include representatives of relevant sections, including the human rights due diligence policy task force, should enable MINUSMA to more effectively coordinate support to the Joint Force, in close collaboration with other security presences in Mali.

77. As outlined in paragraph 25 and 26 above, the MINUSMA force has made significant progress in enhancing its posture and performance, changing mindsets and improving preparedness. It also ameliorated its operational tempo and effectiveness over the past months, with the frequency, duration and scale of operations increasing. There has also been an increase in foot patrols, both by day and by night. A reprioritization of resources allowed the Mission to free up additional units previously used for force protection. Important equipment and capability shortfalls, notably in terms of armoured personnel carriers, have been addressed. The more mobile approach and posture have allowed MINUSMA to increase its ability to prevent armed groups from assembling in large numbers and launch targeted attacks, to project force and security into remote areas and to create a conducive environment for the return of State authority.

78. It is recommended that the Force further increase its effectiveness and efficiency through increased protected mobility, flexibility, agility and a proactive posture across its areas of deployment. Doing so will require the reconfiguration of some of its existing units and the deployment of additional capacities. In an effort to adjust the MINUSMA footprint in the Centre, taking into account the main protection needs in the population centres of Douentza and Mopti, the MINUSMA camp in Diabaly should be handed over to Malian armed forces by early 2020. This would reduce the force's physical footprint and related logistics/sustainment and protection requirements. The 650 personnel, who would be freed up, should be used for reinforcement in other sensitive areas, including in Mopti region. Further camps should be identified for a gradual and conditional handover as part of the comprehensive plan for the effective redeployment of the reconstituted and reformed Malian defence and security forces to northern Mali.

79. Increasing the Mission's mobility will be a critical factor to augment its ability to cope with the dynamic operational environment, in particular in central Mali, and reduce its reaction time. This realignment will enable the enhancement of the mobile operations capacity of MINUSMA through the creation of a mission quick reaction capability, which will combine realigned infantry units as the primary manoeuvre elements, with enablers and other mission components, when required. The mobility of this capability would be enhanced and supported by the deployment of utility and attack helicopters. While the infantry battalions would retain their mechanized and motorized vehicle requirements, helicopters would be used to rapidly move small elements of the task force for the conduct of limited-scale operations or initiate operations of a longer duration. The quick reaction capability would also be supported by existing surveillance and intelligence capacity.

80. It is recommended that the deployment of the two formed police units, which are currently deployed in Bamako, be revised through redeploying one of the two units to reinforce the MINUSMA presence in the Centre. This would allow MINUSMA to conduct more coordinated operations in this highly volatile area, while intensifying its support to the national security forces and facilitate humanitarian access, as required.

81. The formed police units in Bamako, one of which relies on an embedded Special Intervention Team, are currently contributing to the security framework for United Nations staff and installations, in addition to a 250-strong mechanized force protection company. It is recommended that the Secretariat and MINUSMA conduct a review of the security arrangements in Bamako, with a view to identifying measures to improve security control and support, including through narrowing the residential zones for United Nations personnel and taking into account the integration of the existing infrastructure with the move to the integrated Mission headquarters in Bamako. The review should also be aimed at determining an adequate and specialized capacity to replace the current deployment with possible host Government participation to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel and installations.

82. In an effort to leverage the Mission's partnership with the European Union, it is recommended that MINUSMA review its police training platform in Bamako and repurpose the use of at least 20 individual police officers who are currently employed for training activities in Bamako. Some of these training activities could instead be covered by EUCAP Sahel Mali. The redeployment of individual police officers to northern Mali should be conditional on ensuring that it goes hand in hand with the deployment of additional national police personnel.

B. Recommendations to enhance Mission support in the Centre

83. In keeping with Security Council resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), the Mission made significant efforts to reconfigure its posture in order to optimize and rebalance the uniformed and civilian presences in central Mali without impeding its ability to pursue its strategic priority in the North. Part of these efforts include the development of an integrated strategy for the Centre and the generation and deployment to Mopti region of an additional formed police unit to be completed before the end of 2019. Against the backdrop of the surge of violence across community lines, MINUSMA has conducted coordinated operations in Koro and Bankass *cercles* with the national security forces, making full use of available Mission quick reaction capacity and air surveillance assets and technology. The operations enabled increased movement for MINUSMA civilian personnel and investigating teams.

84. In central Mali, MINUSMA should continue to prioritize efforts to facilitate the return of State administration, including through supporting the redeployment of the Malian defence and security forces in the Centre of Mali and the protection of civilians. Dialogue and political advocacy, support for the rule of law and reconciliation and the mediation and resolution of local conflicts with the participation of women and young people will be critical to enhance the protection of civilians. This should be combined with engaging in proactive robust measures to dissuade and, if necessary, engage potential attackers and help to create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian access.

85. It is recommended that MINUSMA enhance its support to the authorities to combat impunity in central Mali and further increase its cooperation with partners, including the European Union. The Mission will also enhance communication efforts towards opinion leaders and public opinion at large for the effective management of expectations regarding its role and ability to protect civilians, while underscoring the role and responsibilities of the Malian authorities. The revision of the *Plan de sécurisation intégrée des régions du Centre*, currently carried out by the Government, may provide additional entry points for MINUSMA efforts in the Centre.

VIII. Observations

86. The signing of a political agreement between the Government and the opposition parties, which renewed the commitment to implementing the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, was an encouraging development following a short period of political uncertainty. A more inclusive Government is now in place with ambitious plans for the people of Mali. I commend President Keita for his consultative approach in addressing the situation and the contribution of opposition parties and other stakeholders in this regard. I urge the Government and all Malian stakeholders, including signatory parties to the Agreement, to redouble their efforts to address the many pressing challenges that the country faces through accelerating the full implementation of the Agreement and completing the constitutional review process, while stepping up efforts to stem the violence in central Mali. This is the time for all Malians to stand together, persevere and show determination to overcome the multiple challenges before them and lay a solid foundation for a more peaceful and stable Mali.

87. The revision of the Constitution is not only one of the main tenets of the Agreement, but also its implementation and the outcome of the peace process hinge upon the completion of the constitutional review process. Institutional and political reforms envisaged under the Agreement will need to be anchored to the Constitution, in particular those aimed at ensuring a greater and more equitable representation of the Malian population in State institutions. The process to finalize the constitutional review must therefore be as consultative, inclusive and collaborative as possible and ensure the buy-in of all key stakeholders representing the diverse Malian society. I call upon all Malian stakeholders, including the Government, the political opposition, signatory armed movements and civil society, to make a concerted effort to include underrepresented demographic groups such as women and young people. The role of Malian women must evolve from one of mere representation into one of more active engagement, consultation and inclusion.

88. The Agreement remains the only valid framework to move forward the peace and reconciliation process and the multiple reforms indispensable to resolve the country's multiple and interlinked crises. I call upon all signatories to finalize the revised implementation road map without delay and deliver on their commitments. The full and unconditional respect for the implementation is the only way forward, and it is non-negotiable. The completion of the constitutional review, the integration of the first caseload of former combatants into the army and their redeployment to northern Mali, and the operationalization of the northern economic development zone are concrete and timely measures that can be achieved in the coming 12 months. They will also assure Malians that there is strong resolve to see a conclusion to this process.

89. The security situation in Mali remains of grave concern. Terrorist groups continue to evolve and spread across borders affecting Burkina Faso and the Niger, as well as countries in the region previously unaffected by terrorism. The situation remains highly complex and is rapidly changing. Security challenges in northern and central Mali are distinct and have different drivers. The absence of an effective State presence, however, remains a key factor, allowing armed groups and para-State structures to proliferate. Against this backdrop, the MINUSMA presence remains essential for the stabilization of Mali, acting as a bulwark against the spread of insecurity in many locations. Coordinated efforts by the national security forces, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the French forces to combat terrorism in the Sahel remain critical. MINUSMA and its partners have greatly increased efforts to coordinate their operations, acting in complementarity and creating mutually beneficial environments and enabling them to better focus on their relevant mandate implementation, in line with the human rights due diligence policy.

I am deeply appreciative of their important efforts and the sacrifices of their brave soldiers, who operate in a hostile and dangerous environment. I highly appreciate the recent Operation Barkhane and operations led by the Joint Force. The Security Council is aware of my view on what is needed to make the Joint Force operational at full strength. I condemn in the strongest terms the attacks against national and international security forces. I am saddened by the heavy losses that the Malian defence and security forces suffered in attacks in Dioura and Guiré and the death of four MINUSMA peacekeepers as a result of a malicious act. I recall that attacks targeting United Nations peacekeepers may constitute war crimes under international law and reiterate my call upon the Malian authorities to spare no effort in identifying the perpetrators of all the attacks against peacekeepers so that they can be brought to justice.

90. I am appalled by the recent upsurge in violence in central Mali, which increasingly affects civilians. I call upon the authorities to step up their concerted efforts to protect civilians. The attack in the village of Ogossagou in the Mopti region, where 157 civilians were killed, was the worst of its kind. The perpetrators must be brought to justice. Impunity fuels violence. I therefore reiterate my call upon the Malian authorities to step up efforts to end impunity. Addressing the situation in central Mali will require a clear commitment from the Government to strengthening its response and addressing extremist movements, communal tensions, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the arming of ethnically based self-defence groups. If these concerns are not addressed, there is a high risk of further escalation that could lead to the commission of atrocity crimes. For its part, the international community must take stock of what more it can do to support the authorities. MINUSMA has taken measures to step up its support to the authorities in addressing the situation in the Centre and stands ready to further take further measures in this regard.

91. I stress once again that the Agreement remains the only valid and viable framework for the peace process in Mali. Its full implementation, including development aspects, is indispensable to stabilize the situation in the country and achieve the redeployment of reconstituted and reformed national defence and security forces to northern Mali. The action taken by my Special Representative and the entire Mission in support of the parties to advance the peace process and stem the violence in the Centre, including through adopting a more proactive and mobile posture of the military and police components, deserves to be acknowledged. The peace process is at a critical juncture, and the presence and political and security roles of MINUSMA will remain paramount over the coming 12 months to enable further progress. In that regard, I recommend that the mandate of MINUSMA be extended for another year, until 30 June 2020, with a configuration as proposed and outlined in my recommendation above. MINUSMA is operating at its maximum capacity. Should the role that the Mission is expected to play in central Mali go beyond the support that I recommended in paragraphs 83 and 84 above, MINUSMA would be required to request additional capacities and resources on the basis of a thorough assessment on the ground.

92. Preventing increased violence and instability will require addressing the root causes of the crisis, including poverty, underdevelopment, a lack of opportunities for young people and climate change, through a more integrated approach. I call upon all national, regional and international actors to step up efforts to address the multiple threats facing Mali and the entire Sahel region through humanitarian assistance and sustainable development, in line with the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and its Support Plan. The situation in Mali is a test of the international community's ability to mobilize in support of peace and stability. Security in Mali has an impact on the entire Sahel, which in turn affects global stability. I call upon

the international community to urgently mobilize the outstanding funds requested by the humanitarian appeal for Mali so that critical relief can be provided to those in need and to disburse funding for the Group of Five for the Sahel priority investment programme in order to implement Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

93. I am grateful to my Special Representative, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, for his unwavering dedication and leadership. I am immensely grateful to the resolute commitment of the personnel of MINUSMA, the United Nations country team and the troop- and police-contributing countries, often in extreme and challenging conditions. I commend the members of the international mediation team, led by Algeria, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the European Union and other regional organizations, multilateral and bilateral partners, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, non-governmental organizations and all other partners for their steadfast commitment to and invaluable support for peace in Mali.

Annex I


**United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali: military and police strength as at
15 May 2019**

Country	Military			Police								
	Experts on Mission, staff officers and units			Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Armenia	1		1									
Austria	2	1	3									
Bangladesh	1 284	17	1 301				236	44	280	236	44	280
Belgium	80	11	91									
Benin	245	14	259	16	2	18	137		137	153	2	155
Bhutan	4		4									
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	1	2									
Burkina Faso	1 654	54	1 708	10	7	17	131	9	140	141	16	157
Burundi	1	1	2									
Cambodia	285	18	303									
Cameroon	3		3	10	4	14				10	4	14
Canada	124	18	142	1	3	4				1	3	4
Chad	1 433	18	1 451	17	2	19				17	2	19
China	386	17	403									
Côte d'Ivoire	160	3	163	16	5	21				16	5	21
Czechia	5	2	7									
Denmark	1		1									
Egypt	1 077		1 077	4	0	4	140		140	144		144
El Salvador	279	24	303									
Estonia	4		4									
Ethiopia	1		1									
Finland	4		4	1	1	2				1	1	2
France	25		25	15		15				14		14
Gambia	3	1	4									
Germany	352	20	372	9	3	12				9	3	12
Ghana	131	19	150									
Guatemala	2		2									
Guinea	853	16	869	9	7	16				9	7	16
Hungary												
Indonesia	12		12									
Italy		1	1	2		2				2		2
Jordan	67		67	11		11				11		11
Kenya	11	1	12									
Latvia	8	1	9									
Liberia	106	10	116									

Country	Military			Police								
	Experts on Mission, staff officers and units			Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Lithuania	35	2	37									
Madagascar				2		2				2		2
Mauritania	7		7									
Mexico	2	1	3									
Nepal	196	3	199									
Netherlands	245	17	262	7	3	10				7	3	10
Niger	856	13	869	31	7	38				31	7	38
Nigeria	66	17	83	2	5	7	100	40	140	102	45	147
Norway	13	1	14									
Pakistan	5		5									
Portugal	2		2	1		1				1		1
Romania	2	1	3	2		2				2		2
Senegal	1 246	32	1 278	22	1	23	249	31	280	271	32	303
Sierra Leone	18	1	19									
Spain	1		1									
Sri Lanka	205		205									
Sweden	237	24	261	3	2	5				3	2	5
Switzerland	4		4	3		3				3		3
Togo	908	30	938	19	1	20	259	20	279	278	21	299
Tunisia	79	3	82	35	1	36				35	1	36
Turkey				2		2				2		2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2		2									
United States of America	7	2	9									
Total	12 740	415	13 155	253	54	307	1 289	143	1 432	1 540	198	1 738

Annex II

Map



Map No. 4506 Rev. 29 UNITED NATIONS May 2019 (Colour)

Office of Information and Communications Technology Geospatial Information Section