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Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**Distr.: General
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**Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review
Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons****Report submitted by Japan**

Action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls upon States parties to submit regular reports on their implementation of the action plan and the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. Action 21 of the action plan states that, as a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. Japan submits the present report in accordance with those commitments.



I. Nuclear disarmament

1. All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

As the only country ever to have suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan remains strongly committed to strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime on all of its three pillars and moving closer towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

Japan is of the view that in order to take steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons, it is essential to build up practical and concrete measures on the basis of cooperation between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, while not losing sight of a clear recognition of the humanitarian aspects of the use of nuclear weapons and an objective assessment of the severe international security environment.

- Japan has been playing an active role in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, a cross-regional group of non-nuclear-weapon States that is committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament and as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and has proposed concrete and effective measures to move forward with nuclear disarmament.
- In May 2017, Japan announced the establishment of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, which consists of 17 experts as follows: 7 Japanese experts, including the Chairperson, and 10 foreign experts from nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group has met four times so far. Following the second meeting, held in March 2018, it submitted recommendations to Foreign Minister Taro Kono. These were also provided to the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at its second session, held in Geneva in April/May 2018.
- Japan is committed to making progress in concrete and practical measures by, among other things, promoting the transparency of nuclear forces, submitting resolutions to the General Assembly calling for united action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, making active contributions towards an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pursuing the early commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (fissile material cut-off treaty) and participating actively in discussions on nuclear disarmament verification;
- Japan has been engaged in raising awareness of the reality of atomic bombings and the clear recognition of their humanitarian consequences across borders and generations.

2. All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.

Japan reaffirms the importance of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of treaty obligations:

- Japan calls upon all States to apply these three principles in relation to the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation through resolutions submitted to the General Assembly
- Japan submitted a working paper, “Transparency, reporting and strengthening the review process” to the 2015 Review Conference, in which it encouraged nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to submit it annually in the context of strengthening the treaty review process.
- Japan, with other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted three working papers on transparency to the 2015 Treaty review process: in 2012, “Transparency of nuclear weapons”; in 2014, “Increased transparency in nuclear disarmament”; and in 2015, “Transparency by non-nuclear-weapon States parties”. During the 2020 Treaty review process, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative remains committed to this effort, submitting the following working papers: in 2017, “Transparency by all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”; in 2018, “Proposals by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to enhance transparency for strengthening the review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”; and in 2019, “Promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear technology: a tool to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals” and having outreach meetings with other groups.

3. In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.

4. The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in

order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

5. The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, *inter alia*:
 - (a) Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3;
 - (b) Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;
 - (c) To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;
 - (d) Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;
 - (e) Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;
 - (f) Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and
 - (g) Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.
6. All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

Japan supported the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament in 2018 to deal with nuclear disarmament. Japan also supported the decision put forward by the Sri Lankan President to establish subsidiary bodies on agenda items 1 to 4, and one on agenda items 5, 6 and 7, contained in document [CD/WP.605](#) in 2018.

Japan has consistently called for the adoption of a programme of work that leads to the negotiation of a disarmament treaty in the Conference. Mr. Nobushige Takamizawa, Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of Japan to the Conference, has stressed the importance of adopting a comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

The following political figures called on all members of the Conference in the recent high-level segments of this body to adopt such a programme of work:

- Mr. Kiyoto Tsuji, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2019
- Mr. Manabu Horii, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2018
- Mr. Motome Takisawa, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2017
- Mr. Masakazu Hamachi, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2016
- Mr. Takashi Uto, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in 2015

In the General Assembly resolution entitled “United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, submitted by Japan and adopted by a substantial majority, Japan has for years stressed the need to continue to explore possibilities for overcoming the ongoing deadlock of more than two decades in the Conference on Disarmament.

7. All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

In the General Assembly resolution entitled “United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, submitted by Japan and adopted by a substantial majority, Japan has stressed the importance of security assurances by nuclear-weapon States.

Japan and the other 11 members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submitted a working paper on “Nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances” to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in 2013.

Mr. Motome Takisawa, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, participated in the international conference on “Building a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World”, which was hosted by Kazakhstan to commemorate the twenty-fifth Anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.

8. All nuclear-weapon States commit to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Those

nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

9. The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.

10. All nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have the beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty, and that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.

11. Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all States commit to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained.

Japan has organized the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues with the United Nations and nuclear-weapon-free-zones have been one of the agenda items of discussion. Japan has contributed to the discussion and promotion of nuclear-weapon-free-zones.

Japan has supported General Assembly resolutions regarding five treaties on nuclear-weapon free zones and the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia.

In the General Assembly resolution entitled “United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, submitted by Japan and adopted by a substantial majority, Japan stressed the importance of the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the 1999 guidelines of the Disarmament Commission.

Japan hosted an unofficial conference in Nagasaki in December 2016 on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Japan signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 8 July 1997.

Japan amended its Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors when it ratified the Treaty.

In the General Assembly resolution entitled “United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, submitted by Japan and adopted by a substantial majority, Japan has continuously stressed the importance of the early entry into force of the Treaty and of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions.

Japan served in an important role as an Article XIV Coordinator of the Treaty, together with Kazakhstan from 2015 to 2017, and as a co-chair of the ninth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of

- the Treaty in 2018, where it stressed the importance of the early entry into force of the Treaty and of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions.
- 12.** All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty recognize the contribution of the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures adopted by consensus at the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in September 2009, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.
- 13.** All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty at the national, regional and global levels.
- 14.** The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is to be encouraged to fully develop the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including early completion and provisional operationalization of the
- 2009–2019
- Japan took every suitable opportunity in its bilateral contacts and during multilateral conferences with the remaining Annex 2 States, at both the political and official levels, to encourage the signature and/or ratification of the Treaty.
- In 2010, Japan invited Diet members and government officials, such as from Indonesia and Egypt, to visit International Monitoring System facilities hosted by Japan and to exchange views on the Treaty with the Japanese authorities.
- Japan confirmed the importance of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in a joint declaration with India issued at the Japan-India summit meeting in October 2018.
- Japan has led and coordinated international efforts for the promotion of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Japan founded the Friends of the Treaty together with Australia and the Netherlands in 2002 and served an important role as an Article XIV Coordinator of the Treaty, together with Kazakhstan, from 2015 to 2017.
- In 2018, Japan took every suitable opportunity in its bilateral contacts and during multilateral conferences with the remaining Annex 2 States, at both the political and official levels, to encourage the signature and/or ratification of the Treaty. For example, it confirmed the importance of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in the joint declaration issued at the Eighth Pacific Islands Leaders' Meeting held in Japan in May 2018, in a joint declaration with Burkina Faso in November 2018 and in a joint declaration with Zambia in December 2018.
- Japan has co-chaired the Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty group, convened biennially. On 27 September 2018, the ninth Ministerial Meeting, held in New York, adopted a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty joint ministerial statement.
- Japan also co-sponsored and voted in favour of the annual General Assembly resolution entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".
- All of the International Monitoring System stations and a laboratory hosted by Japan (six seismological stations, one infrasound station, two radionuclide stations and one laboratory) have been certified by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.
- Japan made a voluntary contribution of approximately \$2.4 million to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

international monitoring system in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, which should, upon entry into force of that Treaty, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with that Treaty.

15. All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

16. The nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

17. In the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal

Organization to further boost its verification abilities in 2017. Japan made a voluntary contribution of \$747,026 in 2011 and \$455,000 in 2013.

Towards the entry into force of the Treaty, Japan has, since 1995, provided a “Global Seismological Observation” training course to introduce up-to-date technologies and knowledge in that field.

Japan strongly supports the objectives of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (fissile material cut-off treaty), and has called for the early commencement of negotiations on the treaty on numerous occasions, including in the General Assembly resolution entitled “United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

Japan, with the other member countries of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted working papers on a fissile material cut-off treaty to the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference in 2012 and to the 2020 Review Conference in 2017.

In 2011, Japan and Australia co-hosted experts’ side events in Geneva on the margins of the Conference on Disarmament to discuss technical aspects of such a treaty and to maintain momentum for the commencement of negotiations at the Conference.

Japan actively participated in and constructively contributed to discussions in the Group of Governmental Experts on a fissile material cut-off treaty in 2014 and 2015 and in the high-level expert preparatory group on such a treaty in 2017 and 2018, which concluded its report with a variety of options for future treaty elements.

of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.

- 18.** All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- 19.** All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.
- 20.** States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.
- 21.** As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General of the

Japan has actively participated in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, which is an international initiative to further understand and find solutions to the complex challenges involved in the verification of nuclear disarmament, by sending experts to all working groups.

Recognizing the Partnership as a strong vehicle for practical and concrete measures to realize the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, Japan hosted the third plenary meeting of the Partnership in Tokyo in June 2016.

Japan has emphasized the importance of the efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities in the recurring General Assembly resolution entitled “United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, submitted by Japan.

Japan has actively participated in discussions within the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, which was established pursuant to a General Assembly resolution.

Japan submitted the following national reports on implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference:

[NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/4](#) (2014)

[NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/9](#) (2017)

[NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/5](#) (2018)

The present report by Japan on the implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference updates our 2018 report.

As part of its efforts to promote the implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, Japan, with the other member countries of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted working papers on transparency to the Preparatory Committee in 2012, “Transparency of nuclear weapons” and 2014, “Increased transparency in nuclear disarmament” and to the 2015 Review Conference “Transparency by non-nuclear-weapon States parties”.

United Nations is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.

22. All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

In addition, Japan submitted a working paper on transparency, reporting and strengthening the review process to the 2015 Review Conference, proposing a text to be included in the final document of the 2015 Review Conference.

In 2017, Japan, with the other member countries of the Initiative, submitted to the Preparatory Committee a working paper, “Transparency by all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, with a new reporting template that can be used by all States parties to provide information about how they have implemented their commitments under the action plan of 2010.

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan is committed to ensuring that the humanitarian consequences and tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will never be forgotten. With this aim, Japan places utmost importance on disarmament and non-proliferation education, especially for the younger generation.

Japan has invited young diplomats from various countries through the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme every year since 1983.

Japan has sponsored the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in different cities since 1989, at which representatives of States, the United Nations, academic institutions and civil society from around the world engage in useful discussions.

Japan in 2017 submitted a working paper, “Disarmament and non-proliferation education and awareness-raising”, jointly with the other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, to the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference, following a joint working paper submitted to the 2015 Review Conference. Japan also made a joint statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education on behalf of 76 countries at the 2015 Review Conference.

Japan started a programme entitled “Special communicator for a world without nuclear weapons” in 2010 for the purpose of sharing the first-hand experience of atomic bombing survivors (*hibakusha*). In addition, Japan launched a new programme entitled “Youth communicator for a world without nuclear weapons” in 2013. Under the programme, young people are expected to share the tragic consequences of nuclear weapons and their thoughts about possible steps across borders and generations. To date, a total of 297 special communicators and 327 youth communicators have been dispatched across the world on those programmes, on 93 and 31 occasions, respectively.

Japan has held the Forum of Youth Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons three times since March 2016 with a view to revitalizing the activities of these youth communicators

and strengthening the networks of youth communicator alumni in Japan and other countries.

Japan has undertaken efforts to make the testimonies of *hibakusha* more widely available and translated them into 13 languages.

In 2015, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in cooperation with the Japanese Government, opened a permanent exhibition on the atomic bombings at the United Nations Office at Vienna, following those in New York and Geneva, to promote understanding of the terrible devastation caused by the use of nuclear weapons.

II. Nuclear non-proliferation

23. The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

Japan has made every possible effort to encourage non-ratifying States.

In paragraph 5 of the General Assembly resolution entitled “United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, submitted by Japan, Japan called upon all States not parties to the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States to the Treaty promptly and without any conditions, in order to achieve its universality and, pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms and to take practical steps in support of the Treaty.

24. The Conference re-endorses the call by previous review conferences for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty.

Japan signed the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement in March 1977 and the Agreement entered into force in December 1977.

Japan signed its additional protocol in December 1998 and it entered into force in December 1999.

25. The Conference, noting that 18 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.

Japan continues to promote the universal acceptance of an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with the model additional protocol to the agreement, as the international verification standard, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and bring into force the additional protocol.

26. The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty’s integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.

Japan has implemented the obligations of the comprehensive safeguards agreement between it and IAEA and the additional protocol and has been making efforts to ensure the transparency of its nuclear activities. A “broader conclusion” has been drawn consistently since it was first determined in the IAEA safeguards statement for 2003.

Japan is committed to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In particular, as a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan has been cooperating fully with IAEA and providing appropriate support to its activities.

27. The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and the respective legal obligations of Member States. In this regard, the Conference calls upon Member States to extend their cooperation to the Agency.

28. The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.

29. The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference calls on States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements.

30. The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

Japan has made the utmost effort to resolve cases of non-compliance with IAEA safeguards obligations at every possible opportunity with the international community, including on the occasion of meetings of the IAEA Board of Governors and at the IAEA General Conference.

As for North Korea, at the IAEA General Conference, Japan co-sponsored resolutions on North Korea.

As for Iran, Japan has been contributing to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including assistance through IAEA. In 2017 and 2018, Japan supported the national training course on safeguards implementation in Iran.

Japan has been actively working towards the universalization of the model additional protocol and continues to provide necessary assistance, especially for Asian countries.

Japan has organized outreach events in some countries, through the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security, and has supported IAEA safeguards seminars to facilitate safeguards implementation, including the additional protocol.

Japan supported the seminars on promoting the conclusion of additional protocols held by IAEA in Ethiopia and the Sudan in 2017, and the seminars held under the joint auspices of Japan Atomic Energy Agency, the Integrated Support Center and partner countries in Thailand and the Lao People's Democratic Republic in 2018.

Japan has organized outreach events in some countries, through the Integrated Support Center, and supported IAEA safeguards seminars to facilitate safeguards implementation, including the additional protocol.

At the time of the IAEA General Assembly in September 2017, Japan hosted a side event on the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the model additional protocol.

Japan participated in and contributed to the annual meeting of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network, held in Korea in October 2017 and in Vienna in November 2018.

The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative in 2013 presented a working paper, "Wider application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States" (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.23), to the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference.

*Actions**Actions taken by Japan*

- 31.** The Conference encourages all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.
- Japan calls upon all States to adopt the modified small quantities protocol, where relevant.
- 32.** The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.
- Japan works to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards. In particular, as a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan supports the efforts of the Director General and Board to continually strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of those safeguards.
- 33.** The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.
- Japan has been the second largest by scale in total payment of assessed, extrabudgetary and voluntary contributions to IAEA.
- 34.** The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of the IAEA statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA.
- The Japan Support Programme for Agency Safeguards contributes to strengthening international safeguards through improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation by transferring Japanese technology and expertise to IAEA.
- The Japan Atomic Energy Agency operates the Clean Laboratory for Environmental Analysis and Research as a member of the IAEA safeguards network laboratories.
- 35.** The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.
- Japan has redoubled its nuclear non-proliferation efforts through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee, as well as through the implementation of obligations related to nuclear non-proliferation, such as the establishment of effective national export controls stipulated in Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#). Japan contributes positively to the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group by, for example, assuming the role of the Point of Contact through its Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna.
- 36.** The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.
- Japan regularly updates its domestic export control regulations in accordance with changes in multilaterally agreed nuclear export control lists.

- 37.** The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.
- Japan, in accordance with multilaterally agreed guidelines, considers whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations when making its export decisions.
- 38.** The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.
- Please refer to the following bluebook on Japan's foreign policy regarding the list of countries with which Japan has bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements: www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2018/html/chapter3/c030104.html.
- (3) B Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
- 39.** States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.
- Please refer to the following bluebook on Japanese foreign policy regarding its policy on nuclear cooperation: www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2018/html/chapter3/c030104.html.
- (3) B Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
- 40.** The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.
- The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit was the occasion to announce various efforts made by Japan. Please see the following link for a summary of efforts: www.mofa.go.jp/dns/n_s_ne/page3e_000467.html.
- 41.** The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.
- Japan takes various physical protection measures in line with, for example, the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors.
- Those measures have been recommended in the IAEA guidance documents, including Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5), as well as INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) and other relevant international instruments.
- The latest measure was the revision of Nuclear Regulation Authority ordinances in September 2016 to tackle insider threats. The trustworthiness check by operators started in November 2017.
- With reference to the requirements of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 and other relevant international instruments, the International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission in 2015 and follow-up mission in 2018 observed that the nuclear security regime in Japan is robust and well established, and incorporates the fundamental principles of the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
- 42.** The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in
- Japan became a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1988 and the 2005 Amendment thereto in 2014. Please see the following link: www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000334.html.

accordance with the objectives and the purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.

43. The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.

The IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission to Japan issued its report. Please see section 2.1 on international obligations and arrangements for international cooperation: www.nsr.go.jp/data/000148261.pdf.

44. The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

Japan's recent matrix regarding the status of its implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) approved by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) can be found at: www.un.org/en/sc/1540/documents/Japan%20revised%20matrix.pdf.

Japan made proactive contributions during its presidency of the Global Partnership in 2016.

Japan has participated proactively in the Proliferation Security Initiative exercises and meetings. Japan hosted the Initiative's maritime interdiction exercise in Pacific Shield 18 in July 2018. See: www.mofa.go.jp/dns/n_s_ne/page25e_000216.html.

Japan hosted the plenary meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in Tokyo in June 2017. See: www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001613.html.

Japan participates in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database and reports when incidents occur.

45. The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

Japan became a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2007.

46. The Conference encourages IAEA to continue to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA member States to broaden their support for the relevant IAEA programmes.

Japan, through the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security, actively organizes various bilateral seminars and workshops and international training courses for personnel of other Member States to enhance the functions of their State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material and some training courses for IAEA personnel, such as a training course on inspection methods for reprocessing processes both at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency experimental facilities and the Tokai Reprocessing Plant.

III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

47. Respect each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.
48. Undertake to facilitate, and reaffirm the right of States parties to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
49. Cooperate with other States parties or international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
50. Give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.
51. Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.
52. Continue efforts, within IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its technical cooperation programme.
53. Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
54. Make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable.
- Japan pursues peaceful uses of nuclear energy in both power applications and various fields of non-power applications under the principle that the use of nuclear technology must be accompanied at all its stages by commitments to and ongoing implementation of the highest standards of safety and security and effective safeguards with full transparency.
- See action 39.
- See the latest IAEA Technical Cooperation Report for examples of Japan's efforts: www-legacy.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC62/GC62InfDocuments/English/gc62inf-4_en.pdf.
- See the latest IAEA Technical Cooperation Report for examples of Japanese efforts: www-legacy.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC62/GC62InfDocuments/English/gc62inf-4_en.pdf.
- See action 38.
- Japan is actively participating in relevant meetings held by IAEA to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA technical cooperation programme, including of the Board of Governors and General Conference.
- Japan is actively participating in the Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee, and Japan has also contributed to the Technical Cooperation Fund and the Peaceful Uses Initiative to strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme.
- The Japanese rate of attainment with regard to the Technical Cooperation Fund has continuously been 100 per cent.

Actions

Actions taken by Japan

- 55.** Encourage all States in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the initiative designed to raise 100 million dollars over the next five years as extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA activities, while welcoming the contributions already pledged by countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities.
- Japan has contributed over \$34 million to the Peaceful Uses Initiative in total (as of January 2019).
- 56.** Encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- See the links below for examples of Japan's efforts:
- Japan Atomic Energy Agency/Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security (www.jaea.go.jp/04/isnc/activity/forum_en.html)
 - Japan Nuclear Human Resource Development Network (<https://jn-hrd-n.jaea.go.jp/en/>)
 - Regional Cooperation Agreement (www.rcaro.org/)
 - IAEA Response and Assistance Network Capacity Building Centre in Fukushima (www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-ranet-capacity-building-centre-fukushima-begins-work; www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/school-of-radiation-emergency-management-held-in-iaea-capacity-building-centre; www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-course-in-asia-and-pacific-region-focuses-on-the-use-of-radiation-monitoring-for-public-protection-in-a-nuclear-emergency; www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/japan-to-support-use-of-ndt-technology-for-recovery-from-earthquakes-floods-in-asia-and-the-pacific)
- 57.** Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.
- See the following link for examples:
IAEA, *Country Nuclear Power Profiles*, 2018 edition: Japan (<https://cnpp.iaea.org/countryprofiles/Japan/Japan.htm>).
- 58.** Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while
- Please see IAEA resolution GC(62)/RES/9, entitled "Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications". Japan supports the resolution.
- The "B Nuclear Power Applications" in the resolution refer to such items as jointly enhancing innovations in nuclear reactors and fuel cycles, as well as discussion among interested member States on the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. See: www-legacy.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC62/GC62Resolutions/English/gc62res-9_en.pdf.

tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.

59. Consider becoming party, if they have not yet done so, to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date.

60. Promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.

Japan has already concluded the following:

- Convention on Nuclear Safety (1995)
- Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1987)
- Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1987)
- Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1988)
- Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (2003)
- International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2007)
- 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2014)

Please refer to Japan's national report for the seventh review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 2017: www.nsr.go.jp/data/000170377.pdf.

Please refer to Japan's national report for the sixth review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, in 2018: www.nsr.go.jp/data/000232629.pdf.

Japan issued a statement by the Head of the Delegation, the Minister of State of the Cabinet Office, Masaji Matsuyama, to the sixty-second session of the IAEA General Conference, on 17 September 2018. See: www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000409519.pdf.

Japan issued a statement by the State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kentaro Sonoura, Head of the Delegation of Japan to the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, on 5 December 2016. See: www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000209417.pdf.

At that conference, Japan announced its intention to work with IAEA to strengthen Japanese counter-terrorism measures, as it will host the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo in 2020.

In February 2018, Japan and IAEA signed the Practical Arrangements on Cooperation in the Area of Support to the Implementation of Nuclear Security Measures on the Occasion of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. See: www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press11e_000021.html.

Actions

Actions taken by Japan

- The Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security holds a workshop with the World Institute for Nuclear Security every year. The eighth such workshop was held in Tokyo on 7 and 8 February 2019. The participants discussed what cybersecurity measures should be implemented at a nuclear power plant to ensure the nuclear security of its critical infrastructure from cyberattacks.
- 61.** Encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.
- Japan issued its National Progress Report: 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. Please see the following link: www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000144982.pdf.
- 62.** Transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.
- With the “Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors”, the “Ship Safety Act”, the “Civil Aeronautics Act” and other national regulations, Japan implements IAEA Regulation No. SSR-6, 2012 and other international standards on transport regulations.
- Shipping States, including Japan, continued communication with coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.
- 63.** Put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.
- Japan signed and concluded the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage on 15 January 2015. The Convention entered into force on 15 April 2015.
- Please refer to IAEA, *Country Nuclear Power Profiles*, 2018 edition: Japan (<https://cnpp.iaea.org/countryprofiles/Japan/Japan.htm>).
- 64.** The Conference calls upon all States to abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.
- Japan issued its National Progress Report: 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. Please see the following link: www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000144982.pdf.
- In order to prevent armed attacks on or threats against nuclear facilities, security guards and police officers protect nuclear facilities and conduct regular training to enhance their capability.