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**General and complete disarmament: nuclear disarmament**

## **Letter dated 30 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

Further to our letter dated 16 August 2017 (S/2017/720), I have the honour to transmit the following information in regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a full member of the United Nations and a State party to many multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. None of these instruments, including resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), prohibit Iran from developing missile and space programmes. Moreover, Iran has been respecting, in good faith, the call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that are designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. As of yet, no viable information to the contrary has ever been provided to the Security Council.

Simultaneously the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has consistently, since the date of the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reported on Iran's full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and on the continuous provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with IAEA, thus, inter alia, assuring the international community that Iran is not engaging in activities, including at the research and development level, that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device. There is also absolutely no evidence that Tehran is deploying infrastructure for the storage or servicing of nuclear weapons.

Given the complete lack of evidence that Iran is developing or producing a nuclear weapon or means of its delivery, the Russian Federation deeply regrets that certain Member States continue with their attempts to abuse the Missile Technology Control Regime in order to inject baseless speculations of alleged violations by Iran of its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Such unfounded actions are not only void of any substantial value to the goal of enhancing the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), they are also highly damaging to the



efforts by the international community to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

We would like to underline that the category I parameters of the annex to the Missile Technology Control Regime are but a reference tool for States in the exercise of restraint when exporting certain missile technologies. Never were they intended to be used in the context of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to ascertain whether or not certain ballistic missiles are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It is well known that such missiles include certain features, such as a special warhead platform, a nuclear weapon control system, an apparatus to prevent unsanctioned access to the nuclear weapon, as well as other features. At the same time none of the communications to the Security Council in connection with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) have ever presented any evidence of the existence of such features on Iranian ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles.

I would be grateful for the circulation of the present letter as a document of the Security Council and of the General Assembly (under agenda item 101 (b), “Nuclear disarmament”).

*(Signed)* **D. Polyanskiy**  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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