



Security Council

Distr.: General
12 June 2018
Original: English

Letter dated 12 June 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a document of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#), presenting its position on the recommendations contained in the ninth report ([S/2018/466](#)) of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution [1526 \(2004\)](#), which was submitted to the Committee in accordance with paragraph (a) of the annex to resolution [2255 \(2015\)](#).

I should be grateful if the present letter and the position paper were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Kairat **Umarov**
Chair
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#)



Position of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) on the recommendations contained in the ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team

1. On 30 April 2018, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted its ninth report (S/2018/466) to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). The Committee is of the opinion that all Member States should be made aware of the Monitoring Team's recommendations and the Committee's position thereon. The paragraph numbers indicated below refer to the ninth report of the Monitoring Team.

Taliban finances and connections to criminal organizations

2. In paragraph 34, the Monitoring Team recommended that the Committee write to all Member States, reminding them of the Taliban's strategic significance to the world supply of opium (and therefore heroin) and of the capacity that exists and is developing to analyse drug consignments and pinpoint their origin, and encouraging Member States worldwide that have information that credibly links heroin dealers to supplies originating from Taliban-controlled areas in Afghanistan to consider putting forward those individuals (regardless of nationality or location) for listing under the sanctions regime established under resolution 1988 (2011). The Committee will act accordingly and agrees to write to Member States, encouraging those that have information that credibly links heroin dealers to supplies originating from Taliban-controlled areas in Afghanistan to consider putting forward those individuals for listing under the 1988 (2011) sanctions regime.

3. In paragraph 35, the Monitoring Team recommended that the Committee write to all Member States, drawing attention to the importance of short shelf-life chemical precursors to the production of heroin from opium and encouraging them to enhance measures to control the production, distribution and export of such chemicals to Afghanistan. The Committee will act accordingly and agrees to write to all Member States, drawing their attention to the importance of short shelf-life chemical precursors to the production of heroin from opium, and encouraging them to enhance measures to control the production, distribution and export of such chemicals to Afghanistan.

Sanctions implementation

4. Given the momentum generated by the Kabul Process and the importance of increasing international engagement to persuade the Taliban to respond positively to it, the Monitoring Team recommended in paragraph 65 that the Committee write to all Member States, highlighting the importance of using the 1988 (2011) sanctions regime to encourage and facilitate such engagement and the requirement that any international travel of listed persons be submitted in accordance with the exemption procedures set out in paragraphs 19 and 20 of Security Council resolution 2255 (2015). The Committee will act accordingly and agrees to write to all Member States, highlighting the importance of using the 1988 (2011) sanctions regime to encourage and facilitate such engagement and the requirement that any international travel of listed persons be submitted in accordance with the exemption procedures set out in paragraphs 19 and 20 of resolution 2255 (2015).

5. Given the importance of the various constituent elements to the production of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan and the importance of explosive materials, detonating cords and detonators to illegal mining activities (from which militants derive significant income), the Monitoring Team recommended in

paragraph 72 that the Committee write to Member States, urging them to work with the Government of Afghanistan to ensure that such items are supplied only to legitimate end users. This will require an increase in international information-sharing, the full use of Member States' national laws, the raising of public and private sector awareness of the sensitivity of these items and the development of strong "know-your-customer" cultures, so as to ensure that such items do not fall into the hands of militants. The Committee will act accordingly and agrees to write to Member States, urging them to work with the Government of Afghanistan to ensure that such items are supplied only to legitimate end users and highlighting to them that this will require an increase in international information-sharing, the full use of Member States' national laws, the raising of public and private sector awareness of the sensitivity of these items and the development of strong "know-your-customer" cultures, so as to ensure that such items do not fall into the hands of militants.
