Letter dated 27 November 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the second monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) pursuant to paragraph 2 (f) of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 and paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The present letter also provides the information requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations that took place from 23 October to 26 November 2013 related to the implementation of the resolution.

Introduction

A number of milestones were reached during the reporting period, which the Director-General has detailed at length in his report. The Syrian Arab Republic submitted its initial declaration to OPCW on 23 October 2013, in which it disclosed details about its chemical weapons programme. Furthermore, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted, as a part of its declaration, its plan for the programme’s destruction. In this plan, the Syrian authorities proposed that its chemical material should be removed from its territory for destruction. On 21 November 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted an amendment to its initial declaration increasing the total amount of declared munitions to approximately 1,260 items.

On 31 October 2013, the Joint Mission confirmed that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic had completed the functional destruction of critical equipment for all of its declared chemical weapons production facilities and mixing/filling plants, rendering them inoperable. By doing so, Syria met the deadline set by the OPCW Executive Council to complete destruction as soon as possible, and in any case not later than 1 November 2013.

On 15 November 2013, the OPCW Executive Council approved the destruction plan of the Syrian Arab Republic for the elimination of its chemical weapons programme. In its decision (EC-M-34/DEC.1), the Executive Council set out detailed requirements and a clear set of timelines for the removal and destruction of primary chemical material outside the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the destruction of other chemical material, unfilled chemical munitions and chemical weapons production facilities inside the Syrian Arab Republic.

During this reporting period, the Special Coordinator visited Moscow, Washington, D.C., The Hague, London and Ankara. She also participated in planning discussions at OPCW headquarters and addressed the Executive Council in
The Hague, briefed the United Nations Security Council in New York, and addressed the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels. In each location, she held bilateral meetings with Member State counterparts to brief on the progress of the Joint Mission and to coordinate and seek support for its future activities. In addition, in all her meetings she solicited financial and in-kind voluntary contributions to two trust funds set up by OPCW and the United Nations to ensure that the Joint Mission operations are sufficiently funded and equipped for the significant tasks ahead.

The Special Coordinator also met with representatives of the United Nations in Geneva, including those of the Joint Special Representative for Syria, to coordinate relevant activities of the Joint Mission. She met with officials of the World Health Organization and is in contact with the United Nations Environment Programme to seek specialized assistance and advice in the domains of public health and environmental protection.

The Special Coordinator also met with counterparts in the Syrian Arab Republic in Damascus to coordinate Joint Mission activities and to seek the Government’s continuing commitment to its obligations under Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and OPCW Executive Council decisions. The discussions reiterated the critical need to ensure the security of Joint Mission personnel and premises. She also met with representatives of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces in Istanbul to explain the Joint Mission’s mandated tasks and activities ahead of the Syrian Arab Republic commencing the transportation of chemical material inside the country and to discuss the need for the safety of the convoys.

In conducting these activities, the Special Coordinator has remained in constant contact with the Director-General of OPCW and myself to ensure that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons headquarters in The Hague and the United Nations Secretariat are fully and expeditiously informed of progress made and challenges faced in implementing mandated tasks.

**United Nations component activities**

The United Nations component of the Joint Mission has augmented its essential staffing, assets and capabilities required on the ground in Damascus, has developed the Joint Mission office in Cyprus and has established a small New York office, while remaining focused on having only a light footprint in each location. To this end, the Joint Mission continues to draw on United Nations resources in the region as well as OPCW and United Nations Headquarters. Some of the United Nations support responsibilities continue to be met through temporary deployments of United Nations personnel who provide short-term capabilities that are critical to the Joint Mission. Currently there are 15 OPCW experts and 48 United Nations personnel working in the Joint Mission, including national staff. These numbers for both OPCW experts and United Nations personnel are tailored to the specific operational requirements of the Joint Mission.

The United Nations component in Damascus continued to provide support through coordination and liaison with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, opposition groups and international stakeholders. It also provided the Joint Mission with security advice and risk assessments, information assessments, communications and outreach, logistical expertise, and logistical and administrative support.
The United Nations component continuously assesses the security situation as it affects the operations of the Joint Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic. It is undertaking measures to install security enhancements at its current headquarters in Damascus. While some enhancements have been implemented, others are either being installed or awaiting importation clearances. All armoured vehicles have been equipped with communications and tracking systems. Safety and security measures have been put in place for all personnel and a programme of security training courses has commenced. Despite these measures, the facility remains vulnerable to certain risks, and the Joint Mission is actively exploring viable alternative locations to base its activities, should the security situation require it.

As I stated in my last letter to the Security Council (S/2013/629), the safety and security of all Joint Mission personnel is of central concern to me, the Director-General of OPCW and the Special Coordinator. The security environment in the Syrian Arab Republic, including in Damascus, remains complex, challenging and unpredictable. The safety and security of Joint Mission personnel remains the ultimate responsibility of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, all parties must also ensure the access and safety of Joint Mission personnel at sites where they may exert influence, in order that the Joint Mission may fulfil its mandate.

Key personnel have now deployed to the Joint Mission office in Cyprus. A donor coordination/advisory cell has been set up to work closely with international contributors. A Swedish aircraft and crew have deployed to Cyprus to carry out cargo and personnel airlift operations for the Joint Mission. Romanian Close Personal Protection officers, based partially in Cyprus to provide protection capabilities for the Special Coordinator in the mission area, have also deployed. It is envisioned that a Danish Close Protection team will assume this role from 1 March 2014 until the end of the mandate of the Mission.

A New York office of the Joint Mission has been established at United Nations Headquarters in order to communicate and coordinate closely with Member States and to ensure timely follow-up on behalf of the Joint Mission. A United Nations Liaison Officer has been continuously present at OPCW headquarters in The Hague to further ensure close collaboration and coordination.

The United Nations and OPCW are still negotiating the tripartite status-of-mission agreement with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, the United Nations and OPCW are seeking to conclude a memorandum of understanding with the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the provision of medical services to Joint Mission personnel.

Phase II activities

The Joint Mission continues with ongoing phase II inspection and verification activities. While 3 of the 23 sites declared by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic have not received physical inspections by Joint Mission personnel owing to safety and security concerns, 2 of these 3 sites have now been verified with the support of sealed GPS cameras used by Syrian personnel, in accordance with guidance provided by Joint Mission inspectors. The exact geographical location and the time the images were captured were then fully authenticated. One of the two sites declared as abandoned by the Syrian Arab Republic was verified as such. Only one site remains to be verified. It has been declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as
inactive. This site will be verified as soon as conditions permit, and following a security assessment by Joint Mission personnel.

In addition, during the reporting period, Joint Mission inspectors also conducted visits to verify the complete destruction of Category 3 munitions at all relevant sites in the Damascus area. The Joint Mission has also completed plans for visits to the Homs area to verify the destruction of Category 3 munitions at the sites there. The Joint Mission remains poised to conduct visits when the security situation becomes permissive.

Also in this reporting period the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic began to destroy specialized and standard equipment belonging to production facilities, in addition to special features of buildings and standard buildings at the same locations. The Joint Mission will begin verifying activities at these sites in the coming days.

**Phase III activities**

In preparation for phase III activities, Joint Mission personnel visited a chemical material storage site near Damascus to determine the nature and quantity of specialist packaging materials required to safely transport all declared chemical material storage containers. The information was provided to an Operational Planning Group meeting at OPCW headquarters in The Hague, which met from 6 to 9 November 2013. Important pledges of in-kind donations, particularly from the United States of America, have since been confirmed to ensure safe and secure packaging, handling and transporting of the chemical material during phase III.

The Operational Planning Group meeting also supported the Syrian Arab Republic in outlining steps the Syrian authorities would be required to take for the removal of selected chemical material from the country for destruction outside its territory. The report of the Group includes timelines and projected logistics and security requirements considered necessary by the Syrian Arab Republic in this regard.

Following a request by the Director-General of OPCW, on 15 November 2013, the Special Coordinator sent a letter to all Member States attaching the projected logistics and security requirements identified by the Syrian Arab Republic as needed to meet the most urgent impending deadlines set out in the OPCW Executive Council decision of the same day. The Director-General of OPCW made the letter of the Special Coordinator available to States parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention for their consideration.

Specialist packaging materials have begun to arrive in Lebanon, and the Joint Mission is contracting transport for onward movement to Damascus. Significant numbers of trucks will be required to transfer the packaging materials overland to the Syrian capital. The Syrian authorities have identified a staging area in Damascus to store the packaging materials prior to their distribution to the various declared sites. In this connection, the United Nations and OPCW maintain that the Syrian Arab Republic, in accordance with its obligations as a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, is responsible for preserving public health and the environment.

In preparation for the packaging of the chemical agents, the Joint Mission has organized a packaging and International Maritime Dangerous Goods course in Beirut to train select Syrian personnel.
Joint Mission personnel have conducted an assessment mission to the port of Latakia, the location designated by the Syrian Arab Republic prior to the transfer of chemical material out of the country. The Joint Mission determined that the port city had all the necessary capabilities required to handle the planned loading and shipment of chemical warfare agents, as well as sufficiently secure facilities for the deployment of Joint Mission personnel. The Joint Mission is currently working to establish a temporary forward operating base in Latakia to support the inspection and verification of chemical material prior to loading. Chemical material may have to be repacked for maritime transport to ensure the highest safety standards.

The Joint Mission is also coordinating the offers of assistance and the planning with respect to the support of the maritime transfer of selected chemical material from the Syrian Arab Republic. In this regard, several Member States have indicated their willingness to provide specialized cargo container vessels capable of safely storing and transporting the material at sea. Member States have also offered maritime escorts to ensure security of the vessels. The Joint Mission is in discussions with these Member States to facilitate an agreed arrangement. A maritime planning group, consisting of interested Member States, will meet in Cyprus to take discussions forward. Details concerning the final destruction plan need to be available as soon as possible. In this regard, the United Nations and OPCW maintain that the States undertaking the removal and maritime transport should seek to agree among themselves on questions of possession, jurisdiction and control and the related questions of liability for, and mitigation of, security and other risks, including in respect of damage to public health and the environment.

In addition to the two trust funds set up by OPCW and the United Nations to fund these activities, the Director-General of OPCW was requested by the Executive Council to set up a third special trust fund to seek financial contributions for the complete destruction of the binary chemical components and associated reaction masses of the Syrian Arab Republic outside the country. On 20 November 2013, OPCW also issued an “Expression of Interest” seeking to identify commercial companies interested in participating in a future tender for the treatment and disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous organic and non-organic chemicals and related packaging materials. Member States are encouraged to contribute to all three trust funds set up by OPCW and the United Nations to ensure successful implementation of the mandate.

Conclusion

The Joint Mission has made considerable progress in verifying the implementation of phase II by the Syrian Arab Republic, in planning for phase III and in starting initial phase III activities. The OPCW Executive Council decision of 15 November 2013 set ambitious timelines. Achieving these timelines will require an unprecedented effort and coordination from all stakeholders under extremely challenging conditions.

Several Member States have played a critical role assisting in the implementation of respective OPCW Executive Council decisions and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). In particular, I would like to reiterate my appreciation to the Government of Cyprus for agreeing to host the Joint Mission office on its territory and for facilitating the deployment of Joint Mission personnel and assets. I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to the Government of
Lebanon for facilitating the transit of all Joint Mission personnel and assets through Beirut’s entry hubs to the Syrian Arab Republic.

In addition, a number of Member States have provided material funding, technical expertise and critical assets to the Joint Mission, and several other Member States are awaiting confirmation of their offers. The Joint Mission has received valuable additional in-kind support from Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States and the European Union. As at 25 November 2013, the OPCW trust fund included €10.8 million with contributions from Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The United Nations trust fund currently includes $2 million from the United States and pledges in the amount of €250,000 from Denmark and €250,000 from Luxembourg. Without this assistance, the Joint Mission would not have been able to implement its mandated tasks.

Going forward there remain a number of issues and circumstances that could impact the implementation of mandated tasks in accordance with OPCW Executive Council decisions and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013).

First, Member State voluntary in-kind contributions continue to be at the forefront of requirements. As described above, progress has been made in procuring and delivering packaging material for phase III activities. Member States considering contributions of assets necessary to ensure security have been asked to engage bilaterally with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. At the same time, the Syrian authorities are being encouraged to consider alternative options to ensure the safety and security of inland transportation for the chemical material. In addition, it is possible that other needs may be identified regarding the destruction of chemical material and reaction mass outside the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as possible additional equipment needed to complete the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, material and production facilities inside the Syrian Arab Republic.

Second, full clarity regarding the plan for the removal and destruction of chemical material outside Syrian territory is critical, including the location for destruction. In order to move forward, detailed arrangements need to be put in place, including timelines concerning the availability of equipment and the docking facilities, and careful agreement regarding specific roles and functions of the Joint Mission and concerned Member States.

Third, the implementation of Joint Mission mandated objectives cannot occur without conditions inside the Syrian Arab Republic that are conducive to carrying out these tasks. The Syrian authorities have continued their constructive cooperation with the Joint Mission. Representatives of the Syrian opposition based in Istanbul have also indicated their support for the safe transportation of convoys containing chemical material. The Security Council, in resolution 2118 (2013), emphasized the importance of ensuring the security of activities undertaken by Joint Mission personnel and allowing them immediate and unfettered access. Furthermore, the Council, by that resolution, decided that all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully in this regard. Nevertheless, recent fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic shows that the security situation is volatile, unpredictable and highly dangerous. The Director-General of OPCW and I remain deeply concerned about the safety and security of Joint Mission personnel.
Given the complexity of the mission and the unpredictable operating environment, many factors remain outside the control of the Joint Mission. Its personnel are making every effort to ensure that the necessary arrangements are in place to implement mandated objectives. The international community should remain unwavering in its support to the women and men of the Joint Mission. The United Nations will continue to act in partnership with OPCW, and through the Joint Mission, to implement the provisions of the decisions of the Executive Council (EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1) and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) in their entirety.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter urgently to the attention of the members of the Security Council.
Annex

Letter dated 26 November 2013 from the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled “Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme” prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-33/Dec.1 and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 23 October to 22 November 2013.

(Signed) Ahmet Üzümcü
Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013, the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) reports to the Executive Council (hereinafter the “Council”) on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of the decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.

2. The first such report by the Secretariat was submitted to the Council on 25 October 2013 (EC-M-34/DG.1, dated 25 October 2013) and covered the period from 27 September to 22 October 2013.

3. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities” (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of this decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat shall report on its implementation “in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1”.

4. This report is therefore submitted in accordance with both above-mentioned Council decisions and includes information relevant to their implementation during the period from 23 October to 22 November 2013.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of EC-M-33/DEC.1

5. Progress achieved within the reporting period by the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilling its obligations as established in paragraph 1 of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 is described below:

   (a) In accordance with subparagraph 1(b) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic shall submit the initial declaration required by Article III of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter “the Convention”) not later than 30 days after the adoption of the Council decision, that is, not later than 27 October 2013. The Secretariat received the initial declaration on 23 October 2013. In its initial declaration, the Syrian Arab Republic provided information required under Article III, declaring possession of chemical weapons, chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFS), abandoned chemical weapons, riot control agents, and other chemical weapons-related facilities, as well as information required under Article VI about chemical industry facilities. On 21 November 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted an amendment to its initial declaration increasing the total amount of declared munitions to approximately 1,260 items and providing information regarding receipts of chemicals and production equipment for its chemical weapons programme between 1982 and 2010.

   (b) In accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to complete the elimination of all chemical weapons
material and equipment in the first half of 2014. As required under Article III of the Convention, the Syrian Arab Republic provided its general plans for destruction of chemical weapons and CWPFs on 23 October 2013, as part of its initial declaration. The Director-General reviewed the submission closely and concluded that “the proposal by Syria that the destruction of chemical weapons be carried out outside its territory constitutes the most viable option available to fulfil the requirements established under the Council decision (EC-M-33/DEC.1) and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) for the safe and expeditious elimination of chemical weapons in Syria” (EC-M-34/DG.14, dated 5 November 2013). Pursuant to subparagraph 1(c) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Council adopted decision EC-M-34/DEC.1 on 15 November 2013. This decision established detailed requirements for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and Syrian CWPFs. It also established timelines for the removal of chemical weapons from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic and for their destruction outside this territory. In addition, on 18 November 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic informed the Secretariat that it had destroyed all declared items of Category 3 chemical weapons.

(c) In accordance with subparagraph 1(d) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic was required to complete as soon as possible, and in any case not later than 1 November 2013, the functional destruction (rendering useless or inoperable) of chemical weapons production and mixing and filling equipment. As reported by the Director-General at the Thirty-Fourth Meeting of the Council, this deadline was met within the target date. Pursuant to subparagraph 2(b) of EC-M-34/DEC.1, Syrian personnel are continuing to destroy special features of declared buildings and structures at CWPFs.

(d) In accordance with subparagraph 1(e) of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and paragraph 7 of resolution 2118 (2013), the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with all aspects of their implementation. The Syrian authorities have continued to extend the necessary cooperation to the OPCW team in the conduct of its activities during the reporting period.

(e) Effective cooperation with the United Nations in the context of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic has continued.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

6. OPCW personnel from the initial deployment to the Syrian Arab Republic returned to The Hague at the end of October 2013. The next rotation of personnel, which at the cut-off date comprised of 14 persons, arrived in Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic, on 6 November 2013 and will remain there for the month of November. Additionally, an OPCW logistics officer is based in Beirut, Lebanon.

7. During the reporting period, the Secretariat was able to verify one of the two sites that could not be visited earlier due to safety and security concerns. Verification was conducted with the support of sealed GPS cameras used by Syrian personnel, in accordance with the guidance of the inspection team. The exact geographical location and the time the footage/images were captured were then fully authenticated. As stated in the initial declaration, the site was confirmed as long abandoned and the building showed extensive battle damage. Thus, the Secretariat has now verified 22 of the 23 sites declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. The one
remaining site could not be visited for safety and security reasons. It has been declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as inactive. The items from this site were moved to other accessible sites and have been verified against the data declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. This remaining site will be inspected as soon as conditions permit and following the assessment by the United Nations.

8. As at the cut-off date of this report, the Secretariat personnel, during the inspections, had verified the destruction of more than 60 per cent of the declared Category 3 chemical weapons described in subparagraph 5(b) above.

9. During the inspections, and in light of the timelines established by the Council for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, Secretariat personnel have engaged in preparations to verify the destruction by the Syrian Arab Republic of all items of specialized production and mixing and filling equipment, as described in subparagraph 5(c) above, as well as the destruction of special features of declared buildings and structures.

10. The Operational Planning Group (OPG), consisting of OPCW and United Nations personnel and national experts provided by States Parties in a position to do so, met in The Hague from 6 to 9 November 2013, with a delegation from the Syrian Arab Republic in attendance. The OPG, comprising 30 experts from various backgrounds, developed an outline of an “Outline Plan for the Removal of Chemical Weapons in Syria for Destruction Outside its Territory”, which was circulated as part of the Annex to document EC-M-34/DG.15, dated 14 November 2013. The OPG presented a scenario for the rapid, sequenced packaging and transport of chemical agents from the Syrian Arab Republic for destruction. The OPG concluded that conditions of safety and security will be absolute prerequisites for the success of such a plan and that due regard must be paid to the protection of people and the environment at every stage of the process of transportation and destruction. Furthermore, the OPG recommended that international norms and standards applicable to the transportation of hazardous material will have to be fully upheld.

11. The Secretariat has developed measures to ensure that no undetected removal of chemical weapons occurs during reloading of some of the chemicals into maritime containers that are suitable for transportation and meet international transportation standards and requirements, or during their actual transportation between the chemical weapons storage facilities (CWSFs) in the Syrian Arab Republic and destruction sites outside the Syrian Arab Republic. These measures will entail a combination of physical presence of inspectors, the use of remote monitoring equipment, the application of seals, as well as, where applicable, weighing or use of alternative means to establish the quantities of chemicals reloaded and transported outside the Syrian Arab Republic. Moreover, samples will be taken, on a random basis, from various containers to assist in the characterization of the chemicals for transportation purposes. These samples will be analysed by the inspection teams and the results will be included in the documentation packages accompanying the maritime containers. The latter will be sealed by OPCW personnel after their certification for maritime shipment and each container will be equipped with a tracking device. The United Nations will lend logistical support during the transportation phase and galvanize and coordinate international assistance to support this operation.

12. As required under paragraph 13 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Secretariat has also initiated work on the development of facility agreements for CWSFs in the Syrian
Arab Republic. The specific arrangements that will govern inspections at such facilities pending the destruction or removal of the stored chemical weapons will be agreed between the Secretariat and the Syrian National Authority, and the Council will be informed accordingly upon their conclusion.

13. In order to explore options for destruction in commercial chemical disposal facilities of the binary chemical weapons components and any associated reaction masses referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of EC-M-34/DEC.1 and the declared chemicals referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of the same decision, as requested under paragraph 24 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, on 21 November 2013, the Secretariat issued a call for expressions of interest from companies interested in participating in a future tender for the treatment and disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous organic and inorganic chemicals and related packaging materials and containers/drumm, or parts thereof. The Secretariat brought the call for expressions of interest to the attention of States Parties via a Note (S/1142/2013, dated 22 November 2013). The deadline for receipt of expressions of interest by companies is 29 November 2013.

14. The Director-General met with the Special Coordinator of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic, Ms. Sigrid Kaag, on 19 October, 1 November, and 15 November 2013. Ms. Kaag briefed the Council at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting on 15 November 2013. Furthermore, Mr. Aamir Shouket has been appointed as Deputy Chief of Cabinet in the Secretariat and will act as the OPCW Liaison Officer with the Special Coordinator.

Supplementary resources

15. The OPCW trust fund to provide funding to facilitate the technical activities of the OPCW in support of the verification of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons (S/1132/2013, dated 16 October 2013) had a balance of EUR 10.4 million as at the cut-off date of this report, having received contributions from Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. A further six States Parties (the Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea) had made formal commitments to contribute an additional amount of EUR 6.5 million. The Director-General would like to express his appreciation to those States Parties that have already made voluntary contributions to the trust fund, or have committed to doing so.

16. The Secretariat would like also to express its gratitude to those States Parties that have provided in-kind support, namely: Cyprus and Lebanon for providing logistical support to the Mission; Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands for air transportation for the deployed teams; the European External Action Service, some European Union Member States, and the United States of America for providing armoured vehicles; and Canada for providing air transportation for the vehicles supplied by the United States of America.

17. In accordance with paragraph 6 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, on 19 November the Secretariat issued a call for voluntary contributions to the special trust fund for the financial resources needed for the activities related to the complete destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons outside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic (S/1141/2013, dated 19 November 2013).