
Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Report submitted by Canada on its implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. Action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls for States parties to submit regular reports on the implementation of the action plan, the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. In line with that commitment, and with a view to enhancing transparency and building confidence, Canada submits the present report on its implementation of the Treaty on an article-by-article basis, on the 13 practical steps and on the 2010 action plan. Such comprehensive reporting is not intended to expand the scope of the commitments made, but is a reflection of the linkages that exist among the articles of the Treaty, the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan. Canada calls upon all other States parties to submit such comprehensive reports at meetings under the auspices of the Treaty.

Article-by-article review of the Treaty

Article I

2. Canada continues to call upon nuclear-weapon States not to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nuclear proliferation continues to pose a threat to the world. Canada maintains that States Members of the United Nations must work together to ensure that Security Council resolutions are fully implemented and that States work together to halt activities that have no reasonable purpose other than the further acquisition of nuclear weapons. Canada welcomed the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009). Canada has implemented Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which aims to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. Canada welcomed Security Council resolution 1977 (2011), in which the Council extended the mandate of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) until 2021.



3. Canada is one of the five members of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, an initiative launched at the summit of the Group of Eight held in 2002. In 2002, Canada pledged Can\$ 1 billion over 10 years to the Global Partnership as a part of the overall US\$ 20 billion commitment by leaders of the Group of Eight to address the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction and related knowledge. To date, Canada has spent more than Can\$ 960 million through its Global Partnership Program by implementing concrete projects that support the non-proliferation and disarmament objectives of the Treaty, including more than Can\$ 485 million towards nuclear and radiological security. At the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, the Prime Minister of Canada announced that Canada was renewing its Global Partnership Program for an additional five years (2013-2018), with additional funding of Can\$ 367 million. The Global Partnership and Canada's Global Partnership Program were originally focused on securing and destroying vulnerable materials in Russia and other countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Through its Program, Canada provided critical security upgrades at 10 nuclear facilities in Russia. Canada has fully dismantled 13 decommissioned nuclear submarines and defuelled 30 reactors in north-west Russia. In the far east of Russia, Canada started projects for the safe return of spent nuclear fuel from the region and has defuelled four reactors. As a member of the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow and the Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine, Canada has funded more than 400 individual research projects engaging more than 3,900 former weapons scientists in civilian employment through various research initiatives and projects, including in the area of nuclear and radiological security. The Global Partnership and Canada's Program have since broadened their work to address security concerns relating to weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, the Americas, Asia and Africa. Recent nuclear security projects include the conversion of nuclear reactors and the complete removal of highly enriched uranium from Mexico and Viet Nam, in cooperation with the United States of America. In March 2012, the Prime Minister of Canada announced that Canada would voluntarily contribute a further Can\$ 5 million to the Nuclear Security Fund of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to complement the nuclear security improvements made previously. With donations totalling Can\$ 17 million, Canada is the third largest State donor to the Fund, established to strengthen nuclear and radiological security worldwide. In cooperation with the United States Department of Energy, Canada is working to enhance the security of vulnerable radioactive sources, many of which are of Canadian origin, at sites in the Americas and Africa.

4. Canada is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which seeks to enhance, in a manner consistent with national legal authorities and international law, practical cooperation on interdiction of, inter alia, nuclear weapons material and technology flowing illegally to and from States and non-State actors. Canada is also an initial partner nation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and an active participant in the Group of Eight Non-Proliferation Directors Group. To contribute to ongoing activities and exercises under the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Canada hosted a table-top exercise demonstrating emergency management capabilities in Toronto in May 2012.

5. In September 2010, Canada joined the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, a cross-regional group of 10 non-nuclear-weapon States that works to promote and support the implementation of the commitments made by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the 2010 action plan, and advocate further progress through practical contributions and proposals. The group has held ministerial-level meetings in September 2010, September 2011 and September 2012 in New York, April 2011 in Berlin, June 2012 in Istanbul and in April 2013 in The Hague. According to the Berlin Statement, issued by the Initiative on 30 April 2011, the group's priorities include advancing negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, promoting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, increasing the level of transparency with regard to the nuclear stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States and promoting the universality of an additional protocol with IAEA. The Initiative submitted joint working papers to the Preparatory Committee in 2012 on a fissile material cut-off treaty, transparency, the Additional Protocol and disarmament education.

Article II

6. Canada continues to abide by its commitment under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosive capability. This commitment is implemented domestically primarily through the Nuclear Safety and Control Act of 2000 and the Export and Import Permits Act of 1985.

7. Canada calls upon other non-nuclear-weapon States not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture, acquire or seek to receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or their delivery vehicles. In this context, Canada condemned in the strongest terms possible North Korea's nuclear weapons test on 12 February 2013, in addition to the nuclear tests conducted on 9 October 2006 and 25 May 2009. Canada urges North Korea to refrain from further tests and other provocative actions that run contrary to its stated desire to engage constructively with the community of nations. Canada also condemned North Korea's ballistic missile test on 12 December 2012 in violation of Security Council resolutions. Canada calls upon North Korea to immediately resume cooperation with IAEA inspectors, to comply fully with all its obligations under Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013) and to fulfil all the commitments that it made as part of previous six-party agreements, including abandoning all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and immediately ceasing all related activities. Canada supports the six-party talks, which remain the best means to achieve a permanent, peaceful resolution of the long-standing security issues of the Korean peninsula, and encourages efforts towards the early resumption of this process.

8. On 10 February 2010, the Prime Minister of Canada called upon Iran to end its defiance of the international community, suspend its enrichment activity and take immediate steps towards transparency and compliance by halting the construction of new enrichment sites and fully cooperating with IAEA. In February 2013, the Director General of IAEA stated in his report that there was credible information to indicate that "Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device". That assessment, based on credible information from a wide variety of sources, provides strong evidence that Iran has violated its commitments under article II and is in non-compliance with its obligations under the Treaty.

Canada continues to urge Iran to comply with all its international obligations, including those set out by the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, and to engage seriously and without preconditions in efforts aimed at restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. This requires immediate and full cooperation with IAEA to address serious concerns about the military dimensions of its nuclear programme and the full implementation of the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Canada has fully implemented in national law the requirements of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010) by imposing rigorous sanctions on Iran. Canada feels strongly that States parties should explore ways for the 2015 Review Conference to seriously and credibly address Iran's non-compliance with the Treaty.

9. Canada fully supported the IAEA Board of Governors resolution in which the Director General was requested to report to the Security Council the assessment that an undeclared nuclear reactor existed at Dair Alzour, in breach of Syria's safeguards obligations. Canada continues to call upon Syria to urgently remedy its non-compliance and to meet its own commitment to "fully cooperate with the Agency to resolve related outstanding issues", so that the Agency can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear programme. Canada also continues to urge Syria to bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible.

10. Canada's export control system is consistent with the lists of those multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms in which it participates and operates in a transparent manner. These measures serve to facilitate peaceful nuclear commerce and international cooperation while ensuring that non-proliferation policies are met. As part of its commitment to continuous improvement, Canada hosted an IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission in June 2009 and follow-up missions in June 2011 and December 2011. The review team found that 30 of the 32 recommendations from the initial 2009 mission had been implemented and affirmed that Canada had a mature and well-established nuclear regulatory framework. Canada continues to cooperate actively with other like-minded States in a variety of international forums to develop new measures aimed at further strengthening the non-proliferation regime, in particular with regard to the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies associated with the production of special fissionable material suitable for nuclear weapons purposes and the suspension of nuclear cooperation in cases of non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments.

Article III

11. Pursuant to article III, Canada has in place a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol to that agreement with IAEA. Canada is of the view that a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol constitutes the safeguards standard required under article III. With this safeguards standard in place, IAEA is in a position to draw an annual conclusion regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Canada. That broader conclusion, first achieved in 2005 and subsequently maintained on an annual basis, provides the highest level of confidence that Canada is in compliance with its commitments under the Treaty. Furthermore, the attainment and

maintenance of the broader conclusion has allowed IAEA to fundamentally change the way safeguards are applied in Canada, by implementing a State-level integrated safeguards approach. These developments are a direct result of Canada's strong support for the IAEA safeguards system and of the high level of cooperation between IAEA and Canada in the implementation of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. At IAEA and the General Assembly, Canada continues to urge States that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible. Canada supports the outreach efforts of the Group of Eight and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to advance the universalization of the Additional Protocol. In addition, through the Canadian Safeguards Support Programme, Canada contributes to the research, development and support of safeguards equipment and techniques for both domestic and international use aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards. That effort resulted in an average annual contribution of approximately Can\$ 1 million over the past three fiscal years. In 2012, Canada also provided a voluntary, extrabudgetary contribution of Can\$ 1 million through its Global Partnership Program towards the Agency's Enhancing Capabilities of the Safeguards Analytical Services project to help to ensure that the Agency has the necessary facilities and equipment with which to undertake accurate and timely scientific analyses of countries' nuclear safeguards compliance.

12. Consistent with its obligation not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to IAEA safeguards, and with decision 2, paragraph 12, of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, with only one exception, Canada will authorize nuclear cooperation involving proliferation-significant items only with those non-nuclear-weapon States that have made an internationally legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and have accepted IAEA safeguards on the full scope of their nuclear activities. All Canada's nuclear partners have accepted, through a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Canada, a number of additional measures designed to ensure that nuclear items supplied by Canada do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Canada maintains a national system for controlling the export of all items especially designed or prepared for nuclear use and certain nuclear-related dual-use items, including, with regard to the specific requirements of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, source or special fissionable material and equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. It ensures that exports of nuclear and nuclear dual-use items are not authorized where there is found to be a risk of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction programme or an unsafeguarded facility, or when an export would be otherwise contrary to Canada's non-proliferation policy and international commitments and obligations. Canadian export control legislation includes a catch-all provision.

13. Canada chaired the Zangger Committee in 2012, a group of 38 States that maintains a list of nuclear-related strategic goods to which IAEA safeguards are applied. Canada hosted a side event on the Committee on the margins of the session of the Preparatory Committee held in Vienna in 2012.

Article IV

14. Canada strongly supports the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada pioneered a pressurized heavy water reactor system — the CANDU nuclear power reactor — that has been successfully exported to four other States parties. Canada maintains a robust domestic nuclear power programme and has a broad and diverse nuclear industry, including uranium, radioisotopes for medical, academic and industrial purposes and nuclear reactor services. Canada believes that nuclear energy can make an important contribution to prosperity and sustainable development, while also addressing concerns about climate change. To that end, Canada has 27 nuclear cooperation agreements in force, covering 44 States parties to the Treaty, both developed and developing, to provide a framework for the fullest possible exchange of nuclear and other material, equipment and technology. Since the 2012 session of the Preparatory Committee, Canada has held official bilateral consultations with nuclear cooperation agreement partner States and formal administrative arrangement consultations with nuclear cooperation agreement partner country authorities. Canada has been a strong supporter of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and has often met or exceeded the rate of attainment for voluntary contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. Canada has also actively supported efforts to strengthen the Technical Cooperation Programme to make it more transparent and accountable in a results-based framework. In April 2012, Canada passed legislation to amend its Criminal Code to improve its approach to prosecuting those who commit acts of nuclear terrorism. Canada's ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials is imminent.

15. Canada is active in all aspects of IAEA work. Canada drafts and sponsors annual resolutions on nuclear power for the Agency's General Conference and also co-sponsors resolutions regarding various non-power nuclear applications. Canadian experts participate in the drafting of IAEA technical documents, act as lecturers for IAEA Technical Cooperation projects and other training courses, serve as peer-review team members, provide guidance and advice to countries embarking on nuclear power programmes and host IAEA Technical Cooperation fellows at Canadian nuclear institutions. Canada also participates in the Agency's International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles. Canada is the seventh highest contributor to the IAEA regular budget, pays its assessed contribution in full and on time and makes extrabudgetary contributions to the Agency's nuclear safety, security, safeguards, energy and technical cooperation programmes.

16. In view of the inherent relationship between States' inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country. Canada is committed to working with other States and relevant international organizations on new arrangements for the supply of nuclear items, consistent with the balance of rights and obligations agreed to in the Treaty and in particular in articles II, III and IV.

17. Canada continues to be involved in and support efforts to assist the harmonized implementation of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and

Export of Radioactive Sources. Canada has on four occasions provided extrabudgetary funding to IAEA to support IAEA Code and Guidance technical meetings to facilitate the participation of delegates from developing countries. Through its renewed Global Partnership Program, Canada plans further contributions to promote the safe and secure management of radioactive sources, in particular those of Canadian origin, worldwide. Canada continues to assist the harmonized implementation of the Guidance through the establishment of bilateral administrative arrangements on the import and export of radioactive sources with its foreign regulatory counterparts. Canada has established 12 such arrangements, most recently with Ireland in March 2013. IAEA has recognized this initiative as a best practice and encourages other States to follow Canada's lead. As one of the world's leading suppliers and exporters of radioactive sources, Canada has a strong interest in the establishment and maintenance of an effective, efficient and harmonized international regime for ensuring their safety and security, including measures to prevent their use in malicious or terrorist acts. Canada encourages all States to implement the provisions of the Code and Guidance in a harmonized manner to assist in providing assurances that radioactive sources are used and maintained within an appropriate regulatory framework of radiation safety and security.

Article V

18. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference affirmed that the provisions of article V were to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Canada signed that treaty in September 1996 and ratified it in December 1998. In October 1998, Canada was the first State signatory to the Treaty to sign a facility agreement with the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to establish the legal basis for activities to construct the monitoring stations to be hosted in Canada. Canada has played an active role in encouraging further signatures and ratification of the Treaty with a view to achieving its universality, including within the Group of Eight. In September 2012, Canada co-hosted a friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ministerial meeting in New York on the margins of the General Assembly high-level meetings. A joint statement was released to reiterate support for the Treaty and its entry into force, endorsed by a record 101 States, including, for the first time, all 5 nuclear-weapon States. In September 2011, Canada joined the consensus among ratifiers of the Treaty in support of the final declaration of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

19. At the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored resolution 67/76, on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In the resolution, the Assembly called for the earliest possible entry into force of the Treaty and urged the maintenance of unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapons test explosions until entry into force was achieved. Following up on the commitments made at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, D.C., by the Prime Minister, Canada finalized a contribution arrangement with the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in October 2012 for the provision of equipment and operational training to strengthen on-site inspection capabilities. Canada places priority on the establishment of the Treaty's verification system and, as such, is a leader among State signatories in contributing resources and expertise to the development of the Treaty's International Monitoring System.

Canada hosts 16 International Monitoring System stations and laboratories. All facilities hosted by Canada had been completed and certified by the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization as at November 2009.

Article VI

20. Canada continues to take seriously the obligation of article VI and the commitments agreed upon in the 1995 principles and objectives, in the 13 practical steps and in the 2010 action plan. Those commitments have been at the forefront of a number of activities and statements. Below is a summary of Canada's activities as they relate to the 13 practical steps agreed upon in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Steps 1 and 2

21. Canada's action in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the moratorium on nuclear testing is described above under article V implementation.

Steps 3 and 4

22. Canada supported decision CD/1864, which was adopted by consensus by the Conference on Disarmament in May 2009. Canada's priority in the Conference is the start of negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. At the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, Canada sponsored resolution 67/53, on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in which the Assembly, among other things, called for the Conference to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty early in 2013. Furthermore, it requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not negotiate such a treaty. Canada supported decision CD/1948, which was put forward by the President of the Conference on 12 February 2013. Canada regrets that the adoption of the draft programme of work contained therein was blocked by two members of the Conference.

Step 5

23. Canada emphasizes the importance of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability in the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons arsenals and facilities. At the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored resolution 67/59, on united action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Step 6

24. At the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, Canada voted in favour of resolutions 67/34, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", and 67/59, on united action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

25. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Canada continues to advocate that the alliance play a positive role in advancing

disarmament objectives through a continuous step-by-step approach in a manner that increases international peace and stability. The 2010 NATO strategic concept for the defence and security of its members clearly stated its commitment “to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all”. That commitment was restated in the NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, released at the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, United States.

Step 7

26. Canada welcomed the entry into force of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia on 5 February 2011, in addition to the unilateral steps taken by the United Kingdom and France with regard to their nuclear arsenals. Canada also welcomed the convening of follow-up meetings to the 2010 Review Conference by the nuclear-weapon States, which took place in Paris on 30 June and 1 July 2011, in Washington, D.C., on 29 June 2012 and in Geneva from 15 to 17 April 2013.

Step 8

27. Canada has encouraged Russia and the United States to implement the Trilateral Initiative by placing surplus stocks of fissile material under IAEA control.

Step 9

28. As noted previously, at the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, Canada voted in favour of resolution 67/34, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapons-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”. Canada also supports measures to reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security, as called for in resolution 67/59, on united action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Step 10

29. Through the Global Partnership Program, Canada is contributing to the elimination and disposition of fissile material, ensuring that it cannot be acquired by terrorists or countries of proliferation concern. Canada has also contributed funds towards Russia’s plutonium disposition programme, which will convert 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium into forms not usable for weapons. In addition, Canada contributed to a United States-led project to shut down the last Russian weapons-grade plutonium-producing reactor in Zheleznogorsk. Canada strongly supports the Nuclear Security Summit and welcomes the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world. At the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, the Prime Minister announced that Canada would contribute Can\$ 5 million and Can\$ 3 million, respectively, to United States-led nuclear security projects in Mexico and Viet Nam. Those projects involved the conversion of nuclear reactors and the complete removal of highly enriched uranium from these countries. The project in Mexico was completed in March 2012 and the project in Viet Nam is

expected to be completed in 2013. Through its renewed Global Partnership Program, Canada will continue to work to develop nuclear security projects around the world.

Step 11

30. Canada is a State party to various conventions, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Treaty on Open Skies, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons) and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty). Canada continues to support mine action in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe and South America.

Step 12

31. Canada continues to encourage States to submit information about their efforts and activities to implement the Treaty as official reports to the Preparatory Committee and Review Conferences.

Step 13

32. At the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, Canada put forward decision 64/512, on verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, which was adopted by consensus.

Article VII

33. Canada continues to underline the need to preserve and respect the negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty through Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and, as applicable, their respective nuclear postures. Canada is not a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Article VIII

34. The indefinite extension of the Treaty and accompanying decisions adopted in 1995 enshrined the concept of permanence with accountability. In accordance with the commitments arising from the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, Canada delivered at the 2010 Review Conference its fifth report on its implementation of the Treaty, which was preceded by reports at the 2007, 2008 and 2009 sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Canada also reported to the Preparatory Committee in 2012 and to the 2010 Review Conference on the steps that it had taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

35. Canada has been active in promoting measures to reinforce the authority and integrity of the Treaty and ensure the implementation of its obligations. At the 2010 Review Conference, Canada presented a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.4) with recommendations for strengthening the institutional structure of the Treaty. Canada continues to support efforts to make the Treaty's institutional structure more responsive, flexible and accountable.

Article IX

36. Canada has consistently worked for the universalization of the Treaty. At the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored resolution 67/59, on united action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in which the Assembly reaffirmed the importance of the universality of the Treaty and called upon States not party to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions. Canada views its position in this regard as consistent with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) (and resolutions 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008)) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in which the Council called upon all States to promote the universal adoption and full implementation of multilateral treaties, the aims of which were to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Article X

37. Canada has continued to coordinate a core group of countries at the IAEA General Conference responsible for a resolution on North Korea, although France temporarily coordinated the group during the 2012 IAEA General Conference. Since 2006, the Canadian-led core group has annually facilitated the adoption of a resolution to promote the resumption of that country's obligations under the Treaty, including the implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement.

38. Canada welcomed the indefinite extension of the Treaty, adopted without a vote in 1995. Negative security assurances provided in 1995 by the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) furnished part of the basis for this indefinite extension, as did paragraph 8 of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Article XI

39. The present report was submitted in Canada's official languages, English and French, which are two of the five languages of the Treaty text.

Steps taken to implement the 2010 action plan

Action 1. Canada's international security policy continues to promote the non-proliferation, reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Action 2. Canada continues to promote the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in the implementation of Treaty obligations.

Action 3. This action is not applicable, being a commitment for nuclear-weapon States.

Action 4. Canada welcomed the entry into force of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on 5 February 2011.

Action 5. As a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Canada endorsed the group's draft standard reporting form to promote greater transparency with regard to the nuclear stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. This draft reporting form was circulated at the 2012 session of the Preparatory Committee with the Initiative's joint working paper on transparency. In September 2012, Canada worked with its partners in the Initiative to engage the nuclear-weapon States on the draft reporting form.

Action 6. Canada continues to call upon the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a comprehensive programme of work that addresses all the core issues on the Conference's agenda.

Action 7. Canada continues to call upon the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a comprehensive programme of work that addresses all the core issues on the Conference's agenda.

Action 8. This action is not applicable, being a commitment for nuclear-weapon States.

Action 9. While Canada is not a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, it supports the convening of a conference on a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East, as agreed upon in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference.

Action 10. Canada continues to call upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as soon as possible and without condition. Canada welcomed the ratification of the Treaty by Indonesia, an Annex 2 State, in February 2012.

Action 11. Canada ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in December 1998.

Action 12. Canada was an active participant at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which took place on 23 September 2011 in New York. Canada joined the consensus on the final declaration produced by the Conference.

Action 13. As a part of its presidency of the Group of Eight in 2010, Canada launched an initiative that made diplomatic representations on behalf of the Group in States that had yet to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. That initiative continued in 2011 and 2012. Furthermore, in September 2012, Canada co-hosted a friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ministerial-level event on the margins of the General Assembly high-level meetings in New York. Such events have been convened since 2002 in years when conferences on facilitating the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty are not held.

Action 14. In October 2012, Canada finalized a contribution arrangement with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization for the provision of equipment and operational training to strengthen on-site inspection capabilities. Canada continues to promote the completion of the Treaty's International Monitoring System. Canada is host to 16 stations and

laboratories that are a part of the System. All the facilities hosted by Canada had been completed and certified by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization as at November 2009.

Action 15. At the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, Canada sponsored resolution 67/53, on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in which, among other things, the Assembly called for the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty early in its 2013 session. Furthermore, it requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not negotiate such a treaty.

Action 16. This action is not applicable, being a commitment for nuclear-weapon States.

Action 17. Canada supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure that fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes is irreversibly removed.

Action 18. Canada does not operate any facility that produces fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Action 19. Canada continues to support efforts to increase confidence, improve transparency and develop efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.

Action 20. Canada continues to encourage States to submit information about their efforts and activities to implement the Treaty as official reports to the Preparatory Committee and Review Conferences.

Action 21. As a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Canada endorsed the Initiative's draft standard reporting form to promote greater transparency with regard to the nuclear stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

Action 22. Since 2003, Canada, through the International Security Research and Outreach Programme of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, has collaborated with a Canadian non-governmental organization on an annual graduate research awards competition. The programme aims to engage postgraduate students at Canadian universities on select issues on the international security agenda, in particular nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. In 2010, the project was expanded to include the presentation of and debate on research papers by award recipients at an event attended by Canadian officials and the Canadian expert community.

Action 23. Canada continues to call upon States that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

Action 24. Pursuant to article III, Canada has in place a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol with IAEA.

Action 25. Canada urges all States that have not yet done so to complete and implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol with IAEA, which Canada views as the safeguards standard required under article III.

Action 26. With Canada's comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol in place, IAEA has reached annual conclusions regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Canada. This broader conclusion was first achieved in 2005 and has been maintained on an annual basis. It provides the highest level of confidence that Canada is in compliance with its commitments under the Treaty. Furthermore, the attainment and maintenance of the broader conclusion has allowed IAEA to fundamentally change the way safeguards are applied in Canada, by implementing a State-level integrated safeguards approach. These developments are a direct result of Canada's strong support for the IAEA safeguards system and of the high level of cooperation between IAEA and Canada in the implementation of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol.

Action 27. Canada is in full compliance with its safeguards obligations and is in full conformity with the IAEA Statute. Canada continues to use its membership of the Board of Governors to direct IAEA to resolve cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations.

Action 28. In support of IAEA efforts to strengthen the safeguards system, Canada brought into force a protocol additional to its safeguards agreement on 8 September 2000. Canada has provided updates to its declaration pursuant to article II of the protocol on an annual basis and has provided complementary access to IAEA inspectors under the provisions of article V. Canada urges States that have yet to do so to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol with IAEA.

Action 29. At their meeting in September 2012, the ministers of the States members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative agreed to send joint letters to key States that had not yet ratified or implemented an additional protocol agreement with IAEA. Canada also supported the joint Group of Eight outreach initiative in 2013 to advance the universalization of the Additional Protocol.

Action 30. This action is not applicable, being a commitment for nuclear-weapon States.

Action 31. This action is not applicable, being a commitment for States with a small quantities protocol.

Action 32. Canada regularly assesses the status of its safeguards to ensure that they are as effective and efficient as possible, and implements all decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies.

Action 33. Canada continues to provide the fullest possible political, technical and financial support to IAEA. Canada consistently provides experts to IAEA technical working groups, supports the Director General and Secretariat, pays its assessed contributions on time and in full and contributes significant extrabudgetary funding to the Agency's Department of Safeguards on an annual basis. In addition, in March 2013, Canada contributed an additional \$3 million through its Global Partnership Program to upgrade IAEA safeguards capabilities.

Action 34. Through the Canadian Safeguards Support Programme, Canada contributes to the research, development and support of safeguards equipment and techniques for both domestic and international use aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards. This effort resulted in an

average annual contribution of approximately Can\$ 1 million over the past three fiscal years and included the further development of equipment for the verification of spent fuel assemblies at light water reactors and its adaptation for use at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, new systems for the monitoring of on-load refuelled reactors, development of laser technology for nuclear material identification and support for improving IAEA processes in drawing safeguards conclusions.

Action 35. Consistent with its obligation not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to IAEA safeguards, and with decision 2, paragraph 12, of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Canada will authorize nuclear cooperation involving proliferation-significant items only with those non-nuclear-weapon States that have made an internationally legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and have accepted IAEA safeguards on the full scope of their nuclear activities. All Canada's nuclear partners have accepted, through a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Canada, a number of additional measures designed to ensure that nuclear items supplied by Canada do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Action 36. Canada's national export control system is consistent with the lists of those multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms in which it participates. These measures ensure that nuclear non-proliferation policies are met, while facilitating peaceful nuclear commerce and international cooperation.

Action 37. Canada maintains a national system for controlling the export of all items especially designed or prepared for nuclear use and certain nuclear-related dual-use items. It ensures that exports of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items are not authorized where there is found to be an unacceptable risk of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction programme or an unsafeguarded facility, or when an export would be otherwise contrary to Canada's non-proliferation policy and international commitments and obligations.

Action 38. Canada supports the legitimate right of all States parties to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes. Canada negotiates nuclear cooperation agreements with States parties, including developing countries, to facilitate mutually beneficial exchanges for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Action 39. In view of the inherent relationship between States parties' inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country.

Action 40. Canada remains committed to maintaining the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Canada achieves effective physical protection at the domestic level through a robust regulatory framework that integrates relevant safety, security and safeguard elements, the implementation of strong physical protection measures and an industry that fully understands and fulfils its responsibilities. This is reinforced by close

cooperation on nuclear security issues between the regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, federal and provincial law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the industry, foreign Governments and international organizations. In April 2012, Canada passed legislation to amend its Criminal Code to improve its approach to prosecute those who commit acts of nuclear terrorism. Canada's ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials is imminent.

Action 41. Following a complete review, nuclear security regulations were amended in 2006 to further reinforce the physical protection of nuclear materials in Canada. Canadian physical protection measures include armed on-site response forces, constant threat monitoring, enhanced security screening, a comprehensive drill and exercise programme and robust perimeter protection. Physical protection is strengthened by a rigorous nuclear material accounting system that tracks nuclear materials, in line with Canada's international commitments.

Action 42. Canada's ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials is imminent. Canada encourages all States in a position to do so to ratify the Amendment as soon as possible.

Action 43. Canada remains committed to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Canada further encourages all States to implement the provisions of the Code and Guidance in a harmonized manner to assist in providing assurances that radioactive sources are used and maintained within an appropriate regulatory framework of radiation safety and security.

Action 44. Canada supports counter-proliferation initiatives such as Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Canada regularly promotes these efforts in multilateral forums and works to advance these issues within, among others, the Group of Eight, the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, the General Assembly and NATO. Canada encourages States that have not yet done so to join these initiatives in order to strengthen the international counter-proliferation framework. Canada's Global Partnership Program has a dedicated unit under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which has a number of projects under way, including delivering chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives training to States that make requests through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Canada is beginning a pilot project on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives training in Colombia, in response to a request made to the Committee. In addition, Canada hosted a Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism tabletop exercise in May 2012 in Toronto. The event focused on intergovernmental interaction during a consequence management event following a radiological attack. Canada participates fully in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database programme. Canada is also supporting regional workshops to build the capacity of States to adapt national legislation that would facilitate the ratification of international legal instruments related to the security of nuclear materials, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its Amendment. Canada continues to assess areas to improve its national capability to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Canada has established effective

domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their components, in accordance with its international legal obligations.

Action 45. Canada signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and is in the process of ratifying it.

Action 46. Canada views a strong and cooperative State system of accounting and control as vital to the implementation of an effective safeguards system. The nature of a country's system is one of the key State-specific factors that IAEA considers when developing a State-level approach to safeguards, which allows for a more focused, adaptable safeguards system. Canada regularly advocates these views within various international forums and continues to work with IAEA in further developing the State-level safeguards concept.

Action 47. Canada possesses an indigenous nuclear power reactor system, a broad and diverse nuclear sector, and is a reliable supplier of uranium, nuclear equipment and technology and radioisotopes.

Action 48. Canada strongly supports the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In view of the inherent relationship between States' inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country.

Action 49. Canada provides experts, equipment and technology through technical cooperation to many developing States parties. Canada has nuclear cooperation with developing countries; cooperation has included exports of nuclear power reactors, nuclear material and equipment.

Action 50. Canada strongly supports the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In view of the inherent relationship between States' inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country. Canada is a strong supporter of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and provides experts, equipment and technology through this programme to developing States parties. Canada's exports of nuclear power reactors and equipment have been to developing countries.

Action 51. Canada is committed to working with other States and relevant international organizations on new arrangements for the supply of nuclear items, consistent with the balance of rights and obligations agreed to in the Treaty and in particular in articles I, II, III and IV. Canada currently has in place 27 nuclear cooperation agreements with 44 States parties to the Treaty.

Action 52. Canada is a strong supporter of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. Canada is actively involved in the work and decisions of the IAEA Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee, in addition to the annual negotiation and adoption of an IAEA General Conference resolution on the strengthening of technical cooperation. Canada contributes significant funding, equipment and expertise to the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme and continues to encourage more focus on results and the dedication of more resources to project implementation and away from administration of the programme, in the first instance by fewer and larger technical cooperation projects.

Canada further supports IAEA partnerships with other United Nations development agencies with a view to leveraging additional funding for technical cooperation project implementation.

Action 53. Canada strongly supports the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada also remains a strong supporter of and financial contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. Canada provides experts, equipment and technology through technical cooperation to developing States parties. Canada's exports of nuclear power reactors and equipment have been to developing countries. Canada is actively involved in the work and decisions of the IAEA Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee, in addition to the annual negotiation and adoption of an IAEA General Conference resolution on the strengthening of technical cooperation.

Action 54. Canada believes strongly in the importance of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund and continues to contribute its assessed voluntary contribution. Canada also uses its membership of the IAEA Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee to ensure better use of Fund resources.

Action 55. Canada supports the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative, including by providing in-kind resources to projects.

Action 56. Canada regularly contributes to projects under the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund intended to support the training of the skilled workforce necessary for countries seeking to develop their own nuclear energy infrastructure. Canada drafts and introduces alternating, biennial IAEA General Conference resolutions on nuclear power infrastructure development and nuclear knowledge, education and training.

Action 57. Canada ensures that the use of nuclear energy is consistent with its national legislation and respective international obligations, both in terms of nuclear safety, nuclear security and nuclear safeguards. Canada has performed a systematic and thorough review of the implications and lessons learned from the accident in March 2011 in Fukushima. The assessment concluded that Canadian nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities in Canada were safe, the Canadian nuclear regulatory framework strong and emergency preparedness and response measures adequate.

Action 58. Canada acknowledges the potential contribution that new mechanisms could make to help to ensure reliable access to nuclear fuel if they provide increased confidence to those seeking to develop or expand nuclear power capabilities. With this in view, Canada supported the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors to establish an IAEA low-enriched uranium fuel bank and will continue to assess proposed fuel assurance mechanisms on their individual merits.

Action 59. Canada is a State party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Canada's ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is imminent.

Action 60. The Fukushima nuclear crisis tested Canadian abilities to respond to serious nuclear safety accidents. Canada was able to offer a significant package of expertise and assistance to Japan. Canadian nuclear and health experts produced daily assessments and modelling of the situation, developed a recommended precautionary evacuation zone for Canadians and provided daily analysis of the worst-case scenarios to guide policy. In December 2011, the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service completed its follow up assessment of Canada's nuclear regulatory framework, which confirmed that Canada's actions in response to the Fukushima accident had been prompt, robust and comprehensive. The response of the Canadian nuclear regulator was identified as a good practice that should be used by other regulatory bodies. Canada supports and encourages Integrated Regulatory Review Service peer reviews to share best practices in the area of nuclear safety. Peer reviews compare a country's regulatory practices with international standards and equivalent good practices elsewhere in the world. In this regard, Canada has published both the findings made by the Integrated Regulatory Review Service in its 2011 follow-up mission to Canada, as well as follow-up actions taken as a result of those findings, and encourages others to do the same. Canada continues to promote the openness and transparency of the Convention on Nuclear Safety review process and in that regard fully supports the latest initiative adopted by the Contracting Parties at their second extraordinary meeting to establish an effectiveness and transparency working group. With regard to nuclear security, Canada continues to actively assist in the further development of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series to assist and promote international recommendations and guidance in this area. Canada has contributed experts to assist in the development, in particular that of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals and the three recommendation-level documents within the series that provide the basis for the technical and implementing guides. Canada has provided experts to IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service teams to further assist in this area. Canada further actively supports the World Institute for Nuclear Security, has assisted with co-hosting three Institute conferences in Canada to date and has participated in other conferences resulting in Institute best practices guides being produced.

Action 61. At the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., Canada committed itself to working with the United States to repatriate spent, United States-origin, highly enriched uranium fuel stored at Chalk River Laboratories by the end of 2018. Canada has made good progress in this commitment, with the first shipment of spent highly enriched uranium fuel successfully returned to the United States in 2010 and a second shipment planned for later in 2013. At the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, Canada agreed to work with the United States to repatriate additional non-fuel highly enriched uranium materials stored at Chalk River Laboratories by 2018. In 2010, Canada signalled its intention to cease isotope production using highly enriched uranium targets by 2016 and invested \$35 million to support the development of alternative isotope production technologies that did not use uranium. In its 2012 budget, Canada reinforced its commitment by providing an additional \$17 million over two years to further the accelerated development of such non-highly enriched uranium isotope technologies.

Action 62. Canada transports radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection. Transport regulations are based on the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive

Materials. Canada also actively participates in the development of IAEA regulations in this area.

Action 63. Canada recognizes the importance of bringing forward modernized nuclear civil liability legislation to bring compensation in line with internationally accepted levels. The Department of Natural Resources is now preparing recommendations to its minister to revise the legislation.

Action 64. Canada notes and reaffirms the consensus reached at the fifty-third regular session of the IAEA General Conference that any armed attack on and threat against safeguarded nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the IAEA Statute.
