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Disarmament*

Working paper submitted by the United States of America**

In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama stated "clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons." Speaking in Seoul in March 2012, the President reaffirmed U.S. support for this goal and highlighted the near-term, practical steps that the United States is taking to move in that direction. These include reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, further reducing our nuclear stockpile, implementing the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), pursuing U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), seeking a treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), and strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a basis for cooperation.

The United States is leading by example in fulfilling its obligations under the NPT and the commitments set out in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. The United States reaffirms its commitment to the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency as necessary building blocks of nuclear disarmament. The United States is also working with all other countries to implement the Action Plan effectively across all three NPT pillars.

Nuclear arms reductions

The United States has been reducing its inventory of nuclear weapons for more than four decades. By September 2009, the U.S. nuclear stockpile was reduced by 84 percent from its peak in 1967. In absolute numbers, the nuclear warheads in the U.S. stockpile declined from 31,255 in 1967 to 5,113 on 30 September 2009, and reductions have continued since then. During this period, the United States unilaterally reduced its non-strategic nuclear warheads by 90 percent.

* Issued without formal editing.

** This paper updates the U.S. paper on the same subject submitted at the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in 2012 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.20).

The New START Treaty, now in its third year in force, further demonstrates the ongoing commitment of the United States to work toward the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. When the Treaty limits apply in 2018, the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Russia will be capped at their lowest level since the 1950s. Under the Treaty, the United States and Russia must limit their deployed strategic warheads to no more than 1,550 by February 2018. As of 1 September 2012, the United States had 1,722 warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers. In addition, we had 806 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, and 1,034 total deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers.

When President Obama signed the New START Treaty on 8 April 2010, and again in his March 2012 speech in Seoul, he made clear his commitment to further reductions and to pursuing discussions with Russia on further reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons — strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed. In his 2013 State of the Union address, the President reiterated his commitment to further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. To this end, the United States seeks to promote strategic stability and increase transparency on a reciprocal basis with Russia by means of an ongoing dialogue in the Arms Control and International Security Working Group of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission.

The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review outlined the U.S. approach to reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. It makes clear the view of the United States that the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. Accordingly, to reflect the security environment of the twenty-first century, the Review announced that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. In NATO's May 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, NATO Allies acknowledged the importance of the negative security assurances offered by the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The Allies further recognized the value that these statements can have in seeking to discourage nuclear proliferation.

On modernization, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review made clear that the United States will not develop new nuclear warheads nor will its Life Extension Programs support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities. It is in the U.S. interest, and that of all other nations, that the now nearly 68-year record of nuclear weapon non-use be extended forever.

NATO's May 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review makes clear that NATO is resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the *conditions for a world without nuclear weapons* in accordance with the goals of the NPT, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dramatically reduced the number, types, and readiness of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. NATO has said it is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in the

context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the disparity between Russian and U.S. NSNW stockpiles in Europe and the broader security environment.

The goal of a world without nuclear weapons will not be reached quickly. It will take a sustained commitment and persistence and be pursued through concrete, practical steps. The President reaffirmed in his 2009 Prague speech that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on the security commitments undertaken by the United States.

Verification, transparency and confidence-building

The United States strongly supports the principle that compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements must be monitored and diligently enforced. We also believe that information sharing and confidence-building measures contribute to stability and security by enhancing predictability, and that transparency is essential to building trust and confidence to create the necessary foundation for further disarmament.

The rigorous and extensive verification provisions of the New START Treaty testify to the importance of transparency and effective verification in providing predictability and stability in international relations. Implementation of the Treaty is going very well. Treaty on-site inspections and other verification measures enable each Party to maintain confidence. The Treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission has met five times, most recently in February 2013, and has proven to be an effective forum for resolving important Treaty implementation issues. In addition, through their respective Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the United States and Russia have exchanged more than 3,800 notifications on the numbers, locations, movements, and eliminations of U.S. and Russian strategic forces covered by the Treaty.

Unilateral transparency measures are also important. Examples include the U.S. release in 2010 of the U.S. nuclear-weapon stockpile figures and articulation in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review of the reduced role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national strategy. In addition, the U.S. nuclear community is exploring the technical steps needed to ensure irreversibility, verifiability and transparency as essential building blocks for further nuclear disarmament, and is considering ways to collaborate with other parties to the NPT in this undertaking. The United States is laying the groundwork for future transparency and verification initiatives, such as managing access at sensitive sites and sharing potentially sensitive verification measurements. Research includes the development of advanced nuclear detector materials, the advancement of chain-of-custody capabilities and the completion of seismic source physics and noble gas migration experiments to improve nuclear testing detection capabilities.

Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the five nuclear-weapon States under the NPT (or "P5") have met regularly to address our commitments under the 2010 NPT Action Plan and to review our progress towards fulfilling them. This is in addition to our individual efforts to promote transparency and verifiability and to fulfill Action Plan commitments. On 18 and 19 April 2013, Russia hosted the fourth successful P5 Conference. The P5 process has expanded the long-standing U.S.-Russia nuclear disarmament dialogue into an ongoing process of

P5 engagement, consistent with our obligations under Article VI of the NPT and our commitments under the Action Plan.

Nuclear testing

In his Prague speech, President Obama pledged that his Administration would pursue U.S. ratification of the CTBT. The Administration has been engaging with the U.S. Senate, laying the groundwork for positive Senate reconsideration of the Treaty. While preparing for U.S. ratification, the Administration has continued to encourage all states that have yet to do so to sign and ratify the Treaty and to work for its early entry into force.

The last U.S. test of a nuclear explosive device was in September 1992 and the United States recently commemorated 20 years without a nuclear test. The United States has maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing, has no intention of resuming testing, and calls upon all states to refrain from nuclear explosive testing. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reiterated that the United States no longer requires nuclear explosive testing to ensure the safety and effectiveness of our remaining nuclear weapons, relying instead on our long-standing Stockpile Stewardship Program. The United States calls upon all states, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), to refrain from nuclear testing.

In addition to using enhanced U.S. national technical means to monitor for nuclear explosions, the United States has continued to support the completion of the monitoring and verification regime under the CTBT, including the International Monitoring System supported by the International Data Centre and the Treaty's on-site inspection (OSI) elements. The United States also continues to provide technical expertise to refine the use of Treaty-specified OSI technologies, and to work with the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and with international partners to prepare for an OSI integrated field exercise in 2014. The United States has continued to work closely with the PTS on the design and procurement plans for the reinstallation of the hydroacoustic station in the Crozet Archipelago in the Indian Ocean. The United States has provided up to $25.5 million to underwrite the project, and provided voluntary contributions-in-kind of $8.9 million and $7.5 million in 2011 and 2012, respectively, for other projects to accelerate development of the Treaty's verification regime.

Fissile material

For many years, the United States has been unilaterally dismantling thousands of nuclear warheads and taking other measures to reduce its nuclear arsenal, in addition to fulfilling requirements set out in international agreements. Meanwhile, the United States has not produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons since 1964 or produced plutonium for weapons since 1988.

The United States has worked with Russia for a number of years to eliminate excess stocks of fissile material that could be used in nuclear warheads. In 1994, 174 metric tons of HEU was removed from the U.S. weapons program. In 2005, the United States announced that an additional 200 metric tons of HEU would be removed, which would be enough for more than 11,000 nuclear weapons. Of that amount, 160 metric tons was designated for use as naval reactor fuel, 20 metric tons was designated for research and space reactor requirements, and 20 metric tons was

designated for down-blending to low-enriched uranium. To date, the United States has down-blended 134 metric tons of its own stocks of HEU to low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel. Additionally, under the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement, 472 metric tons of Russian weapons-origin HEU, which is equivalent to about 18,900 nuclear weapons, has now been down-blended for use as commercial reactor fuel in the United States; that number is expected to reach the Agreement's 500-metric ton target within this calendar year.

In addition, more than 60 metric tons of plutonium was removed from U.S. defence stocks, of which 34 metric tons was included in the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defence Purposes and Related Cooperation. In July 2011, the United States and Russia brought this Agreement and the 2006 and 2010 Protocols thereto into force. The amended Agreement commits each country to dispose of at least 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium, enough in total for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. Disposition will be subject to IAEA monitoring and will transform the material into forms that cannot be used for nuclear weapons.

The United States remains certain that a verified end to the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is an essential and the next logical multilateral step towards disarmament. We have been working to initiate negotiations on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and we are disappointed at the CD's lack of progress. We are also endeavoring to use available opportunities on the margins of the CD to make progress toward FMCT negotiations, including serious consultations among the states that would be directly affected by an FMCT. We are hopeful that the UN Group of Governmental Experts to be established by UN General Assembly Resolution 67/53 will also provide an impetus to the CD.

Non-nuclear disarmament and arms control efforts

Early and significant demonstrations of the U.S. commitment to disarmament were in the fields of biological, chemical and conventional weapons.

The 1969 U.S. decision to unilaterally dismantle our biological weapons program, and our leadership role in negotiating the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), were ground-breaking. Over the years, we have contributed significantly to strengthening the Convention and have led efforts to address changing threats through the Convention. This has been achieved through BWC-related efforts involving not only governments, but also the non-governmental, scientific, and law enforcement communities and the private sector in areas such as dual-use technology, synthetic biology, and codes of conduct for life scientists. At the Seventh BWC Review Conference in 2011, then-Secretary Clinton stressed the need to take practical steps to "bolster international confidence that all countries are living up to our obligations under the Convention." To this end, the United States has made efforts to demonstrate transparency regarding the agencies, projects, and facilities associated with our biodefense programs. The United States continues to pursue initiatives to guard against misuse of the life sciences and to strengthen international preparedness and response capabilities.

The United States continues its steadfast commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and will continue working in a transparent manner towards the complete destruction of its remaining small amount of chemical weapons. To date, we have destroyed approximately 90 percent of our chemical weapons stockpile. The United States also remains fully committed to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons and to working to ensure that there will be no re-emergence of chemical weapons. Such a goal will take commitment from all States Parties and a continued effort in a number of areas to include universality. We recognize that preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons requires a strong inspectorate, a credible industrial verification regime, and enactment by all States Parties of the necessary domestic legal regimes to fully enforce the CWC. These are all areas that will continually be of vital importance for the success and longevity of the CWC and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which is responsible for its implementation. The Third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention sought to reinforce these issues and work with international partners to ensure that the CWC remains an important instrument for ensuring global peace and security.

The United States has continued to take a lead role within the international community in conventional arms control efforts. For example, the three conventional arms control pillars in Europe, the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, the Treaty on Open Skies, and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, are the foundation stones of conventional military transparency and confidence in the Euro-Atlantic region. The United States continues to actively engage with NATO Allies, Russia, and other partners to determine future requirements in an effort to modernize the conventional arms control regime in Europe.

The United States has contributed to conventional weapons disarmament efforts in other ways as well. At the end of 2010, we ended all use of persistent landmines, both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle. Since 1993, we have provided more than $2 billion in support to over 90 countries for conventional weapons destruction programs, including the clearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance; destruction of excess, loosely-secured or otherwise at-risk conventional weapons and munitions; and physical security and stockpile management for weapons and munitions needed for legitimate security needs. Since 2003, we have worked with our partners to reduce over 33,000 excess, loosely-secured, illicitly held or otherwise at-risk man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) in 38 countries. We also support the implementation of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Protocols thereto.

The way ahead

The United States is making significant and far-reaching strides to implement Article VI of the NPT, and U.S. actions are under way at home and with the other P5 countries to put in place the building blocks for further progress. The implementation of President Obama’s Prague agenda and the 2010 NPT Action Plan is well under way. Much progress has been achieved, yet much remains to be done.

The United States will continue to work step by step towards fulfilling our obligations under Article VI and our commitments under the 2010 NPT Action Plan across all three NPT pillars. The United States will also continue to urge other parties to the Treaty to do the same. As Article VI makes clear, all parties to the Treaty have a role to play in disarmament.