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First Committee

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Official Records

Chair: Mr. Viinanen (Finland)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Agenda items 87 to 106 (continued)

General debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chair: Before opening the floor, I should like to remind all delegations once more that the rolling list of speakers for the general debate will close today at 6 p.m. All delegations interested in speaking should make every effort to inscribe their names on the list before that deadline.

Mr. Askarov (Uzbekistan) (*spoke in Russian*): I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chair of the First Committee at the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly. We are confident that under your stewardship the work of the First Committee will be successful.

I speak on behalf of the Central Asian States as Coordinator of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The Treaty's entry into force on 21 March 2009 was a long-awaited event and an important step marking the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia.

In welcoming the entry into force of the Treaty, Central Asia considers that the achievement of a nuclear-free zone in the region is a powerful factor for supporting peace, regional stability and fruitful cooperation among our countries. It is our collective contribution to the progressive development of the global community and, of course, an important element

in strengthening regional security and nuclear disarmament. The process of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia involved the constructive efforts of all five Central Asian States striving to ensure security, stability and peace in the region and to create the conditions needed for the development and prosperity of their peoples.

In September 1997 there was an international conference in Tashkent entitled "Central Asia — Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone". The treaty-signing ceremony took place in Semipalatinsk, where in 1991 the Semipalatinsk nuclear-weapon-test site was closed down. The Kyrgyz Republic is the depositary for the Treaty.

The first consultative meeting of States parties to the Treaty took place in Turkmenistan on 15 October 2009. The second consultative meeting was held on 15 March 2011 in Tashkent. The parties to the Treaty undertook to ban the production, acquisition, development and deployment in their territories of nuclear weapons and components thereof and any other nuclear explosive devices.

The new zone in Central Asia is unique in many respects. It is the first nuclear-free zone in the northern hemisphere, in a region that borders two nuclear Powers — the Russian Federation and China. The Treaty is also the first multilateral agreement on security that encompasses all five countries of Central Asia. It is an important contribution to the fight against international terrorism and in preventing nuclear

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materials and technology from falling into the hands of terrorists.

In 1992 Mongolia, another neighbour of Russia and China, declared its nuclear-weapon-free status. That decision received international recognition in General Assembly resolutions. We are also looking to develop other nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the Middle East. These strong guarantees for peace and security in and around our region are important conditions for the stable development, cooperation and progress of States and their civilized integration into the global community.

Each of our States has its own individual characteristics that have dictated the choice of its own path to integration into modern civilization. However, we also have a common history, and in the future as well we will have much in common. The Central Asian zone has enormous resources; it could become the wealthiest region in the world. That can help us build relations and harmonize interests. Our Governments are working to that end.

The participants in the first consultative meeting of the States parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia showed resolve to cooperate in every way in the disarmament process in the region. They noted the importance of further work to bring together the positions of the States of Central Asia and of nuclear-weapon States on the question of negative guarantees.

The countries of Central Asia have called upon States and international organizations with experience and knowledge with regard to rehabilitating radiation-contaminated areas and objects to provide assistance in overcoming the ecological consequences of extracting uranium ore and in activities linked to nuclear testing.

Undoubtedly, the designation of our region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone contributes to a higher profile for Central Asia as a whole and for each State in the region individually. The nuclear-free zone in Central Asia will have an influence beyond our region, providing positive influences and removing possible threats.

We call on the nuclear States to confirm their adherence to negative security guarantees for non-nuclear States.

Recent events in the area of nuclear non-proliferation show that a nuclear-weapon-free zone

in Central Asia will make a real contribution to implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to the overall disarmament process, and to building regional security mechanisms. The Treaty's entry into force has enabled us to overcome stagnation in the multilateral negotiation process on non-proliferation. Nuclear control activities can be effective only through a system for implementation of agreements and treaties and major political initiatives.

Central Asia calls on all parties to overcome the legal obstacles in the non-proliferation process and to propose ways to adapt to the new reality of the whole system of multilateral agreements, including the NPT. We must acknowledge that this Treaty is an asymmetrical agreement. It provides for penalties only against non-nuclear States. But if nuclear Powers veto the development of nuclear weapons, then they should be the first to cut back on and give up their atomic arsenal. If our collective goal is peace free of nuclear weapons, then both nuclear and non-nuclear countries must contribute to achieving it.

Mr. Swe (Myanmar): I have the pleasure of speaking on behalf of the member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

First, we would like to congratulate you, Sir, on your unanimous election as Chair of the First Committee. We believe that under your able and skilful leadership our deliberations will reach a successful conclusion. Our congratulations also go to the other members of the Bureau. We assure you of our full cooperation and support in discharging your important duty.

ASEAN is increasingly playing a vital role in maintaining peace and stability in South-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. That undoubtedly will contribute to international peace and security. We are also actively contributing towards the aims and objectives of achieving the goals of general and complete disarmament in order to ensure that the people and member States of ASEAN live in peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment.

In implementing one of the stipulated requirements in the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, the ASEAN leaders at the eighteenth ASEAN Summit, held in Jakarta on 7 and 8 May, launched the process for the establishment of

the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation to strengthen research activities on peace, conflict management and conflict resolution.

At their forty-fourth meeting the ASEAN Foreign Ministers acknowledged the significant role of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) as a code of conduct governing inter-State relations in the region. They welcomed the accession of non-ASEAN member States to the TAC and looked forward to the ratification of the Third Protocol amending the TAC by all High Contracting Parties so that the European Union can accede to the TAC. They also looked forward to the accession of Canada to the Third Protocol of the TAC.

Nuclear disarmament continues to be the highest priority on the disarmament agenda of ASEAN member States. In this connection, ASEAN welcomes the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation as an instrument that not only strengthens strategic stability between the two countries but also contributes to international peace and security.

ASEAN reiterates its call for the full implementation of the action plan contained in the Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). ASEAN also welcomes the successful outcome of the 2010 Conference and hopes that the momentum can be carried over to the 2015 Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee meetings, which will start next year.

ASEAN continues to support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a core instrument for the elimination of nuclear weapons. We reiterate our call on all States, particularly those whose ratification is needed for the Treaty's entry into force, to sign and ratify the CTBT at an early date. We commend the intention of Indonesia and the United States to ratify the Treaty.

The commitment and contributions of ASEAN member States to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in the work of the First Committee are reflected in the resolutions adopted by the Committee. One such resolution is entitled: "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*", to be submitted by Malaysia. That draft

resolution underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice on 8 July 1996 that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The draft resolution will once again call upon all States to fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.

In line with the highest priority that we attach to nuclear disarmament, Myanmar will again introduce a draft resolution on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe that the mere existence of nuclear weapons on the planet, coupled with the lack of a legal regime on the complete prohibition of such weapons, poses a serious threat to the survival of humankind. In order to step up our efforts to this end, we have outlined interim measures and steps that need to be taken by nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.

Indonesia, as Chair of ASEAN and on behalf of ASEAN member States, will introduce once again the biennial draft resolution entitled "Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)". We look forward to the support of all Member States for this draft resolution, as it encourages nuclear-weapon States and States parties to the Treaty to ensure the early accession of nuclear-weapon States to the Protocol to the Treaty.

While re-emphasizing the importance of preserving the South-East Asian region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and a zone free of all other weapons of mass destruction, we are encouraged by the frank and open consultations on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone between ASEAN and the nuclear-weapon States that was held in Geneva from 8 to 10 August 2011. ASEAN considered the consultations to be significant progress towards ensuring the early accession of the nuclear-weapon States to the Protocol to the Treaty. We will continue to engage the nuclear-weapon States and encourage them to accede at the earliest to the Protocol.

ASEAN continues to believe that the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk, as well as Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, contribute significantly to strengthening the global nuclear disarmament and nuclear

non-proliferation regime. ASEAN also underscores the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not exist, especially in the Middle East, and expresses its support for a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction remains an effective, comprehensive and non-discriminatory legal instrument on the prevention of the proliferation of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles.

We look forward to the successful convening of the seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. We urge States that have not yet done so to join these treaties at the earliest opportunity.

ASEAN upholds the United Nations Charter and international law and reaffirms the right of each ASEAN member State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion. ASEAN notes international agreements articulating the right of all States to territorial integrity.

ASEAN shares the concern at the negative impact of the illicit trade in small arms on security, human rights and social and economic development. In addressing this illicit trade, it is imperative to strive for the full implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. ASEAN reiterates its call on States and organizations to further strengthen cooperation and assistance in building national capacity for the effective implementation of the Programme of Action.

ASEAN member States believe that in negotiations on the issue of the unregulated trade in small arms, light weapons and/or conventional weapons, the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter should be taken into account, as should the interests and needs of all regions and groups. ASEAN member States will work together, in line with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter, for a balanced outcome.

ASEAN notes the important work done at the second Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, held in Beirut from 12 to 16 September. ASEAN appreciates the important contribution of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to the successful convening of the first Meeting of States Parties to the Convention.

ASEAN member States express their dismay that the Conference on Disarmament has again been unable to undertake substantive work on its agenda. ASEAN invites all Conference members to exert maximum political will and reiterates its call to adopt and implement a balanced and comprehensive programme of work on the basis of its agenda dealing, inter alia, with the core issues in accordance with the rules of procedure and by taking into consideration the security concerns of all States.

In this connection, ASEAN expresses its support for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. At the same time, the Conference on Disarmament should also focus on advancing the other core issues on the agenda of nuclear disarmament, including the negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention, negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

While reaffirming the importance of the principles of transparency and inclusiveness in the disarmament and non-proliferation negotiation process, ASEAN welcomes the call for the appointment of a special coordinator on the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament to examine modalities of review, without any prejudice to the outcome.

Guided by the ASEAN Leaders' Joint Statement issued at the eighteenth ASEAN Summit, we will enhance coordination and cooperation on key global issues in relevant multilateral forums and international organizations such as the United Nations and will also raise our constructive role on the global stage.

Mr. Propper (Israel): At the outset, let me join previous speakers in congratulating you, Sir, on your election as Chair of the First Committee, and assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation as you steer our deliberations towards a successful outcome.

The year that has passed since we last gathered in this Committee has seen a new Middle East evolving. The Arab world is undergoing an historic and significant transformation. The potential positive implications of the democratization process in the Middle East may offer an opportunity for a better atmosphere that could be conducive to the building of essential trust and confidence among regional parties.

While this process of transformation may yield positive results in the region, at the same time it harbours the potential risks of instability and polarization. Time alone will tell whether the Arab Spring will turn into full blossom or whether it will become a relentless winter. It is Israel's sincere hope that the positive outcome will prevail.

At present no regional dialogue exists in the Middle East, nor is there a mechanism to develop confidence-building measures among the countries of the region. Embarking on a process that could result in the eventual establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction is therefore incredibly complex. It raises many practical questions that emanate from the chronically unstable nature of the Middle East and the absence of a broader regional peace.

Israel's perspective and policy in the field of regional security and arms control has always been a pragmatic and realistic approach. It is rooted in its belief that all security concerns of regional members should be taken into account and be addressed within the regional context.

The essential prerequisites before the eventual establishment of the Middle East as a mutually verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems are, *inter alia*, comprehensive and durable peace between the regional parties and full compliance by all regional States with their arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. International experience has demonstrated that such a zone can emanate only from within a region through direct negotiations between regional parties. The Middle East region is no exception. No majority vote or one-sided resolutions in international forums can substitute for broad regional dialogue and cooperation.

In this spirit, Israel positively engaged last July, in Brussels, in the European Union seminar on promoting confidence-building in support of a process aimed at establishing a zone free of weapons of mass

destruction and means of delivery in the Middle East. Israel has also adopted a positive attitude towards the initiative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to convene a forum in November in which participants from the Middle East and other interested parties could learn from the experience of other regions relevant to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, including with regard to confidence-building. We believe that these complex issues must be addressed in direct discussions between the regional parties that can bridge differences and not exacerbate them.

For many years now the agenda of the First Committee has included two resolutions regarding the Middle East. The first deals with establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. That resolution has commanded consensus for around 30 years, and although Israel has certain reservations regarding its language, we do support the annual endorsement of this visionary goal.

In stark contrast to this spirit of cooperation, the Arab League is introducing a second draft resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". It is a contentious resolution that seeks to divert attention from the activities of some regional members that constitute flagrant violations of international obligations undertaken in the disarmament and non-proliferation sphere. It continues to ignore the region's real source of proliferation dangers. It also chooses to disregard the extreme hostility of certain countries in the region that continue to reject any form of peaceful reconciliation and coexistence with Israel.

The introduction of this draft resolution constitutes an annual declaration by its sponsors that they prefer to continue trying to alienate and isolate Israel rather than engage Israel in a cooperative manner. The decision of its sponsors last year to add a paragraph on a 2012 regional conference in this particular resolution raises profound questions regarding the real motivation of the Arab States.

In September this year, during the IAEA General Conference, the Arab States decided not to introduce the Israel Nuclear Capabilities resolution again. They explained it as a step to build confidence before coming events such as the November IAEA Forum. The gesture made in Vienna would be more credible if displayed also in other arms control forums, including the United Nations First Committee in New York. This

Committee would do well to foster and encourage initiatives of a conciliatory nature designed to reduce and lessen regional tensions rather than aggravate them. It is in this context that we call upon Member States to reject that approach and vote against this draft resolution.

The region of the Middle East has embodied and reflected many of the arms control and disarmament challenges faced by the international community. That is the result of what one can only describe as the habitual indulgence of some Middle Eastern States in becoming parties to international instruments that they do not intend to implement and, in some cases, even outright intend to breach.

There is no coincidence in the fact that four out of the five gross violations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have occurred in the Middle East — Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Libya, Syria and Iran — while the fifth case, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, has been deeply involved in nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Indeed, the most dangerous phenomena in the Middle East and well beyond are Iran's hostile policies and statements, its pursuit of nuclear weapons, aggressive development of missile technology and its active involvement in the support and training of the terrorist organizations and individuals.

Israel in particular has consistently been the target of Iran's vicious anti-Semitic campaign, including in this building, notably in statements made year after year by Iran's President calling for the destruction of Israel. The possibility that terrorists would enjoy an Iranian nuclear umbrella, or that they would actually receive such weapons from the Iranian regime, is startling and poses an imminent threat to regional as well as global peace and stability. We are convinced that without halting the Iranian nuclear programme it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to promote an international or regional agenda aimed at strengthening the prevailing non-proliferation regime.

The international community has been shaken this year by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. Our hearts go out to the Government and people of Japan. Against this tragic backdrop, it is not surprising that the safety of nuclear power and the future of the nuclear industry has become a pressing issue in many countries. Nuclear safety should become a priority of the first order when countries consider the

development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In a volatile region such as the Middle East, and given the poor track record of some countries of the region, the issue of the misuse of technology should also be addressed.

The Nuclear Security Summit hosted by United States President Barack Obama recognized the close association between the threat of nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear terrorism sponsored and supported by rogue States. With the collapse of Qaddafi's regime and the volatile situation in Syria, efforts by the international community should be directed towards urgent counter-proliferation issues in those two countries. The worrisome situation in Libya and Syria is a fresh reminder of the need to work together to secure nuclear and chemical materials and to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking and terrorism. This topic should also be the focus of the second Nuclear Security Summit to be held in South Korea next year.

Despite the international nuclear non-proliferation regime's inability adequately to address the particular challenges of the Middle East, Israel has always valued that machinery and acknowledged its importance. Israel has, over the years, demonstrated a consistent policy of responsibility and restraint in the nuclear domain and has supported and, wherever possible, joined treaties and initiatives aimed at curbing and halting nuclear proliferation. As a signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Israel is an active member of the CTBT Organization Preparatory Commission. It maintains two seismic monitoring stations and has contributed significantly to the build-up of the Treaty's verification regime. Israel appreciates the significant progress made in the development of that verification regime, whose completion is a prerequisite to entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with its article IV.

Israel attributes importance to discussing the revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament. While there can be no dispute that the Conference on Disarmament is in need of an up-to-date and clear vision that would allow it to overcome a long stalemate, its revitalization has to take place within the Conference on Disarmament itself. The Conference on Disarmament is a unique body, widely recognized as the single multilateral negotiating body in the disarmament sphere. Its singularity stems from its membership, as well as from its rules of procedure. Although criticized by some as outdated and as a

reflection of past geopolitical realities, Israel remains convinced that the rules of procedure are suited to the complexity and sensitivity of the issues placed on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The rules of procedure, and in particular the rule of consensus, reflect the necessity to protect vital security interests and provide negotiating States with the comfort levels required for dealing with such critical issues. In principle, Israel does not support taking outside the Conference on Disarmament issues that have been mandated to that body, nor do we find such initiatives to be necessarily helpful for the promotion of meaningful work in the Conference on Disarmament.

Israel has been stressing for several years that the prevention of transfers of conventional and non-conventional arms to terrorists should be addressed by the international community as a matter of priority. For example, recent cases have again demonstrated the threat that may be caused by man-portable air-defence systems. Some of those missiles could fall into the wrong hands and present a serious threat to civil aviation. It is our view that a clear and comprehensive norm banning the transfer of arms to terrorists should be created, alongside the demand for concrete steps to be taken.

Israel supports the ongoing negotiations on a new protocol on cluster munitions within the framework of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), aimed at finding the appropriate balance between military and humanitarian concerns. We are of the view that those negotiations could have a real impact on the ground from a humanitarian point of view. It is our hope that States, which have been engaged on parallel tracks, will not hold out on the possibility of achieving substantive achievements within the CCW. Much work, effort and resources have been invested in the negotiation process over the past four years. The Fourth Review Conference of the CCW will take place next month and we trust and hope that we will be in a position to adopt the sixth protocol at that time. From the humanitarian viewpoint further delay in the adoption of that protocol cannot be justified.

As a State party to the CCW and amended Protocol II, Israel has undertaken concrete measures aimed at reducing the potentially adverse consequences that may be associated with the use of anti-personnel

landmines, thereby striking an appropriate balance between humanitarian concerns and legitimate security needs. In that regard, in March 2011 the Israeli Parliament unanimously enacted a minefield clearance law, which sets out a statutory framework for the clearance of minefields not essential to Israel's national security in a short and defined framework. The law establishes the Israeli National Mine Action Authority, which is tasked with the formulation and implementation of multi-year and national mine action plans and with determining national demining specifications, while taking into consideration, inter alia, the International Mine Action Standards endorsed by the United Nations Inter-Agency Coordination Group. Unfortunately, as long as the regional security situation continues to impose a threat on Israel's safety and sovereignty, the need to protect Israeli borders, including through the use of anti-personnel mines, will not be diminished.

Israel aspires to achieve peace and security for all peoples of the Middle East. We hope that the day will come when a regional security framework encompassing all countries of the region will provide a cooperative multilateral response to all the security problems of the region. At the beginning of the Jewish New Year, let me wish Member States, their representatives here present, and the Secretariat, fruitful deliberations during this session and full success for the activities of the United Nations First Committee, which benefit us all.

The Chair: May I remind delegations of the established practice of the First Committee that national statements should be confined to 10 minutes and, when speaking on behalf of a group of countries, to 15 minutes.

Mr. Ulyanov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): As previous speakers have done, I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to your responsible post and wish you every success in the work ahead.

One of the most urgent tasks today is to overcome stagnation and revitalize the key multilateral disarmament institutions. A positive sign is that the intentions of all States coincide here. That has become evident through the many discussions we have had over the past years. Of course we nevertheless sometimes have different views on how to achieve our shared objectives, but in a matter such as multilateral

disarmament, details are important and the specifics of each State's approach should be taken into account. That is what we will be dealing with in the First Committee.

One of the most important and far-reaching events of this year was the entry into force of the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty). The parties have already proceeded to full implementation of their obligations. Later on, we intend, together with our American colleagues, to hold a briefing on that topic here in the First Committee. The fact that the Russian-American Treaty is based on the principles of equality, parity, and equal and indivisible security of the parties is extremely important. We are confident that the nuclear arms reductions envisaged in the Treaty will allow us to enhance international security and stability, as well as strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and expand the process of nuclear disarmament.

Russia remains committed to the noble goal of saving humanity from the nuclear threat and is open to dialogue on further steps towards nuclear disarmament. However, this issue needs a balanced approach. It is necessary to take into account the whole range of political, economic and military factors that affect strategic stability. These factors include unilateral intentions to create a global missile defence system; the unresolved issue of preventing the placement of weapons in outer space; the lack of adequate progress in pursuing the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; the increasing imbalances in conventional arms in Europe; plans to develop and use strategic offensive arms in non-nuclear configurations under the Prompt Global Strike initiative; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of States not now possessing them. Further steps towards nuclear disarmament can be considered and taken only in strict compliance with the principle of equal and indivisible security for all. Moreover, that process should gradually involve all States that possess military nuclear capabilities, without exception.

The interdependent nature of contemporary security problems and the interrelationship of various factors affecting strategic stability are reflected in the missile defence debates. We believe that those issues must be given the most serious consideration by the entire international community, since in one way or

another they can affect the interests of all States and regions. The logic behind Russian concerns is simple and clear. If any party, especially a military alliance, in an accelerated manner and without any limitations builds up its missile defence capabilities, the other party will inevitably have to close the gap by increasing the number of its offensive arms or by taking other asymmetric actions. So, the accelerated implementation of missile defence projects without considering the interests of other States would seriously undermine strategic stability and international security and would certainly be incompatible with efforts to create a favourable international environment for further progress towards general and complete disarmament. Intensive dialogue is currently under way on the topic between the Russian Federation and the United States, and also between Russia and the Council of NATO. We hope that these discussions will be productive.

Undoubtedly, another important priority for us is the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. We intend to move further towards achieving that particular goal. We expect intensified joint work at the Conference on Disarmament on the Russia-China draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. An important element of a treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space is the development of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities. Taking into consideration last year's resolution 65/68 requesting the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts to study, compile and develop transparency and confidence-building measures, it is particularly important to ensure active, purposeful and fruitful work in this area. Considering the fact that the group of governmental experts is to begin its work in 2012, Russia and China will, during this session, introduce a draft procedural decision on transparency and confidence-building measures providing for the inclusion of this item on the agenda of the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. We ask everyone to support it.

International information security is gaining particular significance. The consensus adoption by the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session of a resolution on the topic testifies to the readiness of the international community to cooperate in this sphere, which took note of the valuable work of the Group of Experts on the subject and its report. A similar group

will be re-established in 2012. At the current session of the General Assembly we look forward to the support and sponsorship of delegations for an updated Russian draft in which we propose to adjust the Group's mandate. In this context we would like to draw attention to the initiative by Russia, China, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan regarding the elaboration of a document on rules of behaviour in the sphere of international information security. The draft was circulated here at the United Nations on 12 September. We expect that it will be discussed with interest and in a constructive manner.

Russia has been consistently in favour of addressing current global and regional challenges to the non-proliferation regime exclusively within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The decisions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT are a reliable reference point for our future efforts in this area. I should like to draw attention to the importance of implementing the decisions on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. We consider the convening of a conference on this issue in 2012 to be a priority task. We are convinced that the success of such an event will depend largely on the willingness of the Middle East States to engage in constructive dialogue. As a sponsor of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and as one of the depositaries of the Treaty, Russia is rendering full support to this process. We expect that the venue of the Conference and the appointment of a facilitator will be agreed upon in the near future.

To conclude, I wish to say that the commencement of discussions on a fissile material cut-off treaty at the Conference on Disarmament is in keeping with the interests of all States without exception. Any decision to carry out these negotiations outside the Conference on Disarmament would be counterproductive. We will be looking to build links with other countries to find common ground, and we hope that those ideas will serve as the basis for consensus decisions. Since my allotted time is coming to an end, I will refrain from setting forth our position on other items on the agenda. Our stance is set forth in the full text of the Russian statement, which is available to all delegations for information.

Mr. Quinlan (Australia): I congratulate you, Sir, on your election. You can be assured that Australia's delegation will work very closely and constructively

with you and the Bureau and all Member States to achieve results that actually mean something. In particular we, along with New Zealand, look forward to supporting Mexico in its leadership this year of the draft resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It is a serious failure that in the fifteenth year since it was opened for signature the CTBT has not yet entered into force. We join other States parties in calling on those States yet to ratify the CTBT, particularly annex 2 States, to do so as soon as possible.

Australia has a long history of what we hope has been practical leadership in promoting global disarmament and non-proliferation through bringing the CTBT to the General Assembly, through the model text for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, through the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons and, more recently, the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, through our active support for the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and now through promoting the negotiation of an arms trade treaty. Our approach is, we hope, a very practical one focused on securing progress and leveraging that progress where we can.

I should like to highlight three areas for this session. First, on the NPT. Last year Australia, like many Member States, was encouraged by the NPT Review Conference — notably by the adoption of the consensus Action Plan spanning the NPT's three pillars of disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and also addressing matters relating to the Middle East. As we know, in less than seven months' time NPT States parties will meet for the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference, where Australia hopes to play a leading role. The Preparatory Committee meetings obviously should not be a time for complacency. The Action Plan will only be, and can only be, as good as its implementation. At the same time, Australia believes that the meeting is not the time to reopen last year's debate. NPT States parties have an Action Plan that we have agreed and we have three tasks in that regard, namely, implementation, implementation and implementation. We need to recognize the work already done and have a practical and positive focus on what we still need to do.

For its part Australia, with Japan, has convened the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), whose members include Canada, Chile, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, all countries committed to a world free of nuclear weapons and all countries with strong non-proliferation credentials. Among the practical proposals put forward by the NPDI is our proposal for a standard reporting form, shared with the nuclear-weapon States, to encourage increased transparency and accountability in nuclear disarmament. We have taken every opportunity to advocate ratification of the CTBT by those States that have not yet done so. We have encouraged all States to embrace the Additional Protocol as the standard for effective verification of States' safeguard commitments. We strongly support Canada's efforts to kick-start negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty through its First Committee draft resolution. But of course, implementing the Action Plan, as we know, is not the work of just one or five or ten States but all States. All of us need to make this an urgent and serious priority.

Secondly, there is the area of conventional weapons. As we all know, in many countries throughout the world armed violence is fuelled by the availability of illicit conventional arms, leading to fractured societies and population displacement and dramatically undermining development programmes. As we see all too often, illicit conventional arms also have a particularly harsh impact on women, children and people with disabilities. To counter the spread of illicit arms, Australia is actively pursuing the achievement of a comprehensive, effective and legally binding arms trade treaty and has provided practical assistance to States implementing the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. We will continue to do so. Australia will also continue to advance humanitarian initiatives on conventional weapons. For example, we take an integrated approach to mine action. We do not distinguish in our assistance between different types of explosive remnants of war. In that way we can improve the social and economic well-being of mine-affected communities by incorporating mine-action activities into development programmes. We have currently committed \$100 million to that task.

We will work constructively to support the Convention on Cluster Munitions and build on the extensive preparatory work already done for a protocol on cluster munitions under the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects at the Review Conference in November this year.

Lastly, there is of course the Conference on Disarmament. Effective multilateralism is at the heart of Australia's foreign policy, but the key word for us is "effective". Australia, frankly, is embarrassed to have to say yet again that 2011 was a year of failure for the Conference on Disarmament — no programme of work and no commencement of negotiations, particularly on the long-overdue treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty remains a priority for my country, and we are unapologetic about that. We believe stopping the production of fissile material is a vital means to a vital end, namely, a world free of nuclear weapons. When he spoke to the Conference on Disarmament on 1 March this year, Australian Foreign Minister Rudd warned that, if the Conference on Disarmament did not get down to the business of negotiating, it would be washed away by history. And so it should be. That risk remains, and it remains imperative that we work to prevent it and make the Conference on Disarmament effective. In 2011 Australia and Japan made a practical gesture to encourage the Conference on Disarmament back to work through the side events of our fissile material cut-off treaty experts. We will continue to do all we can to support a fissile material cut-off treaty.

Obviously there are many other challenges. In particular, we must improve compliance with existing instruments. Australia remains gravely concerned by the nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the revelation of a covert uranium enrichment capability. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to regional stability and to the non-proliferation efforts of all of us in the international community. We also share increasingly serious concerns about the mounting evidence of the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme. Iran continues to defy United Nations Security Council resolutions and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements. We again

encourage Iran to comply with Security Council resolutions and engage with IAEA to resolve all issues and demonstrate conclusively the peaceful intent of its nuclear programme.

Australia looks forward, in its thematic statements, to setting out our perspectives and ideas on other important international security issues, including: the need for international dialogue on cyberspace and for rules to guide behaviour in that domain; the need to revitalize discussions on space security; and the need for an outcome at the seventh Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, to be held in Geneva in December, which strengthens that valuable Convention by making it more able to respond to the increasingly rapid advances in life sciences.

In concluding, let me say simply that we all share simple goals: a world free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and a safer future for our citizens and communities from the misuse and proliferation of conventional weapons. Achieving those simple goals is, self-evidently, complex and difficult but not impossible. We just need to act.

Ms. Gottemoeller (United States of America): I should like to thank you, Sir, for the opportunity to deliver remarks on behalf of the United States delegation. Our congratulations go to the Chair and the newly elected members of the Bureau. The United States pledges its support for your efforts to direct a productive First Committee at the sixty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

My delegation hopes to build on last year's productive session and the successes of the past year, as we all work together on a balanced, realistic approach to multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. For the United States, the path from Prague was fast and straight, and the first tasks along the way were long overdue or clear on the horizon. The path is now starting to move into uncharted terrain. The United States is committed to blazing new trails, to pushing forward with momentum.

Let me begin by speaking about the 2010 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty). The Treaty entered into force on 5 February

this year. Implementation of the Treaty is going well and is contributing positively to the United States-Russian relationship. The Treaty represents an important step on the path towards a world without nuclear weapons. As my Russian colleague has already mentioned, I am very pleased that we will be joining together later in the session to present a joint briefing on our successful implementation of the New START Treaty. As one treaty provides a foundation for the next, we believe this vital cooperation will set the stage for further and deeper reductions. We are also pleased to note that Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged diplomatic notes on 13 July this year, bringing the United States-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) and its Protocols into force. The PMDA commits each country to dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium, which represents enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons.

The United States has made great progress over the past year in its efforts to stem proliferation. We are actively working to implement the Action Plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), seeking to strengthen all three pillars of the Treaty. In May 2011 President Obama submitted the protocols of the Treaties establishing the African and South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zones to the United States Senate for its advice and consent. And we are in discussion with parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties of South-East Asia and Central Asia in an effort to reach agreement that would allow the United States to sign the Protocols to those two treaties.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system is the essential underpinning of the non-proliferation regime, providing the necessary assurances regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The United States, along with other Member States and the IAEA secretariat, is carrying out a range of measures to strengthen that system, including universalizing the Additional Protocol. We seek to cooperate with other NPT parties on ways to discourage States from violating the Treaty and then withdrawing from it. Ensuring global nuclear security is a related challenge. We were glad to host a summit last year, in which 47 world leaders endorsed the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material within four years. We are actively preparing for a follow-on

summit in 2012, to be hosted by the Republic of Korea. The United States will continue its active effort to fulfil its commitments under article IV of the NPT to international peaceful nuclear cooperation with States that abide by their non-proliferation obligations, including through the Peaceful Uses Initiative that Secretary Clinton announced at the Review Conference last year. The worldwide expansion of nuclear power must not be accompanied by an increased threat of nuclear proliferation.

Let me now turn to compliance. Compliance with treaties and agreements is a central element of the international security architecture and critical to peace and stability worldwide. At this year's First Committee session the United States will once again sponsor its draft resolution entitled "Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments" (A/C.1/66/L.47). This year's draft resolution on compliance, like its predecessors, acknowledges the widespread consensus within the international community that non-compliance challenges international peace and stability. We ask for the Committee's support of this year's draft resolution.

Like many others in this room the United States is preparing for the seventh Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, to be held in December. We see the Conference as an opportunity to bolster the Biological Weapons Convention so as to enable it to take on the challenge of encouraging scientific progress while constraining the potential for misuse of science. We will ask Member States to come together and focus on new ways to enhance confidence in compliance through greater transparency, more effective implementation, an improved set of confidence-building measures and cooperative use of the Biological Weapons Convention's consultative provisions. We need, moreover, to work together on measures to counter the threat of bioterrorism and to detect and respond effectively to an attack, should one occur.

Regarding the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the United States is proud of the progress made towards a world free of chemical weapons. The progress to date is the result of the combined efforts of the 188 member

States of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). For its part, the United States continues to make steady progress in destroying its chemical weapons. By April 2012 we anticipate having destroyed 90 per cent of our stockpile. The remaining 10 per cent will be destroyed while assigning the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people, protecting the environment and complying with national standards for safety and emissions, as called for in the Convention.

I turn now to our efforts towards future goals. Although some important work is behind us, the United States is not standing still. We are preparing for the next steps in arms control and disarmament. When he signed the New START Treaty, President Obama made it clear that the United States is committed to continuing a step-by-step process to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons, including the pursuit of a future agreement with Russia for broad reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons — strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed. To prepare the way, the United States is reviewing its strategic requirements and developing options for the future of its nuclear stockpile. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is also reviewing its deterrence and defence posture. While this work is proceeding, the United States is ready for serious discussion with Russia on the conceptual, definitional and technical issues that will face us in the next phases of negotiation. Furthermore, as President Obama has said, the United States is committed to securing ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has engaged the United States Senate and the American public on the merits of the Treaty. As we move forward with our process, we call on all Governments to declare or reaffirm their commitment not to conduct explosive nuclear tests. We thank and congratulate Ghana and Guinea for ratifying the Treaty in the past year. We ask that the remaining annex 2 States join us in moving forward towards ratification. At the Article XIV Conference last month, Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher said

"We do not expect that the path remaining to entry into force will be travelled quickly or easily ... but move ahead we will, because we know that the CTBT will benefit the security of the United States and that of the world."

The United States is also eager to begin the negotiation of a verifiable fissile material cut-off

treaty. Although we believe that the Conference on Disarmament is the best suited international body for negotiating a multilateral arms control agreement, we have made no secret of our frustration with the Conference on Disarmament's current impasse with regard to the fissile material cut-off treaty, a frustration shared by many countries and already articulated in this room this morning. While Secretary Clinton told the Conference on Disarmament that our patience is not unlimited, we are encouraged that the five nuclear-weapon States (P-5) are renewing joint efforts to move the Conference on Disarmament to fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations. The five nuclear-weapon States have been conducting consultations and will include additional countries going forward. We plan to meet again during this session of the First Committee of the General Assembly. This process needs time to develop. Resolving the issues that have stalled the Conference on Disarmament will be complicated, but we believe that this course of action has the best potential to move the Conference on Disarmament to action on the fissile material cut-off treaty in 2012.

Let me conclude with a few words regarding P-5 efforts in the disarmament arena. A development of great importance to the United States is the start of a regular, multilateral dialogue among the P-5. The P-5 are committed to the implementation of the Action Plan that was adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. A constructive step in that direction took place at the June conference in Paris when the P-5 met to discuss transparency, verification and confidence-building measures. All the P-5 States recognize the fundamental importance of transparency in building mutual understanding and confidence. In Paris we exchanged information on nuclear doctrine and capabilities and discussed possible voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures. And we conferred on steps taken to implement our article VI commitments, including reporting, a topic of great interest to the NPT community and one for which the P-5 acknowledges a special responsibility. We are preparing to inform the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee about our approaches to reporting.

To ensure a continuing process, the P-5 approved in Paris the creation of a working group on nuclear definitions and terminology. We also discussed the technical challenges associated with verification and will continue our discussion by holding expert-level technical consultations on the subject, the first will be

held in the United Kingdom between now and the next P-5 Conference. The next P-5 Conference will be held in the context of the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee.

Let me stress that we are entering unknown terrain. We face verification challenges that have never before been addressed. As the size of nuclear arsenals decreases, verification becomes more complex. The margins for error increase. We are determined to find ways to overcome those challenges, for we believe that transparency will be more important than ever. The United States is proud to be at the leading edge of transparency efforts, publicly declaring its nuclear stockpile numbers, participating in voluntary and treaty-based inspection measures, working with other nations on military-to-military, scientific and laboratory exchanges and site visits, and frequently, briefing others on its nuclear programmes and disarmament efforts. We hope that all countries will join in the common effort to increase transparency and build mutual confidence. Progress on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation demands nothing less.

We hope that our colleagues have found this overview informative. The United States delegation plans to address many aspects of this year's agenda in greater detail during our interactive dialogues. I can assure you that the United States will tenaciously pursue its significant goals in disarmament and international security. We are eager to hear the statements of our colleagues, and we look forward to cooperating with other delegations on this year's draft resolutions and decisions.

Mr. AlMutairi (Kuwait) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, in the name of the State of Kuwait, I should like to offer our congratulations to you, Sir, on your election as Chair of the First Committee. We are certain that with your wisdom and your proficiency the work of the First Committee will be conducted effectively.

We would also like to congratulate the members of the Bureau and emphasize at this time our readiness to work with you, Sir, and with the members of the Bureau with a view to seeing a successful conclusion to the work of this important Committee.

The establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons has always been a goal of States. However, to realize that goal, the numerous and various challenges threatening the credibility of the conventions and

agreements relating to nuclear disarmament must be faced. We strongly believe that the possession of nuclear weapons does not provide full security to States. Yet, despite the existence of challenges, the world has before it windows of opportunity to achieve its desired goal of becoming free of nuclear weapons. Out of my country's strong belief in the importance of creating a world free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, it has ratified, among others, the following international conventions and agreements within this framework: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC); the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC); and the comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocols of the early warning system on nuclear accidents.

Furthermore, Kuwait signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in September 2005 out of its belief in the dangers that the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups would pose, including its recognition of the threat that that would constitute for regional and international security. In that regard, Kuwait has submitted to the United Nations its national report setting forth the measures it has taken to ensure the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), relating to steps and measures to prevent terrorist groups from obtaining the components of weapons of mass destruction. As for the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, Kuwait has welcomed the adoption by the General Assembly in December 2005 of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.

In view of my country's strong belief in the important role of the United Nations in confronting the challenges of disarmament and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we look forward to continued momentum in disarmament and to reaching the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons by supporting the negotiating process. We also welcome the meetings and conferences that were held in this field, the last of which was the Conference on

Disarmament held in New York in 2010 and the NPT Review Conference also held in New York in May 2010. In that regard, I should like to affirm the importance that my country attaches to convening the international conference scheduled for 2012, and the need to reach an agreement on disarmament under international control, and also the need to reach an agreement for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. However, we find that after almost 16 years since the adoption of the resolution concerning the Middle East during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference calling for the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, we find that nothing has been accomplished up to now. However, we hope that all States will adhere to their commitments and obligations according to the provisions of the NPT.

We cannot but remind members that Israel is still the only country in the Middle East that has not joined the NPT. That constitutes defiance and is a challenge to international legitimacy and to the comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In that regard, we would also draw attention to the contents of resolution GC(53)RES/117 of the General Conference of the IAEA, which expressed concern about the nuclear capabilities of Israel and which called for the need to have Israel subject all its nuclear facilities to the safeguards system of the Agency. My country believes in the right of States to obtain the technology and the know-how for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without any discrimination. We call on the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate and adopt dialogue and understanding as the means to comply with the resolutions of international legitimacy and to cooperate with the IAEA in order to build confidence and dispel fears, particularly since the risk of nuclear accidents has increased in recent years. The dangers that these accidents pose do not recognize borders between States. We have only to remember the impact that the Fukushima accident in Japan had.

My country's delegation looks forward to the consultations and discussions in the Committee and hopes they will be positive and transparent in order to reach a consensus that will achieve the aspirations of Member States to achieve international peace and security.

Mr. Kim Sook (Republic of Korea): At the outset my delegation wishes to join previous speakers in

congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee, and the other members of the Bureau on their election. I am confident that your able leadership will steer us through these month-long deliberations. I take this opportunity also to thank Mr. Sergio Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs for their strenuous efforts in support of the work of the Committee. Allow me to assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation.

In recent years we have taken many positive steps in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Just last year alone we witnessed the signing of the 2010 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty), the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, and the adoption of the Final Document at the eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The New START Treaty entered into force last February, adding to the global momentum towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Those leaps forward, together with the five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament presented by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the vision for a world free of nuclear weapons put forward by President Obama of the United States, add up to a long-overdue recognition by the international community of the fact that disarmament and non-proliferation once again are becoming central to the global agenda.

As we assemble here on this global stage today we must not simply gaze back upon our recent achievements in static self-complacency but instead compel ourselves to take the next steps forward in our meaningful endeavours. Indeed, we must collectively seize the unique opportunity presented to us. My delegation strongly believes that in order to rekindle global efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it is of the utmost importance to restore trust and to nurture a spirit of cooperation between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. The latter must faithfully observe their commitment to non-proliferation, while the former must do their part by making real progress on nuclear disarmament. In particular, it is important faithfully to implement the 64-point conclusions and

recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Our hope for the revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament is now greater than ever. In reflecting on the aspirations of the international community, we have observed various efforts made by many delegations this year. Nevertheless, the Conference on Disarmament continues to make little progress, thus wearing out the patience of the international community.

Moreover, the Disarmament Commission has also failed to produce any final documents or recommendations since 1999. In fact, the multilateral disarmament machinery is in severe disarray. We believe that putting the Conference on Disarmament back on track is at the heart of any solution. With this in mind, and as an ardent supporter of multilateral efforts for disarmament and non-proliferation, the Korean Government has joined others in requesting the convening of a debate on the revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament in July.

In addition, as my delegation has proposed several times, it will also be useful to establish an eminent persons group under the supervision of the Secretary-General to search for solutions to overcome current difficulties in the Conference on Disarmament. Recommendations by eminent persons who have expertise and wisdom in the field of international peace and security would be of tremendous value in facilitating the revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament. It is my sincere hope that the Conference on Disarmament will reach a consensus on its programme of work at its first plenary meeting in 2012, thereby enabling it to begin substantive work.

It is clear that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has both political and practical importance for the international community. Today, 15 years since the Treaty was opened for signature here in New York, the CTBT enjoys near universal support, having been signed by 182 States and ratified by 155. However, the promise of the Treaty will not be fully realized until it enters into force and achieves universality. The seventh Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held on 23 September, provided us with a fresh opportunity to renew our commitment to the CTBT and its objectives. We believe that it is now time to translate declarations into tangible support for

the Treaty. We therefore urge all States that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, particularly those States listed in annex 2, whose ratification is necessary, to do so without further delay, with the aim of bringing it into force by 2012. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the international community must continue to reaffirm its commitment to refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions and acting in a manner that undermines the purpose of the Treaty.

Let me now turn to current pressing challenges to our collective international non-proliferation efforts. North Korea's nuclear programmes continue to pose a dire threat to regional peace and security, as well as an unprecedented challenge to the international non-proliferation regime. In addition to North Korea's two nuclear tests, one in 2006 and the other in 2009, it revealed its uranium enrichment facility in Yongbyon last year. That generated grave concern in the international community, as it could open another path for North Korea to develop nuclear weapons.

It goes without saying that North Korea's pursuit of a uranium enrichment programme is a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), which require North Korea immediately to cease all nuclear activities. In the face of North Korea's repeated acts of defiance, the international community has demonstrated a unified and resolute response against North Korea's nuclear ambitions, particularly with regard to the uranium enrichment issue. For instance, last month the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference unanimously adopted a resolution expressing concern with regard to its uranium enrichment and light-water reactor construction programmes as well as reaffirming that contrary to the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions, North Korea has not abandoned its existing nuclear programmes.

Indeed, the question of how to tackle the North Korean nuclear issue remains vital to securing peace and security in North-East Asia, as well as to sustaining the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime. In step with the efforts of the international community, my Government will continue to pursue a principled approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, faithfully implementing sanctions under the Security Council resolutions while leaving open the door to dialogue. The recent inter-Korean dialogues, which were held in July and September, illustrate those

efforts. We urge North Korea to respond to our calls to demonstrate its willingness and sincerity with regard to denuclearization through concrete actions, so that appropriate conditions for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks can be created. I would stress again that it is essential and urgent for North Korea immediately to cease all nuclear activities, in particular its uranium enrichment, in accordance with Security Council resolutions. We will continue to work closely with the countries concerned to achieve the goal of the denuclearization of North Korea in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

We recognize that all States parties to the NPT have the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as long as they are in full compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. At the same time, we believe that, given the proliferation potential inherent in sensitive nuclear technologies and fuel-cycle activities, States involved in such technologies and activities, which can be directly diverted towards non-peaceful uses, must demonstrate a higher level of commitment to non-proliferation in order to inspire international confidence. It is in that context that we believe that all suspicions and concerns regarding Iran's nuclear intentions should be resolved expeditiously, so that Iran may regain the international community's trust. Indeed, the early and peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue will contribute not only to our efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, but also to stability in the Middle East.

In addition to traditional non-proliferation issues, nuclear safety and security are also an issue that warrants special attention from all countries in order to prevent catastrophic accidents and to guard against the continuing threat of nuclear terrorism. In that regard, my delegation is of the view that the tragic accident in Fukushima in March also has significant global implications for nuclear safety and security. My delegation recognizes the increased synergy between nuclear safety and nuclear security and acknowledges that safety and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner. In that regard we must recognize that incidents arising from the unauthorized acquisition, use, transport or storage of nuclear materials, or attacks on nuclear installations, may have similar consequences to those caused by an accidental release of radiation.

Given that the possibility of nuclear terrorism is the most extreme threat to global security, my delegation joins others in the effort to enhance nuclear security through international cooperation. In that regard, we expect that the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Korea will serve as an excellent opportunity to further address the synergy between nuclear security and nuclear safety, review the implementation of the commitments made at the Washington Summit last year and explore new and creative ways to further enhance nuclear security. For the benefit of Member States interested in learning more, Korea will host a side event about the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit this week in order to share information on the status of our preparations for the Summit.

Last, but not least, the Republic of Korea is of the view that the issue of conventional weapons also warrants the constant attention of the international community. We fully support the goals and principles of an arms trade treaty. The arms trade treaty should reflect well-balanced deliberations with regard to feasibility, scope and parameters, so as to attract the largest possible number of members. We will do our utmost to achieve fruitful results from the deliberations by the target date.

With the United Nations in the lead, encouraging gains continue to emerge in the disarmament community, not only with regard to nuclear non-proliferation but also with regard to the eventual goal of a nuclear-free world. That goal will take more time and strenuous work, but we must continue on our path and refocus our efforts with a view to making lasting progress. In that regard, my delegation once again pledges its intention and willingness to work tirelessly for the success of the First Committee at this session and beyond, playing a role commensurate with our capacity and national focus on multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation.

Ms. Higgin (New Zealand): At the outset, may I convey the congratulations of my Government, Sir, on your assumption of the Chair at this year's session of the First Committee. My delegation looks forward to working with you and your team, and you can be assured of our full support as you discharge your duties. New Zealand will participate actively in the work of the Committee, including as current coordinator of the New Agenda Coalition. We are also pleased to be a core sponsor of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty draft resolution under

Mexico's trusty coordinatorship and in partnership with Australia.

Conventional weapons have featured prominently in the course of this year, with considerable focus on the elements of, and drafting for, an arms trade treaty. There has been useful progress on the universalization and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and on the injection of new momentum into the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, thanks to the Group of Governmental Experts, which met in May ahead of next year's Review Conference on the Programme of Action. New Zealand is a strong supporter of the process under way, which will see us adopt next year a global arms trade treaty. We have no doubt that a comprehensive and legally binding international treaty, one that establishes global standards for all transfers of conventional arms, will enhance stability and development, both internationally and regionally.

An arms trade treaty may not be the panacea for all the problems that flow from the international supply and availability of illicit arms, but it is an essential element in efforts to resolve them. We are grateful for the continuing guidance and skill of the Chair of the arms trade treaty process, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, who has successfully captured in his text the increasingly convergent views of States. He has equipped us with an excellent basis on which to move forward at the final Preparatory Committee meeting in February and during the formal negotiation of the treaty next July.

Next year's review of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons represents an important opportunity to assess whether that framework, established in 2001, is sufficient to deal with the threat that many colleagues here face in their home regions. In some countries the situation has clearly reached crisis point. This year's meeting of governmental experts, which was chaired by New Zealand, has helped to ensure that discussions at the Review Conference will not be divorced from the reality on the ground.

The implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) has been advanced this year, including through discussions that took place at the second Meeting of States Parties held in Beirut last

month. The strong international reaction against the instances of the use of cluster munitions this year has demonstrated the stigmatization that those weapons have now so widely attracted. It will be vital for all countries that are concerned at the human suffering caused by cluster munitions to continue to work together to maintain the high humanitarian standards set in the CCM. The impulse to place the innocent victims of the use, production or trade in weapons — whether they be cluster munitions, landmines or small arms and light weapons — at the centre of our concerns is rightly strong and, in our view, growing.

It is with significant regret that my delegation once again finds itself reflecting on the contrast between the progress observable in the conventional armaments sphere and the ongoing stalemate that besets the United Nations disarmament machinery. My delegation is grateful for the efforts of the Secretary-General in trying to get the Conference on Disarmament back on track. As High Representative Duarte said here yesterday,

“there is no substitute for the United Nations disarmament machinery as a venue for multilateral cooperation. It remains the world’s great ‘assembly line’ for the construction and maintenance of global disarmament norms.”
(A/C.1/66/PV.3)

The lengthy paralysis in the Conference on Disarmament remains highly disturbing to my delegation. It deprives the international community of the value of a ready-made forum for negotiating on key issues like nuclear disarmament and fissile material. In stifling the possibilities for the concrete pursuit of those and other core issues, the Conference has jeopardized the role that the General Assembly entrusted to it as, in the language of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, “a single multilateral negotiating forum”. We all know that it has not functioned as such a forum for more than 15 years now. Nothing has been coming off the assembly line.

In large measure the considerable and urgent work that prompted the Conference’s creation in the first place continues to await the international community’s attention. The General Assembly, which created the Conference on Disarmament, must hold the Conference to better account. After such a long period of impasse, it is incumbent on the General Assembly

now to take steps to ensure that negotiations on the topics on the Conference’s agenda commence without any further delay. If the Conference on Disarmament itself cannot fulfil its mandate as a negotiating body, then the gravity of the issues in question demands that other ways are found to pursue negotiations.

I note that there have been some recent positive developments on matters relevant to the topics on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The entry into force of the 2010 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms is very pleasing. We look forward to seeing the Treaty implemented in full and work commenced on follow-up measures.

Last year’s Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) usefully acknowledged the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would flow from any use of nuclear weapons. The clear and comprehensive pathway agreed at the Review Conference for future efforts towards a nuclear-weapon-free world was also a source of satisfaction for New Zealand. But the action plan is not something simply to be admired. It must be implemented, and implemented in its entirety. All States parties have a responsibility to do so, and we urge all to fulfil that responsibility without delay. In that regard, we welcome the meetings recently held by the nuclear-weapon States in both Paris and Geneva to examine their undertakings. We look forward to learning more about that work in the coming period. It will be important that the new NPT review cycle, starting with our meeting next year in Vienna, builds real momentum towards the 2015 Review Conference. We urge all parties to come to the Preparatory Committee meeting next May ready to engage on the implementation of all elements of the action plan. We should not forget High Representative Duarte’s call to arms — so to speak — yesterday that as disarmament advances, so the world advances.

Mr. Diallo (Senegal) (*spoke in French*): I wish warmly to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the Chair of the First Committee and assure you of the full support and cooperation of my delegation. Likewise, I wish to congratulate all the members of the Bureau.

Senegal associates itself with the statements made by the representatives of Nigeria and Indonesia,

respectively, on behalf of the African Group and the Non-Aligned Movement.

The year 2012 will be crucial for the international disarmament agenda. It will be all the more decisive given that we are moving towards the long-awaited United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty in July 2012. The preparatory process under the able stewardship of Ambassador Roberto García Moritán carries the hope that the treaty will enable us to realize the Organization's potential to build a less chaotic world. At this very moment a number of regions throughout the world continue to experience serious security and stability problems caused by the illegal trade in conventional weapons.

In Africa, in particular, such weapons are genuinely weapons of mass destruction, which feed and perpetuate conflict, spread crime and increase the risk of terrorism. In the face of such a challenge only a universal, robust and legally binding instrument on the arms trade will allow us properly to control the trade in conventional weapons. Senegal heartily welcomes the positive dynamic that we saw at the past three sessions of the Preparatory Committee and believes that our shared resolve on this matter must remain strong until the conclusion, in July 2012, of a legally binding instrument.

Notwithstanding the renewed momentum and optimism brought about by the success of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Security Council summit in September 2010 on the revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament, and the conclusion of the 2010 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty), progress in the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world has fallen well short of our expectations.

We note and deplore the fact that no consensus has emerged in the international disarmament bodies, and here I am referring to the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Overcoming the difficulties that prevent us from achieving our noble goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world continues to be a major challenge, but overcoming that challenge is within our reach, provided that we display the requisite commitment and political resolve. That commitment and political

resolve must take the form of a serious diplomatic effort at the multilateral level with a view to developing a collective and effective solution to the security challenges that humanity faces.

In view of the discussions that we will be having during this session, I should like to recall the nine points that my delegation believes need to be the bedrock of a comprehensive security and peace policy: first, insistence on the aim of ridding the world of nuclear weapons as a priority objective that must receive the support of all States; second, strengthening the authority of the NPT through its universal ratification; third, the entry into force at the earliest opportunity of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the negotiation and adoption of a binding instrument that would prohibit the production of fissile material for military purposes, and of a nuclear-weapons convention to strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation machinery; fourth, the adoption by nuclear-weapon States of an irreversible, verifiable and ambitious programme for the reduction of their arsenals and the concomitant granting of security assurances to non-nuclear States via binding instruments; fifth, greater adherence to the treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones, which contribute decisively to confidence-building and stability — and in this connection we call upon all stakeholders to contribute constructively to the proper implementation of the conclusions of the most recent Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT concerning the convening in 2012 of a conference on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; sixth, respect for the right of countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and reinforcement of the authority and capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency; seventh, specific attention to the illicit trade in conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons. We continue to look forward to the hosting of a summit on conventional weapons at the level of the Security Council, similar to that on nuclear weapons; eighth, a strong resolve to make the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons legally binding; and ninth, proper implementation of the outcome document of the fourth biennial meeting of States to consider the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

I believe that most delegations here share the same concerns and views as those of my country. I wish to assure all members of my country's willingness to work towards the implementation of all of the nine points mentioned.

Ms. Harbaoui (Tunisia) (*spoke in French*): On behalf of the Tunisian delegation I should like to extend my sincere congratulations to you, Sir, on your election to the Chair of the First Committee and to say how much my delegation appreciated the work done by Mr. Miloš Koterec during the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly. I also want to express best wishes to Mr. Sergio Duarte, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. I assure you of my delegation's support and cooperation in the accomplishment of your mission, so that our work will achieve tangible results. My delegation associates itself with the statements made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group.

Once again this year the Committee is meeting at a critical time to examine the progress made in the field of disarmament and international security in order to meet the different challenges facing the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes and, therefore, international peace and security. The meetings held at the margin of the general debate of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly on nuclear safety and security and on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, respectively, have shown how much more work needs to be done if we are to make real progress in the field of comprehensive disarmament.

Since the holding of the substantive session of the Disarmament Commission for 2011, thus closing the last session of its triennial cycle, it is now our duty to preserve the dynamics, so that our efforts will not simply fade away before arriving at solutions that will take into account the concerns of all parties and the needs of all States and all regions in terms of security and stability.

Tunisia takes this opportunity to reaffirm its conviction that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. The attainment of that objective depends on the effective implementation of all the provisions of the NPT and its universalization by preserving the balance among the three pillars,

which are nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and cooperation among Member States for peaceful uses.

The Middle East remains one of the regions of most concern because of the refusal of certain parties to join the NPT and to place their nuclear installations under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency despite the many appeals from other States of the region and appeals from the General Assembly in its many relevant resolutions. In that regard, we call on the international community, in particular the influential Powers, to take urgent and practical measures for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

Tunisia supports that hope and welcomes the forthcoming conference in 2012 on the creation in the Middle East of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. That conference will certainly be a disarmament milestone and will contribute to the establishment of peace in a region where tensions are always heightened.

My delegation welcomes the steady increase in the number of States parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and believes that the universalization of that Treaty can contribute considerably and positively to the disarmament process leading to the establishment of peace and security in the world. We reiterate our appeal to States that have not yet done so to ratify that Treaty. The establishment on our territory of two International Monitoring System stations and the fact that they have functioned normally for some time now is evidence of that commitment.

Aware of the great importance of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction and its obvious effects on international peace and security, my country, which ratified that Convention and completed its destruction of stocks of anti-personnel mines, hopes to see all States parties participating in that process with a view to the attainment of the objectives of the Convention.

Tunisia attaches great importance to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and is determined to continue to act within its framework in order to achieve its basic objective, which is to implement and strengthen the prohibition of chemical weapons. Towards that end, we

appeal for the achievement of the objectives and provisions of that Convention, in particular regarding international cooperation and in the field of chemical activities for peaceful purposes.

We also welcome the positive results of the meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts on the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. We appeal to Member States to submit their national reports, on a voluntary basis, every two years. Within that framework my delegation endorses the recommendations to give new impetus to the implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, but we express our concern about the increase in the number of light weapons circulating in the world. International action is needed in that regard in order to eliminate the illicit trade in and possession of small arms and light weapons, especially in areas of crisis and conflict.

Border zones are a danger area for that type of traffic, where increased vigilance and active cooperation among States of a subregion and their international partners is necessary in order to prevent these weapons from threatening efforts at stability by States or to prevent the weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups, thus threatening the security and stability of States and harming civilian populations. Subregional mechanisms would be helpful in order to halt this scourge effectively and in a coordinated way. Those responsible are not only those who possess weapons but also suppliers and producers.

In conclusion, I should like to reiterate the importance that Tunisia attaches to all issues of multilateral disarmament and its commitment and readiness to cooperate fully with you, Sir, and with the members of the Bureau while wishing you every success in the work of the Committee.

Mr. Al-Saadi (Yemen) (*spoke in Arabic*): It gives me pleasure to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chair of the First Committee. We are confident that your experience and that of the members of the Bureau will contribute to the success of the Committee and its objectives.

My country's delegation associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on

behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and wishes to confirm that the Republic of Yemen deeply believes in the purposes and principles of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, and that multilateral work, dialogue, transparency and the establishment of trust between States and political will is the best way to achieve full disarmament, reduce the spread of weapons and create a world of peace, harmony and stability. My country's delegation expresses its concern at the complex current international security and disarmament situation, and in that connection we call for greater effort to find effective measures and concrete steps in order to make progress on the international agenda of general and complete disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

My country has adopted consistent positions regarding the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and in our political commitment and belief in the importance of international peace and security, we have ratified and acceded to a group of the treaties and international conventions in the field of disarmament. My country will always be fully committed to its international obligations in accordance with the provisions of those treaties and conventions.

We reaffirm our firm position on the need to completely eliminate all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, and we support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and welcome the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in this field. We strongly promote the non-proliferation of these weapons or their components. We have established national committees and enacted relevant laws to ban these types of weapons and punish whoever engages in such activities. We renew our call on all nuclear-weapon States to work seriously for disarmament, the eradication of their arsenals and the establishment of mechanisms for nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The NPT is the main pillar of the non-proliferation regime. My country acceded to the NPT in order to achieve security and stability in the world and, specifically, in the Middle East. However, the fact that Israel has continued its nuclear policy will push the region into an arms race and jeopardize its stability and security. International silence on the Israeli nuclear

programme encourages it to continue its defiance of the international community and not to accede to the NPT. We again affirm that Israel must place all its facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) because its non-accession to the NPT poses a grave threat to the stability and security of the Middle East.

We have taken many steps and measures to ban the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons in implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action in that connection. We are seeking to establish a national coordinating committee to coordinate the activities and policies relating to this, so that it can become a national focal point for combating the illicit trafficking in these weapons, and in addition to enacting some laws to deal with combating the traffic in such weapons. In view of the fact that this is a significant phenomenon, we have introduced a bill in Parliament to enact provisions that authorize the carrying of weapons only outside the capital and the main cities, and the confiscation of unlicensed weapons. But putting an end to this problem requires concerted international efforts in addition to national efforts.

We would stress anew the centrality of the United Nations Programme of Action and the need to support national efforts to fully implement its provisions, in addition to the International Instrument on the marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons.

We renew our call for more concrete efforts and measures to deal with the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, which negatively affects the peace and security of many societies, makes obtaining such weapons easier for terrorist and transnational organized crime groups and leads to instability and the slackening of the pace of development, as well as increased unemployment and poverty. It also encourages terrorism and violence, with negative national and international effects. We support the establishment of a legally binding mechanism and effective international control to put an end to the phenomenon of illicit trafficking in these weapons.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones would contribute effectively to the NPT. We reiterate the need to make the Middle East region a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in order to achieve the universality of the NPT in the Middle East, a total commitment to all the provisions

of the NPT without exception, and the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East issued by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT. For more than 16 years, no real efforts have been made to implement it, although it is one of the main pillars of the package for the extension of the NPT. We also call for the implementation of the practical measures on the Middle East agreed by the 2010 Review Conference, which have been translated into a practical framework, and for the conference that will be held in 2012.

We confirm the importance of giving all countries the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in a transparent manner and in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and of helping those countries to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Developed countries should offer technical assistance to developing countries in accordance with the provisions of the NPT.

In conclusion, we reiterate that we look forward to cooperating with you, Sir, and with all delegations in order to obtain good results in our work and to achieve general and complete disarmament and security for all our peoples, as well as stability and peace throughout the world.

Mr. Acharya (Nepal): I congratulate you, Sir, and other members on election to the Bureau of the Committee. I assure you of my delegation's full support in discharging your important responsibilities. My delegation also associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Nepal consistently advocates the general and complete disarmament of all weapons of mass destruction, including biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological weapons, within an agreed deadline. In 1945, for the first time in human history, the world witnessed the devastating impacts of nuclear technology used for the purpose of war. One can only imagine how catastrophic it would be if the nuclear arsenals of today were to be used in the theatre of war. That realization alone should prod us all to take substantive, immediate and credible steps towards nuclear disarmament.

As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on

Their Destruction (CWC), Nepal strongly believes in the elimination of nuclear weapons to attain nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation once and for all. The declaration of nuclear-weapon-free zones by concluding a binding treaty is a laudable step that would contribute towards the step-by-step denuclearization of the world.

The forward-looking action plan adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference rekindled the hope for progress in all three pillars — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In our opinion, they are interrelated and must be dealt with collectively to ensure a better and safer world for us all and for future generations. But complacency is the greatest threat to progress in all these pillars. Similarly, we believe that the 2012 conference on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction would be an important opportunity to move ahead in establishing peace in the Middle East.

The increasing availability of, and trafficking in, small arms and light weapons throughout the world, specifically in conflict zones, is a matter of serious concern. Conflict is the very antithesis of development, and small arms have played havoc with the lives of common people throughout the world. Nepal fully supports the effective implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. We support the adoption of a legally binding instrument to regulate international arms transfers in order to increase transparency and accountability. In a similar vein, Nepal supports the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, must be revitalized without delay so as to advance multilateral disarmament negotiations, including on the fissile material cut-off treaty. The time has also come to think about necessary reforms in the working procedures and expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would be an important step to take stock of the existing disarmament agenda and machinery in a holistic manner and to devise a future course of action.

In our view, one should look at the issue of disarmament in a comprehensive manner. Disarmament

is not urgent from a moral perspective alone but is also important from an economic perspective. Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations envisages the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources to armaments. But we are saddened to learn that global military expenditure today stands at more than \$1.6 trillion and has been rising in recent years despite the global financial and economic crises. The Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, convened in 1987, urged the international community to devote a greater part of its resources to economic and social development, while keeping military expenditure at the lowest possible level. Every year we renew our commitment to that goal in this Committee by adopting a resolution on the relationship by consensus. Regrettably, we fail to keep our commitment, and the world continues to squander enormous sums on military expenditure, while investing ever so meagrely in peace, development and international cooperation. The entire budget of the United Nations is just a tiny fraction of the world's military expenditure, let alone the budget spent for peacebuilding and economic recovery.

Nepal strongly believes that regional mechanisms complement efforts to promote the global disarmament agenda. The Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament for Asia and the Pacific, located in Kathmandu, is making efforts to promote regional discussions on the important disarmament agenda. Given the importance of the Asia-Pacific region as well as the Centre's agenda, we believe that the Kathmandu process needs to be revitalized to facilitate dialogue and deliberations on many contemporary challenges, including confidence-building in the region. As the host of the Centre, Nepal is fully committed to strengthening it as an effective United Nations regional entity in building regional understanding and confidence for peace and disarmament.

It is from that perspective that we call for an enhanced level of support for the Centre from the international community, particularly Member States from Asia, the Pacific region and beyond, to enhance the importance of the work of the Centre. It holds great potential for concrete achievements in peace and disarmament-related issues. As in previous years, Nepal will, along with other sponsoring countries, introduce a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia

and the Pacific” at the current session of the Committee. Support for the draft resolution by all delegations would be greatly appreciated.

In conclusion, a multilateral approach should be at the centre of advancing non-proliferation and disarmament and promoting international peace and security. The First Committee, being a truly multilateral and inclusive deliberative forum, has an important role to play in steering the course of deliberations to broaden understanding, create consensus and build confidence, and ultimately lead towards general and complete disarmament among Member States. We support the work of the Committee with a view to making tangible progress in the fields of peace, security and disarmament.

Mr. Kleib (Indonesia): I am speaking on behalf of my Ambassador, who is, like you, Sir, at this time chairing another meeting. Our congratulations first to you, Sir, and the Bureau members on your elections. My delegation is confident that your able leadership will steer the work of the First Committee towards achieving tangible results. For its part, Indonesia assures you of its full cooperation and support. We also look forward to working with all delegations to further the Committee’s work in a substantive manner. We align ourselves with the statements made by the Non-Aligned Movement and by Myanmar on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Before proceeding, I wish to express continued Indonesian solidarity with the Government and people of Japan in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami tragedies and the accident in Fukushima earlier this year. We wish them a speedy recovery and progress.

We are all well aware that during the past decade there has been scant or no substantive progress on nuclear disarmament. Indonesia was heartened last year by the achievements of the 2010 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) and the consensus outcome of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Indeed, the hearty welcome and praise given by Indonesia and others for these two achievements were well-deserved. Since then, however, there has been little progress on the ground towards achieving the much-proclaimed vision of a world without nuclear weapons. The

disarmament machinery is at an impasse, and there is scant progress on the agreed Action Plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, including its mandate to convene the crucial 2012 Conference on the Middle East.

The global citizenry expects that we will all fulfil our respective duties and obligations to make the world peaceful and safe for all peoples and regions. Thus, the deadly scourge of nuclear weapons must be eliminated once and for all. As an ardent advocate for realizing a world without nuclear weapons, Indonesia has long both supported and actively contributed to efforts that meaningfully advance the goals of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Many years ago Indonesia wilfully chose the path of peaceful international coexistence without the vicissitudes of nuclear deterrence paradigms. We have also embarked upon our national process for ratifying the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It is our hope that our action will encourage those that have not yet ratified the CTBT. Indonesia hopes that the nuclear-weapon States will accede to the Protocol of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone at the earliest.

Our world will make socio-economic progress and better achieve stability when there is peace and security for all. We must not only echo the fear of nuclear weapons every year but must also show through our actions that we mean to realize the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world. For that and other global security imperatives, what needs to take place, and where, is well known to everyone. What is required is the political capital in the nuclear-weapon States to meet their agreed commitments on complete nuclear disarmament, unleashing a greater positive climate for advancing the wider international disarmament goals.

The lack of political will is manifested also in the stagnation of the whole United Nations disarmament machinery. While Indonesia calls upon countries to do their utmost to break the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, the impasse in the disarmament machinery can be best addressed through a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-IV), the urgent convening of which Indonesia supports fully. The aims of the overwhelmingly large majority of the international community are clear: total nuclear disarmament and, pending that, negative security assurances to

non-nuclear-weapon States along with a universal and legally binding nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting nuclear arms. The right of States parties, under the NPT, to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must also be ensured at all times without any undue impediments.

As we begin the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, Indonesia is fully mindful of the need to make tangible progress on all disarmament and international security concerns. We are thus committed to contributing effectively to the issues of small arms and light weapons, an arms trade treaty, and a review of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, while not forgetting the South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free-zone-related discussions or indeed any other disarmament and security discussions that will come up during the year. On a future arms trade treaty, we will continue to work to ensure that the right of all States to territorial integrity is recognized on the same footing as other rights of States.

On the work of civil society groups and non-governmental organizations, we are of the view that their participation has been very useful in widening global awareness and support for disarmament causes. Indonesia values their involvement in this Committee and supports their engagement, along with that of the media, youth and academia, in order to help garner the needed political will in important quarters.

To conclude, Indonesia stresses that all stakeholders must play their role actively in order to ensure that the political momentum generated last year does not dissipate.

Mr. Sefue (United Republic of Tanzania): My delegation wishes to congratulate you, Sir, and the Bureau on your well-deserved elections. You have our full confidence and assurances of our cooperation and support. My delegation associates itself with the statement from the African Group delivered by Nigeria and that of the Non-Aligned Movement presented by Indonesia. We equally welcome the presence and commitment of His Excellency Mr. Sergio Duarte, the Secretary-General's High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and thank him for his statement.

The United Republic of Tanzania supports the various United Nations instruments aimed at complete,

irreversible and verifiable disarmament covering all types of weapons. We are an adherent and signatory to the Pelindaba Treaty aimed at ensuring that Africa remains a nuclear-weapon-free zone, but we are especially concerned by the security threat posed by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, particularly in the Great Lakes region of Africa. Disarmament is critical to the realization of the fundamental responsibility of the United Nations under the Charter, namely the maintenance of international peace and security. My delegation is convinced, as everybody else should be, that the use and misuse of any category of weapons can threaten peace and security. The many conflicts and instability seen in various parts of the world are manifestations of such violations. All weapons, regardless of their category, pose a danger to life and property. We therefore urge that the disarmament debate should not exclude any category of weapon. The discrimination in weapons also amounts to a discrimination against human beings. Worse still, that discrimination tends to hinge on disparity in economic status. The United Republic of Tanzania believes that disarmament should not be limited to weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, but should also cover conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons, weapons that for us are the greatest cause of conflict, insecurity and instability.

Small arms and light weapons also fuel crime and we have witnessed and continue to witness our people and visitors to our countries being victims of crime perpetrated with such arms and weapons. One example is the current menace of piracy. Others include drug trafficking and the illegal exploitation of natural resources. We live in a globalized world, and the proliferation of illegal arms and light weapons in all their forms and manifestations will ultimately affect people throughout the world. Let us therefore work together for comprehensive disarmament, so as to create a secure environment for the free movement of people and trade and for secure productive activities. People's development, movement and freedom are very much linked to their security. The best way the First Committee can contribute to those basic requisites of development, namely peace and security, is by making progress on comprehensive disarmament.

The United Republic of Tanzania is aware that resources of the international community for the United Nations are limited and that all regions have a

role to play in assisting the United Nations to maintain international peace and security as provided for in Chapter VIII of the Charter. That is why the United Republic of Tanzania has always participated in programmes and projects led by the United Nations or by regional and subregional organizations in pursuit of durable peace and stability.

That is also why we supported Security Council resolution 1653 (2006), which addressed, among other things, the disarmament of rebel groups in the Great Lakes region. My country has also effectively participated in various disarmament processes and initiatives in the Great Lakes region spearheaded by the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons based in Nairobi. We also continue to work with the secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in Bujumbura, the East African Community secretariat in Arusha and several peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions and activities in Africa and the world, more often than not with the meagre resources that we possess.

The United Republic of Tanzania does not support the nuclear armament of any country. The world will, without doubt, be a better place without nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. We consider all weapons of mass destruction to be a grave danger to international peace and security. In that regard, we welcome the initiative undertaken by the United States and the Russian Federation to embark on the course of nuclear disarmament. We call upon the other nuclear Powers to do likewise.

It is also true that disarmament can be an expensive exercise for developing countries, especially the least developed ones. The resources and technical know-how necessary for safe disarmament may not exist in many such countries. Financing and technical gaps in that regard do exist and require the support of others in the international community to fill. My delegation calls upon the United Nations and Member States with the means to do so to help. I am aware of existing initiatives under the Peacebuilding Commission, peacekeeping missions and other efforts, but a comprehensive and holistic approach to disarmament worldwide is needed to reach all Member States. That is possible and doable. Let us all get involved.

There are also cases of historical injustices meted out to some populations in the world. Complete

disarmament will necessitate that such issues be addressed and resolved. As we continue to negotiate the arms trade treaty, the goal should be to ensure that each State not possess other weapons than the types specified, in amounts acceptable and justifiable under Article 51 of the Charter. International cooperation, as requested, as well as offers of assistance to victims of the use or misuse of arms, should also be considered in such deliberations.

In conclusion, the United Republic of Tanzania commits itself to do its part, working with others, to ensure a safer world for development and freedom, a safer world fit for our children, through complete, irreversible and verifiable disarmament covering all types of weapons.

The Chair: I shall now give the floor to representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. Seifi Pargou (Islamic Republic of Iran): Today, one delegation made baseless allegations against the exclusively peaceful nuclear programme of my country. We categorically reject those claims. The Zionist regime, which from its inception has lacked legitimacy in the occupied territories of Palestine, possesses hundreds of nuclear warheads and produces covert weapons of mass destruction through its weapons programmes. It is the main threat to peace and security in the region and beyond. The dark history and record of that regime in invading other countries, killing innocent women and children and committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as undertaking terrorist activities in other countries, are well known to all nations.

The facts are sufficient to show why the representative of such an irresponsible regime would try to divert the attention of Member States by making baseless and absurd allegations against others. The international community is completely aware of that obsolete tactic.

For that reason, through the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 189 NPT parties, including the main supporters of the Zionist regime, unanimously called upon that regime by name to accede to the NPT without any conditions and to put all its clandestine nuclear activities under international safeguards. The international community should continue to exert

pressure on that regime, particularly during the forthcoming 2012 Conference on the Middle East to force it to abide by international calls.

Mr. Ri Tong Il (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I am sorry that I have to ask for another opportunity to take the floor. I should like to make some comments concerning the remarks made by the representative from South Korea with reference to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a threat to world peace and security. That is not true and is a distortion of the underlying fundamental reality on the Korean peninsula.

Before I address the main topic, I should like to remind South Korea that today is 4 October, a very meaningful day for our nation, both North and South Korea. On this day in the year 2007 the second inter-Korean summit meeting adopted the 4 October joint declaration. It is a matter of great regret that on this day of reconciliation, the day of the adoption of that very historic document, South Korea has taken a confrontational approach to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, an issue that more than ever requires solution through dialogue.

The 4 October inter-Korean summit meeting document was unanimously welcomed at the General Assembly in resolution 62/5, as well as by North and South Korea and by fellow countrymen outside the Korean peninsula. Those were practical steps that contributed directly to the adoption of the first inter-Korean summit document, which is called the 15 June joint declaration. It was also unanimously approved by the General Assembly, which made a historic breakthrough towards independent, peaceful reunification, in the spirit of leaving the Korean nation and Korean reunification to the Korean nation. Remove outside forces and end interference. The State of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is committed. I strongly urge the South Korean authorities to come forward and return to the implementation of that very historic document, which the current authorities are rejecting now.

On the main topic of the threat to world peace and security, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has a different view. The major source of threat in the Korean peninsula is the military alliance of the United States and South Korea, which is very outdated. It has existed since the time of the cold war and is getting stronger all the time. Just a month ago, in

August, they held military exercises and involved more than half a million troops from the mainland United States, Japan, the island of Guam, the island of Hawaii and the South Korean military bases of the United States. The military bases of the United States have been full of nuclear weapons since 1957. Everybody recognizes that the first nuclear weapon was brought into South Korea in 1957. I ask the South Korean representative what is his thinking on the existence and deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea by the United States. Does he think they are for peace and security on the Korean peninsula? I want an answer from the South Korean representative. If that is not a threat what is it?

Secondly, concerning uranium enrichment, it was South Korea that went ahead the first time on the Korean peninsula. In 2004 it was revealed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that scientists were carrying out secret enrichment work in South Korea. I do not need to go further into the details, but the IAEA has not taken action nor has the United States. They manipulated the IAEA then, and this time again they have manipulated the Agency. South Korea referred to the IAEA resolution against uranium enrichment. Such activities are very peaceful and in line with the right to the international peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is in line with that trend. The 19 September joint statement also mentions the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's peaceful uranium enrichment. So from a legal point of view, these are very legal and legitimate international norms.

South Korea used the word "sincerity". That word has been articulated by the current South Korean authority since it came to power in 2008. They never ever drop the word "sincerity" when referring to North Korea's attitude towards denuclearization. What about their own sincerity? They continue to expand nuclear war exercises targeting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They continue to serve as a military base outpost and a nuclear-war-exercise post against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. If they are sincere they should not have opened the Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise, which was held last August. We ask South Korea to show sincerity if they really want it.

Concerning the 19 September joint statement I ask the South Korean representative to correctly understand the core spirit of that 19 September joint statement of the Six-Party Talks. The core criterion is

the simultaneous implementation by all parties in the Six-Party Talks; the key players are the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. The basic principle is reflected there — action for action. There have been no confidence-building measures between the two sides. I ask the South Korean representative to correctly understand what “action for action” means.

Mr. Namioka (Japan): I should like to exercise the right of reply to the groundless allegations made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

First, the Government of Japan's adherence to the three non-nuclear principles — not possessing, not manufacturing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into the territory of Japan — remains unchanged and Japan's determination to bring about the total elimination of nuclear weapons with a view to achieving a world without nuclear weapons is unshakeable. Secondly, Japan maintains an exclusively defence-oriented policy and therefore exercises conducted by the Self-Defence Forces of Japan do not target any particular country or area. Moreover, the ballistic missile defence system that Japan has decided to introduce is purely defensive and does not threaten any country or area surrounding Japan.

Thirdly, there is no evidence that the Government of Japan has ever allowed the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United States into Japanese territories. Based on the United States nuclear policy expressed to date, such as the announcement in 1991, it is the judgement of the Japanese Government that there has been currently no introduction of nuclear weapons by the United States, including vessels and/or aircraft to call at ports in, land on or transit Japanese territories. I reiterate that Japan continues to maintain the policy of adhering to the three non-nuclear principles.

Fourthly, Japan has strictly complied with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations as an NPT State party. Japan's peaceful use of nuclear energy has been confirmed by the IAEA in its annual conclusion that all nuclear material have remained in peaceful activities. Moreover, beyond legal obligations, Japan has, as an international transparency measure, regularly reported the amount of plutonium holdings in accordance with the guidelines for the management of plutonium, most recently on 29 September 2011.

Finally, regarding the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, the international community must be reminded that it is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that continues the development of its nuclear and missile programmes, including its uranium enrichment programme, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and the September 2005 joint statement of the Six-Party Talks. It is imperative for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take concrete steps to demonstrate its genuine commitment to complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization and to improve inter-Korean relations in order to have meaningful dialogue among the six parties. Based on that recognition, Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea have been urging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take such concrete steps.

Mr. Hallak (Syria) (*spoke in Arabic*): Bonds of friendship and of mutual respect exist between my country and Japan. That relationship is based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of either of our countries. We were therefore surprised to hear the statement by the representative of Japan in the Committee yesterday when he referred to what he described as the Syrian nuclear issue. That gives the mistaken impression of the real existence of something that could be called the Syrian nuclear question.

That type of negative message harms the bilateral relationship between our two countries and disregards a certain number of realities and truths that I would summarize as follows: first, my country, Syria, was among the first States to adhere to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Secondly, there is no Syrian nuclear issue. All unbridled attempts to invent such a question in international forums is aimed at diverting attention from Israeli crimes and Israeli acts of aggression against my country and the existence of an Israeli nuclear arsenal containing more than 300 nuclear missiles and their delivery systems. That is the only real question that threatens both regional and international peace and security. Thirdly, for many years, Syria has worked towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. My country presented a draft resolution on behalf of the Arab Group to the Security Council in 2003 calling for freeing the Middle East of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. That draft resolution faced the opposition of an influential nuclear State so it

has remained on the table since then in blue ink. We would be very grateful if Japan would support and resubmit such a resolution.

The representative of Israel — which possesses nuclear weapons and refuses to adhere to the NPT or to submit its nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards — this morning made a terroristic nuclear statement which is provocative and runs counter to the intelligence of peoples and nations. As is customary, when the Israeli position is weak and precarious and bears no relation to the truth, we see the representatives of Israel resort to this kind of allegation and fallacious claim, in an attempt to reverse the truth, to avoid accountability, and to stay away from the international consensus on the foundations of the NPT and nuclear non-proliferation. That is done in order to conceal the military aggression against my country in 2007.

These are Israeli attempts to divert attention from the dangers of Israeli nuclear weaponry and the Israeli nuclear arsenal, and Israel's refusal to adhere to the NPT and to submit its nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards, even though the former and current Directors General of the IAEA visited Israel to prompt it to comply with the hundreds of United Nations resolutions that for decades have called upon Israel to display good faith. This also despite the fact that Israeli nuclear scientists have warned of the dangers imposed by Israel's nuclear programme on the entire region. Among all the resolutions, some were adopted by high-level international agencies, some by the Security Council such as resolution 487 (1981), some by the IAEA, including GC(53)/RES/17 of 2009, and many by the General Assembly, most recently at its previous session.

It is no longer a secret that Israel is pursuing an aggressive nuclear-weapons policy based on a sizeable nuclear arsenal, an arsenal of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, which, by its magnitude, is larger than the arsenals of both France and the United Kingdom. Israel and its allies continue to conceal the possible dangers of its possession of nuclear weapons and the threat that this poses to the States of the region through what has been called the policy of nuclear ambiguity, which has for decades been worked out in cooperation with or with the connivance of successive United States Administrations.

The Programme of Action adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT approved a special section regarding the resolution of 1995 stipulating that there should be a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. If Israel is sincere about its claims and allegations, then it should endeavour to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East stipulating the establishment of such a nuclear-weapon-free zone. We call upon Israel to participate in the efforts of the region in order to put an end to its nuclear terrorism against States of the region.

Mentioning the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., last year is out of place. It does not in any way serve the cause of nuclear non-proliferation, because that Summit was not global. Participation was limited to 47 States only. The Summit took place outside the framework of the United Nations and dealt with non-consensus important issues, issues that should have been dealt with by the party concerned, namely the IAEA. Israel should participate seriously in international efforts with a view to prohibiting nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, including through the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in order to dispel the Israeli nuclear danger that is hovering over the States and peoples of the region.

Mr. Park Chul min (Republic of Korea): I take the floor now to exercise the right of reply in response to what the representative from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea said a few minutes ago.

The statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not consistent with the facts. However, I do not want to engage in a long and useless debate with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I shall be very brief and just want to rectify the distortion of facts mentioned by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

First, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea mentioned that our keynote speech this morning characterized North Korea as a threat to world peace and security. There is no doubt about that at all. Even North Korea recognizes that North Korea itself is the threat imposed on international society. I say clearly one more time here, North Korea's nuclear programmes continue to pose a direct threat to regional peace and security as well as an unprecedented challenge to the international non-proliferation regime.

Secondly, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has referred many times, not just here today but last year, in previous years, and for many years, to the 2007 and 2000 South and North Summit meeting documentation. We cannot even count the many legally binding agreements, treaties and documents between North and South, but the North Korean delegate mentioned just two documents. The Republic of Korea stands ready to stick to implementing all the previous agreements between North and South. That is our answer.

Thirdly, North Korea mentioned some events that took place in 2004 in the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which involved a rather minor question that came up in connection the signing of the Additional Protocol by the Republic of Korea. The matter concerned was a very rare case. The Republic of Korea, as a very responsible country, agreed to and applied for an Additional Protocol at that time. The IAEA confirmed at that time that the research in question was a relatively minor bit of scientific research being carried out by the Korean scientific corps, and in the same year, 2004, the IAEA issued its annual verification report. There is nothing left to resolve. There is no problem with South Korean scientific research. Whatever might have raised questions in the past has been resolved.

The Six-Party Talks afford a forum in which to make real progress towards the dismantlement of North Korea's existing nuclear weapons and all their nuclear programmes. In that process the six parties, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, have committed themselves to "action for action" in accordance with the 19 September 2005 agreement and the successive follow-up implementation arrangements. However, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has shattered its commitments and obligations by twice conducting nuclear-weapon tests and by revealing its uranium enrichment programme (UEP) facilities in November 2010. They have even gone so far as to threaten to institute nuclear levies.

Under those circumstances it is our strong belief that the Six-Party Talks will not be able to make genuine progress, unless the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shows its genuine intention and willingness for its denuclearization. In the present circumstances the resumption of the Six-Party Talks would result in empty discussions that would be to no avail. We would just encounter another propaganda

barrage from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, exactly as we have experienced over the past 20 years.

In order to make the Six-Party Talks a success, three measures should be taken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has continually argued that its nuclear-weapons programme has resulted from the hostile policy of the United States Government against it. That argument is ridiculous and preposterous. If we followed the absurd argument of the North Korean delegation, all sovereign countries throughout the world should develop a nuclear-weapons programme for their national security. There is no excuse for any country clandestinely, or blatantly like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to develop a nuclear-weapons programme. We seek a world free of nuclear weapons. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should act responsibly as a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the United Nations. I take this opportunity to urge North Korea to do what they have to do as quickly as possible.

Lastly, the joint military exercises of the Republic of Korea and the United States are conducted within the Republic of Korea's area of operations for the purpose of strengthening our deterrence capabilities against North Korea's military provocations and are therefore purely defensive in nature. The Republic of Korea urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to desist from further provocations and move towards passive cooperation through substantial changes in its actions rather than simple rhetoric. To that end the Government of the Republic of Korea will continue its efforts together with the relevant member countries.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for a second right of reply. I urge him to be brief as we should already have concluded our meeting.

Mr. Ri Tong Il (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I am sorry to ask for the floor again, because we have already exhausted the time for our morning session, but concerning the remarks of Japan and South Korea I shall be brief.

The Japanese representative touched upon the three-point non-nuclear principles. I do not need to repeat all I said yesterday, but in addition to that, this

year the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi accident attracted international attention and at the same time concern. The concern focused on why there was such a great delay in receiving an international survey team and relief teams. There was scepticism about that. There were news reports that there was a tunnel underground with nuclear-weapons programme facilities.

The Japanese representative then mentioned that the Japanese armed forces were for self-defence. They are no longer for self-defence but are now offensive in nature. They have all the weapons in the world, the most highly developed nuclear weapons as far as mankind's current weapon capability has come. Furthermore, they are making territorial claims — South Korea's Tokto Island off the Korean peninsula, the Kuril Islands off Russia, and there is another island bordering the sea with China. They are creating problems, and one country is supporting and encouraging those Japanese Government claims. It is adding more fuel to the fire.

The Japanese representative touched again on the importance of the Six-Party Talks. One thing to remember is that the Japanese delegation to the successive Six-Party Talks that have been held so far has never honoured its commitment and obligations under those Six-Party Talks. Rather, each time they have come to the table with issues totally different from the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, namely the abduction issue, and have disturbed the process and progress of that meeting.

Concerning the South Korean remarks, there is a concept of threat. I asked the South Korean representative to answer my question and he avoided answering my question. It is an historical fact that the South Korea and United States military alliance should leave the Korean peninsula. It has a great negative impact on the prevailing security situation on the

Korean peninsula, in the Asia-Pacific region and throughout the world. The military exercises have only a negative impact. There is no justification. They already have Operation Plan 5027, a joint operation plan that is a military war scenario, and under that plan the number one target is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea — they want to occupy Pyongyang the capital, then occupy the whole of North Korea, and then have the nuclear weapons eliminated. That is a war scenario. It exists and is a known secret. Under that scenario every now and then they have simulation exercises. At any time they are ready to move into action, into war, and to attack if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains complacent.

Concerning enrichment, Japan and South Korea said the enrichment is transparent, but they already have the technical know-how through that experiment. The issue is the know-how. They have it. They say they have stopped but they have already gained the know-how. They have the expertise and, when the time comes, they can make it. That is the true reality.

The document adopted at the inter-Korean summit meeting is the vital document, and its vitality was proved in the process of reconciliation. The representative talked of previous documents, but no other documents are as vital as that one.

Those two documents led to a breakthrough, opening various channels and even a railway line connected through the demarcation line, and opening Mount Kūmgangsan tourist resort, a whole mountain for South Korean tourists —

The Chair: I am sorry to interrupt the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but he has exhausted his allotted five minutes of time.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.