
**Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

18 June 2009

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Summary record of the 2nd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 4 May 2009, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee
(continued)

1. **Mr. de Macedo Soares** (Brazil) said that it had been ten years since there had been political consensus, and very little progress in the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been made in that time. The first pillar of the Treaty, non-proliferation, was a negative undertaking and had been largely successful, having been reinforced with additional measures, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Much less had been done with regard to the second pillar, a positive undertaking to establish a world free of nuclear weapons. The concept of a “credible deterrent” was still being discussed, even though it could give the impression that those weapons were useful. Cynicism about the impossibility of disinventing nuclear weapons ignored the fact that the international community had disinvented other weapons of mass destruction. Promises to disarm were generally accompanied by new proposals to tighten access to nuclear energy. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system remained of the utmost importance, and verification should be an integral part of every instrument concerning weapons of mass destruction.

2. When Brazil had become a party to the NPT, it had already renounced nuclear weapons at the highest level — in its Constitution — and comprehensive safeguards had already been accepted. Brazil was fully committed to the Treaty and ready to engage actively to preserve its integrity and promote its implementation.

3. **Mr. Al-Jarman** (United Arab Emirates), speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, said that that the Group attached particular importance to the current session of the Preparatory Committee, which provided a welcome opportunity to overcome past differences and to build consensus in the run-up to the 2010 Review Conference. For all its successes, the NPT had not yet become universal owing to the application of double standards in its implementation by some States. Such practices had not only undermined efforts aimed at the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones but had also diminished the credibility of the Treaty and its

ability to safeguard the security of States parties in the Middle East.

4. The Arab Group therefore welcomed the positive initiatives launched recently by the President of the United States of America to work towards the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons; to engage in serious negotiations with the President of the Russian Federation for further reductions in strategic arms; to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); and to begin negotiations on a viable fissile material cut-off treaty.

5. Ultimately, the only guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used was their total elimination. In the meantime, however, the current session should focus on: maintaining a balance between the three pillars supporting the NPT; developing an international legally binding instrument to provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; adopting a comprehensive action plan to ensure the universality of the Treaty; reaffirming the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes, subject to verification by IAEA, reinvigorating the Conference on Disarmament; and adopting practical steps to ensure the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995.

6. **Ms. Kelly** (Ireland) said that the only feasible way to eliminate the continuing threat posed by nuclear weapons was their elimination. Her country had consistently called for the prioritization of nuclear disarmament and believed that the 13 practical steps agreed to that end in 2000 remained the benchmarks for future progress.

7. Her Government welcomed the recent initiative of the President of the United States of America to work towards a world without nuclear weapons, particularly his intention to strengthen the NPT, to pursue ratification of the CTBT and to seek a new treaty to verifiably end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. It also encouraged the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation to negotiate a successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) as a matter of urgency.

8. A number of immediate steps could be taken to strengthen the NPT, including increased transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. The entry into

force of the CTBT would also make a significant contribution to the disarmament regime. In that context, Ireland reiterated its call for the States listed in Annex 2 to the CTBT to ratify the Treaty immediately and unconditionally.

9. For the past 40 years, the NPT had provided the essential framework for the development of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. The Treaty also contained key rights and obligations regarding the use of nuclear energy, which must be respected equally by all of its States parties. In view of the continued importance of the universality of the Treaty, Ireland continued to call on those States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the NPT.

10. While it was important not to become sidetracked by procedures, it was equally critical to identify areas where the NPT strengthened review process could be improved. In that connection, a practical and progressive approach in line with the review process laid down by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was needed. Shorter annual meetings with the authority to adopt consensus decisions on issues requiring immediate attention should also be considered.

11. **Mr. Shibayama** (Japan) said that the current momentum towards nuclear disarmament should be fully capitalized upon to ensure the success of the 2010 Review Conference. Japan itself had consistently played a leading role in efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, particularly by submitting an annual draft resolution on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which received the overwhelming support of the General Assembly, and its efforts to promote the entry into force of the CTBT.

12. The international community should continue to work towards the universalization of the NPT and, where appropriate, must work together to prevent States parties from abusing their legitimate rights under the Treaty. In that connection, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should take concrete actions to implement Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) and the agreements reached at the Six-Party Talks. The Islamic Republic of Iran should also take appropriate steps to restore the confidence of the international community concerning the nature of its nuclear programme.

13. The Foreign Minister of Japan had recently outlined 11 key benchmarks for global nuclear

disarmament, which could potentially become a foundation for consensus-building at the 2010 Review Conference. The benchmarks covered three basic areas: steps by all nuclear-weapon States; steps by the entire international community; and steps to support States promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those benchmarks had been included in a working paper submitted by Japan to the Secretariat. His Government also intended to hold an international meeting on global nuclear disarmament prior to the 2010 Review Conference.

14. **Mr. Cserveny** (Observer for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that there was a wide expectation in the international community that States parties to the NPT would come together with a renewed unity of purpose to prepare the groundwork for a successful outcome to the 2010 Review Conference. Since the 2005 Review Conference, 25 States parties had signed Additional Protocols and 24 States parties had brought Additional Protocols into force. Thus, a total of 120 States parties had Additional Protocols signed but not yet in force, and 91 States parties had Additional Protocols in force. Moreover, nearly three quarters of States with comprehensive safeguards agreements had signed Additional Protocols, and more than half of the States with such agreements now had Additional Protocols in force. In order to continue that steady progress, he called on those States that had not yet done so to conclude Additional Protocols and safeguards agreements and to bring them into force without delay.

15. The 2008 safeguards implementation report had been submitted to the Agency's Board of Governors for its consideration in June 2009. To date, the Agency had concluded that all nuclear material had remained in peaceful activities for 51 of the 84 States with both comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols in force. The same conclusion on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material had been drawn for the 70 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force but no Additional Protocols.

16. As of May 2009, the Agency had continued to apply safeguards under the comprehensive safeguards agreement of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to verify the correctness and completeness of its declaration. While all declared nuclear material in that country remained in peaceful nuclear activities, a number of outstanding issues still needed to be clarified regarding its past nuclear activities.

17. The Syrian Arab Republic had denied allegations that its installation at the Dair Alzour site, destroyed by an Israeli air strike, had been the site of a nuclear reactor under construction. While all declared nuclear material in the Syrian Arab Republic remained in peaceful activities, the Agency was continuing its verification work in that country, including its investigation regarding the nature of the destroyed facility.

18. The Agency had been unable to reach any conclusions with respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which did not have a safeguards agreement in place and where IAEA inspectors had been unable to perform any monitoring or verification activities since 14 April 2009.

19. States relying on nuclear power needed to have confidence in their ability to obtain nuclear fuel in a predictable, stable and cost-effective manner over the long term. A dozen or so proposals on nuclear fuel supply assurances had already been made, including a notable proposal from the Russian Federation for a low-enriched uranium reserve for use by IAEA member States.

20. IAEA continued to play a key role as a catalyst for sustainable development and was an increasingly important part of both the global nuclear safety and security regime and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. In 2008, a total of \$96.4 million had been disbursed to 122 countries and territories under the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme, which was used to address the development priorities of its member States. In the area of nuclear safety and security, the Agency continued to support and promote the global nuclear safety and security regime as a framework for achieving high levels of safety and security in nuclear activities.

21. **Mr. Macedo** (Mexico) said that the time was right for progress towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in light of the recent statements made by leaders of nuclear-weapon States, the negotiations on a new strategic arms reduction treaty to replace the START I Treaty, and the statement made by the President of the United States of America in Prague expressing renewed commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. The NPT was a fundamental instrument and achieving its universal ratification was a priority. States that were not party to the Treaty should sign it as soon as possible.

22. The total eradication of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee that they would never be used and would not proliferate. Nuclear-weapon States should implement the 13 practical steps contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)). Nuclear-weapon States should comply with their article VI obligations and accelerate the implementation of the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. States parties should strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including by introducing a moratorium on military nuclear activities, negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty, furthering the negotiations on a legally binding instrument on nuclear disarmament, and concluding a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

23. Universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was crucial. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion should be maintained pending entry into force of that Treaty. All States had the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and it was the role of IAEA to ensure that nuclear energy was being used exclusively for those purposes.

24. Mexico welcomed the recent entry into force of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. Establishing that zone raised the profile of countries that had renounced nuclear weapons and gave a stronger message of humanity's desire for a world without nuclear weapons. More States should conclude agreements to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they did not yet exist. To contribute to the success of the 2010 NPT review cycle, a second session of the Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones should be held, as had been agreed at the first session. He called on other nuclear-weapon-free zones to work together to ensure that the second session was held, with the assistance of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

25. **Ms. Aitimova** (Kazakhstan) said that Kazakhstan had been strongly committed to the process of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons since the early days of its independence. Its renunciation of nuclear weapons, the closure of its nuclear test site and its commitment to its international

obligations reaffirmed its will to strengthen global cooperation on the issue. The CTBT should enter into force as soon as possible and its verification regime should be strengthened, a process to which Kazakhstan had contributed by making available the Semipalatinsk former nuclear test site for the 2008 integrated on-site inspection field exercise. All nuclear activity in Kazakhstan was being carried out in accordance with IAEA standards and under its control. States parties that had not yet done so should meet the conditions for transparency in accordance with safeguards agreements with IAEA, including the signing of Additional Protocols.

26. The establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones was an important way to ensure the sustainability of the non-proliferation regime. In response to the Secretary-General's call to address any outstanding issues to ensure the effective implementation of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, the five Central Asian States had submitted a working paper in accordance with article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.12).

27. The nuclear disarmament process had stagnated in recent years due to a lack of consensus and political will, however, recent developments provided a source of encouragement. Kazakhstan welcomed the pledges by the leaders of the Russian Federation and the United States to reduce their nuclear arsenals and the statement by the President of the United States that he would seek a world without nuclear weapons and pursue the ratification of the CTBT. Though the NPT remained the basis for the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, the Treaty had failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the appearance of new de facto nuclear States, partly due to a lack of progress in implementing the obligations to reduce existing nuclear arsenals.

28. Non-proliferation and disarmament were complementary processes. IAEA verification regimes should be strengthened, and States that had not yet done so should conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA. There should be a new, legally binding treaty on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, the negotiations for a non-discriminatory, universally applicable fissile material cut-off treaty should be completed as soon as possible, and an international agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be drafted.

29. Recognizing the right of any nation to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, under strict international control, she stressed that a peaceful, diplomatic resolution should be sought to the recent disputes over nuclear programmes. All States possessing enrichment technologies should work towards internationalizing the services of nuclear technology centres, under the auspices of IAEA.

30. **Mr. Gumbi** (South Africa) said that it was the duty of all States parties to build on the three interlinked provisions of the Treaty in a balanced manner. It was the primary obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to realize nuclear disarmament, and recent statements provided some hope in that regard. Progress towards the entry into force of the CTBT and the resumption of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty would provide much-needed confidence. While it was the legitimate right of all States to utilize the atom for peaceful purposes, that right should be exercised with adequate assurances for the international community that there would be no diversion for military purposes.

31. It was incumbent upon all States parties to commit to providing IAEA with the necessary support to fulfil its mandate. Nuclear safety and security remained important, and it was critical that existing IAEA conventions and guidelines should be fully implemented. Increasing the resources of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund could assist in achieving the Millennium Development Goals and the targets of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The existence of an illicit nuclear network presented a serious challenge to the NPT, and decisive action was needed to counter it, including the prosecution of those involved.

32. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an indispensable part of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and efforts should be made to establish such zones in regions where they did not yet exist. In that connection, South Africa welcomed the possibility of the early entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty. The NPT remained the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. South Africa would continue to promote its universal implementation. The consensus decisions of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference would provide a sound basis for a successful 2010 Review Conference.

33. **Mr. Ali** (Malaysia) said that he supported the complete and general disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, accomplished under effective international controls. The multilateral treaties relating to such weapons should be universal, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The current session of the Preparatory Committee was the important final leg in the journey towards a reinvigoration of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda which would culminate in the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The provisional agenda for the 2010 Conference should be agreed immediately.

34. The political will to eliminate the nuclear threat had been absent in recent times. However, the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons was not a utopian dream and achieving it was not a quixotic quest, it had simply been derailed by the focus of some countries in the West on non-proliferation. Malaysia welcomed the recent pronouncement by the President of the United States in Prague, reasserting his commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. That long-overdue call resonated with increasing demands by civil society and former statesmen and policymakers in the West that nuclear-weapon States should exercise leadership and take tangible steps towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

35. However, the NPT was under great strain. Developing countries that had renounced nuclear weapons were expected to accept the privilege of the few to maintain their nuclear arsenals and extend their protection to their close allies. Preferential treatment to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was being given to States that were not party to the NPT, which ran counter to article IV of the Treaty. The failure of many in the West to put pressure on Israel to accede to the Treaty was preventing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

36. Regardless of those discouraging developments, the NPT continued to hold, largely due to the unwavering commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States to their treaty obligations. States parties should reaffirm and strengthen the grand bargain of the Treaty.

Malaysia had submitted a draft resolution to the Disarmament and International Security Committee every year since 1997, reminding Member States of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice reaffirming that nuclear-weapon States were obligated under article VI of the Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

37. To that end, all States should immediately begin multilateral negotiations leading to the early conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. Efforts towards disarmament would bolster efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Malaysia strongly disagreed with the doctrine that nuclear-weapon States should maintain nuclear weapons as a deterrent. In their bid to achieve security at all costs, their actions had heightened the sense of insecurity among non-nuclear-weapon States, spurring them to seek their own deterrents, including through the development of nuclear weapons.

38. The change in United States policy was cause for hope, but actions spoke louder than words. Malaysia looked forward to seeing an agreement concluded between the United States and the Russian Federation on a successor to the START I Treaty. United States ratification of the CTBT would spur other Annex 2 countries to accede to it. States parties to the NPT must cooperate to resolve outstanding issues and work to restore the balance of the Treaty. The norms and principles laid down in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD I), the decisions and resolutions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the agreements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference should serve as a basis for that undertaking.

39. In 2008, Malaysia had joined a cross-regional initiative with Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, the De-Alerting Group. The Group believed that the maintenance and deployment of nuclear weapons at high levels of readiness posed a grave danger to all. Taking nuclear weapons off alert was a practical step that could be taken by nuclear-weapon States to reduce the risk of nuclear war and would not diminish their security

capabilities in any way. De-alerting would complement quantitative disarmament measures.

40. **Mr. Duncan** (United Kingdom) said that his country's Prime Minister had described nuclear weapons as one of the big issues of the contemporary world, even though it had perhaps had less exposure than the issues of climate change, the global financial crisis, global poverty and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, or the security threats posed by regional conflicts and terrorism. However, not only was the nuclear question as pressing as those other issues, they were intrinsically linked and required the same concerted international response.

41. The NPT provided a set of principles and a framework that had served well for the past 40 years. The task ahead was to renew the grand bargain at its heart and reinvigorate the commitment of the international community to stopping proliferation, realizing the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and delivering the ultimate goal: a world free from nuclear weapons. A global coalition should be built around that shared vision. The world needed to move from a decade of deadlock to a decade of decision.

42. The United Kingdom had set out its vision for a reinvigorated non-proliferation regime and a world without nuclear weapons at the beginning of the review cycle in 2007. Two years on, the Prime Minister had committed to a renewed push. The United Kingdom welcomed the commitment, energy and leadership brought to the issue by the President of the United States and the agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to conclude a legally binding successor to the START I Treaty. However, success at the 2010 Review Conference was the shared responsibility of all States. All States needed to comply with their international nuclear non-proliferation obligations, especially in cases where they had been reinforced by Security Council resolutions. The United Kingdom was ready to play its full part, including through the publication of a "Road to 2010" plan later that year, intended to identify areas around which consensus could be built to strengthen the NPT and the broader disarmament architecture at the 2010 Review Conference.

43. **Mr. Hosseini** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the world was facing a number of challenges caused by the double standards and unjust policies of certain States. Those States portrayed themselves as the

guarantors of peace and security, yet their illegal actions were weakening international institutions. Implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty continued to be unbalanced. The United States of America, the United Kingdom and France possessed thousands of nuclear weapons and continued to develop and transfer them, including to non-nuclear-weapon States. There was a growing tendency to threaten the use of such weapons for political purposes, and a real risk that they might be deployed. Non-nuclear-weapon States might legitimately ask what they had achieved by acceding to the Treaty.

44. The non-nuclear-weapon States had nevertheless agreed in 1995 to extend the Treaty indefinitely, in the hope that it could be rescued at the 2000 Review Conference. However, in a frustrating setback, a certain number of nuclear-weapon States had subsequently reneged on their unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament. Recent efforts to turn the Treaty into a single-goal treaty appeared to be aimed at securing a monopoly on nuclear energy for nuclear-weapon States.

45. The United States, the United Kingdom and France continued to cooperate on nuclear programmes with the Zionist regime, in blatant violation of the Treaty and of the commitments undertaken in 1995 and in 2000. The Zionist regime had rejected international calls to accede to the Treaty, thereby preventing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Its nuclear weapons threatened international peace and security, with potentially catastrophic results.

46. Article IV of the Treaty provided for the transfer of peaceful technologies to States parties. However, certain States persisted in imposing illegal and unilateral restrictions on States parties to the Treaty, thereby depriving the latter of their legitimate and inalienable right to nuclear development. The 2010 Conference should address that practice, as well as the instrumental use of international organizations. IAEA should verify compliance with article IV, and violators ought to pay compensation.

47. Certain nuclear-weapon States had contributed to the emergence of new nuclear-weapon possessors and given momentum to the arms race. The Review Conference could not overlook the fact that those States had transferred weapons-grade materials to non-parties. Yet the decision recently taken by the

Nuclear Suppliers Group, under pressure from the United States, gave the signal that there was more to be gained from remaining outside the Treaty.

48. The United States authorities had recently undertaken to change course and move towards nuclear disarmament. The experience of the previous forty years showed that such promises had never materialized. It was therefore essential that they should be backed by verifiable and irreversible action. The United States should abandon the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, honour its commitments under the Review Conferences and end its nuclear cooperation with the Zionist regime, urging the latter to eliminate its nuclear arsenal and accede to the Treaty.

49. Statements such as that of the Czech Republic on behalf of the European Union had referred to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was in fact exclusively peaceful. Such references were selective and detrimental to a cooperative working environment. It was also discouraging that the Secretary-General had referred to a State party and to a non-party on an equal standing.

50. **Mr. Valero** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that multilateral negotiations towards disarmament had reached a stalemate. There was a risk that nuclear weapons could be acquired by terrorist groups, or indeed deployed by nuclear-weapons-States against States parties. In accordance with the letter and spirit of the Treaty, the nuclear powers should exercise greater responsibility in working to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Negotiations towards achieving horizontal and vertical proliferation should take place in a spirit of good faith. It was regrettable some States were held to their obligations under international agreements whereas others were exempted. Such discriminatory practices ran counter to the principle of the equality of States.

51. The nuclear-weapon States had made substantial commitments at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. A transparent and universal verification system was therefore necessary. The Conference on Disarmament should work to identify the necessary steps to eliminate all nuclear weapons within a specific time frame. It was also important to arrive at a consensus in order to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and to give it a mandate. Another vital issue was the negotiation of a convention

prohibiting the production of fissile material for the development of nuclear weapons.

52. It was unacceptable that certain nuclear-weapon-States continued to consider nuclear weapons as a deterrent against other States parties, while the latter were in compliance with their obligations. Non-nuclear-weapon States must receive negative security guarantees through a binding international instrument. His country also hoped that further nuclear-weapon-free zones would be established, in particular in the Middle East and in central Europe. Lastly, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, parties had an inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. His country rejected any politicized attempts to undermine the provisions of the Treaty through actions aimed at impairing its integrity.

53. **Mr. Snoussi** (Tunisia) said that States parties must find a balance between their respective obligations and responsibilities under the provisions of the NPT. In that connection, he welcomed the decision taken by the United States and the Russian Federation to intensify negotiations on reducing their strategic nuclear weapon arsenals, as well as the commitment made by the new administration of the United States to advance the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

54. Regrettably, there had been no meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament. He called on the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil the unequivocal commitments that they had made at the 2000 Review Conference to begin eliminating their arsenals and hoped that they would honour their promise by speeding up negotiations on the 13 practical steps agreed upon in 2000. In the meantime, effective safeguards had to be put in place against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against States that had voluntarily renounced the possession of nuclear weapons.

55. The failure of some nuclear-weapon States to ratify the CTBT, especially those whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force, was cause for concern. Moreover, the development of new types of nuclear weapons was contrary to the guarantees given by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the adoption of the CTBT. One objective still to be achieved was the drafting of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Negotiations had not even begun on such an

instrument, even though it was crucial for the speedy and effective elimination of nuclear weapons.

56. It was crucial to uphold the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The development of civilian nuclear programmes by States should be respected and encouraged; at the same time, IAEA played an essential role in ensuring that States fulfilled their commitments to safety, security and non-proliferation.

57. The effectiveness and credibility of the NPT depended on its universality. It was especially urgent for States with a nuclear capability to accede to it, as that would reinforce security in regions of tension like the Middle East. It was regrettable that, despite the desire shown by the States of the Middle East to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Israel alone continued to refuse to sign the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision. Such behaviour constituted an obstacle to disarmament efforts in general and to the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East.

58. **Mr. Argüello** (Argentina) said that his country's position as a producer and user of nuclear energy gave it a particular responsibility to promote nuclear disarmament. At the bilateral level, Argentina and Brazil had in 2008 reaffirmed their nuclear cooperation agreements, which covered such areas as uranium enrichment and the construction of power reactors. Such agreements sprang from a will to satisfy the region's energy needs while ensuring the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear technology. At the regional level, Argentina was party to such agreements as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

59. States parties should honour their commitment to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, instead of seeking to reinterpret that commitment. Nuclear powers should show leadership, notably by moving towards the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, promoting the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and calling for the Disarmament Conference to begin negotiations without preconditions towards a treaty on fissile materials. He welcomed the recent statement made by the two largest nuclear-weapon States, and trusted that it would lead to tangible action.

60. As a State possessing the technology necessary for the full nuclear fuel cycle, Argentina stressed the need to take a balanced approach to such advanced technology. Any attempt to redefine the delicate

balance of obligations contained in the Treaty, to question the value of those obligations, or indeed to cast doubt on the right of States to peaceful nuclear development, risked undermining the non-proliferation system in place. His country would spare no effort to preserve the integrity and legitimacy of the Treaty. Several delegations had expressed cautious optimism about the current Preparatory Committee, and it was important to capitalize on that renewed political will.

61. **Mr. Enkhsaikhan** (Mongolia), reporting on the first meeting of Mongolia and the focal points of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, held in Mongolia in April 2009, said that participants had discussed implementation of the Tlatelolco Declaration as well as preparations for the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Participants had stressed the importance of the universalization of the NPT and of the speedy entry into force of the CTBT. They had been briefed on developments regarding the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention and the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol. Participants had also expressed support for the Secretary-General's five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament; welcomed the entry into force of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and the imminent entry into force of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone; and considered the possibility of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare an updated comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects.

62. Representatives from Mongolia, the Russian Federation and China had met in March 2009 to discuss a draft trilateral treaty prepared by Mongolia to address the external aspects of its status. The draft was similar to other nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties but took into account Mongolia's location and its relations with its two neighbours. The three parties had agreed to continue talks.

63. **Mr. Al-Hamadi** (Qatar) said that progress was still slow with regard to nuclear disarmament, owing to the refusal of five nuclear-weapon States to reduce and stop the development of their nuclear arsenals and the failure of other nuclear-weapon States to accede to the NPT. The final disposal of all nuclear weapons must remain the ultimate objective of States parties to the NPT. Until then, a binding international instrument

must be reached in order to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use. It was also important to stress the inalienable right of States parties to the NPT to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

64. Qatar supported early implementation of the CTBT and rapid action on General Assembly resolution 50/66 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. The States parties to the NPT, particularly those that had supported that resolution, must break their silence regarding Israel's nuclear policy, which violated the NPT, brought the region into an arms race and endangered regional and international security. The accession of Israel to the NPT would boost confidence in seeking solutions to the problems of the Middle East. The Arab countries would be seeking alternatives with regard to a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone depending on the outcomes of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

65. It was regrettable that no progress had been made at the 2009 substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission regarding the goal of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, because of double standards and discriminatory policies. Qatar had taken a number of steps to strengthen the NPT at the international and national levels, including by participating in conferences and submitting reports to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs; signing a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and a small quantities protocol with IAEA; providing training to technical experts and professionals in the implementation of international instruments on the prohibition of weapons of all kinds; and enacting the necessary national legislation to comply with his country's obligations in the areas of disarmament and international security.

66. **Mr. Onemola** (Nigeria) said that States parties must adopt a spirit of compromise if they were to achieve consensus on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. He welcomed the recent statements made by the Russian Federation and the United States, which had effectively renewed their commitments to reducing their nuclear armaments, and called on other nuclear-weapon States to do the same. He urged the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty and called on States that had not yet done so to accede to the NPT and to ratify the CTBT.

67. **Mr. Balé** (Congo) said that only the full implementation of the legal obligations of States parties to the NPT to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to launch negotiations on effective measures to cease the nuclear arms race could ensure international peace and security. Universal ratification of the NPT and implementation of the recommendations adopted by the States parties to the NPT at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, particularly the 13 practical steps, were of crucial importance.

68. He welcomed the recent entry into force of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia and the efforts of the African Union towards establishing an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. He furthermore supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

69. Limiting negotiations to States parties to the NPT diminished the effectiveness of the Treaty. It was therefore crucial to pursue the objective of universal adherence. Negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material and other explosive substances for military purposes were urgently necessary. It was also important to strengthen the role of IAEA as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties.

70. Lastly, States' compliance with their obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) must be enforced in order to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Cooperation between States on that issue must take place within the framework of the United Nations, in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner.

71. **Mr. Owade** (Kenya) said that nuclear disarmament must remain the ultimate goal, given emerging threats, including terrorism. Nuclear-weapon States therefore needed to hasten their reduction of nuclear arsenals. In that regard, he welcomed the decision by the United States and the Russian Federation to launch a new round of negotiations on nuclear arms reduction and called on other major nuclear-weapon States to undertake similar strategic negotiations in order to enhance nuclear safety and security. The question of the entry into force of the CTBT should be addressed as a matter of priority. In that connection, he welcomed the recent overtures by Washington to ratify that Treaty and appealed to all

States, particularly those whose ratification was needed for the Treaty to enter into force, to do so as quickly as possible.

72. IAEA played a pivotal role in verifying compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties concluded under the NPT. Attempts to play political games with IAEA would only weaken it and render it incapable of discharging its crucial responsibilities in promoting nuclear safety. It was important to recognize the inalienable right of States parties to the NPT to determine and meet their nuclear energy needs. IAEA could be an important partner in ensuring a non-discriminatory approach to nuclear fuel supply and an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between suppliers and consumers.

73. **Mr. Danon** (France) expressed the hope that the 2010 NPT Review Conference would see the adoption of concrete, realistic action plans, based on the Treaty's three pillars. France had taken a number of steps to contribute to nuclear disarmament since its accession to the Treaty, including, most recently, the proposal of tangible initiatives for disarmament to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session.

74. With regard to proliferation, the international community must respond firmly to the major challenges posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was necessary to promote universal implementation of IAEA safeguards agreements as well as the conclusion of additional protocols; together, those instruments would allow IAEA to best fulfil its mission. It was also important to advocate for more rigorous export controls, especially within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, in order to prevent the transfer of nuclear materials. Operational decisions must be taken with regard to the consequences of withdrawals from the Treaty.

75. The international community must use every possible means to prevent risks, particularly those related to terrorism, that were linked to the availability and circulation of nuclear goods, including through clandestine networks. France was willing to share its experience with civilian nuclear energy with any country seeking to acquire a nuclear power capacity and in compliance with their international non-proliferation obligations. In recent years, his country had forged an increasing number of

partnerships, particularly with developing countries, in order to achieve that objective.

76. He stressed the urgent nature of engaging in a dialogue with India, Israel and Pakistan, with a view to ensuring their compliance with international standards on non-proliferation and export controls. The establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East was of the utmost importance. A solution to the Iranian question would contribute to international non-proliferation efforts and to the realization of such a zone. Ratification of the CTBT by all Middle Eastern States and the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty would also constitute significant steps in that direction.

77. **Mr. Duncan** (United Kingdom), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said it was regrettable that some delegations had not heeded the words of the Secretary-General with regard to the need to alleviate international concerns. He would address the allegations made about British commitment to nuclear disarmament during the appropriate cluster debate. He drew attention to a recent speech made by the British Prime Minister who, while recognizing the serious challenges currently facing the world, had urged the international community to unite around a common purpose and form a new multilateralism that rejected confrontation and was based on a commitment to the power of international cooperation.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.