
**Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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New York, 4 May-15 May 2009

Summary record (partial)* of the 7th meeting**

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 7 May 2009, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe)

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General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory
Committee (*continued*)

* No summary record was prepared for the rest of the meeting.
** No summary record was issued for the 6th meeting.

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The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Tóth** (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)) said that, despite the stormy times it had endured since opening for signature in 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) enjoyed ever-greater support. As of today, it had been signed by 180 countries and ratified by 148. It needed to be ratified by a further nine Annex 2 countries to enter into force. In that connection, he welcomed the recent statement by United States President Obama and drew attention to the upcoming Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, which offered a unique opportunity to capitalize on the political momentum of recent days and to send a high-level signal of unity of purpose for the Treaty's entry into force. He hoped that all States signatories would attend the Conference at the highest possible level.

2. Much progress had been made since the CTBTO Preparatory Commission had last addressed a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) review forum, in 2000. The CTBT verification regime was nearing completion. With regard to the international monitoring system, 236 monitoring stations and 10 radionuclide laboratories had been certified. Several more stations were being certified and many more were under construction. In addition, a new global communications infrastructure (GCI II) was up and running and great strides had been made towards on-site inspection readiness.

3. The CTBT verification regime had been validated two and a half years earlier when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had conducted a nuclear test. Though only half the international monitoring system had been in place at the time, the verification regime had exceeded expectations. The explosion had been detected by over 20 monitoring stations worldwide and traces of radioactive noble gas attributable to the test had been picked up. The verification regime had increased the ability to detect and to identify nuclear explosions significantly. When combined with on-site inspections, no country would be able to evade detection.

4. The recent threat by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to conduct another nuclear test

underscored the urgent need for a legally binding universal ban on nuclear testing through the early entry into force of the CTBT. He called on all States to refrain from acts that defeated the Treaty's object and purpose.

5. To stay abreast of scientific developments, the Preparatory Commission had initiated the International Scientific Studies project, which aimed to assess the readiness and capability of the CTBT verification regime in a coordinated international effort. The scientific institutions involved would present their results at a conference to be held in Vienna in June.

6. The CTBT would enter into force only if States considered it fundamental to their national interests. In his view, the CTBT played a key role in today's environment of heightened attention to non-State actors and their potential access to nuclear weapons, devices, fissile material, technology and expertise. A strong and verifiable final barrier on the road to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability was a vital component of a comprehensive approach to addressing common security challenges.

7. The CTBT was a strong instrument for non-proliferation. Testing was necessary for nuclear-weapon possessors seeking to develop new nuclear weapons and for would-be possessors seeking to establish confidence in their nuclear weapon programmes. Making the de facto international norm against nuclear testing legally binding would close that door once and for all. Once the CTBT verification regime became fully operational, non-compliance could be addressed properly, thereby strengthening the overall objectives of the NPT. The CTBT was also a catalyst for disarmament. By providing a legal barrier against nuclear testing, it curbed the development of new nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon possessors. It was also a confidence- and security-building measure. Once in force, it would be a key element in the process of deeper arms reductions and multilateral disarmament.

8. The nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime faced challenges on many fronts. The prospect of nuclear terrorism was very real. The world was also seeing a global nuclear energy renaissance. With more fissile material in circulation and more actors handling that material, a strengthened comprehensive system of barriers against misuse was urgently needed. Such a systemic approach required a CTBT in force.

9. The CTBT was one of the key elements on which consensus could be built in advance of the 2010 Review Conference. Its entry into force and full implementation were achievable and, while insufficient, necessary for success. Progress towards the entry into force of the CTBT could drive the international community's resolve to address the challenges facing the non-proliferation regime. As such, it was a measure where progress could be achieved relatively quickly. The CTBT already existed. It had been signed by 180 States and ratified by almost 150. Its verification regime was close to completion and had been tried and tested. While not the only answer to the concerns generated by nuclear weapons, the CTBT would be an integral part of a strengthened comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Its entry into force would pave the way to solving many of the challenges facing the regime.

The discussion covered in the summary record ended at 10.25 a.m.