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**Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review  
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

9 June 2009

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**Third session**

New York, 4-15 May 2009

**Summary record (partial)\* of the 5th meeting\*\***

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 6 May 2009 at 10 a.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Chidyausiku . . . . . (Zimbabwe)

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General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory  
Committee (*continued*)

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\* No summary record was prepared for the rest of the meeting.  
\*\* No summary record was issued for the 4th meeting.

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*The discussion covered in the summary record began at 10.30 a.m.*

**General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee** (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Mutandiro** (Zimbabwe) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the only cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and reaffirming its importance was thus a collective responsibility of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. Measures should be taken to persuade those countries not yet party to the Treaty to adhere to it. States parties must also focus on measures to advance in a balanced manner its three pillars: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2. Negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on modalities for an agreed programme of work on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty should begin without delay, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should enter into force as soon as possible. Zimbabwe had signed and ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba, which sought to establish the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and called on African countries that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty promptly. Similarly, a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should be established as soon as possible, pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the 1995 Review Conference.

3. All State parties should uphold article IV of the Treaty, which underpinned their right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. There was increased demand for the applications of nuclear technology in the agriculture, energy and water management sectors, among others.

4. The 2010 Review Conference should work to strengthen the technical cooperation activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the provision of adequate financial resources. Provision of such assistance should not be subject to political manipulation and the application of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be restricted under the guise of non-proliferation. Measures to enhance the effectiveness of IAEA and uphold its integrity and impartiality were critical to the effectiveness and integrity of the Treaty.

5. **Mr. Chandra** (Sri Lanka) said that while in recent years much attention had been paid to the threat of nuclear proliferation, in fact, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation went hand in hand and parallel progress was therefore required. Promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy was gaining momentum, and access to its benefits, accompanied by commitment to effective implementation of safeguards, safety and security, was integral to the success of the Treaty. Use and transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination should be fully assured.

6. While Sri Lanka welcomed reductions by the nuclear-weapon States in their arsenals, such partial reductions did not meet the expectations of most State parties, especially in the light of qualitative developments in nuclear arsenals which reaffirmed nuclear deterrence as an important feature of those States' strategic security policies. That approach had cast doubt on commitments to nuclear disarmament and disrupted the delicate balance on which the Treaty was founded. Pursuant to the 1995 Review Conference decision, it was unjustifiable for nuclear-weapon States to maintain nuclear military postures toward non-nuclear-weapon States that were in compliance with their Treaty obligations.

7. Developed countries had an important role to play in facilitating legitimate developments of nuclear energy in the non-nuclear-weapon States parties by allowing them to participate fully in the transfer of nuclear equipment and information for peaceful purposes. There must be a spirit of give and take in order to build on earlier consensus, as had been the case in 1995, when Sri Lanka had chaired the Conference.

8. **Ms. Ashipala-Musavyi** (Namibia) said that on the issue of nuclear fuel supply assurances, the views of all States parties should be taken into account and comprehensive, inclusive and transparent consultations should precede any substantive consideration. All countries that had not yet signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were urged to do so without delay, especially those listed in Annex 2, without whose ratifications the Treaty could not enter into force. In that connection, Namibia had hosted a workshop for the countries of the Southern African Development Community in order to build momentum for a successful session outcome.

9. **Mr. Alkaabi** (United Arab Emirates) said that progress in achieving the goal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had, at times, gone in the wrong direction, with nuclear-weapon States developing new nuclear weapons and non-nuclear-weapon States seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. That raised fears of such weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible parties. Intentional negligence of the commitments made at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, in particular, non-compliance with the resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, was cause for concern.

10. He drew attention to the two working papers introduced by the Arab Group highlighting a number of important issues: nuclear-weapon States should enter into serious negotiations to ensure their implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed on at the 2000 conference; the international community should reaffirm its rejection of attempts to transfer, produce or stockpile nuclear weapons, especially in the Arab Gulf and neighbouring regions; effective measures should be taken to ensure that States not party to the Treaty joined without delay; States should enter into arrangements calling for regional and subregional nuclear-weapon-free zones; and the right of countries, in particular developing countries, to develop nuclear programmes for peaceful use should be reaffirmed. In that connection, the United Arab Emirates were developing a peaceful nuclear energy programme, to be carried out with full operational transparency and high standards of safety, security and non-proliferation. The country was cooperating with IAEA and had signed a number of relevant international instruments.

11. **Mr. Pramudwinai** (Thailand) said that, in the efforts to reach the common goal of the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, the recent policy announcement of the new United States administration on disarmament and non-proliferation and the agreement reached recently between the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation to work together to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty were encouraging. His country also supported the five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament of the Secretary-General.

12. Thailand had been an active proponent of the Bangkok Treaty, which established the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. That had been the first

such zone in Asia and had served as a basis for the non-proliferation and nuclear safety regime in Southeast Asia for over a decade. The Treaty had been signed and ratified by all 10 member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

13. Thailand welcomed the initiative by Mongolia to promote cooperation among existing nuclear-weapon-free zones by hosting a meeting of focal points of those treaties in April 2009. The entry into force of the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, which had created the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, was also encouraging.

14. The recent global energy crisis and climate change had resulted in an increasing need for countries to turn to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which was an inalienable right, in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty. Thailand, which was considering launching a nuclear power programme, stressed the importance of nuclear safety and security as essential to ensure public confidence.

15. **Ms. Castellón** (Plurinational State of Bolivia) said that her country's new Political Constitution defined it as a pacifist State that promoted the right to peace and rejected aggression as a solution to international conflict. The Constitution also prohibited the establishment of foreign military bases in the country. The idea of nuclear deterrence amounted to fighting fire with fire; only the elimination of nuclear weapons could eliminate the risk of nuclear war. It was vital to set aside any political calculations regarding which State should take the first step in that direction. Those States that had the power to destroy the world had a responsibility to take action.

16. The 2010 Conference would provide an opportunity to move on from previous failures. The Treaty was an important instrument and should be consolidated as a pillar of nuclear disarmament. A transparent and effective international verification system should be developed and further nuclear-weapon-free zones established, in particular in the Middle East. At the same time, States parties had a right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

17. **Mr. Ja'afari** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that although the Treaty remained the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, its implementation gave cause for concern. The two most significant pillars, non-proliferation and disarmament,

were not granted equal importance and the third pillar, the right to peaceful nuclear technology, was hampered by double standards.

18. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an important means to promote peace and security. In 2003, the Syrian Arab Republic had, on behalf of the Arab Group, submitted to the Security Council an initiative to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons. However, certain influential States had failed to support the initiative, which awaited more favourable international conditions.

19. Israel had refused to accede to the Treaty and had not opened its nuclear installations to the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Israel's nuclear weapons capacity contravened such international resolutions as Security Council resolution 487 (1981). The international community should press Israel to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State without conditions or restrictions, and to open all of its nuclear installations to inspection.

20. One of the fundamental goals of the Treaty and of the Statute of IAEA was to promote the inalienable rights contained in article IV of the Treaty, which could not be reinterpreted. The Syrian Arab Republic therefore called on all States parties to refrain from imposing any limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment and technology to States parties that had concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.

21. His country had submitted to the Preparatory Committee a working paper on substantive issues in the implementation of the Treaty, which included a number of recommendations. In particular, a subsidiary organization should be established under Main Committee II to examine the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and to determine steps towards implementation of the resolution on the Middle East and of the final document of the 2000 Review Conference.

22. **Ms. Espinosa** (Ecuador) said that the Treaty of Tlatelolco had created the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world, which had been followed by others. It was important to press for such a zone in the Middle East as a step towards a comprehensive peace in the region. Ecuador supported the work of IAEA, which was the sole competent authority for verifying

compliance with the Treaty. The threat of nuclear war had not disappeared, and it was deplorable that there was as yet no effective multilateral commitment to nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States had a shared responsibility to implement the Treaty. The former should work in good faith to eliminate their nuclear weapons; the latter should pursue their inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in compliance with established procedures. Ecuador supported the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was an integral part of the non-proliferation regime. The fact that a major Power had now committed to ratifying the CTBT gave cause for great optimism, and she hoped that commitment would lead to swift action.

23. The concept of security should include not only the narrowly militaristic dimension, but also the need to fulfil the basic necessities of all peoples. Peaceful nuclear technology could help achieve the Millennium Development Goals, ensuring sustainable development and a decent life for all.

24. The inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology should not be eroded through the imposition of additional commitments on States that clearly did not represent a threat. Ecuador was in favour of multilateralism and condemned any unilateral action, even if presented as collective. Any such initiative sought by implication to replace the existing structure of the United Nations and of international law. It had become urgent to gather consensus to develop the non-proliferation regime and ensure peace and prosperity for humanity.

25. **Mr. Al-Assad** (League of Arab States) said that many of the statements made by delegations had drawn attention to two points: first, the Treaty was faced with a number of challenges that endangered its credibility; second, the call by the new administration in the United States of America for a world free from nuclear weapons represented a positive development. The League of Arab States had issued a statement expressing the hope that the preliminary steps set forth by the United States would lead to practical action at the 2010 Review Conference. It hoped that the United States would set aside past mistakes and adopt a new approach to proliferation issues.

26. Before further strengthening the Treaty, it was vital to ensure universal accession and to implement the decisions taken thus far, giving equal attention to

the three pillars. Implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East constituted an overarching non-negotiable priority for the Arab States. Israel persisted in refusing to accede to the Treaty or open its nuclear installations to inspection, and some States believed that the Arab-Israeli conflict justified that policy. However, that assumption rested on the flawed and dangerous logic of nuclear deterrence. Notwithstanding the conflict, all of the Arab States had acceded to the Treaty. The international community had a responsibility to change the prevailing discourse regarding the Middle East. The current State-by-State approach was selective and discriminatory, and should be replaced with a comprehensive, regional vision.

27. The recent Summit of the League of Arab States in Doha had adopted a resolution calling for the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East and for specific practical steps to be determined in order to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The resolution called on the League of Arab States to examine the courses of action open to Arab States in view of the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference.

28. **Mr. Robotjazi** (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that a delegation had used an incorrect term to refer to the Persian Gulf. The term Persian Gulf was the only historically established and universally recognized name for the sea area between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Arabian peninsula. Any other name was devoid of legal or political value.

*The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.*