
**Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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**Principles of fuel supply guarantees and the
multilateralization of fuel cycle activities****Working paper submitted by Germany and the
Russian Federation**

1. We are committed to the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in all of its three pillars, non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We respect the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the development of fuel cycle activities, in conformity with their obligations under the Treaty.
2. Back-up mechanisms and multilateral fuel cycle guarantees could reduce proliferation risks while at the same time increasing energy security and reducing costs. Multilateral cooperation in the area of fuel supply will help to build trust and foster the implementation of the Treaty in all three pillars. We therefore welcome the role that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has played in promoting multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including nuclear fuel assurances.
3. The development of civil nuclear power must be consistent with the highest non-proliferation standards and should permit States to use nuclear energy and to create a viable alternative to the acquisition of sensitive fuel cycle technologies. As the Director General of IAEA has noted, “nuclear fuel cycles pose specific proliferation risks, which we should seek to minimize, while continuing to uphold States’ rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty”.
4. We share the goal expressed by the Director General in his statement at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in November 2007 “(a) that any such mechanism would be apolitical and non-discriminatory, and would be available to all States that are in compliance with their safeguards obligations; and (b) that it would not require a State to give up its rights regarding any parts of the nuclear fuel cycle”.
5. We support efforts to make use of synergies and harmonize proposals made in the area of nuclear fuel supply in order to ensure their compatibility for the sake of the general benefit of nuclear non-proliferation.



6. Fuel supply and multilateralization and guarantee schemes should not have any negative impact on the functioning of the market but should, on the contrary, widen its geographical basis on the supply side. Due to their historical and socio-economic experiences and environments, States will perceive proposed guarantee schemes and multilateral fuel supply chains differently. Countries should have an opportunity to choose between different supply chains and different types of guarantees.

7. We support the development of a range of potential measures. We are open to different schemes on the basis of our technical abilities and socio-economic environments and in full compliance with our international obligations, especially those on nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and security.

8. In the framework of strengthening the Treaty we welcome the Russian initiative to set up multinational centres to provide nuclear fuel cycle services and, as the first step, to establish the International Uranium Enrichment Centre on the basis of the enrichment plant in Angarsk, which the Russian Federation has offered to place under IAEA safeguards. States participating in the centre will have guaranteed access to enrichment services to meet their nuclear fuel needs without the necessity of developing their own production facilities.

9. We also welcome the German proposal of a multilateral enrichment sanctuary project, which offers a perspective for countries to gain full and independent ownership of enrichment capacities without further proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies.

10. We are also prepared to work together with IAEA and with other countries to clarify outstanding issues regarding the benefits and practical questions of fuel reserves as well as multinational centres.

11. We take stock of the existing experiences in international cooperation in the area of nuclear fuel supply activities, for instance, the cooperation Germany has undertaken with partners in the framework of Urenco and the steps taken by Urenco partners to widen access to its technology without creating proliferation risks.
