



General Assembly

Sixty-second session

First Committee

9th meeting

Wednesday, 17 October 2007, 10 a.m.
New York

Official Records

Chairperson: Mr. Badji (Senegal)

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Agenda items 88 to 105 (continued)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of draft resolutions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): In accordance with the programme of work and timetable, this morning the Committee will continue with the second segment of its work, namely, the thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items, namely, items 88 to 105.

As I explained yesterday with regard to the list of speakers, delegations are asked to sign up with the Secretariat for clusters in which they are interested. Of course, the Secretariat will maintain rolling lists of speakers for each cluster. Delegations are requested to be prepared to speak on the clusters for which they have signed up.

This morning, the Committee will have an exchange of views with the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the representative of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy

Agency. The subject will be the current state of affairs in the field of arms control and disarmament and the role of the respective organizations.

I would like to welcome our panellists and, without further delay, to first give the floor to Mr. Sergio Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

Mr. Duarte: I am very privileged today to participate in this panel together with four distinguished visitors to the First Committee — Rogelio Pflirter, the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO); Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament; and Gustavo Zlauvinen, Representative of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the United Nations. The subject of this panel refers to the role of those respective organizations, when in fact they play a wide variety of roles in advancing multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation goals. In my remarks, I will focus on the historical context for that important work, in particular on the extensive cooperation that the United Nations has maintained over many years with each of those autonomous international organizations.

As we grapple with the crises of the present and confront future challenges, we should recognize that all of our work during this session is part of a long history of efforts to advance global disarmament and arms control norms, and thereby strengthen international

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peace and security. The goal of prohibiting the use of the deadliest and most indiscriminate types of weaponry has a legacy dating back many centuries. It even appears in the ancient Hindu epic, the *Ramayana*. The idea of creating special international organizations to confront such challenges, however, made its initial appearance in the Middle Ages, when Pierre Dubois proposed the creation of an international organization to deal with the problem of war. In Europe, Dante and Erasmus explored this idea further, as did the Duc de Sully, Émeric Crucé, and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Across the Atlantic, William Penn would later become one of the first to explore a disarmament role for an international organization. Many more proposals would follow.

Those efforts led eventually to the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and later to the establishment of the League of Nations and the United Nations. One of the first actions of the United Nations was to consider a United States proposal, introduced in 1946 by Bernard Baruch, to create an international atomic development authority to be entrusted with all phases of the development and use of atomic energy. In his famous “Atoms for Peace” speech seven years later in the General Assembly, President Eisenhower proposed the creation of an international atomic energy agency, a proposal that came to fruition in 1957. In 1961, the United States and the Soviet Union jointly endorsed a programme for general and complete disarmament, which included a proposal to establish an international disarmament organization that should be created within the framework of the United Nations.

The world’s inability to reach consensus on an agreement on general and complete disarmament, however, led to an alternative approach, often called partial measures, involving the negotiation of treaties or the launching of other ad hoc initiatives on more specific issues and types of weapons. That led to the creation of some dedicated agencies, including all of the intergovernmental organizations represented on our panel today. That growth of international organizations devoted to specific types of weapons has not rendered the United Nations obsolete — to the contrary, it has strongly reinforced its own vital roles. The United Nations is indispensable in achieving synergy among the diverse activities of international organizations throughout the world, at both the global and the regional levels.

There is in our world much work to do that is highly technical and should be as free as possible from political interference. Yet there is also a need to ensure that our collective work on global disarmament challenges is coordinated and integrated, so that we do not find ourselves mired in duplication of effort or, even worse, working at cross-purposes. Furthermore, all of the work of the United Nations — including its advocacy initiatives, its work with non-governmental organizations, its efforts to educate the public, its many regional and subregional workshops promoting the implementation of agreed multilateral norms, its efforts to promote the rule of law and universal membership in key multilateral treaties, its ongoing deliberations of the state of existing and emerging disarmament initiatives and, through the Security Council, its role in enforcing agreed norms — in all those areas, progress at the United Nations serves to benefit the work of those other disarmament-related organizations.

That is all very much consistent with one of the most fundamental purposes of the United Nations as stated in the Charter, which is to be a “centre for harmonizing the actions of nations” in pursuit of their common ends. It is also consistent with the words of the Final Document of its first special session on disarmament — adopted in this very room in 1978 — in which the General Assembly underscored that the United Nations has “a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament”. (*resolution S-10/2, para. 27*) The commitment of the United Nations to each of the entities represented on our panel today is profound and registered at the highest level. It also extends to international organizations that are not represented here today.

On 22 January, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon sent a personal message to the opening of the 2007 session of the Conference on Disarmament, stressing that he had “staked out as one of [his] priorities the mission to invigorate disarmament and non-proliferation efforts”. (Press release *SG/SM/10848*)

On 17 September, he sent a personal message — which I was honoured to read out — upon the opening of the fifty-first session of the IAEA’s General Conference, underscoring that “We must redouble our efforts to revitalize the international disarmament and non-proliferation agenda, and rid the world of nuclear weapons”. (Press release *SG/SM/11158*)

The United Nations has long supported efforts by the IAEA to encourage States to adopt the Additional Protocol to strengthen physical security over nuclear material and facilities, to promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, to ensure that nuclear energy is used exclusively for peaceful purposes and to promote the adoption of comprehensive safeguards by non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We have provided administrative and substantive support to the parties to that treaty since its entry into force in 1970.

On that same 17 September, the Secretary-General sent a message — which I also read out on his behalf — to the fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), where he called for persistent efforts on the part of States and civil society to achieve that historic goal. The Office for Disarmament Affairs and its regional centres for peace and disarmament in Latin America and the Caribbean and in the Asia/Pacific region have actively worked with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission to promote the entry into force of this treaty.

Later that month, the Secretary-General personally addressed the High-level Meeting on the Tenth Anniversary of the Entry Into Force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a commemorative event that was marked in many other United Nations arenas in activities jointly arranged by the OPCW and the Office for Disarmament Affairs, which has also worked to promote universality and full implementation of that convention.

Within the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, and to assist Member States with the implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Office for Disarmament Affairs is working together with several international organizations to develop a single comprehensive bio-incident database and to update the technical guidelines and procedures established by the General Assembly in 1987 for investigations in the case of allegations of use of biological warfare agents.

Of course, our cooperation with other international organizations is by no means limited to those dealing with weapons of mass destruction. We work with local, subregional and regional organizations on literally a daily basis to promote efforts against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The Office for

Disarmament Affairs is the coordinating focal point of efforts within the larger inter-agency United Nations family to promote this goal. Our efforts against this illicit trade have achieved widespread recognition, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean. Our Office also leads the working group on disarmament and non-proliferation to improve coordination between the United Nations and regional and other intergovernmental organizations. This collaboration covers a wide gamut of activities, ranging from small arms to weapons of mass destruction, including efforts to promote implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

The Office for Disarmament Affairs has also been working with other organizations to promote norms against inhumane weaponry. The Geneva branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs works closely with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, while also assisting States parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in pursuing the elimination of inhumane weapons. In our official statements and in meetings, the United Nations Secretariat is also supporting efforts to establish norms governing cluster munitions. It is a poignant irony that today, so long after the *Ramayana* opposed the use of inhumane weapons, we are still grappling with this problem.

Looking ahead, I see great prospects for cooperation between all international organizations involved in disarmament. I see a trend towards joint partnerships, greater information-sharing, mutual recognition of the work of our various organizations, new initiatives to promote public education, expanded collective efforts at the regional and subregional levels, jointly-produced publications, innovative media approaches and many other ways that we can work together to achieve our historic common goals.

I would like to conclude by saying that the future of the world lies not in international organizations, but in international organization. Our goal must be to deepen the scope of cooperation among our Member States in the pursuit of agreed multilateral goals. International organizations are not an end, but a means to achieve such goals. In this light, I welcome the thoughts of all of our panellists today and of members of this Committee, on how the United Nations can deepen this trend of positive cooperation over the years ahead.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I now invite Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikidze, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament to take the floor.

Mr. Ordzhonikidze (Secretary-General, Conference on Disarmament): Today we have an important event because we have present the representatives of the major international organizations that deal with disarmament issues and we have an audience full of people who are really concerned with these issues — maybe even more concerned than the panellists. But at the same time, we have a good forum to discuss and express our opinions.

What has gone wrong with disarmament? Why has disarmament been downgraded so far that it is no longer part of the political dialogue? During this past year, disarmament has been neglected in many international forums as well as in bilateral relations. What is the effect of this neglect of the disarmament issue?

I must start with the Conference on Disarmament because it, more than any other forum, has the potential to increase world stability and to bolster confidence in relations between peoples. That is because having confidence in disarmament includes dealing with the issue of strategic arms.

During its first decade, the Conference on Disarmament set out its priorities in the Decalogue — on the basis of which the yearly agenda was to be created — and specified its working methods, which were then periodically reviewed and modified. Towards the end of that period, preparatory efforts began to bear fruit — the Conference entered the phase of the negotiation of treaties. Upon the conclusion of negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1992 and on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, those items were removed from the agenda.

Following the adoption of the treaties, the Conference entered a period where the pace of its activities began to slow down and that period led to the impasse which continues today. Paradoxically, the origins of the impasse can be attributed to the end of the cold war, which significantly changed the international security equilibrium and led to a re-evaluation of disarmament priorities by States. Those priorities, until then rather stable, began to evolve along with a changing perception of the issue of security by States. New actors emerged on the international scene, and with the possibility of the

acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists, international relations became ever more complex, more dangerous and less predictable than previously.

Notions of strategic stability, war avoidance and nuclear deterrence were redefined and multilateralism gave way to the predominance of particular national interests. Except for a short period in 1998 when the two ad hoc committees were established, one on negative security assurances and the second on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to start negotiations or structured deliberations on any item on its agenda. Intensive efforts to break the deadlock did not bring about the expected results. Gradually, the divergence of views on disarmament priorities led to the establishment of a package of items that represented the priorities of various groups of States but was not acceptable as a whole to a number of States: the so-called programme of work.

Subsequently, variations on that programme of work, while sometimes attracting the support of a considerable number of Member States, have never enjoyed consensus. For years, success in striking a balance among priorities has eluded the Conference. Thus, instead of negotiating multilateral disarmament agreements, the Conference has been trying to forge consensus on current disarmament priorities.

Over the years, the impasse has been attributed to a number of causes, including differing views concerning the agenda, the rules of procedure, the decision-making process, the informal system of political groups, the composition of the Conference and the lack of involvement by civil society — which, by the way, is a concern not only for the Conference on Disarmament. The lack of support for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the field of disarmament, which is felt by all of us in the diplomatic disarmament community, is very unfortunate. We have to work for better support for and understanding of NGOs and the media. Without them, I do not think that we will be able to reach out, either to Governments — which is most important — or to people who would give support to us.

The expansions in the number of Conference members by 23 in 1996 and by 5 in 1999, have not helped the Conference to overcome its problems. Member States have continued to disagree about

changing the agenda that was developed during the early years of the Conference and changing the composition of political groups. Furthermore, as I said, civil society is not fully using the existing mechanisms for disseminating its views and materials to Conference members, including the mechanisms adopted by the Conference in 2004.

In that context, we should not lose sight of the fact that progress on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation has also been elusive in other contexts. The greatest disappointment at the September 2005 World Summit was no doubt the failure to reach agreement on even a single paragraph regarding nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Weapons of mass destruction — in particular the possibility that they will fall into the hands of terrorists — pose a severe danger to all of us. Progress on disarmament and non-proliferation is vital for our collective security, and efforts must continue as a matter of priority.

Recent figures by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicate that, over the past year, the global total spent on arms topped \$1.2 trillion for the first time since the height of the cold war. In contrast, the amount spent on aid during the same period was \$78.6 billion. Thus, as we see, disarmament could free up significant resources to be channelled towards development efforts, in addition to building greater confidence among States and contributing to strategic stability throughout the world. That in turn would be conducive to the development agenda, including the main development objective of the United Nations: implementation of the Millennium Development Goals.

Following last year's setbacks in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, the whole multilateral disarmament machinery needs an overhaul. The impasse in the Conference on Disarmament has a political source, not a structural or procedural one. The annual debates aimed at getting the Conference back to work — I am Secretary-General of the Conference — have revealed mostly the unchanged political positions of States. In such circumstances, it seems that it will be difficult to agree on a programme of work without joint efforts based on new and imaginative approaches. Generating more interest and changing attitudes towards the Conference in capitals could be a welcome remedy. In addition, developing a new political consensus on priorities in the area of arms control and disarmament, going beyond narrowly defined national

security interests, could be of crucial importance for revitalization of the Conference.

I strongly believe that, without political decisions at the highest level, even the most determined efforts by the existing multilateral disarmament bodies — including, of course, the Conference on Disarmament — will not succeed. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in one of his many messages to the Conference on Disarmament,

“the impasse cannot be broken by procedural means or by merely fine-tuning existing proposals. Capitals need to thoroughly reassess attitudes towards the Conference, and develop a new political consensus on priorities in arms control and disarmament”.

Frustration over the impasse has led some to contemplate the possibility of suspending or even dissolving the Conference should it not be able to deliver results in the foreseeable future. That idea has been floating around since 2004, as well as the idea of doing something else — setting up some other organ. However, there are also other views, to the effect that replacing the Conference with another negotiating mechanism would not necessarily solve the problems and might even exacerbate them.

These problems are not related to the structure of the Conference; they are, as I have stated several times, problems of political will. We must proceed accordingly. Needless to say, certain issues can be resolved only through the multilateral disarmament negotiating body. That body is the Conference on Disarmament, which, as history shows, has produced many important international treaties and agreements, as I have stated.

We should not be discouraged from using existing and potential mechanisms currently available to the Conference, such as debates on issues on the agenda and structural debates aimed at mutually influencing the policies and security perceptions of Member States and furthering the consensus-building process.

In parallel, the Conference on Disarmament should review its working methods and seek new approaches that could make it more responsive to contemporary security threats and challenges. Progress may be modest, but the Conference cannot afford to remain inactive. We must remember that consensus-building is a process that takes time. But it must not take too much time, especially when we are dealing

with issues of strategic importance. Political will, perseverance and patience should be the virtues guiding the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament.

I should now like to say a few words about the previous session of the Conference on Disarmament. I do not think it is an exaggeration to state that the Conference on Disarmament is at a crossroads. I want to take this opportunity to take stock of the situation prevailing in the Conference last year.

I would say that very few positive things occurred. I must begin with a positive development that began in 2006 when the six Presidents of the Conference decided to engage in close cooperation in guiding the work of the Conference throughout the year. That new approach enabled the Conference to considerably intensify its work, attracting broad participation by experts from capitals. In that regard, I must mention the invaluable contributions of the six Presidents, namely, the representatives of Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Senegal and Slovakia. The new practice of continuity among the Presidents has been maintained for a second year. The six Presidents for 2007 — the representatives of South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland and Syria — have been faultless in their commitment to continue to provide leadership. That is very important for the Conference on Disarmament, which has a rotating presidency.

In previous years, we would have major problems when one President would pursue one goal with one means and his or her successor would do something entirely different. I believe that since 2006 all the rotating Presidents of the Conference have cooperated closely in compiling the P6 vision paper, which sets out the visions of the six Presidents, representing various regions of the world. That is precisely what is now helping the Conference on Disarmament to move forward, if only a little.

The seven Coordinators appointed by the Presidents have also been assiduous in supporting the presidency. The work on the seven agenda items over which they have presided has demonstrated the capacity of Conference members for hard work and close engagement.

It is also significant that the state of affairs in the Conference resulting from this new level of intensity has encouraged the six Presidents to submit a paper known as the presidential proposal — document

CD/2007/L.1 — containing the elements of a decision aimed at moving the Conference on Disarmament out of its long-standing stalemate. This year also, the presidency will submit a presidential report at the end of each of the three parts of the annual session.

Finally, this year, the Conference submitted a more substantive report to the General Assembly. The report was developed in a good spirit, which is important in any diplomatic effort. In that connection, I would like to quote from the assessment made by the representative of Syria, the most recent President of the Conference, who will present the report of the Conference on Disarmament to the members of the Committee:

“The CD has achieved substantive progress by conducting important thematic debates on all agenda items and advancing considerably in its efforts but could not yet reach consensus on a programme of work. A momentum was created to move the CD out of its longstanding stalemate, and the efforts to reach an agreement to start substantive work must be continued”.

Of course, that is not the opinion of individuals; it is the opinion of the President, the representative of Syria, who made that statement with the agreement of Conference members.

I believe that all of those positive developments reflect a recent determination on the part of Conference members to breathe some life into the Conference.

With regard to what is significant this year, as I said, the Conference has benefited from the cohesion in leadership that began in 2006 and was reflected in the P6 vision paper (CD/1809). The constantly changing focus of the Conference, in which each President used to embark in a different direction from that of his or her predecessor, has ceased, as I already mentioned. The new practice of presidential continuity has already enabled the six Presidents for 2008 to begin discussions among themselves on the prospects for cooperation throughout next year's session. The work of the Conference has been much more coherent because of the session schedule of activities agreed early in the year. The Conference has been more inclined than in the past to recognize the value of regular presidential reports and records of major activities. The Conference has also been noticeably more pragmatic, conducting its work according to a

schedule of activities rather than a more formal programme of work.

At next year's session, there will be some major challenges. During the intersessional period, it might be good to reflect carefully on the following points, which I would like to raise with the members of the Conference on Disarmament and the members of the First Committee.

Can the differences regarding the 2007 presidential proposal be resolved in a manner that increases the chances of its adoption by consensus? I would like members to follow up on that issue. Is the notion of a comprehensive work programme — which involves more or less simultaneous and balanced treatment of core issues — unrealistically ambitious? The comprehensive approach of the past 10 years has not produced a breakthrough. Ironically, in aiming for a comprehensive approach, the Conference continues to end up with no programme of work. Realistically speaking, what are the prospects in the near future for overcoming the difficulties that have so far blocked the adoption of the presidential proposal? New and determined efforts are needed to break the continued impasse, but the achievements of the 2006 and 2007 sessions have given us a clear and convincing set of ideas to that end.

I should like to draw some final conclusions. First, the investment that has gone into this year's efforts to reach an understanding is based on the common desire that the Conference on Disarmament complement its mandate as a negotiating body rather than a forum for debate. Secondly, that investment also means that the potential of the Conference as a negotiating body is alive and that the Conference is capable of realizing it in the near future. Thirdly, and more important, it constitutes a recognition — I hope — of this body's special responsibility to address the crucial disarmament and non-proliferation issues of our time, thus contributing to the improvement of security, fostering better relations among all States and, by saving billions of dollars, providing a chance to implement the Millennium Development Goals. Fourthly, for my part, I will do all I can to assist Member States in finding a solution.

It is important that the six Presidents for 2008 provide the Conference on Disarmament with imaginative leadership, taking into account the legitimate security concerns of all States. I urge all

United Nations Member States to encourage the Conference on Disarmament to get back to work and to adopt without a vote a forward-looking resolution. It is just the beginning of the future success — and I really believe this — of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): Thank you, Mr. Ordzhonikidze, for your statement. I believe that it was closely followed, given that many actors from the Conference on Disarmament (CD) are present, which proves that the CD is not a cold forum where strange things happen. On the contrary, the CD is in step with global developments and concerns. Indeed, you have just spoken of a promising future in which progress in the CD will truly reflect what the international community wishes to achieve in the area of nuclear disarmament.

The next speaker on my list, and I take great pleasure in giving him the floor, is Mr. Rogelio Pflirter, Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Mr. Pflirter (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons): Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your election. I wish you and your Committee every success in its important work. Allow me also to say how delighted I am to share the podium here with some distinguished personalities. First, I would like to again extend my felicitations to His Excellency Mr. Sergio Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and to extend recognition for his statement and for the fact that he outlined an idea which I fully share: the need for international organizations and the United Nations system to cooperate in order to maximize the work we do and the skills we can offer. I also wish to express my gratitude to the Office for Disarmament Affairs for the support they have staunchly rendered to my own organization.

I am also delighted to be here with the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). I visited the CD in early August and at that time it marked the tenth anniversary of my organization. I am grateful for that. And, of course, I am also delighted to be here with the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), as well as my colleague from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

This has been an important year for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The date 29 April 2007 marked the tenth

anniversary of the entry into force of the treaty that created OPCW. Only a few days ago, on 27 September, a High-level Meeting was convened here at the United Nations at which some 140 Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives of United Nations Member States gathered to reaffirm their support for the noble objectives of the Convention and the OPCW. As I stated on that occasion, while the symbolic theme of the Meeting was the tenth anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), it was in fact an international congregation dedicated to peace, progress and multilateralism as an effective way to advance the interests of humanity.

In his statement, His Excellency Mr. Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations Secretary-General, described the Convention as a truly significant accomplishment in the field of disarmament and as a monument to the world's determination to eliminate one of the most inhumane weapons ever conceived. Allow me at this stage to also pay tribute to the Secretary-General for his support of the Chemical Weapons Convention and for the priority he attaches to issues related to disarmament, as was recalled by his High Representative a few minutes ago.

The significance of the commemorations of the tenth anniversary lies in the recognition of the concrete achievements that the OPCW can point to. In this relatively short period, our membership has reached the figure of 182 States — a rewarding result of the persistent efforts to promote the universality of the Convention, as well as a sign of the broad support across the world for the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In terms of its disarmament goals, over one third of all declared chemical weapons have been effectively, irreversibly, totally eliminated. As at 30 September 2007, more than 25,000 metric tons of the over 71,000 declared metric tons of chemical agents had been certified by the OPCW as destroyed. This represents around 35 per cent of the declared stockpiles worldwide. All 65 chemical weapon production facilities declared by 12 States parties had been inactivated and 94 per cent of them had been either destroyed or converted for peaceful purposes in accordance with the Convention.

OPCW inspectors continue to monitor continuously the destruction processes at the relevant facilities, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. As at 31 August 2007, close to 1,800 inspections had been

carried out in connection with chemical demilitarization, which amounts to a total of 116,902 inspector days — or 85 per cent — and 86 million kilometres flown around the globe. At the same time, over 1,200 inspections had been carried out at chemical-industry-related facilities.

The importance of an established, well-honed and efficient industry inspection regime cannot be overemphasized, since this is fundamental to promoting the confidence among States parties that the chemical industry engages only in legitimate and peaceful activities, thus advancing the security goals of the Convention.

Effective national implementation of the Convention within the domestic jurisdictions of our Member States represents an important factor in the eventual success of the Convention. We have developed programmes that ensure critical assistance to the national efforts in this area, and the number of States parties that have enacted comprehensive domestic measures to render the Convention effective in their respective legal orders is progressively increasing. This is a vital area also in the global effort to prevent terrorists and other individuals from acquiring, transferring and misusing dangerous substances and technologies in order to threaten lives. Full national implementation of the Convention thus represents a crucial contribution to global counter-terrorism efforts.

Within our international cooperation and assistance programmes, over 5,600 persons have been involved in a broad range of activities and exchanges aimed at the promotion of chemistry for exclusively peaceful purposes and at enhancing the capacity of Member States to react in case of a threat or actual attack involving the use of chemical weapons against them.

Let me now develop the ideas I have just outlined. What has been accomplished also brings into sharp focus that which remains to be realized. We have no doubt in our minds that significant challenges exist that will need to be addressed effectively in the near and the long term. With less than four years remaining before 29 April 2012, which is the deadline for completing the destruction of all declared chemical weapon stockpiles, we have understandably focused our attention on the ongoing destruction campaigns in all six possessor States but particularly in the two

major possessor States, namely, the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

I have to say that on 11 July 2007, the OPCW and its member States witnessed a historic landmark when Albania became the first possessor country to eliminate its chemical weapons stockpiles completely. This represents a truly momentous step, not only for Albania, but also for the international community as a whole. I wholeheartedly congratulate Albania on this achievement, which took place despite considerable technical challenges that were beyond the control of the Albanian Government. This effectively determined that the destruction phase could not be completed within the time initially envisioned under the terms of the Convention. Nevertheless, we all value enormously the dedication of Albania in completing the destruction phase, and we also pay tribute to the United States and to Greece, Italy and Switzerland for the critical support they provided to Albania in its destruction campaign.

In terms of the realization of the object and purpose of the Convention, this development proves that chemical disarmament is within our reach. If one country can accomplish it, so can others.

As I informed the Committee last year, the other five possessor States had requested and been granted extensions of the destruction deadlines. The Russian Federation and the United States have until 29 April 2012, which is the final non-extendable deadline under the Convention. The Russian Federation has completed the destruction of 23 per cent of its chemical weapons stockpiles. Destruction activities in Russia have progressively intensified with the coming online of two new destruction facilities in recent months at Kambarka and Maradykovsky. Russia's efforts and determination to fulfil its disarmament obligations is commendable. The assistance that the Group of Eight countries and other donor States have provided in support of the Russian Federation's destruction programme has been crucial to the increased momentum of chemical demilitarization in Russia, and I hope that this vital cooperation will continue in the future.

The other major possessor State, the United States of America has destroyed over 13,000 metric tons of chemical-warfare agents. This represents 48 per cent of the total United States stockpiles, and it is an important milestone in their destruction campaign. I wish to commend the commitment of the United States,

which began destroying its stockpiles even before the Convention entered into force. Such commitment to honour the obligations under the Convention has remained steadfast. At the same time, the United States has provided critically needed assistance to other countries in their own destruction efforts.

With respect to other possessor States, I wish to note the exemplary resolve of India to complete the destruction of its stockpiles within the extended April 2009 deadline. India has already destroyed 87 per cent of its declared chemical weapons stockpiles and by April 2009 it is expected to reach its 100 per cent target.

Similarly, a State party has already carried out destruction of 94 per cent of its chemical weapons stockpiles and deserves equal praise. This State party is expected to complete the process by the end of 2008.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has undertaken measures to ensure that its chemical weapons stockpiles will be destroyed by the year 2011, in accordance with the deadline set by the Conference of States Parties. This country recently informed our Executive Council that it was finalizing arrangements for setting up the required destruction facility in order to complete this task within that deadline.

While these figures are a sign of steady progress, it is just as clear that the disarmament efforts will continue to demand most of our attention, energies and resources. The two major possessor States face a challenging task ahead. Although the total volume of chemical weapons destroyed so far falls short of what the Convention envisaged, this does not represent a deficit in the political will of the possessor States but is a result of the technical and financial challenges encountered in the destruction process that the drafters of the CWC could not have fully anticipated.

We find encouragement in the visibly strong commitment to the Convention shown by all possessor States and we encourage them to exhaust all efforts to ensure that the completion of the destruction takes place by the deadlines decided by the Conference of States Parties in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Together with our disarmament efforts, we need to continue to ensure that the non-proliferation regime under the Convention is implemented to its full potential and in all its aspects. As I have mentioned, more than 1,200 inspections have already taken place

under OPCW supervision in 80 countries. This figure is bound to increase in the future, in both actual and relative terms; for as we approach the completion of the destruction obligations of possessor States, it is clear that in the long term, non-proliferation will represent the core objective and activity of OPCW.

Therefore, we must ensure that the non-proliferation regime presently being implemented under the Convention remains at all times effective. That will require the continued refinement of our industry verification efforts and their implementation with greater intensity, so that all categories of relevant facilities contemplated in the Convention are adequately covered. When I say all categories, I am referring to the four of them, including the category known as “other chemical production facilities”, facilities which at this stage are, in my view, not being inspected to the degree that would be desirable in order to be able to provide Member States with sufficient assurances of non-proliferation.

The chemical industry like any other modern enterprise also continues to evolve, while the verification mechanism remains relatively stable. Increasing overlaps between chemical and biological sciences, the integration of chemical engineering into the life sciences and the fusion between these and information technology are factors that have an impact on a number of areas whose relevance is crucial to the purposes of the Convention. It is an obligation and a challenge for OPCW to ensure that it remains at all times capable of addressing this evolution in an efficient way.

Let me at this juncture pay tribute once again to the involvement of industry in support of the Chemical Weapons Convention and OPCW. We look forward to continued interaction with industry in order to ensure that at all stages we receive their continued endorsement.

New technologies, such as nanotechnologies and the creation of new chemical manufacturing methodologies, if abused, could lend themselves to the fabrication of new chemical weapons and pose a challenge to the verification regime established under the Convention. Therefore, for the mechanism to maintain its relevance and effectiveness in the future, OPCW will have to adapt to rapidly changing research, production and management methods throughout the global chemical industry.

In this context, I wish to note the significance of our Scientific Advisory Board which is constantly engaged in ensuring that the mechanisms set forth in the Convention to enforce the chemical weapons ban keep pace with progress. In this endeavour, continued cooperation from scientists and engineers all over the world is crucial.

While we endeavour to ensure that the norms in the Convention remain effective and adapt to the evolving circumstances, the safety net against the possible acquisition, development and misuse of toxic chemicals and their precursors needs to be secured within the realm of our member States’ internal legal systems. States parties have to ensure that the prohibitions under the Convention are translated into domestic rules applicable to any individual or entity operating within their jurisdiction and control.

We cannot feel secure so long as there are loopholes that possible criminal and terrorist uses of chemistry and its products could take advantage of. As I mentioned earlier, the organisation is therefore actively promoting full implementation of the Convention, not just for the sake of ensuring that obligations under the Convention are duly complied with, but for the sake of enhancing security in all its aspects vis-à-vis possible behaviours by Governments as well as by individuals.

Since the first Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention held in 2003, which adopted an action plan to boost effective national implementation globally, there has been a steady increase in the number of States parties that introduced the appropriate legislation, including penal legislation. The number of States parties that have enacted comprehensive legislation has increased from approximately 50 in 2003, to 77 at present, while an additional 43 States parties have enacted legislation covering some, though not all, areas relevant to the Convention.

At the same time, the number of States parties that have designated or established their national authority — a requirement under the Convention and a key factor in its domestic implementation — has increased to 172, or 95 per cent of all States parties. While these figures represent satisfactory progress, at the same time they demonstrate that more must be done in order to ensure that the key provisions of the Convention are fully implemented domestically and

that the Convention is therefore being duly complied with.

The added threat posed once again by the availability of some common toxic chemical compounds which could be used for nefarious purposes by someone who has the rudimentary but widely available knowledge needed to weaponize them makes it incumbent on all States to be aware of and to address the existing dangers. Full implementation of the Convention by all States parties and joint efforts in all regions and with all stakeholders are also crucial to ensure full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

Several chlorine attacks carried out very recently in Iraq underline the dangers posed by the use of not just well-known chemical weapons, but also other toxic chemicals used in daily life. Although the OPCW is not an anti-terrorism agency, given the comprehensive prohibition against chemical weapons that falls within our remit, we have an important contribution to make in this area. That contribution should be realized through full implementation of both that prohibition, as agreed by our Executive Council after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and resolution 1540 (2004).

Since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), the OPCW has extended appropriate cooperation to the United Nations, in particular the Security Council Committee established pursuant to that resolution and other relevant United Nations bodies, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate. Last February, I briefed the Security Council, which was meeting to review cooperation between the Council and international organizations in the implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) (see S/PV.5635). We have also participated actively in all regional outreach events organized by the United Nations and other interested bodies to promote the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in Africa, Asia — including, as we speak, Central Asia — Latin America and the Caribbean and the Middle East.

Two other important pillars of our work relate to articles X and XI of the Convention, which cover international cooperation and assistance. Those are areas that are of particular importance to our many member States whose economies are developing or in transition. The OPCW carries out a number of

programmes that aim to build the capacities of our member States to promote the peaceful applications of chemistry and the pursuit of legitimate industry-related activities.

We have a number of regular activities designed to benefit our States parties. These include courses to develop analytical skills, support for research projects and the placement of interns in various institutions around the world. One of our best-known training programmes is the so-called associate programme, which is designed to provide chemists and chemical engineers from our member States whose economies are developing or in transition with a greater understanding of the CWC — focusing, above all, on the promotion of the peaceful uses of chemistry — and to facilitate industry-related national implementation of the Convention. International cooperation and assistance programmes also include elements for building the national capacities of our member States. I have to say that the interest in these international cooperation programmes has also increased notably as a result of concerns about the possible emergence of terrorist activities within our States parties.

The overwhelming majority of the members of the international community now belong to the OPCW family. The fact that 182 States are parties to the Convention represents a global recognition that the norms against chemical weapons are fully in force today under international law and that they apply to all countries and peoples.

While verification promotes confidence in compliance by States parties, it is natural that concerns should be raised regarding those that choose not to join the Convention. We have to ensure that the Convention is accepted by each and every country in the world and each and every Member of the United Nations. Even when every possessor State that is a State party to the Convention has completely eliminated its stockpiles of chemical weapons, there will be no guarantee that such weapons have been completely eliminated. There remain countries outside the Convention that could have chemical-weapons programmes and arsenals. Those countries could try to retain the option of using such weapons.

Therefore, if the CWC is to succeed, it is of the utmost urgency and importance that we meet the challenge of persuading the 13 States that have not yet done so to join the Convention. It is reassuring to know

that some of those countries are at an advanced stage in the accession process, including Iraq and Lebanon. Indeed, my organization has been actively working with both of those countries. For example, we have carried out visits to Beirut and meetings with Iraqi officials in Amman in order to ensure that both countries hit the ground running, so to speak, when they join the Convention.

Unfortunately, we cannot be as sanguine with regard to elsewhere in the Middle East. Countries such as Egypt, Israel — which has signed but not yet ratified the Convention — and Syria continue to cite regional security concerns as reasons for not having joined the Convention. I, for one, as Director-General of this organization, firmly believe in the validity of the Convention, no matter what the regional circumstances may be. What are the practical effects of retaining the option of using chemical weapons in a particular region? There is certainly no strategic advantage, since wars are no longer won with chemical weapons. What remains is the threat of terrorism against civilians, who are the first and only victims of the use of chemical weapons in conflicts. Therefore, I believe that there are no longer any legal, moral or strategic reasons that could legitimize the continued absence of certain countries — including in the Middle East — from the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We also look forward to the day when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will join the OPCW. Once again, I should like to point out that the organization stands ready to provide that country with all possible support to help it join the Chemical Weapons Convention. We also remain in close contact with the few remaining countries in Africa and the Caribbean whose political commitment to join the Convention is not in question but which have so far failed to take the appropriate steps to become full members. That also applies to Myanmar, which is another signatory State. We hope that the extensive contacts that we have had with Myanmar will finally bear fruit and that it will also become a full member of the organization.

In sum, the OPCW faces important decisions and challenges in the coming years. These will be crucial in our efforts to ensure that the Convention's hard-earned prohibitions remain relevant in the face of contemporary and future needs. All of these challenges will be faced by our member States during the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention,

which will take place at The Hague in early 2008. Work to that end is now being carried out under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Lynn Parker, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to my organization. I hope that that preparatory work will help to ensure the success of the Convention.

I wish to conclude my statement by recalling that the CWC and the OPCW are widely recognized as examples of the success of multilateralism in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation with regard to the whole category of weapons of mass destruction. That is no accident. The Convention represents the realization of the long-sought comprehensive prohibition of one of the most dangerous and inhumane categories of weapons. I must also praise our States parties, which have spared no effort to ensure that the OPCW carries out its mandate effectively, so that the world will never again witness the devastating effects of chemical weapons. Indeed, the OPCW is a good example of how multilateralism and the idea of consensus, as the one instrument that brings everyone on board, have the capacity to help us arrive at concrete results in the field of disarmament.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Pfirter for his long statement, which reflected his concern to inform the Committee about his many inspection activities and, in particular, his efforts relating to cooperation with countries possessing chemical weapons aimed at destroying their stockpiles and his efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime through the component of verification. That component is very important in promoting any Convention, in particular the important Chemical Weapons Convention. He also told us what challenges must be met in order to promote such cooperation, particularly for emerging countries and countries that need it. I thank him for all that and, in particular, for his efforts aimed at universalization of the Convention.

I now call on Mr. Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

Mr. Tóth (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization): First of all, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairperson, on your election and to wish you a fruitful and successful session of the First Committee. It is nice to be back in the Committee and to see so

many old friends and colleagues. Of course, that is not the only reason that this forum is unique. This is a unique body for one-stop shopping, pulling together various arrangements; it is a unique opportunity to be exposed to the current situation with respect to prohibition regimes for weapons of mass destruction, in terms of both implementation and codification. So I feel privileged to be here to report to members on the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). I would like to thank the First Committee and its Chairperson, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and his Office for this opportunity.

Let me start with an event that was a defining moment in our life. Last month, the Fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT took place in Vienna. It was attended by representatives of more than 100 ratifiers and States signatories of the Treaty. The Conference adopted a Final Declaration by consensus. That in itself is, as members of the First Committee are well aware, a rare commodity in today's multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation environment. The Declaration calls on those States that have not done so to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay. Particular emphasis is given to those 10 States, listed in Annex 2, whose ratification is necessary for the Treaty's entry into force. The Conference and its Final Declaration were further proof of the international community's strong commitment to establishing a universal and internationally verifiable CTBT as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Since September 2005, more than 20 States have signed or ratified the Treaty. That brings the number of States signatories to 177 and the number of ratifiers to 140.

Last year, my speech to the First Committee (see A/C.1/61/PV.8) took place on 9 October, the date of the nuclear-weapon test proclaimed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I had to rush back to Vienna. In hindsight, I can say that that date turned out to be the most defining moment for the Preparatory Commission in recent years.

The test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was an imposed performance test for our organization and its nascent verification regime as well as for our technical capabilities and procedures. The yield of the explosion was low. At the time, we had only fewer than 180 of the international monitoring system's 321 stations in operation. Nevertheless, the

event was well recorded by our system. Within 20 minutes, 22 seismic stations all over the globe — one of them as far away as La Paz, Bolivia — recorded and located the event. Within two hours, States signatories received data indicating the exact time and location of the explosion. The event was located with the kind of precision that would be required for a possible on-site inspection after the Treaty's entry into force. Two weeks later, a radionuclide station in Canada — 7,500 kilometres away — picked up key traces of radioactive noble gases.

Thus, the monitoring system lived up to its name by functioning as a System — with a capital “S” — in a holistic and synergistic way. The various technologies worked together in an integrated manner. The key role of the radionuclide and noble-gas technologies was particularly highlighted. Moreover, the relevance of on-site inspection, which would provide the ultimate verification regarding the nature of an event, was underscored. In short, the Preparatory Commission was able to prove the value of the significant investment in the build-up of the verification system. The event in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea thus constituted a validation of the CTBT verification system. That bodes well for the verifiability of the CTBT once the system is complete and the Treaty is in force.

Since last year, the Preparatory Commission has certainly not remained idle. Despite a difficult financial situation for the Commission, we expect 71 per cent of all stations to be certified — meaning that they meet our stringent technical requirements — by the end of this year. That represents a 20 per cent increase over the past year alone. The number of noble-gas stations increased by 70 per cent during the past 12 months. The network of hydroacoustic stations is now virtually complete. Very recently, China began to transmit initial data from a radionuclide station to Vienna. That is a very significant development. It means that, for the first time, stations from all five nuclear-weapon States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are contributing data to the International Data Centre.

In March 2007, we inaugurated a new state-of-the-art Operations Centre. It watches over every step in the movement of verification data: their generation at the monitoring station, their transmission to Vienna, their processing at the International Data Centre and, finally, their distribution. Essential improvements have

been made in the Centre's processing methods and software with regard to all four technologies. The achievements have been particularly significant in the area of data analysis regarding radionuclide particulates and noble gas, as well as atmospheric transport modelling.

There are also important challenges ahead of us. Many of the remaining stations to be installed and certified pose the most difficulties, including considerable technical, financial, administrative and political challenges. Moreover, the building of more noble-gas stations — so critical in the light of the event in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea — needs to be accelerated. By the time that the Treaty enters into force, we have to learn how to keep that dynamically growing monitoring system up and running. At the same time, the highest standards of data availability and timeliness need to be maintained. Further improvements in processing methods and software related to various technologies are required.

Another challenging key event for the Preparatory Commission will be the first-ever integrated on-site inspection field exercise, to be conducted next autumn. It will be an important step towards the achievement of operational readiness and the capacity to carry out on-site inspections after the Treaty's entry into force.

While the announced North Korean nuclear test was deeply regrettable, it also refocused the attention of the international community on the relevance of the CTBT. It clearly underscored the degree to which the international community supports the CTBT as a key disarmament and non-proliferation instrument.

The way in which the CTBT monitoring system generates data and products is truly multilateral — indeed, I would call it multilateralism at its best. Eighty-nine countries of the North, the South, the East and the West are hosting the facilities of the monitoring system and receive all data and products in near-real time. No country could build and deploy such a system alone. The Treaty is thus an example of democratic and transparent verification.

I should like to mention in particular the increase in the degree of interest in the benefits of the system, especially on the part of less developed countries. Since 2005 there has been a 20 per cent increase in users in national institutions. The overall number was 840 institutions receiving data and data products during that time. The benefits provided for by the system also

include a variety of potential and important civil and scientific applications. Most notable in this context is our contribution to tsunami warning organizations. As the provider of the fastest data — seismic and hydroacoustic — our system enhances the ability of tsunami warning centres to issue timely and reliable tsunami alerts.

Nuclear energy production and nuclear capacity are projected to increase significantly in the decades to come. More and more States will embark upon the road of wanting to master different segments of the nuclear fuel cycle for their energy needs. We may be moving in a direction where the important delineation between nuclear energy for peaceful or for weapons purposes will be more a political and legal issue than a technological challenge. Legal and other barriers intended to prevent the misuse of the nuclear energy upstream of the fuel cycle are facing increasing difficulties. This is due to the fact that the clear differentiation between permitted civilian and prohibited activities is such a complex challenge.

A nuclear test provides the final and irreversible proof as to the intentions of a State. The CTBT provides, thus, this last and clearly visible barrier between the peaceful legitimate use and the misuse of nuclear energy. A multilateral, credible and effective nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation system will therefore become even more important in the future than it already is today. I am convinced that a CTBT in force is a logical and necessary element of this system, if today's and future nuclear non-proliferation challenges are to be addressed credibly.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): Thank you, Mr. Tóth, for your statement and thank you for clearly outlining the position of your Commission between the challenge of putting in place a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the challenge of allowing countries that need it to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to promote their development.

The next speaker is Mr. Gustavo Zlauvinen, representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I give him the floor.

Mr. Zlauvinen (International Atomic Energy Agency): As have previous speakers, I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee and our good friend Ambassador Sergio Duarte on his appointment as High Representative of the Secretary-General for

Disarmament Affairs. We have worked very closely with him in past years and we are sure that we will continue doing so.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) welcomes this opportunity to share with delegations to the First Committee some remarks and ideas on topics of relevance to the IAEA and the international community as a whole. Fifty years ago, the IAEA was entrusted with the mission of ensuring that nuclear energy would not become a cause for the destruction of humanity but rather would be an engine for peace and prosperity. Security and development were brought together as two aspects of the same ideal: Atoms for Peace.

If one were to recall our history since that time, a number of milestones would stand out, together with challenges and painful experiences necessitating change, adjustment and innovation. Today, we would like to refer to some recent developments and current challenges. But in doing so, we should not lose sight of the goals and ideals that have guided the Agency since its inception. They remain as relevant and meaningful today as they were to our founders in 1957.

It is clear that nuclear threats have become more dangerous and more complex. The emergence of the illicit trade in nuclear technology is one key example, and another is the reported interest of sophisticated extremist groups in acquiring nuclear weapons or radioactive dispersal devices. In parallel, nuclear material and its production have become more difficult to verify. Energy security concerns and climate change are prompting many countries to revisit the nuclear power option. And to ensure a supply of power reactor fuel, more countries have shown interest in mastering the full nuclear fuel cycle — a step that brings them quite close to a potential nuclear weapon capability.

As the IAEA Director General and other international non-proliferation experts have noted, nearly 27,000 nuclear warheads that reportedly already exist in the arsenals of some nine countries, and the cold war hair trigger alert deployment status of significant numbers of these weapons, further contribute to nuclear fears.

Against this backdrop, there are three critical aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime that must be strengthened if a cascade of nuclear proliferation is to be avoided. First, security of existing nuclear material stockpiles and improved controls over

the transfer and production of nuclear material are urgently needed. Effective control of nuclear material remains the choke point for preventing the production of additional nuclear weapons.

Currently, there are reported to be over 1,800 tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in civil stocks. Many initiatives are in progress to help countries improve the physical protection of this weapon-usable nuclear material. Good progress has been made in recent years, but hard work still lies ahead. Efforts in that direction should be redoubled.

The IAEA is supporting international efforts to minimize and eventually eliminate the civilian use of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Nearly 100 civilian facilities around the world, mainly research reactors, operate with small amounts of HEU. But most of their functions could be achieved using low-enriched uranium (LEU). Nuclear experts are pressing forward with research and development aimed at eliminating the remaining technical hurdles so that research reactors will be capable of performing all required functions using LEU.

Technological innovation will also be essential to support the design of proliferation-resistant fuel cycles. A number of countries are working on such designs and on innovation to enhance nuclear safety, security and waste disposal. One important area of research and development currently being conducted at the laboratory level involves new technological approaches for dealing with the plutonium in spent fuel, using innovative approaches to either fuel composition or fuel reprocessing. In each case, the technique would create isotopic barriers in the spent fuel that would allow reprocessing for use in energy generation while preventing the separation of weapon-usable plutonium.

It is also crucial that controls over nuclear material production — that is, uranium enrichment and plutonium separation activities — be enhanced by developing a new, multilateral framework for the nuclear fuel cycle. I will return to that point later in my presentation.

Secondly, the verification authority and capability of the IAEA must be strengthened. Effective verification has four elements: adequate legal authority, state-of-the-art technology, access to all relevant information and locations, and sufficient human and financial resources. During the past decade, the Agency's safeguards system experienced a remarkable

transformation. It evolved from a system focused on declared nuclear material at declared nuclear facilities to a much more comprehensive, information-driven system able to provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States as a whole.

The strengthening of safeguards in the early 1990s introduced new methods and techniques — for example, remote monitoring and environmental sampling. The additional protocol to safeguards agreements has proved its value since its adoption in 1997. With better access to relevant information and locations, the IAEA provides credible assurance. Without the additional protocol, the IAEA cannot provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activity. Additional protocols are presently in force in 84 States, and so more progress must still be made. Some 30 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have not yet concluded the required safeguards agreement with my organization. In the absence of safeguards in those countries, the IAEA cannot perform any verification activities and therefore cannot provide any assurance. If there is to be a credible verification system, a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol should be the universal standard.

With regard to the future, the Agency's crucial verification role must evolve and expand in many key aspects. An expansion in the use of nuclear power could greatly increase the number of nuclear facilities and the amount of nuclear material that would need to be subjected to Agency verification. The resuscitation of nuclear disarmament efforts could potentially add to the IAEA's verification and monitoring activities. The Agency will need more sophisticated approaches for information analysis as well as for continuous updates to verification equipment and expertise. As new facilities and countries come under safeguards, the IAEA will need corresponding increases in funding and personnel.

Thirdly, disarmament needs to be given the prominence and the priority it deserves. It has now been 37 years since the NPT entered into force. All States except four are within the NPT fold. The Treaty includes not only nuclear non-proliferation obligations, but also the goal of nuclear disarmament. Whether countries choose to continue to rely on nuclear weapons as the centrepiece of their security strategies or to abandon that reliance, their choice will undoubtedly influence the actions of others.

Therefore, multilateral disarmament efforts need to be revived by bringing the CTBT into force and initiating negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). The CTBT and the FMCT are intended to work together in parallel to prohibit both the quantitative and the qualitative tools that would enable countries to develop nuclear weapons, whether they be non-nuclear-weapon countries or countries that already have such weapons. It is our sincere hope that every effort will be made to see to it that the CTBT will enter into force in the near term and that negotiations will start without delay on an FMCT.

The expected expansion in nuclear power will cause a commensurate increase in the demand for nuclear-fuel-cycle services and in the need for an assurance-of-supply mechanism. It could also increase the potential proliferation risks created by the spread of sensitive nuclear technology, particularly if more countries decide to create independent uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities. Those trends point clearly to the urgent need for the development of a new, multilateral framework for the nuclear fuel cycle, including both front and back ends.

Over the past two years, a number of proposals and ideas have been put forward in that regard. With respect to the front end, some parties have proposed the creation of an actual or virtual reserve fuel bank of last resort, under IAEA auspices, for assurances regarding the supply of nuclear fuel. Such a bank would operate on the basis of apolitical and non-discriminatory non-proliferation criteria. Others are proposing to convert a national facility into an international enrichment centre. Still others are proposing the construction of a new multinational enrichment facility under IAEA control. The IAEA secretariat has examined those proposals and their legal, technical, financial and institutional aspects. In June, the Director General made a report to the IAEA Board of Governors on options for assurances regarding the supply of nuclear fuel. He trusts that the report will be of help to Member States in considering that important issue.

Controlling nuclear material is a complex process; yet, without concerted action, it could be the Achilles' heel of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. An incremental approach is the way to move forward, beginning with the establishment of an equitable system for assurance of supply. The next step would be to seek to bring any new operations aimed at uranium

enrichment and plutonium separation under multinational control. Over time, such multinational controls would also be extended to existing facilities, to ensure that all countries are treated equally in terms of their nuclear capabilities.

Fifty years after the Atoms for Peace initiative, the time has come to think about a new framework for the use of nuclear energy — a framework that takes into account both the lessons we have learned and the current reality. In that regard, the First Committee has an important role to play in identifying areas of multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control that need to be addressed. The Committee serves not only as a unique forum for discussion, but also, and in particular, as the international community's only "thermostat" for gauging the progress — or lack thereof — in these crucial matters. In that regard, the IAEA stands ready to provide relevant expert input to the multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament processes.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I should like to thank Mr. Zlauvinen for his statement and for all the information that he has just made available to us, as well as for the efforts of his Agency. As he said, the Agency is a kind of thermostat regarding security guarantees, verification and, in particular, nuclear material controls.

We have heard the last speaker for this morning's meeting. We shall now observe a brief pause in order to move from the formal meeting to an informal meeting, in which we shall hold a question-and-answer session so that delegations can pose questions to our speakers.

The meeting was suspended at 12.10 p.m. and resumed at 1.05 p.m.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): Before adjourning, I remind all delegations that the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions is today at 6 p.m. and that we are going to meet this afternoon at 3 p.m. The first speaker on my list is the delegation of Bangladesh, followed by the delegations of Mexico, Portugal, Uzbekistan, and so forth down the list of speakers. Since we have panellists this afternoon, I naturally ask that delegates arrive on time.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): I have two announcements. First, the Caucus of the Non-Aligned Movement will be meeting right after the adjournment of this meeting. Secondly, the permanent missions of Austria and Peru, together with the United Nations Development Programme, are organizing tomorrow, Thursday, 18 October, during the lunch break, 1.15 to 2.45 p.m., an event entitled "The cluster munitions process: the way forward" in this conference room 4.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.