
**Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 9 April 2002, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Salander (Sweden)

Contents

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory
Committee (*continued*)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Mostovets** (Russian Federation) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), having stood the test of time, was a cornerstone of the international security system. Given that the two key challenges currently facing the international community — terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — were interrelated, efforts to combat those scourges must go hand in hand. The Russian Federation continued to support international efforts to that end, including those made in the context of the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, while States must join forces to create a global system capable of responding to new challenges and threats, including in the nuclear sphere, new proposals must not be seen to vie with traditional disarmament and non-proliferation measures, but rather be used to supplement and enhance them. Of particular importance was the development of an appropriate international legal basis.

2. The genuine threat of nuclear terrorism made it vital to elaborate effective measures to prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear materials and technology. A coordinated approach to the strengthening of multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes was thus in order.

3. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in the contemporary world must be resolutely averted, since it would only increase the risk of nuclear weapons being used in regional conflicts. The Russian Federation attached particular importance to the NPT as the primary tool for preventing such a crisis, and as an instrument for promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It thus supported a comprehensive and objective review of the Treaty's functioning in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document agreed at the 2000 Review Conference.

4. The Russian Federation continued to adhere to the decisions of that Conference and was engaged in active follow-up. The Final Document represented a forward-looking programme of multilateral, regional and other measures. It should be used to inform negotiations on a progressive and consensual basis, taking into account the security interests of all State parties. The Final Document should be implemented in

its totality, without selectivity and under conditions of stability and predictability. Universal ratification of the NPT was also of the utmost importance. Further efforts must be made to involve States that were not yet parties to the Treaty in the non-proliferation regime.

5. The main task of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference should be to elaborate recommendations that would lead to a further strengthening of the Treaty. That effort should not, however, require the establishment of new bodies or the duplication of functions of other international mechanisms.

6. The Russian Federation had made significant progress in achieving the key objectives of the NPT, including the priority tasks agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. He recalled in that connection the Millennium Summit initiative of President Vladimir Putin concerning the development of nuclear technologies capable of resisting proliferation.

7. The Russian Federation was actively engaged in reducing the nuclear threat with the ultimate goal of achieving complete disarmament. Not only did the country consistently meet its obligations under relevant multilateral treaties, but it was prepared to reduce its nuclear arsenal to a minimum level, both on a bilateral basis with the United States of America and on a multilateral basis with other nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with strategic stability requirements.

8. The Russian Federation had fully implemented its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty concluded with the United States of America, eliminating medium- and shorter-range ground-based missiles. The inspection process had been completed in May 2001. The country was also continuing to reduce its strategic offensive weapons.

9. The Russian Federation had also fulfilled its obligations under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) ahead of schedule, exceeding agreed targets. The number of deployed strategic delivery systems had been reduced to 1,136 and the number of associated re-entry vehicles to 5,518 (the targets being 1,600 and 6,000 respectively). The Russian Federation had also ratified the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and submitted a draft START III to the United States of America in mid-2000. His delegation believed it was necessary to conclude a new, legally binding treaty under which the Russian Federation and the United States of America

would commit themselves, inter alia, to reducing re-entry vehicles to a level of between 1,700 and 2,200 within 10 years, although the Russian Federation had been prepared for an even greater reduction. Such an instrument should take the linkages between offensive and defensive weapons into account, and the resulting reductions should be capable of being reliably monitored. The Russian Federation and the United States of America were currently engaged in intensive negotiations to elaborate such a treaty as well as a declaration of new strategic relations between the two countries.

10. The Russian Federation considered the decision by the United States of America to withdraw from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) to be mistaken, since it was contrary not only to the recommendations of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference but also to international opinion as reflected in the relevant General Assembly resolutions of the past three years. Such a withdrawal could also lead to the “weaponization” of outer space.

11. Concerning tactical nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation continued to fulfil its unilaterally declared initiatives in accordance with the presidential statements of 5 October 1991 and 29 January 1992. All nuclear weapons had been returned to Russian territory and were currently in the process of being liquidated. His delegation wished to draw attention again to the Russian Federation’s proposal that all nuclear weapons should be returned to the territories of the nuclear-weapon States to which they belonged.

12. The Russian Federation continued to attach great importance to the unconditional fulfilment of negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States in 1995 and had incorporated such a provision into its military doctrine. His delegation urged all relevant States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), to which the Russian Federation had long been party.

13. In the interests of disarmament, as well as regional and international security and mutual trust, the Russian Federation welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. Since the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco more than 30 years previously, over 100 States had joined such zones, which only contributed to the non-proliferation regime. When such zones did not contradict international legal standards, they received

appropriate recognition and assurances. Failure to observe international standards only complicated the process, as had occurred in the case of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. It was to be hoped that the difficulties that had arisen in that regard would be settled through dialogue with nuclear-weapon States.

14. In view of the complexity of the regional situation, it was a matter of concern that attempts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had reached an impasse. His delegation wished to stress the importance of implementing the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995.

15. The elaboration and implementation of effective measures to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime must not undermine the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by all States. To that end, national legislation and multilateral export control mechanisms should be reinforced, with particular regard to the nuclear sphere.

16. The Russian Federation actively supported the efforts of IAEA to strengthen safeguards, prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and establish effective monitoring mechanisms for nuclear-weapon-free zones.

17. The Preparatory Committee should build on the experience accumulated during the six previous conferences. The Russian Federation, for its part, would continue to support efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and cooperate constructively with all interested States to that end.

18. **Mr. Chullikatt** (Observer for the Holy See), noting the widely shared concern about the state of nuclear disarmament, said that the lack of progress achieved in following up the 2000 Review Conference had been particularly discouraging. The prospects for implementing the 13 practical steps were particularly alarming. Although no nuclear testing had taken place, the entry into force of the CTBT was far from becoming a reality, the Conference on Disarmament was paralysed and one of the parties to the ABM Treaty had given notice of withdrawal. Nuclear weapons continued to be kept on alert status and the admonition of the highest legal authority in the world — the International Court of Justice — had been ignored.

19. Even more serious was the overt determination of some States to continue to assign a critical role to nuclear weapons in their military doctrines. Although the international community rightly welcomed the willingness of certain Powers to reduce their stocks of

operationally deployed warheads, the real effectiveness of a unilateral disarmament that was not irreversible was open to question.

20. His delegation was deeply concerned that the old posture of nuclear deterrence should not be written into new strategies. As an end in itself, deterrence only fuelled the arms race. The Holy See had constantly asserted, moreover, that deterrence should be viewed as only one stage in the disarmament process. Likewise, the rule of law should not countenance the continuation of doctrines that held nuclear weapons as essential, nor could there be moral acceptance of military doctrines that embodied the permanence of nuclear weapons. Pope John Paul II had called for the banishment of all nuclear weapons through a workable system of negotiation or arbitration. All nuclear-weapon States must be urged to come to the negotiating table.

21. Nuclear weapons were instruments of death and destruction incompatible with the peace being sought for the twenty-first century and could not be justified. Only through unequivocal action towards their elimination could the international community be certain that nations were acting in good faith. The Preparatory Committee must develop a sharpened sense of urgency in its efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, for the continued development of weapon systems that could jeopardize the natural structure upon which all civilization rested seriously undermined the quest to build a culture of peace for current and future generations.

22. **Mr. Clodumar** (Nauru), speaking on behalf of the States members of the Pacific Islands Forum, also drew attention to the threats posed to mankind by the continued possession of nuclear weapons. The events of 11 September 2001 had highlighted the importance of avoiding their further proliferation, and the NPT constituted the foundation for their total elimination.

23. In 1995, the Forum had welcomed the indefinite extension of the Treaty and had urged non-signatories to accede to it. The Forum had also urged the nuclear Powers to comply with their obligation to negotiate in good faith towards nuclear disarmament. In 2000, the Forum had welcomed the measures identified by the Review Conference to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime and had urged active pursuit by nuclear-weapon States of the 13 practical steps. The Forum looked forward to progress reports by those States on the implementation of their nuclear disarmament commitments.

24. The Forum attached particular importance to promoting the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, in accordance with the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba. The importance of those treaties had been stressed in various General Assembly resolutions as well as in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The Forum wished to reiterate its appeal to the United States of America to follow the example of other nuclear-weapon States by ratifying the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga.

25. The States of the Pacific Islands Forum continued to be concerned about the hazards of shipping radioactive materials through their region and actively supported measures to improve international regulations and safety standards. The 2000 Review Conference had underscored the importance of such measures for the protection of the States concerned and had invited States shipping radioactive materials to provide appropriate assurances and establish effective liability mechanisms. Of particular importance in that regard were arrangements for prior notification and consultations with coastal States pursuant to relevant international instruments.

26. The Forum fully supported the vital role of the NPT and stood ready to assist in any way with implementation of the 13 practical steps and other progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.

27. **Mr. Rauf** (Observer for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) praised the historic Final Document adopted by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference of States parties, which had outlined practical steps for achieving systematic progress towards nuclear disarmament, strengthening the safeguards system and promoting the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy within a framework of confidence and cooperation. The activities of IAEA were directed at building and maintaining a global nuclear safety regime, verifying commitments to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, ensuring the security of nuclear material and facilities and bringing about the development and transfer of peaceful technologies.

28. The Director General of IAEA had emphasized that verification activities could not be considered in isolation from multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts. The universalization, consolidation and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime were important for its continuing sustainability and credibility.

The 2000 Final Document had referred repeatedly to the importance of IAEA safeguards under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty in ensuring compliance with non-proliferation obligations and in creating an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and cooperation. The 2000 Review Conference had also reaffirmed the Agency's competence and responsibility for verification and had called upon States to give their full and continuing support to the safeguards system. The Agency once again urged the 51 States parties that had not concluded and brought into force the required safeguards agreements to do so without further delay.

29. Under the NPT safeguards agreements IAEA had the right and obligation to ensure that all nuclear material being used in the peaceful nuclear activities of a State were subject to safeguards. IAEA could provide assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities only for those States that had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force. It was a source of continuing disappointment that overall progress in the signing and bringing into force of additional protocols remained slow. Of the States parties that had yet to bring additional protocols into force, 53 had nuclear facilities under safeguards yet only 29 had signed a protocol. He urged all States parties that had not yet done so to conclude additional protocols and bring them into force at the earliest possible date so that the Agency could provide the comprehensive assurance called for under article III of the Treaty. IAEA had in fact organized a number of regional seminars on strengthened safeguards to help States prepare the necessary legislative framework for adopting additional protocols.

30. IAEA continued to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. At the request of the Security Council, the Agency continued to monitor the freeze of that country's graphite-moderated reactor. Similarly, the Agency stood ready to resume Security Council-mandated verification activities in Iraq at short notice.

31. The Agency had reviewed its activities and programmes with a view to strengthening its ability to improve protection against acts of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. In March 2001 the Agency's Board of Governors had approved a plan of action covering physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, detection of malicious activities

involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, strengthening State systems for nuclear material accountancy and control, security of radioactive sources, assessment of safety- and security-related vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities, response to malicious acts and threats, adherence to international agreements and guidelines, and enhancement of programme coordination and information management for nuclear safety-related matters. Those activities were designed to supplement and reinforce national efforts. Initial funding for the plan was being sought through voluntary contributions.

32. The Agency's activities in the field of nuclear safety covered nuclear installation safety, nuclear safety coordination, and radiation and waste safety. Nuclear safety was a primary national responsibility but was also a legitimate international concern. The development and adoption of internationally binding norms under IAEA auspices had significantly contributed to the enhancement of nuclear safety worldwide. However, many States were not parties to those conventions, certain key areas of nuclear safety were still not subject to conventions and some of the existing conventions were not sufficiently comprehensive in their coverage. Two areas of concern were the safety of research reactors and the safety and security of radioactive sources. An important advance in the field of the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste had been the adoption in 2001 of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. A resolution adopted at the Agency's 2001 General Conference had called for efforts to examine and further improve measures and international regulations on the international maritime transport of radioactive materials and spent fuel.

33. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference had called for expanded use of the Agency's technical cooperation programme, which sought to develop infrastructure related to the application of nuclear technology and nuclear techniques. Such technology had proved valuable, for example, in helping to eradicate the tsetse fly in Africa and in evaluating nutritional status and bioavailability of vitamins and minerals. The Technical Cooperation Fund was supporting activities in 96 countries, mainly in the areas of health, food and agriculture and nuclear safety. He hoped that contributions to the Fund would increase so that such activities, which were consistent with the development goals of the countries concerned, could continue.

34. **Mr. Valdivieso** (Colombia) said that since the 2000 Review Conference the international community had witnessed various negative developments in the field of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: the slow progress in negotiations, in particular the virtual paralysis in the Conference on Disarmament; the persistence of strategic defence doctrines that included the use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances; the decision by one nuclear-weapon State to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to develop a national anti-ballistic missile defence system; and the fact that four States had still not acceded to the NPT. Colombia was committed to the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament process and remained convinced of the need to preserve, strengthen and universalize the NPT.

35. The current session of the Preparatory Committee should address both procedural and substantive issues and review the implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000. The situation in the Middle East also demanded the Committee's attention, and the sole State in the region not party to the Treaty must be pressured to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Much also remained to be done in the field of nuclear disarmament, given the persistence of nuclear-weapon use doctrines and the continued qualitative development of nuclear weapons.

36. Negotiations should be started in the Conference on Disarmament, as agreed in 1995, on nuclear disarmament, prohibition of the production of fissionable material for military purposes and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The CTBT must also enter into force as soon as possible. Colombia, one of the countries whose ratification was required for that Treaty to enter into force, had already issued an act, currently under constitutional review, approving the Treaty. The slow pace of development of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was disappointing, and Colombia supported the convening of an extraordinary conference of the States parties devoted to that topic.

37. There was a striking difference between the approach taken by some delegations to international security issues and their approach to other multilateral issues, such as respect for human rights, international humanitarian law and human security. A defence doctrine should, as a matter of priority, reflect respect for international humanitarian law and human security. It should also be remembered that the non-nuclear-weapon States had agreed in 1995 to an indefinite extension of the NPT but not to the indefinite extension of

a situation in which some States had nuclear weapons and others not. The non-nuclear-weapon States therefore insisted that the nuclear-weapon States should fulfil their unequivocal undertaking to eliminate their nuclear arsenals totally and that the 13 practical steps that formed part of the agreement should be implemented.

38. **Mr. Al-Otaibi** (Saudi Arabia) said that his country devoted considerable attention to efforts aimed at the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, through its support for the relevant United Nations resolutions. It also continued to call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

39. At the regional level, Saudi Arabia participated in the efforts of the League of Arab States to make the region a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. A technical committee made up of experts from Arab States had been created pursuant to a resolution of the League's Council and was charged with studying a draft treaty on that subject.

40. While the NPT was of considerable interest to the Arab world, as indicated by the participation of the Arab States in the drafting of the Treaty as well as their signing and ratification of it, Israel obstinately refused to accede to the Treaty and to place its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. Israel was in fact the only country in the Middle East that possessed nuclear weapons and programmes for other weapons of mass destruction that were not subject to international monitoring.

41. Israel's position was in obvious conflict with its stated desire for peace, as peace must be based on confidence and proof of good will between the States and peoples of the region, not on the possession or threat of use of nuclear weapons or the adoption of a policy of hegemony, all of which threatened not only the peoples of the region but international peace and security.

42. Israel's continued rejection of appeals by the United Nations, IAEA, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the League of Arab States to become a party to the Treaty and place its nuclear installations under the safeguards system was in defiance of the international community's calls for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. Such action undermined the authority and international character of the Treaty and obstructed the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The accession of the Arab States to the Treaty coupled with Israel's failure to do so only heightened

tension in the region. His delegation wished to stress the importance of the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference calling for the accession of all States of the region to the Treaty. That resolution was fundamental to any discussion of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

43. The significant progress made at the 2000 Review Conference, reflected in its final document, must be concretized through the adoption of practical steps for the implementation of the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to bring about the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, pursuant to article VI of the Treaty.

44. **Mr. Mubarak** (Egypt) said that his country viewed the nuclear non-proliferation regime as an interim arrangement that would lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons under strict and effective supervision. However, that objective could not be achieved without the renunciation of policies, doctrines and strategies based on the concept of nuclear deterrence.

45. The principles and objectives of the NPT were still far from realization. The five nuclear-weapon States had made only limited progress at the unilateral and bilateral levels towards reducing their nuclear stockpiles and achieving nuclear disarmament, thus providing a pretext and even an incentive to three other States to acquire military nuclear capability. The effectiveness of the Treaty in achieving its major objectives was therefore in question.

46. While some speakers had been pessimistic concerning the achievement of universal adherence to the Treaty or the likelihood of any tangible progress in that regard in the foreseeable future, universal adherence must remain one of the major priorities of international action in the non-proliferation field. For that reason it was one of the most salient issues before the 2005 Review Conference.

47. The IAEA safeguards regime was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, and its universal application merited absolute priority. While deserving of support, additional protocols to the safeguards agreements, the integrated safeguards and other additional measures could not be accorded higher priority than the major objective and would not be effective or credible in the absence of universal participation in the full-scope safeguards regime.

48. The five nuclear-weapon States must implement the 13 practical steps set forth in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Failure to implement those steps would present a clear challenge to the Treaty and cast doubt on the usefulness of its indefinite extension.

49. The approach to be taken to nuclear disarmament was dictated by the agreed objective, namely to eliminate nuclear weapons and save the world not only from their possible use but from their very existence. It was important to guard against lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and to ensure that they would not be used at all before they could be completely eliminated. The States members of the New Agenda Coalition, of which Egypt was the current coordinator, would continue their efforts to ensure that the nuclear-weapon States met their commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

50. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference had reaffirmed that the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference remained valid until its objectives were achieved. The only State in the region that had not acceded to the Treaty was Israel, which continued to hamper efforts to rid the region of nuclear weapons. It was therefore incumbent on all States parties to urge Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards. Egypt had submitted its report on the steps it had taken to achieve the goals of the 1995 resolution in document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/3, and he wished to know what steps the five nuclear-weapon States had taken to that end. The Egyptian proposal for the establishment of a mechanism to monitor progress made in the implementation of the resolution and the related recommendations made at the 2000 Review Conference still required consideration.

51. In the light of the recent negative developments with respect to nuclear disarmament and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Preparatory Committee should consider at its first session substantive and procedural matters agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. Time should be allocated for the discussion of nuclear disarmament and regional questions, including the question of the Middle East, and the Preparatory Committee should also consider the reports of States on steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the

Middle East and on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

52. **Mr. Faessler** (Observer for Switzerland) said that the international community should make every effort to achieve disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, two crucial issues for international security. The NPT was still the principal tool in that respect and the decisions taken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference provided the basis for strengthening its role.

53. One of the Preparatory Committee's tasks was to consider developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty. Such developments included a new awareness of the danger of nuclear proliferation, as a result of international terrorism. Switzerland believed that the best way to prevent nuclear proliferation was the negotiation and adoption of binding universal instruments of international law, rather than political commitments and unilateral measures.

54. Various positive developments had taken place since the 2000 Review Conference. They included: the continuation of nuclear disarmament and control measures, particularly by the United States of America and Russia; the signing of protocols additional to the IAEA safeguards agreements by about 60 countries; the initiation by the Agency of discussions on the prevention of nuclear terrorism following the events of 11 September 2001; and international efforts to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and other measures aimed at preventing unauthorized persons and groups from gaining access to such material.

55. Yet, the goal of total disarmament was still far from being achieved. The military importance of nuclear weapons remained unchanged and nuclear dissuasion remained part of the defence policy of some countries. The Conference on Disarmament had yet to adopt a work programme in order to start negotiations on fissile material and nuclear disarmament. Lastly, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had still not been ratified by all States, particularly those of southern Asia and the Middle East, and doubts remained as to the extent of compliance with the Treaty by some States parties, particularly Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

56. There was thus an imbalance, which needed to be corrected, between the progress made in achieving the

goals set out in article VI and the implementation of the other provisions of the Treaty, particularly articles II and III. His delegation therefore continued to insist that the decision on extension taken in 1995 could not mean the indefinite extension of the status quo, particularly with regard to the nuclear-weapon States. That imbalance also undermined the two commitments that had made the conclusion and extension of the NPT possible: first, the renunciation by most States of nuclear weapons, although they maintained the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in exchange for a pledge by the nuclear-weapon States to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament; and, second, the indefinite extension of the NPT in exchange for the adoption of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the establishment of a strengthened review process and the adoption of a resolution on the Middle East.

57. The Preparatory Committee's work should be based on a reaffirmation of the basic commitments mentioned above, which were reflected in the link between nuclear non-proliferation and the specific obligations of the nuclear Powers in the area of nuclear disarmament. The Committee should also reaffirm the link between the extension of the NPT and the implementation of the other decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

58. **Mr. Westdal** (Canada) said that the outlook for success in implementing the 13 steps to disarmament was sombre, and the ongoing development of nuclear weapons and missile programmes in volatile regions, particularly by States not party to the NPT, was a source of grave concern. However, relations between the United States of America and Russia had improved and would hopefully lead to irreversible and verifiable reductions in nuclear stockpiles, and while the CTBT had not entered into force, the global moratorium on testing was holding and gathering credibility over time.

59. Canada continued to be convinced that global security prospects were best served by legally binding multilateral treaties. Accordingly, the global norm enshrined in the NPT should be preserved and enhanced. The discrimination inherent in the NPT was acceptable only in a larger context of coherent commitment, and credible progress towards disarmament and negative security assurances, a key element of the 1995 extension decision, remained essential.

60. A significant outcome of the 1995 and 2000 Conferences was a strengthened review process. Permanence with accountability had been the basis for indefinite extension in 1995, and accountability required transparency, hence the importance of the reporting process. While all States parties were required to submit reports, the purpose, scope and format of such reports had yet to be defined. Canada would be submitting a working paper on reporting to initiate general discussion on the topic during the current session.

61. Canada believed in partnerships with civil society as a means of working towards shared objectives in the areas of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, and welcomed the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Preparatory Committee's work. The Committee should send a clear signal that States parties valued the roles played by NGOs and consider how to enhance their participation in the preparatory process for the 2005 Review Conference and the Conference itself.

62. Non-compliance with the NPT had been addressed only partially. The IAEA safeguards system needed to be reinforced, through universal adherence and full respect of obligations. Canada urged the 51 States parties that had not yet done so to sign comprehensive safeguards agreements, and to bring into force an additional protocol. That would enhance the system's effectiveness by contributing to a more stable security environment, particularly in regions such as the Middle East.

63. The NPT offered concrete benefits to all States parties, inter alia, by permitting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for a wide variety of purposes. Canada urged all States parties to ensure that such uses could be sustained without generating concerns that they might contribute to proliferation. It was clearly essential to ensure that nuclear material, equipment and technology were kept out of the hands of terrorists. In that context, it was urgent to work towards strengthening the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and also IAEA.

64. **Mr. Goussous** (Jordan) said that, 32 years after the entry into force of the NPT, it was necessary to pause and reflect on what the Treaty had failed to achieve in order to highlight the obstacles to be overcome. The Treaty had succeeded in linking nuclear proliferation with the increased probability of nuclear

war and in drawing attention to the danger of nuclear arms races at the regional level, and it had also provided a legal basis for the IAEA safeguards regime.

65. Article VI of the Treaty established three objectives: cessation of the nuclear arms race; nuclear disarmament; and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The first objective had been achieved only by the two super-Powers at the bilateral level, the second was still a distant prospect and the successful achievement of the third was even more remote.

66. An insurmountable obstacle to full implementation of the Treaty was the refusal of certain nuclear-weapon States to accede to it. Israel in particular still refused to accede despite the progress made in the Middle East peace process. Israel's accession would help prevent nuclear accidents that might have catastrophic consequences; it would facilitate negotiations in the framework of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security; it would promote progress on other bilateral tracks of the peace process and enhance confidence-building; it would mitigate the regional arms race and release financial resources for economic and social development; and it would encourage others to accede and thus have a positive impact on universal adherence to the Treaty.

67. Israel's failure to accede to the Treaty was impeding the confidence-building process, strengthening the psychological barriers separating the States and peoples of the region and nullifying the international efforts that had been made. It would be difficult to convince the peoples of the region of Israel's credibility, seriousness and desire for a just, durable and comprehensive peace if it maintained its refusal to accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision.

68. In article 4 of the Treaty of Peace between Jordan and Israel, the parties undertook to create a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and non-conventional. Israel's accession to the NPT would thus be in keeping with that undertaking and would pave the way for the establishment in the region of a nuclear-weapon-free zone or even a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.

69. In fulfilment of their obligations under the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States must redouble their efforts to achieve general and complete nuclear disarmament

and conclude a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. They must endeavour to make nuclear technology available to non-nuclear States at reasonable cost and must provide them with legally binding, comprehensive, effective and unequivocal positive and negative security assurances. The nuclear-weapon States must secure universal adherence to the Treaty and bring pressure to bear on nuclear-capable States to accede to it. They must also strengthen the role of the Security Council in monitoring the implementation of the Treaty, enhance and expand the role of IAEA and its system of safeguards, and encourage the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all parts of the world while giving priority to the creation of such a zone in the Middle East.

70. Jordan was committed to achieving peace and consolidating stability and security in the Middle East and in the world at large. In order to enhance the role of the NPT as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime, it was necessary from time to time to subject it to review and to constructive criticism.

71. **Mr. Ben Youssef** (Tunisia) noted that some progress had been made in ensuring the universality of the NPT, particularly in the light of the growing awareness of the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the nuclear arms race. However, much remained to be done to attain the goal established in article VI of making nuclear disarmament subject to strict and effective international control.

72. Until complete nuclear disarmament had been attained, commitments must be made to establish effective guarantees that nuclear weapons would not be used or their use threatened against non-nuclear-weapon States. In that respect, nuclear-weapon States had specific obligations under the NPT, in particular its article VI.

73. The first step taken to implement the provisions of article VI had been the conclusion of negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It was thus a matter of concern that that Treaty had not been ratified by certain nuclear-weapon States, some of which were among the 44 States whose ratification was necessary under article XIV. The second step would be the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty which would strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and contribute to nuclear disarmament, but that treaty was

not even being negotiated. Given the importance of the commitment of all States parties to work resolutely towards ensuring the universality of the NPT, States parties should seek to strengthen security in regions such as the Middle East, where Israel was the only State that was still not party to the NPT and had refused to place its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. It was unfortunate that, despite the clearly expressed desire of the States of the region to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone there, Israel was the sole State to possess nuclear arms, a situation which constituted an obstacle to peace in the region.

74. His delegation was convinced that the real solution lay in the total and definitive elimination of nuclear arms and the irreversible rejection of the policy of nuclear dissuasion by nuclear-weapon countries. The NPT offered the means to achieve that goal.

75. **Mr. Manalo** (Philippines) said that even though the political and security environment that had prevailed in 1968 no longer existed, the objectives of the NPT remained just as urgent. The increasing gap between the haves and have-nots, together with conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, heightened uncertainties about regional and international peace and security and made global negotiations on nuclear disarmament and adherence to the rule of law even more imperative. Total elimination of nuclear weapons remained the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons. The Philippines continued to support efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty and called on all States that had not yet done so to accede to it without delay and without conditions.

76. Nevertheless, after more than three decades of the Treaty regime, progress towards further reductions in nuclear weapons remained limited. Only the full and unconditional implementation of the Treaty, particularly article VI thereof, and of the 13 steps for nuclear disarmament that had been drawn up at the 2000 Review Conference, could ensure further progress. Negotiations for a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control should also be pursued. To that end, the Philippines supported the call by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries for nuclear-weapon States to launch negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including a convention on nuclear weapons and a legally binding international

instrument that provided unconditional assurance to all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The discordance in the missile control regime also needed to be addressed with a view to achieving a substantial limitation in strategic arms. While welcome, unilateral declarations on reductions in commissioned nuclear warheads did not ensure global security; multilateral efforts still played a critical role in achieving international peace and security.

77. The Philippines fully supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a complementary effort on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States to ensure non-proliferation. It joined other members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in urging the nuclear-weapon States to accept and ratify the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty so that it could enter into force at the earliest possible date.

78. With regard to safeguards and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, his delegation upheld the inalienable right of all States parties to the NPT to research in and the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, subject to IAEA monitoring and safeguards agreements.

79. **Mr. Kadiri** (Morocco) said that the Committee's main task was to identify ways and means of creating conditions conducive to the implementation of the NPT and to the consolidation of the gains that had been made in the field of nuclear disarmament. Despite its imperfections, the Treaty had played a critical role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in strengthening international peace and security. Its indefinite extension in 1995 had put an end to the uncertainty that had weighed on the nuclear non-proliferation regime and had given rise to a new form of review conference in which nuclear-weapon States were called upon to report on the progress made towards the gradual elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Regrettably, very little had been done to implement the positive conclusions of the 2000 Review Conference. The unfavourable political environment, moreover, had caused serious difficulties for multilateral diplomatic efforts to achieve disarmament.

80. The tragic and unexpected events of 11 September 2001 had posed a new challenge to international security by combining the threat of terrorism with that of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and had adversely affected the irreversibility

of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. That setback could only lead to nuclear proliferation, an accelerating arms race and illicit trafficking in arms.

81. While unilateral and bilateral efforts to reduce strategic weapons arsenals were welcome, the NPT remained a valid alternative to deterrence and military measures and an adequate response to the many current challenges to international peace and security. The best way to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction was to strengthen multilateral disarmament and arms control instruments, promote international cooperation and institute appropriate verification mechanisms.

82. To that end, the international community should continue to pursue the objective of universality for the Treaty. In the Middle East, Israel remained the only nuclear-capable State that had not acceded to the Treaty or brought its facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime. The 2000 Review Conference had reiterated the importance of accession by that State to the Treaty as a necessary measure for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Implementation of the 1995 resolution on that question would avert the risk of a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in that vulnerable region of the world.

83. **Mr. Atieh** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that it had been clear from the outset that the NPT was not an end in itself but a step towards nuclear non-proliferation until effective measures relating to full disarmament could be adopted. After 32 years, however, the international community had yet to succeed in ridding the world of nuclear weapons. The world had not become more secure despite the end of the cold war.

84. Like most non-nuclear-weapon States, his country had accepted the Treaty, despite its shortcomings, in the hope of containing the dangers of nuclear weapons pending their complete elimination and of obtaining the technical assistance the nuclear-weapon States had promised to provide with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was still open to question whether those States had met any of their commitments.

85. The Syrian Arab Republic had always been committed to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and was deeply concerned that Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty represented an obstacle to the establishment of such a zone. Israel had persisted in its refusal despite repeated warnings from the international community that its intransigent

position was seriously damaging the credibility and universality of the Treaty and preventing the establishment of the zone notwithstanding the good faith of the other parties concerned. The establishment of such a zone would require Israel to accede to the Treaty, place all of its nuclear installations under the IAEA full-scope safeguards regime and eliminate its stocks of nuclear weapons.

86. It was paradoxical that Israel should say that it was prepared to consider accession to the Treaty only after a comprehensive peace had been achieved in the region, whereas its actual policies confirmed without any doubt not only that it was evading the requirements of peace with its immediate neighbours but that it was actively continuing to raise obstacles to such a peace.

87. One nuclear-weapon State was reported to be endeavouring to produce small-scale nuclear bombs for use against States including non-nuclear-weapon States that were not seeking to obtain such weapons. That development pointed to a new era in which nuclear weapons might be used in military operations, a situation that was incompatible with all the relevant treaties and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. International security and stability required the elimination of the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, the conclusion of a treaty providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and support by the Security Council for the role of IAEA, especially with respect to negative assurances.

88. Nuclear proliferation was a serious threat to security and peace, and the NPT was the cornerstone of the international community's efforts to limit the dangers of nuclear weapons pending their complete elimination. Among the Treaty's most important shortcomings, however, was the imbalance between the responsibilities and obligations of the non-nuclear-weapon States and the advantages accorded to the nuclear-weapon States.

89. Issues of peace, security and disarmament had become more inclusive and more closely bound up with other issues, such as development. It was therefore necessary to establish a conceptual link between disarmament and development by providing assistance in the economic adjustment process, encouraging more rapid progress on international development issues and placing international peace and

security on a firmer basis. A spirit of mutual understanding, constructive cooperation and honest political intentions would bring about further progress towards a more secure, more just and more affluent world. The NPT would remain incapable of achieving its goals as long there were States that had not acceded to it and did not comply with it. Universal adherence to the Treaty was the objective condition that would give it the credibility necessary to ensure its success and the achievement of the goals for which it had been concluded.

90. **Mr. Singhara Na Ayudhaya** (Thailand) said that the Preparatory Committee was meeting at a time when the NPT regime was facing numerous challenges. Since the 2000 Review Conference there had been a gradual erosion of multilateralism in general, and of multilateral disarmament regimes, including those concerned with nuclear weapons. The loss of momentum in the CTBT process despite the increase in the number of new accessions and the collective efforts of participating States at the 2001 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty gave further cause for concern. The tragic events of 11 September 2001 had also highlighted the vulnerability of all States to acts of international terrorism and rekindled fears of the threat of nuclear terrorism and access by non-State actors to nuclear technology and materials. Nuclear-weapon States, moreover, had yet to make any significant progress towards reducing their nuclear arsenals or changing their nuclear strategies to pave the way for enhanced global and regional security from the threat of nuclear weapons.

91. Thailand was a staunch supporter of the NPT and adhered strictly to its obligations thereunder. Its domestic policy measures were consistent with its efforts at the regional level, where it worked closely with the States members of ASEAN to ensure that the region was free from the threat of nuclear weapons. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, was an important step towards the objective of global nuclear disarmament. Further, as part of the advocacy and cooperative aspects of the Bangkok Treaty which had established the Zone, Thailand had organized regional workshops and seminars with IAEA on such issues as radiation safety.

92. The Committee's substantive discussions should focus on nuclear disarmament and regional issues, including the Middle East. In reviewing the progress

achieved since the 2000 Review Conference, it should focus on the 13 practical steps for the implementation of article VI of the NPT and on paragraphs 3 and 4 of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, particularly the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to complete nuclear disarmament. At the same time, in order for the nuclear non-proliferation process to maintain its relevance in the face of the changing international security landscape, particularly in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, other issues, such as nuclear terrorism and safeguards, should also be addressed. In that connection, Thailand supported the recent IAEA proposals on the issue of protection against nuclear terrorism. It should also be borne in mind that efforts to prevent nuclear non-proliferation should not impede the transfer of nuclear technology to help States in their research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.