
**2000 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

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New York, 24 April-19 May 2000**Strengthening the review process for the Treaty: proposal
for the establishment of a Non-Proliferation Treaty
Management Board****Working paper submitted by Nigeria**

1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and it has served the international community very well. In recent times, it has been facing serious challenges. Those challenges, as well as the recurring differences and confrontations each time a review process is in motion, have revealed the weakness of the Treaty, the vulnerability of the non-proliferation regime, and the fragility of the coalition that brought about consensus decisions at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
2. Management questions have too often been at the core of the problems of the Non-Proliferation Treaty review processes. Indeed, during the long intervening periods between review conferences, parties to the Treaty do not have Treaty-based consultative mechanisms to turn to for their complaints, difficulties, frustrations or any other concerns. In the past, such concerns have been allowed to reach boiling point and are then heaped on the review conferences, resulting in inconclusive meetings in certain cases. This is in sharp contrast to other treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which have their own implementing organizations, along with their Governing Councils, to supervise the operation of those treaties and deal with the concerns of the parties.
3. In order to address this shortcoming in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is proposed that consideration be given by the parties to the establishment of a Non-Proliferation Treaty Management Board that would serve as an executive body for the Treaty and the decisions adopted by the parties.
4. The Board's activities should be complementary to, and not in competition with, those of the International Atomic Energy Agency under articles III and IV of the Treaty, the review conferences and their preparatory committees.

5. The functions to be performed by the Board will include:

(a) Receiving and deliberating on complaints about non-compliance, difficulties that the parties may be experiencing and any other concerns;

(b) Acting as a clearing house for information and reports, including the annual reports to be submitted by the parties on their nuclear activities as well as other matters relating to the Treaty;

(c) Preventing proliferation;

(d) Responding to any significant cases affecting the integrity of the Treaty;

(e) Generally acting as an Executive Council overseeing the operation of the Treaty;

(f) Serving as a consultative mechanism through which parties to the Treaty could hold dialogue with non-parties, as well as encourage them to join the Treaty.

6. Members of the Board shall be elected by the parties to the Treaty, bearing in mind the need for equitable geographical distribution and to include members with advanced nuclear programmes.
