
2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

3 April 2000
Original: English

New York, 24 April-19 May 2000

Realization of the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in various regions of the world

Background paper prepared by the United Nations Secretariat

Contents

	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction	1-3	2
II. General	4-7	2
III. Major developments with regard to the realization of the goals of the Treaty in various regions of the world since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference ..	8-58	3
A. Africa and the Middle East	8-17	3
B. The Americas	18-31	5
C. Asia and the Pacific	32-44	6
D. Europe	45-58	8

I. Introduction

1. At its third session (10-21 May 1999), the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons invited the Secretariat of the United Nations to prepare for the Conference a background paper on the realization of the goals of the Treaty in various regions of the world.

2. The Preparatory Committee stated that the following general approach should apply to the proposed papers (similar to the approach applied for the preparation of background documentation for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference): all papers must give balanced, objective and factual descriptions of the relevant developments, be as short as possible and be easily readable. They must refrain from presenting value judgements. Rather than presenting collections of statements, they should reflect agreements reached, actual unilateral and multilateral measures taken, understandings adopted, formal proposals for agreements made and important political developments directly related to any of the foregoing. The papers should focus on the period since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and on the implementation of the outcome of that conference, including the decisions on “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty” and on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” and the “Resolution on the Middle East”.

3. The present paper highlights major developments with regard to the realization of the goals of the Treaty that have taken place in various regions of the world since the 1995 Conference. A more detailed description of developments, including unilateral, bilateral and multilateral initiatives and measures taken, is contained in the background papers prepared by the United Nations Secretariat on the tenth preambular paragraph of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.2000/2), on articles I and II (NPT/CONF.2000/3), on article VI (NPT/CONF.2000/4), on article VII (NPT/CONF.2000/5), on security assurances (NPT/CONF.2000/6) and on the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East (NPT/CONF.2000/7). Detailed information on the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relevant to articles III, IV and V is contained in documents NPT/CONF.2000/9 to 11, respectively. Specific developments with regard to the Treaties of

Tlatelolco and Rarotonga, the Bangkok Treaty and the Pelindaba Treaty are reflected in documents NPT/CONF.2000/12 to 15. For ease of reference, cross-references to the matters discussed in the above papers are included.

II. General

4. More than 50 years have passed since the world entered the nuclear age. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and thereby reducing nuclear dangers, while guaranteeing that the benefits of the peaceful application of nuclear energy are universally realized, is a tremendous challenge to world peace and security. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has become the cornerstone of global efforts by the international community to meet this challenge.

5. The Non-Proliferation Treaty consists of a series of mutually reinforcing and legally binding obligations and commitments between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States pertaining both to nuclear non-proliferation (articles I and II) and to nuclear disarmament (article VI). The latter is the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty on the part of the nuclear-weapon States with respect to the goal of nuclear disarmament. All parties to the Treaty pledge to work towards general and complete disarmament. These fundamental obligations are accompanied by a system of international safeguards (article III) and an assurance concerning the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (article IV).

6. In 1995, the obligations under the Treaty were extended indefinitely by means of a package that included decisions on the “Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty”, on “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty”, on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, containing benchmarks to measure the performance of all Treaty parties, and the Resolution on the Middle East.

7. Since the 1995 Conference, nine more States have become parties to the Treaty: Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu. With these accessions the overall membership of the Treaty increased to 187 from 178 at the time of the 1995 Conference. Four States remain outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan.

III. Major developments with regard to the realization of the goals of the Treaty in various regions of the world since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference

A. Africa and the Middle East

8. In the period under review, Angola, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman and the United Arab Emirates acceded to the Treaty.

9. States of the region signed or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Of the 44 countries worldwide whose ratifications are required before that Treaty can enter into force, one State of the region has already ratified it (see NPT/CONF.2000/2).

10. With regard to articles II and III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the implementation of the mandates given to IAEA and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq, as defined by Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, continued until 16 December 1998, when the Agency and UNSCOM personnel were withdrawn from Iraq. In view of its inability to carry out Security Council resolutions-related activities since December 1998 and in the light of its obligations pursuant to Iraq's comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, IAEA carried out an inspection in Iraq, in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement, in January 2000. The inspection had the limited objective of verifying the inventory of the nuclear material remaining in Iraq, consisting of low-enriched, depleted and natural uranium. (For detailed information, see background paper on articles I and II (NPT/CONF.2000/3) and the background paper by IAEA on activities related to article III (NPT/CONF.2000/9).)

11. During the period under review, States of the region have on numerous occasions, within the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission, as well as in international forums outside the United Nations system, continued to express their support for measures at all levels to achieve the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons and have submitted various proposals in this regard (see NPT/CONF.2000/4, paras. 11-28).

12. Some States of the region have also signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines. Regarding the latter Convention, the States parties to the Convention convened their First Meeting in Maputo from 3 to 7 May 1999. In the Maputo Declaration, adopted at the Meeting, the States parties, *inter alia*, reaffirmed their commitment to the total eradication of anti-personnel mines (see NPT/CONF.2000/4, paras. 73 and 74).

13. With regard to the destabilizing effect of illicit arms flows, in particular of small arms, to and in Africa, the Security Council, in its resolution 1209 (1998), expressed its concern and urged Member States that had the ability to do so to cooperate with African States to strengthen their capacity to combat the movement of illegal arms. It requested the Secretary-General to consider practical ways to work with African States in implementing national, regional or subregional programmes for voluntary weapons collection, disposal and destruction, including the possibility of the establishment of a fund to support such programmes. In October 1998, the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa.¹ The General Assembly welcomed the Decision on the Prevention and Combating of Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Related Crimes adopted by the Southern African Development Community (SADC)² and decision AHG/Dec.137(XXXV) on the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).³ The Assembly also welcomed Mali's initiative to curb the illicit circulation of small arms, to destroy thousands of small arms collected from ex-combatants and to collect those weapons also in the affected States of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion; encouraged the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to curb the illicit circulation of small arms and collect such arms in the affected States that so requested, with the support of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and in close cooperation with OAU; encouraged further progress on the issue and appealed for further action and support from the region and from the international community. The Secretary-General has designated the Department for Disarmament Affairs as the focal point

to coordinate all action on small arms within the United Nations system. The Department for Disarmament Affairs has established the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) as the mechanism for implementing the decisions of the Secretary-General (see NPT/CONF.2000/4, paras. 61, 62, 65 and 66).

14. The General Assembly continued to support the activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.⁴ It reaffirmed its support for efforts aimed at confidence-building measures, the promotion of peace and the prevention, management and settlement of political crises and armed conflicts in Central Africa at regional and subregional levels (see NPT/CONF.2000/4, para. 88).

15. On 11 April 1996, 45 African States signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). On 12 April 1996, the President of the Security Council on behalf of the Council stated that the signature of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty constituted an important contribution by the African countries to the maintenance of international peace and security.⁵ By its resolution 51/53 and subsequent resolutions,⁶ the General Assembly welcomed with satisfaction the successful conclusion of the signing ceremony of the Treaty and called upon African States to sign and ratify the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty as soon as possible so that it might enter into force without delay; expressed its appreciation to the international community and in particular to the nuclear-weapon States which had signed the Protocols that concerned them, and called upon them to ratify the Protocols as soon as possible. It also called upon the States contemplated in Protocol III to the Treaty to take all necessary measures to ensure the speedy application of the Treaty to territories for which they were, *de jure* or *de facto*, internationally responsible and which lay within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty. By its resolution 54/48 of 1 December 1999, the Assembly called upon the African States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that had not concluded comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with IAEA to do so and to conclude additional protocols to their Safeguards Agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the Board of Governors on 15 May 1997. To date, 55 States have signed the Treaty and 11 African States have ratified it. China and France have ratified the Protocols that concern them.⁷ The

Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America have signed the Protocols for which they are eligible. At the current stage, six of the 11 States that have ratified the Treaty have comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with IAEA in force.

16. Resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East were adopted annually by the General Assembly without a vote.⁸ In 1999, the General Assembly, by its resolution 54/51 of 1 December 1999, urged all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions, and, as a means of promoting that objective, invited the countries concerned to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Assembly called upon all countries of the region that had not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. It further invited those countries not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear-explosive devices. The Assembly furthermore invited the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and, at the same time, to refrain from any action that ran counter to both the letter and the spirit of the initiative. With regard to the Middle East Multilateral Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS), the Group has not met since December 1994. At the Multilateral Steering Group meeting held in Moscow, on 1 February 2000, the participating Foreign Ministers emphasized the importance of reaching an agreed comprehensive agenda for ACRS. In that regard, they called upon the parties in the region to intensify their efforts to reach an agreement on this and to resume their work, with the help of the co-sponsors, with the goal of getting formal ACRS activities under way within a few months.⁹ (For detailed information, see background paper on the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East — NPT/CONF.2000/7.)

17. With regard to technical cooperation among developing countries, IAEA in its paper on the activities of the Agency related to article IV of the Treaty stresses that the most successful mechanisms established to stimulate such cooperation are

undoubtedly the Regional Cooperative Agreements for Asia (RCA), for Latin America (ARCAL) and for Africa (AFRA). It underlines that in Africa, while the budget for national Technical Cooperation projects has changed little in the past five years, allocations for AFRA and other regional projects have increased considerably, from about one fourth of the total programme budget in 1993 to over half in the Technical Cooperation programme for 1999-2000. (For detailed information, see NPT/CONF.2000/10.)

B. The Americas

18. Since the 1995 Conference, Brazil and Chile have acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

19. States of the region signed or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Of the 44 countries worldwide whose ratifications are required before that Treaty can enter into force, five States from the region have already ratified it. On 13 October 1999, the United States Senate rejected the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Following the vote, President Clinton stressed that eventually the United States would ratify the Treaty and affirmed that under his presidency the United States would not conduct any new nuclear tests (see NPT/CONF.2000/2).

20. During the period under review, States of the region have on numerous occasions, within the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission, as well as in international forums outside the United Nations system, continued to express strong support for measures at all levels to achieve the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons and have submitted various proposals in that regard (see NPT/CONF.2000/4, paras. 11-28).

21. The United States and the Russian Federation continued their bilateral negotiations mainly in the framework of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). The START II Treaty was ratified by the United States Senate in January 1996. In March 1997, at a summit meeting in Helsinki, the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation reaffirmed their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security.¹⁰ In addition to the bilateral negotiations with the Russian Federation, the United States stated that it had eliminated over 80

per cent of its tactical nuclear warheads and almost completely eliminated its non-strategic nuclear weapons. It had furthermore eliminated 47 per cent of its deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

22. In January 1999, the United States Government announced its intention to increase funding for ongoing National Missile Defense and Theatre Missile Defense programmes. It was also announced that the bilateral 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty might have to be amended in order to accommodate a national missile defence system. Following a summit meeting between the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation at Cologne, Germany, a Joint Statement between the United States and the Russian Federation concerning Strategic Offensive and Defensive Arms and further Strengthening of Stability¹¹ was issued by the two Governments in June 1999. Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security and stressed the importance of the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

23. Work continued on the "trilateral initiative" between the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA, launched in 1996, to address technical, legal and financial issues associated with IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. (For details on the developments described above, see NPT/CONF.2000/4, paras. 29-38 and 40.)

24. In January 2000, the United States released a report on its National Security Strategy. The report stated that "nuclear weapons serve as a guarantee" of America's security commitments to its allies. It also stressed that the United States would continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any potential adversaries who may have or seek access to nuclear forces¹² (see NPT/CONF.2000/4, para. 9).

25. States of the region have signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines.

26. On 1 July 1998, the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Matters¹³ entered into force. In June 1999, the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions was adopted.¹⁴

27. During the period under review, States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco continued their cooperation within the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) as well as through arrangements between some of its members. A detailed description of developments is contained in the background paper on the Treaty of Tlatelolco (NPT/CONF.2000/12). Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements are in force with 31 of the 32 States parties to the Treaty.

28. In 1996, a resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas was submitted to the General Assembly for the first time by Brazil. By that resolution and similar resolutions of subsequent years,¹⁵ the General Assembly, *inter alia*, welcomed the contribution that the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba as well as the Antarctic Treaty were making towards freeing the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas from nuclear weapons (see NPT/CONF. 2000/5, para. 18).

29. In an effort to strengthen peace and security in the region, States members of the Organization of American States (OAS) continued to promote and encourage the adoption and implementation of confidence- and security-building measures. An Action Plan for confidence- and security-building measures for the region was endorsed by the OAS General Assembly¹⁶ which envisages the development of a cooperation programme to address the concerns raised by the maritime transport of nuclear and other waste; continue to support the efforts of small island States to address their special security concerns; improve and broaden the information submitted by member States to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms; and continue consultations and the exchange of ideas within the hemisphere to advance the limitation and control of conventional weapons in the region.¹⁷ In July 1998, the Governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay signed a Political Declaration of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), Bolivia and Chile as a Zone of Peace.¹⁸ By that Declaration, the participating States, *inter alia*, declared MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile as a zone of peace, free from weapons of mass destruction.¹⁹

30. In May 1998, a cooperation agreement between the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and IAEA entered into force (see NPT/CONF.2000/9, para.105).

31. In February 1998, the States members of OPANAL adopted a declaration on the transport of radioactive waste, calling upon the international community to strengthen the strict regulation of this type of waste so as to entail guarantees on security measures, non-contamination, contingency plans in the case of accidents, and the exchange of information with interested States.²⁰

C. Asia and the Pacific

32. In the period under review, Vanuatu became a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

33. States of the region signed or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Of the 44 countries worldwide whose ratifications are required before that Treaty can enter into force, four States from the region have already ratified it. Three States whose signature and ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force have not yet signed (see also NPT/CONF.2000/2).

34. On 11 and 13 May 1998, India announced that it had conducted five underground nuclear test explosions. Pakistan then announced on 28 and 30 May that it had conducted six nuclear tests. The tests were the first since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in September 1996 and the de facto moratorium on nuclear testing that had been in existence since then. The international community both within and outside the United Nations system reacted strongly by condemning the tests, considering them a setback in nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and calling upon both States to undertake measures to adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions. The Security Council, by its resolution 1172 (1998) of 6 June 1998, recognized that the tests conducted by India and Pakistan constituted a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; and urged India and Pakistan, and all other States that had not yet done so, to become Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions. The Council set out a number of steps to be undertaken by the two countries, including to immediately stop their nuclear weapons development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons and to cease development of ballistic missiles

capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Since the testing, both India and Pakistan have each announced a unilateral moratorium. They have declared their intentions to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty but stated that they needed to build a national consensus on signing the Treaty. Both States are engaged in bilateral discussions on the issues with key interlocutors. (For detailed information see NPT/CONF.2000/2, paras. 33-41.)

35. With regard to implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), some progress has been made since 1995 with regard to some of the safeguards measures required by the Agency, but not others. The Agency remains unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration by the DPRK of its nuclear material subject to safeguards. The DPRK accepts the Agency activities solely within the context of the Agreed Framework concluded between the United States of America and the DPRK in October 1994 (see also NPT/CONF.2000/9, paras. 65-68).

36. During the period under review, States of the region have on numerous occasions, within the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission, as well as in international forums outside the United Nations system, continued to express their support for measures at all levels to achieve the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons and have submitted various proposals in that regard. (For detailed information, see NPT/CONF.2000/4, paras. 11-28.)

37. China has continued to stress that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances and has undertaken unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. It underlined that it had shown utmost restraint in the development of nuclear weapons, that it had conducted a very limited number of nuclear tests and possessed a very limited number of nuclear weapons. It also stated that its nuclear weapons had been placed under strict control, thereby removing the risk of an accidental launch²¹ (see NPT/CONF.2000/4, para. 44). In 1997, China ratified Protocols I and II to the Pelindaba Treaty.

38. In September 1996, Kazakhstan completed its nuclear-weapon dismantlement programme and

reported that the last nuclear missile launchers in its territory had been eliminated.²²

39. States of the region have also signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines.

40. In 1996, France, the United Kingdom and the United States signed Protocols 1, 2 and 3 to the Treaty of Rarotonga, and France and the United Kingdom ratified Protocols 1, 2 and 3 in 1996 and 1997 respectively. (For detailed information, see the memorandum from the South Pacific Forum Secretariat (NPT/CONF.2000/13).) All Contracting Parties to that Treaty have met its requirement to bring into force comprehensive Safeguards Agreements pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or equivalent in scope and effect (see NPT/CONF.2000/9, para. 72).

41. The Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty) was signed in December 1995 by all 10 countries of South-East Asia. It entered into force in March 1997 and has been ratified by 9 of the signatory States. Eight of the contracting States parties have brought into force comprehensive Safeguards Agreements pursuant to the requirements of the Treaty. Since its entry into force, the parties to the Treaty have been proceeding on two tracks, firstly on the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and secondly on obtaining support for the Treaty and its Protocol from the five nuclear-weapon States. Substantial progress has been made on both tracks, including the convening of the Inaugural Meeting of the Commission for the zone in July 1999, the launching of a dialogue with IAEA to discuss cooperation between the Agency and the parties to the Treaty and consultations with the five nuclear-weapon States. China has expressed its readiness to be the first country to sign the Protocol to the Treaty. (For detailed information, see the memorandum from the depositary of the Bangkok Treaty (NPT/CONF.2000/15).)

42. With the adoption of resolution 53/77 D of 4 December 1998, the General Assembly for the first time unanimously welcomed the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status. On 3 February 2000, the parliament of Mongolia adopted the Law on the international security and nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia as well as the resolution on measures to be taken in connection with the adoption of the Law²³ (see NPT/CONF.2000/5, para. 11).

43. The General Assembly, by its resolutions adopted in 1997 and 1998,²⁴ called upon all States to support the initiative by the five Central Asian States²⁵ to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to provide assistance in the preparation of the form and elements of an agreement on such a zone. Consequently, an expert group, consisting of experts from each of the five States, was established to prepare the form and elements of an agreement for such a zone. While progress has been made towards drafting a treaty on establishing such a zone in Central Asia, final agreement has still not been reached on the text (see NPT/CONF.2000/5, paras. 12 and 13).

44. At the sixth Summit of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) held at Hanoi in December 1998, member States adopted the Hanoi Plan of Action, in which they pledged, *inter alia*, to support and participate actively in all efforts to achieve the objectives of general and complete disarmament, especially the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; to continue efforts to promote confidence-building measures in the South China Sea between and among the parties concerned; and to intensify intra-ASEAN security cooperation through existing mechanisms.²⁶

D. Europe

45. Since the 1995 Conference, Andorra has become a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

46. States of the region signed or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Of the 44 countries worldwide whose ratifications are required before that Treaty can enter into force, 18 States have already ratified it, including France and the United Kingdom (see also document NPT/CONF.2000/2).

47. During the period under review, States of the region have on numerous occasions, within the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission, as well as in international forums outside the United Nations system, continued to express their support for measures at all levels to achieve the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons and have submitted various proposals in that regard. (For detailed information, see NPT/CONF.2000/4, paras. 11-28.)

48. The United States and the Russian Federation continued their bilateral discussions mainly in the framework of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). In March 1997, at a Summit Meeting in Helsinki, the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation reaffirmed their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security.²⁷ In addition to the bilateral negotiations, the Russian Federation reported that it had taken a number of major steps resulting in considerably reduced nuclear arsenals. Over 930 launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles had been eliminated, as well as about 2,000 missiles for such launchers, 24 nuclear submarines and over 80 heavy bombers. All in all, by December 2001, the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation will be reduced by approximately 40 per cent. Russian land-based missiles of two categories, with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometres, were reported to have been completely eliminated and a ban on their production and testing was imposed. As far as tactical nuclear weapons are concerned, the Russian Federation stated that it fully and consistently implemented its declared unilateral initiatives.

49. Following a summit meeting between the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation at Cologne, Germany, a Joint Statement between the United States and the Russian Federation concerning Strategic Offensive and Defensive Arms and further Strengthening of Stability²⁸ was issued by the two Governments in June 1999. Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security and stressed the importance of further reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

50. Work continued on the "trilateral initiative" between the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA, launched in 1996, to address technical, legal and financial issues associated with IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes.

51. In June 1999, the United States and the Russian Federation signed a protocol to continue the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme in the Russian Federation.

52. In June 1996, the process of withdrawing strategic nuclear warheads from the territory of Ukraine to the Russian Federation for subsequent destruction under the supervision of Ukrainian observers was completed.²⁹ By 27 November 1996, the removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Belarus had been completed.³⁰ In July 1999, the United States and Ukraine also extended the agreement to continue the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme in Ukraine through December 2006. (For details on the developments described in paragraphs 48 to 52, see NPT/CONF.2000/4, paras. 29-41.)

53. The United Kingdom's Strategic Defence Review, undertaken in 1997, included significant reductions in, and transparency about, its nuclear deterrent. Overall, the United Kingdom will maintain fewer than 200 operationally available nuclear warheads, a reduction of one third from the previously announced ceiling of 300. The explosive power of the operationally available weapons will have been reduced by over 70 per cent since the end of the cold war. The United Kingdom has also published information about its defence stocks of fissile material and is taking steps to place under safeguards some 50 per cent of its unsafeguarded plutonium. It stated that it had ceased production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other explosive devices in 1995 (see also NPT/CONF.2000/4, para. 42).

54. France has significantly reduced the format and alert-status of its nuclear forces since 1991. Specifically, it completely eliminated the ground-to-ground component of its nuclear deterrent by dismantling the Plateau d'Albion ground component, which contained 18 strategic missiles, and by the final removal of 30 short-range Hades missiles. The de-targeting of strategic French nuclear weapons was implemented in September 1997. France completely dismantled in 1996-1997 its former nuclear test site in the Pacific and ratified the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga. France has ceased all production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and closed its production facilities and the operations to dismantle them are under way³¹ (see also NPT/CONF.2000/4, para. 43).

55. In 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reaffirmed its policy of nuclear deterrence and, referring to nuclear weapons, the New Strategic Concept stated that "they will continue to fulfil an essential role", although "the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be

contemplated ... are extremely remote".³² The Russian Federation, also in January 2000, published its new National Security Strategy in which it stressed the right to use all available means, including nuclear weapons, to repel aggressors (see NPT/CONF.2000/4, para. 9).

56. States of the region have also signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines.

57. With regard to conventional disarmament measures, an Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was concluded in November 1999. States of the region took an active part in measures aimed at restraining conventional arms transfers and preventing and combating illicit trafficking in small arms. In June 1998, the European Union adopted a code of conduct on arms sales, which called for, *inter alia*, restraint in conventional arms transfers by all EU member States and the promotion of conversions in the field of conventional arms exports.³³ The EU Council also adopted a Joint Action on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilization and spread of small arms and light weapons, and made a recommendation on combating the excessive and uncontrolled accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons as part of the European Union's emergency aid, reconstruction and development programmes.³⁴

58. All 15 States members of EU have concluded protocols additional to their respective Safeguards Agreements with IAEA and with Euratom.

Notes

¹ A/53/763-S/1998/1194. A Code of Conduct to backstop the implementation of the Moratorium was adopted on 10 December 1999 by the Heads of State or Government of ECOWAS.

² A/54/488-S/1999/1082.

³ A/54/424.

⁴ See resolutions 50/71 B, 51/46 C, 52/39 B, 53/78 A and 54/55 A (all resolutions were adopted without a vote).

⁵ S/PRST/1996/17.

⁶ Resolution 52/46.

⁷ China has ratified Protocols I and II. France has ratified Protocols I, II and III.

⁸ Resolutions 50/66, 51/41, 52/34, 53/74 and 54/51.

- ⁹ Moscow Steering Group Ministerial Joint Declaration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department Reports, 1 February 2000.
- ¹⁰ NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/6; the joint statement was also issued as document CD/1460.
- ¹¹ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 20 June 1999.
- ¹² The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, press release, 5 January 2000.
- ¹³ A/53/78.
- ¹⁴ CD/1591.
- ¹⁵ Resolutions 51/45 B (adopted by a vote of 129 to 3, with 38 abstentions); 52/38 N (131-3-34); 53/77 Q (154-3-10); and 54/54 L (157-3-4).
- ¹⁶ AG/RES. 1566 (XXVIII-O/98).
- ¹⁷ *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 23: 1998 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 99.IX.1), p. 105.
- ¹⁸ CD/1552.
- ¹⁹ See also the statement by Brazil on behalf of the countries belonging to MERCOSUR in the First Committee of the General Assembly at its fifty-third session (A/C.1/53/PV.21).
- ²⁰ *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 23:1998 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 99.IX.1), p. 27.
- ²¹ See A/C.1/53/PV.23; see also NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/SR.1, A/C.1/54/PV.5 and NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/SR.1.
- ²² A/C.1/51/5, annex.
- ²³ A/55/56-S/2000/160.
- ²⁴ Resolutions 52/38 S and 53/77 A were adopted without a vote.
- ²⁵ Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
- ²⁶ See Hanoi Plan of Action, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Viet Nam, 13 December 1998, in: *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 23:1998 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 99.IX.1), pp. 106 and 107.
- ²⁷ NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/6; the joint statement was also issued as document CD/1460.
- ²⁸ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 20 June 1999.
- ²⁹ See A/51/157, annex; A/51/159-S/1996/417; and A/51/169-S/1996/417.
- ³⁰ A/51/708, annex.
- ³¹ See A/C.1/53/PV.16 and 30; see also NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/26.
- ³² See NATO press release NAC-S(99)65, 24 April 1999.
- ³³ CD/1544.
- ³⁴ A/54/374.