

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Developments since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference

Background paper prepared by the United Nations Secretariat

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I. Introduction

1. At its third session (10-21 May 1999), the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons invited the Secretary-General to prepare for the Conference a background paper on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty,¹ covering developments regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

2. The Preparatory Committee stated that the following general approach should apply to the proposed papers (similar to the approach applied for the preparation of background documentation for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference): all papers must give balanced, objective and factual descriptions of the relevant developments, be as short as possible and be easily readable. They must refrain from presenting value judgements. Rather than presenting collections of statements, they should reflect agreements reached, actual unilateral and multilateral measures taken, understandings adopted, formal proposals for agreements made and important political developments directly related to any of the foregoing. The papers should focus on the period since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and on the implementation of the outcome of that conference, including the decisions on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" and on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and the "Resolution on the Middle East".

3. The present paper is submitted in response to that request. It covers developments between May 1995 and February 2000. A detailed account of events that took place before May 1995 is contained in the background paper on the same subject prepared for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/4). As separate papers have been prepared on the issues of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban (NPT/CONF.2000/2), nuclear-weapon-free zones (NPT/CONF.2000/5, NPT/CONF.2000/12, NPT/CONF.2000/13, NPT/CONF.2000/14, and NPT/CONF.2000/15) and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States (NPT/CONF.2000/6), those questions are not dealt with in the present paper.

II. Arms limitation and disarmament efforts since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference

A. Measures and initiatives relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

1. Multilateral nuclear disarmament efforts within the United Nations framework

4. During the period under review, issues of nuclear disarmament continued to be dealt with in the various bodies of the United Nations system. Within the United Nations framework, there are basically three forums where the issue of multilateral nuclear disarmament is permanently on the agenda: (a) the General Assembly, specifically its First Committee; (b) the Disarmament Commission; and (c) the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament.

Non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war

5. The issue of non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war continued to be debated within various forums, both within and outside the United Nations framework. The difference in positions between various political groups and individual States remained evident, however. In 1996, for the first time in history, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered a legal advisory opinion on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*.² Replying to a request made by the General Assembly,³ the Court agreed unanimously that the threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that was contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4 (refraining from the threat or use of force), of the Charter of the United Nations and that failed to meet all the requirements of Article 51 (inherent right of individual or collective self-defence) was unlawful, and that such threat or use of nuclear weapons should be compatible with international law applicable in armed conflict. According to the Court's opinion, the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. However, the Court could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in

which the very survival of a State would be at stake.⁴ It decided unanimously, however, that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

6. Ever since the ICJ gave its advisory opinion, the General Assembly has had before it specific resolutions on the subject matter.⁵ The resolutions have called for multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons, and providing for their elimination. Member States were requested to report to the Secretary-General on the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the resolutions and on nuclear disarmament. Pursuant to that request, the Secretary-General submitted a note to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session containing information received from Governments on their implementation of the current resolution on the advisory opinion and on nuclear disarmament.⁶

7. In the General Assembly, the different positions on the subject were also reflected in the voting patterns on a resolution entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons”, which has been submitted annually for many years.⁷ The resolution, *inter alia*, refers to the 8 July 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, and the objective of a nuclear weapons convention. Furthermore, the resolution calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and to report to the General Assembly on the results of such negotiations.

8. Divergent views were also evident on another resolution entitled “Reducing nuclear danger”,⁸ a resolution introduced for the first time at the fifty-third session of the General Assembly, which called for a review of nuclear doctrines and for urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. It requested the five nuclear-weapon States to undertake measures towards implementation

of those steps. The resolution called upon States Members of the United Nations to prevent proliferation and to promote nuclear disarmament and eliminate nuclear weapons. In this connection, controversial discussions took place on various modifications undertaken in the nuclear doctrines of States and military alliances, respectively.

9. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), at its 50th anniversary summit in April 1999, approved and updated its Strategic Concept. The NATO alliance reaffirmed its policy of nuclear deterrence and, referring to nuclear weapons, the Concept stated that “they will continue to fulfil an essential role”, although “the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated ... are extremely remote”.⁹ In January 2000, the United States of America released a report on its National Security Strategy. The report stated that “nuclear weapons serve as a guarantee” of America’s security commitments to its allies. It also stressed that the United States would continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any potential adversaries who might have or, who might seek access to nuclear forces.¹⁰ The Russian Federation, also in January 2000, published its new national security strategy, in which it stressed the right to use all available means, including nuclear weapons, to repel aggressors. The use of nuclear weapons in war would be contemplated “if all other means of resolving the crisis have been exhausted”.¹¹ China reiterated its position that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances and that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

10. The Conference on Disarmament discussed the issue of the non-use of nuclear weapons under the item “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”. During plenary meetings of the Conference, some delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the agenda item, the detailed descriptions of which were duly recorded in the annual reports of the Conference to the General Assembly, related official documents and working papers, as well as plenary records.

Nuclear disarmament

11. At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the States parties agreed that in order to fully realize and effectively implement article VI of the Treaty, it

was important to achieve the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons; and by all States, of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.¹² Progress in this area has, however, been limited. Long-standing differences over substantive as well as overall procedural questions continued to prevent the start of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

12. During the period under review, the General Assembly has adopted annually resolutions on various aspects of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament. The voting has revealed deeply rooted divergences, reflecting different strategic doctrines and national security perceptions. Differences also remained over the pace, form and ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament negotiations. The critical issue in the debates was whether to proceed on a multilateral or on a bilateral basis in negotiating nuclear disarmament.

13. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on several occasions called for urgent nuclear disarmament measures. In the Final Document of the Ministerial Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held in New Delhi in April 1997, the Movement stressed that it was imperative that security in the post-cold war era should be promoted through drastic reductions in nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination.¹³ In September 1998, the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, at their Summit Conference held at Durban, South Africa, called for an international conference on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.¹⁴

14. Ideas and concepts for nuclear disarmament were also developed outside the United Nations framework and had an impact on the deliberations within the multilateral disarmament forums. In 1996, the Canberra Commission, convened by the Government of Australia, issued a report on practical steps towards a nuclear-free world.¹⁵ A "Model Nuclear Weapons Convention", drafted by an international consortium of lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts, was submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-second session, in 1997.¹⁶ Furthermore, in August 1999, the report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament¹⁷ was submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

15. The views of those States that felt that more efforts were needed to make progress in the area of nuclear disarmament have been reflected annually in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. By those resolutions, the Assembly called upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, through a set of legal instruments, which might include a nuclear weapons convention, and also called for the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament.¹⁸ The Secretary-General, in a note submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session, expressed the hope that the Conference on Disarmament would be able to overcome the difficulties encountered in elaborating a programme of work and would be able to address all issues on its agenda.¹⁹

16. A resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda"²⁰ was introduced for the first time at the fifty-third session of the General Assembly in 1998. By that resolution, the General Assembly expressed its conviction that the existence of nuclear weapons was a threat to the survival of humanity and expressed concern at the prospect of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. Referring to the declaration on a new agenda to achieve a nuclear-free-world (see paras. 24-25 below), the General Assembly, *inter alia*, called upon the nuclear-weapon States to make an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the speedy and total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to engage without delay in an accelerated process of disarmament negotiations, and to undertake a number of early steps in that context. It called upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and also supported an international conference on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. In accordance with the request made by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General submitted a report²¹ to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session containing his observations as well as the responses of a number of international organizations and bodies regarding the possible elements for developing verification arrangements as envisaged in that resolution.

17. A number of other States felt, however, that important progress conducive to the ultimate objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons had been made. In this connection, the General Assembly adopted annual resolutions entitled “Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons”,²² by which the Assembly, *inter alia*, welcomed the efforts of the Russian Federation and the United States for nuclear disarmament, including the START I and II Treaties, and noted the progress in commencing the discussion on START III. The resolutions also called for multilateral discussion on future steps on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and for further efforts from the five nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally and through negotiations, with the ultimate objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly furthermore reaffirmed the crucial importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and called upon States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it without delay and without conditions. In addition, by the resolution in this series adopted at the fifty-fourth session, it welcomed the efforts to increase transparency on nuclear activities and took note of the report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.²³ The Assembly also encouraged the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

18. Other resolutions dealt with the bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms reductions between the Russian Federation and the United States.²⁴ The General Assembly, by those resolutions, welcomed the actions taken towards the signing and the ratification, respectively, of START I and of START II, and urged both countries to take the necessary steps to bring both Treaties into force at the earliest possible date and to commence negotiations on a START III agreement immediately after ratification of START II by the Russian Federation. The Assembly also encouraged the Russian Federation and the United States in their efforts aimed at reducing and eliminating their nuclear weapons. No resolution on the subject was adopted in 1999, however.

19. The General Assembly in 1999 also adopted a resolution on the “Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile

Systems” (see paras. 30-36 below). By that resolution, the Assembly stressed the paramount importance of full and strict compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the parties; recalled that the provisions of the Treaty were intended as a contribution to the creation of more favourable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms; and expressed concern that the implementation of any measures undermining the purposes and provisions of the Treaty affected not only the security interests of the parties, but also those of the whole international community. The Assembly also called for continued efforts to strengthen the Treaty and preserve its integrity and validity so that it would remain a cornerstone in maintaining global strategic stability and world peace and in promoting further strategic nuclear reductions. It called upon the parties to limit the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and to refrain from the deployment of such systems for the defence of the territory of their country. The Assembly furthermore considered that the implementation of any measure undermining the purposes and provisions of the Treaty would also undermine global strategic stability and world peace and the promotion of further strategic nuclear arms reductions; urged all Member States to support efforts aimed at stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and supported further efforts by the international community in the light of emerging developments towards safeguarding the inviolability and integrity of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.²⁵ The international community was, however, divided in its support of that resolution. The United States stated that although the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was a cornerstone, there were always new developments in technology, in political climate and in the nature of security threats. Therefore, as circumstances had changed, it might become necessary to change the Treaty to reflect those new realities.²⁶

20. The Disarmament Commission has been engaged in the discussion of the process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The discussions focused on a general outline for guidelines and recommendations for nuclear disarmament. During the deliberations, the vital importance and urgency of disarmament in general, and of nuclear disarmament in particular, with a view to achieving the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, were reaffirmed by many delegations

as equally relevant in the new political and security environment. Although the Commission was to conclude its deliberation on this item in 1994, it was not able to finish its work in time. The Commission continued the consideration of the item in 1995, but no consensus document on the subject was achieved. Since 1996, the discussions have focused on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. The Commission was able to conclude its work on the issue at its 1999 session with the adoption of a consensus paper. (See also background paper NPT/CONF.2000/5.)

21. During the period under review, nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation were among the most debated issues in the Conference on Disarmament. Many Member States pressed for multilateral negotiations in the Conference, with the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons within a specific time-frame. Others, however, including the United States and the Russian Federation, favoured a gradual, bilateral approach.

22. A proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament²⁷ was submitted to the Conference in March 1996 and, subsequently, a proposal for a "Programme of Action on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" was made by a group of 28 delegations from non-aligned countries.²⁸ The proposal envisaged negotiations on a phased programme within a fixed period of time for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons until 2020. Also, various possible mandates for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament were submitted to the Conference by a number of delegations.²⁹ Further proposals concerning action on nuclear disarmament by the Conference were made by several States.³⁰ However, the positions of delegations were still too far apart to be bridged. The Group of 21 continued to attach the "highest priority" to nuclear disarmament, while many other delegations, including those from the Western group, supported the idea of establishing some form of consultative, advisory mechanism within the Conference on Disarmament to exchange information and facilitate cooperation and accountability.

23. The rotating presidency of the Conference continued, in particular throughout the 1998 and 1999 sessions, to pursue intensive consultations and to seek the views of the Member States on appropriate methods and approaches for dealing with the agenda item on

nuclear disarmament. The exchange of views revealed a divergence of opinion between those delegations that believed that the Conference should now concentrate its energies on launching the negotiations for a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and those that felt that the Conference also needed to establish an ad hoc committee or some other mechanism for addressing nuclear disarmament. Although the consultations were wide-ranging and substantive, they were inconclusive.

24. In June 1998, a group of eight States issued a Joint Ministerial Declaration entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda".³¹ Considering the continued threat to humanity represented by the perspective of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons and the attendant possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the Declaration called for a new international agenda to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world through the pursuit, in parallel, of a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels. It called upon the nuclear-weapon States and the three nuclear-weapon-capable States to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability, and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement.

25. The Declaration specifically called for practical steps that the nuclear-weapon States could, and should, take immediately, such as to abandon current hair-trigger postures by proceeding to de-alert and deactivate their weapons, and also to remove non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites. Such measures would create beneficial conditions for continued disarmament efforts and help prevent inadvertent, accidental or unauthorized launches. The Declaration also stressed the need for other measures pending the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, such as legally binding instruments with respect to a joint no-first-use undertaking between the nuclear-weapon States and as regards negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, the Declaration stressed that the maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons would require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.

Ban of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

26. Proposals on the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes have been made at various times and in various forums. Following the cessation of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States, the prospects for negotiations on the subject increased considerably in the 1990s. The decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.³²

27. In March 1995, the Conference on Disarmament adopted the report of the Special Coordinator³³ on his consultations "on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and established an ad hoc committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. However, the Conference did not appoint the Chairman of the Committee, and therefore the Committee did not meet.³⁴ In August 1998, after intensive consultations, the Conference decided to establish, under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.³⁵ The Ad Hoc Committee held a general exchange of views as a first step in the substantive negotiations and agreed to recommend to the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of its session in 1999.³⁶

28. The General Assembly, at its fifty-third session,³⁷ in 1998 unanimously welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to establish the Ad Hoc Committee, and noted with satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Committee had already engaged in the first step in the

substantive negotiations and encouraged the Conference to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of its 1999 session. Although proposals were made on how to deal with the subject,³⁸ the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to commence work owing to existing divergent views on procedural as well as substantive issues.

2. Other unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures on nuclear disarmament

29. During the period under review, the United States and the Russian Federation continued their bilateral negotiations mainly in the framework of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). The START II Treaty, which called for reducing the levels of nuclear warheads to 3,500 or 3,000 on each side, was ratified by the United States Senate in January 1996. It has not yet been ratified by the Russian lower house of Parliament, the State Duma. In March 1997, at a summit meeting in Helsinki, the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation reaffirmed their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security.³⁹ Specifically, they agreed that, once START II entered into force, both States would immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, which would contain ceilings of 2,000 to 2,500 warheads, i.e., 20 per cent of peak cold war levels. START III would include the destruction of the means of delivery and of the nuclear warheads themselves. It would also embrace transparency measures to ensure that nuclear material from destroyed warheads would never again be used in weapons. Furthermore, an understanding was reached that the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under START II would be extended to the end of 2007. The nuclear delivery vehicles slated for elimination would, however, be de-activated by the end of 2003 by removing their warheads or by some other agreed procedure. At a summit meeting in Moscow in September 1998, the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation again reaffirmed those commitments and expressed their determination to cooperate in speeding up the entry into force of START II and launching negotiations on lower levels within the framework of START III.⁴⁰

30. With regard to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the United States Secretary of State and the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, Belarus,

Kazakhstan and Ukraine in September 1997 signed a Memorandum of Understanding providing for succession to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the four above-mentioned former Republics of the Soviet Union.⁴¹ According to that memorandum, those USSR successor States collectively assumed the rights and obligations of the USSR. Accordingly, only a single anti-ballistic missile deployment area is permitted among the four successor States; furthermore, only 15 launchers at anti-ballistic missile test ranges are collectively permitted. The Russian Federation will be able to continue to operate any existing early-warning radars, as well as the anti-ballistic missile test range, located within other States, with the permission of the Governments concerned. The five States also signed two agreements clarifying the demarcation between strategic and theatre ballistic-missile defences. By defining the speed and range of the target missiles that theatre defence systems were permitted to shoot down in tests, concerns about possible violations of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were resolved.

31. In January 1999, the United States Government announced its intention to increase funding for ongoing National Missile Defense and Theatre Missile Defense programmes. It was also announced that the bilateral 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty might have to be amended in order to accommodate a National Missile Defense system. A Deployment Readiness Review has been scheduled for June 2000 in order to assess the progress of the National Missile Defense and to provide information for a deployment schedule. Even if a decision to deploy such a system were made, the actual deployment would not take place until 2005. Both chambers of the United States Congress approved, respectively, two separate bills in March 1999 mandating the deployment of a National Missile Defense system capable of defending the United States from limited ballistic-missile attacks as soon as it is technologically possible. In July of that year, the President of the United States signed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, which stated that it was United States policy to deploy a limited National Missile Defense system “as soon as technologically feasible”.⁴²

32. The United States has since then been seeking to negotiate an agreement with the Russian Federation to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Following a summit meeting at Cologne, Germany, between the Presidents of the United States and the Russian

Presidents, a “Joint Statement between the United States and the Russian Federation concerning Strategic Offensive and Defensive Arms and further Strengthening of Stability”⁴³ was issued by the two Governments in June 1999. Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security and stressed the importance of the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons. Both States also recognized the fundamental importance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability, and vowed to enhance its viability and effectiveness in the future. In that regard, both parties affirmed their existing obligations under article XIII of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that had a bearing on the Treaty and, as appropriate, possible proposals for increasing the viability of the Treaty. Both parties also decided to engage in discussions on START III and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty issues in accordance with the principles agreed upon.⁴⁴

33. Consequently, consultations on further reductions in strategic nuclear arms began in Moscow in the summer of 1999 and continued in January 2000. They focused on further nuclear arms cuts and United States plans to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to accommodate a limited missile defence system. The provisions of the Treaty that would be directly affected would include article 1, which does not allow the deployment of a nationwide anti-ballistic missile defence; article 3, which authorizes two anti-ballistic missile sites, amended to one site each by the 1974 Protocol, around each party’s capital or an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) site with no more than 100 interceptors and the engagement radars within a 150 km radius; and article 5, which requires each party not to test or deploy anti-ballistic missile systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based.

34. Despite assurances by the United States that the planned National Missile Defense network was designed to protect it from limited missile attacks from certain States and not aimed at the Russian Federation’s strategic missiles, the Russian Federation has rejected any modifications to the Treaty.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, it stated that it was prepared to discuss the creation of a global system to monitor the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies, and

to cooperate further with the United States and other States in areas connected with anti-ballistic missile systems, without breaching the limitations imposed by the Treaty.⁴⁶ China and the Russian Federation, after consultations held in April 1999 on issues related to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, voiced their grave concern at United States plans to prepare a national anti-missile defence system. They considered the implementation of such plans to be a violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The two sides stated that the undermining or violation of the Treaty would lead to a series of negative consequences which could destabilize the international situation both at the global and at the regional levels and lead to the resumption of the arms race and create additional obstacles to the process of disarmament. At the same time, the two sides declared their readiness to discuss and cooperate for the preservation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.⁴⁷

35. Given the significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, other countries began to express interest in the issue. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the five permanent members of the Security Council, after meeting with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 23 September 1999, issued a statement⁴⁸ in which they reaffirmed the importance of preserving the integrity and validity of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Russian Federation urged the international community to support the Treaty, given its importance for ensuring global strategic stability and furthering the process of nuclear disarmament.⁴⁹ China expressed deep concerns over the United States National Missile Defense and Theatre Missile Defense programmes, called for full and strict compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the States parties and supported the international efforts to preserve the inviolability and integrity of the Treaty.

36. Many other States also voiced concern at United States plans to develop a national missile defence system and supported a General Assembly resolution on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was introduced by the Russian Federation, together with Belarus and China, at the fifty-fourth session in 1999 to obtain greater international support for the preservation of the Treaty (see para. 19 above). China expressed deep concerns over increased funding for the United States missile defence programme and the

development of National Missile Defense and Theatre Missile Defense systems.

37. Progress continued on the “trilateral initiative” between the United States, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), launched in 1996, to address technical, legal and financial issues associated with IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. The IAEA verification under this initiative is intended to promote international confidence that fissile material made subject by either of the two States to Agency verification remains irrevocably removed from nuclear-weapon programmes. It is foreseen that the Russian Federation and the United States would submit for IAEA verification weapon-origin fissile material. The United States would also submit for IAEA verification other fissile material no longer required for defence purposes. In 1999, further progress was made towards the completion of the model verification agreement that will serve as the basis for implementing the new verification role. Furthermore, work is under way to develop the verification arrangements for specific facilities identified by the Russian Federation and the United States where the new agreements would apply the model verification agreement being developed which may also be used by other NPT nuclear-weapon States for international verification of fissile material in conjunction with future arms control measures.⁵⁰ (See also background paper NPT/CONF.2000/9.)

38. In June 1999, the United States and the Russian Federation signed a protocol to continue the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme in the Russian Federation. The protocol to the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation (CTR Umbrella Agreement) extends the legal framework for the CTR programme in the Russian Federation for an additional seven years. Through the CTR programme, the United States provides equipment, services and technical support to assist the Russian Federation and other newly independent States in preventing proliferation and securing and dismantling weapons of mass destruction, related materials and production facilities inherited from the former Soviet Union.⁵¹

39. In July 1999, the United States and Ukraine also extended the agreement to continue the CTR

programme in Ukraine through December 2006. Earlier that year, CTR achieved a major milestone: the complete elimination of the SS-9 ICBM system which Ukraine had inherited from the Soviet Union, including 111 missiles, 130 missile silos and 13 launch control centres. By extending the Umbrella Agreement, the United States and Ukraine will be able to continue similar efforts to prevent proliferation and reduce arsenals of weapons of mass destruction. CTR is expected to help in the dismantling of the former Soviet nuclear weapons infrastructure in Ukraine, including weapons storage sites, ICBM production sites and missile propellant handling facilities. It will also continue to promote improved defence relations between the United States and Ukraine by funding a programme of defence and military contracts.⁵²

40. In addition to the bilateral United States-Russian negotiations, nuclear-weapon States have undertaken numerous unilateral measures. The United States stated that it had eliminated over 80 per cent of its tactical nuclear warheads and almost completely eliminated its non-strategic nuclear weapons. It had furthermore eliminated 47 per cent of its deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Specifically, between 1988 and 1999, it had dismantled 13,495 nuclear warheads, along with more than 1,700 missile launchers and bombers. It had completely eliminated more than a dozen different types of nuclear warheads, and all warheads for ground-launched tactical nuclear missiles had been withdrawn from service by 1992. In addition, the United States declared that it had cancelled four major strategic programmes and halted bomber production. It had also ceased production of both plutonium and high-enriched uranium for weapons purposes. The United States furthermore declared that it had unilaterally removed more than 225 metric tons of fissile material from its military nuclear stockpiles, part of which had already been put under IAEA safeguards, and additional excess material was being readied for international inspections.⁵³

41. The Russian Federation reported that, in the course of its unilateral initiatives and within the framework of the implementation of the START I Treaty, it had taken a number of major steps resulting in considerably reduced nuclear arsenals. Over 930 launchers of ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles had been eliminated, as well as about 2,000 missiles for such launchers, 24 nuclear submarines and over 80 heavy bombers. All in all, by December 2001,

the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation will have been reduced by approximately 40 per cent. Within the framework of the future START III, the Russian Federation expressed its readiness to agree to a more substantial reduction of nuclear arms than had been foreseen at the Helsinki Summit in March 1997, namely, a reduction of the overall threshold of up to 1,500 warheads, which it considered to be sufficient for the continuation of mutual strategic stability. The Russian Federation would also like any START III negotiation to tackle the issue of sea-launched cruise missiles, which it considers extremely destabilizing in both the nuclear and the non-nuclear senses. Russian land-based missiles of two categories, with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometres, were reported to have been completely eliminated and a ban on their production and testing was imposed. As far as tactical nuclear weapons are concerned, the Russian Federation stated that it fully and consistently implemented its declared unilateral initiatives. Accordingly, all tactical nuclear weapons had been removed from surface ships and multi-purpose submarines as well as from the Navy land-based aircraft and had been placed in centralized storage facilities. One third of the aggregate number of nuclear munitions for tactical sea-based missiles and the Navy aircraft had been eliminated. Furthermore, according to Russian sources, the destruction of nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, artillery shells and nuclear mines was nearing completion and half of the total number of nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and nuclear bombs had been destroyed. Finally, all nuclear armaments located outside the country had been brought back to Russian territory and their liquidation was under way.⁵⁴

42. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's Strategic Defence Review, undertaken in 1997, included significant reductions in, and transparency about, its nuclear deterrent. Specifically, the WE-177, the United Kingdom's free-fall nuclear bomb, has been entirely withdrawn from service. Henceforth, the United Kingdom nuclear deterrent will comprise only one weapon system: Trident. Only one Trident submarine will be on patrol at any time, carrying a reduced load of 48 warheads, half the previously announced ceiling of 96 warheads. The submarine on patrol will be at a reduced state of alert, at several days' "notice to fire", enabling it to carry out a range of secondary tasks. Its missiles are de-targeted. Overall, the United Kingdom will maintain fewer than 200 operationally available nuclear

warheads, a reduction of one third from the previously announced ceiling of 300. The explosive power of the operationally available weapons will have been reduced by over 70 per cent since the end of the cold war. The United Kingdom has also published information about its defence stocks of fissile material and is taking steps to place under safeguards some 50 per cent of its unsafeguarded plutonium. It stated that it had ceased production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other explosive devices in 1995. In addition, it is reducing its holdings of fissile material available for use in nuclear weapons. For the sake of greater transparency, it declared that it was holding the following stocks outside safeguards: 7.6 tonnes of plutonium, 21.9 tonnes of high-enriched uranium and 15,000 tonnes of other forms of uranium. As a consequence of the review, the United Kingdom concluded that substantial quantities of that material were no longer required and that 4.4 tonnes of plutonium was found to be surplus to national security requirements. The material had either already been placed under Euratom safeguards and made liable to inspection by IAEA, or would become subject to the same safeguards regime soon. In addition, over 9,000 tonnes of depleted, natural and low-enriched uranium was declared surplus to national security requirements and has also been placed under Euratom safeguards and made liable to inspection by IAEA. Furthermore, in 1998, the United Kingdom announced that all future enrichment and reprocessing in the country would be subject to international oversight.⁵⁵

43. France has significantly reduced the format and alert status of its nuclear forces since 1991. Specifically, it completely eliminated the ground-to-ground component of its nuclear deterrent by dismantling the Plateau d'Albion ground component, which contained 18 strategic missiles, and by the final removal of 30 short-range Hades missiles. The format of its deterrent force now rests on two components only, instead of the previous three: a sea component and an airborne one. The number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in the new format adopted in 1996 is four (instead of five previously), which has enabled France to maintain two of them, if necessary permanently, at sea instead of three in the early 1990s. The de-targeting of strategic French nuclear weapons was implemented in September 1997, when President Chirac announced that, following the dismantling of the Plateau d'Albion surface-to-surface missiles, no part of the French nuclear deterrent force was any

longer targeted. France in 1996-1997 completely dismantled its former nuclear test site in the Pacific and ratified the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. France has ceased all production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons; its production facilities were closed respectively in 1992 (reprocessing plant) and 1996 (enrichment plant) and the operations to dismantle them are under way.⁵⁶

44. China repeatedly stated that its very limited nuclear force was never intended to pose a threat to other countries, that self-defence was its sole purpose and that China had made important contributions to international nuclear disarmament. Since the time when China came into possession of nuclear weapons, it had solemnly declared that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. China had also undertaken unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China said that it had never deployed nuclear weapons outside its territory, nor had it used or threatened to use nuclear weapons against any other countries. It underlined that it had shown utmost restraint in the development of nuclear weapons, that it had conducted a very limited number of nuclear tests and possessed a very limited number of nuclear weapons. It had supported the countries concerned in their efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among themselves and had provided unconditional security assurances to the States parties to the treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones. Moreover, China stated that its nuclear weapons had been placed under strict control, thereby removing the risk of an accidental launch. Finally, China stressed that it had always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.⁵⁷

B. Measures and initiatives relating to general and complete disarmament

1. General and complete disarmament

45. Advocated by the General Assembly for more than two decades, general and complete disarmament under effective international control continues to be the ultimate goal of all endeavours undertaken in the sphere of disarmament. The Disarmament Commission, already in 1979, had unanimously adopted "Elements

of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament".⁵⁸ In the Conference on Disarmament, the issue had been on the agenda for several years.

United Nations special session on Disarmament

46. After three special sessions devoted to disarmament had been held in 1978, 1982 and 1988, respectively, the General Assembly, in 1995, decided to convene its fourth special session devoted to disarmament.⁵⁹ It later agreed to set an exact date for, and to decide on organizational matters relating to, the special session, subject to the outcome of deliberations at the Disarmament Commission. Pursuant to requests by the General Assembly, the issue was discussed in working groups of the Disarmament Commission during its 1996 to 1999 substantive sessions. It was generally agreed that a fourth special session devoted to disarmament would be convened, subject to the emergence of consensus on its objectives and agenda. It did not prove possible, however, to reach consensus on the objectives and agenda for such a special session. The General Assembly, in 1999, decided, subject to the emergence of a consensus on its objectives and agenda, to convene a fourth special session on disarmament, and requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the objectives, agenda and timing of the special session.⁶⁰ The item is no longer on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission.

2. Bacteriological (biological) weapons

47. Efforts by the international community in this field have largely focused on the further strengthening of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Biological Weapons Convention) (see also para. 55 below). The Convention was the first international agreement which sought the total elimination of a major weapons system. However, the Convention did not envisage a compliance and verification mechanism. A Special Conference of the States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, held in September 1994, decided to establish an ad hoc group open to all States parties to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included in a legally binding instrument. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Group requires it to consider four specific areas: (a) definitions of terms and objective

criteria; (b) incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence-building and transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime; (c) a system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention; and (d) specific measures designed to ensure the effective and full implementation of article X. In August 1997, the States parties were presented for the first time with a text consolidating proposals made thus far by delegations. As it stands at present, the draft protocol comprises in particular a set of compliance measures integrated by declarations, visits, procedures for "consultation, clarification and cooperation", and investigations; measures for scientific and technological exchange for peaceful purposes and technical cooperation; definitions; national implementation and assistance provisions; and confidentiality provisions; and it envisages an organization consisting of three organs: an executive council, a conference of the States parties and a technical secretariat.

48. Considerable progress has been achieved by the Ad Hoc Group. The general framework and elements needed to establish a protocol as mandated by the States parties are reflected in the current text under consideration. Further efforts are needed so that consensus may be reached on some fundamental issues, the resolution of which would enable the completion of the negotiations. The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties, held in 1997, mandated that work on the future protocol should be concluded at the latest by the Fifth Review Conference, to be held in 2001. In September 1998, an Informal Ministerial Meeting on the Negotiation towards Conclusion of the Protocol to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention affirmed its strong support for the Biological Weapons Convention and for strengthening its effectiveness and improving its implementation. The General Assembly, in annual resolutions⁶¹ on the Biological Weapons Convention, welcomed the progress made by the Ad Hoc Group and called upon all States parties to complete the protocol on the basis of consensus at the earliest possible date.

3. Chemical weapons

49. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) is the product of more than 20 years of negotiations at the Conference

on Disarmament and one of the most complex international conventions ever negotiated. It is the first internationally negotiated disarmament treaty with a comprehensive verification regime. The Convention entered into force in April 1997. One hundred sixty-eight States have signed or acceded to it. So far, instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited by 131 States.

50. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which was established in May 1997 with headquarters at The Hague, is entrusted with overseeing and ensuring the effective implementation of the provisions of the Convention. Verification of compliance with the Convention is undertaken through a combination of reporting requirements, routine on-site inspections of declared sites and short-notice challenge inspections at any place under the jurisdiction or control of any State party. The verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention affect not only the military sector but also the civilian chemical industry, worldwide, through certain restrictions and obligations regarding the production, processing and consumption of chemicals that are considered relevant to the objectives of the Convention.

51. Four sessions of the Conference of the States Parties of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons were held during the period under review and important decisions with regard to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention were taken at them. The 41-member Executive Council, which oversees the day-to-day operations of the Organization, was also elected. Presently, the Organization comprises a staff of about 500 men and women from 64 member States, from all regions of the world. Since its establishment, the Organization has conducted nearly 600 inspections in more than 30 States parties, at both military and chemical industry facilities. By the end of 1999, three of the four States parties which had declared possession of stockpiles of chemical weapons were operating destruction facilities and had begun to actively destroy their chemical weapons. More than 8 million declared chemical munitions and bulk containers and more than 100 declared chemical weapons-related facilities have been accounted for worldwide. All of them have to be destroyed, under the supervision of the Organization, within the time-frames established under the Convention. By January 2000, over 4,500 tonnes of

chemical agents and more than 1 million chemical weapons munitions and containers had been destroyed under the supervision of the Organization's inspectors.

52. The Organization and its secretariat are also assigned important functions, under article X of the Convention, with regard to the provision of assistance and protection against the use and the threat of use of chemical weapons. In addition, article XI requires the Organization to promote international cooperation in the field of peaceful chemical activities. To implement these tasks, the Organization has established an international mechanism for mobilizing and coordinating the international response to requests for assistance. It maintains a data bank of information on protection against chemical weapons. It is working to set up a network of experts on protection against chemical weapons. It also manages the Voluntary Fund for Assistance.

53. During the period under review, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolutions⁶² on the implementation of the Convention and on cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. By the resolutions, the Assembly expressed its appreciation for the ongoing work of the Organization and stressed the importance of all possessors of chemical weapons or chemical weapons production or development facilities adhering to the Convention. Furthermore, the Assembly stressed the importance of full and effective implementation of all provisions of the Convention, urged all States parties to meet their obligations under the Convention in full and on time and called upon States which had not yet done so to become parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention without delay.

54. The problem of the potential military misuse of certain dual-purpose chemicals or biological substances as well as their possible use by terrorists continued to be of international concern. During the period under review, efforts of the "Australia Group" to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons through export controls continued. However, States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention undertook a moral and legal commitment not to develop, produce, stockpile or acquire those weapons, and also to destroy any such weapons which they might have. Consequently, developing countries in particular felt that, in return, they had a right to expect that no obstacles would be placed in their way regarding the import or export of

chemicals or biological substances, or of relevant technologies, for peaceful purposes. They therefore called repeatedly for a reconsideration of the application of such export controls to States parties to the two Conventions. Members of the Australia Group, for their part, reaffirmed that they would review their policies in the light of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.⁶³ They also reiterated their readiness to brief non-members on their export control guidelines and confirmed the usefulness of regional seminars as a means of widening contacts with other countries on these issues. The Group furthermore discussed dangers emanating from possible terrorist activities involving chemical and biological weapons and agreed that the subject needed continuing attention.

55. With regard to Iraq's compliance with Security Council resolution 687 (1991), the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) continued to carry out its mandate in terms of the unconditional destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all chemical weapons and biological weapons and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres. In 1995, Iraq provided information for the first time on its offensive biological weapons programme, ranging from research and development through the production, weaponization and military deployment of biological and toxin agents. In the chemical field, Iraq provided information indicating a much larger and more advanced programme for the production and storage of the chemical warfare agent VX than previously stated.⁶⁴ The Commission was able to take possession of a large number of additional documents on Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes, but inadequacies, incompleteness and lack of documentation in many fields increased the Commission's difficulties in fulfilling the tasks as mandated by Security Council resolutions. In view of Iraq's refusal in 1997 to allow access to sites designated by the Commission, the Security Council adopted resolutions by which it demanded that Iraq give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to those sites.⁶⁵ The Secretary-General in February 1998 reached agreement on a Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and Iraq.⁶⁶ The Security Council unanimously endorsed the Memorandum of Understanding concerning initial and subsequent entries to presidential sites.⁶⁷ Initial entries to the presidential sites took place in March 1998. Thereafter, UNSCOM continued its inspections, but relations between Iraq and UNSCOM

deteriorated. The decision by Iraq in August 1998 to suspend its cooperation with UNSCOM and to cease cooperation entirely in October of that year was condemned unanimously by the Security Council.⁶⁸ In November 1998, UNSCOM resumed its activities in Iraq for a short period of time. In mid-December 1998,⁶⁹ UNSCOM staff were withdrawn prior to military action by the United Kingdom and the United States, bringing to a halt all disarmament and monitoring activities by UNSCOM in Iraq. Following the submission in January 1999 of a comprehensive review by UNSCOM of its work in Iraq, the Security Council established an expert panel on Iraq regarding disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues,⁷⁰ which submitted its report to the Council in March 1999.⁷¹ Furthermore, on 17 December 1999, the Council adopted resolution 1284 (1999),⁷² by which it established the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), thereby replacing UNSCOM. UNMOVIC will undertake the responsibilities with regard to the verification of compliance by Iraq with its obligations under paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions. The Council also reaffirmed the criteria for Iraqi compliance, and affirmed that the obligations of Iraq regarding cooperation with the Special Commission, unrestricted access and provision of information, will apply in respect of UNMOVIC. The resolution, furthermore, provides a mechanism for suspending sanctions for a period of 120 days if Iraq cooperates "in all respects" with UNMOVIC and IAEA and makes progress on disarmament for a period of 120 days after the reinforced ongoing monitoring and verification is fully operational (see also NPT/CONF.2000/3).

4. Other weapons of mass destruction

56. The issue of new weapons of mass destruction has long been under consideration within the framework of the United Nations. It has not been possible so far, however, to find generally acceptable criteria for the identification of such weapons. As a result, both the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament have tended to focus on prohibitions of specific categories of weapons, in particular radiological weapons. In the regional context, an initiative was launched by Egypt on the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (see NPT/CONF.2000/7).

57. The Conference on Disarmament continued to have on its agenda the item entitled “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: radiological weapons”. However, it did not establish an ad hoc committee on the item during the period under review. During plenary meetings of the Conference, some delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the item, the detailed descriptions of which were duly recorded in the annual reports of the Conference, related official documents and working papers, as well as plenary records. The General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to keep the matter under review with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on specific negotiations on identified types of such weapons.⁷³

5. Limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and arms transfers on a worldwide and regional basis

Conventional disarmament

58. In recent years, with a growing number of armed conflicts involving conventional weapons, the need to address conventional disarmament has been increasingly recognized. The General Assembly has adopted a growing number of resolutions and decisions on various aspects of the conventional arms race and conventional disarmament. Discussion of the issue at the United Nations has focused on various elements: conventional weapons per se and efforts to limit international arms transfers and arms production; transparency in military expenditures; small arms and light weapons; inhumane weapons and the Convention restricting their use; and the regulation of the transfer of technology with military applications. The concept of “practical disarmament measures” was developed as a relatively new political initiative to deal with wide-ranging challenges from conventional arms, including the reintegration of former combatants and weapons collection programmes. It first appeared on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1996 and has enjoyed consensus votes ever since.⁷⁴ In its resolution 51/45 N of 10 December 1996, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in the light of experience gained from conflict resolution, to make recommendations and suggestions for an integrated approach to such practical disarmament measures, taking also into account the work of the United Nations expert panel on small arms, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its

fifty-second session. Pursuant to that resolution, the report was submitted to the General Assembly in 1997.⁷⁵ Measures undertaken in implementing the concept of practical disarmament measures are initiated at the request of Member States.

59. By resolutions entitled “Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms”⁷⁶ the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the effective implementation of such measures. Specifically, the Assembly invited Member States to provide the Secretary-General with relevant information on national control measures on arms transfers with a view to preventing illicit arms transfers. The Assembly also invited Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views on: (a) effective ways and means of collecting weapons transferred illicitly, in particular in the light of experience gained by the United Nations; and (b) concrete proposals concerning measures at the national, regional and international levels to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms. The Secretary-General, in his report,⁷⁷ transmitted to the General Assembly the replies received from Member States in response to those requests. The Assembly also noted the regional and subregional initiatives in conventional disarmament and arms control,⁷⁸ such as the activities of countries in South Asia, and in Europe, through the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.⁷⁹ The Assembly furthermore decided to give urgent consideration to conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, and requested the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional conventional arms control.

60. The Disarmament Commission, in 1996, adopted “Guidelines for International Arms Transfers”.⁸⁰ In the Guidelines, concern is expressed about the problem of illicit arms trafficking, defined as “international trade in conventional arms which is contrary to the laws of States and/or international law”. Suggesting actions to be taken by each Member State at the national, international and institutional levels to combat the problem of illicit arms trafficking, the guidelines recommended different initiatives to be undertaken by each State and at the international level. In 1999, the Disarmament Commission adopted “Guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament, with particular emphasis on consolidation of peace in

the context of General Assembly resolution 51/45 N^o.⁸¹ With the adoption of the guidelines, Member States emphasized that the excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons could best be averted by a combination of reduction and prevention measures. The guidelines cover: practical disarmament measures in post-conflict situations; confidence-building in post-conflict situations; regional and international financial and technical assistance; other conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament measures; and the role of the United Nations.

Small arms and light weapons

61. There is a broad consensus among Member States that the illicit proliferation and widespread use of small arms poses a threat to international peace and development. The Security Council, by its resolution 1209 (1998), expressed its concern at the destabilizing effect of illicit arms flows, in particular of small arms, to and in Africa, and urged Member States that had the ability to do so to cooperate with African States to strengthen their capacity to combat the movement of illegal arms. It requested the Secretary-General to consider practical ways to work with the African States in implementing national, regional or subregional programmes for voluntary weapons collection, disposal and destruction, including the possibility of the establishment of a fund to support such programmes.⁸² In September 1999, the Security Council held its first ministerial debate on the issue of small arms. Following the debate, the Council President read a statement⁸³ on behalf of the members which underlined the vital importance of effective national regulations and controls on small-arms transfers. He also called for measures to discourage arms flows to countries or regions engaged in, or emerging from, armed conflicts. The Secretary-General was requested to develop a reference manual on ecologically safe methods of destroying weapons to help States dispose of weapons that have been surrendered. The General Assembly, in 1998 as well as in 1999,⁸⁴ requested the Secretary-General to hold broad-based consultations on: (a) the magnitude and scope of the phenomenon of illicit trafficking in small arms; (b) possible measures to combat illicit trafficking in, and illicit circulation of, small arms, including those suited to indigenous regional approaches; and (c) the role of the United Nations in collecting, collating, sharing and disseminating information on illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. In accordance with that

request, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session.⁸⁵

62. During the period under review, a number of activities were carried out to assist States in curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them.⁸⁶ The General Assembly welcomed Mali's initiative to curb the illicit circulation of small arms, to destroy thousands of small arms collected from ex-combatants and to collect those weapons also in the affected States of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion; encouraged the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to curb the illicit circulation of small arms and collect such arms in the affected States that so requested, with the support of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and in close cooperation with the Organization for African Unity (OAU); and encouraged further progress on the issue and appealed for further action and support from the region and from the international community. The reports of the Secretary-General on assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them⁸⁷ referred to the actual experiences of West African States in this field of growing international concern and took into account a number of initiatives at the subregional, regional and international levels to address the issue of the illicit traffic in small arms.

63. By its resolution 50/70 B, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on small arms, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts. Pursuant to that resolution, the report was submitted to the Assembly at its fifty-second session, in 1997.⁸⁸ The report contains a series of recommendations for dealing with the problems presented by such small arms. A second report, again with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, was submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session.⁸⁹ The report reviewed the progress towards implementing the prevention and reductions recommendations contained in the 1997 report and outlined the objectives, scope and agenda for the international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects, suggested to be held in 2001. The General Assembly⁹⁰ endorsed the recommendations and requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States. The Secretary-General, in his note submitted to the General Assembly in 1999⁹¹ in accordance with that request, acknowledged that political momentum had been building to give priority attention to curbing the illicit arms traffic and

supported the decision to convene an international conference on the issue no later than 2001. The proposal has received support from many more States and the Government of Switzerland has offered to host the Conference. At its fifty-fourth session, the General Assembly decided to convene the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in June/July 2001.⁹² It also established a Preparatory Committee, which was requested to make recommendations to the Conference on all relevant matters, including the objective, a draft agenda, draft rules of procedure and draft final documents, which will include a programme of action, and to decide on background documents to be made available in advance. The Preparatory Committee held its first session from 28 February to 1 March 2000 and decided to convene a second session in January 2001 in New York.

64. A group of experts to address the problem of ammunition and explosives was established by the Secretary-General in 1999.⁹³ Its main objective was to examine whether enhanced controls on ammunition and explosives could contribute to preventing and reducing the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and proliferation, as well as the abuse, of small arms and light weapons. The report, which was submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session,⁹⁴ contains a series of recommendations on prevention measures and reduction measures and on the role and activities of the United Nations. Furthermore, consultations were held in May 1999 with a group of qualified experts to examine the feasibility of carrying out a study on restricting the manufacture and trade of small arms to manufacturers and dealers authorized by States. The consultative meeting of experts concluded that a study for restricting the manufacture and trade of small arms to manufacturers and dealers was both feasible and desirable, and could help Member States and the international community to promote national and international efforts in addressing the issue of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.⁹⁵

65. The Secretary-General has designated the Department for Disarmament Affairs as the focal point for the coordination of all action on small arms within the United Nations system. The Department has established the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) as the mechanism for implementing the decision of the Secretary-General. CASA includes all departments and agencies with comparative advantages

in pursuing the fivefold objectives of the United Nations policy on small arms: to retain its lead in putting the issue on the global agenda; to assume a coordinating role in determining priorities for international action; to encourage civil society involvement in building societal resistance to violence; to strengthen United Nations capability for responding to requests for assistance by affected countries; and to ensure that its objectives are pursued without prejudice to the overall goals of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

66. Negotiations on a protocol on the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition and other related materials are under way within the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.⁹⁶ The General Assembly also supports initiatives undertaken outside the United Nations framework, such as: the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)⁹⁷, the Oslo Understanding and the Brussels Call for Action,⁹⁸ the Decision on the Prevention and Combating of Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Related Crimes taken by the Southern African Development Community (SADC),⁹⁹ the Decisions on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons taken by the Organization of African Unity,¹⁰⁰ the code of conduct on arms sales adopted by the European Union,¹⁰¹ the European Union programme for preventing and combating illicit trafficking in conventional arms and its Joint Action on Small Arms¹⁰² and the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials.¹⁰³

Register of Conventional Arms

67. Since the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was launched in 1992, nearly 150 States have submitted data and information at least once, with a core group of about 80 States, including almost all major exporters and most major importers, that participate regularly. Each year, all States Members of the United Nations are asked to report their imports and exports of major conventional weapons during the previous year.¹⁰⁴ Information is requested on transfers of seven categories of such weapons: battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large

calibre artillery systems (over 100 mm); combat aircraft; attack helicopters; warships (above 750 tonnes); and missiles and missile launchers (range above 25 km). For each category, States are requested to provide the numbers of weapons that they have imported or exported for each country of origin or destination, using a standardized reporting form. They are also invited, on a voluntary basis, to provide further qualitative information on these transfers, such as the types and models of weapons involved and the purposes of the transfer. Participating States are similarly invited to provide "available background information" on their national procurement and military holdings. Since the first replies to the Register were submitted, a growing number of States have been willing to provide detailed information on the type and model of the weapons being transferred. Moreover, the inclusion of qualitative data on weapon types has also become nearly universal among participating arms importers.¹⁰⁵ At the regional level, in June 1999, the States members of the Organization of American States adopted the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions.¹⁰⁶ Using the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, the Convention prescribes mandatory yearly reports on conventional weapons acquisitions and exports, complemented by specific reports on each acquisition.

68. In 1994¹⁰⁷ and in 1997¹⁰⁸, respectively, the continuing operation of the Register and its further development was reviewed by groups of governmental experts. One of the issues considered related to the addition of further categories of equipment and the expansion of the scope of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production, as a further measure to increase confidence-building and transparency in military matters. However, it has so far proved impossible to secure sufficiently wide support for either the inclusion of additional categories of conventional weapons or the expansion of the scope to the Register to include military holdings and procurements. Moreover, there was no agreement in these reviews to significantly revise or adjust the seven categories of arms covered by the Register. In 1999, the General Assembly, by its resolution 54/54 O, of 1 December 1999, requested Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. It also requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of

governmental experts to be convened in 2000, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. In addition, since 1997, the General Assembly has adopted resolutions entitled "Transparency in armaments",¹⁰⁹ by which it urged Member States to submit their views to the Secretary-General concerning broadening the scope of the Register to include weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and also transfers of equipment and technology directly related to the development and manufacture of such weapons, and requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of another group of experts, to report at its fifty-fifth session on the early expansion of the scope of the Register and on the elaboration of measures for the development of the Register in order to increase transparency related to weapons of mass destruction.¹¹⁰

Prohibition or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects

Blinding laser weapons

69. The 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Inhumane Weapons Convention), to which are annexed Protocols on specific types of weapons, was concluded as a result of efforts to ban or curb the use of certain categories of weapons. The Convention and its Protocols provide for the protection of civilians and civilian objects from attack by means of incendiary weapons, landmines (see below) and booby traps, and prohibit entirely the use of any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments that cannot readily be detected in the human body. The Convention is kept under review in two contexts: that of wider adherence and that of broader scope, the latter either through the amendment of its existing Protocols, to make them more stringent, or through the elaboration of additional protocols.

70. The First Review Conference of States Parties to the Inhumane Weapons Convention, held at Vienna in October 1995, adopted a new legally binding instrument of humanitarian law prohibiting the use of laser weapons to blind soldiers or civilians. The new Protocol IV to the Inhumane Weapons Convention prohibits both the use and the transfer of laser weapons

specifically designed to cause permanent blindness as one of their combat functions. It also requires States to take all feasible precautions, including the training of their armed forces, to avoid permanent blinding through the legitimate use of other laser systems. Protocol IV entered into force in July 1998 and to date has 46 States parties.

6. Prohibition of anti-personnel landmines

71. In recent years, the determination of the international community has been growing to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines. At first, impetus came primarily from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); the question later also became the focus of disarmament endeavours within the United Nations.

72. The size of the problem and the indiscriminate suffering caused to civilians have led to a number of activities designed to restrict, if not eliminate, these weapons. Protocol II to the Inhumane Weapons Convention, while placing restrictions on the use of mines, does not prohibit their production and transfer. At the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Inhumane Weapons Convention, agreement on an amended Protocol II was reached in May 1996. Its scope of application was extended to cover both international and internal conflicts. It now prohibits the use of non-detectable anti-personnel mines and their transfer (albeit with a nine-year deferral period from entry into force) and places certain technical restrictions on the use of all anti-personnel mines. The Amended Protocol entered into force in December 1998 and to date has 47 States parties. The First Annual Conference to address the implementation of its provisions was held from 15 to 17 December 1999. The Conference issued a declaration urging all States that had not yet done so to accede to Amended Protocol II as soon as possible and decided to convene the Second Annual Conference at Geneva from 11 to 13 December 2000.

73. Amended Protocol II to the Inhumane Weapons Convention was broadly welcomed. However, it was widely felt that only the total prohibition and elimination of anti-personnel mines would put an end to the terrible human suffering they caused. As a result, an initiative that became known as the "Ottawa Process" was launched by advocates of a comprehensive ban on anti-personnel mines, including

States, non-governmental organizations and international organizations. International conferences aiming at the elaboration of a legal instrument were held in Canada (1996), Austria (1997) and Belgium (1997), culminating in Norway (September 1997) with the adoption of the text of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.¹¹¹ The Convention was opened for signature in December 1997 and entered into force on 1 March 1999. It provides, *inter alia*, that States parties undertake "never under any circumstances to use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines" (article 1). Article 7 of the Convention, on transparency measures, provides for annual reports by States parties to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the depositary of the Convention, on their national implementation measures, stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, the location of all mined areas, the status of programmes for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities, the status of programmes for the destruction of anti-personnel mines, etc. As provided for in the Convention, the first report shall be submitted by a State party as soon as practicable, but not later than 180 days following the entry into force of the Convention for that State party. To date, 30 States parties have reported to the Secretary-General. The First Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention was held in Maputo from 3 to 7 May 1999. In the Maputo Declaration, adopted at the conference, the States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the total eradication of anti-personnel mines¹¹². The Second Meeting of the States Parties is scheduled to be held from 11 to 15 September 2000 at the Palais des Nations, Geneva. At present, the mine ban Convention has 90 ratifiers and 47 signatories.

74. There is growing awareness within the international community that what has come to be known as the global landmine crisis has far-reaching consequences and requires a multifaceted and integrated response. There is also recognition that the United Nations has a key role to play in articulating this response and in providing the necessary support and coordination mechanisms. This role was reaffirmed in successive resolutions of the General Assembly on assistance in mine clearance, as well as in the amended Protocol II to the Inhumane Weapons Convention and in the mine ban Convention. In response to various

requests made by the Assembly, the responsible entities of the United Nations continued and enhanced their humanitarian work in the area of landmine assistance, particularly the World Health Organization (WHO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Programme (WFP). The focal point for mine action is located in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

75. For a number of years, the United Nations as well as humanitarian and non-governmental organizations have been trying to tackle the problems caused by mines. The General Assembly since 1993 has adopted resolutions on mine-related issues, first entitled "Assistance in mine clearance" and later "Assistance in mine action", a term that encompasses mine clearance, mine awareness, victim assistance and globally effective advocacy.¹¹³ By those resolutions the Assembly called upon Member States to provide the necessary information and technical and material assistance to locate, remove, destroy or otherwise render ineffective minefields, mines, booby traps and other devices in accordance with international law, as soon as possible. It urged Member States, regional organizations, governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations to provide the Secretary-General with information, data and resources that could be useful in strengthening the coordination role of the United Nations in the field of mine awareness, training, surveying, mine detection and clearance, scientific research on mine-detection and clearance technology, and information on and distribution of medical equipment and supplies. Furthermore, the Assembly urged Member States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations to provide technological assistance to mine-inflicted countries and to promote scientific research and development on humanitarian mine-clearance techniques and technology, so that mine-clearance activities could be carried out more effectively. The Assembly also invited Member States to develop national programmes to promote awareness of landmines, especially among children.

76. A Voluntary Fund for Mine Clearance was established by the Secretary-General in 1994. The Secretary-General annually submitted reports on

assistance in mine clearance and on the operation of the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance and other demining programmes.¹¹⁴ During the period under review, there was an increase in the number of mine-action programmes in place and their scope.

77. An international meeting on mine clearance was held at Geneva from 5 to 7 July 1995, and an international conference on mine-clearance technology was held in Denmark in July 1996. These were followed by an expert conference on mechanical mine clearance in Bonn in December 1996 and a meeting on mine clearance and victim assistance in Tokyo in March 1997. The Secretary-General, in his 1999 report, stated that as coordinator of the consolidated appeal process, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs continued to work with partners to solicit timely and adequate funding for mine-action activities in countries covered by the appeal. In 1999, over \$63 million was requested by various partners for various mine-action activities. However, only some \$10 million had been received.¹¹⁵

7. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

78. The issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space received further attention in the period under review. The General Assembly each year adopted resolutions on the subject.¹¹⁶ By those resolutions, the Assembly reaffirmed the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space, and recognized that the legal regime applicable to outer space by itself did not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space and that there was a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness. The Assembly emphasized the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, and the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification. The Assembly furthermore called upon States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute to the peaceful uses of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in space and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties. It invited the Conference on Disarmament to complete the examination and updating of the mandate and to establish an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

79. The Conference on Disarmament, between 1995 and 1999, considered the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Delegations reaffirmed, or further elaborated on, their respective positions on the agenda item. However, owing to continuing divergent views, the Conference was unable to establish an ad hoc committee on the item. However, in 1998, a Special Coordinator was appointed who was mandated to seek the views of the members of the Conference on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. His report, resulting from bilateral as well as open-ended consultations with members and participating non-members of the Conference,¹¹⁷ indicated that there was a general recognition of the importance and urgency of the issue and that it was also generally understood that, while there was no objection in principle to the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on the subject, further consultations were needed. The Special Coordinator also proposed as a draft mandate for the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee to “continue to examine and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the agenda item with a view to, *inter alia*, agreeing on a mandate for an ad hoc committee to negotiate specific measures towards the prevention of an arms race in outer space”. There was a wide measure of support for the draft mandate and the approach therein, although finding consensus thereon would require further consultations. Therefore, the Special Coordinator recommended that the draft mandate be used as a basis for further consultations. In 1999, a number of proposals were put forward by delegations on how to deal with the issue.¹¹⁸

80. The issue was also referred to by the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III), held at Vienna in July 1999. In the Declaration on Space and Human Development,¹¹⁹ adopted by the Conference, the participating States recognized that outer space should be the province of all humankind, to be utilized for peaceful purposes and in the interests of maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. They also reaffirmed the common interest of all humanity in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, and stressed their conviction of the need to prevent an arms race in outer space as an essential

condition for the promotion of international cooperation in this regard.

8. Arms limitation and disarmament measures relating to the environment and to the sea

81. Concern for the natural environment in connection with disarmament has been considered within the multilateral disarmament framework for decades. In earlier years, attention focused on the modification of the environment for military purposes and resulted in the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention) in 1977. At present, the Convention has 66 States parties. In the Final Declaration adopted by the second ENMOD Review Conference in 1992 it was stated that a third Review Conference might be held at the request of a majority of States parties not earlier than 1997. Since no such request has been made to date, according to article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Convention, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as depositary, is requested to solicit the views of all States parties concerning the convening of such a Conference before 2002.

82. In recent years, international attention has shifted towards a different aspect of the environmental issue. The General Assembly, in the period under review, annually adopted resolutions on the “Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control”.¹²⁰ By those resolutions, the General Assembly reaffirmed that international disarmament forums should take fully into account the relevant environmental norms in negotiating treaties and agreements on disarmament and arms limitation, and that all States, through their actions, should fully contribute to ensuring compliance with those norms in the implementation of treaties and conventions. Furthermore, States were called upon to adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures so as to contribute to ensuring the application of scientific and technological progress in international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to attaining sustainable development. The Assembly invited all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General information on the measures they had adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the resolutions, and requested the Secretary-General to report to the

General Assembly on the information received. Accordingly, the Secretary-General submitted reports to the Assembly containing information provided by Member States on the implementation of the measures they had adopted.¹²¹

83. The Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, held in 1989, had requested the Secretary-General to report at three-year intervals on developments relevant to the Seabed Treaty and on verification of compliance with its provisions. Pursuant to that request, the Secretary-General, in 1995 and 1998, submitted reports to the General Assembly transmitting replies from Governments regarding technological developments relevant to the Treaty.¹²²

9. Science and technology

New scientific and technological developments; advanced technologies

84. International attention continues to be given to the question of modern military technology and its impact on international security. During the period under review, the General Assembly adopted resolutions on the issue which reflected the existing differences in approach to the subject. By two resolutions,¹²³ the Assembly stressed that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needed to be maintained and encouraged. States were invited to enhance the dialogue on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields with a view to ensuring implementation of their relevant commitments and exploring ways and means of further developing international legal rules on transfers of high technology with military applications. By other resolutions,¹²⁴ the Assembly expressed concern that the military application of scientific and technological developments could contribute significantly to the improvement and upgrading of advanced weapons and particularly weapons of mass destruction. The Assembly furthermore affirmed that scientific and technological progress should be used for the benefit of all mankind to promote the sustainable economic and social development of all States and to safeguard international security, and that international cooperation in the use of science and technology

through the transfer and exchange of technological know-how for peaceful purposes should be promoted. Member States were invited to undertake additional efforts to apply science and technology for disarmament-related purposes and to make disarmament-related technologies available to interested States. Member States were also urged to undertake multilateral negotiations with the participation of all interested States in order to establish universally acceptable, non-discriminatory guidelines for international transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications. In accordance with requests made by the Assembly in those resolutions, the Secretary-General submitted several reports¹²⁵ on the subject to the General Assembly.

Information and telecommunication

85. In 1998, for the first time, and in 1999, the General Assembly addressed the issue of developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.¹²⁶ By those resolutions, the Assembly expressed concern that information technologies and means could potentially be used for purposes that were inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security and might adversely affect the security of States. Member States were called upon to promote at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security. Furthermore, the General Assembly invited all Member States to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the general appreciation of the issues of information security; the definition of basic notions related to information security, including unauthorized interference with or misuse of information and telecommunications systems and information resources; and on the advisability of developing international principles that would enhance the security of global information and telecommunications systems and help to combat information terrorism and criminality. In accordance with those requests, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session.¹²⁷ In August 1999, the Department for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/70 of 4 December 1998, held an international meeting of experts in Geneva on developments in the field of information

and telecommunications in the context of international security.

Missile Technology Control Regime

86. In the period under review, concerns over the past several years about the dangers to international security posed by revived interest in missiles and missile defences have further increased. There are reportedly more than a dozen States possessing various levels of capabilities for the development and production of ballistic missiles and it has become increasingly easier to obtain access to technology, expertise and information for the development of such systems. There is, however, currently no multilateral treaty or agreement regulating the production, possession or trade of missiles. There are also no multilaterally negotiated norms against the spread of ballistic-missile technology for military purposes. The General Assembly, in 1999, adopted a resolution on the subject of missiles,¹²⁸ by which it expressed its conviction of the need for a comprehensive approach towards missiles in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner, and requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of all Member States on the issue of missiles, in all its aspects.

87. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), established in 1987, which has at present 32 members, is an informal and voluntary export control regime that seeks to limit the proliferation of missile systems and related technology. MTCR consists of a basic policy statement, a set of guidelines to limit the conditions under which missile technology may be transferred, a list of technologies to be controlled and an informal mechanism by which the partners can share information about potential transfers. However, the control regime has not been generally accepted. Many developing countries consider such restrictions to be discriminatory and fear that they may adversely affect their economic development. Most industrialized countries, on the other hand, maintain that there is a need to strengthen the existing control regimes involving the transfer of science and technology which could be used for military purposes. The rules limit the export of ballistic missiles with range of at least 300 kilometres and a payload of at least 500 kilograms. The regime, originally meant to control only transfers of equipment and technology which could make a contribution to missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons, was amended in 1993 to cover also

missiles capable of delivering biological and chemical weapons.

10. Confidence-building measures/transparency in armaments

88. The subject of confidence-building, encompassing a variety of measures conducive to achieving structures of security based on cooperation and openness, has been addressed continuously in various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. Whereas in the past attention centred mainly on the development of the general concept of confidence-building, the focus has recently shifted somewhat towards supporting the various aspects of United Nations work on disarmament, training, security and confidence-building in the regional framework. Within this context, resolutions adopted by the General Assembly¹²⁹ generally supported proposals for disarmament and confidence-building at the global, regional and subregional levels which were complementing each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security. Member States were called upon to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels. In a more specific context, the General Assembly supported the activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.¹³⁰ The Assembly reaffirmed its support for efforts aimed at confidence-building measures, the promotion of peace and the prevention, management and settlement of political crises and armed conflicts in Central Africa at the regional and subregional levels. It furthermore appealed for voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for implementing the work of the Standing Advisory Committee and requested continued assistance from the United Nations for continuing its work. In accordance with requests made by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General submitted a number of reports on the subject.¹³¹

89. Convinced that objective information and greater openness with respect to military activities would contribute to increased confidence among States, the General Assembly has promoted transparency in armaments as part of the general process of confidence-building. The two major projects in this respect consist of the establishment, maintenance and

development of the Register of Conventional Arms (see paras. 67-68 above) and the system for standardized reporting on military expenditures (see para. 91 below).

90. The subject of transparency in armaments was also considered in the Conference on Disarmament and a Special Coordinator on the issue was appointed in March 1998. In his report to the Conference at the end of the 1998 session, the Coordinator underlined three main aspects of the issue: the merits of transparency in armaments, the scope of activity on transparency in armaments, and possible ways of dealing with transparency in armaments within the Conference on Disarmament. The Coordinator referred to a “largely shared view” among delegations to the Conference about establishing an ad hoc committee on transparency in armaments with a deliberative mandate to consider all proposals made regarding the three main aspects mentioned above. The next possible step could then be to decide which topic could be usefully elaborated and negotiated towards measures at the global level. Although the common endeavours had brought the Conference closer together, there was no consensus view on how to proceed further on the subject of transparency in armaments. In 1999, the Conference on Disarmament, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 53/77 V of 4 December 1998, had the item of transparency in armaments on its agenda, but no new developments occurred and delegations merely reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the issue during plenary meetings of the Conference. A number of proposals have been made in this regard.¹³²

11. Disarmament, development and other economic aspects

91. The social and economic consequences of military expenditure remain a cause for concern. With the prospects of significant reductions in armed forces and armaments in the 1990s, the issue of the “peace dividend” has drawn considerable attention. From the beginning of the decade, the worldwide trend in military spending was downward. It has been estimated that in the decade of 1985-1995, between \$720 billion and \$935 billion in funds was theoretically made available as a result of defence cutbacks. However, that trend has not had a major impact on military budgets and, to date, hopes for a massive peace dividend for productive and development-oriented needs have not

yet materialized. There were signs that the recent trend would be reversed and global military expenditure would rise starting in 2000. Within the United Nations framework, efforts continued towards achieving wider participation in the voluntary system for standardized reporting on military expenditures and the General Assembly, by several resolutions,¹³³ called upon Member States to take part in the reporting system.¹³⁴ The Secretary-General submitted annually standardized reports to the General Assembly containing information provided by Member States with regard to their military expenditure.¹³⁵ To date only a limited number of some 30 States have participated annually in the reporting system. Responding to requests made by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General submitted reports on ways and means to implement the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters, including, in particular, how to strengthen and broaden participation in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures.¹³⁶ The Secretary-General, furthermore, held consultations with relevant international bodies with a view to ascertaining the requirements for adjusting the existing instrument to encourage wider participation, with emphasis on examining possibilities for enhancing complementarity among international and regional reporting systems and to exchange related information with those bodies.

92. Conversion of military facilities for productive civilian purposes is another long-standing issue. This concept is being increasingly viewed in a wider context, in terms of the transformation of military structures and resources for peaceful uses, covering not only the conversion of military production facilities but also the downsizing of military forces, the reduction of military expenditures, the orientation of research-and-development spending, the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and the destruction of surplus weapons. Many of these issues are critical to transitional societies and to post-conflict societies which face the daunting task of reconstruction in the aftermath of devastating civil war.

93. The possibility of reducing the resources devoted to the military sector and reallocating part of them to civilian purposes as well as the issue of economic costs of disarmament received renewed attention of the international community following the end of the cold war. There is a growing consensus that unless socio-economic progress can be made on a sustainable basis

and the fundamental human rights of people are fully recognized, conflict and violence will continue to undermine development prospects. The General Assembly, during the period under review, each year adopted resolutions on the relationship between disarmament and development.¹³⁷ By those resolutions, the Assembly urged the international community to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever widening gap between developed and developing countries. Furthermore, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to take action for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held in 1987, and to report thereon. Accordingly, the Secretary-General submitted a number of reports on the subject to the General Assembly.¹³⁸ In his report to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session, the Secretary-General indicated that a high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development had been established within the United Nations system. The purpose of the Steering Group was to determine the short-, medium- and long-term priorities from a broadly defined mandate (as contained in the action programme adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development), within the framework of current international relations. The Steering Group identified specific programmes and activities, including the holding of periodic seminars to focus on specific issues in the disarmament and development field. An International Conference on Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development was held at Brussels in October 1998,¹³⁹ and a symposium on Disarmament and Development was held at United Nations Headquarters in July 1999.

Notes

¹ Article VI of the Treaty reads as follows:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

² A/51/218, annex.

³ See General Assembly resolution 49/75 K.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/51/4)*, para. 182. The conclusion was drawn by seven votes to seven, by the President's casting vote.

⁵ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: resolution 51/45 M (115 to 22, with 32 abstaining); 52/38 O (116-26-24); 53/77 W (123-25-25); 54/54 Q (114-28-22).

⁶ A/54/161 and Add.1.

⁷ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 50/71 E (108-27-28); 51/46 D (114-31-27); 52/39 C (109-30-27); 53/78 D (111-39-22); 54/55 D (104-42-17).

⁸ General Assembly resolutions 53/77 F (108-45-17) and 54/54 K (104-43-14).

⁹ See NATO press release NAC-S(99)65, 24 April 1999.

¹⁰ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, press release, 5 January 2000.

¹¹ See *Krasnaya Zvezda*, No. 10, 20 January 2000.

¹² Decision 2 on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, paragraphs 3 and 4, read as follows:

“Nuclear disarmament”:

“3. Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

“4. The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:

(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint;

(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the

production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

¹³ CD/1457.

¹⁴ A/53/667-S/1998/1071.

¹⁵ The executive summary of the report was circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1429).

¹⁶ A/C.1/52/7.

¹⁷ A/54/205-S/1999/853, annex.

¹⁸ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 50/70 P (106-39-17); 51/45 O (110-39-20); 52/38 L (109-39-18); 53/77 X (110-41-18); 54/54 P (104-41-17).

¹⁹ A/54/371.

²⁰ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 53/77 Y (114-18-38); 54/54 G (111-13-39).

²¹ A/54/372.

²² The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 50/70 C (154-0-10); 51/45 G (159-0-11); 52/38 K (156-0-10); 53/77 U (160-0-11); 54/54 D (153-0-12).

²³ A/54/205-S/1999/853, annex.

²⁴ The resolutions, though in large part identical, differed in one respect: the drafts sponsored by Western and Eastern European States (solely by the United States in 1997 and 1998) — 50/70 I (150-0-14); 51/45 R (160-0-11); 52/38 M (161-0-8); 53/77 Z (166-0-8) — made reference to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while the drafts sponsored by non-aligned States — 50/70 N (105-37-20); 51/45 I (107-37-24) — did not, largely owing to the fact that some of these countries are not parties to the Treaty.

²⁵ Resolution 54/54 A was adopted by 80 votes to 4, with 68 abstentions.

²⁶ See A/C.1/54/PV.24.

²⁷ Group of 21 (CD/1388).

²⁸ Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab

Republic, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zaire and Zimbabwe (CD/1419).

²⁹ Egypt (CD/1453); Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe (CD/1463); South Africa (CD/1483); Algeria (CD/1545); Egypt (CD/1563); Group of 21 (CD/1571).

³⁰ Canada (CD/1486); Belgium (CD/1496); Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Norway (CD/1565); Canada (CD/1568 and CD/1574).

³¹ CD/1542 was submitted by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden. The Joint Declaration was also issued as document A/53/138.

³² NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), decision 2, para. 4 (b).

³³ CD/1299.

³⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/50/27)* paras. 27-28.

³⁵ CD/1547.

³⁶ CD/1555.

³⁷ Resolution 53/77 I was adopted without a vote.

³⁸ CD/1566, CD/1570, CD/1575, CD/1578, CD/1586 and CD/1593.

³⁹ NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/6; the joint statement was also issued as document CD/1460.

⁴⁰ A/53/371-S/1998/848, annex.

⁴¹ United States State Department, Office of the Spokesman, 26 September 1997.

⁴² CD/1589.

⁴³ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 20 June 1999.

⁴⁴ CD/1327.

⁴⁵ A/C.1/54/3.

⁴⁶ CD/1599.

⁴⁷ CD/1584.

⁴⁸ S/1999/996.

⁴⁹ A/C.1/54/3.

⁵⁰ See IAEA, 43rd General Conference, PR 99/10, 27 September 1999.

- ⁵¹ United States Department of Defense, press release 307-99, 24 June 1999.
- ⁵² United States Department of Defense press release, 5 August 1999.
- ⁵³ See A/C.1/53/PV.5, 18 and 30; and A/C.1/54/PV.12.
- ⁵⁴ See A/C.1/53/PV.5 and A/C.1/54/PV.5.
- ⁵⁵ See CD/PV.800; A/C.1/53/PV.16 and 28; see also NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/SR.4.
- ⁵⁶ See A/C.1/53/PV.16 and 30; see also NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/26.
- ⁵⁷ See A/C.1/53/PV.16 and 23; see also NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/SR.9; A/C.1/54/PV.5; and NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/SR.1.
- ⁵⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, sect. IV, para. 19.
- ⁵⁹ General Assembly resolution 50/70 F.
- ⁶⁰ Resolution 54/54 U was adopted without a vote.
- ⁶¹ Resolutions 50/79, 51/54, 52/47, 53/84 and 54/61 were adopted without a vote.
- ⁶² Resolutions 51/45 T, 52/38 T, 53/77 R and 54/54 E were adopted without a vote.
- ⁶³ See CD/1164.
- ⁶⁴ S/1995/864 and S/1995/1038.
- ⁶⁵ Resolutions 1115 (1997), 1134 (1997) and 1137 (1997).
- ⁶⁶ S/1998/166.
- ⁶⁷ Resolution 1154 (1998).
- ⁶⁸ Resolution 1194 (1998).
- ⁶⁹ S/1998/1172.
- ⁷⁰ S/1999/100.
- ⁷¹ S/1999/415.
- ⁷² The resolution was adopted by a vote of 11 to none, with China, France, Malaysia and the Russian Federation abstaining.
- ⁷³ General Assembly resolutions 51/37 and 54/44 were adopted without a vote.
- ⁷⁴ Resolutions 51/45 N, 52/38 G, 53/77 M and 54/54 H were adopted without a vote; see also A/52/289 and A/54/258.
- ⁷⁵ A/52/289.
- ⁷⁶ Resolutions 50/70 J and 51/45 F.
- ⁷⁷ A/52/229.
- ⁷⁸ Resolutions 50/70 L (158-0-7); 51/45 Q (164-1-2); 52/38 Q (164-1-2); 53/77 P (164-1-2); and 54/54 M (159-1-1).
- ⁷⁹ The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (CD/1064) was signed at Paris in November 1990 by members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. Decisions for adapting the Treaty were taken in 1996, 1997 and 1998. An Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty was agreed upon in November 1999.
- ⁸⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/51/42)* annex I.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, *Fifty-fourth session, Supplement No. 42 (A/54/42)* annex III.
- ⁸² See resolution 1209 (1998).
- ⁸³ S/PRST/1999/28.
- ⁸⁴ Resolutions 53/77 T and 54/54 R were adopted without a vote.
- ⁸⁵ A/54/404 and Add.1.
- ⁸⁶ Resolutions 50/70 H, 51/45 L, 52/38 C, 53/77 B and 54/54 J were adopted without a vote.
- ⁸⁷ A/50/405, A/51/452, A/52/264, A/53/207 and A/54/309.
- ⁸⁸ A/52/298.
- ⁸⁹ A/54/258.
- ⁹⁰ Resolutions 52/38 J (158-0-6) and 53/77 E (169-0-1).
- ⁹¹ A/54/260.
- ⁹² Resolution 54/54 V was adopted by 119 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.
- ⁹³ See resolution 52/38 J.
- ⁹⁴ A/54/155.
- ⁹⁵ See A/54/160.
- ⁹⁶ See A/AC.254/4/Add.2/Rev.2; A/AC.254/4/Rev.4; and A/AC.254/L.147/Add.3.
- ⁹⁷ A/53/763-S/1998/1194. A Code of Conduct to backstop the implementation of the Moratorium was adopted on 10 December 1999 by the heads of State and Government of ECOWAS.
- ⁹⁸ A/53/681.
- ⁹⁹ A/54/488-S/1999/1082.
- ¹⁰⁰ A/54/424.
- ¹⁰¹ CD/1544.
- ¹⁰² A/54/374.
- ¹⁰³ A/53/78.

- ¹⁰⁴ See General Assembly resolutions 50/70 D (149-0-15); 51/45 H (154-0-15); 52/38 R (155-0-12); 53/77 V (159-0-12); and 54/54 O (150-0-12).
- ¹⁰⁵ See A/50/547; A/51/300 and Add.1-4; A/52/312 and Corr.1 and 2 and Add.1-4; A/53/334 and Add.1 and 2 and Corr.1 and 2; and A/54/226 and Add.1 and 2.
- ¹⁰⁶ CD/1591.
- ¹⁰⁷ A/49/316.
- ¹⁰⁸ A/52/312.
- ¹⁰⁹ Resolutions 52/38 B (98-45-13); 53/77 S (104-46-17); and 54/54 I (97-48-15).
- ¹¹⁰ See resolution 54/54 I.
- ¹¹¹ CD/1478.
- ¹¹² See document APL/MSP.1/1999/1, part II.
- ¹¹³ Resolutions 50/82, 51/149, 52/173, 53/26 and 54/191.
- ¹¹⁴ See, for example, A/51/540, A/52/679, A/53/496 and A/54/445.
- ¹¹⁵ See A/54/445.
- ¹¹⁶ Resolutions 50/69 (121-0-46); 51/44 (126-0-44); 52/37 (128-0-39); 53/76 (165-0-4); and 54/53 (162-0-2).
- ¹¹⁷ See CD/PV.797 and CD/PV.805.
- ¹¹⁸ See, for example, CD/1487 (Canada); CD/1569 (Canada); and CD/1576 (China).
- ¹¹⁹ A/CONF.184/6.
- ¹²⁰ Resolutions 50/70 M (157-4-2); 51/45 E (137-4-27); 52/38 E (160-0-6); 53/77 J (170-0-4); and 54/54 S (159-0-4).
- ¹²¹ A/53/158 and Add.1 and 2; A/54/163 and Add.1.
- ¹²² A/50/383 and A/53/160.
- ¹²³ Resolutions 50/62 (104-6-53) and 51/40 (161-0-8).
- ¹²⁴ Resolutions 50/63 (157-0-9); 51/39 (105-39-24); 52/33 (103-43-19); 53/73 (99-45-23); and 54/50 (98-46-19).
- ¹²⁵ A/50/409, A/53/202 and A/54/167 and Add.1.
- ¹²⁶ Resolutions 53/70 and 54/49 were adopted without a vote.
- ¹²⁷ A/54/213.
- ¹²⁸ Resolution 54/54 F was adopted by 94 votes to none, with 65 abstentions.
- ¹²⁹ Resolutions 50/70 K (165-0-1); 51/45 K (170-0-1); 52/38; 53/77 O; and 54/54 N (the last three resolutions were adopted without a vote).
- ¹³⁰ See resolutions 50/71 B, 51/46 C, 52/39 B, 53/78 A and 54/55 A (all resolutions were adopted without a vote).
- ¹³¹ A/50/474, A/51/287, A/52/293, A/53/369 and A/54/364.
- ¹³² CD/1494 (Netherlands); see also reports of the Special Coordinator on his consultations with members and participating non-members of the Conference on the most appropriate way to deal with this item (CD/PV.799 and CD/PV.805).
- ¹³³ Resolutions 51/38, 52/32, 53/72 and 54/43 (all resolutions were adopted without a vote).
- ¹³⁴ See resolution 35/142 B, para. 2.
- ¹³⁵ A/50/277 and Add.1, A/51/209, A/52/312, A/53/218 and A/54/298.
- ¹³⁶ A/53/218 and A/54/298.
- ¹³⁷ Resolutions 50/70 G, 51/45 D, 52/38 D, 53/77 K and 54/54 T (all resolutions were adopted without a vote).
- ¹³⁸ A/50/388, A/51/207, A/52/228, A/53/206 and A/54/254.
- ¹³⁹ A/53/681, annex.