



Human Rights Council
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review
Forty-seventh session
Geneva, 4–15 November 2024

Summary of stakeholders' submissions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

I. Background

1. The present report was prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21, taking into consideration the periodicity of the universal periodic review and the outcome of the previous review.¹ It is a summary of 35 stakeholders' submissions² for the universal periodic review, presented in a summarized manner owing to word-limit constraints.

II. Information provided by stakeholders

A. Scope of international obligations and cooperation with human rights mechanisms

2. Several stakeholders made recommendations for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to ratify core international human rights treaties and optional protocols to which it was not yet a party.³

3. Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) recommended that the DPRK accede to the International Labour Organization (ILO) and ratify the core ILO Conventions, in particular the Forced Labour Convention No.29 with its 2014 Protocol, the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention No.105, the Minimum Age Convention No. 138, and the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention No.182.⁴

4. Several stakeholders recommended that the DPRK ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.⁵

5. JS9 recommended that the DPRK ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.⁶

* The present document is being issued without formal editing.



6. International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) urged the DPRK to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as a matter of international urgency.⁷

7. Amnesty International (AI) stated that as of March 2024, embassies and international humanitarian organizations remained barred from re-entering the country.⁸

8. Korea Center for United Nations Human Rights Policy (KOCUN) recommended that the DPRK grant access to and cooperate with all international organizations working in the field of health, food security, nutrition and education.⁹

9. Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) urged the DPRK to issue a standing invitation to United Nations Special Procedures and allow full and unhindered access to all parts of the country.¹⁰

10. CSW urged the DPRK to acknowledge and implement the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK and other accountability mechanisms (A/HRC/25/63, February 2014).¹¹

11. JS13 recommended that the DPRK publish the full text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ratified human rights treaties, translated into Korean, on the national network service (*Kwangmyong*).¹²

B. National human rights framework

1. Constitutional and legislative framework

12. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) recommended that the DPRK prohibit and abolish the use of torture, the death penalty, and the *songbun* discrimination system.¹³

13. International Democracy Hub (IDH) recommended that the DPRK incorporate principles of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention on the Rights of the Child into domestic legislation to protect persons with disabilities and children.¹⁴

14. JS7 recommended that the DPRK enact laws that prohibit discrimination against women as defined in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and eliminate gender-based discrimination in social institutions and practices.¹⁵

2. Institutional infrastructure and policy measures

15. AI recommended that the DPRK consider establishing a national human rights institution in accordance with the Paris Principles.¹⁶

16. Korean Peninsula Future Women's Institute (KPFWI) recommended that the DPRK enhance human rights education for law enforcement, especially guards and patrol officers, and create an oversight mechanism for human rights violations.¹⁷

C. Promotion and protection of human rights

1. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

Equality and non-discrimination

17. CSW stated that the state's *songbun* system divided the population into 51 categories of political class, falling under three broad castes of 'core', 'wavering' and 'hostile'. The classes were determined by birth, with factors including the family's background and political record. Those in the 'hostile' class were subject to intense persecution and discrimination and were prejudged as being disloyal to the state and the socialist revolution, including by holding and practicing values that were considered as dissident by the state.

Those in the hostile classes included Christians, other religious communities, and those who shared ancestry with people convicted of a political crime.¹⁸

18. CSW stated that a person's *songbun* classification affected nearly every aspect of their life, including access to healthcare, what part of the country they could live in, access to education, food rations and employment opportunities. It even played a role in how they were criminally punished.¹⁹

19. NKHR stated that the *songbun* system required citizens to submit quotas of goods to export, including minerals, agricultural and livestock products, metal, and construction materials.²⁰

20. CSW urged the DPRK to end state-sanctioned discrimination underpinned by the *songbun* system and introduce anti-discrimination legislation to further protect the rights of its citizens.²¹

Right to life, liberty and security of person, and freedom from torture

21. The UPR Project at Birmingham City University (The UPR Project at BCU) stated that the DPRK continued to hide the full extent of its use of the death penalty by restricting access to death penalty-related information, including lack of access to independent media and sources in the country.²²

22. AI recommended that the DPRK establish an official moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty.²³

23. Korea Future (KF) stated that despite the promulgation of the Law on the Prevention of Beating in 2021 and the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Law in 2021, ongoing reports of torture and mistreatment by State-affiliated agents, particularly during the pre-trial examination phase, cast significant scepticism on the enforcement or efficacy of those laws in ameliorating detention conditions.²⁴

24. CSW stated that the use of torture was widespread and systematic across the network of prison camps in the DPRK. The DPRK used torture during interrogations to extract confessions from prisoners, which regularly resulted in paralysis, serious injury and death. Forms of torture utilized by authorities included sleep deprivation, severe beatings, rape and sexual violence.²⁵

25. KF recommended that the DPRK prohibit torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment within the entirety of the penal system, categorically outlawing activities such as, but not limited to, severe physical assault and the prolonged deprivation of food.²⁶

26. JS1 recommended that the DPRK conduct credible, independent, and impartial investigations into all allegations of torture, prioritizing allegations raised by persons who had been sentenced to death and by persons who were charged with crimes that were subject to the death penalty.²⁷

27. JS1 recommended that the DPRK render inadmissible any evidence obtained through use of torture and ill-treatment, including enforced disappearances, except when used to prove that a person had engaged in torture or enforced disappearances.²⁸

28. AI stated that there were serious concerns about the fate of hundreds of people, mainly women, whom the Chinese authorities had reportedly forcibly returned to the DPRK in October 2023. It stated that the DPRK regarded anyone who escaped the country as criminals or traitors for illegally crossing the border. In the past, returnees had been arbitrarily detained and subjected to torture and other ill-treatment.²⁹

29. CSW recommended that the DPRK ensure that those who are repatriated were not subjected to any punishment, including torture, enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention.³⁰

30. JS1 stated that persons suspected of challenging State power remained vulnerable to prosecution for "political" crimes by the Ministry of State Security. Authorities arrested and held individuals *incommunicado* for political crimes, which might result in enforced disappearance. Arrest and detention under the Administrative Penalty Law continued to operate outside of any judicial oversight.³¹

31. Mulmangcho (MMC) recommended that the DPRK acknowledge the existence of abductees and prisoners of war and transparently disclose their situation to the international community. It also recommended that the DPRK repatriate surviving abductees and prisoners of war as well as the remains of those deceased to the Republic of Korea.³²

32. Korean War Abductees' Family Union (KWAFU) implored the DPRK to provide confirmation of the fate of the 4,777 Korean War abductees. It stated that surviving abductees must be sent back to the Republic of Korea and that the remains of deceased abductees must be brought back to their families.³³

33. Justice for North Korea (JFNK) stated that a total of six citizens of the Republic of Korea were detained in the DPRK. They were detained in inhumane conditions without consular access due to a lack of proper legal procedures. It recommended that consulates be allowed to interview and communicate with them.³⁴

34. Korea of All (KOA) recommended that the DPRK ensure the safe movement of the ethnic Koreans from Japan detained in the DPRK to places they voluntarily chose, ensure correspondence among the separated families, and ensure reunion of the separated families.³⁵

35. HRNK stated that the DPRK had yet to acknowledge the existence of political prison camps (*kwanliso*), but that satellite imagery and escapees' testimonies continued to prove the existence and expansion of such camps.³⁶

36. CSW was alarmed about the ongoing policy of crushing political dissent through the use of large-scale political prison camps (*kwanliso*). Persons who were deemed to have engaged in major political crimes were regularly 'disappeared', i.e. taken to the prison camps without trial, often overnight.³⁷

37. Human Rights Foundation (HRF) stated that based on satellite images, it was estimated that more than 120,000 people were currently imprisoned in the DPRK across four known prison camps. Detainees were at high risk of torture and other ill-treatment.³⁸

38. NKHR recommended that the DPRK acknowledge the existence of political prison camps (*kwanliso*), provide international humanitarian organizations and human rights monitors immediate access to the camps and victims, and dismantle all political prison camps (*kwanliso*) and release all political detainees.³⁹

39. JS1 stated that prison conditions were harsh and life-threatening due to food shortages, gross overcrowding, physical abuse, and inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care.⁴⁰

40. CSW recommended that the DPRK protect the rights of incarcerated persons by adopting and implementing the Nelson Mandela Rules, particularly with regard to sanitary conditions, food, drinking water, file management, non-discrimination and contact with the outside world.⁴¹

41. KF recommended that the DPRK enhance detention conditions to safeguard the right to health, facilitating unconditional access to medical services encompassing mental, physical, maternal, and reproductive healthcare, and affirming the accessibility of sufficient personal hygiene amenities.⁴²

42. End Corporal Punishment (ECP) recommended that the DPRK accelerate its efforts to clearly prohibit all corporal punishment of children in every setting of their lives and repeal any legal defence allowing its use, as a matter of priority.⁴³

Administration of justice, including impunity, and the rule of law

43. JS1 stated that despite guarantees of judicial independence in its law, the DPRK denied such independence in practice. Judicial institutions lacked independence and functioned as delegated bodies of the Worker's Party of Korea and the Supreme People's Assembly. The principle of Party supremacy and centralism resulted in a judicial system under which the Worker's Party of Korea exercised control.⁴⁴

44. JS1 stated that lawyers operated under the oversight of party-controlled lawyers' committees and thus lacked independence. The State and the Worker's Party of Korea required all lawyers to follow and execute State and party policies.⁴⁵

45. KF recommended that the DPRK ensure the independence and impartiality of judicial authorities and guarantee the right to a fair trial for individuals subject to administrative sanctions.⁴⁶
46. JS6 stated that the DPRK had continued to deny the right to a fair trial to the accused, especially those suspected of harbouring “anti-state motives”.⁴⁷
47. JS6 stated that defendants with ties to the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea received lighter sentences than those without such relations.⁴⁸
48. Broken Chalk (BC) stated that the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code contained no judicial review or preliminary examination stage provisions. There were no safeguards for the presumption of innocence, the right to remain silent or the right against self-incrimination.⁴⁹
49. JS1 recommended that the DPRK inform anyone who was arrested, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for their arrest and promptly inform of any charges against them, as required by article 9(2) of the ICCPR.⁵⁰
50. JS6 recommended that the DPRK ensure the right of defendants in criminal cases to receive effective assistance from their defense counsels at all stages of the proceedings.⁵¹
51. JS1 stated that public trials, held in major public locations such as stadiums, or city or town squares, ostensibly localized administration of justice but were largely a tool of political propaganda to produce fear among the population.⁵²
52. CSW urged the DPRK to prioritize the reform of the penal system to comply with international human rights standards.⁵³

Fundamental freedoms

53. JS6 stated that State-controlled media remained the only source of information allowed in the DPRK and predominantly served as a tool for propaganda and indoctrination. The Korean Central News Agency operated under the direct supervision of the Government and was the primary source of information for the population.⁵⁴
54. AI stated that restrictions on the freedom of opinion and expression had continued to intensify. The Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act and the Youth Education Guarantee Law enacted in 2020 and 2021 respectively further restricted access to information. Hostility towards South Korean culture and media was on the rise. The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act adopted in January 2023 punished the use of “South Korean style” speech. According to the law, anyone found speaking, writing, sending messages, or exchanging emails in “South Korean style” speech was liable to a minimum of six years’ reform through labour. In cases considered severe, the sentence could be increased to a life term of reform through labour or even the death penalty.⁵⁵
55. AI recommended that the DPRK abolish or amend all legal provisions that unjustifiably limited the right to freedom of expression, and allow free access to the Internet, social media, international communications, foreign broadcasts and publications, including the popular culture of other countries.⁵⁶
56. JS6 stated that the DPRK designated informants in neighbourhoods and encouraged all residents to report any suspicious behaviour, creating an atmosphere of fear and self-censorship.⁵⁷
57. JS10 recommended that the DPRK cease the longstanding political practices and dated customs of ideological struggle sessions, public self-criticism, mutual criticism sessions, and public people’s trials.⁵⁸
58. JS4 stated that leaving the country without permission was deemed as “treachery against the nation,” punishable by death or by detention in abusive and forced labour camps.⁵⁹
59. Free to Move (F2M) stated that permits were required for all domestic travels, including to visit Pyongyang, areas near the border with the Republic of Korea, and areas near the border with China. Despite such tight controls and surveillance, many people

continued to travel for personal purposes, including business. Merchants and business operators bribed Government-run corporations to obtain permits.⁶⁰

60. CSW stated that the Covid-19 pandemic had been used by the DPRK to maintain restrictions on movement. Closed borders and high security continued to prevent citizens from leaving the country.⁶¹

61. AI recommended that the DPRK amend the Criminal Code and other legislation to remove the requirement for permission to travel abroad and within the country in line with international human rights treaties, to which it was a State Party.⁶²

62. CSW stated that all forms of independent religious activity, particularly communal activities were restricted. Any citizen who expressed an opinion or belief outside the state ideology faced severe punishment. Christians were the victims of particularly extreme persecution with public executions, arrests, forced labour, imprisonment in political prison camps (*kwanliso*) and torture being a daily threat.⁶³

63. European Centre for Law and Justice (ECLJ) stated that Christians were prohibited from gathering to meet and worship, even in their homes. If Christians were caught practicing their faith, even in private, they were either sent to labour camps or killed on the spot.⁶⁴

64. ECLJ stated that the DPRK utilized a propaganda campaign to indoctrinate the population into believing that Christians were inherently evil. Even from a young age, children were taught that Christians were evil and would kidnap, torture, and kill them.⁶⁵

65. Improving North Korean Human Rights Center (INKHR) recommended that the DPRK guarantee the right to freedom of religion in accordance with article 68 of its Constitution and cease to incarcerate worshippers in political prison camps (*kwanliso*).⁶⁶

Right to privacy

66. JS4 stated that the DPRK heavily censored and controlled media and international communication. Social networking services were designed with backdoors, allowing Government-controlled agencies access to citizens' information.⁶⁷

67. JS4 recommended that the DPRK cease the monitoring and surveillance of all forms of communication.⁶⁸

Right to marriage and family life

68. Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) stated that women faced a number of hurdles in seeking divorce from husbands who inflicted domestic violence on them. Divorce required a court order, which was difficult to achieve, due to the Government's insistence on preserving marriage. The Socialist Women's Union of Korea had led an education campaign against divorce, based on instructions it had received from the Worker's Party of Korea. In addition, divorce could disqualify a woman's children from admission into the Party, which prioritized family history.⁶⁹

69. KPFWI recommended that the DPRK amend the Family Law Act to add a provision recognizing divorce by consent.⁷⁰

70. JS12 stated that families of defectors were placed under strict surveillance by the authorities and faced severe restrictions on their movement, employment, and access to basic services. The incessant monitoring and control led to the breakdown of family relationships and social isolation.⁷¹

Prohibition of all forms of slavery, including trafficking in persons

71. HRF stated that prisoners at ordinary prison (*kyohwaso*) and political prison camps (*kwanliso*) were subjected to forced labour, including extremely long working hours, food rations, poor living and hygiene conditions, denial of medical care, and frequent beating for minor infractions and failing to meet work quotas.⁷²

72. NKHR recommended that the DPRK immediately cease the use of forced labour in detention facilities.⁷³

73. HRF stated that the DPRK routinely and systematically required forced, uncompensated labour from its population to sustain the economy. Refusing the order to work as a “volunteer” could result in severe punishment, including torture and imprisonment.⁷⁴

74. NKDB stated that the labour mobilization of children remained a significant issue in the education system. Young students, especially those in rural schools, continued to be mobilized for agricultural and other forms of labour as part of their compulsory education.⁷⁵

75. BC stated that despite the law prohibiting work by children younger than 16 and criminalizing forced child labour, military-style youth construction brigades enrolled children between the ages of 16 and 17. They were subject to 10 years of long and hazardous working hours. The forced labour had resulted in growth deficiencies, exhaustion, malnutrition, and physical and psychological injuries.⁷⁶

76. JS9 stated that brokers facilitated networks that coerced women and girls from the DPRK into the People’s Republic of China, subjecting them to forced prostitution, marriage, labour, and enduring physical and sexual violence from traffickers. Deceived by fraudulent job offers or seeking escape from dire conditions in the DPRK, those women willingly entered trafficking channels. Women and girls repatriated to the DPRK were not shielded from penal consequences and faced punishment for treason.⁷⁷

77. IDH recommended that the DPRK enact and enforce legislation that explicitly prohibited all forms of forced labour, including trafficking, debt bondage, and hazardous work.⁷⁸

78. NKDB recommended that the DPRK explicitly prohibit child labour and exploitation in all settings, including schools and homes.⁷⁹

79. JS7 recommended that the DPRK immediately cease the practice of mobilizing students for month-long forced labour in rural areas and for various military drills during after-school hours under conditions, in which their safety was not ensured.⁸⁰

Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work

80. JS10 stated that children of collective farm workers were unable to choose urban labourer jobs after their graduation. The DPRK strictly regulated the migration of young people from rural areas to cities, due to a shortage of rural labour.⁸¹

81. KPFWI recommended that the DPRK pay salaries to Government employees at a level that could guarantee their livelihood and abolish forced and unpaid labour.⁸²

82. JS5 stated that the DPRK failed to provide help for persons with disabilities who were unable to work.⁸³

Right to social security

83. NK Imprisonment Victims’ Family Association (NKIVFA) stated that the social security system offered assistance for funeral expenses and old-age pensions only to a limited number of privileged groups such as “champions of revolution” or “patriotic martyrs”. Most older persons did not have access to healthcare services and social security coverage specified in the Elderly Protection Act. Older women not categorized into such privileged groups were completely left out of the social security system.⁸⁴

84. NKIVFA recommended that the DPRK provide healthcare support and basic social security coverage for older persons by substantively implementing the Elderly Protection Act.⁸⁵

85. JS7 recommended that the DPRK establish a system to address the social hardship of children with disabilities and their families.⁸⁶

Right to an adequate standard of living

86. INHRK stated that the DPRK had failed to ensure the right to food and health during the Covid-19 pandemic. The DPRK had shut down its borders and rejected aid from the

international community, resulting in numerous deaths from lack of adequate food and medical treatment.⁸⁷

87. KPFWI recommended that the DPRK take national measures to improve water supply in rural areas and resolve power shortages.⁸⁸

88. JS10 recommended that the DPRK overhaul the sewage and drainage facilities in provincial areas and realize the modernization of sanitation facilities for toilets nationwide.⁸⁹

Right to health

89. JS12 stated that the healthcare system in the DPRK was characterized by sub-standard medical care, due to the lack of qualified medical professionals, inadequate education, limited resources, and a shortage of essential medicines, equipment and supplies. Widespread corruption within the system often forced patients to pay bribes or use personal connections to receive even basic medical services. The limited availability of medical facilities and the unequal distribution of resources between urban and rural areas further exacerbated the issue of healthcare accessibility.⁹⁰

90. NKDB stated that the right to health was especially compromised for vulnerable groups, including women, children, and persons with disabilities.⁹¹

91. NKIVFA recommended that the DPRK enhance the efficiency of its healthcare system to ensure the availability, accessibility and quality of free healthcare services.⁹²

92. JS12 stated that there was a lack of access to skilled midwives and emergency obstetric care in the DPRK and recommended that the DPRK train medical personnel to reduce maternal and infant mortality.⁹³

Right to education

93. BC stated that the “*songbun*” classification system, based on perceived loyalty to the ruling Kim family and the Government, played a vital role in a child’s progression in education. If the child’s parents had an excellent *songbun*, then the child would be allowed to progress academically, while children of those with bad *songbun* might even be denied from pursuing higher education.⁹⁴

94. JS10 stated that even though the university entrance exam system had changed to allow anyone to apply, the gap between urban and rural areas and the disparity between Pyongyang and other provinces were enormous. Gaining university admission based solely on merit remained a distant reality.⁹⁵

95. BC stated that education in the DPRK was centred around idolizing the leader. Schools instilled a collective commitment towards communist ideology among citizens and elites.⁹⁶

96. BC stated that children were educated on anti-South Korean propaganda. It stated that the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act had led to a ban on using the South Korean language style. Harsh punishments of six years or more of forced labour or even the death penalty in extreme cases had been imposed.⁹⁷

97. BC recommended that the DPRK establish a national curriculum aligned with international standards to ensure an inclusive environment free from racial, religious and national hatred.⁹⁸

98. BC stated that schoolchildren had weekly “life review sessions”, during which they communicated their failings and received criticism. This was done in the presence of their peers as a learning lesson. The practice continued to create a feeling of shame and social ostracization among students and was used as a method to curb internal dissent.⁹⁹

99. NKDB stated that rural schools were characterized by lower attendance, as fewer families in rural areas were capable of making financial contributions.¹⁰⁰

100. BC stated that in poorer rural areas, children had to bring scrap iron, paper, and rabbit skins to school. This was used as a salary for the teachers or a way to support the schools. The students could be asked to trade other goods, done under the disguise of being an

assignment. Failure to complete the assignment showed disloyalty towards the regime. The child was then subject to physical or emotional punishment or poor grades.¹⁰¹

101. IDH recommended that the DPRK guarantee that every child, irrespective of their socio-economic background or geographical location have unrestricted access to quality education, including children with disabilities.¹⁰²

102. NKDB recommended that the DPRK subsidize all costs associated with compulsory education, including development costs.¹⁰³

103. NKDB stated that families refrained from enrolling children with disabilities in schools, due to the negative perception towards persons with disabilities and a lack of accommodations in the education system.¹⁰⁴

104. JS7 recommended that the DPRK provide inclusive education for children with disabilities, providing necessary support services and accommodations to ensure equal participation and learning outcomes.¹⁰⁵

Cultural rights

105. JS10 recommended that the DPRK enable youth to enjoy classic world literature and various cultural activities by connecting provincial middle schools to the intranet, distributing digital books, and allowing students access to these digital books via the intranet.¹⁰⁶

Business and human rights

106. NKHR recommended that the DPRK respect labour protection provisions in the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and implement robust human rights due diligence of companies that operated or invested in the DPRK.¹⁰⁷

2. Rights of specific persons or groups

Women

107. JS12 stated that systematic and widespread violations of women's rights were commonplace in the DPRK, where a culture of sexual abuse and assault against women was entrenched both in organizational life and within the household.¹⁰⁸

108. JS9 stated that groups particularly susceptible to sexual violence included women and girls in the military, the workplace (including *jangmadang* or private markets), construction youth brigades, women with disabilities, and those in detention.¹⁰⁹

109. JS9 stated that neither the Criminal Code nor the Criminal Procedure Law criminalized domestic violence. There remained a notable absence of legal provisions ensuring the rehabilitation and support of victims, indicating a significant gap in the legal framework and protection mechanisms for addressing and mitigating gender-based violence, including sexual violence and domestic violence in the DPRK.¹¹⁰

110. JS7 stated that men in the DPRK did not consider domestic violence as a crime. Due to that mentality, police officers did not intervene on domestic violence, nor take action against it maintaining a hands-off approach.¹¹¹

111. HRNK stated that women in detention facilities were consistently subjected to sexual abuse and rape by prison guards and state officials, who did not face any consequences for their actions.¹¹²

112. JS11 recommended that the DPRK reform national laws to criminalize all forms of gender-based violence, including sexual assault, sexual abuse, rape, and marital rape.¹¹³

113. NKDB recommended that the DPRK establish reporting and recourse mechanisms for victims of gender-based violence, including domestic violence.¹¹⁴

114. KPFWI recommended that the DPRK establish women's counselling centres for victims of sexual violence and domestic violence and create shelters for their protection.¹¹⁵

115. JS12 recommended that the DPRK conduct education and awareness-raising campaigns on gender equality and women's rights.¹¹⁶

116. JS2 recommended that the DPRK guarantee long-overdue, accessible, and adequate gender-specific services and benefits, including obstetric and gynaecological care, postpartum care, maternity leave, affordable feminine hygiene products, domestic violence shelters, and gender-sensitive counselling.¹¹⁷

117. JS2 stated that the Socialist Women's Union of Korea was a tool for political indoctrination and social control and material coercion, through which the Government forced women to partake in unpaid strenuous labour and relinquish foodstuffs and large sums of money for redistribution.¹¹⁸

118. HRNK stated that there was an intensification of a crackdown on women, triggered by their robust involvement in informal markets (*jangmadang*).¹¹⁹

Children

119. JS7 recommended that the DPRK amend legislation to ensure comprehensive protection for all individuals under 18 years of age, including reviewing national laws to raise the minimum legal age for marriage to 18.¹²⁰

120. KF stated that reports persisted of children in political prison camps being subjected to compulsory labour, enduring physical assaults, and punitive actions for not meeting work quotas. Children as young as four years old were coerced into labour, without any differentiation from adults in terms of work type or volume.¹²¹

Older persons

121. NKIVFA stated that most nursing homes for older persons, especially those with disabilities were concentrated in and around Pyongyang. Nursing homes and other residential care facilities were originally intended to accommodate older persons without any family and caregiver. However, they were used to exclusively serve privileged groups.¹²²

122. NKIVFA stated that older women in the DPRK often served as breadwinners for their families while taking care of their husbands and grandchildren, doing household chores and repaying debts for the livelihood of the whole family. Over 99 per cent of women traders at the *jangmadang* (informal markets) were older women.¹²³

123. NKIVFA recommended that the DPRK expand elderly protection and care facilities and provide support tailored to the needs of older women and older persons without any family or caregiver.¹²⁴

Persons with disabilities

124. JS5 stated that the level of awareness about persons with disabilities in the DPRK had not noticeably changed since 2019. Negative attitudes and perceptions towards them constituted serious social barriers that hindered full social participation and equality.¹²⁵

125. NKDB stated that persons with intellectual disabilities remained stigmatized in the DPRK, being labelled "number 49 subjects", and were taken to state-run facilities called "number 49 hospitals" in remote regions.¹²⁶

126. JS5 recommended that the DPRK conduct awareness campaigns to promote understanding and acceptance of persons with disabilities within society with the goal to prevent harmful and abusive behaviours and misconceptions about persons with disabilities that contribute to stigma.¹²⁷

127. IDH recommended that the DPRK conduct awareness campaigns to foster understanding and acceptance of children with disabilities within society, and advocate for their rights to education, healthcare, and social inclusion, promoting a supportive environment that values diversity.¹²⁸

128. JS5 recommended that the DPRK build accessible infrastructures and appropriate healthcare services for persons with disabilities.¹²⁹

129. JS5 recommended that the DPRK promote the presence of persons with disabilities in Government workplaces, including implementing a standard percentage of persons with disabilities hired in Governmental organizations and ensuring that they are paid equal salaries.¹³⁰

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons

130. JS9 stated that the DPRK had not tackled discrimination and violence against individuals with diverse sexual orientation, gender identity, expression, and sex characteristics, due to its non-recognition of the existence of such diversity within its population.¹³¹

Stateless persons

131. IDH recommended that the DPRK enhance the birth registration system to ensure that every child was registered at birth, preventing statelessness, and guaranteeing their right to citizenship, identity, and access to essential services.¹³²

Notes

¹ A/HRC/42/10, A/HRC/42/10/Add.1, and A/HRC/42/2.

² The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org (one asterisk denotes a national human rights institution with A status).

Civil society

Individual submissions:

AI	Amnesty International, London (United Kingdom);
BC	Broken Chalk, Amsterdam (the Netherlands);
CSW	Christian Solidarity Worldwide, New Malden (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
ECLJ	The European Centre for Law and Justice, Strasbourg (France);
ECP	End Corporal Punishment, Geneva (Switzerland);
F2M	Free to Move, Osaka (Japan);
HRF	Human Rights Foundation, New York (United States of America);
HRNK	The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, Washington D.C. (United States of America);
ICAN	The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Geneva (Switzerland);
IDH	International Democracy Hub, Seoul (Republic of Korea);
INKHR	Improving North Korean Human Rights Center, Seoul (Republic of Korea);
JFNK	Justice for North Korea, Uijeongbu-si (Republic of Korea);
KF	Korea Future, New Malden (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
KPFWI	The Korean Peninsula Future Women's Institute, Seoul (Republic of Korea);
KOA	Korea of All, KangwonDo (Japan);
KOCUN	The Korea Center for United Nations Human Rights Policy, Seoul (Republic of Korea);
KWAFU	The Korean War Abductees' Family Union, Paju (Republic of Korea);
MMC	The Mulmangcho, Seoul (Republic of Korea);
NKDB	The Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, Seoul (Republic of Korea);
NKHR	Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, Seoul (Republic of Korea);
NKIVFA	The NK Imprisonment Victims' Family Association, Seoul (Republic of Korea);
The UPR Project at BCU	The UPR Project at Birmingham City University, Birmingham (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

Joint submissions:

JS1 **Joint submission 1 submitted by:** The Advocates for Human

- Rights, Minneapolis (United States of America); The World Coalition Against the Death Penalty; Transitional Justice Working Group;
- JS2 **Joint submission 2 submitted by:** Jubilee Campaign USA, Fairfax (United States of America); North Korea Freedom Coalition, Fairfax (United States of America); Defense Forum Foundation, Falls Church (United States of America); Isabella Foundation, Rockville (United States of America); Christian Freedom International, Front Royal (United States of America); PSALT NK, Englewood Cliffs (United States of America);
- JS3 **Joint submission 3 submitted by:** International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI), London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); the Coalition for Genocide Response;
- JS4 **Joint submission 4 submitted by:** People for Successful COrean REunfication (PSCORE), Seoul (Republic of Korea); North Korean Human Rights Corporation (NKHRC);
- JS5 **Joint submission 5 submitted by:** Lawyers for Human Rights and Unification of Korea (Hanbyun); People for Successful COrean REunfication (PSCORE);
- JS6 **Joint submission 6 submitted by:** International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Paris (France); Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB);
- JS7 **Joint submission 7 submitted by:** the Korea Center for United Nations Human Rights Policy (KOCUN), Seoul (Republic of Korea); Free to Move (F2M); Improving North Korean Human Rights Center (INKHR); International Democracy Hub (IDH); Justice for North Korea (JFNK); Korea Future Women's Institute (KFWI); Korea of All (KOA); Mulmangcho (MMC); NK Imprisonment Victims' Family Association (NKIVFA);
- JS8 **Joint submission 8 submitted by:** The World Evangelical Alliance (WEA), Geneva (Switzerland); PeaceCorea; the Korea Evangelical Fellowship (KEF);
- JS9 **Joint submission 9 submitted by:** Korea Future, New Malden (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland); Eum Research Institute, Seoul (Republic of Korea); UNISEED, Seoul (Republic of Korea);
- JS10 **Joint submission 10 submitted by:** Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights (NK Net), Seoul (Republic of Korea); Asia Press Osaka, Osaka (Japan); CADAL, Buenos Aires (Argentina);
- JS11 **Joint submission 11 submitted by:** Human Rights Watch, Geneva (Switzerland); Transitional Justice Working Group;
- JS12 **Joint submission 12 submitted by:** Rights for Female North Koreans (RFNK), Gunpo-si (Republic of Korea); WOORI ONE;
- JS13 **Joint submission 13 submitted by:** Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), Seoul (Republic of Korea); the Mulmangcho (MMC).

³ JS1, para. 3; JS2, para. 7; JS5, pp. 4 and 13; JS7, paras. 4–6; JS13, pp. 3 and 12; AI, para. 3; CSW, para. 7; HRF, para. 36 (b); HRNK, para. 19, 22 and 23; KF, p. 7; KOCUN, paras. 3–8; and The UPR Project at BCU, p. 6.

⁴ NKHR, para. 18.

⁵ JS11, p. 3; JS13, p. 5; CSW, para. 9; and HRNK, para. 19.

⁶ JS9, para. 73.

⁷ ICAN, p. 1.

⁸ AI, para. 19.

⁹ KOCUN, para. 12. See also JS7, para. 10; JS11, p. 8; and NKDB.

¹⁰ CSW, para. 14. See also JS7, para. 13; JS11, p. 8; AI, para. 27; and KOCUN, para. 13.

¹¹ CSW, para. 13. See also JS3, para. 45.

¹² JS13, p. 3.

¹³ HRNK, para. 19.

- ¹⁴ IDH, para. 4.
¹⁵ JS7, para. 57.
¹⁶ AI, para. 28. See also JS7, para. 14; KOCUN, para. 15; and The UPR Project at BCU, p. 6.
¹⁷ KPFWI, para. 8.
¹⁸ CSW, paras. 15–17.
¹⁹ Ibid., para. 16.
²⁰ NKHR, para. 5.
²¹ CSW, paras. 18 and 19. See also KOA, para. 8.
²² The UPR Project at BCU, para. 19.
²³ AI, para. 36. See also JS1, paras. 2 and 3; and The UPR Project at BCU, para. 3.
²⁴ KF, para. 12.
²⁵ CSW, para. 32. See also HRF, para. 27.
²⁶ KF, p. 6.
²⁷ JS1, para. 53.
²⁸ Ibid., para. 53.
²⁹ AI, para. 20.
³⁰ CSW, para. 41.
³¹ JS1, para. 44.
³² MMC, para. 16. See also JS11, p. 4; JS13, p. 13; and HRNK, para. 24.
³³ KWAFU, para. 18.
³⁴ JFNK, pp. 1–2. See also JS7, para. 31; and JS8, para. 7.
³⁵ KOA, para. 2. See also JS7, para. 42; and HRNK, para. 24.
³⁶ HRNK, paras. 5 and 6.
³⁷ CSW, para. 24.
³⁸ HRF, para. 21.
³⁹ NKHR, para. 18. See also JS11, p. 3; JS13, pp. 12 and 13; CSW, para. 29; and HRNK, para. 15.
⁴⁰ JS1, para. 37. See also KF, para. 9.
⁴¹ CSW, para. 31. See also JS7, para. 17; and INKHR, para. 6.
⁴² KF, p. 7.
⁴³ ECP, p. 1.
⁴⁴ JS1, para. 50.
⁴⁵ Ibid., para. 49.
⁴⁶ KF, p. 6.
⁴⁷ JS6, para. 5.
⁴⁸ Ibid., para. 10.
⁴⁹ BC, para. 25.
⁵⁰ JS1, para. 53.
⁵¹ J6, p. 7.
⁵² JS1, para. 52.
⁵³ CSW, para. 30.
⁵⁴ JS6, p. 17.
⁵⁵ AI, paras. 4 and 16.
⁵⁶ AI, paras. 29 and 30. See also JS6, p. 8; and JS11, p. 6.
⁵⁷ JS6, para. 20.
⁵⁸ JS10, para. 11.
⁵⁹ JS4, p. 6.
⁶⁰ F2M, paras. 5–6 and 8.
⁶¹ CSW, para. 37.
⁶² AI, para. 32. See also JS6, p. 8; JS11, p. 5; CSW, para. 40; and KF, p. 6.
⁶³ CSW, para. 43.
⁶⁴ ECLJ, para. 12. See also JS3, paras. 14 and 15.
⁶⁵ ECLJ, para. 15.
⁶⁶ INKHR, para. 8. See also JS2, para. 21; and JS7, para. 20.
⁶⁷ JS4, pp. 8 and 9.
⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 15.
⁶⁹ NKDB, para. 7.
⁷⁰ KPFWI, para. 3.
⁷¹ JS12, para. 43.
⁷² HRF, para. 20. See also NKHR, para. 8.
⁷³ NKHR, para. 18.
⁷⁴ HRF, para. 19.
⁷⁵ NKDB, para. 11. See also BC, para. 28.

- ⁷⁶ BC, para. 28.
⁷⁷ JS9, paras. 55 and 56.
⁷⁸ IDH, para. 18.
⁷⁹ NKDB, p. 6.
⁸⁰ JS7, para. 73.
⁸¹ JS10, para. 22.
⁸² KPFWI, para. 13.
⁸³ JS5, p. 12.
⁸⁴ NKIVFA, para. 3 and 4.
⁸⁵ Ibid. para. 12 (a). See also JS7, para. 66.
⁸⁶ JS7, para. 76.
⁸⁷ INHRK, para. 9.
⁸⁸ KPFWI, para. 15. See also JS7, paras. 60 and 61.
⁸⁹ JS10, para. 37.
⁹⁰ JS12, paras. 37 and 38.
⁹¹ NKDB, para. 17.
⁹² NKIVFA, para. 12 (c).
⁹³ JS12, para. 35 and p. 11.
⁹⁴ BC, para. 20.
⁹⁵ JS10, para. 21.
⁹⁶ BC, paras. 11 and 12.
⁹⁷ Ibid., para. 16.
⁹⁸ Ibid., para. 47.
⁹⁹ Ibid., para. 19.
¹⁰⁰ NKDB, paras. 9 and 10.
¹⁰¹ BC, para. 27.
¹⁰² IDH, para. 12.
¹⁰³ NKDB, p. 6.
¹⁰⁴ Ibid., para. 15.
¹⁰⁵ JS7, para. 75. See also IDH, para. 39; and NKDB, p. 6.
¹⁰⁶ JS10, para. 27.
¹⁰⁷ NKHR, para. 18.
¹⁰⁸ JS12, para. 5.
¹⁰⁹ JS9, para. 46.
¹¹⁰ Ibid., para. 17.
¹¹¹ JS7, para. 52.
¹¹² HRNK, para. 10.
¹¹³ JS11, p. 6. See also KPFWI, para. 22.
¹¹⁴ NKDB, p. 6. See also JS9, para. 71.
¹¹⁵ KPFWI, para. 23. See also JS12, p. 11.
¹¹⁶ JS12, p. 11.
¹¹⁷ JS2, para. 43.
¹¹⁸ Ibid., para. 24.
¹¹⁹ HRNK, para. 9.
¹²⁰ JS7, para. 74.
¹²¹ KF, para. 10.
¹²² NKIVFA, para. 10.
¹²³ Ibid., para. 11.
¹²⁴ Ibid., para. 12 (d). See also JS7, para. 68.
¹²⁵ JS5, pp. 6–8.
¹²⁶ NKDB, para. 12.
¹²⁷ JS5, p. 13.
¹²⁸ IDH, para. 42.
¹²⁹ JS5, p. 14.
¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 14.
¹³¹ JS9, para. 18.
¹³² IDH, para. 6.