

《关于禁止发展、生产和储存细菌(生物)
及毒素武器和销毁此种武器的公约》
缔约国第九次审查会议

15 February 2022
Chinese
Original: English

筹备委员会

2021年12月20日和2022年4月4日至11日，日内瓦

议程项目7

全面审议《公约》的所有条款

在2017至2020年闭会期间方案过程中举行的缔约国会议所
达成的共同谅解

执行支助股提交的背景资料文件*

概要

筹备委员会决定请执行支助股编写一份关于在2017至2020年闭会期间方案过程中举行的缔约国会议所达成的共同谅解的背景资料文件(见BWC/CONF.IX/PC/2, 第27段)。执行支助股据此汇编了这份文件, 其中转载2017、2018、2019和2020年缔约国会议通过的各份报告中的实质性段落。为进一步支持缔约国筹备第九次审查会议, 本文件附件载有缔约国提交的工作文件清单和与《生物武器公约》会议参加情况有关的数据分析。

一. 导言

1. 《关于禁止发展、生产和储存细菌(生物)及毒素武器和销毁此种武器的公约》缔约国第八次审查会议《最后文件》关于决定和建议的一节中载有以下决定:¹

“6. 在2016年11月25日最后全体会议上, 会议决定缔约国举行年度会议。第一次年度会议于2017年在日内瓦举行, 从2017年12月4日开始, 为期最多5天, 争取在实质性问题 and 下一次审查会议之前时期的进程上取得进展, 以期就闭会期间进程达成协商一致。”

* 因提交方无法控制的情况, 本文件迟交。

¹ 见BWC/CONF.VIII/4, 第三部分, 第6-12段。



7. 沿循第七次审查会议商定的做法，本次审查会议商定，第一年会议将由不结盟运动和其他国家集团的一名代表主持；第二年会议由东欧集团的一名代表主持；第三年会议由西方集团的一名代表主持；第四年会议由不结盟运动和其他国家集团的一名代表主持。年度主席由两名年度副主席襄助，另两个区域集团各自推举一名年度副主席。

8. 会议决定在 2017 年至 2021 年期间比照延长第七次审查会议上商定的执行支助股的任务授权。年度会议将审议执行支助股的年度报告和在实现《公约》普遍性方面取得的进展。

9. 会议决定继续保持第七次审查会议决定建立的合作数据库。执行支助股借助有待缔约国提供的投入，将设法改进该数据库，以确保数据库更加方便用户和全面，并确保缔约国可在数据库中提供具体、及时和切实的合作表示和合作请求。

10. 为了支持和帮助更多发展中缔约国参加年度缔约国会议，会议决定更新赞助方案，由有能力的缔约国提供自愿捐款。赞助方案将继续由执行支助股管理，而执行支助股将征求缔约国会议主席和副主席的意见。

11. 会议决定，年度会议和执行支助股的费用将由《公约》所有缔约国按照联合国会费分摊比例表分摊，同时根据《公约》缔约国数目与联合国会员国数目之间的差异按比例作出调整。在这方面，会议核准 BWC/CONF.VIII/CRP.4 号文件所载的 2017 年至 2020 年费用估计。

12. 会议注意到，在新的联合国财务程序之下，必须具备资金才能举行会议。会议请缔约国收到联合国的摊款通知后尽快支付估计费用分摊额，以帮助确保会议能够如期举行。”

2. 根据第八次审查会议的上述决定，2017 年缔约国会议就以下决定达成了一致意见：²

“19. 2017 年缔约国会议讨论了供第九次审查会议之前这段时期审议的实质性和程序性问题，以期就闭会期间进程达成一致意见。就下列事项达成了一致意见：

(a) 确认了先前的 2003-2015 年闭会期间方案，保留先前的结构：先举行年度专家会议，再举行年度缔约国会议。

(b) 闭会期间方案的目的是讨论决定纳入闭会期间方案的专题并促进就其达成共同谅解和采取有效行动。

(c) 认识到需要在改进闭会期间方案与缔约国面临的财力和人力限制之间求得平衡，2018-2020 年期间每年为闭会期间方案划拨十二天时间。闭会期间的工作将遵循加强执行《公约》所有条款以更好地应对当前挑战的宗旨。为期八天的专家会议将相继举行，并至少在每次为期四天的年度缔约国会议召开 3 个月前举行。将最大限度地利用自愿捐款供资的赞助方案，以便利发展中缔约国参与闭会期间方案的各次会议。

² 见 BWC/MSP/2017/6, 第 19 段。

(d) 2018 年缔约国会议的各次会议将由一名来自东欧集团的代表担任主席，2019 年会议将由西方集团的代表担任主席，2020 年会议由不结盟运动和其他国家集团的代表担任主席。年度主席由两名年度副主席襄助，另两个区域集团各自推举一名年度副主席。除了专家会议的报告，缔约国会议还将审议执行支助股的年度报告和有关普遍加入的进展。2018 年专家会议将由不结盟运动和其他国家集团(第一次和第二次专家会议)和西方集团(第三次和第四次专家会议)担任主席，2019 年会议将由东欧集团(第一次和第二次专家会议)和不结盟运动和其他国家集团(第三次和第四次专家会议)担任主席，2020 年会议将由西方集团(第一次和第二次专家会议)和东欧集团(第三次和第四次专家会议)担任主席。每年的第五次专家会议将由担任缔约国会议主席的区域集团担任主席。

	缔约国会议	第一次专家会议	第二次专家会议	第三次专家会议	第四次专家会议	第五次专家会议
2018 年	东欧集团	不结盟运动和其他国家集团	不结盟运动和其他国家集团	西方集团	西方集团	东欧集团
2019 年	西方集团	东欧集团	东欧集团	不结盟运动和其他国家集团	不结盟运动和其他国家集团	西方集团
2020 年	不结盟运动和其他国家集团	西方集团	西方集团	东欧集团	东欧集团	不结盟运动和其他国家集团

所有会议均将比照适用第八次审查会议的《议事规则》。

(e) 专家会议将不限成员名额，并将审议下列议题：

第一次专家会议(两天)：合作和援助，特别着重于加强第十条下的合作和援助：

- 审议缔约国关于充分和全面执行第十条所有条款的报告；
- 审议执行支助股关于第七次审查会议建立并由第八次审查会议更新的援助与合作数据库运作情况的报告，并审议数据库的进一步落实，包括进一步加强数据库运作的措施，包括参照 BWC/MSP/2017/4 号文件的措施；
- 查明在充分开展用于和平目的的生物科学和技术(包括设备和材料)领域国际合作、援助和交流方面遇到的挑战和障碍，以及克服这些挑战和障碍的可能的方法和途径；
- 制定为解决差距和需求而自愿筹集资源、包括财务资源的准则和程序；
- 促进教育、培训、交流和配对方案，以及在与《公约》执行相关的生物科学和技术领域开发人力资源的其他手段，特别是在发展中国家；

- 通过国际合作促进生物安全和生物安保方面的能力建设，以及检测、报告和应对突发传染病或生物武器攻击方面的能力建设，包括戒备、应对及控制和缓解危机等领域的能力建设；
- 与国际组织和在各级防治传染病的网络协作，并展开区域和次区域合作以促进《公约》所有条款的执行。

第二次专家会议(两天): 审查与《公约》有关的科学和技术领域的发展:

- 审查与《公约》相关的科学和技术发展，包括以此加强执行《公约》的所有条款以及查明与《公约》有关的新科学技术发展的潜在益处和风险，特别关注积极影响；
- 生物风险评估和管理；
- 利用已经在《公约》范围内就此问题开展的工作，制定符合国家需求的生物科学家和所有相关人员的自愿行为守则范本，并开展生物安保教育；
- 2018 年，第二次专家会议将讨论基因组编辑这一具体主题，并酌情考虑上述问题；
- 与《公约》相关的以及与世卫组织、国际兽疫局、粮农组织、《国际植保公约》和禁化武组织等有关多边组织的活动相关的任何其他科学和技术发展。

第三次专家会议(一天): 加强国家执行:

- 与《公约》第四条有关的措施；
- 提交“建立信任措施表格”的数量和质量；
- 根据《公约》促进透明度和建立信任的各种方式；
- 第十条下的国际合作和援助的作用，以支持加强《公约》的执行；
- 与第三条有关的问题，包括充分遵守《公约》所有条款包括第十条的有效的出口管制措施。

第四次专家会议(两天): 援助、应对和戒备:

- 执行第七条所面临的实际挑战和可能的解决办法；
- 协助缔约国提交第七条框架内的援助申请的一套指导方针和格式；
- 酌情制定程序，包括建立和使用援助数据库，以改善对缔约国根据第七条提交的援助申请作出没有先决条件的迅速有效回应的程序，并改善缔约国之间及缔约国与世卫组织、国际兽疫局及粮农组织等相关国际和区域组织的协作与合作；
- 研究流动生物医学站的概念如何促进有效的援助、应对和戒备工作，以期加强《公约》的执行；

- 探讨缔约国个体和集体可采取哪些方法，协助增强对传染病爆发(无论其起源为自然还是蓄意人为)的国际响应能力；
- 探讨在针对农业、牲畜以及自然环境恶意使用生物制剂和毒素的可能情况下，有哪些戒备、应对以及提供援助的方法。

第五次专家会议(一天)：加强《公约》的机制：

- 审议在《公约》框架内通过可能的额外法律措施或其他措施进一步加强《公约》及其运作的各种方法和备选办法。

(f) 每次专家会议将编写反映其审议情况包括可能成果的记实性报告，供缔约国会议审议。所有会议，无论是专家会议还是缔约国会议，都将以协商一致方式达成任何结论或结果。缔约国会议将负责管理闭会期间方案，包括以协商一致的方式就预算和财务事项采取必要措施，以期确保闭会期间方案的适当执行。第九次审查会议将审议缔约国会议和专家会议的工作和成果，并以协商一致的方式就闭会期间方案的任何建议和任何进一步行动作出决定。”

3. 虽然 2017、2018、2019 和 2020 年缔约国会议未能达成筹备委员会所要求的像以往闭会期间方案达成的那种程度的共同谅解，但缔约国会议还是就不同问题达成了一些共同谅解，见本文件下一节。第三节从执行支助股的角度，提供了一些关于闭会期间方案的行政和程序事项的简要说明。附件提供了一些资料，可供缔约国在筹备第九次审查会议时用于对闭会期间方案的评价。

二. 共同谅解

A. 管理闭会期间方案：预算和财务事项

2017 年

4. 关于这一议程项目，2017 年缔约国会议最后报告载有以下内容：³

“20. 会议在议程项目 9 下审议了财务事项。会议关切地注意到《公约》的财务状况欠佳，特别是由于目前资金安排的系统性问题以及拖欠摊款的问题，请 2018 年缔约国会议主席与联合国日内瓦办事处、联合国裁军事务厅、执行支助股以及各缔约国协商编写一份资料文件，讨论解决缔约国商定的会议和执行支助股的财务可预测性和可持续性问题的措施，供缔约国 2018 年审议。

21. 执行支助股以两份备选方案的形式提交了 2018 年至 2020 年闭会期间方案的费用估计，分别比第八次审查会议核准的费用估计(见 [BWC/CONF.VIII/5](#))增加了五天和十天。鉴于第 19 段商定的闭会期间方案，缔约国会议同意将对这些费用估计进行调整，并作为 [BWC/MSP/2017/5](#) 号文件尽快分发给缔约国。”

³ 见 [BWC/MSP/2017/6](#), 第 20-21 段。

2018 年

5. 关于这一议程项目，2018 年缔约国会议最后报告载有以下内容：⁴

“20. 会议审议了主席 Ljupčo Jivan Gjorgjinski 先生根据 BWC/MSP/2017/6 第 20 段编写的资料文件(BWC/MSP/2018/5)。这份文件研究了财务状况，提出了处理可预测性和可持续性问题的可能措施，以期确保闭会期间方案的恰当执行。2018 年 12 月 5 日，联合国日内瓦办事处行政司司长克莱门斯·亚当斯先生介绍了《公约》的缴款情况和财务前景。亚当斯先生和联合国裁军事务厅日内瓦办事处主任安雅·卡斯佩森女士回答了代表团的提问。缔约国认识到，《公约》遇到财务困难，主要有三个原因：一些缔约国不缴纳摊款，另一些缔约国拖欠摊款，以及联合国关于并非由联合国正常预算供资的活动的财务规定。为处理这些情况，缔约国会议核可采取以下措施：

A. 鼓励及时缴款的措施

21. 缔约国会议：

(a) 强调，缔约国及时、全额缴纳年度摊款对《公约》的财务可持续性和闭会期间工作方案的充分执行来说无疑至关重要，并强调缔约国应当履行其在《公约》之下的义务；

(b) 请拖欠摊款的缔约国尽早缴纳未付款项；

(c) 注意到一些缔约国在履行资金义务方面遇到的困难，请缔约国会议主席与这些缔约国联系，以便更好地了解不缴纳摊款的原因，并鼓励它们立即支付款项；

(d) 呼吁所有缔约国尽早支付发票，并在可行情况下于年初之前支付；

(e) 请联合国日内瓦办事处至少于年初之前 90 天发送发票。

B. 确保流动资金的措施

22. 缔约国会议商定：

(a) 在考虑到前三年的平均收取率和付款形态的情况下，作为一项临时措施(第九次审查会议将对这项措施进行审议，以看其是否有效，并且还将探索由摊款供资的可能性)，在采取其它可能步骤确保流动资金之前，设立一个周转基金，这个基金将通过自愿捐款供资，并且仅用作收到合理预期的缴款之前的短期资金来源。从周转基金中提用的款额将在 12 个月中由缔约国的年度摊款补还。为确保核准方案和活动的延续性，应当优先考虑为执行支助股的合同供资；

(b) 每个财务年度的账户将在随后的 12 个月中保持未结清状态，相关账户届时应当结清，最终余额得到确定，并且将任何剩余资金发还缔约

⁴ 见 BWC/MSP/2018/6, 第 20-24 段。

国，作为其下次摊款的抵免。财务年度终了时未使用的余额可作为短期资金来源，为这一过渡时期规定开展的活动供资。

C. 避免赤字支出/债务积累的措施

23. 缔约国会议：

(a) 申明特定年份的资金义务将限于一个以前三年的平均收取率为基础的数额，除非该年份的缴款显示，这一水平将被超出。主席将在与其它主席团成员协商的情况下管控经核可的工作计划可能受到的影响，并且以公开、透明和协商的方式行事；

(b) 确认未付缴款拖欠款应当仍为相关缔约国收到的发票开列的所涉年份的最初摊款额；

(c) 请联合国根据特定财务年度账户结清之后的最终现金余额，计算在这个财务年度付款的缔约国应得的贷方余额；

(d) 决定签署国和非签署观察员国的代表团应当根据在《联合国分摊比额表》中承担的份额，分担它们出席了会议的费用。

D. 进一步措施

24. 缔约国会议还：

(a) 请联合国日内瓦办事处和执行支助股定期报告周转基金的支出、收取和使用情况；

(b) 请 2019 年缔约国会议主席(在充分征求并听取缔约国的意见的情况下)、联合国裁军事务厅和联合国日内瓦办事处确定进一步措施，包括鼓励付款的可能措施，供 2019 年缔约国会议审议；

(c) 决心继续监测《公约》的财务状况，并请 2019 年缔约国会议主席在与联合国裁军事务厅和联合国日内瓦办事处密切协商的前提下，报告《公约》总体财务状况，以上措施的执行情况，以及促成按规定及时付款可能的进一步措施，供 2019 年缔约国会议审议。”

2019 年

6. 关于这一议程项目，2019 年缔约国会议最后报告载有以下内容：⁵

“22. 会议审议了主席编写的关于《公约》总体财务状况的报告(BWC/MSP/2019/5)。执行支助股股长丹尼尔·费克斯先生于 2019 年 12 月 5 日介绍了《公约》的缴款状况和财务前景。

23. 缔约国注意到主席编写的报告和执行支助股提供的简报。继缔约国会议 2018 年核可采取措施包括设立营运基金之后，今年的财政状况有所改善，缔约各国对此表示欢迎。缔约各国强调需要继续监测《公约》的财务状况，并请 2020 年缔约国会议主席与缔约各国、执行支助股、联合国裁军事

⁵ BWC/MSP/2019/7, 第 22-23 段。

务厅和联合国日内瓦办事处密切协商，以透明的方式报告《公约》的总体财务状况、2018 年核可的措施的执行情况以及可能采取的进一步措施供 2020 年缔约国会议审议，同时考虑到足额缴纳会费的缔约国的未偿还贷项，以便按要求及时付款。”

2020 年

7. 关于这一议程项目，2020 年缔约国会议最后报告载有以下内容：⁶

“21. 会议审议了主席编写的关于《公约》总体财务状况的报告(BWC/MSP/2020/5)。执行支助股股长丹尼尔·费克斯先生于 2021 年 11 月 25 日介绍了《公约》的缴款状况和财务前景。

22. 缔约国注意到主席编写的报告和执行支助股提供的简报。缔约国强调需要继续监测《公约》的财务状况并探讨为稳定这一状况而可能采取的进一步措施，供第九次审查会议审议。缔约国注意到 2018 年缔约国会议核可的措施，包括设立周转基金，第九次审查会议将审议这项措施。

23. 除 2018 年缔约国会议核可的措施之外，缔约国还商定：

(a) 作为对 2018 年缔约国会议最后报告第 21(e)段的后续行动，请联合国日内瓦办事处至少在财务期起始日 90 天之前或缔约国通过下一财务期预算之日起 60 天以后(以较晚日期为准)依据估计费用发送发票，以鼓励有能力的国家尽早缴款并提高流动性；

(b) 贷记额依据编订临时摊款额时使用的联合国分摊比率计算。”

B. 审议专家会议反映会议审议情况包括可能成果的纪实性报告

2018 年

8. 关于这一议程项目，2018 年缔约国会议最后报告载有以下内容：⁷

“25. 根据 2017 年缔约国会议的决定，缔约国在专家会议上继续就关于加强《公约》的议题寻求共同谅解和有效行动。

26. 没有就专家会议的审议包括任何可能的结果达成协商一致。”

2019 年

9. 关于这一议程项目，2019 年缔约国会议最后报告载有以下内容：⁸

“24. 根据 2017 年缔约国会议的决定，缔约国在专家会议上继续就关于加强《公约》的议题寻求共同谅解和有效行动。

25. 未就专家会议的审议包括任何可能的结果达成协商一致。

26. 各专家会议在日内瓦举行，审议了 2017 年缔约国会议分配的议题。合作和援助(特别侧重加强第十条之下的合作和援助)问题专家会议由格鲁吉亚

⁶ 见 BWC/MSP/2020/7, 第 21-23 段。

⁷ 见 BWC/MSP/2018/6, 第 25-26 段。

⁸ 见 BWC/MSP/2019/7, 第 24-27 段。

的维克多·多利兹大使主持于 2019 年 7 月 29 日至 30 日在日内瓦举行。审查与《公约》有关的科学和技术领域发展情况专家会议由白俄罗斯的尤里·尼古拉奇克先生主持于 2019 年 7 月 31 日和 8 月 2 日举行。加强国家执行问题专家会议由南非的勒博冈·菲莱拉女士主持于 2019 年 8 月 5 日举行。援助、反应和戒备问题专家会议由巴基斯坦的乌斯曼·伊克巴尔·贾登先生主持于 2019 年 8 月 6 日至 7 日举行。加强《公约》体制问题专家会议由瑞士的洛朗·马斯梅让先生主持于 2019 年 8 月 8 日举行。

27. 缔约国会议对各专家会议的主席表示感谢，并注意到载于 [BWC/MSP/2019/MX.1/2](#)、[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/2](#)、[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/2](#)、[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/2](#) 和 [BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/2](#) 号文件的专家会议报告。缔约国会议注意到专家会议开展的工作和进行的讨论的价值。”

2020 年

10. 关于这一议程项目，2020 年缔约国会议最后报告载有以下内容：⁹

“24. 根据 2017 年缔约国会议的决定，缔约国在专家会议上继续就关于加强《公约》的议题寻求共同谅解和有效行动。

25. 各专家会议在日内瓦举行，审议了 2017 年缔约国会议分配的议题。如每次专家会议的报告所示，会议原定于 2020 年 8 月 25 日至 9 月 3 日举行。然而，会议因 2019 冠状病毒病(COVID-19)大流行而推迟数次，按照缔约国以书面默许程序达成的协议，改为 2021 年 8 月 30 日至 9 月 8 日在日内瓦万国宫举行。合作和援助(特别侧重加强第十条之下的合作和援助)问题专家会议由芬兰的基莫·劳卡宁先生主持，于 2021 年 8 月 30 日至 31 日举行。审查与《公约》有关的科学和技术领域发展情况专家会议由日本的中井一浩先生主持，于 2021 年 9 月 1 日至 2 日举行。加强国家执行问题专家会议由哈萨克斯坦的阿尔曼·拜索诺夫先生主持，于 2021 年 9 月 3 日举行。援助、反应和戒备问题专家会议由北马其顿的埃莱娜·库兹曼诺夫斯卡·比翁迪奇大使主持，于 2021 年 9 月 6 日至 7 日举行。加强《公约》体制问题专家会议由巴拿马的格里塞勒·德尔卡门·罗德里格斯·拉米雷斯女士主持，于 2021 年 9 月 8 日举行。

26. 缔约国会议对各专家会议的主席表示感谢，并注意到载于 [BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/2](#)、[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/2/Rev.1](#)、[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.3/2](#)、[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.4/2](#) 和 [BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/2](#) 号文件的专家会议报告。缔约国会议注意到专家会议开展的工作和进行的讨论的价值。

27. 会议审议了关于如何反映专家会议审议情况包括可能成果的提案，但审议未得出结果。

28. 缔约国会议欢迎专家会议的实质性讨论。未就专家会议的审议包括任何可能的成果达成协商一致。”

⁹ 见 [BWC/MSP/2020/7](#)，第 24-28 段。

三. 执行支助股关于行政和程序事项的说明

11. 2017 年缔约国会议商定的 2018-2020 年闭会期间方案与以往闭会期间方案的做法不同。以往闭会期间方案的所有年度会议都由同一人主持(专家会议和缔约国会议), 而 2018-2020 年闭会期间方案举行了五次单独的专家会议, 每次会议由不同的人主持, 而缔约国会议由另一人主持。这一新的模式增加了复杂性, 意味着必须在协调问题方面花费大量时间, 但同时也意味着所有区域集团和一些缔约国每一年期间都在处理《生物武器公约》事项。定期举行“主席团”会议对于保持对闭会期间方案的协调和监督十分重要, 在 COVID-19 疫情期间尤为关键。新的模式还更明确地区分了以技术为重点的专家会议和以政治为重点的缔约国会议。

12. 与 2012-2015 年闭会期间方案每年只有 10 天会议相比, 2018-2020 年闭会期间方案专门用于《生物武器公约》讨论的天数略有增加, 但没有达到 2003-2005 年闭会期间方案每年举行 15 天会议的程度。尽管与 2012 年至 2015 年举行的会议相比时间有所增加, 但仍发生分配的时间不够的情况。2019 年加强国家执行问题专家会议就是这种情况: 每次缔约国会议更是如此, 四天似乎不足以完成分配给会议的所有任务。

13. 在 2018-2020 年闭会期间方案过程中, 财务问题占用了大量时间, 远远多于以往任何一个周期。2018 年、2019 年和 2020 年缔约国会议有一个具体的议程项目——“管理闭会期间方案: 预算和财务事项”, 2018 年缔约国会议在该议程项目下核可了一系列财务措施, 大大改善了《公约》的财务状况。每次缔约国会议主席都提交了一份关于《公约》总体财务状况的报告, 2020 年缔约国会议还商定了其他财务措施。然而, 一些缔约国仍有大量欠款, 主席不得不花大量时间鼓励缔约国缴纳欠款, 并取得了一些成功。

14. COVID-19 疫情显然对 2018-2020 年闭会期间方案产生了重大影响, 导致原定于 2020 年举行的会议推迟了近一年。为了进行非正式讨论并保持对《生物武器公约》问题的参与, 2020 年缔约国会议主席请执行支助股与专家会议主席合作举办非正式网络研讨会。参加这些网络研讨会的人数众多, 即使无法举行正式会议, 也可就各种问题进行非正式讨论。

15. 疫情加快了其他技术的创新和正常化。在疫情之前, 《生物武器公约》会议已经通过联合国网络电视进行现场直播, 这一做法现在已成为标准做法。会议录像进行了存档, 可直接从《生物武器公约》网站的会议网页上查找, 同时提供自动生成的会议文字版本。¹⁰ 在闭会期间方案过程中对会议室基础设施进行的升级也使专家更容易进行技术专题介绍和播放预先录制的视频信息。

16. 执行支助股希望, 这些关于行政和程序事项的简要介绍可供缔约国在评估 2018-2020 年闭会期间方案和审议第九次审查会议之后可能的后续闭会期间方案时使用。

¹⁰ 《生物武器公约》的会议网页链接, 见: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/biological-weapons/about/meetings/>。

Annex I

[English only]

Working papers submitted by States Parties (2017-2020)

MX1 - Cooperation and Assistance, with a Particular Focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X

2018 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.1](#) - Australia's Article X report for 2016 and 2017 – Submitted by Australia

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.2](#) - Promotion of Capacity Building: Sustainable Laboratories for High Consequence Pathogens - Submitted by Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.3](#) - Report on BWC Implementation Workshop Rabat, Morocco, 10-11 May 2018 - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.4](#) - Outcome of the International Workshop on Cooperation and Assistance under Article X – Submitted by Norway

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.5](#) - Institutional Mechanism for International Co-operation and Compliance with Article X - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the BWC

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.6](#) - Cooperation and Assistance, with a particular focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.7](#) - Report on Implementation of Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.8](#) - Comparative review of biological threats needs assessment and national action plans implemented under BTWC, EU CBRN Centres of Excellence, WHO (IHR-JEE), and 1540 UNSCR, African Regional Conference, 25-26 October 2017, Rabat, Morocco - Submitted by the European Union

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.9](#) - Improving the Utility and Functioning of the BWC Assistance and Cooperation Database - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.10](#) - Participation of the Russian Federation in implementation of the Article X of the BTWC - Submitted by the Russian Federation

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.11](#) - Implementación del Artículo X de la Convención de Armas Biológicas (CAB) – Submitted by Cuba (Spanish only)

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/WP.12](#) - Cooperation and Assistance, with a particular Focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

2019 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.1/WP.1](#) - Facilitating the fullest possible exchange of science and technology under Article X - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.1/WP.2](#) - Capacity Building through International Cooperation: The British Medical Journal's Clinical Decision Support Training Initiative - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.1/WP.3](#) - Institutional Mechanism for International Cooperation and Compliance with Article X - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.1/WP.4](#) - Cooperation and Assistance, with a particular focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.1/WP.5](#) - Report on implementation of Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.1/WP.6](#) - Cooperation and Assistance, with a particular Focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the BWC

2020 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.1](#) - Report on Implementation of Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.2](#) - What constitutes assistance and cooperation under Article X ? -Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.3](#) - Proposal for establishment of an international platform dedicated to biosecurity and biosafety: SecBio - Submitted by France

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.4](#) - Contributions to the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic - Submitted by the United States

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.5](#) - Pandemia as catalyst to enhance cooperation and assistance? Germany's continued implementation of Article X under the special circumstances of COVID-19 - Submitted by Germany

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.6](#) - Challenges and obstacles to international cooperation, assistance and exchange in the biological sciences and technology under Article X - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.1/WP.7](#) - Difficulties and obstacles faced by Cuba for the full implementation of Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by Cuba

MX2 - Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention

2018 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.1](#) - Germany's best practice in handling (bio)security-relevant research: Self-governance organized by the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina and the German Research Foundation (DFG) - Submitted by Germany

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.2](#) - Technical Working Paper on Genome Editing and Other Scientific and Technological Developments of Relevance to the Convention - Submitted by Switzerland

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.3](#) - Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention - Genome editing – Submitted by Australia

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.4](#) - Genome editing: addressing implications for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.5](#) - Recent Advances in Gene Editing and Synthesis Technologies and their Implications - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.6](#) - Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention - Genome Editing - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.7](#) - Report of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on Developments in Science and Technology for the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention - Note by the Implementation Support Unit

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.8](#) - Response by the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on the Report of the Scientific Advisory Board of the on Developments in Science and Technology for the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention - Note by the Implementation Support Unit

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.9](#) - Proposal for the development of a model code of conduct for biological scientists under the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by China and Pakistan

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.10](#) - Códigos de Conducta en el Marco de la Convención de Armas Biológicas – Submitted by Cuba

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.11](#) - Nuevos adelantos de la Ciencia y la Tecnología en la Esfera de la Biología, en particular la Edición de Genes y la Biología Sintética – Submitted by Cuba

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/WP.12](#) - Review of Developments in the field of Science and Technology related to the Convention - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement

2019 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.1](#) - Rethinking the BTWC science and technology review: A renewed case for a BTWC Scientific and Technological Experts Advisory Forum (STEAF) - Submitted by Germany, co-sponsored by the Netherlands and Sweden

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.1/Corr.1](#) - Rethinking the BTWC science and technology review: A renewed case for a BTWC Scientific and Technological Experts Advisory Forum (STEAF) - Submitted by Germany, co-sponsored by Chile, the Netherlands and Sweden

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.2](#) - Scientific and Technological Developments of Relevance to the Convention and the Assessment of Benefits and Risks - Submitted by Switzerland

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.3](#) - Approaches to Risk and Benefit Assessment for Advances in the Life Sciences - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.4](#) - Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention – Synthetic biology - Submitted by Australia

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.5](#) - Scientific and Technological Developments of Relevance to the Convention - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.6](#) - Biological risk assessment and management: some further considerations - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.2/WP.7](#) - Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the BWC

2020 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.1](#) - Approaches to Governance for Scientific and Technological Advances in the Life Sciences Relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.2](#) - Biorisk management standards and their role in BTWC implementation - Submitted by Austria, Belgium, Chile, France, Germany, Iraq, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain and Thailand

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.3](#) - Biological risk assessment and management: a need for guiding principles and frameworks-Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.4](#) - Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Proposal for the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee - Submitted by the Russian Federation

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.5*](#) - Exploring Science and Technology Review Mechanisms under the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by Germany

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.6](#) - The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists - Submitted by China and Pakistan

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.6/Corr.1](#) - The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists - Submitted by China and Pakistan, co-sponsored by Brazil

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.7](#) - A Scientific and Technological Advisory Process for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United States

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.8](#) - Summary of October 2020 Experts' Meeting on Strengthening Laboratory Biorisk Management - Submitted by the United States

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.9](#) - Benefits of science and technology developments for the global COVID-19 response - Submitted by the United States

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.10](#) - Managing Biosafety and Biosecurity Risks: The Importance of Codes of Conduct and a BTWC Science and Technology Advisory Process - Submitted by Switzerland

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.11](#) - Review Process of Science and Technology Developments relevant to the BWC: Some Considerations - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.2/WP.12](#) - Examen de los adelantos en la esfera de la ciencia y la tecnología relacionados con la Convención - Presentado por Cuba

MX3 – Strengthening National Implementation

2018 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.1/Rev.1](#) - El transporte de agentes biológicos debe protegerse con medidas de Biocustodia - Submitted by Chile, Colombia, Panama and Spain (unofficial English translation in the annex)

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.2](#) - Building Confidence in Compliance: Peer Review Transparency Exercise at the Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Research (CPHR) of the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health (NCDC) in Tbilisi, Georgia - Submitted by Georgia, co-sponsored by Germany

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.3](#) - Improving the Quality of CBM Information: A Review of Recent Proposals and Some Suggestions for Future Work - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.4](#) - Strengthening national implementation: The UK Biological Security Strategy 2018 - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.5](#) - Séminaire sur la mise en œuvre de la Convention sur l'Interdiction des Armes Biologiques et à Toxines (Rabat, 10 et 11 Mai 2018) - Submitted by Morocco

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.6](#) - Step-by-Step Approach to CBM Participation Submitted by Japan, Co-sponsored by Australia, Germany, Malaysia, and Switzerland

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.6/Corr.1](#) - Step-by-Step Approach to CBM Participation Submitted by Japan, Co-sponsored by Australia, Germany, Malaysia, Republic of Korea and Switzerland

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.7](#) - National Implementation under Article IV - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.8](#) - Cumplimiento de las Disposiciones de la Convención de Armas Biológicas (CAB) – Submitted by Cuba

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.9](#) - Strengthening National Implementation - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

2019 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/WP.1](#) - Strengthening National Implementation: The United States National Biodefense Strategy - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/WP.2/Rev.1](#) - Proposals to Enhance Confidence-Building Measures Participation - Submitted by Japan, co-sponsored by Australia, Germany, Malaysia and Republic of Korea

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/WP.3](#) - National Implementation under Article IV - Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/WP.4](#) - Confidence Building Measure G - Declaration of Vaccine Production Facilities: identifying additional relevant facilities - Submitted by Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/WP.5](#) - An Exchange Platform for Voluntary Transparency Exercises - Submitted by France

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/WP.6](#) - Strengthening National Implementation - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

2020 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.3/WP.1](#) - Online training course for Biological Weapons Convention National Contact Points in Southeast Asia : a model approach for other regions - Submitted by Japan

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.3/WP.2](#) - U.S. Project to Strengthen BWC National Implementation: An Offer of Assistance - Submitted by the United States

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.3/WP.3](#) - Strengthening National Implementation: The National Biorisk Management Committee in Iraq (Overview) - Submitted by the Republic of Iraq

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.3/WP.4](#) - An exchange Platform for voluntary transparency exercises: Terms of reference - Submitted by Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Spain

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.3/WP.5](#) - Fortalecimiento de la Implementación Nacional - Presentado por Cuba

MX4 – Assistance, Response and Preparedness

2018 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.1](#) - Assistance and protection from biological weapons in the context of Article VII of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the Russian Federation (unofficial English translation in the annex)

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.2](#) - The United Kingdom public health rapid support team concept - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.3](#) - Implementation of Article VII - Submitted by South Africa

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.4](#) - Provision of assistance to a State Party that has been exposed as a result of a violation of the Convention - Submitted by South Africa

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.5](#) - Recent International Developments Relevant to Article VII - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.6](#) - Australia's Health Security Initiative: Strengthening regional response capabilities for infectious disease outbreaks - Submitted by Australia

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.7](#) - Strengthening Cooperation among States Parties and Relevant International Organizations in Response to Deliberate Spread of Infectious Diseases - Submitted by Japan, co-sponsored by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.8](#) - A contribution to the discussions on the practical challenges facing the implementation of Article VII, and possible solutions - Submitted by Canada

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.9](#) - Strengthening Article VII: International Cooperation and Assistance in Preparing for and Responding to Biological Incidents - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.10](#) - Investigations of Alleged Biological Weapons Use: Overlap with Public Health Assistance under Article VII of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/WP.11](#) - Assistance, response and preparedness - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

2019 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.1](#) - An integrated approach to preparedness, detection, and response to agricultural threats: The experience of the United States - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.2](#) - Update on Australia's Health Security Initiative for the Indo-Pacific region: Strengthening regional response capabilities for infectious disease outbreaks - Submitted by Australia

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.3](#) - Approach to Strengthening Measures for Emerging Infectious Diseases based on Lessons Learned from the Ebola Outbreak - Submitted by Japan

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.4](#) - Strengthening National, Sub-Regional and International Capacities to Prepare for and Respond to the Deliberate Use of Biological Weapons: Project update - Submitted by Japan

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.5](#) - Possible hostile use of biological agents and toxins against livestock: Existing support mechanisms by relevant international organizations and capacity

building efforts by Canada through the G7-Led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction - Submitted by Canada

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.6](#) - Core Elements for an Effective Article VII Response: the need for an international coordinating body - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.4/WP.7](#) - Assistance, response and preparedness - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the BWC

2020 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.4/WP.1](#) - Strengthening National, Sub-Regional and International Capacities to Prepare for and Respond to the Deliberate Use of Biological Weapons”: Project update - Submitted by Japan

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.4/WP.2](#) - Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Operationalising mobile biomedical units to deliver protection against biological weapons, investigate their alleged use, and to suppress epidemics of various etiology- Submitted by the Russian Federation

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.4/WP.3](#) - Proposal for the establishment of a database for assistance under Article VII of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: specific pending issues and way forward for the operationalization of the proposal - Submitted by India and France

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.4/WP.3/Corr.1](#) - Proposal for the establishment of a database for assistance under Article VII of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: specific pending issues and way forward for the operationalization of the proposal - Submitted by India and France

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.4/WP.4*](#) - Lessons Learned in International Cooperation and Assistance from an Agricultural Incident - Submitted by the United States

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.4/WP.5](#) - Strengthening Capacities in Responding to and Preparing for the Deliberate Use of Biological Weapons: Lessons Learned from UNSGM Table Top Exercise 2020 and Outlook to the Capstone Field Exercise - Submitted by Germany

MX5 – Institutional Strengthening of the Convention

2018 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.5/WP.1](#) - Investigation framework to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by Japan

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.5/WP.2](#) - Further strengthen the Convention and its functioning - Submitted by Cuba

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.5/WP.3](#) - Institutional Strengthening of the BWC - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2018/MX.5/WP.4](#) - Institutional Strengthening of the Convention - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

2019 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/WP.1](#) - Institutional strengthening of the Convention: Reflections on the 2001 Protocol and the verification challenge - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/WP.2](#) - Utilizing the Convention's Tools to Strengthen its Institutional Functions - Submitted by the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/WP.3](#) - International conference "Global biosecurity challenges. Problems and solutions", Sochi, 20-21 June 2019 – Submitted by the Russian Federation [unofficial English translation in annex]

[BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/WP.4](#) - Institutional Strengthening of the Convention - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States Parties to the BWC

2020 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.1](#) - Review conferences, decision making and future institutional strengthening of the Convention-Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.2](#) - Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Proposal for the BWC Article VI Implementation - Submitted by the Russian Federation

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.3](#) - Proposal for inclusion in the final document of the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the Russian Federation

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.4](#) - Concept note on the creation of an International Agency for Biological Safety (IABS) - Submitted by Kazakhstan

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.5](#) - III International research and practical Conference "Global Biosecurity Challenges. Problems and Solutions" (Sochi, 24-25 June 2021) - Submitted by the Russian Federation

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.5/Corr.1](#) - III International research and practical Conference "Global Biosecurity Challenges. Problems and Solutions" (Sochi, 24-25 June 2021) - Submitted by the Russian Federation

[BWC/MSP/2020/MX.5/WP.6](#) - Enhancing Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment as an Integral Part of the Institutional Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) - Submitted by Panama

Meetings of States Parties

2017 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.1](#) - Peer Review Exercise on the National Implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (Morocco 9-11 May 2017) - Submitted by Morocco

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.2](#) - Need to establish a BWC science and technology review process - Submitted by Switzerland

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.3](#) - Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention through a reinforced intersessional work programme - Submitted by the members of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the European Union

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.4](#) - Peer Review in the BWC Context. Working with Colleagues to Strengthen the Convention: Possible roles for a BWC Peer Review as a Transparency and Confidence-Building Measure - Submitted by Germany

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.5](#) - Efforts of Kyrgyzstan in implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by Kyrgyzstan

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.6](#) - Confidence Building Measure G - Declaration of Vaccine Production Facilities: Potential for Missed Reporting of Relevant Facilities - Submitted by the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.7](#) - Report on Implementation of Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.8](#) - Intersessional Programme - Submitted by Cuba

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.9](#) - The Mantra of Confidence Building: Proposal for the 2018 2020 Intersessional Process - Submitted by Germany, Japan and the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.10](#) - Elements of a Possible Intersessional Process - Submitted by Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.11](#) - Biopreparedness field training exercises: national and international capacity-building - Submitted by Portugal

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.12](#) - Institutional Mechanism for International Cooperation and Compliance with Article X – Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.13](#) – Visitas Voluntarias: Un instrumento para una mejor cooperación en el marco de la CABT - Presentado por Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, España, Guatemala, México, República Dominicana, Panamá, Paraguay y Perú

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.13/Corr.1](#) – Visitas Voluntarias: Un instrumento para una mejor cooperación en el marco de la CABT - Presentado por Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, España, Guatemala, México, República Dominicana, Panamá, Paraguay y Perú

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.14](#) - Step-by-Step Approach to CBM Participation - Submitted by Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea and Switzerland

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.15](#) - Strengthening cooperation with international organizations - Submitted by Australia, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.17](#) - International activities of Global Partnership Member Countries related to Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by: Canada, Denmark, European Union, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.16](#) - Analyse des risques et menaces biologiques – Soumis par la France

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.18](#) - The European Union's continued support for strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by the European Union

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.19](#) - Implementation of Articles IV and X of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the Republic of Korea

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.20](#) - Responding to deliberate biological release: the requirements for effective, coordinated international action - Submitted by Canada, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.21](#) - Intersessional Programme - Submitted by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.22](#) - Awareness-raising, education and outreach: recent developments - Submitted by Ukraine, Japan, UK

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.22/Corr.1](#) - Awareness-raising, education and outreach: recent developments - Submitted by Ukraine, Japan, UK

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.23](#) - Dificultades y obstáculos que enfrenta Cuba para la plena aplicación del Artículo X de la Convención sobre Armas Biológicas - Presentado por Cuba

[BWC/MSP/2017/WP.24](#) - Submitted by Malaysia and the United States of America - Report on BWC relevant developments by International Expert

2018 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2018/WP.1](#) - Strengthening implementation of Article III of the BTWC - Submitted by India and the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2018/WP.2](#) - Article X reports: Australia's approach to structure and content - Submitted by Australia

[BWC/MSP/2018/WP.3](#) - Dificultades y obstáculos que enfrenta Cuba para la plena aplicación del Artículo X de la Convención sobre Armas Biológicas - Submitted by Cuba (unofficial English translation contained in the annex)

[BWC/MSP/2018/WP.4](#) - Approach to Strengthening Measures for Emerging Infectious Diseases based on Lessons Learned from the Ebola Outbreak - Submitted by Japan

[BWC/MSP/2018/WP.5](#) - Building Confidence through Transparency: Peer Review Transparency Visit at the Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Research of the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health in Tbilisi, Georgia - Submitted by Georgia and Germany, co-sponsored by Austria, Belgium, Columbia, Iraq, Hungary, Malaysia, Mali, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2018/WP.5/Corr.1](#) - Submitted by Georgia and Germany, co-sponsored by Austria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Iraq, Malaysia, Mali, Montenegro, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America

[BWC/MSP/2018/WP.6](#) - Core Elements for an Effective Article VII Response - Submitted by the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (unofficial Russian translation contained in the annex)

[BWC/MSP/2018/WP.7](#) - Proposal for establishment of a database for assistance in the framework of Article VII of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by France and India

[BWC/MSP/2018/WP.8](#) - Report of the Regional Workshop for Central Asian States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention on scientific and practical implementation issues (Almaty, Kazakhstan, 23-24 October 2018) - Submitted by Kazakhstan, co-sponsored by Germany

[BWC/MSP/2018/WP.9](#) - International Activities of Global Partnership Member Countries related to Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by Canada, Denmark, European Union, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States

[BWC/MSP/2018/WP.10](#) - A new initiative to promote voluntary transparency and confidence building measures - Submitted by France

[BWC/MSP/2018/WP.11](#) - Transparency visit to the Lugar Center, Georgia: An Independent Report – Submitted by Georgia

2019 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2019/WP.1](#) - Dificultades y obstáculos que enfrenta Cuba para la plena aplicación del Artículo X de la Convención sobre Armas Biológicas - Presentado por Cuba [Unofficial English translation - [Difficulties and obstacles faced by Cuba for the full implementation of Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention](#)]

[BWC/MSP/2019/WP.2](#) - Fortalecimiento Institucional de la Convención de Armas Biológicas - Presentado por Cuba [Unofficial English translation - [Institutional Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention](#)]

[BWC/MSP/2019/WP.3](#) - Report on Germany's Implementation of Article X with a special focus on the "German Biosecurity Programme" - Submitted by Germany

[BWC/MSP/2019/WP.4](#) - Investigating alleged use of biological agents against agriculture, livestock and the natural environment: A practical approach - Submitted by Portugal

[BWC/MSP/2019/WP.5](#) - Implementation of Articles IV and X of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the Republic of Korea

2020 Working papers

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.1](#) - Proposal to enhance the format of confidence-building measures under the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the Russian Federation

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.2](#) - Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Proposal for the BWC Article VI Implementation - Submitted by the Russian Federation

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.3](#) - Proposal for the establishment of a database for assistance under Article VII of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Submitted by France and India

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.4](#) - An exchange Platform for voluntary transparency exercises: terms of reference - Submitted by Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands and Spain

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.5](#) - Proposal for establishment of an international platform dedicated to biosecurity and biosafety: SecBio - Submitted by France

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.6](#) - Enhancing Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment as an Integral Part of the Institutional Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.7](#) - The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists - Submitted by China and Pakistan, Co-sponsored by Brazil

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.8](#) - Implementation of Articles IV and X of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the Republic of Korea

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.9](#) - Report on Implementation of Article X of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction - Submitted by the Russian Federation

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.10](#) - Difficulties and obstacles faced by Cuba for the full implementation of Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by Cuba

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.11](#) - Article X Cooperation and Laboratory Support: The Example of the Biological Threat Reduction Program - Submitted by the United States of the America

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.12](#) - Current Trends and their Implications to the Biological Weapons Convention - Submitted by the United States of the America

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.13](#) - Progress on Dissemination of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists - Submitted by China and Pakistan

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.14](#) - Nomination for the Presidency of the Ninth BWC Review Conference - Submitted by India

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.15](#) - Concept note and chart produced by the Chairperson of the 2020 Meeting of Experts on Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention - Submitted by Japan

[BWC/MSP/2020/WP.16](#) - Proposals to the BWC MSP 2020 Draft Final Report - Submitted by the Russian Federation

Annex II

[English only]

Gender distribution at BWC meetings from 2017 to 2020

The charts below shows that participation by gender in BWC meetings is not equal, as more men are represented than women, for both the Meetings of States Parties, as well as the Meetings of Experts.

The data below are based on registrations in the online Indico system, and include the following categories of participants: States Parties, Signatory States, States not party, and experts from international organizations, as well as Non-Governmental Organizations.

Figure I




Figure II

