Letter dated 19 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament

In my capacity as Chair of the First Preparatory Committee of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was held from 2 to 12 May in Vienna, I would kindly like to request you to issue the following 3 documents as document of the Conference on Disarmament:

- Report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session;
- Chair’s factual summary (working paper);
- Towards 2020: reflections of the Chair of the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee.

(Signed) Henk Cor van der Kwast
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament
Ambassador at large
Report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session

I. Introduction

1. At its seventieth session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 70/28, took note of the decision of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, following appropriate consultations, to hold the first session of the Preparatory Committee in Vienna from 2 to 12 May 2017.

2. Accordingly, the first session of the Preparatory Committee was opened on 2 May 2017 by Thomas Markram, Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

3. At the 1st meeting of the Preparatory Committee, on 2 May, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, delivered a statement.

4. At the 1st meeting of the Preparatory Committee, on 2 May, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Lassina Zerbo, delivered a statement.

5. At the 9th meeting of the Preparatory Committee, on 8 May, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, delivered a statement.

6. The following 114 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons participated in the work of the Preparatory Committee at its first session: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

7. The Preparatory Committee held 16 meetings, of which summary records were provided for the opening meeting (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.1/SR.1), the general debate (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.1/SR.1-6) and the closing meeting.

(NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/SR.16), in accordance with a decision taken by the Committee. The summary records are issued separately from the present report (see annex).

8. Ioan Tudor, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Office for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Committee. Cornel Feruta, Chief Coordinator, Director General’s Office for Coordination, International Atomic Energy Agency, represented the Agency.

II. Substantive and procedural issues

A. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee

9. With regard to the chairmanship of the various sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the presidency of the 2020 Review Conference, an understanding had been reached among delegations, according to which a representative of the Western Group should be proposed to chair the first session, a representative of the Group of Eastern European States should be proposed to chair the second session, a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be proposed to chair the third session and a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty should be proposed for the presidency of the 2020 Review Conference. All groups were encouraged to propose the representatives for the chairmanship of the various sessions of the Preparatory Committee and for the presidency of the 2020 Review Conference at their earliest possible convenience.

10. Pursuant to that understanding, Ambassador Henk Cor van der Kwast, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament, the representative of the Western Group, was proposed to chair the first session. At its 1st meeting, on 2 May, the Preparatory Committee elected Mr. van der Kwast by acclamation to serve as Chair of the first session.

11. At its 1st meeting, on 2 May, the Preparatory Committee adopted the following agenda (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/7):

1. Opening of the session.
2. Election of the Chair.
3. Adoption of the agenda.
4. General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee.
5. Statements by non-governmental organizations.
6. Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East, adopted in 1995; the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference.
7. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee:
   (a) Election of officers;
   (b) Dates and venues for further sessions;
   (c) Methods of work:
      (i) Decision-making;
      (ii) Participation;
      (iii) Working languages;
      (iv) Records and documents.

8. Report on the results of the session to the next session of the Preparatory Committee.

9. Organization of the 2020 Review Conference:
   (a) Dates and venue;
   (b) Draft rules of procedure;
   (c) Election of the President and other officers;
   (d) Appointment of the Secretary-General;
   (e) Provisional agenda;
   (f) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee;
   (g) Background documentation;
   (h) Final document(s).

10. Adoption of the final report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference.

11. Any other matters.

12. Furthermore, the Preparatory Committee took note of the indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/4) as well as the summarized indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/5).

13. In the course of the discussion on the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee, the following decisions were taken:

   (a) Election of officers
       Pursuant to the understanding referred to in paragraph 9 above, Ambassador Adam Bugajski, Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations Office and the International Organizations in Vienna, and the representative of the Group of Eastern European States, was proposed to chair the second session. At its 1st meeting, on 2 May, the Committee elected by acclamation Mr. Bugajski to serve as Chair of the second session;

   (b) Dates and venues for further sessions
       At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided that it would hold its second session from 23 April to 4 May 2018 in Geneva;

   (c) Methods of work
       (i) Decision-making
At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided to make every effort to adopt its decisions by consensus. In the event that a consensus could not be reached, the Committee could then take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 2015 Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which would be applied mutatis mutandis;

(ii) Participation

At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided that representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries’ nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Committee. No State not party to the Treaty attended the meetings of the Committee as an observer;

Representatives of specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their organizations’ nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as documents of the Committee. Furthermore, the Committee decided, based on the agreement at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, which would be applied mutatis mutandis, that specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations be invited to make oral presentations to the Committee upon the decision of the Committee, on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, the following specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations were represented as observers at the meetings of the Committee: the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the African Union, the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Arab States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research;

Representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed, to be seated in the designated area, to receive documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee’s work. The Committee shall also allocate a meeting to NGOs to address each session of the Committee. Accordingly, representatives of 48 NGOs attended the meetings of the Committee (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.1/INF/3);
(iii) Working languages

At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided to use Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish as its working languages;

(iv) Records and documents

At its 1st meeting, the Committee decided that summary records would be provided, at each session, for the Committee’s opening meetings, the general debate and the closing meetings. There would be records of decisions taken at the other meetings.

14. The Preparatory Committee set aside five meetings for a general debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Committee, in the course of which 82 statements were made. The statements are reflected in the summary records of those meetings (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/SR.1-6). Furthermore, in accordance with the decision adopted at its first meeting, the Committee invited the representatives of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the International Committee of the Red Cross to make statements at the end of the general debate.

15. At its 4th meeting, on 3 May, the Committee heard 18 statements by non-governmental organizations.

16. The Committee held a total of nine meetings for a substantive discussion under agenda item 6.

17. The discussion was structured according to an indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/4), which provided equal time for the consideration of three clusters of issues and three specific blocs of issues.

18. The Committee considered the following three clusters of issues based on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2015/1, annex V):

(a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security (articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3; article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12; article VII, with specific reference to the main issues considered in this cluster); security assurances (Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995); effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons);

(b) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones (article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7; articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV; article VII);

(c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II (articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5; article V); other provisions of the Treaty.

19. The Committee considered the following three specific blocs of issues:

(a) Nuclear disarmament and security assurances;
(b) Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East;

(c) Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty.

The Committee also considered the issue of improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process.

B. Organization of the 2020 Review Conference

20. The Preparatory Committee, in conformity with its task to prepare for the 2020 Review Conference, took the following actions:

(a) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee

At its 16th meeting, on 12 May 2017, the Committee decided to request the Secretariat to provide for its second session an estimate of the costs of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including its Preparatory Committee;

(b) Nomination of the provisional Secretary-General of the 2020 Review Conference

At its 16th meeting, on 12 May 2017, the Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2020 Review Conference, a nomination which would later be confirmed by the Conference itself.

C. Documentation

21. During the session, the Committee had before it the following documents:

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/1 Implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: summary update to the reports submitted by Austria

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/2 Declaration of the member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean on the fiftieth anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco): submission by the secretariat of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/3 Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Poland

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/4 Establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons: report submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/5</td>
<td>Implementation of article VI: report submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/6</td>
<td>Financial report</td>
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<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: national report submitted by New Zealand</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/9</td>
<td>Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report by Japan</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/10</td>
<td>Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Canada</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/11</td>
<td>Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East: report by Canada</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/12</td>
<td>Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Australia</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/13</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear challenge to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: joint statement endorsed by Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America — statement open to all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>Towards 2020: reflections of the Chair of the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.1</td>
<td>Procedures in relation to exports of nuclear materials and certain categories of equipment and material under article III (2) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New</td>
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Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America as the members of the Zangger Committee

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.2 Addressing “Vienna issues”: the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; compliance and verification; export controls; cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; nuclear safety; nuclear security; and discouraging withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (the Vienna Group of Ten)

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.3 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.4 Security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.5 The inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes: working paper submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.6 Fissile material cut-off treaty: practical steps to implement action 15 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.7 Nuclear non-proliferation: working paper submitted by the European Union

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.8/Rev.1 Peaceful uses of nuclear technology: working paper submitted by the European Union

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.9 Taking forward nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by Ireland on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa, as members of the New Agenda Coalition

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.10 Informal dialogue between coastal and shipping States: working paper submitted by Australia, Chile, Colombia, France, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as members of the informal dialogue between coastal and shipping States
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<td>Nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
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<td>Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East: working paper submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.13</td>
<td>Strengthening accountability through enhanced transparency and measurability of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty: working paper submitted by Ireland on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa as members of the New Agenda Coalition</td>
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<td>Non-proliferation in all its aspects: working paper submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.16</td>
<td>Disarmament and non-proliferation education and awareness-raising: working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17</td>
<td>Transparency by all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: joint working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.18</td>
<td>Nuclear testing: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.19</td>
<td>Nuclear-weapon-free zones: working paper submitted by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.20</td>
<td>The inalienable right to develop research, production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.22</td>
<td>Verification: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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| NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.23 | Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.25</td>
<td>Security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.26</td>
<td>Promotion of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy</td>
<td>Joint working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)</td>
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<td>Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East</td>
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<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.29</td>
<td>Suggestions for the 2017 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference</td>
<td>Working paper submitted by Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.30</td>
<td>Establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction</td>
<td>Joint working paper submitted by Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Sudan, United Arab Emirates and Yemen</td>
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<td>NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.31</td>
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<td>Nuclear-weapon-free zones and nuclear issues in the Middle East</td>
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submitted by China

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.36 Nuclear disarmament and reducing the danger of nuclear war: working paper submitted by China

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.37 Nuclear disarmament in context: a global governance issue: working paper submitted by Ireland

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.38 Gender, development and nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by Ireland

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.39 Common interests of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by United States of America

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.40 Chair’s factual summary (working paper)

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/1/Rev.1 Information for participation by non-governmental organizations

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/2/Rev.1 Information for States parties, observer States and intergovernmental organizations

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/3 List of non-governmental organizations

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/4 Indicative timetable

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/5 Indicative timetable (summarized)

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/6 List of Secretariat officers

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/7 List of participants

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/MISC.1 Provisional list of participants

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/CRP.1 Draft decisions on the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee and the 2020 Review Conference

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/CRP.2 Draft report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/CRP.3 Draft Chair’s factual summary

22. A list of the delegations to the Preparatory Committee, including States parties, observer States, specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, is contained in document NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/INF/7.
Annex

Summary records of the first session of the Preparatory Committee

The summary records will be issued individually in documents NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/SR.1-6 and 16.
Chair’s factual summary (working paper)**

1. States parties reaffirmed the central role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation of the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. They emphasized the vital contribution of the Treaty to international peace, security and stability. It was mentioned that the Treaty had created a political rules-based order, like a constitution, and that it required constant maintenance and strengthening.

2. States parties stressed the fundamental importance of the full and effective implementation of the Treaty, for which all States parties shared a common responsibility. They emphasized the importance of ensuring the balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty, noting their mutually reinforcing nature.

3. In that context, States parties underlined the need to implement fully and effectively the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, including the action plan. States parties expressed regret that an agreement had not been reached on a substantive final document at the 2015 Review Conference.

4. States parties looked forward to the 2020 Review Conference, which would mark the fiftieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty. The Conference was considered to be an opportunity to take stock of past achievements and look forward to future progress, including a world free of nuclear weapons. In that context, a number of recommendations were made for possible consideration and adoption at the 2020 Review Conference in pursuit of the full implementation of the Treaty and outstanding commitments.

5. States parties stressed the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty. They again called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, without further delay and without any conditions, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols consistent with the model additional protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). States parties also called upon South Sudan to accede to the Treaty.

6. States parties recalled action 22 of the 2010 action plan and, in connection with its implementation, all States were encouraged to take into account that the overall objective of disarmament and non-proliferation education was to impart knowledge and skills to individuals so as to empower them to make their contribution to concrete disarmament and non-proliferation measures. In that context, it was emphasized that disarmament and non-proliferation education was not intended to prescribe specific ways of thinking, but rather to nurture critical thinking. There was also reference to the need to pass on to younger generations the amassed knowledge and experience of the realities of atomic bombings; to

involve, in a collaborative way, various actors, such as governments, local, national and international organizations, non-governmental organizations, the media, academics and the private sector; and to make use of new information and communications technologies, as well as the full range of pedagogical methods.

7. States parties emphasized the importance of promoting the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men in the process of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was noted that research showed that women’s participation rates were lower in meetings relating to the Treaty than in other multilateral forums. States parties were encouraged, in accordance with their commitments under Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), to support actively the participation of female delegates in their own delegations, including through sponsorship programmes. It was noted that the disproportionate, gendered impact of exposure to ionizing radiation should be factored into the discussions in the current review cycle.

8. States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the full and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty. It was recalled that States parties were committed to pursuing policies that were fully compatible with the Treaty and to contributing to achieving a world without nuclear weapons. In that context, there were calls for States parties to use the current review cycle to identify, elaborate and negotiate effective measures for the full implementation of article VI.

9. Reference was made to the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith, in accordance with article VI, and the unequivocal undertaking made by the nuclear-weapon States in 2000, and reaffirmed in 2010, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Deep concern was expressed regarding the slow pace of progress towards disarmament and the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, in accordance with their relevant multilateral obligations.

10. It was recalled that the nuclear-weapon States had committed to undertaking further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, regardless of their location, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. The States with the largest nuclear arsenals were encouraged to lead efforts in that regard. States parties emphasized the importance of applying the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility in relation to the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations.

11. The Russian Federation and the United States of America were encouraged to commence negotiations to achieve greater reductions in their nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic nuclear weapons. All nuclear-weapon States were called upon to refrain from increasing the number of nuclear warheads in their arsenals.

12. It was affirmed that the importance of making progress towards general and complete disarmament remained the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process. The view was also expressed that the goal of nuclear disarmament should be pursued in the context of general and complete disarmament, as reflected in the Treaty.

13. States parties discussed disarmament in relation to international peace, security, stability and confidence-building. It was recalled that the implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of steps leading to nuclear disarmament should be pursued in a way that promoted international stability, peace and security, and that they should be based on the principle of equal and undiminished security for all. There were concerns that the continued possession
of nuclear weapons could fuel further proliferation. In that regard, the strong links between disarmament, non-proliferation and international security were also emphasized. Reference was made to the importance of strong non-proliferation guarantees as being essential to creating the conditions for further nuclear disarmament. The point was also made that article VI of the Treaty did not tie the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations “in good faith” to any conditions whatsoever.

14. Deep concern was expressed at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and the need was reaffirmed for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. Reference was made to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, issued at The Hague, the Netherlands, on 8 July 1996. In that context, the view was expressed that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be inconsistent with the fundamental rules of international humanitarian law. That view was not shared by the nuclear-weapon States.

15. References were made to issues discussed at the international conferences held in Oslo in March 2013, Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014 and Vienna in December 2014. It was stressed that those discussions had added to the knowledge and understanding of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear-weapon detonations and the associated risks posed by nuclear weapons. The view was expressed that such consequences and the need to prevent the use of nuclear weapons were considered to underpin nuclear disarmament efforts. There was a suggestion to discuss those issues in the context of the Treaty.

16. States parties recognized the value of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. They expressed concern over issues relating to the implementation of that Treaty and called for efforts to preserve its viability and to resolve implementation issues in accordance with its provisions, including through its Special Verification Commission.

17. There were concerns regarding the continued role of nuclear weapons in national and regional military doctrines. There were calls upon the nuclear-weapon States and all other States that continued to maintain a role for nuclear weapons in their military doctrines to take measures to diminish and eliminate that role. The nuclear-weapon States emphasized the diminished role that nuclear weapons had been assigned in their security doctrines over the past decades, but also recalled the continuing role for nuclear deterrence in those doctrines.

18. There were concerns regarding the risks of unintended nuclear detonations, including as a result of any vulnerability to cyberattacks of the technology used in nuclear-weapon systems. The nuclear-weapon States were called upon to continue undertaking all efforts necessary to comprehensively address the risk of unintended nuclear detonations. Nuclear-weapon States underlined their efforts to maintain the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, thereby diminishing the risk of accidental use, including efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring the means to detonate a nuclear or radiological device and to protect nuclear material from theft and nuclear facilities from sabotage.

19. The nuclear-weapon States were urged to take steps to rapidly reduce the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems, in line with previously agreed commitments. It was considered that the current review cycle of the Treaty should recognize a link between high alert levels and their associated risks and the potentially catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. It was
suggested that reductions in the operational status of nuclear-weapon systems would reduce risks, increase human and international security and represent an intermediate disarmament step. The nuclear-weapon States were called upon to report regularly on their implementation of the recommendations. Nuclear-weapon States outlined progress made on decreasing the operational readiness of their arsenals. In that connection, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland noted that its weapons were on several days’ notice to fire. France and the United Kingdom stressed that they had de-targeted their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War. The Russian Federation stressed its de-alerting of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as the “zero-target assignment” of nuclear weapons.

20. The nuclear-weapon States informed the States parties about the outcome of their conference held in Washington, D.C., on 14 and 15 September 2016, which included discussions for the first time on their doctrines and strategic stability.

21. China affirmed its readiness to lead the second phase of the development of the glossary of key nuclear terms. China also affirmed its commitment to a policy of no-first-use, as well as its undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear-weapon-free zones or non-nuclear-weapon States.

22. States parties welcomed the steps taken to implement the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The Russian Federation and the United States affirmed their intention to meet their obligations under the Treaty by 2018. The Russian Federation and the United States emphasized that they had reduced the size of their overall stockpiles of active and inactive nuclear warheads by over 80 per cent from their Cold War peaks.

23. The United Kingdom affirmed its commitment to completing the planned reduction of its overall stockpile of nuclear weapons. France recalled that it had completed reductions of its nuclear forces, dismantled its production facilities for fissile materials for nuclear weapons and dismantled its nuclear test site in the Pacific. China, France and the United Kingdom stressed that they maintained the minimum level of deterrence required for national security.

24. Acknowledgement of the unilateral and bilateral nuclear arms reductions by some nuclear-weapon States notwithstanding, concerns were expressed at the fact that the total estimated number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amounted to more than 15,000. It was stressed that efforts were needed to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. The view was expressed that reductions in deployed nuclear weapons could not substitute for the complete and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. In that regard, it was recognized that the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.

25. Concern was expressed over the continued qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure, as well as plans to further invest in upgrading, refurbishing or extending the service life of nuclear weapons and related facilities. The view was expressed that such modernization of nuclear-weapon systems could contribute to a new arms race and undermine the value of reductions in nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States remarked that such modernizations were aimed at safety and security.
26. States parties emphasized that increasing transparency could be an important objective for the review cycle and recalled the commitments on transparency reflected in the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, as well as in actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan adopted in 2010. It was pointed out that reporting by all States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, was an effective instrument both for increasing transparency on nuclear disarmament activities and for greater accountability as a part of the strengthened review process. Reporting and transparency were linked to the principles of verifiability and accountability, as well as to confidence-building between States parties.

27. States parties welcomed, in that regard, the increased transparency demonstrated by nuclear-weapon States. It was noted that the information in the national reports submitted by the nuclear-weapon States at the third session of the Preparatory Committee held in 2014 and at the 2015 Review Conference did not cover the entire range of nuclear weapons and warheads, which differed significantly in amount, nature and type between the nuclear-weapon States.

28. Nuclear-weapon States were encouraged to further develop their reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals. The nuclear-weapon States were called upon to provide updated and completed reporting forms at future meetings, without prejudice to national security. It was noted that options to increase the measurability of progress in that area should be discussed, including the specification of benchmarks and similar criteria, such as targets, indicators and deadlines.

29. A number of items were highlighted for reporting by nuclear-weapon States, including but not limited to: (a) the number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads; (b) the number and the type of delivery vehicles; (c) the measures taken to reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) the measures taken to reduce the risk of unintended, unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons; (e) the measures taken to de-alert or reduce the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems; (f) the number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts; and (g) the amount of fissile material for military purposes.

30. It was emphasized that the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a key contribution towards the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, an indispensable step on the way towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, and an important additional non-proliferation instrument that would strengthen the integrity of the Treaty. In that context, several benefits of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices were mentioned, including its potential to: offer a unique opportunity to establish a non-discriminatory treaty regime; help to cap the quantitative nuclear arms race; establish greater transparency; help to establish baselines for further nuclear disarmament and form a potential building block for the verification thereof; create the conditions for drawing additional States into the multilateral non-proliferation regime; and contribute to regional security and stability, particularly in South Asia, in the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula.

31. The decision of the General Assembly to establish a high-level expert preparatory group on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was recalled. The open-ended informal consultative meeting convened by the Chair of the group, which had allowed all Member States to engage in interactive discussions and share their views, was welcomed, and the links between the work of the high-level expert preparatory group and the Conference on Disarmament were highlighted. It was pointed out that those links would facilitate the transfer of work back to the Conference on Disarmament, should it agree upon and implement a balanced and comprehensive programme of work that included the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

32. Pending the negotiation and entry into force of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States and all other relevant States were called upon to maintain or declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Emphasis was placed on the urgent need to create a de facto fissile material cut-off situation, which would then facilitate negotiations on, and the conclusion of, a fissile material cut-off treaty. The need to implement actions 16, 17 and 18 agreed at the 2010 Review Conference was also reaffirmed in that regard.

33. The urgent importance of bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force, as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, was underlined. Recent ratifications of the Treaty by Angola, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Myanmar, Niue and Swaziland were welcomed.

34. The intrinsic link between the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the goals and objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was stressed. It was pointed out that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would provide the global community with a permanent, non-discriminatory, verifiable and legally binding commitment to put an end to all nuclear-weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as a means to constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, which would limit both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation.

35. To achieve that end, all States that had not yet done so were called upon to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay, particularly the eight remaining States whose ratifications were needed for the Treaty to enter into force. It was recalled that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the Treaty would have a beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty. Those States were called upon not to wait for other States to ratify that Treaty first. The special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to encourage the countries listed in annex 2 to the Treaty to sign and ratify the Treaty was reaffirmed, and the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to take the initiative in that regard.

36. States parties welcomed the existing de facto moratorium on nuclear test explosions. However, that was not considered to be a substitute for a permanent and legally binding commitment to end nuclear-weapon testing and all other nuclear explosions, which could be achieved only by the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The importance of refraining from any activities that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was emphasized.
37. States were called upon to close and dismantle any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, prohibit nuclear-weapon research and development and refrain from the use of alternate means of nuclear testing and the use of new technologies to upgrade nuclear-weapon systems.

38. States parties stressed the need to support the important work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization on establishing the verification system for the Treaty and encouraged States that had not yet done so to complete the International Monitoring System stations in their territory and send data to the International Data Centre as soon as possible. They encouraged non-signatory States to participate in future sessions of the Preparatory Commission as observers.

39. There was recognition of the contribution of the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conferences) to the process of universalizing the Treaty.

40. States parties discussed the relevance of security assurances by nuclear-weapon States in the light of the objectives of the Treaty. It was reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

41. The legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in receiving unequivocal security assurances from nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them as part of a binding and agreed security arrangement was raised. In that regard, it was emphasized that such assurances should be legally binding, unconditional, universal and non-discriminatory.

42. All nuclear-weapon States were called upon to reaffirm the existing security assurances, of which the Security Council had taken note in its resolution 984 (1995) and which it had recalled in resolutions 1887 (2009) and 2310 (2016).

43. All concerned States were encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols and to work constructively to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States were encouraged to review any related reservations.

44. It was emphasized that there was a need to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. There were calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on the issue at the 2020 Review Conference. It was also considered that the Conference on Disarmament should begin substantive work on concluding an international legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States at an early date. The importance of existing security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States was recalled, especially through the protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as through other arrangements such as the Budapest Memorandums signed in 1994.

45. States parties considered the importance of nuclear disarmament verification for the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, as highlighted in the 2010 action plan and the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. New and continued cooperative efforts between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States towards the development of nuclear disarmament
verification capabilities were welcomed. It was pointed out that they would contribute to providing assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements to further enhance their contribution for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Reference was made to the contribution of nuclear disarmament verification to capacity-building, testing verification technologies and elaborating model verification protocols.

46. All States were encouraged, including in cooperation with international organizations and civil society, to pursue and intensify efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities, taking into account the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the area of verification.

47. In that connection, States parties noted the decision of the General Assembly to establish a group of governmental experts on nuclear disarmament verification, which would meet in 2018 and 2019, as well as international initiatives including the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership. The initiatives were called upon to further their work on nuclear disarmament verification, thus contributing to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. The Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership announced its intention to conduct a realistic arms control verification and monitoring simulation in October and to report its findings to the 2018 session of the Preparatory Committee.

48. Multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations were considered to provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues collectively. States parties elaborated their views on advanced stages of the nuclear disarmament process, leading up to, achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons.

49. Support was expressed for the negotiations on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 71/258. It was stated that the instrument would not undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but rather would reaffirm, complement, support and strengthen the Treaty, including by facilitating the implementation of article VI. Other States parties did not support the pursuit of such an instrument, as they were convinced that efforts towards nuclear disarmament under article VI could be based on practical steps that took national and international security concerns into account. They considered that such an instrument would not lead to further nuclear disarmament and would possibly weaken or undermine the Treaty.

50. It was stated that the current security environment added momentum to the need for nuclear disarmament. Support was expressed for a progressive, step-by-step approach to disarmament leading to a so-called minimization point. At that point, a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons convention could be negotiated. In that context, reference was made to a discussion on the “building blocks” of a world without nuclear weapons. There were also calls for the negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.

51. Deep regret was expressed at the continuing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, including the persistent failure to agree on, and implement, a
comprehensive and balanced programme of work, despite further attempts to achieve consensus. States parties recalled that they had agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. The view was expressed that the Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate forum for the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices on the basis of the report on consultations on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (CD/1299) (known as the “Shannon report”).

52. There were continued calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to begin immediately and to conclude at an early date negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein.

53. The decision of the General Assembly to convene a high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament on 26 September 2013 was recalled, as was the follow-up action by the Assembly.

54. States parties welcomed the interaction with civil society, research institutes and academic organizations during the review cycle and greater engagement with non-governmental organizations in the context of the review process of the Treaty, as well as in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

55. States parties emphasized that IAEA safeguards were a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, played an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and helped to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation.

56. States parties reaffirmed that IAEA was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its statute and its safeguards system, compliance by States parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. They also stressed that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in that regard.

57. States parties underscored the importance of complying with non-proliferation obligations, addressing all non-compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty’s integrity and the authority of the IAEA safeguards. They also underscored the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the Agency’s statute and the respective legal obligations of States parties and called upon all States to extend their cooperation in that regard. The primary responsibility of the Security Council in cases of non-compliance was also underlined.

58. States parties stressed that the non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in the Treaty were also essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation and that IAEA safeguards made a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
59. States parties considered that safeguards should be implemented in a manner
designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty and avoid hampering the
economic or technological development of the States parties or international
cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. Adherence to the Treaty and
to full-scope safeguards was emphasized as a condition for any cooperation in the
field of peaceful nuclear activities with States not parties to the Treaty.

60. States parties recalled the importance of the application of IAEA safeguards
pursuant to comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153
(Corrected) to all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear
activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III,
paragraph 1, of the Treaty for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such
material was not being diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.

61. States parties welcomed the fact that 174 non-nuclear-weapon States parties
had comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA in force. They urged the
non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty that had yet to bring into force
comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible.

62. States parties reaffirmed that comprehensive safeguards agreements
pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty should be designed to provide
for verification by IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State’s
declarations so that there was credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear
material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities.

63. States parties recognized that comprehensive safeguards agreements based
on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) had been successful in their main focus of
providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and had also provided a
limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material
and activities. They noted that implementation of the measures specified in the
model additional protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) generated, in an effective
and efficient manner, increased confidence regarding the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole and that those measures were
an integral part of IAEA safeguards.

64. States parties emphasized that it was the sovereign decision of any State to
conclude an additional protocol but that, once in force or applied provisionally,
the additional protocol was a legal obligation. The fact that 128 States parties had
brought additional protocols into force was welcomed. States parties that had not
yet done so were encouraged to conclude and to bring into force additional
protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their
entry into force.

65. The assistance provided to States, including through IAEA, to conclude,
bring into force and implement comprehensive safeguards agreements and
additional protocols was welcomed. The consideration by IAEA and States parties
of specific measures that would promote the universalization of comprehensive
safeguards agreements and adherence to additional protocols was also welcomed.

66. The need to distinguish between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-
building measures and to ensure that such voluntary measures were not turned
into legal safeguards obligations was emphasized. It was also noted that
additional measures related to safeguards should not affect the rights of the non-
nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.
67. States parties considered that, in the case of a State party with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol represented an enhanced verification standard for that State, which enabled IAEA to provide increased assurances on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State as a whole. It was also noted that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, represented the current verification standard under the Treaty.

68. States parties stressed the importance of IAEA exercising fully its mandate and its authority in accordance with its statute to provide assurances on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in accordance with respective comprehensive safeguards agreements and, where relevant, additional protocols.

69. States parties welcomed the fact that 64 States parties had accepted to amend their small quantities protocols and 7 other States parties had rescinded their small quantities protocols. They urged all States parties with small quantities protocols that had not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.

70. States parties called for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary-offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stressed that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be applied universally once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons had been achieved.

71. States parties stressed the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to implementation of safeguards in accordance with safeguards agreements, the Agency’s statute and its confidentiality regime.

72. States parties noted the considerable increase in the Agency’s safeguards responsibilities and the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards were functioning and stressed the need to ensure that the Agency continued to have the political, technical and financial support necessary to effectively fulfil its responsibility to apply safeguards as required under article III of the Treaty.

73. States parties emphasized the importance of maintaining the credibility, effectiveness, and integrity of IAEA safeguards and stressed that safeguards implementation should remain technically based, effective, transparent, non-discriminatory and objective. They supported the further strengthening of IAEA safeguards. In that context, support was expressed for the State-level concept as an important development aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. States parties welcomed the continued open dialogue on safeguards matters between the IAEA secretariat and States to maintain and foster transparency and confidence in the implementation of safeguards and noted the Agency’s work on updating, developing and implementing State-level safeguards approaches.

74. States parties reaffirmed that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented by all States parties.
75. States parties welcomed additional technical and financial contributions by States to help IAEA to meet its safeguards responsibilities, and to enhance the related technology base, including the modernization of its Safeguards Analytical Laboratories. They noted the assistance provided to IAEA by member States and relevant organizations, including through the Member State Support Programme, to facilitate capacity-building, including related research and development, and the implementation of safeguards. They also welcomed that such assistance would continue to be provided to that end.

76. States parties encouraged, within the framework of the IAEA statute, the further development of a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among member States and with IAEA. They also encouraged the States concerned to promote early consultations with IAEA, at the appropriate stage, on safeguards-relevant aspects of new nuclear facilities in order to facilitate future safeguards implementation.

77. States parties recognized that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State. They recalled that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of nuclear security, consistent with States’ national legislation and respective international obligations.

78. States parties stressed the importance of the effective physical protection of all nuclear material and nuclear facilities. They called upon all States, within their responsibility, to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security, including the physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and of the associated facilities at all stages in their life cycle and the protection of sensitive information. In that regard they encouraged all States, in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security, to take into account and apply, as appropriate, the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications. They welcomed the contribution made by the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee in the development of the Nuclear Security Series publications.

79. States parties reaffirmed the central role of IAEA in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear security.

80. States parties welcomed the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions, held in 2016, the Ministerial Declaration adopted at that Conference and the fact that IAEA would continue to organize international conferences on nuclear security every three years.

81. States parties encouraged IAEA to continue to assist States upon request in strengthening their national regulatory controls on nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of State systems to account for and control nuclear material. They also encouraged States to make further use of assistance in the field of nuclear security, where such assistance was needed and requested, including though the IAEA services in the field of nuclear security, such as the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans, International Nuclear Security Advisory Service and International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions. The Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC/869) was noted, and States parties that had not yet done so were encouraged to subscribe to it.

82. States parties welcomed the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, encouraged all parties
to the Convention and the Amendment to implement fully their obligations thereunder, and further encouraged States that had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention and its Amendment as soon as possible.

83. States parties took note of the work of IAEA in support of the efforts of States to combat trafficking in nuclear material, including the activities that it had undertaken to provide for an enhanced exchange of information and the continued maintenance of its incident and trafficking database. They called upon all States to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear material throughout their territories, in accordance with their national legislation and relevant international obligations, and called upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in that regard. They also called upon States to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

84. States parties expressed concerns regarding the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In that connection, they recalled the obligation of all States to implement fully Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

85. States parties encouraged all States that had not yet done so to become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

86. States parties reiterated the need to ensure that their nuclear-related exports did not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports were in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, in particular, in articles I, II and III, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.

87. The role of national rules and regulations in ensuring that States parties were able to give effect to their commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items to all States, taking into account articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and States parties, also fully respecting article IV, was recognized. In that context, States parties that had not yet done so were encouraged to establish and implement effective national rules and regulations and to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.

88. States parties underlined that any supplier arrangement should continue to be transparent and to ensure that in formulating export guidelines they did not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty.

89. Concern was expressed regarding limitations and restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, which were considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. In that context, a call was made for the immediate removal of any restrictions or limitations placed on peaceful uses of nuclear energy that were incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty. A view was also expressed that effective export controls were essential for facilitating the fullest possible cooperation regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with the Treaty.
90. States parties recalled that the 1995 Extension and Review Conference had noted that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope safeguards and international legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

91. States parties welcomed cooperation among States parties and assistance available, including through IAEA, to promote and implement high standards of safeguards, nuclear security and export controls. They encouraged States parties in a position to contribute to such efforts to do so.

92. States parties reaffirmed the conviction that the further establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhanced global and regional peace and security, strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributed to realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. They reaffirmed their support for internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and in accordance with the guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission in 1999.

93. States parties recognized the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia were making towards attaining the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. They welcomed the parallel declarations concerning the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia adopted by the nuclear-weapon States and Mongolia on 17 September 2012. They also welcomed the increased cooperation among the members of the zones. States parties recalled the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. They emphasized the important role of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) as the specialized body in the region for articulating common positions and joint action on nuclear disarmament. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was noted as an important endowment of the international community and a political, legal and institutional reference for the creation of other nuclear-weapon-free zones.

94. States parties emphasized the potential of regional approaches to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They noted the role of regional cooperation in terms of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses. In that context, States parties made reference to the regional dialogues on the Treaty held in Santiago, Jakarta and Dakar, held in the context of the preparation for the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee on the initiative of the Chair and the host States.

95. States parties welcomed the progress made towards ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and the continuing efforts in that regard of the parties to the Bangkok Treaty and the nuclear-weapon States with respect to the Protocol to that Treaty. States parties looked forward to the nuclear-weapon States signing and ratifying the Protocol to that Treaty as soon as possible. They welcomed the signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. Reference was made to the importance of the nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so signing and ratifying the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and of their bringing into effect the security assurances provided under nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and their protocols.

96. The importance of establishing further nuclear-weapon-free zones where they did not exist, especially in the Middle East, was underlined.

97. States parties reaffirmed their support for the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. They reaffirmed that the 1995 resolution remained valid until its goals and objectives had been achieved and that the 1995 resolution, which had been sponsored by the depositary States of the Treaty, was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was extended indefinitely without a vote in 1995. States parties recalled their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all measures necessary for its prompt implementation.

98. Strong support was reaffirmed for the practical steps agreed at the 2010 Review Conference, including the convening of a conference, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. Calls were made for the preparations to be completed and for the delayed conference to be convened at an early date. The view was also stressed that the sponsors of the 1995 resolution should propose new and alternative mechanisms and present practical and constructive proposals to achieve its prompt implementation.

99. It was deeply regretted that a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as endorsed at the 2010 Review Conference, had not taken place. The delay in implementing the 1995 resolution was also regretted.

100. It was recalled that relevant steps and confidence-building measures would contribute to the realization of the objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. It was also recalled that all States should refrain from undertaking any measures that precluded the achievement of that objective, and in that connection, recent negative developments affecting security in the region were noted with concern. The view was expressed that such developments had had a negative effect on efforts to implement the 1995 resolution.

101. The special responsibility of the sponsors of the 1995 resolution, together with that of the States of the region, as well as that of all States parties, to implement the resolution and support efforts leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction was emphasized.

102. The successful ongoing implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was welcomed. States parties underscored the vital role of IAEA in verifying and monitoring the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. The strict adherence by the Islamic Republic of Iran to all of its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan and its full cooperation with IAEA to achieve international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme was emphasized.
The need for all parties concerned to continue maintaining their constructive role so as to ensure that progress was made towards the full implementation of the Plan was also stressed.

103. Concern was expressed about the continuous lack of cooperation and progress on the long-outstanding safeguards issues concerning the Syrian Arab Republic. The Syrian Arab Republic was called upon to remedy its non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and to cooperate fully with IAEA to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues. The Syrian Arab Republic stated that it was committed to the implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement.

104. States parties condemned in the strongest terms the five nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including those carried out on 6 January and 9 September 2016, and the repeated launches of ballistic missiles in violation of and with flagrant disregard for the Security Council resolutions. States parties strongly urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests and launches that used ballistic missile technology, in accordance with relevant Council resolutions, and to renounce its policy of building its nuclear forces, which undermined the global non-proliferation regime.

105. States parties strongly urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, to cease all related activities immediately and to abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, as required under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

106. States parties reaffirmed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could not have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the Treaty, as stated in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, reiterated the international community’s opposition to the possession by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of nuclear weapons and urged the country to return, at an early date, to the Treaty, to come into full compliance with the Treaty and to cooperate promptly with IAEA on the full and effective implementation of IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

107. States parties strongly urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions and to take concrete steps to fulfil its commitments under the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks of 19 September 2005.

108. States parties stressed the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia at large, and the desire for a diplomatic resolution through dialogue of the nuclear issue in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. There were calls to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. States parties also supported and encouraged the diplomatic efforts of the international community to address the challenge posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

109. States parties recalled that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research on, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty. They stressed that the right constituted a fundamental pillar of the Treaty and recalled that each country’s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected, without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation.
agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including its fuel cycle policies.

110. States parties recalled their undertaking to facilitate, and their right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They called upon States in a position to do so to cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States parties or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with due consideration for their development needs in accordance with article IV.

111. States parties emphasized that transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty should be encouraged and that they would be facilitated by eliminating undue constraints that might impede such cooperation.

112. States parties noted that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied at all stages by commitments to, and the ongoing implementation of, safeguards consistent with States parties’ national legislation and respective international obligations, as well as appropriate effective levels of safety and security.

113. States parties recognized the indispensable role played by science and technology, including nuclear science and technology, in achieving social and economic development for all States parties.

114. States parties commended the Agency’s contribution to peace and development under the motto “Atoms for peace and development”. They underlined the role of IAEA in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the development and delivery of effective and efficient programmes in areas such as health and nutrition, food and agriculture, water and environment, and industrial applications. In addition, they noted with appreciation the Agency’s response to emergencies such as the Ebola and Zika virus disease outbreaks.

115. States parties underlined the need for enhanced international cooperation, including through the efforts of IAEA, to expand the extent to which nuclear sciences and applications were utilized to improve the quality of life and the well-being of the peoples of the world, including the achievement of the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (General Assembly resolution 70/1), as well as the Paris Agreement on climate change.

116. States parties acknowledged the development of competent human resources as a key component of the sustainable use of nuclear energy and underlined the importance of collaboration with IAEA, as well as among States parties, in that regard. They welcomed initiatives directed at expanding nuclear knowledge and expertise, as well as training in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

117. States parties acknowledged the central role of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme in enhancing the application of nuclear science and technology in many States parties, in particular in developing countries, and recognized the Technical Cooperation Fund as the most important mechanism for the implementation of the Programme. They stressed the need to make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities were sufficient, assured and predictable and to meet the objectives mandated under article II of the Agency’s statute.
118. States parties recalled the need to strengthen the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They noted the ongoing collaborative efforts by IAEA and its member States to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Programme. IAEA was encouraged to work in a systematic manner to raise awareness of its activities with key players in the field of development and to strengthen partnerships with relevant organizations to enhance the synergies between relevant activities. In that context, States parties welcomed the convening of the International Conference on the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme: Sixty Years and Beyond — Contributing to Development from 30 May to 1 June 2017.

119. The need to continue strengthening regional and interregional cooperation by identifying, utilizing and strengthening established regional capacities was underlined. IAEA was called upon to enhance regional collaboration, including under regional cooperation agreements, among States parties through projects that focus on specific shared needs and priorities.

120. States parties welcomed the progress made in the implementation of the Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL) project, which was central to the Agency’s efforts to provide opportunities for training and research and development in relation to nuclear applications in broader areas, thus enhancing the access of States parties, in particular developing countries, to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. They welcomed the contributions that countries had made to the project and called upon all States in a position to do so to make appropriate contributions to support the completion of the modernization of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria.

121. States parties acknowledged that the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative had become instrumental in mobilizing extrabudgetary contributions to support IAEA activities aimed at promoting broad development goals in member States and to allow IAEA to be more flexible and quicker in responding to evolving priorities of member States, as well as to unexpected needs or unforeseen emergency events. While welcoming the contributions that countries had made in support of IAEA activities, they encouraged States parties in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the Peaceful Uses Initiative.

122. States parties acknowledged that each State party had the right to define its national energy policy and that nuclear power was expected to continue playing an important role in the energy mix of many countries around the world. They called upon IAEA to continue to support interested member States in building their national capacities in the operation of nuclear power plants and in embarking on new nuclear power programmes.

123. States parties concerned were encouraged, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use low-enriched uranium, where technically and economically feasible.

124. States parties noted developments in relation to multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the progress made in establishing an IAEA low-enriched uranium bank. It was noted that the creation of mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply should not affect rights under the Treaty and should be without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies.

125. States parties recognized that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rested with individual States and reaffirmed the central role of IAEA in promoting international cooperation on matters relating to nuclear safety, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards.
126. States parties called upon States that had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

127. States parties welcomed the Agency’s activities directed towards strengthening nuclear safety in operating power and research reactors and its work regarding the provision of international peer review services, support for regulatory bodies and in other areas relevant to the infrastructure of member States.

128. States parties noted with appreciation the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and called upon IAEA to continue to build upon the Action Plan and the experience of its implementation by member States, the report by the Director General of IAEA on the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the principles enshrined in the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety.

129. States parties recalled that it was in the interests of all States parties that the transport of radioactive material should continue to be conducted in accordance with international safety, security and environmental protection standards and guidelines. International cooperation efforts to enhance the safety of the transportation of such material, including through the use of best practice guidelines for systematic communications in relation to the safe maritime and other transport of radioactive material, were welcomed.

130. States parties encouraged States that had not yet done so to put in place a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established under the main pertinent international instruments.

131. States parties recalled that each State party, in exercising its national sovereignty, had the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decided that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Treaty, had jeopardized the supreme interest of its country, in accordance with article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty.

132. It was noted, however, that withdrawal from the Treaty could constitute a risk to non-proliferation efforts and could constitute a threat to international peace and security. It was emphasized that any reinterpretation or restriction of the sovereign right of withdrawal could be detrimental to the implementation of the Treaty. It was also noted that the faithful and balanced implementation of the Treaty would ensure that no State had any incentive to withdraw.

133. It was underscored that, under international law, a withdrawing party would remain responsible for violations of the Treaty committed prior to its withdrawal. It was further underscored that withdrawal should not affect any right, obligation or legal situation between the withdrawing State and each of the other States parties created through implementation of the Treaty prior to withdrawal, including those relating to IAEA safeguards. It was further considered that nuclear supplier States should be encouraged to exercise their right to incorporate dismantling and/or return clauses or fallback safeguards in the event of withdrawal into contracts or arrangements concluded with the withdrawing States, and to adopt standard clauses for that purpose.
134. States parties reaffirmed the purpose of the review process as set out in the relevant decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference.

135. States parties exchanged views on a number of specific proposals, including: enhancing the interactivity of discussions; increasing accountability through transparency and reporting; increasing the participation of women in delegations; enabling the Preparatory Committee to take substantive decisions; conducting work on the basis of a rolling text so as to enable progress to be carried forward by each session of the Preparatory Committee; ensuring effective time management; and revisiting the topics considered by subsidiary bodies.

136. There was also recognition of the need to ensure efficiency, effectiveness, coordination and continuity throughout the review cycle. In that context, there were calls for, inter alia: the early nomination of Presidents of the Review Conference and Chairs of the Preparatory Committee; encouraging past and incumbent Presidents and Chairs to be available for consultations with the incoming President and Chairs regarding practical matters relating to their responsibilities; and continuing outreach and the practice of holding regional dialogues prior to each session.
Towards 2020: reflections of the Chair of the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee

The following points were taken by the Chair from the discussions at the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Chair considers that these reflect basic views on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its review cycle that appear to be shared by its States parties. It is the hope of the Chair that these can serve as a reference point for further discussions in the current review cycle.

1. The Non-Proliferation Treaty remains of central importance to its States parties, which have reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty and the implementation of its provisions.

2. The Treaty contains shared common objectives. Despite disagreements over the pace of its implementation, progress on disarmament, non-proliferation and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are considered to be mutually enabling, reinforcing and balancing elements.

3. The Treaty is the cornerstone of the global regime for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. As such, it is an essential part of the modern collective security system. The current international geopolitical challenges underline the important role of the Treaty and the need to uphold and strengthen it.

4. The Treaty helps us to ease tensions and build confidence between States and, therefore, contributes to a safer, more secure and more peaceful world. As its preamble reflects, the Treaty aims to safeguard its States parties and their peoples from the devastation of nuclear conflict.

5. The Treaty is central to our legal and political efforts on non-proliferation and disarmament. These form a continuing process that is underpinned by the Treaty’s review cycle. The Treaty combines a near-universal scope with a legally binding framework.

6. It is important that we maintain an open, inclusive and transparent dialogue at the meetings of the Review Conference and the Preparatory Committee. We must strive to make these meetings as effective and efficient as possible, including by maximizing the continuity between them.

7. We must, therefore, ensure that the vitality and integrity of the Treaty remain intact, and that we continue to work towards its universalization.

8. With a view to the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty’s entry into force in 2020, we should work to identify areas where progress is possible, cooperate in order to move forward and search for compromise where necessary.