

weapon States in general have come to regard the achievement of a comprehensive test ban as a litmus test of the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to halt the arms race, adding that verification of compliance no longer seems to be an obstacle to reaching agreement.

*Taking into account* that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water<sup>9</sup> undertook in that Treaty, almost twenty years ago, to seek the achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in 1968 in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,<sup>10</sup>

*Recalling* that in its resolution 35/145 A of 12 December 1980 it urged all States members of the Committee on Disarmament to support the establishment by the Committee, from the beginning of its session in 1981, of an *ad hoc* working group which should start the multilateral negotiations of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests,

*Deploring* that the Committee on Disarmament, as stated in paragraph 44 of its report to the Assembly,<sup>11</sup> was prevented from responding to that exhortation owing to the negative attitude of two nuclear-weapon States,

1. *Reiterates once again its grave concern* that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority and constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and a contribution to nuclear disarmament;

3. *Urges* all States that have not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and, meanwhile, to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty;

4. *Urges likewise* all States members of the Committee on Disarmament:

(a) To bear in mind that the consensus rule should not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective discharge of the functions of the Committee;

(b) To support the establishment by the Committee, from the beginning of its session in 1982, of an *ad hoc* working group which should start the multilateral negotiations of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests;

(c) To exert their best endeavours in order that the Committee may transmit the multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982;

5. *Calls upon* the States depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two treaties and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons".

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### 36/85. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/145 B

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, in particular resolution 32/78 of 12 December 1977, paragraph 51 of resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, resolution 33/60 of 14 December 1978, section IV of resolution 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, resolution 34/73 of 11 December 1979 and resolution 35/145 B of 12 December 1980,

*Reaffirming* its conviction that it is in the interest of all people that nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments should cease, as this would be a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, a means of relieving the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations and a measure of the utmost importance in bringing the nuclear-arms race to an end,

*Recalling* that the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water<sup>12</sup> and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons<sup>13</sup> expressed their determination in those treaties to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

*Expressing* the belief that, to be effective and capable of attracting the widest possible adherence, a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing should include provision for an effective verification system,

*Recognizing*, accordingly, the importance to such a treaty of the work assigned by the Committee on Disarmament to the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on a global network of stations for the exchange of seismological data,

*Deeply concerned* about the fact that the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States have not resumed their negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear-test explosions in all environments and its protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes,

*Emphasizing* the urgent need for a complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons,

*Recognizing* the indispensable role of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty capable of attracting the widest possible international support and adherence,

*Expressing regret* that it did not prove possible for the Committee on Disarmament to commence negotiations on such a treaty,

*Convinced* that the proceedings of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982, would benefit substantially from positive progress towards the conclusion of such a treaty,

1. *Reiterates its grave concern* that, despite the express wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States, nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated;

<sup>9</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

<sup>10</sup> Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

<sup>11</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*.

<sup>12</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

<sup>13</sup> Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

2. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the greatest urgency and highest priority;

3. *Expresses the conviction* that such a treaty constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries;

4. *Calls upon* the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to resume their negotiations and to exert their best efforts to bring them to an early successful conclusion and invites them to prepare a report on the state of negotiations in good time for submission to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament;

5. *Reiterates its conviction* that the Committee on Disarmament has an indispensable role in the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing;

6. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session in 1982;

7. *Also requests* the Committee on Disarmament to determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network and an effective verification system;

8. *Further requests* the Committee on Disarmament to exert all efforts in order that the draft of such a treaty may be submitted to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date;

9. *Urges* all members of the Committee on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to co-operate with the Committee in fulfilling its mandate;

10. *Calls upon* the Committee on Disarmament to report on progress to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-seventh session;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item relating to the implementation of the present resolution.

*91st plenary meeting  
9 December 1981*

### 36/86. Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

#### A

#### NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 34/76 B of 11 December 1979 and 35/146 A of 12 December 1980,

*Bearing in mind* the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa<sup>14</sup> adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, which was held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

*Recalling* that, in its resolution 33/63 of 14 December 1978, it vigorously condemned any attempt by South Africa to introduce in any way whatsoever nuclear weapons into the continent and demanded that South Africa refrain forth-

with from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere,

*Alarmed* by the content and growing sophistication of South Africa's military and nuclear programme,

*Alarmed also* at the fact that South Africa's nuclear programme has enabled it to acquire nuclear-weapon capability enhanced by the continued support and collaboration which certain Western countries and Israel have given to it,

*Noting with grave concern* that South Africa's capacity to produce nuclear weapons has been established, *inter alia*, by the content of its nuclear programme, as well as by the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field<sup>15</sup> following the reported detonation by that country of a nuclear device on 22 September 1979, and that it might indeed have acquired nuclear weapons,

*Taking note* of the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa on ways and means of making the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa more effective,<sup>16</sup> as well as the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 473 (1980),<sup>17</sup>

*Having examined* the report of the Secretary-General of 9 September 1980,<sup>15</sup> as well as his report of 3 September 1981,<sup>18</sup> submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/146 A on the nuclear capability of South Africa,

*Noting with concern* that South Africa has persistently refused to conclude adequate and comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

*Gravely concerned* that South Africa, in flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, has continued its military attacks against independent States of southern Africa, in particular Angola, and has increased its acts of subversion aimed at destabilizing those States,

*Equally concerned* that the acquisition of military equipment and nuclear-weapon capability by the racist régime of South Africa, with its abhorrent system of *apartheid* and its record of violence and aggression, poses a serious danger to international peace and security,

*Recalling* its decision taken at the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa,<sup>19</sup>

*Expressing its indignation* at the fact that some Western countries, by a ready recourse to the use of the veto, have continually frustrated every effort at the United Nations to deal with the question of South Africa,

1. *Deplores* the massive build-up of South Africa's military machine, including its frenzied acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail;

2. *Reaffirms* that the racist régime's plans and capability in the nuclear field constitute a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardize the security of African States and increase the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

<sup>15</sup> A/35/402 and Corr.1.

<sup>16</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1980*, document S/14179.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/14167.

<sup>18</sup> A/36/430.

<sup>19</sup> Resolution S-10/2, para. 63 (c).

<sup>14</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 105, document A/5975.