



Security Council

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United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides an account of the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) from 21 August to 18 November 2024, pursuant to the mandate set out in Security Council resolution [350 \(1974\)](#) and extended in subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution [2737 \(2024\)](#).

II. Situation in the area of operations and activities of the Force

2. The ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic was generally maintained, notwithstanding several violations of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 1974. The overall security situation in the UNDOF area of operations remained volatile, with continued military activity in the areas of separation and limitation and across the ceasefire line, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution [2737 \(2024\)](#).

3. In employing its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and to see that it is scrupulously observed, as prescribed in the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, UNDOF reports all breaches of the ceasefire line that it observes. All incidents of firing across the ceasefire line, and the crossing of the ceasefire line by military aircraft, drones, vehicles, equipment and personnel, as well as other individuals, constitute violations of the Agreement. In its regular interactions with both sides, the leadership of UNDOF continued to call upon the parties to exercise restraint and avoid any activities that might lead to an escalation of tensions in the region.

4. On 27 August, United Nations personnel at observation post 54 observed one main battle tank in the vicinity of a ceasefire line barrel on the Alpha side (Israeli-occupied Golan) firing into the area of separation, towards Rafid village on the Bravo side.

5. On 6 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel fired multiple gunshots towards the Bravo gate at the Qunaytirah crossing, injuring a liaison officer and grazing a policeman, both personnel of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, deployed at the gate.

6. On 12 September, United Nations personnel at position 80 heard three detonations west of their position and observed smoke south of Rafid village in the



area of separation. Syrian authorities informed UNDOF that, on 12 September, “Israel fired 2 mortar shells towards the south of Al Rafid which led to the injury of the Syrian citizen ... while he was irrigating his farmland, then he was taken to the hospital”. The Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that, on 12 September, “the IDF targeted ... a Syrian and Iranian Axis operative, who posed an immediate threat to the safety and security of Israel The State of Israel reserves the right to defend itself and protect its citizens from Iranian Axis terrorists ...”. A United Nations team deployed to the location of the incident found indications of two explosions. Open sources reported a drone strike targeting a vehicle in the vicinity of Khan Arnabah on that day.

7. Also on 12 September, United Nations personnel at observation post 72 and position 32 heard several explosions and bursts of gunfire south-east of Khan Arnabah. On that day, Syrian authorities informed UNDOF that “Israeli UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] fired 2 missiles at a car while passing a checkpoint in KA [Khan Arnabah] which led to the martyrdom of all the people inside the vehicle and injury of several civilians and a policeman who were near the checkpoint”. Also on the same day, the Israel Defense Forces relayed to UNDOF that their “forces eliminated ... a Hezbollah operative in the Golan Project IVO [in the vicinity of] Quneitra who posed an immediate threat to the safety and security of the State of Israel The State of Israel reserves the right to defend itself from Hezbollah terrorist ...”. A United Nations team that deployed to the location of the incident assessed that an anti-tank missile had been utilized in the attack.

8. On 28 September, personnel at United Nations observation post 51 noticed three Israel Defense Forces personnel fire multiple gun shots towards a location in the area of separation, where UNDOF observed some shepherds herding their flock around the same time.

9. On 3 October, United Nations personnel at observation posts 54 and 68 heard and saw explosions on the Bravo side. Shortly thereafter, personnel at position 80 observed detonations, also on the Bravo side, and those at position 85 observed a main battle tank on the Alpha side firing six rounds towards the Bravo side.

10. On 9 October, United Nations personnel at position 27 observed one drone flying from the Alpha side across the ceasefire line and subsequently returning in a south-westerly direction. Later that day, Syrian authorities informed UNDOF that “it was an attack from the Alpha side and a Syrian man was martyred”. Open sources reported that an Israel Defense Forces drone had attacked a motorcycle, killing one individual and injuring five others.

11. On 18 October, United Nations personnel at position 86B observed one round fired from a main battle tank on the Alpha side towards the south of their position, passing over the position and impacting a village in the area of limitation on the Bravo side, approximately 3 km from the position. Shortly thereafter, United Nations personnel at positions 80, 85 and 86B heard detonations and immediately went into shelter, where they remained for approximately 15 minutes.

12. On 24 October, United Nations personnel at position 80 and observation post 54 heard detonations from indirect fire originating from west of Tall al-Faras on the Alpha side. They observed three explosions in the vicinity of the ceasefire line within the area of separation.

13. On multiple occasions during the reporting period, United Nations personnel in the UNDOF area of operations went into shelter due to heavy firing and explosions, including when the Israeli Iron Dome system was activated to intercept rockets fired from Lebanon towards Israel. On 1 October, United Nations personnel in the southern part of the area of limitation on the Alpha side observed at least 80 rockets fired from

a north-easterly direction. Around the same time, United Nations personnel also observed between 50 and 100 Iron Dome interceptions. On all those occasions, United Nations personnel noticed detonations in locations at a distance that they could not determine. UNDOF assessed that the rocket fire was likely related to the reported firing by Iran or affiliated groups towards the Israeli-occupied Golan and Israel.

14. On 11 September, United Nations personnel in the southern part of the area of separation observed twelve Israel Defense Forces soldiers crossing the ceasefire line on foot and remaining in the area of separation for approximately 20 minutes before returning to the Alpha side. On 4 October, United Nations personnel at position Hermon Base observed four vehicles moving with their lights off along the route connecting United Nations positions Hermon South and Hermon Hotel and returning along the same route. On 9 October, United Nations personnel at position Hermon Base observed five vehicles with their lights off moving and returning along the same route.

15. During the reporting period, United Nations personnel observed aircraft, including fighter jets and drones, flying from the Alpha side across the ceasefire line and over the area of separation, and, on some occasions, across the area of separation towards the Bravo side. On 1 and 2 October, United Nations personnel at positions 27 and 22 observed six aircraft and one drone, respectively, flying from the Alpha side across the ceasefire line and towards Damascus. On 23 October, United Nations personnel at position 86B observed an aircraft flying on the Alpha side and intercepting what UNDOF assessed to be a drone over the area of separation. Prior to that incident, personnel at observation post 54 heard an explosion in the vicinity of Tasil and Shajarah in the area of limitation on the Bravo side. The personnel at position 86B went into shelter. Around the same time, personnel at position 85 observed one fighter aircraft flying over the area of separation. On 8 November, the personnel at observation post 55 observed five aircraft flying at low altitude from the Alpha side and crossing the ceasefire line.

16. Since late July, United Nations personnel has observed the Israel Defense Force construct counter-mobility obstacles along the ceasefire line. The personnel found four distinct locations where the Israel Defense Force have constructed these obstacles along the ceasefire line, which reach a length of approximately 12.5 km, including a trench that is approximately 5 m wide and 3 m deep, a 3-metre-high berm and large rocks on the eastern side of the obstacles. As at 18 November, United Nations personnel observed that the Israel Defense Forces' construction continued in three locations, two in the central part of the ceasefire line and one in the southern part. In addition, the personnel observed Israeli excavators and other heavy equipment used in the construction and ditches and berms, not only west of the ceasefire line barrels, but also in various places along the barrels east of the ceasefire line. The obstacles have encroached into the area of separation by between 5 m and 20 m, with roadblocks established through the use of rocks and soil in five places. The Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that the construction is "a defensive measure to prevent any intrusion" into the Alpha side by "personnel from the AOS [area of separation]". The Syrian authorities have expressed concern to UNDOF regarding this work. On 15 November 2024, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic informed the United Nations Secretariat that "Within the framework of the dangerous escalation in the region, the Israeli occupation entity is carrying out engineering activity that includes digging trenches and raising embankments along the ceasefire line in the northern and southern parts of the area of separation".

17. Throughout the reporting period, sporadic heavy explosions and bursts of heavy machine gun and small arms fire persisted in the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side. UNDOF assessed that the military activity was the result of the controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance as part of clearance operations by the

Syrian armed forces. UNDOF observed the continued presence of Syrian security forces, some of whom were armed, staffing several checkpoints within the area of separation.

18. On 21 occasions during the reporting period, Israel Defense Forces personnel restricted the movement of UNDOF on the Alpha side. On three occasions, UNDOF personnel were restricted from proceeding with their patrolling due to a roadblock on the Bravo side. The patrol withdrew from the location.

19. On 7 November, United Nations personnel patrolling along the ceasefire line in the southern part of the area of separation observed Israeli construction equipment in the area of separation. The United Nations personnel could not proceed with their patrolling and withdrew from the area due to a blockade made from a pile of rocks on the route and a signal from the Israel Defense Forces in the area for them to withdraw. Later that day, an UNDOF convoy patrolling along the ceasefire line also in the southern part of the area of separation could not proceed as Israel Defense Forces personnel in trucks blocked the convoy. Eleven Israel Defense Forces soldiers dismounted from their trucks, checked the identity cards of the United Nations personnel and informed the latter that they could not proceed with the patrol. The patrol withdrew from the area.

20. The continued presence of Iron Dome systems, artillery systems and multiple rocket launcher systems in the area of limitation on the Alpha side constitutes a violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement in each case. Pursuant to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, the presence of any unauthorized military equipment or personnel in the areas of separation and limitation is a violation of the Agreement.

21. UNDOF protested to the parties with regard to all violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement that it had observed, including the firing into and across the area of separation, as well as across the ceasefire line, the presence of unauthorized equipment and personnel in the areas of separation and limitation, and the crossing of the ceasefire line by Israel Defense Forces personnel and by drones and aircraft, as well as by individuals from the Bravo side. UNDOF liaised closely with the parties to de-escalate the situation, including during periods of heightened tension. In addition, UNDOF protested all restrictions on the movement of United Nations personnel carrying out their mandated activities.

22. UNDOF continued to observe regular crossings of the ceasefire line by individuals from the Bravo side. While the individuals were unidentified, UNDOF assessed that, by the nature of their activities in the area, they in most cases were shepherds and farmers from the surrounding areas tending livestock, as well as hunters carrying weapons. The Israel Defense Forces continued to express deep concern about the crossings, which they stated were a threat to the safety and security of their personnel operating in proximity to the ceasefire line. On several occasions, the Israel Defense Forces fired warning shots to discourage individuals from approaching the Israeli technical fence.

23. On 16 September, UNDOF, in coordination with the Israel Defense Forces and the Syrian authorities, facilitated the return, through the Qunaytirah crossing, of an individual from the Bravo side, who had been detained by the Israel Defense Forces for allegedly crossing the ceasefire line.

24. On 24 September, UNDOF, in cooperation with the parties, also facilitated the return to the Bravo side, through the Qunaytirah crossing, of an individual who had allegedly crossed the ceasefire line by approximately 100 m on 21 September. The Israel Defense Forces had fired shots, ostensibly to discourage individuals from the Bravo side from crossing the ceasefire line, injuring one individual. The Israel

Defense Forces administered medical assistance to the individual and transferred the person to an Israeli medical facility.

25. The Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed several identical letters to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General. In a letter dated 7 October 2024 ([A/79/503-S/2024/718](#)), he stated: “The Israeli occupation entity launched two successive air strikes from the direction of the occupied Syrian Golan on the residential Mazzah neighbourhood of the capital Damascus. The first came at dawn on Tuesday, 1 October 2024, killing three civilians, injuring nine others, and causing significant material damage to residential buildings and infrastructure. The second came at noon on Wednesday, 2 October 2024, killing three civilians, injuring three others, and causing material damage to private property in the vicinity.” In a letter dated 10 October 2024 ([A/79/523-S/2024/729](#)), the Permanent Representative stated that “the Israeli occupation entity launched an air strike from the direction of the occupied Syrian Golan. Three missiles were fired at a building in the residential neighbourhood of Mazzah in the capital Damascus. The preliminary toll is 9 civilians killed, including children and women, and 11 others injured. Significant material damage was done to private property in the vicinity.” He also stated, on 24 October 2024 ([A/79/562-S/2024/770](#)), that on “24 October 2024, the Israeli occupation entity launched an air raid from the occupied Syrian Golan and from northern Lebanon. It targeted the residential neighbourhood of Kafr Susah, in the capital Damascus, and a military checkpoint in the Homs countryside. One soldier was killed and seven injured, and material damage was caused to public and private property”. In addition, in a letter dated 29 October 2024 ([A/79/569-S/2024/792](#)), he stated that, on 26 October 2024, the Israeli occupation entity had “launched an air strike from the direction of the occupied Syrian Golan and Lebanese territory at certain sites in the southern and central regions, causing material damage to private and public property”. On 6 November 2024 ([A/79/585-S/2024/807](#)), he stated that on “4 November 2024, the Israeli occupation entity launched an air strike from the direction of the occupied Syrian Golan and Lebanese territory against southern Damascus, causing material damage to private and public property”.

26. UNDOF assessed that the security situation in the northern and central parts of its area of operations on the Bravo side had generally remained calm but continued to be volatile in the southern sector, with security incidents reportedly occurring in locations within the area of limitation, including areas along UNDOF patrol routes in Dar‘a Governorate. Open sources reported security incidents in Jasim, Nawa, Tafas, and Inkhil in the southern part of the area of limitation involving armed and improvised explosive device attacks targeting checkpoints and convoys of the Syrian security forces, other government authorities and former members of armed opposition groups.

27. Since early March 2020, the Israel Defense Forces have restricted the movement of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan personnel through the Alpha gate at the Qunaytirah crossing, requiring advance notice of movement, which has continued to adversely affect the operational and administrative activities of the mission. Since the attack by Hamas and other Palestinian groups against Israel on 7 October 2023 and subsequent developments in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Israel Defense Forces have further limited these movements at the Qunaytirah crossing. During the reporting period, the Israel Defense Forces maintained two scheduled weekly crossings at the Alpha gate and facilitated 21 operational, one emergency and two humanitarian crossings at that gate.

28. UNDOF continued to liaise with the Israel Defense Forces on their full facilitation of the crossing of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan personnel at the Qunaytirah crossing and on the need for United Nations personnel to cross using only


documents issued by UNDOF at the crossing and to return to the established crossing procedures. The Syrian authorities returned to the established procedures to facilitate the movement of UNDOF personnel and supplies through the Bravo gate at the Qunaytirah crossing.

29. UNDOF continued to engage with the Israel Defense Forces with a view to addressing restrictions on the movement and access of United Nations personnel from the Alpha side, through the Israeli technical fence gates, to United Nations observation posts in the area of separation.

30. UNDOF, with the facilitation of the Israel Defense Forces and the Syrian authorities, continued to carry out, through Observer Group Golan, fortnightly inspections of the military positions of the Israel Defense Forces and the Syrian security forces in select parts of the respective areas of limitation. UNDOF continued to engage with both parties to facilitate the expansion of the inspections in their respective positions in the various parts of the areas of limitation.

31. As part of the return to full mandate implementation on the Bravo side, UNDOF continued restoring, repainting and refurbishing the barrels marking the ceasefire line and the Bravo line, which delineate the area of separation, with 129 barrels restored along the ceasefire line and 153 barrels along the Bravo line (see figure I). UNDOF continued to consult with the parties on the barrel refurbishment and, in some instances, replacement activity.

Figure I
Number of barrels restored, repainted and refurbished along the ceasefire line and the Bravo line




32. The restrictions on access through the technical fence gate imposed by the Israel Defense Forces has slowed the progress on the reconstruction of United Nations observation post 52, in particular following the events of 7 October 2023. The reconstruction of this observation post has commenced. The reoccupation of the observation post will complete the return of Observer Group Golan to all observation

posts that the military observers temporarily vacated in 2014 owing to the deterioration in the security situation (see figure II).

Figure II


Number of reoccupied Force positions and Observer Group Golan positions on the Bravo side since 2017



33. UNDOF operations continued to be supported by the military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Observer Group Golan, who are under the operational control of the UNDOF Force Commander and maintain 10 fixed observation posts within the UNDOF area of operations. The focus of Observer Group Golan remained on continuous static observation and situational awareness. In addition, the military observers are tasked with carrying out investigations of incidents within the UNDOF area of operations.

34. UNDOF monthly operational patrols continued in the areas of separation and limitation, with 1,097 operational activities carried out in August, 1,122 in September and 1,138 in October (see figure III). UNDOF patrol routes cover the full breadth of the area of separation and 70 per cent of the area of limitation. The volatile security situation in the southern part of the area of operations continued to hinder progress in opening new patrol routes in the area of limitation on the Bravo side.

Figure III
Number of Force patrols carried out per month



35. Security developments in Lebanon have affected the primary route for supplies and troop rotations of UNDOF between Beirut and Damascus, through the Judaydah and Masna' border crossing. The Israeli air strike of 4 October in the vicinity of the border crossing made the supply route inaccessible for UNDOF fuel supply and troop rotations. UNDOF has arranged to utilize alternative routes between Syria and Lebanon and between Syria and Jordan.

36. UNDOF continued to assess that there remained a significant threat to United Nations personnel in its area of operations from explosive remnants of war, including unexploded ordnance and mines, as well as a possible threat as a result of localized violence, including the possible presence of sleeper cells of armed groups.

37. UNDOF continually conducts assessments of and updates contingency plans for the reinforcement, extraction and evacuation of positions and observation posts on both the Alpha and Bravo sides, in addition to regular rehearsals, exercises and training for various contingencies. Risk mitigation measures, including force protection measures, continue to be developed at positions, observation posts and the operational base at Camp Ziouani and headquarters at Camp Faouar.

38. UNDOF recorded no allegations of misconduct during the period from 1 August to 31 October. The mission continued to implement activities, including regular personnel training related to prevention, enforcement and remedial actions regarding misconduct.

39. As at 18 November, UNDOF had conducted 10 evaluations out of the 12 planned for 2024, achieving a compliance rate of 83 per cent, in implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping commitment and Security Council resolution [2436 \(2018\)](#). A few shortfalls were identified regarding the participation of women and expired shelf life of ammunition and explosives. These shortfalls did not affect the overall performance of UNDOF units and are being addressed with the relevant troop-contributing countries.

40. As at 12 November, UNDOF comprised 1,171 troops, including 92 women peacekeepers. Troops are deployed from Argentina (1), Australia (2), Bhutan (4), Czechia (4), Fiji (148), Ghana (5), India (199), Ireland (4), Kazakhstan (140), Nepal (448), the Republic of Korea (1), Uruguay (213) and Zambia (3). In addition, 92 military observers from Observer Group Golan, including 12 women, assisted UNDOF in carrying out its tasks.

III. Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

41. In its resolution 2737 (2024), the Security Council called upon the parties concerned to immediately implement its resolution 338 (1973). It decided to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a period of six months, until 31 December 2024 and requested the Secretary-General to report every 90 days on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973). The search for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Middle East, in particular the efforts made at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973), was addressed in the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East (A/79/194), submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 78/11, entitled “The Syrian Golan”.

42. Since the discontinuation of indirect peace talks in December 2008, there have been no negotiations between the parties. I look forward to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and the resumption of efforts towards a comprehensive, just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973) and other relevant resolutions.

IV. Financial aspects

43. The General Assembly, by its resolution 78/304 of 3 July 2024, appropriated the amount of \$68.7 million for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025.

44. As at 12 November 2024, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNDOF amounted to \$17.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to \$1,761.4 million.

45. Reimbursement of troop costs as well as reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment have been made for the period up to 30 June 2024, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

V. Observations

46. At a time of heightened tensions and escalation in the region, I remain concerned about the continued violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, including breaches of the ceasefire on 27 August, on 3, 6, 12 and 28 September and on 3, 18 and 24 October. Any firing across the ceasefire line is in violation of the Agreement and must cease immediately. The Israel Defense Forces should refrain from firing into the area of separation and across the ceasefire line, as well as from crossing the ceasefire line and having their construction and equipment in the area of separation. I also remain concerned by the continued presence of the Syrian security forces in the area of separation. There should be no military forces or activities in the area of separation, other than those of UNDOF. The continued presence of unauthorized weapons and equipment in the areas of limitation on both the Alpha and the Bravo sides, as well as the flying of aircraft and drones across the ceasefire line and over the area of separation, are in violation of the Agreement.

47. I urge the parties to the Agreement to exercise the utmost restraint and comply with the Agreement. I continue to encourage members of the Security Council to support efforts to raise the awareness of both parties of the risk of escalation and the need to preserve the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic.

48. It remains critical that the parties maintain their liaison with UNDOF. All violations of the ceasefire line increase tensions between the signatories to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement of 1974 and undermine stability in the area. The continued liaison by UNDOF with the parties has contributed to de-escalation during times of heightened tensions in the region.

49. The continued commitment of both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and support for the presence of UNDOF remain essential. I count on the continued cooperation of both parties to ensure that the Force can implement its mandate fully, including the extension of inspections on both sides. I remain concerned by the restrictions on the movement of UNDOF in its area of operations, including at the Alpha gate at the Qunaytirah crossing. At the same time, the parties must continue to support the enhancement of the liaison function of UNDOF.

50. Given the worrying trend of continued violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and the volatile security situation in the southern part of the area of limitation on the Bravo side amid the regional escalation, the safety and security of military and civilian personnel in UNDOF and Observer Group Golan are of particular concern. The parties must refrain from any activity that may risk the safety of the peacekeepers. It is therefore of particular importance that the Security Council continue to bring to bear its influence on the concerned parties to ensure that UNDOF is accorded the ability to operate safely and securely and is allowed to operate freely in accordance with the Agreement. It remains important that the parties also continue to facilitate the deployment of all personnel to UNDOF for effective mandate implementation.

51. The continued support of Member States, and in particular the confidence of troop-contributing countries in UNDOF and their commitment to it, remain key factors in the Force's ability to carry out its mandate. I am grateful to the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Bhutan, Czechia, Fiji, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Nepal, the Republic of Korea, Uruguay and Zambia for their contributions and the commitment, resolve and consummate professionalism of their military personnel in UNDOF. I am also thankful to the Member States that have contributed military observers to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

52. I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for six months, until 30 June 2025. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel also has expressed its agreement.

53. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the Head of Mission and Force Commander, Lieutenant General Nirmal Kumar Thapa, the military and civilian personnel serving under his leadership in UNDOF, and the military observers in Observer Group Golan, who continue to perform the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council with efficiency and commitment, under extremely challenging circumstances.

Map

