



# Security Council

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## Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2024

### Report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since the previous report, issued on 12 July 2024 (S/2024/548). The exchanges of fire across the Blue Line between Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups in Lebanon and the Israel Defense Forces, in repeated breach of the cessation of hostilities and in violation of resolution 1701 (2006), escalated dramatically during the reporting period, resulting in deteriorating conditions that are moving further away from those envisaged by the Council in resolution 1701 (2006). The launch by the Israel Defense Forces of Operation Northern Arrows on 23 September, with ground operations north of the Blue Line starting on 1 October, represented a new phase of the conflict. Heavy Israeli bombardments across Lebanon, including in Beirut, led to significant casualties, displacement and destruction. Intensified attacks by Hizbullah further into Israel also resulted in casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. The dramatic escalation of the hostilities starkly underscored the urgency of an immediate return to the cessation of hostilities and the long-term imperative for progress towards a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel.

#### II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

##### A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

2. From 21 June to 22 September, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) recorded 2,531 trajectories of projectiles fired from within the area of operations from north to south of the Blue Line and 3,332 from south to north of the Blue Line, as well as 276 air attacks by the Israel Defense Forces. For the same period, UNIFIL detected a total of 216 trajectories of projectiles fired from north of the Litani River – outside the mission's area of operations – towards Israel and the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan on 15 occasions. From 23 September to 20 October, UNIFIL detected 2,316 trajectories fired from within the area of operations from north to south and 15,481 trajectories from south to north of the Blue Line, and 942 air attacks by the Israel Defense Forces. For the same 28-day period, the mission detected a total of




378 trajectories of projectiles fired from north of the Litani River on 65 occasions. Each trajectory can represent multiple projectiles. Almost all trajectories recorded were of rockets, mortar bombs and artillery shells. UNIFIL radars cannot detect some types of projectiles, such as air-to-surface missiles, tank rounds, portable anti-tank missiles or projectiles fired from light weapons. UNIFIL could not verify the large number of strikes that were reported to have impacted elsewhere in Lebanon during the reporting period.

3. On 15 October, UNIFIL detected 1,279 trajectories, the highest number for a single day since 8 October 2023. Of these, 71 trajectories were from north to south and 1,208 were from south to north of the Blue Line. The peak before 23 September was on 25 August when Hizbullah launched Operation Day of Arba'in in its stated response to the killing of commander Fuad Shukr (see paras. 7 and 8), with 146 trajectories from north to south and 119 from south to north.

Figure I

**Weekly trajectories of projectiles detected by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, June to October 2024**



Source: UNIFIL.

4. Hizbullah claimed responsibility for multiple attacks on targets in northern Israel and the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan, using rockets, missiles, artillery and drones. After 1 October, Hizbullah and the Israel Defense Forces also clashed within the UNIFIL area of operations (north of the Blue Line). On 13 October, Hizbullah claimed 38 operations, the highest daily number since 8 October 2023.

5. Throughout the reporting period, the Israel Defense Forces conducted strikes on Hizbullah commanders, including in residential buildings. On 3 July, Mohammad Neameh Nasser was the first of several Hizbullah commanders to be killed during the reporting period, in a drone strike by Israel Defense Forces in a residential area in Tyre (Sector West).

6. On 27 July, 12 children were killed and dozens wounded in Majdal Shams, located in the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan. In a letter dated 29 July addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Israel

Katz, stated: “On 27 July 2024, Hezbollah launched numerous rockets from Lebanon into Israeli territory, targeting civilians in the Druze village of Majdal Shams. This attack resulted in the murder of twelve children and teenagers who were innocently playing soccer, with approximately thirty other civilians injured”. Hizbullah stated that it had “no connection with the incident whatsoever”. Although UNIFIL could not verify the full sequence of events, as the site of impact was outside its area of responsibility, it did detect the trajectory of a projectile, assessed to be a 122 mm rocket, crossing the Blue Line around the time in question that day, with a point of origin in the Shab’a Farms area and with a calculated point of impact 836 m from the soccer field in Majdal Shams.

7. On 30 July, the Israel Defense Forces killed the Hizbullah commander Fuad Shukr in an air strike in the densely populated southern suburbs of Beirut. In identical letters dated 31 July addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([A/78/977-S/2024/587](#)), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that “at 1930 hours on 30 July 2024, Israel targeted a residential building near Bahman Hospital, in the Harat Hurayk area in the southern suburbs of Beirut, causing major destruction. Five civilians, including 1 woman and 2 children, were killed and more than 75 other civilians were injured”. On 1 August, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, vowed revenge.

8. On 25 August, UNIFIL recorded 85 air strikes by the Israel Defense Forces, mostly in Sector West. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently stated that they had conducted “pre-emptive” air strikes against over 270 Hizbullah targets. Shortly thereafter, Hizbullah launched hundreds of rockets and drones into Israel in its stated response to the killing of Mr. Shukr.

9. On 17 and 18 September, simultaneous explosions of thousands of pagers and handheld radios primarily used by Hizbullah caused at least 40 fatalities, including those of two children, and over 3,400 injuries, including to the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Lebanon. In identical letters dated 19 September addressed to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General ([A/79/367-S/2024/685](#)), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that this “large-scale cyberattack [...] targeting thousands of people of different age groups in large and densely populated areas such as the South, Nabatiyah, Mount Lebanon, Beirut, and the Bekaa [...] is a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and human rights, and should be classified as a war crime”.

10. On 20 September, the Hizbullah commander Ibrahim Aqil was killed in an Israel Defense Forces air strike in the densely populated southern suburbs of Beirut. According to the Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon, the strike, which led to the collapse of two residential buildings, caused 55 fatalities, including those of women and children, with more than 66 injured. The same day, Hizbullah conducted missile strikes in the vicinity of Haifa. In a letter dated 23 September addressed to the President of the Security Council, Mr. Katz stated that “Hezbollah carried out a large-scale, indiscriminate attack on the Haifa region”.

11. On 23 September, the Israel Defense Forces launched Operation Northern Arrows, with hundreds of air strikes across Lebanon, especially in the UNIFIL area of operations. The Israel Defense Forces stated that they had hit over 1,300 Hizbullah targets. The Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon stated that at least 558 people, including 50 children and 94 women, were killed that day. The strikes also caused mass displacement and widespread damage to civilian infrastructure.

12. The Israel Defense Forces continued heavy bombardment across Lebanon up to 20 October, including in the UNIFIL area of operations, in densely populated urban

centres such as the southern suburbs of Beirut, Baalbek, Nabatiyah and Sidon, and across the Biqa', causing further displacement and casualties.

13. On 27 September, the Israel Defense Forces stated that they had killed the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Mr. Nasrallah, along with several Hizbullah commanders, including Ali Karaki, commander of Hizbullah's southern front, in a strike on "the Central Headquarters of the Hezbollah terrorist organization, embedded under residential buildings in the heart of the Dahieh in Beirut". The bombing levelled at least four residential buildings, causing at least 38 fatalities, including that of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Abbas Nilforoushan, with dozens more wounded or missing. On 28 September, Hizbullah confirmed the death of Mr. Nasrallah.

14. On 28 September, the Israel Defense Forces stated that they had "targeted missile storage facilities belonging to Hizbullah that were buried under six civilian buildings in Dahieh". In another strike that day on the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had killed Nabil Qaouk, the deputy head of Hizbullah's executive council. On 29 September, 72 people, all civilians, were killed following air strikes in Sidon, according to the Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon. On 3 October, the Israel Defense Forces struck what they said was Hizbullah's "central intelligence headquarters" in the southern suburbs of Beirut, killing Hashem Safieddine, head of Hizbullah's executive council, and several others. Israeli strikes on central Beirut, including on the Islamic Health Authority in Bashurah on 3 October, as well as in Nuwayri and Ra's al-Nab' on 10 October, resulted in dozens of fatalities and injuries to hundreds of people. Twenty-three people displaced from South Lebanon, including 12 women and two children, were killed in an Israeli strike on Aytu, Zagharta district, on 14 October. On 16 October, Israeli strikes on the Nabatiyah municipal building killed 16 people, including the mayor, and injured 53. The Israel Defense Forces stated that on 20 October they had carried out strikes across Lebanon against branches of the Al-Qard al-Hassan Association, a Hizbullah-affiliated financial institution.

15. In identical letters dated 15 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([A/79/538-S/2024/749](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that "the scale of the destruction in the wake of Israeli air strikes is staggering. They slice right through residential buildings and leave behind craters dozens of metres deep. That suggests they are using depleted-uranium bombs".

16. On 30 September, the Israel Defense Forces urged UNIFIL to vacate its 29 positions located within 5 km of the Blue Line, except the mission headquarters at Naqurah, and on 1 October announced that they had started "limited, localized, and targeted ground raids based on precise intelligence against Hezbollah terrorist targets and infrastructure in southern Lebanon. These targets are located in villages close to the border and pose an immediate threat to Israeli communities in northern Israel". In identical letters dated 2 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([A/79/396-S/2024/715](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that "advance raids began on the night of 1 October 2024. Israel has massed troops, tank columns and armoured vehicles along the southern border of Lebanon".

17. UNIFIL observed the Israel Defense Forces cross north of the Blue Line in the vicinity of Arab al-Luwayzah and Udaysah on 1 October and near Kfar Kila (all Sector East) on 2 October. Exchanges of fire between the Israel Defense Forces and Hizbullah subsequently occurred in the vicinity of Bint Jubayl, Marun al-Ra's and Yarun (all Sector West). On 7 October, UNIFIL observed clashes near Labunnah (Sector West). On 8 October, it observed the Israel Defense Forces crossing the Blue

Line near Mays al-Jabal (Sector East), followed by clashes with Hizbullah. Further incursions were observed near Ramiyah (Sector West) and Shab'a (Sector East). By 20 October, clashes had been observed in the areas of Ayta al-Sha'b, Marwahin and Ramiyah (all Sector West) and Markaba and Udaysah (both Sector East). UNIFIL also observed Israel Defense Forces naval vessels in the vicinity of Lebanese territorial waters, firing into the mission's area of operations near Labunnah on several occasions after 23 September.

18. Residential areas and civilian infrastructure in the UNIFIL area of operations were increasingly impacted by air strikes after 23 September, rendering many neighbourhoods and villages uninhabitable. Electricity and water infrastructure was heavily damaged in Ayta al-Sha'b, Hanawiye and Ma'rub (all Sector West) as well as in Khiyam and Marji'yun (both Sector East). At least 14 medical workers were reportedly killed and medical facilities, ambulances and civil defence centres damaged by Israeli strikes in the UNIFIL area of operations. Air strikes on civil defence centres reportedly led to 35 fatalities during the reporting period. On 5 October, the hospitals in Marji'yun and Bint Jubayl shut down, leaving only one functioning hospital in southern Lebanon, in Tibnin. The Israel Defense Forces issued statements advising residents of at least 67 villages in South Lebanon to move north of the Awali River (outside of the area of operations). The Israel Defense Forces also warned people against using boats in Lebanese territorial waters south of the Awali River. Over 110 displacement notices were issued by the Israel Defense Forces across Lebanon.

19. In identical letters dated 5 September addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([A/78/1000-S/2024/657](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that "more than 75 per cent of trajectories of projectiles fired across the Blue Line since 8 October 2023 originated south of the Blue Line, that is, on the Israeli side [...] Israeli bombardment has resulted in [...] the displacement of more than 111,000 residents of southern villages. Over 3,000 housing units have been destroyed and some 32,000 more have suffered damage".

20. Civilian casualties were reported in Israel following strikes from Lebanon. The most affected population centres were near the Blue Line, including Manara, Qiryat Shmona and Shtula. After 23 September, Haifa, Tiberias and Tel Aviv were also impacted. In a letter dated 10 October addressed to the President of the Security Council, Mr. Katz stated that "Hezbollah have fired over 13,000 projectiles, 1,500 anti-tank missiles, and hundreds of explosive drones at Israeli communities forcing over 63,000 people to evacuate their homes. This war which was imposed on Israel resulted up until now in 51 casualties, over 372 injured [...] One year later, on October 1, 2024, the [Israel Defense Forces] initiated targeted, limited raid operations in Southern Lebanon aimed at Hezbollah military assets and infrastructures along the Blue Line". He added that "hundreds of terrorists have been eliminated including Hezbollah's senior chain of command and Radwan commanders and operatives. More than 700 Hezbollah terror assets in Lebanon such as tunnels, weaponry, missiles, and launchers – all embedded in the heart of civilian areas – have been uncovered and destroyed".


21. As at 20 October, Israeli authorities reported 30 Israel Defense Forces fatalities from strikes by Hizbullah south of the Blue Line since 8 October 2023 and 16 fatalities north of the Blue Line since 1 October 2024.

22. The Lebanese Armed Forces incurred at least seven fatalities as well as damage to assets and infrastructure following Israeli strikes in the UNIFIL area of operations.

23. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace daily, in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and of Lebanese sovereignty. From 21 June to


22 September, UNIFIL recorded 1,892 air violations by the Israel Defense Forces, totalling 7,251 hours in overflight time. From 23 September to 20 October, UNIFIL recorded 1,293 air violations by the Israel Defense Forces, totalling 7,450 hours in overflight time. Drones accounted for approximately 57 per cent of the violations, fighter aircraft 42 per cent and helicopters and unidentified aircraft 1 per cent. The highest number of daily air violations, 70, was detected on 17 October.

Figure II  
**Violations of Lebanese airspace by the Israel Defense Forces detected by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, June to October 2024**



Source: UNIFIL.

Figure III  
**Weekly air attacks by the Israel Defense Forces observed by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, June to October 2024**



Source: UNIFIL.

24. Hizbullah reportedly increased its use of offensive drones on targets in Israel. UNIFIL was unable to verify such reports, however. The deadliest such attack occurred on 13 October when four Israel Defense Forces personnel were killed and dozens wounded in Binyamina, south of Haifa. Hizbullah also stated that it had launched surface-to-air missiles at Israel Defense Forces fighter aircraft and a helicopter on at least six occasions. UNIFIL detected the launch of a surface-to-air missile towards Israel Defense Forces fighter jets from the vicinity of Burj Qallawiyah (Sector West) on 25 July.


25. Until 22 September, UNIFIL maintained a visible presence and a high operational tempo despite the exchanges of fire across the Blue Line. From 23 September, to ensure the safety and security of its personnel, peacekeepers spent long periods of time in shelter. The mission's freedom of movement (see annex I)\* to undertake mandated activities was severely restricted from 23 September, more so from 1 October, inhibiting mobile operations and its monitoring and reporting capacity. Prior to 23 September, there were several incidents of denial of freedom of movement that the Lebanese Armed Forces helped to resolve through dialogue with the individuals concerned.

26. From 21 June to 22 September, the Mission conducted a monthly average of 13,671 operational activities, including 5,221 vehicular patrols. Sixteen per cent of UNIFIL operational patrols involved at least one woman peacekeeper. The average percentage of UNIFIL operations conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, among the activities that could be, was 16.8 per cent, compared with 18.6 per cent for the previous reporting period (see [S/2024/548](#), para. 25). This included an average of 2,179 Blue Line vehicle patrols and 547 counter-rocket-launching patrols each month. In addition, UNIFIL maintained eight permanent checkpoints, including on the main entry routes into the area of operations. From 21 June to 20 October, UNIFIL, independently or in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, discovered unauthorized weapons on 30 occasions, mostly abandoned mobile rocket launching platforms and rockets. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed of all such weapons located. Foot patrols, temporary checkpoints, market walks and air operations remained suspended, except for a limited number of foot patrols in areas sufficiently distant from the Blue Line. From 23 September to 20 October, UNIFIL conducted only 94 vehicular patrols.

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\* Circulated in the language of submission only.

Figure IV  
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon operational activities, June to October 2024



Source: UNIFIL.

27. Due to the continued exchanges of fire and contamination of the terrain with unexploded ordnance and remnants of war, UNIFIL was not able to monitor all areas, including locations of interest, on a systematic basis.

28. UNIFIL started 18 technical investigations related to impacts on UNIFIL personnel, assets or premises, concluding 9. The results of the concluded investigations were shared with the parties. Seven cases were initiated after 23 September.

29. Pursuant to the strategic dialogue process, focused on support to the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy, UNIFIL conducted 149 joint training exercises and activities with the Lebanese Armed Forces ground forces and 110 with naval units from 21 June to 20 October.

30. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to support maritime interdiction operations, hailing 2,265 vessels from 21 June to 20 October. All 431 vessels referred for inspection by UNIFIL were cleared by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy continued to assume command functions for maritime interdiction operations, with support from the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. On 17 October, an uncrewed aerial vehicle of unknown origin approached a Maritime Task Force vessel off the southern Lebanese coast. In accordance with established procedure, the vessel used electronic countermeasures, after which the drone fell and exploded.

**B. Security and liaison arrangements**

31. From 21 June to 20 October, UNIFIL facilitated 1,220 civilian and humanitarian activities in areas close to the Blue Line, including 383 after 23 September. UNIFIL notified the Israel Defense Forces of 575 rescue and recovery operations by the Lebanese Red Cross and 251 Lebanese civil defence operations, including to



extinguish bushfires. UNIFIL liaised with the Israel Defense Forces 320 times with respect to the safety and security of the Lebanese Armed Forces, including 283 times after 23 September.

32. On 1,019 occasions, UNIFIL liaised with the parties in connection with UNIFIL force protection, including for convoys, patrols, technical investigations and medical evacuations, as well as regarding static positions. On 79 occasions, UNIFIL requested the Israel Defense Forces to stop firing in the vicinity of UNIFIL positions as well as the residences of Observer Group Lebanon or mission civilian personnel in Tyre. Between 21 June and 20 October, UNIFIL provided shelter to approximately 119 civilians under imminent threat.

33. No tripartite meetings were held despite the mission's readiness to convene upon request of the parties. The establishment of a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv remains pending, notwithstanding the agreement of Israel to the proposal made in 2008 for such an office.

34. UNIFIL approved seven quick-impact projects, two of which were in support of crisis response efforts, including in support of internally displaced persons.

35. UNIFIL continued to support the implementation of Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) on women and peace and security, including by providing training on gender mainstreaming for 2,837 UNIFIL military and civilian personnel, of whom 202 were women, by 23 September.

### C. Disarming armed groups

36. No progress was achieved with respect to the disarmament of armed groups in Lebanon. As reported above, Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups continued to demonstrate their military capabilities, including in strikes from Lebanon into Israel. The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hizbullah and other groups in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) continues to restrict the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.

37. The Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, stated on 10 July that "if there is an agreement for a ceasefire in Gaza [...] our front will stop firing". On 17 July, he stated that "if the aggression stops [...] it is the State that will negotiate". On 1 August, he said: "What happened in Dahieh was an aggression, not just an assassination [...] we have entered a new and different phase. Its escalation depends on the behaviour and reactions of the enemy". In addition, on 6 August, he stated: "For 10 months, we had set a ceiling [...] Even when they killed civilians, we targeted the military [...] Israel chose this escalation with Lebanon".

38. In statistics published on 8 October, Hizbullah stated that it had conducted 3,194 military operations against Israel since 8 October 2023. On 16 August, Hizbullah released video footage of underground tunnels filled with weapons and armed personnel. On 25 August, Hizbullah first launched a drone from the Bika' region and, on 25 September, first launched a ballistic missile at the Mossad headquarters near Tel Aviv.

39. In identical letters dated 25 August, addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2024/630](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that "the Hezbollah attack against Israel planned for this morning unequivocally demonstrates the presence of illegal weapons in southern Lebanon [...] This situation highlights the urgent need to demilitarize the area south of the Litani River and achieve the disarmament of Hezbollah and other armed militias operating in southern Lebanon" (see para. 8).

40. The Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, announced on 16 September “the update of the war goals to include the safe return of northern residents to their homes”. The Minister of Defence of Israel, Yoav Gallant, also stated that day that “the possibility for an agreement is running out as Hizbullah continues to ‘tie itself’ to Hamas and refuses to end the conflict”. Following the Israeli strike on 20 September (see para. 10), Mr. Gallant stated: “Our enemies have no place of refuge – not even the Dahieh in Beirut”.

41. On 19 September, Mr. Nasrallah stated: “No military escalation, nor killings or assassination or even comprehensive war can return the northern residents”. The Deputy Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Naim Qassem, stated on 22 September that Hizbullah had entered an “open-ended battle of reckoning” against Israel.

42. In a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 23 September, Mr. Katz stated: “Israel acted last week in Beirut against Hezbollah’s leadership to thwart their plan to infiltrate the Galilee region and execute terror attacks against Israel, similar to those committed by Hamas on October 7th [...] Israel has been compelled to take measures for its self-defense [...] Israel has given advanced warning to the civilians in Lebanon located near buildings and areas used by Hizbullah for military purposes, and advised them to move out of harm’s way immediately” (see para. 11).

43. In a video message addressed to the Lebanese population on 23 September, Mr. Netanyahu stated that “Israel’s war is not with you. It’s with Hizbullah”. On 24 September, he stated: “Whoever has a missile in the living room and a rocket in the garage will no longer have a home”.

44. In Hizbullah’s first public remarks since Mr. Nasrallah’s death, Mr. Qassem stated on 30 September that “the path of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah that he oversaw continues”. Earlier, on 28 September, the Israel Defense Forces stated: “We will target whoever replaces Hassan Nasrallah”.

45. In identical letters dated 1 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2024/713](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated that: “Iran carried out a series of missile attacks against the military and security targets of the Israeli regime [...] in response to [...] the injuring of Iran’s Ambassador to Lebanon due to the deliberate and indiscriminate targeting of civilians in Lebanon by detonating pagers on 17 September 2024, and the assassinations of the Secretary-General of Hezbollah in Lebanon and General Abbas Nilforoushan, an Iranian senior military adviser, in Beirut on 27 September 2024”.

46. By 28 September, Hizbullah had announced that 502 of its members had been killed since 8 October 2023. Hizbullah subsequently ceased publishing death notices. Other non-State armed groups in Lebanon acknowledged at least 89 fatalities. The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas, the Al-Fajr Forces of Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiya and the Lebanese Resistance Brigades claimed responsibility for attacks on northern Israel during the reporting period, while the Amal Movement, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the Al-Quds Brigades of Palestinian Islamic Jihad acknowledged fatalities among their members. A leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade was killed in a strike on Sidon on 21 August, the first strike by Israel on the armed wing of Fatah in Lebanon. In its first strike in central Beirut since 2006, the Israel Defense Forces killed three members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine on 30 September. On 1 October, the Israel Defense Forces claimed to have killed Al-Faqar Hanawi, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Imam Hussein division, in an air strike in Beirut.

47. On 30 September, Hamas announced that its leader in Lebanon, Fatah Sherif Abu el-Amin, had been killed alongside his family in the El Buss camp near Tyre. He

had been on administrative leave without pay from his position at the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) since March 2024 while an investigation was under way into allegations of a possible link to Hamas. Three people were killed on 1 October in the first strike by the Israel Defense Forces on Ein El Hilweh, near Sidon. On 5 October, in their northernmost air strike, the Israel Defense Forces killed Saeed Atallah, a commander with the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas, and his family, in the Beddawi camp near Tripoli, north Lebanon. Heavy bombardment of the southern suburbs of Beirut precipitated an exodus from the nearby Sabra and Chatila camps.

48. Due to the continued presence of armed actors, four UNRWA schools in Ein El Hilweh remained inaccessible.

49. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrested six individuals, all allegedly affiliated with Da'esh, on terrorism-related charges.

#### **D. Arms embargo and border control**

50. Allegations of arms transfers to non-State armed actors continued and remain of serious concern. If confirmed, such transfers would constitute a violation of resolution 1701 (2006) (see annex II).\*\* While it takes allegations of arms transfers seriously, the United Nations is not in a position to substantiate them independently.

51. The Israeli Air Force stated on 26 September that “we are going to prevent any possibility of weapon transfers from Iran, in light of the capabilities we’ve now degraded from Hezbollah”. The Israel Defense Forces announced on 28 September that “we will not allow hostile flights with combat equipment to land [...] Beirut airport is a civilian airport and must be maintained as such”. The control tower of Beirut international airport was subsequently hacked, with a warning issued to an incoming Iranian civilian aircraft against landing. The caretaker Minister of Public Works and Transport of Lebanon, Ali Hamieh, subsequently instructed Rafic Hariri International Airport to inform the Iranian aircraft not to enter Lebanese airspace.

52. On 26 September, the Israel Defense Forces stated: “[Israeli Air Force] fighter jets struck infrastructure along the Syria-Lebanon border used by Hezbollah to transfer weapons from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon”. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently claimed on 3 October that Hizbullah was using the civilian Masna’ border crossing to smuggle weapons and, on 4 October, bombed the road to the border crossing.

53. Reports of Hizbullah’s military engagement in the Syrian Arab Republic continued.

#### **E. Landmines and cluster bombs**

54. The exchanges of fire continued to create unexploded ordnance contamination, posing a threat to civilians on both sides of the Blue Line and to United Nations and humanitarian personnel. While demining activities remained suspended, UNIFIL deminers dealt with unexploded ordnance on 10 occasions, following impacts on UNIFIL positions. To enhance the mission’s ammunition management, 163 demolitions totalling 9,246 kg of expired ammunition were conducted. The Mine Action Service of the United Nations provided seven explosive ordnance risk awareness sessions for 115 military and civilian personnel.

\*\* Circulated in the language of submission only.

## F. Delineation of borders

55. There was no progress made towards the delineation or demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, nor in relation to the issue of the Shab'a Farms area. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area proposed in the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) ([S/2007/641](#)).

## G. Political and institutional stability

56. On 25 September, the United States of America and France issued a joint call, endorsed by Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Union, for an "immediate 21-day ceasefire across the Lebanon-Israel border to provide space for diplomacy towards the conclusion of a diplomatic settlement consistent with Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), and the implementation of Security Council resolution [2735 \(2024\)](#) regarding a ceasefire in Gaza". The joint call was not heeded.

57. At an extraordinary session of the caretaker Cabinet on 28 September, the caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Mikati, stated: "We reaffirm our commitment to international legitimacy and international law, and we demand a ceasefire and the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#)". He called on the Lebanese people to "put aside political differences, divergent positions, and different options, so that we can all come together on what preserves, protects, and strengthens the nation". For the first time since the presidency was vacated on 31 October 2022, ministers affiliated with the Free Patriotic Movement attended the Cabinet session.

58. On 29 September, Mr. Mikati stated: "No matter how long the war lasts, we will eventually return to Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). We can save blood and go to implement the agreement". The same day, Mr. Katz stated: "We reject the settlement proposal with Hizbullah and will not agree to a ceasefire. The only way to reach an agreement is to transfer Hizbullah to the north of the Litani and disarm it".

59. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon engaged intensively with all actors concerned in Lebanon and Israel during the reporting period, as well as with interlocutors in the region and beyond, to stress the importance of an immediate return to the cessation of hostilities and the need for a diplomatic solution, towards the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

60. Following Mr. Nasrallah's death, the Lebanese Armed Forces on 29 September called "on citizens to preserve national unity and not to be drawn into actions that may affect civil peace at this dangerous and delicate stage in the history of our country". On 8 October, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that they maintain their "readiness to defend the land within the available capabilities, based on the decisions of the political authority".

61. The caretaker Cabinet activated national and subnational emergency operations centres to respond to the unfolding humanitarian crisis. The Ministry of Public Health directed hospitals in affected areas to postpone non-emergency cases. After 23 September, schools and educational institutions closed, with over 1,000 schools and public buildings converted into collective shelters for the displaced.

62. As at 20 October, the Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon stated that since 8 October 2023 over 2,467 people had been killed, including 150 children and 270 women, and 11,569 injured, with over 1,860 people killed from 23 September to

20 October 2024. The Government of Lebanon estimated that more than 1.2 million had been displaced. Extensive damage, including to civilian infrastructure, had been incurred. The World Health Organization verified 46 attacks on healthcare facilities in Lebanon, resulting in 95 deaths and 77 injuries among health workers and patients. Five hospitals and 100 primary health centres and dispensaries across Lebanon were closed, and another five hospitals partially evacuated, due to damage from Israeli bombardment. Damage to 28 water facilities from the bombardments affected water access for at least 344,000 people. On 16 October, one case of cholera was confirmed among those displaced.

63. Complementary to the government-led response, the United Nations, Member States and non-governmental partners mobilized food, water and essential supplies for distribution to the displaced. On 1 October, the Lebanon flash appeal, calling for \$425.7 million to assist 1 million people until December, was launched. As at 20 October, the appeal was 15.1 per cent funded with \$64.4 million.

64. Domestic and international efforts to overcome the impasse with respect to the election of a president continued without success. On 30 September, following a meeting with the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, Mr. Mikati stated that “Lebanon will hold a parliamentary session to elect a new president as soon as a ceasefire in the conflict between Hizbullah and Israel takes hold”. Parliament did not convene during the reporting period.

65. On 14 August, the caretaker Cabinet approved the enlistment of 1,500 Lebanese Armed Forces personnel for deployment in southern Lebanon (see annex III).\*\*\*

66. The caretaker Cabinet on 23 September approved the draft 2025 State budget, pending review by Parliament. More than two and a half years since the signing of the staff-level agreement between the International Monetary Fund and Lebanon (see [S/2022/556](#), para. 50), most prerequisite actions for a board-level agreement remain outstanding.

67. There was no progress in the judicial investigation into the Beirut port explosion on 4 August 2020, the prosecution of 68 individuals in the case of the deadly Tayyunah clashes on 14 October 2021 (see [S/2021/953](#), para. 57) or the investigation into the killing of Lokman Slim on 4 February 2021 (see [S/2021/240](#), para. 46).

68. In September, the former Governor of the Central Bank, Riad Salameh, was arrested and charged with embezzlement, theft of public funds, forgery and illicit enrichment.

69. The National Commission for Lebanese Women convened consultations in three governorates with local authorities and civil society to support development of the country’s second national action plan on Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#). In addition, the Lebanese Armed Forces, with support from the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), initiated a series of capacity-building workshops for women soldiers.

70. As at 30 September, 779,621 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, including 768,353 Syrian refugees and 11,268 refugees and asylum-seekers of other nationalities. With new registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR suspended by the Government of Lebanon since 2015, the actual number of refugees is unknown. The Government of Lebanon estimates that there are 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon. So far in 2024, UNHCR has identified 485 deportation incidents affecting at least 4,800 Syrian nationals following raids and arrests at checkpoints and 19 deportation incidents involving 878 Syrian nationals following unsuccessful

\*\*\* Circulated in the language of submission only.

onward movements by sea. Growing frustration with the unresolved Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon was coupled with the imposition by local authorities of restrictive administrative measures and a contraction in the protection space, including a heightened risk of refoulement. At least 34 Syrians, including children and women, were reportedly killed in Israeli strikes on Nabatiyah on 17 August and on Yunin, northern Bīqā', on 26 September. Since 23 September, at least 276,000 people of Lebanese and Syrian nationality have fled overland to the Syrian Arab Republic.

### III. Security and safety measures

71. The designated officials north and south of the Litani River continued to coordinate to ensure the safety and security of all United Nations personnel in Lebanon. On 1 August, temporary family restrictions until 31 December and the relocation of national staff and their families from high-risk areas north of the Litani River were approved. On 23 September, the designated official south of the Litani River required international civilian personnel, and advised all national staff, except programme-critical personnel, to temporarily relocate from south to north of the Litani River. National staff who remained in the area of operations were advised to proceed to the nearest United Nations position for shelter when needed. The programme-critical UNIFIL international civilian personnel and Observer Group Lebanon personnel who remained south of the Litani River relocated to UNIFIL headquarters at Naqurah. On 1 October, the reduction of the footprint of non-programme-critical staff from Lebanon, including those who had relocated from south to north of the Litani River, was approved. One UNIFIL contractor was killed in an Israeli air strike near Naqurah on 2 September. One locally recruited UNHCR staff member, together with one of her eligible dependents, and one UNHCR contractor were killed in Israeli air strikes in Bīqā' and Tyre, respectively, on 23 September.

72. UNIFIL remained in position, including in all positions along the Blue Line, while adapting its security and safety measures, including military contingency plans and force protection measures, to reduce its footprint in positions near the Blue Line. After 23 September, UNIFIL prioritized logistical movements to resupply its positions.

73. From 21 June to 20 October, UNIFIL registered at least 50 instances of impacts on United Nations positions and vehicles, with eight peacekeepers injured. Three were injured on 18 August by an air strike near their vehicle in the vicinity of Duhayrah (Sector West). On 27 July and 13 August, UNIFIL patrol vehicles were hit by gunfire near Sarda (Sector East). On 10 August, a nearby explosion damaged two UNIFIL vehicles in the vicinity of Hanin (Sector West). On 25 June, the car of three UNIFIL contractors was hit by gunfire near Ramiyah.

74. From 1 through 20 October, UNIFIL positions came under direct and repeated fire, with five peacekeepers injured. On 2 October, the Israel Defense Forces constructed a staging position directly adjacent to a UNIFIL position near Marun al-Ra's, with tanks positioned at the site. The Israel Defense Forces fired over the United Nations position and conducted controlled explosive demolitions nearby, damaging perimeter bastions. The Israel Defense Forces vacated the position several days later, following formal protests by the United Nations. On 8 October, Israel Defense Forces soldiers fired at UNIFIL positions in Ra's al-Naqurah, where tripartite meetings were previously held, causing material damage, and in Labunnah, disabling the perimeter-monitoring cameras. On 10 October, the Israel Defense Forces fired through a breach in the protective wall of the UNIFIL position in Labunnah, hitting the bunker where peacekeepers were sheltering and damaging vehicles and a

communications system. A drone was observed flying inside the position. On 10 October, an Israel Defense Forces tank fired at an observation tower at UNIFIL headquarters in Naqurah, injuring two peacekeepers. On 11 October, two peacekeepers were injured following two explosions near an observation tower at the Naqurah headquarters. Overnight on 11 to 12 October, a peacekeeper at the Naqurah headquarters was injured by a stray bullet, which caused minor injuries. On 13 October, two Israel Defense Forces tanks destroyed the main gate of a UNIFIL position in Ramiyah, forcibly entered the premises and departed only following UNIFIL protests. Shortly thereafter, smoke grenades were fired by the Israel Defense Forces near the position, causing skin irritation and/or gastrointestinal reactions to 15 peacekeepers. On 16 October, an Israel Defense Forces tank fired at a watchtower at a UNIFIL position near Kfar Kila, damaging the tower and destroying two cameras. On 20 October, a bulldozer of the Israel Defense Forces demolished an observation tower and perimeter fence of a UNIFIL position in Marwahin. UNIFIL and the Department of Peace Operations protested these developments to the Israeli authorities, underscoring the responsibility of the parties to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel and premises.

75. Rotations of contingents were suspended for October. Since 28 September, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force shuttled some UNIFIL personnel between Beirut and Naqurah.

76. The next trial hearing in the case of the fatal attack against UNIFIL near Mazra'at al-Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022 is scheduled for 12 February 2025, having been postponed from 7 June 2024. The United Nations has not been informed of any criminal proceedings to bring to justice the perpetrators of the incident of 4 August 2018 in the village of Majdal Zun (Sector West). The Military Prosecutor instructed the Lebanese Armed Forces to expand the investigations into the acts of aggression against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Shaqra on 22 December 2021, in Bint Jubayl on 4 January 2022 and in Ramiyah on 25 January 2022.

#### **IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**

77. As at 20 October, UNIFIL had 10,048 military personnel, including 857 women (8.5 per cent), from 50 troop-contributing countries, and 787 civilian staff (241 international and 546 national), including 253 women (32 per cent). The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force comprised five vessels, with 548 of the mission's military personnel, including 45 women (8.6 per cent). In addition, 49 military observers, including 10 women (20.4 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization served with Observer Group Lebanon under the operational command and control of UNIFIL. The most senior military women had the rank of lieutenant colonel, while the most senior civilian woman served at the D-2 level.

78. UNIFIL continued to implement the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System and to assess the continued relevance of UNIFIL resources (see [S/2020/473](#)), pursuant to Security Council resolution [2539 \(2020\)](#).

79. The mission continued to be the subject of widespread misinformation and disinformation in Lebanon and Israel regarding its mandate, activities and capacity to implement resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). In response, it issued statements, conducted interviews and organized in-person and virtual media visits to clarify its mandate and activities.

80. UNIFIL conducted 13 evaluations of units, for logistics, training and operational preparedness, in implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping commitments and Security Council resolution [2436 \(2018\)](#). No shortfalls were identified.



## V. Conduct and discipline

81. From 1 June to 30 September, UNIFIL recorded seven allegations of possible unsatisfactory conduct, which includes one allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse. No allegations were reported in the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon. The missions remain committed to strict adherence to the United Nations zero tolerance policies on sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment. Induction and awareness training on United Nations standards of conduct was provided to 7 civilian and 2,808 military personnel of UNIFIL. In addition, 394 civilian staff members received training on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and the prevention of sexual harassment.

## VI. Observations

82. One year since the onset of the exchanges of fire across the Blue Line, in repeated breach of the cessation of hostilities and in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), Lebanon and Israel are on the precipice of an all-out conflict that risks plunging the region into catastrophe. This must be avoided at all costs.

83. On both sides of the Blue Line, too many lives have been lost. Many people have been wounded. More than 1 million have been displaced. Homes, villages and livelihoods have been destroyed. Every rocket and missile fired, every bomb dropped and every ground operation conducted pulls the parties further away from the vision set out in resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and the conditions necessary for the safe return of civilians on both sides. I am gravely concerned for the safety of civilians on both sides of the Blue Line and I strongly condemn the loss of civilian lives.

84. I once again urge all actors concerned to step back from the brink. No effort should be spared to avert an even wider conflagration. De-escalation and a political solution are still possible – they are the only viable way forward. I call on the entire international community to leverage its influence before it is too late. A politically negotiated solution for a return to the cessation of hostilities must be anchored in the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) by both parties. The Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander continue their engagements to this end. Meanwhile, the United Nations flag continues to fly along the Blue Line. UNIFIL remains in position to support implementation by the parties of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) in line with its mandate as bestowed upon it by the Security Council.

85. The spiralling violence, which has included intense aerial bombardment by Israel in densely populated areas in Lebanon – including in Beirut – and land incursions by the Israel Defense Forces across the Blue line, is the deadliest that Lebanon has experienced in a generation. It has created a humanitarian crisis, disproportionately affecting women and girls, with widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure. Three members of the United Nations family have also been lost, and several United Nations peacekeepers wounded. I urge all actors concerned to comply fully with their obligations under international humanitarian law, including the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack and against the effects of attacks, and to facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian aid, as well as the movement of humanitarian workers, including through effective humanitarian notification mechanisms to mitigate the risk to both humanitarian actors and to those accessing assistance. The protection of civilians, including women, children, journalists, medical workers and other first responders, as well as civilian infrastructure, must be ensured. Civilians, including children, journalists and medical



workers, should never be targeted. I call on donors to ensure that the Lebanon flash appeal is fully funded.

86. The continued daily attacks by Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups since 8 October 2023 demonstrate the possession of weapons outside the authority of the State in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line and undermine the sovereignty and security of the Lebanese State, in violation of resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1559 (2004). I once again call upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon and the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory. I repeat my call to address the outstanding elements of resolution 1701 (2006) and the issue of the national defence strategy. It remains important that earlier decisions of the national dialogue are implemented, especially those pertaining to the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

87. Resolution 1701 (2006) requires the parties to respect the Blue Line and the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders. Operations by the Israel Defense Forces on Lebanese territory and attacks by Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups in Lebanon on Israel are a blatant violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

88. I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty from Israel and call again for the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory. I also condemn any violation of the sovereignty of Israel by Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups from Lebanon. I strongly condemn any armed activities at or in the vicinity of UNIFIL positions and recall that all acts that endanger the safety and security of peacekeepers are considered violations of international law. UNIFIL peacekeepers must not be targeted. Attacks against them are in breach of international law, including international humanitarian law, and may constitute a war crime. The freedom of movement of the mission must also be ensured by all actors. The ability of UNIFIL to implement its operational activities as mandated is more critical than ever.

89. Perpetrators of attacks against UNIFIL, including those responsible for the killing of a peacekeeper and injuries to three others near Mazra'at al-Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022, must be held to account. The role of the host Government remains crucial in helping to prevent such incidents in the future, including by helping to dispel misinformation and disinformation regarding the mission's mandate. I note with concern that the Lebanese Armed Forces, which have refrained from the exchanges of fire across the Blue Line, have suffered fatalities. I welcome the decision of the caretaker Government of Lebanon to approve the enlistment of an additional 1,500 Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers, an important step towards extending the authority of the State throughout its territory. The strengthened presence and capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River, as well as at sea, are at the core of resolution 1701 (2006). I extend my appreciation to the Member States whose support has helped to sustain the Lebanese Armed Forces, and I call on donors to bolster their material and financial support commensurate with their commitment to the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

90. As the political impasse approaches two years, I urge Lebanese political leaders to take resolute steps towards the election of a president who will represent and advocate for the interests of all Lebanese people and towards ensuring fully functional State institutions to address the country's pressing political and security challenges.

91. I regret that there has been no progress made on the issue of the Shab'a Farms in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 (2006). I reiterate my call upon

Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to submit their responses to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area as provided in the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 October 2007 (S/2007/641).

92. The continued occupation by the Israel Defense Forces of northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line is in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and must cease. I again urge the Israeli authorities to fulfil their obligations under resolution 1701 (2006) to withdraw from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line. I note that the Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, while the Government of Israel has yet to respond.

93. I call upon the Government of Lebanon to abide by its policy of disassociation, consistent with the Baabda Declaration of 2012, and for all Lebanese parties and nationals to cease their involvement in the Syrian conflict and other conflicts in the region. I am deeply concerned by the risk of regionalization of the conflict between Hizbullah and Israel. I condemn any movement of fighters and war materiel across the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, or elsewhere in the region, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

94. I remain concerned that chronic and acute funding shortfalls will jeopardize the critical role of UNRWA in providing stability across the region. I appeal to donors to increase their financial support to ensure the continuity of essential services and support by UNRWA to all Palestine refugees in Lebanon, as elsewhere. The independent review of the Agency's neutrality found that it has a more robust neutrality framework than comparable entities and is making every effort to implement the recommendations of the review.

95. I acknowledge the enormous challenges for Lebanon that come from hosting large numbers of refugees on its territory. While the hospitality that the Lebanese people have extended to large numbers of refugees for decades is laudable, I call on the wider international community to work towards sustainable solutions that meet the needs of refugees and alleviate the undue burden on Lebanon. A robust, united, well-funded response to the rising needs of the refugees and their host communities remains vital, as does the consistent application of legal and procedural safeguards, including the principle of non-refoulement, to ensure that the protection space does not contract further. The prevailing security risks and the challenges of addressing widespread internal displacement in Lebanon only further compound the urgency of finding sustainable solutions, including to allow those Syrian refugees who wish to return home to do so safely and in dignity.

96. More than four years since the Beirut port explosion on 4 August 2020, I reiterate my call for the Lebanese authorities to follow through on the conduct of an impartial, thorough and transparent investigation.

97. I express my condolences to all those affected by the ongoing hostilities. I express my sincere gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon. In particular, I recognize the bravery of the peacekeepers on the front line, maintaining their positions under the most severe security conditions and logistical constraints. I thank the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz, as well as the troop-contributing countries that remained united in this difficult period, and all members of the United Nations country team for their continued dedication to peace and stability in these extremely difficult circumstances.

## Annex I

### **Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 June to 20 October 2024**

1. In paragraph 15 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, were fully respected and unimpeded. It called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by UNIFIL for the purpose of swift investigations, including all locations of interest, all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line (as reported in [S/2019/237](#)) and unauthorized firing ranges, in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.
2. In the reporting period, UNIFIL continued its operations until 22 September, despite the daily exchanges of fire across the Blue Line, which affected patrols and UNIFIL positions, in particular those close to the Blue Line. Operations in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces continued, where possible.
3. These included a focus on counter-rocket-launching patrols, including in the surroundings of UNIFIL positions, and Blue Line armoured vehicle patrols. Some foot patrols and market walks resumed where security conditions allowed until 22 September, while temporary checkpoints and air operations remained suspended throughout the reporting period.
4. From 21 June to 22 September, UNIFIL conducted an average of 5,221 monthly vehicle patrols during the day and at night. Of these, an average of 2,179 vehicle patrols were conducted each month along the Blue Line. In addition, the Force conducted an average of 1,027 inspection activities each month, which included the operation of permanent checkpoints and the conduct of counter-rocket-launching patrols each month. Between 23 September and 20 October, only 94 patrols were completed.
5. From 23 September to 20 October, normal operational and logistical activities outside positions were only possible for a total of 53 hours and limited to certain parts of the area of operations. The prolonged periods of time that UNIFIL peacekeepers spent in shelter following notifications from the Israel Defense Forces, stated by the latter to be necessary for the safety and security of UNIFIL personnel, further significantly impeded mandated activities. Between 8 and 10 October, for instance, some positions were in shelter for a continuous 42 hours.
6. From 21 June to 22 September, UNIFIL was subject to direct attacks on several occasions. Four such attacks occurred close to Sarda in Sector East. On one occasion, a contractor was injured by incoming fire and evacuated to a civilian hospital outside of the area of operations.
7. As noted in the report, following the launch by the Israel Defense Forces of Operation Northern Arrows on 23 September, UNIFIL movement all but ceased. Furthermore, with ground operations north of the Blue Line in the area of operations from 1 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel and infrastructure were on occasion situated directly next to United Nations positions, and such positions were damaged as a result of exchanges of fire between the Israel Defense Forces and Hizbullah.
8. Prior to 23 September, the mission continuously coordinated with the Lebanese Armed Forces with respect to its freedom of movement and unrestricted access to its entire area of operations. However, the Lebanese Armed Forces continued to object

to some patrol routes proposed by UNIFIL to expand the Force's presence outside main routes and municipal centres, on the grounds that they were either private roads or areas of strategic importance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL consistently followed up on reported incidents of restrictions of movement with the Lebanese authorities. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, the Force continued to experience restrictions, as detailed below. Notably, since the start of Israeli ground operations on 1 October, the limited movements that UNIFIL has undertaken in the area of operations have on a few occasions been impeded by the Israel Defense Forces as well as by damage and attacks on United Nations positions.

#### **Access to all locations of interest**

9. Owing to the security situation, during the reporting period, UNIFIL was not able to systematically monitor locations of interest, including Green Without Borders sites. Many of these sites were destroyed or damaged by the Israel Defense Forces.

#### **Freedom of movement incidents**

10. On 22 June, approximately 20 individuals stopped two UNIFIL patrol vehicles in the vicinity of Kawtariyat al Ruzz (outside the area of operations) about 6 km from the Tyre-Sidon highway. The individuals searched the vehicles and personnel and seized eight mobile phones, three watches, a pair of earphones, maps and an internal driving order. After 40 minutes, another individual arrived and asked the peacekeepers to make a U-turn. Shortly thereafter, the peacekeepers returned to a nearby UNIFIL position without completing their planned activities. UNIFIL followed up with the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to have the seized items returned. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

11. On 28 June, 10 individuals with a scooter blocked a UNIFIL patrol from entering the urban area of Suwwanan in the vicinity of Majdal Silm (Sector East). The peacekeepers turned back without completing their planned itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL liaised with the local municipal authorities, which said that some young men had stopped the patrol from entering the village late at night without the Lebanese Armed Forces. The mayor further stated that this incident had occurred without any aggressive behaviour.

12. On 6 July, eight individuals with two cars stopped a UNIFIL patrol that was returning from a joint activity with the Lebanese Armed Forces in the vicinity of Burj al-Muluk (Sector East). The individuals waved knives, seized a United Nations flag and attempted to puncture one of the vehicles' tires. Peacekeepers remained in their vehicles until a man persuaded the individuals to leave. The patrol then drove to a nearby UNIFIL position. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

13. On 12 July, 8 to 10 individuals with three scooters and two vehicles blocked a UNIFIL patrol north-west of Burj al Qibli (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and reached the location 30 minutes later. The patrol resumed its planned itinerary.

14. On 12 July, a UNIFIL convoy unintentionally impeded the movement of a private vehicle while making a U-turn on the coastal road, south-east of Tyre (Sector West). The private vehicle followed the convoy in an aggressive manner and hit one of the UNIFIL vehicles. The left mirror was damaged and the front bumper scratched. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed about the incident. The local mayor informed UNIFIL that he had contacted the Lebanese Armed Forces at the time of the incident and the situation was resolved, noting that UNIFIL was patrolling without the Lebanese Armed Forces.

15. On 13 July, a UNIFIL patrol was blocked by a vehicle north-east of Yatar (Sector West). A few minutes afterwards, an additional vehicle and three motorcycles arrived and blocked the patrol at the rear. Five minutes later, 5 to 10 additional vehicles and scooters gathered at the scene, with a total of around 20 individuals surrounding the patrol, 1 hitting the patrol vehicles. Two of the individuals then drove with the patrol out of the area, warning it not to return. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. The local mayor stated that the youths had acted independently. In response, the municipality issued a public notice instructing residents to leave such matters to the Lebanese Armed Forces or the municipal police if necessary.

16. On 14 July, UNIFIL peacekeepers on a joint patrol with the Lebanese Armed Forces observed a rocket launching platform in the vicinity of Dayr Mimas (Sector East). Shortly thereafter, approximately 20 individuals, one vehicle and several scooters arrived at the location and acted aggressively, damaging the UNIFIL vehicles slightly. The UNIFIL patrol left while a Lebanese Armed Forces explosive ordnance disposal team remained at the site.

17. On 15 July, a UNIFIL team (four hospital personnel with an ambulance) diverted from the main road by mistake was stopped by approximately 10 individuals in the southern suburbs of Beirut (outside the area of operations). The individuals checked the documentation and cell phones of the medical personnel, directed them to an office and told them to wait. Two hours later, they were accompanied by a Lebanese Armed Forces vehicle to a Lebanese Armed Forces intelligence office and questioned for about two hours. Subsequently, the medical staff were brought back to the highway and continued their movement to Naqurah (Sector West). No aggressive behaviour was observed. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

18. On 21 July, a UNIFIL patrol stopped north-west of Khirbat Silm (Sector East) due to a vehicle malfunction. Ten individuals reached the patrol and when, 15 minutes later, a UNIFIL quick reaction team arrived at the location, they prevented it from recovering the vehicle. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and, after 50 minutes, a Lebanese Armed Forces patrol arrived and facilitated the recovery of the vehicle by the quick reaction team. The patrol continued its planned itinerary. No injury to any personnel or damage was reported.

19. On 22 July, a UNIFIL patrol had to stop near Qusayr (Sector East) due to a mechanical failure and, shortly thereafter, approximately 20 individuals arrived, warned the peacekeepers to leave immediately and burned tyres. When the UNIFIL quick reaction team arrived 50 minutes later and the convoy began moving towards a nearby UNIFIL position, the individuals again blocked the road with cars and scooters. At one point, approximately 20 individuals were observed, some using radios and others with handguns. Arriving at the UNIFIL position, the last UNIFIL vehicles were once again blocked by individuals for a few minutes. Two UNIFIL peacekeepers sustained minor injuries. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

20. On 27 July, a UNIFIL patrol's vehicle was hit by gunshots south-west of Sarda. The point of origin of the shots could not be confirmed, but the mission's assessment is that they were fired by the Israel Defense Forces from south of the Blue Line. The vehicle was hit ten times and suffered from a flat tyre, rendering it immobile. The UNIFIL recovery team moved the damaged vehicle to a nearby UNIFIL position. No injury to UNIFIL peacekeepers was reported. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed, and a formal protest letter was sent to the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL has also launched an internal investigation into the incident.

21. On 29 July, an individual, without providing an explanation, told a UNIFIL patrol that it could not continue on a specific road in the vicinity of Rashayya al-Fukhkhar (Sector East). The individual did not act aggressively. The patrol

reversed and reached the UNIFIL position to which it was travelling. There was no impact on patrolling activities, as peacekeepers had already finished their operational duties. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL followed up with the local mayor, who denounced the behaviour and reiterated the municipality's good relations with the mission.

22. On 2 August, two individuals on a scooter stopped a UNIFIL logistical movement near Dayr Siryan (Sector East) and damaged the camera of one of the vehicles before leaving. The patrol continued its planned movement and there was no injury to UNIFIL personnel. UNIFIL contacted the mayor of Dayr Siryan, who stated that he was unaware of the incident and that it was an isolated act, not directed by any parties or authorities. He emphasized his commitment to maintaining positive relations with UNIFIL. The Lebanese Armed Forces were also informed. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

23. On 7 August, two individuals on scooters encircled a UNIFIL convoy in the vicinity of Ayn Ba'al (Sector West) and threw a shoe at one of the vehicles. At the same time, one of the vehicle's rear windows was smashed; peacekeepers were not able to confirm how the window was broken. There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel, and the convoy was able to continue its planned itinerary. The local deputy mayor stated to UNIFIL that he was unaware of the incident and added that the village population is friendly towards UNIFIL. However, he explained that if the patrol went into narrow streets or took the valley road without the Lebanese Armed Forces, it would be stopped by villagers.

24. On 8 August, five individuals with three vehicles blocked a UNIFIL patrol from the front and back, impeding its movement in the vicinity of Aynata (Sector West). The individuals did not act aggressively and were not carrying weapons. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed, reached the location shortly thereafter and assisted the patrol in moving away from the area. The patrol interrupted its planned activities and returned to its UNIFIL position. UNIFIL followed up with the mayor of Aynata, who expressed his concern, as UNIFIL has repeatedly been stopped in this neighbourhood where the local community is very suspicious. In addition, the mayor said that he would put up road signs indicating the main road for UNIFIL patrols.

25. On 10 August, a UNIFIL patrol reported an explosion approximately 60 m from its vehicles close to Hanin (Sector West), both of which were damaged. The patrol was able to return to its UNIFIL position. No injury to UNIFIL personnel was reported. At the moment of the strike, no warning or recommendation to seek shelter had been received by UNIFIL. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

26. On 11 August, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol was blocked by a vehicle parked in the middle of the road, along with nine unarmed men, south-east of Kafr Hammam (Sector East). The patrol's language assistant interacted with the individuals, but tension increased and the patrol was asked to leave. A few minutes later, the Observer Group Lebanon patrol returned to its base. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

27. On 13 August, UNIFIL peacekeepers south-west of Sarda heard nine machine gun shots, two hitting the back and the right side of the last patrol vehicle. The impacts were not noted until the activity was completed and the patrol reached its destination. The UNIFIL patrol was moving from north to south along the Blue Line, which was on the west side of the convoy. No injury to UNIFIL personnel was reported. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

28. On 18 August, UNIFIL peacekeepers on administrative duty reported an air strike in close proximity to their UNIFIL vehicle. All three peacekeepers suffered injuries and the vehicle was damaged. At the moment of the strike, no warning or recommendation to seek shelter had been received by UNIFIL.

29. On 19 August, two individuals stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Kafr Hammam and told peacekeepers that they could not continue on that specific road. The patrol observed bushes and branches further along the road, obstructing movement, and turned around. The patrol continued patrolling, making a detour. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

30. On 30 August, three individuals in civilian clothes with two motorcycles stopped a UNIFIL patrol near 'Aytit (Sector West) and aggressively requested the patrol to turn back. One individual told the peacekeepers to remain in the vehicles while making a phone call. A UNIFIL vehicle was hit with a machete-like knife, causing scratches and damage to one side mirror. Five or six more individuals reached the location and, to avoid further tension, the patrol moved back approximately 1 km and informed the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived and accompanied the patrol out of the area, and it returned to its UNIFIL position. The local mayor condemned the attack and attributed it as an individual incident, noting that two police officers were deployed rapidly to the site. The mayor also recommended that UNIFIL patrols be conducted with the Lebanese Armed Forces to prevent such incidents.

31. On 2 September, UNIFIL peacekeepers on a patrol reported five gunshots close to their patrol near Sarda (Sector East). Stones that ricocheted after being hit by the bullets bounced and impacted the patrol vehicles, although the vehicles were not directly struck by gunshots. The patrol was able to continue its planned itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

32. On 3 September, a convoy of two UNIFIL vehicles, followed by three UNIFIL civilian contractors in three unmarked civilian cars, was hit by gun fire in the vicinity of Sarda (Sector East) while moving from north to south along the Blue Line, with the Blue Line on the west side of the convoy. One of the contractors was injured by an impact on his upper body and several impacts on the right side of his vehicle were noted. The convoy reached its final destination and the UNIFIL contractor was evacuated to a civilian hospital outside the area of operations.

33. On 9 September, approximately 30 individuals blocked the road in front of a joint Lebanese Armed Forces-UNIFIL patrol near Majdal Zun (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces engaged with the individuals and urged the UNIFIL peacekeepers to change their itinerary. The patrol moved to another location and subsequently decided to continue in the opposite direction. No aggressive behaviour was noted during the incident.

34. On 10 September, two individuals with a scooter and a vehicle stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Qalawiyah (Sector West) and asked peacekeepers to turn back. The patrol moved and waited for the Lebanese Armed Forces, which had been informed. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived 20 minutes later together with an individual on a scooter who previously had taken a photo of the patrol. The patrol assessed the situation with the Lebanese Armed Forces and continued its movement, using an alternative route.

35. On 13 September, approximately 10 unarmed individuals stopped a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Bra'shit (Sector West) and asked peacekeepers to turn back. The individuals threatened the peacekeepers and stole three cell phones, one base station radio, one tablet, one camera, one global navigation satellite system and one

antenna. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed, reached the location after 50 minutes, and accompanied the patrol to a nearby Lebanese Armed Forces position before moving to a UNIFIL position. There were no injuries to UNIFIL personnel. UNIFIL is following up with the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to have the seized items returned. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

36. On 14 September, six individuals with five scooters blocked a UNIFIL patrol, north-west of Rashaf (Sector West). The individuals behaved aggressively, and one threw a rock at the patrol vehicle, without hitting it. The patrol turned around, but was once again blocked. Peacekeepers were able to take an alternative road towards Haddatha (Sector West) and requested assistance from the Lebanese Armed Forces. After 15 minutes, the patrol decided to continue to a nearby UNIFIL position on its own. This is the third denial of freedom in Rashaf during 2024.

37. On 17 September, a UNIFIL ambulance conducted a medical evacuation from Naqurah to Beirut when, on the outskirts of Tyre, an angry crowd of 20 to 30 individuals, some carrying small iron rods and screwdrivers, stopped and vandalized the ambulance by throwing stones at the windows and attempted to forcibly open the doors. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the scene and intervened. The ambulance continued its movement to a nearby medical facility and waited for the Lebanese Armed Forces to facilitate its movement to a UNIFIL position. The incident occurred in the context of widespread panic following the explosion of communication devices in Lebanon.

38. On 17 September, several individuals gathered with ambulances, vehicles and scooters on the road in Tibnin (Sector West), blocking a UNIFIL convoy's movement. When the convoy tried to leave the area, some individuals started acting aggressively, throwing stones. With the help of some other individuals, the convoy left the area and reached a nearby UNIFIL position. The incident occurred in the context of widespread panic following the explosion of communication devices in Lebanon.

39. On 17 September, military observers from Observer Group Lebanon observed a UNIFIL ambulance being hit by an angry crowd on the coastal road, north-west of Burj al Qibli. A man approached the Observer Group Lebanon vehicle, which was stuck in traffic close to the ambulance and shouted while punching the windows. Two other individuals hit the car and attempted to open the doors and smash the windows. Some others in the crowd intervened and helped the Observer Group Lebanon personnel turn their vehicle and drive back towards UNIFIL headquarters in Naqurah. No damage or casualties were reported. The incident occurred in the context of widespread panic following the explosion of communication devices in Lebanon.

40. On 18 September, 30 to 40 individuals exhibiting aggressive behaviour stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Burj al Qibli. The individuals surrounded the patrol and smashed the vehicles' windows and side mirrors, and slashed and deflated the vehicles' tires. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. The vehicles were towed to a UNIFIL position, accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The event occurred in the context of widespread panic caused by the second wave of explosions of communication devices across the country.

41. On 19 September, three individuals made hand gestures, telling a UNIFIL patrol to turn back in the vicinity of Qulaylah (Sector West). The patrol that was conducted together with the Lebanese Armed Forces stopped. The Lebanese Armed Forces talked to the individuals and it was agreed that the patrol would turn back on the same road, not finalizing the planned route.

42. On 21 September, three individuals, identifying themselves as Hizbullah members, stopped a UNIFIL patrol north-east of Mukhayyam a-Qasimiyah (outside



the area of operations) and took communication devices. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and arrived at the location after 30 minutes, and shortly thereafter the UNIFIL patrol returned to its position. UNIFIL is following up with the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to have the seized items returned.

43. On 27 September, approximately 30 male individuals stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Juwayya (Sector West) and aggressively asked peacekeepers to turn around. The patrol observed a vehicle carrying heavy military equipment and another bus carrying approximately 20 women in the vicinity. The patrol turned around and continued the patrol on an amended itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

44. On 11 October, Israel Defense Forces soldiers in three vehicles stopped a critical UNIFIL logistical convoy near Mays al-Jabal (Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces stated that the movement had been declared unsafe due to the ongoing operations, and the UNIFIL convoy moved to a nearby UNIFIL position. Later the same day, Israel Defense Forces soldiers stopped the same UNIFIL convoy once again near Mays al-Jabal. The convoy returned without finishing the movement as planned. UNIFIL protested the incident. The Israel Defense Forces characterized events as “preventive measures to ensure the safety and well-being of UNIFIL forces in the jurisdiction”.

45. On 18 October, while carrying out road clearing to enable access to a nearby UNIFIL position in the vicinity of Mays al-Jabal, UNIFIL peacekeepers reported several impacts in the area, and an Israeli tank shell impacted approximately 20 m from the UNIFIL explosive ordnance team. UNIFIL peacekeepers were not able to continue the scheduled work and returned to their UNIFIL position.

#### **Impact on United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon positions and personnel**

46. From 21 June to 30 September, UNIFIL positions and assets were impacted on at least 21 occasions, including four impacts characterized as restrictions of freedom of movement. UNIFIL continued to protest to Lebanese authorities where non-State armed groups were seen to be operating in the vicinity of UNIFIL positions. From 1 October and the start of the Israel Defense Forces ground operation until 20 October, UNIFIL positions were directly or indirectly affected on at least 19 occasions, as detailed below. In addition, on 18 October, the impact of an explosion recorded approximately 20 m from UNIFIL peacekeepers conducting explosive ordnance disposal work restricted their freedom of movement.

47. On 2 October, UNIFIL peacekeepers in a UNIFIL position south-east of Marun al-Ra's (Sector West) reported that two Israel Defense Forces tanks were circling their position. One moved to the front gate and pointed its barrel towards the UNIFIL position before leaving the location. Later the same day, several gunshots and two tank shots were fired towards the UNIFIL position from the vicinity of vehicles belonging to the Israel Defense Forces parked in the area. No injury or damage was reported. The following day, three Israel Defense Forces tanks oriented their turrets towards the position, and 40 minutes later, while stationed behind the UNIFIL position, one of the tanks fired a round over the position. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces. No injury or damage was reported.

48. On 2 October, a shell impacted in a UNIFIL position, south-west of Udaysah (Sector East), and exploded within the premises while peacekeepers were in bunkers. There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel, but several walls and vehicles were damaged. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

49. On 2 October, several gunshots and two tank shots were fired towards a UNIFIL position south-east of Marun al-Ra's from the vicinity of Israel Defense Forces vehicles. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces. No injury or damage was reported.

50. On the night between 6 and 7 October, on two occasions there was small arms and tank fire from a south-to-north direction. This damaged a wall and the structure of a UNIFIL position south-west of Alma al-Sha'b (Sector West). UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.
51. On 7 October, the Israel Defense Forces conducted two controlled demolitions close to a UNIFIL position south-east of Marun al-Ra's. The two explosions caused damage to the UNIFIL position, including the collapse of several bastion walls. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.
52. On 7 October, a UNIFIL vehicle inside a UNIFIL position south-east of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) was hit and caught fire. UNIFIL sent a "stop fire" request to the Israel Defense Forces, and peacekeepers were able to extinguish the fire.
53. On 8 October, two Israeli soldiers fired directly at and destroyed a perimeter security camera at a UNIFIL position south-west of Alma al-Sha'b. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.
54. On 8 October, the building that until October 2023 housed the tripartite meetings south of Naqurah (Sector West) was hit by small arms fire from a nearby Israel Defense Forces position. Three spotlights and a radio relay station were damaged. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.
55. On 10 October, an Israel Defense Forces tank was observed pointing a laser towards an observation post in the UNIFIL headquarters Green Hill camp, south-west of Naqurah. Shortly thereafter, the post was directly hit by a tank shell and two UNIFIL peacekeepers sustained injuries. UNIFIL protested the incident. In official statements, the Israel Defense Forces said that they had "instructed the [United Nations] forces in the area to remain in protected spaces", following which they opened fire.
56. On 10 October, a UNIFIL position south-west of Alma al-Sha'b was directly targeted by small arms fire through a breach in the perimeter wall, caused earlier by adjacent Israel Defense Forces groundworks. Vehicles, communication equipment and the entrance of the bunker where all the peacekeepers were sheltering at the moment of the incident were damaged. In addition, a drone flew into the UNIFIL position and descended at the entrance of the bunker. The following day, at the same UNIFIL position, an Israel Defense Forces excavator repeatedly hit the perimeter T-wall, destroying three sections. After UNIFIL personnel addressed the Israel Defense Forces soldiers, they asserted that the damage to the wall was not intentional and subsequently stopped the activity. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.
57. On 11 October, two UNIFIL peacekeepers sustained injuries due to indirect explosions near UNIFIL headquarters, north-west of Naqurah. One of the peacekeepers was injured by shrapnel and evacuated to a hospital in Tyre for medical treatment. An internal investigation is ongoing to determine the circumstances of the incident.
58. On 11 October, in UNIFIL headquarters south-west of Naqurah, a UNIFIL peacekeeper was hit by a bullet. The peacekeeper, who had spent a prolonged period in shelter, had stepped out briefly and was hit while wearing his protective equipment. The peacekeeper received medical attention at the UNIFIL headquarters hospital, and a bullet was removed from his chest. The source of the fire is currently unknown. An investigation is ongoing to determine how the peacekeeper was injured.
59. On 13 October, Israel Defense Forces excavators were observed opening a path between a UNIFIL position south-east of Ramiyah (Sector West) and an Israel Defense Forces position south of the Blue Line. The following night, two Israel

Defense Forces tanks forced the entry gate and proceeded into the UNIFIL position. UNIFIL contacted the Israel Defense Forces and after 45 minutes the tanks left the position. One hour later, UNIFIL peacekeepers reported several smoke grenades fired approximately 100 m north of the position, engulfing the camp and causing skin irritation and gastrointestinal reactions to 15 peacekeepers. UNIFIL protested the incident. The Israel Defense Forces asserted that the tanks had reversed into the UNIFIL position amid intense firing during a casualty evacuation procedure, and when fire stopped and the injured soldiers were evacuated, the tanks left the position. The Israel Defense Forces further stated that the smoke grenades had been fired to cover the evacuation.


60. On 14 October, two vehicles, a road and accommodation buildings in the UNIFIL headquarters Green Hill camp sustained damage due to an impact inside the camp. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident. There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel.

61. On 16 October, an Israel Defense Forces tank fired a shot towards a watchtower located in a UNIFIL position east of Dayr Amis (Sector East). Two security cameras, walls, a ceiling and a door were damaged. Shrapnel was also found inside the camp. There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

62. On 20 October, peacekeepers in a UNIFIL position in the vicinity of Marwahin (Sector West) observed engineering work conducted by the Israel Defense Forces adjacent to their UNIFIL position. During the works, a UNIFIL watchtower and the position's perimeter fence were destroyed. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

Figure

**Incidents of restriction of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon freedom of movement and impacts on the mission's positions and personnel, 21 June to 20 October 2024**



Source: UNIFIL.

## Annex II

### Implementation of the arms embargo

1. In paragraph 21 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), according to which all States shall take the measures necessary to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States regarding allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).
2. It is stipulated in paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, inter alia, the sale or supply of arms and related material of all types to any entity or individual in Lebanon.
3. In a letter dated 23 September addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel stated that “Iran is the mastermind behind Hezbollah’s relentless aggression against Israel since October 8th. Iran guides, trains, and arms Hizbullah and its proxies”.
4. In identical letters dated 1 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2024/712](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “in Lebanon, Iran supplied Hizbullah with 150,000 rockets, anti-tank missiles and explosive unmanned aerial vehicles, breaching Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#)”.
5. In identical letters dated 8 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2024/721](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated: “During a press briefing in New York on 25 September, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi, in response to a question about the supply of advanced weapons to Hezbollah, acknowledged that ‘Iran has always said that it supports Hezbollah in its just cause to defend Lebanon against the atrocities of Israel and against its occupation’, hence openly admitted the violation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) by Iran. This Iranian support has been translated by Hezbollah into relentless rockets, drones, [uncrewed aerial vehicles] and anti-tank missiles being used during attacks against Israeli communities since 8 October 2023. Most recently, such attacks were conducted on 6 October 2024, when a barrage of rockets from Lebanon was aimed towards the coastal city of Haifa and the city of Tiberias, where a number of people were wounded, including one severely. Later on, on 7 October, rockets were launched by Hezbollah also towards the metropolitan area of Tel Aviv, on top of the ongoing attacks towards the northern communities of Israel. [...] Against this backdrop I wish to recall once again that Israel has the right to take all necessary measures to protect itself and its citizens against the ongoing acts of hostilities by the axis of evil led by Iran”.
6. In response, in identical letters dated 17 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2024/755](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations wrote that “Iran’s support for resistance groups is entirely legitimate under international law. The resistance groups are engaged in a lawful struggle against Israel’s brutal occupation and relentless aggression”.
7. In a letter dated 10 October to the President of the Security Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel stated: “Hezbollah is still working to enhance its military capabilities and amass new and sophisticated weaponry with support from Iran [...] The group continues to use the crossings between Syria and Lebanon to smuggle arms

from Iran, including through the Masnaa international border crossing [...] Iran funds, trains, arms, and directs its proxies to carry out terror attacks against Israel. Even now, Iran attempts to smuggle arms to Hezbollah, breaching the arms embargo of resolution 1701 (2006) through land and air”.

8. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution 1701 (2006) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

## Annex III

### Mobilization of international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces

1. In paragraph 10 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council recalled paragraph 10 of its resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#). It urged further and increased international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, as the only legitimate armed forces of Lebanon, and all State security institutions, in response to the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as the framework of the International Support Group for Lebanon, through additional and expedited assistance in areas where the Lebanese Armed Forces are most critically in need of support, including daily logistical needs and maintenance, counter-terrorism, border protection and naval capacity.

2. In identical letters dated 9 January 2024 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([A/78/712-S/2024/36](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated: "The Government of Lebanon also requests support from the United Nations to help the Lebanese State extend its authority over the entirety of Lebanese territory by strengthening its armed forces. In particular, support should be provided for deployment of those forces south of the Litani River, and they should be provided with equipment in cooperation with [the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)], so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#)". Subsequently, on 29 February, the caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Mikati, stated that to implement resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), the army would need allied countries to help with everything from "fuel to equipment to means of transportation to the barracks and even to weapons – everything the army needs".

3. Donor coordination efforts in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces accelerated over the reporting period. Several meetings of the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon, which was launched on 1 March in Rome, were held, including in London on 5 August and in Paris on 23 September. The meetings were attended by representatives of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Lebanon, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Spain, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and UNIFIL. Complementary efforts have been replicated at the country level through a Beirut-based operational donor working group. The Office of the Special Coordinator and UNIFIL, which participate in both coordination mechanisms, have likewise increased efforts to define a common strategy for joint engagement with the Lebanese Armed Forces and donors to enable the meaningful and timely deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon and to coordinate and align efforts with national priorities.

4. Following the approval by the caretaker Cabinet on 14 August for the enlistment of 1,500 soldiers in the Lebanese Armed Forces (see para. 65 of the report), efforts by members of the Military Technical Committee to support the equipment and capabilities development of the 1,500 soldiers commenced. To this end, pooled funding from Germany (\$4 million), Canada (\$0.813 million) and Denmark (\$1.5 million) was used to provide the new recruits with basic equipment and essential items. Other donors, including France, Italy and the United Kingdom, focused on the provision of basic training. The United States provided 186 military vehicles and France provided 20 armoured vehicles to be deployed to South Lebanon. Members of the Military Technical Committee dispatched on 7 June to Beirut a first cargo with

first aid and medicines, followed by two additional shipments on 11 and 25 July. In July, Qatar donated \$20 million to the Lebanese Armed Forces to support the livelihoods of soldiers.

5. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, together with UNIFIL and international partners, continues to engage with potential donors to secure future support to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

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