



# Security Council

Seventy-eighth year

**9511**<sup>th</sup> meeting

Monday, 18 December 2023, 3 p.m.

New York

*Provisional*

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*President:* Mr. De La Gasca . . . . . (Ecuador)

*Members:*

Albania . . . . .	Mr. Spasse
Brazil . . . . .	Mr. França Danese
China . . . . .	Mr. Geng Shuang
France . . . . .	Mr. Olmedo
Gabon . . . . .	Mrs. Ngyema Ndong
Ghana . . . . .	Ms. Oppong-Ntiri
Japan . . . . .	Mrs. Shino
Malta . . . . .	Mrs. Frazier
Mozambique . . . . .	Mr. Afonso
Russian Federation . . . . .	Mr. Nebenzia
Switzerland . . . . .	Mrs. Chanda
United Arab Emirates . . . . .	Mr. Abushahab
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . . . .	Mr. Kariuki
United States of America . . . . .	Mr. Kelley

## Agenda

### Non-proliferation

Letter dated 5 December 2023 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2023/963)

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*The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.*

### **Adoption of the agenda**

*The agenda was adopted.*

### **Non-proliferation**

#### **Letter dated 5 December 2023 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2023/963)**

**The President** (*spoke in Spanish*): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in this meeting.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; and His Excellency Mr. Olof Skoog, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Joint Commission.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2023/963, which contains the text of a letter dated 5 December 2023 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council.

At this meeting, the Council will hear briefings by Ms. DiCarlo, His Excellency Mr. Skoog and Ambassador Vanessa Frazier, Permanent Representative of Malta, in her capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

I now give the floor to Ms. DiCarlo.

**Ms. DiCarlo:** I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Despite repeated calls on all parties concerned to renew dialogue and engagement aimed at a return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan and

resolution 2231 (2015), diplomatic efforts remain at a standstill. Nonetheless, the Secretary-General still considers that the JCPOA represents the best available option to ensure that the Iranian nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful.

In that context, the Secretary-General has stressed that it is essential for Iran to reverse steps that are not consistent with its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan and which it has pledged are reversible. He has also underscored that the United States of America would need to lift or waive its sanctions, as outlined in the Plan, and extend waivers regarding the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In its most recent report, dated 15 November 2023, the International Atomic Energy Agency noted that, unfortunately, its verification and monitoring continues to be, "seriously affected by Iran's cessation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA". The Agency is still unable to verify the stockpile of enriched uranium in the country. Nevertheless, the Agency estimates that Iran maintains a total enriched uranium stockpile more than 20 times the allowable amount under the JCPOA. This includes increased quantities of uranium enriched to 20 per cent and 60 per cent. Such a stockpile of enriched uranium remains a very serious concern.

I will now turn to the restrictive measures set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), as reviewed in the Secretary-General's sixteenth report on the resolution (S/2023/975). The restrictive measures related to missile activities and transfers, as well as the asset freeze expired the day after 18 October 2023, in accordance with the resolution. Therefore, the report of the Secretary-General covers the implementation of those provisions until 18 October.

First, on the nuclear-related provisions, no new proposals were submitted to the procurement channel in the last six months. The Security Council, however, received three notifications, submitted pursuant to the nuclear-related restrictive measures for certain activities consistent with the Plan. During the reporting period, the United States renewed waivers with respect to nuclear non-proliferation projects foreseen in the Plan and the nuclear-related provisions in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for another 180-day period.

Secondly, regarding ballistic missile-related provisions, France, Germany, the Republic of Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom

of Great Britain and Northern Ireland provided information to the Secretary-General and the Council concerning a test flight of a space launch vehicle conducted by Iran in September. The letters received from those Member States continue to reflect differing opinions on whether this type of launch is inconsistent with the resolution.

Thirdly, we also examined information related to paragraph 4 of annex B. That paragraph pertains to the supply, sale or transfer to or from Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, as set out in Council document S/2015/546, which require prior approval of the Council. It includes the list of complete delivery systems and subsystems, as well as the associated components and equipment, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) systems with a range of 300 km or more.

At the invitation of the Government of Yemen, the Secretariat examined the debris of a cruise missile used in an attack by the Houthis on the Al-Dhaba oil terminal in November of last year. We observed numerous similarities relating to design, configuration, dimensions, manufacturers and part numbering between the debris seen in Yemen and previously examined components of cruise missiles used in prior Houthi attacks on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as with cruise missile components seized by the United States and United Kingdom.

The Secretariat assessed that the cruise missile used in the November 2022 attack was also of Iranian origin and may have been transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). That assessment was subsequently corroborated by the unveiling of a new Iranian cruise missile, designated as *Paveh*, and the release of better images of an Iranian jet engine. The Secretariat determined that both the cruise missile and the jet engine shared identical or similar design characteristics, structure and components with those observed in cruise missiles used in prior Houthi attacks or found in maritime seizures that have been reported to the Council.

During the reporting period, we also examined the ballistic missile components seized by the British Royal Navy in February 2023 and alleged to have been transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). Those included an inertial navigation

system and a re-entry vehicle nose cone. We observed again that those components had design characteristics or markings similar to those seen on components examined from the debris of previous ballistic missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

We also received letters from Ukraine and the United States reiterating their concerns about the alleged transfers of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Iran to the Russian Federation in a manner inconsistent with paragraph 4 of annex B. The United States also shared information that it assessed to be clear evidence of the supply of those UAVs based on its analysis of debris recovered from attacks on Ukraine compared with debris collected from other theatres. In response letters, the Permanent Representatives of Iran and the Russian Federation once again disputed those allegations. They dismissed the evidence presented by the United States and Ukraine as utterly fabricated and disputed any violation of resolution 2231 (2015).

In October, the Secretariat attended a briefing organized by the United Kingdom and the United States. The briefing included displays of various weapon systems, including the debris of UAVs reportedly recovered from Russian attacks against Ukraine in the fall of 2022, as well as similar UAV debris allegedly retrieved from attacks in Iraq and for which Iran claimed responsibility.

Israel submitted letters regarding multiple launches of ballistic and cruise missiles and of uncrewed aerial vehicles by the Houthis in October and November of this year. According to Israel, those missiles and weapons were transferred to the Houthis by Iran on or before 18 October 2023 in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). Iran rejected those allegations as entirely groundless, and the Russian Federation noted that they are not substantiated with any proof.

The Secretariat noted that the information provided by Israel concerning the attack dates and types of weapon systems used is broadly consistent with statements and a video released by the Houthis. While the Secretariat cannot confirm the authenticity of the video, we did note that the weapon systems displayed in it resemble those used in multiple prior Houthi attacks and which we assessed to be of Iranian origin.

Finally, the Secretariat received information from a Member State alleging actions inconsistent with the assets freeze provisions, actions that the Secretariat was unable to corroborate.

The adoption of the JCPOA, just over eight years ago, was rightly and universally hailed as a historic breakthrough. Today the hope that the deal engendered has greatly diminished. The United Nations will continue to urge the participants to exercise maximum restraint and to exhaust all available diplomatic avenues to restore the Plan. Indeed, the participants are responsible for its fate. But whether the JCPOA succeeds or fails — especially at this extremely dangerous juncture in global peace and security — matters to all of us.

In conclusion, I would like to thank Her Excellency Mrs. Vanessa Frazier for her leadership as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.

**The President** (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Skoog.

**Mr. Skoog**: It is an honour to have the opportunity to address the Security Council on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr. Josep Borrell Fontelles, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

I would like to thank Secretary-General António Guterres, represented today by Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, and the Secretariat for their work related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), as well as Malta as the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015).

Let me highlight the important role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the sole impartial and independent international organization mandated by the Security Council to monitor and verify the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation commitments under the JCPOA.

The IAEA continues to document the expansion of Iran's nuclear programme gravely departing from its JCPOA commitments, notably as regards the expansion of Iran's nuclear enrichment infrastructure and the continued rise of highly enriched uranium stockpile, including at 60 per cent, which is of particular proliferation concern. Moreover, the relationship with the IAEA has further deteriorated in recent months, with a negative impact on the Agency's ability to carry out its monitoring duties.

We continue to recognize that Iran has faced and continues to face very serious negative economic consequences following the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the re-imposition by the United States of previously lifted unilateral sanctions. The United States has also imposed additional sanctions linked to the nuclear programme. On its side, the EU has lifted all its nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions since the JCPOA implementation day, and that remains the case.

On 14 September, the High Representative received a letter from the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom stating that Iran has been in non-compliance with the JCPOA since 2019 and that that has not been resolved through the JCPOA's dispute resolution mechanism. They expressed their intention not to take the steps regarding the lifting of further sanctions on the JCPOA transition day on 18 October 2023.

As Coordinator, in line with the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism, the High Representative consulted all JCPOA participants on the way ahead. Following those consultations, he noted that the issue remained unresolved given the diverging views expressed. At the same time, he noted that participants reiterated their determination to find a diplomatic solution within the framework of the JCPOA. Subsequently, the EU Council decided to maintain the restrictive measures under the EU non-proliferation regime on Iran on transition day. That step is reversible and does not amount to the imposition of additional EU sanctions on Iran. Moreover, all EU sanctions that had already been lifted under the JCPOA remain lifted. The EU continues to support the full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA and of resolution 2231 (2015).

On its side, to our knowledge, Iran has not sought the ratification of the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, as it was supposed to do on transition day. Regarding other aspects of JCPOA implementation, we note that the procurement channel remains ready to receive proposals. It was designed as a transparency and confidence-building mechanism to give assurances that transfers of nuclear and dual-use goods and services are fully in line with resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. Moreover, civil nuclear cooperation with Iran under annex III of the JCPOA continues.

We are extremely worried about Iran's military support for Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine, including through deliveries of drones, which were made in violation of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). We call on the Government of Iran to stop that military cooperation with a country that is violating every principle of the Charter of the United Nations. That cooperation has not stopped and has even increased, as publicly announced. The EU will continue to respond to that, as necessary.

The world is facing a range of severe crises. In that context, it is important to keep in mind that the current deeply troubling situation in the Middle East makes it even more urgent to find ways to stabilize the region, of which the JCPOA should be an essential part. With that in mind, we call on all remaining parties to the JCPOA and the United States to sustain dialogue in order to address the Iranian nuclear programme without delay. Nuclear diplomacy must be restored. We concur with the Secretary-General's assessment in his report (S/2023/975) that the JCPOA still represents the best available option for ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. We urge Iran to resume full cooperation with the IAEA and to refrain from taking any additional step away from its JCPOA commitments, as a first and minimum measure. De-escalation steps on the nuclear front will help restore trust. They could recreate an environment conducive to the resumption of negotiations, possibly leading ultimately to a fully effective JCPOA.

In August 2022, the High Representative was able to put forward a compromise text laying down the necessary steps for the United States to return to the JCPOA and for Iran to resume the full implementation of its commitments. Regrettably, it was not possible to reach a deal at that time. Since then, the overall political context has aggravated the situation and has made a return to the negotiation table even more difficult. That compromise text is still on the table as a potential point of departure for any renewed effort to bring the JCPOA back on track. The High representative continues his efforts to facilitate the dialogue among all participants in the JCPOA and with the United States

**The President** (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Ambassador Skoog for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Frazier.

**Mrs. Frazier:** I speak in my capacity as the Security Council's appointed Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

The sixteenth Facilitator's report (see S/2023/963) was approved by Council members on 14 December. I would like to thank all Council members for their cooperation and constructive engagement in the process and for their spirit of compromise and flexibility. This is my second report as the Council's appointed Facilitator, and I am grateful for the Council's continued support. I am also very pleased that we were able to put forth the report to the Council.

The report provides a factual account of the activities that took place relating to the 2231 format of the Security Council, covering the period from 1 July 2023 to 14 December 2023. It includes six subsections, namely, the summaries of activities, monitoring the implementation of the resolution, relevant communications, key aspects of the workings of the procurement channel and transparency, outreach and guidance. Members may refer to the report for details, but I would like to mention the following key aspects.

First, one meeting of the Council in the 2231 format was held during the reporting period. The meeting was held on 14 December, and representatives of the Security Council discussed the findings and recommendations contained in the sixteenth report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/975) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), prior to its public release. Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo already referred to those points in her statement.

Secondly, during the reporting period, a total of 14 notes were circulated within the 2231 format. In addition, a total of four official communications were sent to Member States and the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission, and a total of six communications from Member States and the Coordinator were received.

Among the communications circulated were the two regular quarterly reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in September and November, in which key aspects of those Agency reports are duly reflected in my report. The IAEA plays an important role in the verification and monitoring of nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as requested under resolution 2231 (2015). The IAEA's work provides confidence for the international community that the nuclear programme of the Islamic

Republic of Iran is for exclusively peaceful purposes, in accordance with the modalities set out in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The reports of the Director General play a significant role in that regard.

Thirdly, I report that no new proposals were submitted to the Security Council through the procurement channel during the reporting period. The procurement channel represents a key transparency and confidence-building mechanism under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It remains operational, and the Procurement Working Group stands ready to review proposals.

Finally, I would like to note that, on 18 October, the specific restrictions under annex B — namely, the ballistic missile-related provisions in paragraphs 3 and 4 and the assets freeze restrictions in paragraphs 6 (c) and (d) — applied for eight years from the date of adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, namely, until 18 October 2023, which was duly reflected in my report. In that regard, the Secretariat informed the 2231 format of the specific administrative actions it took on 19 October, which included the removal of 23 individuals and 61 entities on the 2231 list, as well as from the Security Council website and Security Council consolidated list. This has also been appropriately reflected in my report.

As Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo just stated, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as endorsed by the Council through resolution 2231 (2015), is the best available option to ensure that the Iranian nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful. Despite current challenges, I believe that, through dialogue and multilateralism, we can make the utmost effort in ensuring that the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015) are implemented effectively, while building upon mutual trust and cooperation.

Lastly, I would like to state that, as Facilitator, I will do my utmost to support the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which it underpins. My team and I will work closely with all Council members in an impartial and transparent manner to meet our shared responsibility. I look forward to continuing and strengthening our dialogue and cooperation on the road ahead.

**The President** (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Ambassador Frazier for her briefing.

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

**Mr. Kelley** (United States of America): I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador Skoog for their briefings and the Security Council's appointed Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the presentation of her report (see S/2023/963).

We are meeting at a time when Iran continues to take increasingly provocative steps to expand its nuclear activities. Iran is not only failing to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve outstanding safeguards issues, but it is also wilfully hampering the Agency's verification and monitoring activities. The concerns of the international community are rising. We have made clear that Iran should take actions to build international confidence and de-escalate tension, not continue nuclear provocations that cause grave proliferation risks. The United States is fully committed to resolving the international community's concerns regarding Iran's nuclear programme through diplomacy. Unfortunately, Iran's actions suggest that that goal is not its priority.

We remain postured and prepared to use all means necessary to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. Iran's ballistic missile activity is an enduring threat to regional and international peace and stability. Even after certain restrictions in resolution 2231 (2015) expired in October, we have continued to take vigorous measures to counter that threat. We and our allies and partners will continue to block the proliferation of sensitive ballistic missile technology to and from Iran. We will also continue to sanction companies and traders contributing to that threat.

On 18 October, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to use every tool at its disposal to counter Iran's development, procurement and proliferation of ballistic missiles, uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other dangerous weapons. We welcome the actions by others to do the same.

We are grateful to the United Nations for its analysis of, and investigation into, cruise missiles of Iranian origin used in an attack on the Al-Dhabba oil terminal in Yemen in November 2022 and ballistic missile components of Iranian origin seized by the United Kingdom from a vessel in the Gulf of Oman in February 2023. Those shipments undermine international efforts to support a durable resolution to the conflict in Yemen

and are a threat to regional security — issues that we should all be taking seriously.

Yet we see a disturbing trend of the Council turning a blind eye to open violations of its provisions. The United States remains deeply disappointed that the United Nations Secretariat failed to examine evidence of Iran's transfer of UAVs to Russia in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). Both Iran and Russia violated their obligations under resolution 2231 (2015) by participating in those transfers without obtaining advance approval from the Council.

Iranian UAV development and proliferation poses a significant and growing global threat. Russia's acquisition of hundreds of Iranian drones and its use of them against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure and to kill Ukrainian civilians in its unprovoked war against Ukraine is of grave concern. We should not be shy about condemning that destabilizing and dangerous behaviour.

A few months ago, evidence arose of additional grave violations of resolution 2231 (2015) — violations committed by a permanent member of the Council. Russia's open violation of resolution 2231 (2015) would be of serious concern under any circumstances, but we are exceptionally alarmed that Russia is using those drones to attack Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and kill Ukrainian civilians. Now, months after that initial report of the use of Iranian drones in Ukraine, we learned last week that Russia has resumed using Iranian drones procured in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). On 25 November, Moscow launched its largest drone attack yet against Kyiv using Iranian-made drones.

In return for that support, Russia has been offering Iran unprecedented defence cooperation, including on missiles, electronics and air defence. Earlier this year, Iran announced that it had finalized a deal to buy Su-35 fighter jets from Russia. Iran is seeking to purchase even more military equipment from Russia, including attack helicopters, radars and Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft. In addition, Russia has been helping Iran to develop and maintain its satellite collection capabilities and other space-based programmes. In total, Iran is seeking billions of dollars' worth of military equipment from Russia to strengthen its military capabilities. This is not acceptable. There must be some degree of accountability for openly violating resolutions of the Council.

The Security Council must be clear and united in condemning that activity. When Iran defies the Security Council repeatedly without consequence, it undermines the fundamental credibility of the Council itself.

**Mr. Geng Shuang** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): At the outset, I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo; Ambassador Skoog, the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; and Ambassador Frazier, the Permanent Representative of Malta, for their briefings.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is an important outcome of multilateral diplomacy, endorsed by the Security Council, and a key pillar in the maintenance of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and of peace and stability in the Middle East. In the current context of heightened Israeli-Palestinian tensions and their spillover effects, the JCPOA has become increasingly important.

As the old Chinese saying goes, a boat sailing against the current must forge ahead, or it will be driven back. The current stalemate in the compliance negotiations is unsustainable. China therefore calls on all parties concerned to make critical decisions, demonstrating political wisdom and a stronger sense of urgency, in order to reach consensus as soon as possible on the resumption of the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA.

In that connection, I wish to emphasize four points.

First, the JCPOA is the only correct path to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. All parties should cherish the hard-won results of the negotiations and, on the basis of the text from August last year, they must remain positive and flexible, address the legitimate concerns of all parties in a balanced manner and resume talks as soon as possible so as to return the agreement to the right track at an early date.

China supports the European Union as the coordinator of the JCPOA Joint Commission and encourages it to continue playing a key coordinating role. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should follow the principles of objectivity, neutrality and impartiality, and engage in constructive dialogue and cooperation with Iran on safeguards and monitoring issues.

Secondly, the United States, as the initiator of the Iranian nuclear crisis, should recognize its own responsibilities, demonstrate political sincerity,

fulfil its commitments under the JCPOA and lift its unilateral sanctions and long-armed restriction measures against Iran and third parties without delay. The recent irresponsible statements by Israeli officials pertaining to the threat of use of nuclear weapons have heightened global concerns over the Israeli nuclear issue. China once again urges certain countries to stop applying double standards in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, actively support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and promote Israel's early accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State, as well as the placement of all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

Thirdly, this year's deliberations of the IAEA Board of Governors on the Iranian nuclear issue have, thus far, generally gone smoothly. While the Security Council's restrictive measures on Iran's missile programme have been lifted as scheduled, the Iranian nuclear situation remains sensitive and fragile. At this critical juncture, all parties concerned should refrain from linking the Iranian nuclear negotiations to other issues, using the Iranian nuclear issue to serve geopolitical purposes or taking any steps that might aggravate conflicts or escalate the situation. All parties should remain committed to bolstering dialogue rather than triggering confrontation, creating opportunities rather than crises and seeking cooperation rather than exerting pressure at will.

Fourthly, against the backdrop of the intensified Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Middle East cannot afford to be shaken by another security crisis and must urgently see a fundamental shift from chaos to peace and stability. China calls on all parties to act on the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security; to uphold the principle of the indivisibility of security; to build a regional security architecture that takes on board the legitimate concerns of all parties; and to enhance trust- and consensus-building so as to create the conditions for lasting peace.

Certain countries outside the region should set aside their narrow geopolitical self-interests, cease political manoeuvring and desist from the erroneous practice of deliberately creating hostilities and inciting confrontation in the region. Instead, they should make concrete contributions to the maintenance of regional security.

As a permanent member of the Council and a party to the JCPOA, China has always been committed to upholding the validity of the agreement and the authority of the Council's resolutions and has been working to promote a political and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We will continue to take an objective and impartial position, stay engaged with the parties concerned and play a positive, constructive role in bringing the JCPOA back on the right track as soon as possible, thereby safeguarding the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and peace and stability in the Middle East.

**Mr. Spasse (Albania):** Let me start by thanking Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Skoog and Ambassador Frazier for their briefings.

The sixteenth report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/975) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) is another important document shedding light on the advancement of the Iranian illicit nuclear programme and its non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It is yet further testimony to the unlawful nature of Iranian nuclear proliferation activities, and it questions once again its so-called peaceful purposes. We do not see meaningful steps towards the fulfilment of the obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol. A lack of transparency continues from the Iranian side, and the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out full verification and monitoring remains heavily undermined. So far, Iran has continued to accumulate uranium, and its stockpile is enriched up to 60 per cent, while Tehran constantly refuses to comply with its legal obligations under the subsidiary arrangement.

Iran's missile programmes remain one of the greatest challenges to international non-proliferation efforts. Today Iran holds the largest inventory of strategic missiles in the Middle East, posing an increased threat to countries across the region and beyond. As the Secretary-General's report clearly states, cruise missiles of Iranian origin were used in an attack on the Al-Dahbba oil terminal in Yemen in November 2022. As assessed by the Secretariat, the examined ballistic missile components seized by the United Kingdom in early 2023 in a vessel in the Gulf of Oman were of Iranian origin. Aiming to empower the Houthis and supporting their escalatory and destabilizing actions in Yemen, and recently in the Red Sea, Iran has clearly



violated resolution 2231 (2015) by illegally transferring weapons without the approval of the Council.

Furthermore, Iran has continued with other escalatory steps, in blatant violation of paragraph 3 of annex B of the resolution, by conducting activities related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The launch of Qased rockets in September 2023, disregarding the restrictions under the JCPOA, is another deplorable violation of resolution 2231 (2015). In addition, Iran's provision of missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) technology to its partners and proxies endangers international stability and escalates regional tensions. The illicit transfer of hundreds of Iranian Mohajer and Shahed series of UAVs to Russia, in clear violation of resolution 2231 (2015), has become a supply of death for the Ukrainian people.

The whole picture obviously raises questions as to whether Iran will ever take any steps to reverse the escalatory destabilizing trajectory and its disregard for international norms. The international community has dealt patiently and reasonably with Iran in trying to convince Tehran that the diplomatic path is the best solution. Unfortunately, Tehran has continuously rejected every offer to return to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA, and regrettably, its nuclear programme is now more advanced than ever.

In conclusion, I would like to express Albania's position that the international community must continue to maintain scrutiny over Iranian ballistic missile activities until Iran finds its path towards diplomacy.

**Mr. Nebenzia** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), Ambassador Frazier of Malta, for their briefings. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Frazier and her team for their efforts in preparing a six-monthly report (see S/2023/963) by the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), which the Security Council endorsed by consensus last week.

We also take note of the briefing of the Head of the Delegation of the European Union (EU), Mr. Olof Skoog. We regret the fact that his statement was far removed from the principles of impartiality to which the EU should adhere when carrying out its duties as Coordinator of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Joint Commission. Instead of outlining the objective situation surrounding the Plan, European

colleagues are trying to place the responsibility for the current crisis in the implementation of the JCPOA on Iran and doing everything they can to obscure the illegitimate and destructive measures taken by the United States, the European parties to the JCPOA and Brussels itself — in particular their violation of the commitments set out in the Plan amid the persisting unilateral anti-Iranian restrictions, which they were supposed to lift in October.

The adoption of the JCPOA in 2015 was a unique example of what multilateral diplomacy can do in today's world. At that time, parties to the nuclear deal set aside political differences and took a truly pragmatic approach that accounted for the interests of all stakeholders and ensured that they had every opportunity to monitor the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. However, the more time passes, the more we see that some of the States parties to the JCPOA, as well as the one State that simply withdrew from it, are trying their best to render obsolete this shared diplomatic achievement.

Against that background, we must state that, in her statement, the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) once again regrettably preferred not to name the reason for the failure of the full implementation of the JCPOA, which everyone knows was the United States' withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018 and its imposition of illegitimate unilateral sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. More than five years have passed, the American Administration has changed and the United States is approaching a new electoral cycle, but there have still been no real steps on Washington's part to rectify the situation. American promises to abandon the policy of maximum pressure on Tehran and return to the nuclear deal have remained empty words. Furthermore, the situation is only getting worse. The United States' violations of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) have long since become chronic in nature.

Unfortunately, the Secretary-General still prefers to ignore that obvious fact in his reports, limiting himself to modest appeals to Washington to lift anti-Iranian sanctions or to provide for exemptions. Similarly, the report (S/2023/975) simply disregards the actions of the United Kingdom, Germany, France and the EU, which have, for years, followed the "bad example" of their friends across the Atlantic. I would not like to think that Secretary-General Guterres has thereby shown his personal solidarity with their actions. In fact, the

text of Secretary-General's report may give the deeply erroneous impression that Tehran bears the main responsibility for the dysfunctionality of the JCPOA. However, it is clear to any reasonable person on whose side of the court the ball is. We should remain mindful that Iran's return to fulfilling its suspended voluntary obligations to limit its nuclear power programme can take place only with simultaneous reciprocity of the Western parties and the United States, whose actions led to the current situation. This approach is what Russia stood for from the very beginning, and ultimately, it was this approach that underpinned the comprehensive decision of the JCPOA Joint Commission. However, the United States and European participants of the Plan essentially sabotaged efforts to finalize this package and to agree on it. On top of that, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and the EU chose to deal another direct blow to the prospects of a full-scale recovery of the JCPOA.

The decisions of the United Kingdom, Germany, France and the EU to purposely disregard their obligations and unilaterally maintain the anti-Iranian restrictions, which they were supposed to lift on 18 October, are not very different from the actions of the United States in terms of their destructive effect on the implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). The only difference is that Washington is not implementing the nuclear deal at all, while London, Berlin, Paris and Brussels are implementing it only in part. We once again are seeing a clear disregard for international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the authority of the Security Council. The Secretary-General, who, one would think, would defend those principles and who understands the real reason for the situation, is simply ignoring those facts.

We would like to point out that no reference to article 36 of the JCPOA or the supposed launch, in 2020, of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, which the Western parties to the JCPOA are trying to use to justify their completely illegitimate actions, is relevant here. The Russian Federation has repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that the Dispute Resolution Mechanism was not launched as a result of the numerous procedural issues that have not yet been addressed. Moreover, in letters circulated in the Security Council during the reporting period, the United Kingdom, France and Germany accuse Iran of failing to ratify the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement of the IAEA while cynically and hypocritically omitting the

fact that Tehran was to have taken steps in that direction after the full lifting of the illegal unilateral sanctions.

We are no less concerned about the ongoing attempts by a small group of countries to spread a narrative about violations of paragraphs 3 and 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). They did not let up, even when the deadline for such restrictions had expired. Now they are trying to hold Iran accountable retrospectively. Western countries are focusing in particular on the alleged transfers of Iranian drones to Russia for use in Ukraine and they continue to urge the Secretariat to violate Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations by insisting on the conducting of so-called investigations.

In that context, we were concerned that the Secretary-General's report (S/2023/975) contained a reference to the private display by the Permanent Representative of the United States of debris of what were said to be drones allegedly downed in Ukraine. That display was an in-group gathering to which we and Iranian colleagues were not invited. Perhaps, for the organizers, the truth would have been hard to swallow. However, the Americans did invite Secretariat staff to their cosy get-together, and regretfully, the latter accepted that provocation. By choosing to attend that event, representatives of the team for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) clearly overstepped their official duties as set out in presidential note S/2016/44 of 16 January 2016. We recommend that our American colleagues, who go on with regard to the Secretariat having a mandate to conduct investigations, study that document very carefully. We would also like to recall that the team for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) has neither a mandate nor the expertise to carry out verification, inspection or attribution activities within the framework of resolution 2231 (2015). The Secretariat's actions that were conducted without the prior consent of the Security Council cannot serve as a basis for any conclusions or assessments.

Regardless of the provocations of Western countries, the fact remains that no convincing arguments with regard to the violations of the so-called missile provisions of annex B have been presented. All the letters circulated within the Security Council and in the context of the team for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) were just speculations, suspicions and understandings. As we know, there were not and could not be any transfers to circumvent the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). No evidence to the

contrary has been provided, nor has any evidence been provided that the debris presented by the Americans and the British had been collected in Ukraine. Against that background, we reject attempts to use the reports by the Secretary-General and the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) to spread unsubstantiated insinuations and, as a consequence, to raise tensions with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme. Today the United States representative did not say a word about the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), or rather the United States' failure to implement it, but rather focused on yet another round of allegations against Russia and Iran.

The United States and European parties to the JCPOA will not be able to cover up for their own violations of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) through illegitimate unilateral actions or by raising tensions. Those countries are the ones that bear the primary responsibility for the failure to implement the nuclear deal, and they must align their policies with its letter and spirit. For its part, the Russian Federation is firmly convinced that Security Council decisions must be implemented in strict compliance with the agreed parameters. Any attempts by the United States and European parties to the JCPOA to revise them retrospectively are illegal, dangerous and undermine the very basis of resolution 2231 (2015). We expect the Western countries to abandon as soon as possible their policy of unilateral restrictions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Any other scenario will call into question the prospects for the JCPOA and lead to an escalation with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme which could have devastating consequences for the already tense situation in the Middle East.

The Russian Federation is firmly convinced that there is no alternative to the JCPOA. An early launch of the Plan is the only appropriate path that would meet the regional and international security interests. We hope that the Secretary-General, who calls the JCPOA the best possible means of ensuring the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, will not allow any dubious, to put it mildly, elements in his reports which would jeopardize the already fragile prospects for a full-fledged restoration of the Vienna agreement.

**Mr. Olmedo** (France) (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank the Under-Secretary-General, the Ambassador of the European Union and the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for their statements.

It is with the greatest concern that we take the floor today. For more than four years, Iran has violated its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015). Over the past six months, those violations have continued and worsened, reaching unprecedented levels and without any credible civilian justification.

The most recent reports of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) bear witness to the scale of those violations.

Iran continues to enrich uranium far beyond what it committed to under the JCPOA. It continues to accumulate uranium enriched up to 60 per cent, well above the limit set by the agreement. Its stockpile of enriched uranium is now 22 times greater than the maximum quantity defined in the agreement, without credible justification in the context of a civilian nuclear programme.

Iran continues to install new advanced centrifuges that increase its uranium enrichment capacity. IAEA reports have indicated that enrichment activities have been conducted at Fordow, where activities were not expected to take place until 2031. Iran continues to strip the agreement of its meaning.

Iran has reduced its cooperation with the IAEA. Thus, the Agency's ability to carry out its verification and monitoring work and exercise its mandate has been affected. The withdrawal of accreditation of a number of inspectors last September is a further unacceptable hindrance. The Agency has made it clear that it may no longer be able to re-establish the continuity of its knowledge on the state of Iran's nuclear programme. Those actions weaken the Agency's ability to provide assurances with regard to the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It is essential that Iran cooperate with the Agency and enable it to carry out its mandate.

Over the past six months, Iran has also pursued ballistic missile-related activities that are incompatible with compliance with resolution 2231 (2015).

In addition, Iran has transferred armed drones, despite the fact that such transfers were prohibited by resolution 2231 (2015), notably to regional players who are contributing to the destabilization of the region. Some of those drones have also been transferred to Russia and used to strike infrastructure in Ukraine. Those transfers must stop. Any additional arms deliveries to Russia would constitute a serious

escalation, in particular the transfer of short-range ballistic missiles. Such deliveries would have serious consequences that would only further isolate Iran on the international stage.

For more than three years, France, together with its E3 partners — Germany and the United Kingdom — has been in good faith seeking an approach on the basis of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for addressing Iran's non-compliance with its commitments thereunder. In January 2020, Germany, France and the United Kingdom triggered the dispute resolution mechanism provided for in the agreement. In the context of that procedure and beyond, we have made every effort to resolve the issues caused by Iran's non-compliance. That includes in 2022, when in-depth discussions took place on a revised agreement. Iran did not seize those opportunities, and we regret that.

Iran's persistent violations of its commitments makes the lifting of the restrictive measures due to expire on transition day, 18 October, impossible. We therefore decided, with our E3 partners and in coordination with other partners, to maintain those measures, as we are permitted to do under paragraph 36 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We have made it clear that we are prepared to reverse that decision, should Iran resume its implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA.

The expansion of Iran's nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes is extremely serious. It threatens our international non-proliferation architecture. It increases the risks to stability and security in the Middle East and worldwide. That is not in the interest of any member of the Security Council. We remain committed to ensuring that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons and to finding a diplomatic solution.

**Mrs. Chanda** (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, Ambassador Frazier and Ambassador Skoog for their briefings.

Barely eight years old, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), rightly regarded as a success story in the use of multilateral diplomacy in non-proliferation efforts, now seems to have become the monument of a bygone era. The implementation of the Plan of Action is failing, and the situation has become more perilous than ever.

Switzerland has on several occasions expressed its deep concern both about the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA and the various measures taken by Iran. In particular, Switzerland deplores the fact that, despite the willingness shown by most of the parties to negotiate a rapid return to the JCPOA, no progress has been made. The JCPOA is an important element of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and of international security. Consequently, the swift and full implementation by all parties of their obligations is essential.

Rescuing the JCPOA depends on three aspects.

First, the latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) raises many questions about the overall increase in Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium, its installation of new centrifuges and the difficulties encountered by the Agency in verifying Iran's nuclear programme. In order to reassure the international community, the Iranian authorities should cooperate rigorously, transparently and steadfastly with the IAEA. Otherwise, the Agency's ability to guarantee the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme remains compromised. That is why Iran must comply fully with its commitments under the JCPOA and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Secondly, we are particularly concerned about the substantiated indications that Iran has transferred ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles to third countries, such as Yemen and Russia. We stress that, until 18 October, any transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed under the Missile Technology Control Regime constituted a violation of resolution 2231 (2015). The recent developments in the region have underlined the extent to which such transfers can contribute to the escalation of conflicts. We also regret Iran's development and testing of ballistic missiles, which is inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).

Finally, the current state of the JCPOA reminds us that urgent diplomatic efforts are needed to prevent it from collapsing completely. It is significant that the Secretary-General recommends nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as key actions in his New Agenda for Peace. It is through the negotiation and maintenance of such norms that the true cornerstone of the multilateral framework — trust — is built. We hope for the resumption of talks with a view to reminding the

parties concerned the interest we all have in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. To ensure lasting political détente, there must be a return to compliance with the obligations and the spirit of the JCPOA.

The Security Council must give this issue its full attention. It must find a common voice on this issue. Switzerland, as it has done in the past in hosting critical stages of the negotiations, stands ready to facilitate any diplomatic solution aimed at sustaining the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

**Mr. Kariuki** (United Kingdom): Let me thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and the Secretariat at large for their support in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I also thank Ambassador Olof Skoog for his briefing and Ambassador Frazier for her briefing and work as the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015).

Since refusing the opportunity to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) through the deals tabled in 2022, Iran has continued to escalate its nuclear programme. Transition day has now passed, and the United Kingdom and the European Union have maintained proliferation-related sanctions on Iran, in accordance with the JCPOA's dispute resolution mechanism. The United Kingdom is fully committed to using all diplomatic tools to prevent Iran from delivering a nuclear weapon.

The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is 22 times over the JCPOA limits. It manufactures and operates thousands of prohibited advanced centrifuges, gaining irreversible knowledge, which the JCPOA sought to prevent. Iran continues producing highly enriched uranium, for which there is no credible civilian justification, calling into question the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. In addition, Iran is launching missiles that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons and is testing technologies directly applicable to medium and long-range ballistic missiles, in the form of satellite-launch vehicles.

Iran's missile programme remains of fundamental concern for nuclear non-proliferation. The Secretary-General has acknowledged evidence showing that, during the period of restrictions under this resolution, Iran developed and exported missiles without seeking the Security Council's authorization. Iran supplied ballistic missiles to armed groups in Iraq, Yemen and Syria, which are targeting Red Sea shipping

and coalition personnel in the region. And as Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo said, the United Kingdom has provided evidence that Iran supplied unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia. Those UAVs have subsequently been used to attack civilians in Ukraine. All such transfers were in violation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Resolution 2231 (2015)'s restrictions on Iran's ballistic-missile activities may have been lifted, but the Council must continue by that resolution or any other to hold Iran to account for its proliferation activities.

**Mrs. Frazier** (Malta): I will now deliver a statement in my national capacity.

I too thank Under Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador Skoog for their briefings.

We welcome the Secretary-General's sixteenth report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2023/975), as well as the Joint Commission's report (S/2023/963) on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions. We have taken due note of both reports.

Malta reaffirms its commitment to the restoration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its full implementation. We are firm in our belief that the agreement and its endorsement in resolution 2231 (2015) have been pivotal instruments for non-proliferation efforts, as well as for stability in the Middle East.

We share the Secretary-General's view the JCPOA still remains the best available option to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. And we urge all parties to refrain from taking further steps away from the implementation of the JCPOA and to return to their commitments under the agreement.

Malta commends the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose verification and monitoring activities remain indispensable. In its most recent report, the Agency noted that "verification and monitoring has been seriously affected". The IAEA's ability to conduct verification activities, in particular at enrichment facilities, was further impaired by Iran's decisions to remove all JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment and to withdraw the designation of several IAEA inspectors.

Moreover, the IAEA estimated that, as of October 2023, the total stockpile of enriched uranium in the

country far exceeded the limits under the agreement. That is concerning, and we encourage closer cooperation and information-sharing between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA.

Malta takes note of concerns raised regarding alleged violations of the provisions contained in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), before the so-called transition day. Those include the launch of a space launch vehicle using ballistic-missile technology reportedly capable of delivering nuclear weapons and transfers of unmanned aerial vehicles, allegedly occurred before the expiration of such provisions, on 18 October. Iran has expressed its position, rejecting those allegations. We encourage all parties involved to address those issues through dialogue and diplomacy.

We reiterate our commitment to ensuring that all parties take steps to return to the full implementation of the JCPOA, and we support all diplomatic solutions in that regard.

In conclusion, I call on the Council to ensure the full and effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

**Ms. Oppong-Ntiri** (Ghana): I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, Ambassador Olof Skoog and Ambassador Vanessa Frazier for their briefings.

It is regrettable that the reports on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) persist in their discouraging trend, with diplomatic efforts currently stalled. Despite repeated calls for all concerned parties to renew dialogue and engagement aimed at a return to the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015), progress remains elusive.

Recent developments, arising from verification exercises conducted by the Secretariat, raise concerns given the current situation in the region. We hold the view that the Secretariat's findings warrant careful attention and diplomatic consideration. It is imperative for all parties involved to approach those concerns with a commitment to dialogue and engagement, fostering an atmosphere conducive to addressing the broader challenges at hand. Given the precarious situation in the Middle East, we emphasize the importance of preserving regional peace and security through active involvement, based on full respect for international

law, mutual respect, good neighbourliness, cooperation and dialogue.

Ghana reiterates its call for both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States to show flexibility in order to fully restore the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). We maintain that the JCPOA provides the best approach to address the Iranian nuclear programme, striking a balance that allows Iran to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, while upholding crucial non-proliferation principles.

As we conclude our term on the Council, we earnestly call upon all parties to honour their commitments under the JCPOA, aiming to restore the delicate balance in reciprocal obligations within the agreement. Our ongoing plea to Iran is to fulfil all its commitments, reversing any actions not aligned with its obligations. Central to restoration is Iran's adherence to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, implementing voluntary transparency measures with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Simultaneously, we stress the importance of the United States lifting or waiving sanctions as outlined in the Plan.

Furthermore, critical to the process is the reconsideration of the decision by France, Germany and the United Kingdom — the E3 — regarding the sanctions relief specified in annex V, paragraph 20, to the JCPOA. In unity, those measures will contribute to fostering stability and trust — not only among the key stakeholders, but also in the rest of the region.

Moving forward, we emphasize the importance of developing a practical road map for key stakeholders to return to full compliance with the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). That effort would entail rebuilding trust and coordinating endeavours to foster a shared understanding of the existing text and its mandates. In that regard, we reaffirm our support for the IAEA's efforts in monitoring and verifying Iran's nuclear programme and underscore the critical role the Agency plays in restoring trust and confidence within the international community.

In conclusion, we stress the significance of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as core guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and consider the JCPOA as a critical multilateral achievement in the realm of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

As we pass the torch to incoming members of the Council, we strongly urge all parties to employ determined diplomacy, tact and patience for the restoration of the agreement. It is our earnest hope that the agreement will take a positive turn in the near future, recognizing that timely action on the JCPOA is crucial to prevent any escalation of the already precarious situation in the Middle East.

**Mrs. Ngyema Ndong** (Gabon) (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Olof Skoog, for their briefings on the state of implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I would also like to thank the Permanent Representative of Malta, Mrs. Vanessa Frazier, for her role as Facilitator.

The sixteenth report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/975) on the implementation of the action plan of resolution 2231 (2015) reinforces our conviction that to date there is no better alternative to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Despite the challenges that continue to stand in the way of its full and complete implementation, the Plan of Action continues to constitute the preferred framework for reducing threats to international peace and security linked to nuclear development.

In that respect, I would like to make several observations.

First, the parties must make concessions. Iran must reverse the measures taken since 2019 and the United States of America must lift or waive the sanctions against the Republic of Iran, in accordance with the commitments under annex 2. From my country's point of view, that is the best way of restoring the confidence needed to return to the pre-2018 situation.

Secondly, it seems equally vital for the International Atomic Energy Agency to be restored to its full capacity in order to enable it to carry out its verification and monitoring missions, which means re-establishing the monitoring and control equipment, as provided for in the agreement, with Iran's full cooperation, of course.

Thirdly, I would like to take note of Iran's expressed willingness to fulfil its obligations under the JCPOA and urge all parties to maintain the thread of negotiations, through the mechanisms provided for in the agreement, but also by any other means, including bilaterally and through informal channels. The parties must resume

dialogue, without preconditions. Suspicions that the commitments contained in paragraph 4 of annex B are being violated can be removed only through frank cooperation by all parties.

Fourthly, we must preserve the JCPOA as an important component for peace and security in the Middle East and in the world. Similarly, it is critical to work with the actors in the region at all levels to reduce tensions. My country remains convinced that this objective is complementary to that of making the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

I reiterate my country's commitment to the objectives of the JCPOA, which are fully in line with the commitments entered into under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which Gabon remains deeply committed. I urge the Security Council to do more to preserve the achievements of that historic agreement in order to avoid any setbacks, which would be detrimental to our collective security.

To conclude, Gabon notes that, despite their antagonisms, the parties remain keen to see the Plan implemented. That is a positive element on which we should continue to build in order to return to full implementation of the agreement.

**Mr. Afonso** (Mozambique): I thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Ambassador Olof Skoog for their important briefings. I wish to express Mozambique's appreciation to Ambassador Vanessa Frazier, Permanent Representative of Malta, for her devotion and engagement in her capacity as Facilitator for the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). I wish to acknowledge the presence of His Excellency the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

We note with regret that since the last meeting of the Council on this topic on 6 July 2023 (see S/PV.9367), no substantive progress has been made on the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That situation is clearly captured by the sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015):

"Progress with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue has fallen short of the expectations of the participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the international community. Despite repeated calls for all parties concerned to renew

dialogue and engagement aimed at a return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), diplomatic efforts remain at a standstill” (S/2023/975, *para. 1*).

That situation represents an additional challenge to international peace and security in an already sensitive and fragile international context.

It is worth reminding ourselves that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is a product of a long and protracted negotiation process aimed at ensuring the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Cognizant of the challenges to the full implementation of the JCPOA, we call on all signatory parties to recommit themselves to its very noble objective and ensure the full and effective implementation of the Plan by all. To that effect, we underscore the importance of renewed confidence-building measures, effective use of every single diplomatic channel, constructive dialogue and engagement, and an approach that can ensure cooperative and mutual benefits, with the United Nations at the centre of those efforts.

The preservation of peace and the avoidance of catastrophic consequences are paramount in our collective efforts. They are at the core of the purposes and principles of the United Nations. We hold the view that nuclear weapons anywhere in the world pose an existential threat to humankind as a whole. The possibility of their use at any given time, whether intentionally or by accident, miscalculation or misjudgement, would be catastrophic for all humankind. That is the reason that the international community is evolving towards the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the illegality of their use. In that context, peace-loving nations, including my own country, Mozambique, unequivocally advocate the total elimination of nuclear weapons and uphold the principle of general and complete disarmament, as provided by the Charter of the United Nations.

**Mrs. Shino** (Japan): I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Vanessa Frazier and Ambassador Olof Skoog for their informative briefings.

Since we last discussed the Iran nuclear issue in this Chamber six months ago (see S/PV.9367), regrettably, negotiations to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have remained stalled. Japan reiterates its unwavering support for the JCPOA, which is highly important for strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and contributing to the peace and stability of the Middle East. All relevant parties

must swiftly return to the agreement and comply fully with their commitments.

Japan is deeply troubled by the expansion of Iran’s nuclear activities, including the continued increase of stockpiles of highly enriched uranium beyond the limits set under the JCPOA. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are the fundamental instrument for ensuring global nuclear non-proliferation. Only the IAEA can provide assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. In that connection, Japan has made a series of high-level diplomatic efforts in calling on Iran to take constructive measures, including the full and unconditional implementation of the joint statement by Iran and the IAEA, without further delay. The restoration of the JCPOA will require sincere confidence-building measures among the key stakeholders. Diplomacy is the only way to address that issue, and Japan encourages all parties to renew their commitment to resolving the outstanding issues.

With regard to proliferation concerns, tensions in the Middle East are high, particularly owing to the ongoing conflict in Gaza. Japan is seriously concerned that the conflict could spill over across the region. Thus, Iran must refrain from any destabilizing actions, including the possible transfer of missiles, uncrewed aerial vehicles and other related military technologies to both State and non-State actors. Japan will continue to monitor the situation and take appropriate actions in cooperation with the international community to prevent the illegal supply, sale or transfer of ballistic-missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods and technologies, which could seriously undermine peace and security in the region.

Even amid such challenging times, it is critical to continue necessary dialogue, while fostering mutual trust. Japan has maintained a long-standing relationship with Iran. Within the past three months, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida had an in-person summit meeting and telephone conversation with President Raisi, during which the Prime Minister directly conveyed our concerns and exchanged candid views on a variety of issues, including the implementation of the JCPOA and the conflicts in the region. Likewise, our respective Foreign Ministers have actively engaged with each other on multiple occasions. In addition, we recently conducted a high-level dialogue on disarmament and non-proliferation issues between Japan and Iran. Japan will continue to make its utmost efforts to bridge the



gaps between the parties concerned in order to resolve regional non-proliferation issues.

**Mr. França Danese** (Brazil): I thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for her briefing and Malta for its work as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I also thank the Head of the Delegation of the European Union for his briefing.

As usual, we carefully read the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/975) on the matter before us today. The picture it paints on the direction of this file is grim. Both annex A and key parts of annex B have now lost most, or all, of their effectiveness. That takes us even further away from the objectives of resolution 2231 (2015), which had been a landmark achievement of the Council. Brazil has been concerned about the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) since 2018. We regretted the United States decision to leave the agreement that year, just as we regretted Iranian actions in response to that decision that have progressively undermined the letter and spirit of the Plan of Action. Despite repeated calls for rebuilding trust, what we have seen since August 2022 is a cycle of brinkmanship on all sides that has taken us increasingly further away from achieving the goal of restoring the JCPOA. Recent public statements by key officials indicate that such a scenario is just not on the table. In the absence of any available alternative, that is cause for great concern.

Those developments leave no doubt that resolution 2231 (2015) is at a crossroads. Accepting that there are no prospects for a multilateral diplomatic answer to the Iranian nuclear file would be a fatalistic and dangerous approach both to the region and to broader global efforts on non-proliferation. A better option does exist. Yet it requires commodities that are increasingly scarce: the ability to compromise and the willingness not to let the perfect be the enemy of the good. A new framework is needed, building on the successes of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015).

While we will not be on the Council to see it, allow me to share a few elements that could be present in any new framework.

First, a new agreement should begin with a multilateral component supported by a Security Council resolution from the start.

Secondly, any new framework must involve a greater range of stakeholders, both within and outside the region. The limited composition of the original JCPOA helped make its reversal easier and opened the door to brinkmanship.

Thirdly, the framework needs clear language on its key aspects in order to avoid conceptual disagreement on their implementation, as we have witnessed regarding resolution 2231 (2015) dispositions on missile-related activities.

Lastly, and perhaps most challenging, stakeholders must be able to prioritize and be willing to accept real compromises for those priorities. No single agreement is going to resolve all of the geopolitical issues of the region. A new agreement might need to be broader than the JCPOA. Yet it must not attempt to do too much. Focusing on key areas, such as nuclear non-proliferation and delivery systems, might be more achievable than a broad, yet less enforceable, mandate on conventional military assets.

None of that will be easy. Yet the success of the JCPOA, even if temporary, showed that multilateral diplomatic agreements are still possible on disarmament and non-proliferation. However, an updated framework would be more legitimate, durable and effective.

**Mr. Abushahab** (United Arab Emirates): I will begin by expressing my deep appreciation to Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador Skoog for their briefings today on the latest developments concerning the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). I also extend my thanks to Ambassador Frazier for her role as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

The United Arab Emirates believes that there is still an opportunity for constructive diplomacy on what is a pressing issue for international peace and security. The impasse that we have seen thus far on the JCPOA does not have to be the end of diplomatic engagement. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the increasingly escalatory steps taken by Iran over the past four years. Concerted actions have culminated in not only the complete cessation of the implementation of Iran's nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, but a further escalation to levels and a scope of activities that are difficult to justify for any peaceful nuclear programme. Specifically, decisions by Iran to prevent the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from carrying out essential verification and monitoring

activities, together with the removal of all JCPOA-related surveillance equipment and denying access to records, have severely disrupted the continuity of knowledge. Furthermore, Iran's decision to withdraw the designations of a large number of experienced IAEA inspectors hampers the Agency's ability to effectively verify the country's nuclear programme.

All told, Iran's conduct calls into question the veracity of its claims and contributes to the international community's suspicions of its actions. Providing ongoing assurances of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme demands that the IAEA be granted full access to relevant locations and any monitoring records to fulfil its critical mandate. Iran must also refrain from its escalatory steps and provide the Agency with its full cooperation, including relevant answers to the Agency's outstanding questions on safeguards. For its part, the United Arab Emirates reaffirms its full support and confidence in the IAEA and its staff.

Regional security is at stake in the face of the continued proliferation of advanced weapons, including missiles and drones, to non-State actors. We are troubled by the findings by the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/975) indicating that Houthi militias continue to be beneficiaries of such weapons. The evidence is clear. The examination of debris from the cruise missile used in the November 2022 Al-Dhabba attack revealed consistency with previous Iranian-origin cruise missiles. The design of the seized missiles is similar to those used in attacks in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Yemen between 2019 and 2022. Those findings further entrench instability at a time when regional efforts are focused on de-escalation and conflict resolution. Rebuilding trust and achieving collective peace and security require taking tangible steps towards ending weapons proliferation to non-State actors.

As our term on the Security Council will soon come to an end, I want to reaffirm from this Chamber our belief that de-escalation, dialogue and diplomacy remain the only path to address the concerns surrounding Iran's nuclear programme. We call on Iran to spare no effort in building confidence in its nuclear programme that fully guarantees its exclusively peaceful nature.

**The President** (*spoke in Spanish*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Ecuador.

I am grateful for the briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Mr. Olof Skoog. I also thank Ambassador Vanessa Frazier, Permanent Representative of Malta, for the information presented and for her work as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Despite the current challenges, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) continues to be the best political and diplomatic option available for addressing the Iran nuclear issue, as stated by the Secretary-General in his latest report (S/2023/975). Likewise, we take note with concern of what was stated by the Secretary-General in his report, and we reiterate that any transfer of unmanned aerial vehicles or other types of weapons constitutes a violation of the JCPOA.

We regret the state of the implementation of the JCPOA as a result of unilateral actions outside the provisions of that agreement, which the Security Council endorsed with resolution 2231 (2015) in July 2015. We recognize the efforts of those seeking to keep the JCPOA in force. For that reason, Ecuador once again calls for dialogue and the full restoration of that mechanism and encourages all parties to resume their efforts to resolve outstanding issues.

In that context, Ecuador supports the role and cooperation, verification and surveillance work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — actions that are essential for the validity of the JCPOA. As mentioned by the Director General in his report, the obstruction of the IAEA's verification and monitoring efforts prevents it from providing guarantees on the peaceful nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme. Consequently, we urge the Islamic Republic of Iran to commit to the full implementation of its obligations arising from resolution 2231 (2015) — and therefore the JCPOA — and to return to full and effective cooperation with the IAEA, which is an essential requirement to restore trust among all actors.

I wish to conclude my statement by expressing that, for Ecuador, lasting peace and security for all States are based on dialogue and cooperation. Therefore, we reiterate our call to all parties involved in the JCPOA to redouble their efforts so as to ensure that

diplomacy prevails and to move forward in the search for negotiated solutions.

I resume my functions as President of the Council.

I now give the floor to the representative of Germany.

**Mr. Zahneisen** (Germany): Allow me to express our sincere gratitude to Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo; to Ambassador Frazier, as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015); and Ambassador Skoog, as Coordinator of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Joint Commission. I want to thank all three of them for their briefings today.

As Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo said at the beginning of her presentation, resolution 2231 (2015) and the associated Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action were rightly hailed back in 2015 as historic breakthroughs towards resolving the dispute over Iran's nuclear programme. If fully implemented, the JCPOA would offer a clear path towards resolving international concerns with regard to the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It would also lead to a comprehensive lifting of sanctions and contribute positively to regional and international peace. We concur with the Secretary-General that the JCPOA remains the best way forward.

However, it is regrettable that, eight years later, we find ourselves yet again gathered in the Council Chamber to address not only Iran's escalating nuclear activities, but also its growing missile development and continuous weapons proliferation — all three in stark contrast to the spirit of the resolution. The extent of Iran's violations against the JCPOA is clearly outlined in the recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General. I will cite just one striking statistic to underscore the alarming situation: Iran now holds a stockpile of enriched uranium that exceeds by more than 22 times the limit agreed in the JCPOA.

For us, Iran's actions raise serious questions and concerns and have direct implications for international peace and security. Allow me to emphasize just three of them.

First, if Iran's nuclear programme is genuinely civilian, why has Iran enriched so much uranium, now to an enrichment level of up to 60 per cent? If that amount

of highly enriched uranium is further processed, it would be largely sufficient for three nuclear weapons.

Secondly, if Iran's programme is indeed completely peaceful, as Iran maintains, then why does Iran obstruct cooperation with the IAEA — the very organization that is not only best suited, but specifically mandated to confirm Iran's claim of the peaceful nature of its programme?

Thirdly, if Iran asserts that it is acting in good faith, then why does Iran transfer hundreds of Shahed uncrewed aerial vehicles to Russia, knowingly supporting Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and violating resolution 2231 (2015) yet again in doing so?

I would like to make one point very clear, and I reiterate it here yet again: despite Iran's sustained violations and despite the mistrust that Iran's actions have created, Germany will remain fully committed to seeking a diplomatic resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis. As an immediate step to re-establish confidence and to reopen avenues for a diplomatic solution, we call on Iran to cease its weapons proliferation, including to non-State actors, which endangers not only the region but also the entire international community. We also ask Iran to heed the repeated call by the IAEA Director General to honour its commitments, as well as its legal obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and to enable the necessary cooperation with the Agency without further delay.

**The President** (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

**Mr. Iravani** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I thank Ms. DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, who once again reiterated the Secretary-General's long-standing strong view and stance that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) still represents the best available option. I also thank Malta for its efforts as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We take note of the statement delivered by the European Union (EU) representative.

Since the Council's previous briefing (see S/PV.9367), the Islamic Republic of Iran has worked persistently towards the JCPOA's revival. We have engaged in substantive talks with Germany, France and

the United Kingdom (E3) and the EU, including during the high-level segment of the General Assembly.

Nevertheless, despite our good faith and efforts, the other parties have taken no tangible steps thus far. Neither the United States nor the E3/EU are sincere or determined to end the continued significant non-performance of their obligations under the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). As usual, today they unsuccessfully attempted to shift the narrative, switch the victim and the culprit, wage a disinformation campaign and play a destructive blame game by intentionally ignoring the root causes of the JCPOA's current situation. It is worth noting that the party that withdrew from the JCPOA was the United States, not Iran.

Iran has only taken a number of lawful remedial measures in the full year since the United States' withdrawal and the E3/EU's inability to convince it to return to the deal and fulfil its obligations. Our objective was crystal clear: to restore the delicate balance in reciprocal commitments and benefits under the JCPOA. That was unavoidable, as the deal is founded on Iran's nuclear-related commitments in exchange for the comprehensive lifting of all United Nations, EU and United States sanctions, as well as the promotion of normal economic and trade relations with Iran, as explained in detail in the JCPOA and in resolution 2231 (2015).

More importantly, Iran's remedial measures have been authorized by the JCPOA's paragraphs 26 and 36, according to which, should there be a "re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions", Iran has the right "to cease performing" its commitments "in whole or in part". Still, unlike the irreversible consequences of the illegal actions of the United States, all of our measures can be reversed as soon as all sanctions are lifted in a verifiable manner. Therefore, the responsibility for the JCPOA's current situation rests squarely and exclusively with the United States and then with the E3/EU for multiple cases of significant non-performance with their obligations under the JCPOA and continued systematic material breaches of their explicit legal obligations under resolution 2231 (2015). Furthermore, the impasse in the Vienna talks emanates merely from the lack of political will on the part of the United States and the E3, driven by their internal political considerations.

At the same time, the United States continues to force other Member States — publicly, explicitly and aggressively — to either violate resolution 2231 (2015)

or face punishment. It is noteworthy that the United States itself has been a co-penholder of, and voted for, this unanimously adopted binding resolution. Given the clear-cut legal obligations of all Member States under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council, such unlawful, coercive and brazen behaviour by a permanent member of the Council is highly irresponsible and unprecedented. Likewise, the United States continues to defy the unanimously issued order of the International Court of Justice of 3 October 2018, which includes an obligation to remove impediments to humanitarian trade with Iran. That is yet another violation of international law by the United States.

I would like to draw attention to clear differences between Iran's commitments under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and those under the JCPOA, which are reciprocal and voluntary in nature. Iran has always complied with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and has offered its full cooperation in order to enable the IAEA to effectively implement its verification activities in Iran. So far, Iran's peaceful nuclear programme has continuously been scrutinized by the IAEA's most robust monitoring and verification processes.

Regarding the level of uranium enriched by Iran, I must stress that, while emphasizing the binding obligations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Iran, like all other Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons States parties, has an inherent right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, irrespective of the enrichment level. Committed to its international obligations, Iran is determined to exercise that right. Despite that, so far Iran has never enriched uranium above 60 per cent.

Following the termination of arms-related restrictions and travel bans under resolution 2231 (2015) on 18 October 2020, fortunately, all restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities and transfers to and from Iran, and the assets freeze on individuals and entities listed in resolution 2231 (2015), automatically terminated on 18 October 2023. Accordingly, the Secretariat removed from the Council's website the list of 84 individuals and entities subject to such measures and officially brought that and the termination of other restrictive measures to the attention of all Member States. Consequently, strict adherence to, and compliance with, that requirement is imperative for

all Member States. Any actions taken to the contrary, regardless of pretext or designation, would contravene the obligations outlined in resolution 2231 (2015) and should therefore be avoided by the respective Member State.

Resolution 2231 (2015) has nothing to do with regional issues, and any efforts to establish such a linkage is an abuse of process. As such, the attempt to establish a false link between the use of uncrewed aerial vehicles in the conflict in Ukraine and resolution 2231 (2015) is misleading and entirely unfounded. Iran's position on the conflict in Ukraine is clear and consistent. The main, long-standing threat to the peace and security of our region is well-known to all, and attempts to conceal it through disinformation, smear campaigns or baseless accusations against others are futile and unfounded. Contrary to unfounded claims, Iran has consistently demonstrated its commitment to fostering peace and security in the region. No individual, group or country acts at Iran's behest, and as such, we are not responsible for the conduct of anyone in the region.

However, the United States is fully responsible for all its decades-long aggressions and its other crimes and unlawful measures in our region. In addition, it is responsible for all crimes of the Israeli regime, as it could not commit any such savage crimes in Gaza without the consent, order and all-out political, financial and military support of, and collaboration with, the United States. Moreover, the United States obstructed the Council's commitment to fulfilling its Charter obligations in halting the Israeli war machine against the people of Gaza. One clear example is their use of the veto here in this Chamber, which prevented

a ceasefire in Gaza despite the global appeal from the international community.

While my letter dated 15 December 2023 contains our detailed comments on the Secretariat's sixteenth report on resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2023/975), I would like to highlight our main observation. The report refers to specific visits and their so-called findings. That activity is unauthorized and unlawful, representing a clear violation of the Secretariat's designated mandate. The mandate, as explicitly outlined in paragraph 6 of note S/2016/44 by the Council's President, is strictly confined to administrative support. Moreover, while the Secretariat's 2231 team has no required technical expertise, even such an unauthorized investigation about a highly technical question has been conducted by a number of administrative staff. That is ironic. Such unprofessional, unlawful and politically influenced conduct by the Secretariat runs counter to resolution 2231 (2015) and presidential note 44, and more importantly, it violates the Secretariat's explicit obligations under Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations. I must also reiterate our consistent position that, even prior to the termination of certain ballistic missile-related restrictive measures on 18 October, Iran's space and missile programmes had been outside the scope and competence of resolution 2231 (2015).

In conclusion, the Islamic Republic of Iran stands prepared to resume the full implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA once it is revived and the United States and all other parties accept to fulfil, in a timely, effective, full and faithful manner, all their obligations under the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). That indeed requires their genuine political will.

*The meeting rose at 5 p.m.*