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MEETING: 28 MARCH 1983

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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2424th MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 28 March 1983, at 11 a.m.

President: Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2424)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 22 March 1983 from the Deputy Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15651).

The meeting was called to order at 12.05 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 22 March 1983 from the Deputy Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15651)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [2420th to 2423rd meetings], I invite the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Honduras to take a place at the Security Council table. I invite the representatives of Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, the Dominican Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ecuador, Grenada, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritius, Mexico, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Spain, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Paz Barnica (Honduras) took a place at the Council table. Mr. Abada (Algeria), Mr. Muñiz (Argentina), Mr. Moseley (Barbados), Miss Dever (Belgium), Mr. Salazar Paredes (Bolivia), Mr. Bueno (Brazil), Mr. Sanz de Santamaría (Colombia), Mr. Zumbado Jiménez (Costa Rica), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Al-Alfi (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Knipping Victoria (Dominican Republic), Mr. Jelonek (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Albornoz (Ecuador),

Mr. Taylor (Grenada), Mr. Purushottam (India), Mr. Serajzadeh (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Maudave (Mauritius), Mr. Muñoz Ledo (Mexico), Mr. Ozores Typaldos (Panama), Mr. Pastor de la Torre (Peru), Mr. Arcilla (Philippines), Mr. de Pintés (Spain), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mrs. Coronel de Rodríguez (Venezuela), Mr. Hoang Bich Son (Viet Nam) and Mr. Silović (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Bulgaria, El Salvador, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, Mongolia and the Syrian Arab Republic in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Tsyetkov (Bulgaria), Mr. Rosales Rivera (El Salvador), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. La Rocca (Italy), Mr. Narkhuu (Mongolia) and Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council will now resume its consideration of the item on its agenda. I should like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the following documents: S/15654, a letter dated 24 March 1983 from the representative of Mongolia to the President of the Security Council; and S/15656, a letter dated 25 March 1983 from the Deputy Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua to the President of the Security Council.

4. The first speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Honduras, Mr. Edgardo Paz Barnica. I welcome him and invite him to make his statement.

5. Mr. PAZ BARNICA (Honduras) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wanted to speak personally in this debate to reiterate what the representative of Honduras has already said in this international forum and to clear up any doubts that might still exist concerning the position of my Government on the painful internal conflict that is now occurring in the sister Republic of Nicaragua.

6. It is unusual for a State member of the Organization of American States (OAS), which Nicaragua is, to have recourse to the Security Council without having first addressed itself to the regional body, in keeping with Article 52, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the Organization of American States. However, my Government is not shunning debate in this world Organization, and it is participating in it in the hope that we can agree on a civilized and peaceful solution to the complex problems of Central America.

7. I have said and wish to repeat that the Government of Nicaragua is involved in an armed struggle of an internal nature: Nicaraguans are fighting against Nicaraguans on Nicaraguan soil. The present outbreak of violence, unfortunately, is not sudden or unexpected. To any impartial observer it was obvious that a few months after the triumph of the Sandinist Revolution—which had aroused such high hopes at the time of victory over the dictatorship—it had begun like Saturn to devour its own sons. Members of the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction, like other high State officials, had not only abandoned their governmental functions but had also openly and resolutely joined the opposition. Among others there were Violeta de Chamorro, Alfonso Robelo, Arturo Cruz, ex-members of the Governing Junta; Edén Pastora, a hero of the Revolution, ex-Deputy Minister of Defence and former Chief of the Sandinist People's Militia; and many others who did not wish to take part in diverting the Revolution from its original concepts. As cause or effect of that fact, the régime has turned repressive. The prisons are full of political prisoners, basic individual and social guarantees have been restricted and freedom of the press and even of worship have been limited, as was obvious during the recent pastoral visit to Nicaragua of His Holiness Pope John Paul II. All that deserved rejection by men of good will throughout the world.

8. In the face of this sombre picture, aggravated by an enormous economic crisis, the Government of Nicaragua, using a hackneyed tactic, has decided to make one or more enemies in Central America, and nothing has been more convenient than to blame some of its immediate neighbours, including Honduras, for what has happened or might happen in Nicaragua. Gradually, relations between the States in the area have become tense, both because of the border incidents provoked by the Sandinist forces and the unfounded and brazen accusations that attempts are being made to destabilize the Nicaraguan Government.

9. In order fully to comprehend how absurd those accusations are, it is necessary to take a look at history. In 1980, after nearly 20 years of *de facto* and irregular Governments Honduras undertook, with perseverance and sacrifice, to return to democratic institutions. It held elections for representatives to the National Constituent Assembly on 20 April 1980 in a climate of peace, freedom and honesty; a new Constitution for the Republic was adopted; and, while neighbouring countries were involved in violence, the Honduran people returned to

the polls in 1981 to elect the President of the Republic, representatives to the National Congress and municipal mayors, with the participation of more than 80 per cent of the electorate, and won international praise. The process towards Honduras democratization culminated on 27 January 1982 when President Roberto Suazo Córdova assumed the presidency, supported by the majority of the Honduran people, in the presence of various officials of American countries, including Commander Daniel Ortega Saavedra, the Co-ordinator of the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction of the Republic of Nicaragua.

10. The primary concern of the new Honduran Government in internal matters was to maintain tranquillity in the country, strengthen democratic institutions and promote the economic and social development of the nation. Externally, our primary goal has been peaceful coexistence with all the countries of the Earth by strict implementation of the principles contained in the Charter of the Organization, especially those of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, the right of peoples to self-determination and the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means.

11. For that reason, barely two months after the new Government took power, on 23 March 1982, it submitted to the Permanent Council of the OAS a peace proposal for Central America [see S/14919] made up of six points which can be summed up as follows: first, to agree on the cessation of the arms race in the area, the reduction of arms and the prohibition of the importation of military supplies—all in the interest of achieving general disarmament; secondly, to reduce and eliminate foreign advisers, military and others; thirdly, to agree on the cessation and prevention of illegal trafficking in arms in the region; fourthly, to agree on a system of international supervision and control of the agreements reached; fifthly, to refrain from creating new territorial or maritime disputes that might aggravate the situation in the region; and sixthly, to promote a multilateral dialogue of a regional and permanent nature, making possible domestic political agreements for the establishment of democratic and pluralistic régimes based on the free, proper and honest expression of the will of the people. Between then and now my country's Government has done its utmost to see to it that that proposal and any other designed to achieve the same peaceful end become a reality, to the benefit of the entire region of Central America.

12. On this occasion Honduras reaffirms its unshakeable decision to begin as soon as possible a multilateral dialogue, first and foremost with the Central American countries and open to other democratically governed Latin American countries in the Caribbean. We believe that this is the right way to reach responsible and serious agreements that will strengthen peace and security in the region. A number of States have accepted this initiative. However, not only has the Government of Nicaragua remained completely silent on the subject, but its highest leaders have also made threatening statements declaring that a war against Honduras is inevitable, in flagrant

violation of the fundamental principles recognized by the international legal community.

13. It is clear, then, that Nicaragua wants war, whereas Honduras wants peace. If that were not case, then one might ask how it is that our country is prepared to open up its territory without any restrictions to international supervision, provided that Nicaragua does likewise, especially in the border areas, ports, airports and other strategic zones. How else can one explain our constant willingness to enter into a dialogue? In addition there was a long talk with the Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua, Mr. Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, last 8 October here at Headquarters, under the auspices of the Secretary-General.

14. Subsequently, spontaneously and forthrightly, in November I travelled to Managua bearing a message of peace and understanding from my Government to the people and Government and people of Nicaragua, a message that was radically censored in all that country's media by the Censorship Commission, which is under the Nicaraguan Government. I have here clear and affirmative proof, a copy of the newspaper *La Prensa* of that date, in which even a tiny notice about the arrival in Nicaragua of the Foreign Minister of Honduras on a good will mission of peace and harmony was censored. I should like to present further evidence of that fact. Here is a person who accompanied me during the press conference at the international airport in Managua and who heard my statement and our willingness to promote peace. He was witness to what I said, as well as to the fact that that conference was completely censored. I refer to the Deputy Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua, Mr. Victor Hugo Tinoco, who was seated at my side on that occasion. In spite of that brazenness, and in view of the continuous accusations that Honduras is harbouring forces opposed to the Nicaraguan régime in camps from which they supposedly attack Sandinist forces, in February of this year I issued a cordial invitation to Minister D'Escoto Brockmann to travel with me to the border area between both countries and see for himself that there are no such camps on Honduran territory, whose alleged existence led to an intensive and well-orchestrated publicity campaign to discredit my country, in Nicaragua's stubborn attempt to appear to be the victim, to change its role from killer to victim, to radicalize its conduct, to distract attention from the serious internal conflict besetting that country and to continue to enjoy reaping the benefits of international economic and military aid and handouts. I hardly need to say that the Government of Nicaragua declined similar offers.

15. Militarily, Honduras has also demonstrated its desire for serious and civilized dialogue. During the past year, first there was a meeting of senior military leaders of both countries at the Honduran customs post of La Fraternidad, presided over by the Chiefs of the General Staffs. A little while afterwards, in the Nicaraguan port of Corinto there was another meeting of the heads of the respective naval forces, with a subsequent meeting scheduled but never held, because of Nicaragua's reluctance

to agree to machinery designed to prevent border incidents and to establish a climate of détente in Central America.

16. The Government of Nicaragua has still not replied to the invitation for that further meeting of naval chiefs to prevent maritime incidents. Last November I repeated this invitation personally to the Co-ordinator of the Governing Junta, Commander Daniel Ortega Saavedra, and he told me that meetings of that kind were unimportant.

17. It is truly regrettable that all these efforts by my country to bring about a better regional understanding have been fruitless and that relations between Central American States have become only more tense. While Honduras seeks the relaxation of tension and a dialogue with all the countries of the region, Nicaragua threatens us with imminent war. Here are statements by the highest leaders, who have stated that they are prepared to confront Honduras and to start an international war. In order to justify the massive mobilization of troops in the border area begun last Thursday, the Government of Nicaragua now publicly and directly accuses the armed forces of Honduras of having bombarded and, what is even more unusual, of having even invaded Nicaraguan territory, charges which my Government vigorously rejects as being completely unfounded and totally brazen.

18. My country's Government once again proclaims its complete neutrality in the internal conflicts afflicting neighbouring countries and its sincere interest that those fraternal peoples enjoy the precious gift of peace and democracy through dialogue, understanding and mutual respect. Our interest in these objectives is particularly great because, owing to our geographical proximity, internal conflicts tend to extend beyond borders and to affect normal development in our country. Proof of that is that Honduras recently took in nearly 40,000 refugees from Central American countries, especially Salvadorians and Nicaraguans. As the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees can attest, the number of Nicaraguans has increased alarmingly over the last few weeks. The presence of refugees in Honduras can be explained only by their awareness that the Honduran Government is remaining neutral in the struggles of their countries and is guaranteeing a climate of freedom, security and humanitarian understanding in face of the climate of uncertainty and violence that exists in their respective countries. These are the only Nicaraguan camps which, although we did not seek their existence, exist on Honduran territory.

19. As the representative of a legitimate Government arising from the freely expressed majority will of the Honduran people, respectful of the law and of its international commitments, I formally denounce before the Council the unjustified acts of provocation and threats made by the Nicaraguan Government against Honduras, which constitute a real and serious danger to peace and security in the Central American region. Similarly, I

appeal to the Council to adopt specific measures so that, through dialogue and negotiation, a comprehensive regional solution to the Central American tragedy may be found, for the various factors at play are comprehensive and regional—the political turmoil, the rents in society, the economic contradictions and the violence that has been unleashed, all of which have thrown this region of the Latin American continent into a state of upheaval.

20. I repeat that the most fervent desire of the Government of Honduras is for peace to return to Central America, thus promoting an atmosphere in which public freedoms would flourish, the pluralistic democratic system would be strengthened and the dignity of the human person enhanced.

21. Mr. TINOCO (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall address myself to a few central and basic points which I believe it important to highlight with regard to the statement just delivered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Honduras, Mr. Edgardo Paz Barnica.

22. We believe that it is important to bring out precisely those aspects which were ignored in that statement. We wish to recall that, with regard to the oft-repeated invitation, supposedly ignored by Nicaragua, to visit the camps of counter-revolutionaries operating in Honduras—camps from which they have been infiltrating into Nicaragua since February—we have already clearly expounded our position at an earlier meeting of the Council. In this connection I think that the representative of Honduras could provide his Minister with the verbatim records containing our reply on this matter [2420th meeting, paras. 128-129].

23. With regard to the peace proposals of Honduras and its alleged efforts to help bring about peace, I should like to mention a number of steps taken by the Nicaraguan Government.

24. For example, I wish to draw the Council's attention to the fact that on 6 May 1981 the first step was taken by the Republic of Nicaragua, when my country's Government called for a meeting at the highest level in which would also participate the Ministers of Defence and the Chiefs of the General Staffs. This call was directed, in note No. 064 of 6 May, to the Government of Honduras, then headed by General Policarpo Paz García. In its note No. 178 of 11 May Honduras accepted Nicaragua's invitation. It was precisely as a result of that meeting that a series of agreements was reached, and since the beginning of May 1981—before the process of escalation of the activities of the counter-revolutionary camps in Honduras began and before the \$20 million grant by the American Administration to help these bands was approved—we have been working with Honduras, trying to prevent that country's being transformed into a spring-board and, hence, an instrument for intervention against Nicaragua.

25. In November of that same year, a member of the Governing Junta, Mr. Rafael Córdova Rivas, went to

Tegucigalpa—the first visit to Honduras by a member of the Governing Junta since the triumph of the Revolution, at a time when there had not yet been a visit at that level from Honduras to Nicaragua—and I accompanied him personally. We had talks with Colonel Elvir Sierra, then Foreign Minister. We reiterated to him that there was a need to implement everything that had been agreed upon in the Guasale meeting in May of that year. We made a series of proposals with respect to joint patrolling of the borders with a view to preventing the installation of counter-revolutionary camps, which had only just begun at the time.

26. On 27 January 1982, as a display of political good will by Nicaragua towards Honduras, the Co-ordinator of the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction, Commander Daniel Ortega Saavedra, as Minister Paz Barnica just informed us, attended the ceremony of the assumption of power by the new President of Honduras, Mr. Roberto Suazo Córdova.

27. On 15 March our Foreign Minister, Mr. Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, in note No. 108 invited the already appointed Foreign Minister of Honduras, Edgardo Paz Barnica, to hold a meeting between them at whatever date deemed convenient by Honduras, in order to reach a better understanding between our nations. On 19 March, Foreign Minister Paz Barnica sent note No. 185 DSM, dated 17 March, in which he said, "circumstances oblige me to be away from Honduras for the next few days, and when I return we shall by common agreement establish the dates for this meeting".

28. Since the Foreign Minister of Honduras had not yet come to Nicaragua, on 21 April it was decided that Foreign Minister D'Escoto Brockmann would go to Tegucigalpa, where he presented to the Honduran Government, through Foreign Minister Paz Barnica, a six-point proposal aimed at preventing erosion in relations between Nicaragua and Honduras. The six points were: first, to hold an immediate meeting of the army chiefs of both countries—a meeting which never took place, in spite of the willingness of the Government of Nicaragua; secondly, to sign a non-aggression agreement between our two countries; thirdly, to set up a joint border patrol; fourthly, to dismantle the Somoquist counter-revolutionary camps; fifthly, to refrain from setting up any foreign naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca, where Honduran and Nicaraguan waters meet; and sixthly, to hold bilateral meetings of all kinds and, with the co-operation of international organizations, to repatriate the Miskitos who wished to return to Nicaragua.

29. On 20 May a meeting was held in La Fraternidad with Colonel José Abdenego Sueso Rosa, Chief of the General Staff of the Honduran armed forces. Unfortunately, however, nothing developed from that meeting. On 24 August, to continue this outline of what are perhaps the most relevant points in the Nicaraguan process of rapprochement with Honduras, in an effort to prevent Honduras from becoming a spring-board for counter-revolution—Foreign Minister D'Escoto Brockmann, completing the proposal of Commander Ortega

Saavedra, invited Foreign Minister Paz Barnica to meet with him at Managua on 1, 2 and 3 September, if convenient. On 1 September, Foreign Minister Paz Barnica, replying to that invitation, said that he could not accept it because he had "prior commitments". On 24 September Foreign Minister Paz Barnica was again invited to a meeting with the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, and the Honduran Foreign Ministry issued the same excuses on 29 September. On 8 October the meeting between Foreign Minister Paz Barnica and Foreign Minister D'Escoto Brockmann was held, which is the meeting to which Mr. Paz Barnica referred. On 12 November Foreign Minister Paz Barnica, precisely in response to the earlier invitation made on all the dates I have just mentioned, decided to visit Nicaragua and met with Commander Ortega Saavedra, of the Governing Junta, and me.

30. On 19 February 1983—as I said earlier, this coincided with the mobilization of the counter-revolutionary camps already concentrated especially in the Las Trojes area, in the El Paraíso department of Honduras and in the Mosquito Coast area of Honduras—an invitation was issued, to which we replied that we considered it necessary to hold high-level meetings to determine how to carry out the inspection. Of course, the Council has been told that Nicaragua did not respond to that invitation, which is quite inaccurate.

31. I wanted to bring this to the attention of the Council in order to demonstrate that Nicaragua has been making an effort, not only to reach fraternal agreement with Honduras, but also to try and prevent Honduras from becoming a staging area for counter-revolutionary forces opposed to the Sandinist Government. This has been impossible to accomplish, however, because of the tremendous pressure and manipulation of the United States Government through a number of steps we are familiar with.

32. It is interesting to note that it has been glibly affirmed here that the present aggression against Nicaragua is an internal conflict, that what has been happening in Nicaragua is the result of an internal conflict between Nicaraguan Somozist forces and Sandinist forces.

33. It is a secret to no one, as I have already explained, that since early February 1982, when we began making efforts to prevent Honduras from stepping up its participation in the counter-revolution, there were at least 13 camps along the Honduran border. We said that beginning in December those camps began to mass troops at two strategic points in the Las Trojes and Mosquitia areas basically. It is precisely from those areas, which had already been centres of military activity, that Somozist gangs began to enter our country.

34. An attempt has been made here to deny the undeniable: that Honduran territory has been used for the activities of those counter-revolutionary forces, with the assent and under the direction of important sectors of the Honduran army and Government. We wish to support this thesis because we do not wish to foist all responsibility

on the entire Honduran Government. Let us speak about specific facts.

35. The other day, the representative of Honduras said that they could not control all those thousands of kilometres of border; this can be read in the verbatim records [*ibid.*, para. 64]. I would remind the Council that we have only 700 kilometres of border between us. That is not the main point, though. There are areas along that 700-kilometre border where the population density is relatively high, with roads and means of communication that are systematically used by the counter-revolutionary forces. If the Government of Honduras had really wanted to control those gangs then it would have done so quite some time ago.

36. For example, from the first months of 1982 to the first months of 1983, these counter-revolutionary gangs have caused a total of 386 deaths, 284 wounded and 211 captured, mostly in the border area of our country. This is no mere invention of the Nicaraguan revolution. The family members, as reported in *The New York Times* of today, the widows of those Nicaraguans killed along the border can confirm this. During that period there were about 183 attacks along the border, 131 of which have been virtually right on the border line and other, more recent, ones a few kilometres inside the border. In which departments? Basically, in the Chinandega, Madriz, Nueva Segovia and Zelaya departments.

37. I was saying that if the Honduran authorities had wanted to control the Somozist gangs at all they could have done so. We are not talking about thousands of kilometres. Let us just take one area—the El Paraíso area, the Honduran department which borders on the Nicaraguan department of Nueva Segovia. Or let us take the Choluteca area that borders on the Nicaraguan Chinandega department. We are talking about a border area of not more than 70 kilometres in length, and what has happened there? There have been at least 36 attacks in this area of less than 70 kilometres, no fewer than 36 attacks by counter-revolutionary gangs at various levels. There was an attack on border guards at Santo Tomás del Nance, an attack on the bridges over the Negro River, where both bridges were blown up, an attack on the bridge over the Toronado River, an attack on Peña del Jicote, an attack on Las Mesas, an attack on La Guarruma, an attack on Rancho Los Encinos, an attack on La Esperanza, an attack on Valle de Las Torres, two attacks on Ranchón Bibijagua, two attacks on La Zopilota hill, two attacks on El Paraíso, two attacks on border guards at La Ceiba, two attacks on border guards at El Varador, four attacks on Loma Oscura, four attacks on Vado Ancho and five attacks on San Pedro del Norte. According to all elementary military logic the concentration of attacks in an area widely known for its counter-revolutionary activity would have enabled the Honduran Government or Honduran troops to have captured at least one Somozist, but they have not been able to do so. They have not had even one encounter with a counter-revolutionary force when operating throughout the period of these 36 attacks in a very small area of territory.

38. Let me give some other examples so that people will not go on saying that this is an internal conflict. This is the very position maintained by the United States Administration, which says, "There is an internal conflict in Nicaragua; there is an internal conflict in El Salvador; therefore things are the same. Let us negotiate them together." Let hope that that means that they will be willing to negotiate in El Salvador in the near future; that could be one explanation. But let us look at the Nueva Segovia area, which borders on the Honduran department of El Paraíso. What has happened there in the past 10 months? There have been 43 attacks from Honduran territory. We can mention some: an attack on Ojo de Agua, an attack on El Tablazo, an attack on La Ceiba, an attack on Cerro de Ayote, an attack on San José de las Manos, an attack on Teotecacinte, an attack on Loma de las Islas, an attack on Planes de Bilán, an attack on border guards at Zacateras, an attack on border guards at Playa Hermosa, an attack on border guards at Huanito, an attack on border guards at Rio Coco, an attack on border guards at Cerro Jesus and other attacks on border guards at El Porvenir, El Portillo, Mata de Plátano and Las Puertas. All of these attacks again took place in an area of less than 70 kilometres, again close to the border between Honduras and Nicaragua. Along the same 70 kilometres there have also been two attacks on El Suyital, two attacks on Los Arenales, two attacks on border guards at Los Planes, two attacks on troops at San Francisco, two attacks on Siuche and two attacks on Las Pampas.

39. It would be very difficult to try to deny reality. All the attacks I have just mentioned are only a few examples. They are not all the attacks that have occurred; they are just those which have taken place along the border area. We are not talking about any of the other attacks, which have taken place 15, 20 or 25 kilometres within Nicaraguan territory; we are speaking strictly about border attacks.

40. If this were an internal conflict, what would be the logic of the counter-revolutionary Somozist bands, if they are inside the country, to attack the border area, which is precisely where the Sandinist army is fortified, instead of attacking other areas within the country, which are less heavily guarded because the Sandinist forces are at the northern border? It would not be at all logical to think that counter-revolutionary bands within the country are going to go to the most heavily fortified points—in the north—to attack the frontier. The only explanation for this is that those bands have been trained, equipped and assembled and are attacking across this border, attacking the aforementioned military border posts all along the border between Honduras and Nicaragua. This is what is being termed an internal conflict, in an attempt to deny the undeniable. An attempt is being made to continue to deny what is generally recognized by the entire international community. Of course, the United States is sponsor and patron and is financing and developing this undeclared war against Nicaragua.

41. But we ask ourselves, what is the logic of the Honduran authorities? Why are they allowing their territory

to be used for counter-revolutionary activities against Nicaragua? There were elections in 1982, and the new Government should not have allowed this. I should like to say that we really thought that the situation would change with the new Honduran Government, that the new civilian Government would adopt a somewhat more balanced position, that the forces in Honduras would not be as influential, and that common sense would prevail and there would be some sort of understanding promoted with Nicaragua.

42. Indeed, we must be clear on the fact that there have been two general trends in Honduras. A sector of Honduran society and of the Government—and the interesting thing is that this sector consists of private enterprise, which has business dealings with Nicaragua—has always tried to avoid a conflict with Nicaragua. But the military sectors, pressured by the American Administration especially since John Dimitri Negroponte was appointed ambassador, have begun to harass all those who supported the policy of détente with Nicaragua. But we hoped, after the 1982 elections, that the civilian sector, which was seeking détente, would prevail over the military sector, which was promoting a policy of confrontation with Nicaragua and support for the counter-revolutionary bands.

43. But this was not possible. Little by little, the aggressive, war-mongering sector undermined the civilian pro-détente sector that exists—or existed, because I think it is less influential now—in Honduran society. There has been a series of attacks on those, even within the army, who wanted conciliation with Nicaragua. But what has happened is that instead of strengthening civilian power, it is precisely the military's power that has become stronger. The chief of the armed forces, Gustavo Alvarez, one of the most aggressive elements against Nicaragua, has been given all the power. He has assumed new military powers in Honduras and, together with Ambassador Negroponte, is directing all counter-revolutionary activities against Nicaragua. There have been sectors within the Honduran army who wanted détente with Nicaragua, and those sectors were excluded a few months after the election in the internal struggle between the sectors supporting peace and those supporting war. We have two very clear examples of this. The leaders of the conciliation movement within the Honduran army who sought coexistence with Nicaragua were expelled from Honduras, for all practical intents and purposes. Let us take the case of Colonel Hubber Bodden, for example, who had been head of Honduran intelligence. Colonel Alvarez, supported by the American Embassy, sent him as a military attaché to Argentina, which was to send him very far away, especially at the time when Argentina did not have active relations with Central America. And what happened to the other leader in the Honduran army who wanted a conciliation with Nicaragua, Colonel Leónidas Torres Arias? He also was sent by Gustavo Alvarez and the American Embassy to the other side of the Earth to Taiwan. This gives some idea of why Nicaragua has tried to follow the internal strife in Honduras, because of the role Honduras is going to play

against Nicaragua. However, unfortunately, it is obvious that the most aggressive side seems to be holding sway now; hence these counter-revolutionary bands and Honduras' complicity with the American Administration.

44. Perhaps the representative of Honduras did not give to his Foreign Minister the article that appeared in *The New York Times* of today about counter-revolutionary camps in Honduras, which the author had the opportunity of seeing. The article is by Stephen Kinzer, an American reporter in Honduras who went to the counter-revolutionary camp where they told him that some of them had been infiltrating Nicaragua with the support of certain Honduran officials. But all of this is a lie, according to the American Administration. And, according to the American Administration, this is an internal conflict and is not particularly relevant. But the American representatives here have not said anything about another article that appeared in *The New York Times* by Saul Landau, where he says that on 19 November 1981, William J. Casey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), went to the House Select Committee on Intelligence to talk about the \$20 million plan that was being developed. The American Administration claims that this too is a lie and that all the American congressmen criticizing this destabilization plan and these funds allocated to destabilizing Nicaragua are paranoid. All congressmen, Republicans and Democrats—I will not mention any names, for they are known to everyone here—who are in opposition are seeing things, and no such plan of aggression against Nicaragua exists, according to the American Administration.

45. It should also be recalled, and I repeat, that the American delegation in the Council has not deigned to answer the three concrete questions put to it which might help the Council to assess American responsibility in this matter. The three questions to which there have been no replies are: is the CIA linked to the counter-revolutionary forces which are operating against Nicaragua? Has official money from the American Government been approved for anti-Nicaragua activities in the sum of \$20 million? Are there counter-revolutionary training camps in the United States, or are there not? These are three concrete questions which have not yet been replied to; this lack of response reveals the level of interference by the American Administration, the nearly public acceptance of its war against Nicaragua. We think it has been important to denounce these facts in the Council because we cannot allow these flagrant efforts to destabilize the sovereign Government of Nicaragua to pass unnoticed.

46. Finally, and in a more constructive vein, I wish to state what the position of Nicaragua is, to see whether it is still possible to find some way out, or a formula of understanding, not as a result of any effort by the American Government, but by pressure that may be put on that Government. I have received from Managua express instructions to propose to the delegation of Honduras and to Foreign Minister Paz Barnica of Honduras the following: that there be a presidential meeting between

the President of Honduras, Mr. Suazo Córdova, and Commander Ortega Saavedra, the Co-ordinator of the Governing Junta—preferably in the presence of the Presidents of Mexico and Venezuela, who would testify to the good faith and the positions of the parties—to discuss relations between Nicaragua and Honduras in any place to be chosen by the Government of Honduras in Mexico or in Venezuela at the earliest possible date, to be decided on by Honduras. This is an official proposal that we make in the Council to the Government of Honduras for a meeting between President Suazo Córdova and Commander Ortega Saavedra at a time and place suitable to Honduras to begin discussions on the relations between our two countries.

47. As regards the United States Government, a decisive factor in the Central American crisis and in the aggression—not just the determining factor but the propelling factor and instigator of aggression against Nicaragua—we would propose that we immediately begin direct and frank talks in a third country to be chosen by common consent. It could be in any country that has on past occasions shown a willingness to serve as a venue for meetings between Nicaragua and the United States; it could be in France, Spain, Mexico, Venezuela or Panama, in order to discuss the relations and difficulties between our two countries.

48. Those are two concrete proposals.

49. Mr. AMEGA (Togo) (*interpretation from French*): At a time when the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization¹ is being considered, facts brought to the attention of the Council by various speakers following Nicaragua's presentation of its case have concretely demonstrated the refusal of States to respect the principles of the Charter to which they have subscribed, thus confirming one of the observations of the Secretary-General, who wrote:

"I sometimes feel that we now take the Charter far less seriously than did its authors, living as they did in the wake of a world tragedy. I believe therefore that an important first step would be a conscious recommitment by Governments to the Charter."²

50. Is it necessary to remind anyone that we the peoples of the United Nations have declared our determination to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small", and for these ends we have also resolved to "practice tolerance and to live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security"? Can we ever tire of repeating that all States Members of the Organization are bound to respect those affirmations of the Preamble to the Charter and to act in accordance with the principles that derive from it, that is, the sovereign equality of all Members, the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means and the non-use of force or

the threat of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State or in any other way incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations?

51. In a world teeming with crises, particularly those that are engulfing Central America, given the grave problems confronting Nicaragua, and after having heard the different statements made in this Council, my delegation must face up to a grim truth: that the law of the jungle still reigns supreme in international relations. Justice, law, equity and tolerance have been pilloried. The Council has in the course of its meetings on this matter been made only too aware of acts of violence, murders and massive violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and it has received information with regard to intent to commit aggression and to cause destabilization.

52. These different factors, which are germs of conflagration and hotbeds of tension, can be analysed only in terms of survival of the States of the region which, feeling that their sovereignty is threatened, have taken certain measures to safeguard that sovereignty. Those measures often take the form of signing agreements and pacts with friendly countries ready to provide them with the military material necessary for the defence of that sovereignty. Thus are forged alliances which, far from contributing to the improvement of existing situations, serve only to maintain them if not to worsen them and thus fuel the fires of confrontation between the blocs that are the sources of these alliances. The factors of tension will disappear once the threats of aggression and the violations of fundamental rights are brought to a halt and guarantees of independence and peace are given to all sides, and once all the States of the area concerned are willing to respect the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and each State has the freedom to exercise its sovereign rights and freely to choose the new social and political experiments desired by its people. It is precisely in this spirit that the principles of the Charter were conceived.

53. The delegation of Togo was happy to welcome the statements of the parties with regard to their willingness to enter into negotiations to guarantee peace and security in the region. Thus the parties concerned are clearly aware of their obligations under the Charter, especially in its Article 33, which states that:

“The parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of inter-

national peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or agreements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”

It is also the task of the Council to propose to the parties appropriate measures for the bringing about of a settlement of the current conflict.

54. However, we cannot overlook the existence of the mediation initiatives of Mexico and other States of the area to bring about negotiations. Within this context my delegation wishes to stress its wholehearted appreciation of the attempts made so far to settle this crisis. We wish warmly to encourage those initiatives and express the hope that the parties will evince all the necessary good will in the negotiations. It is important that the countries concerned should embark upon dialogue with a view to adopting practical measures to guarantee the peace the region needs.

55. As I said last year in this very place:

“The people of Togo ardently wishes peace . . . for itself and for all nations. That peace must be real and must contribute to the effective emancipation of our different nations. That is why, faced with the disarray in our world which threatens the international equilibrium, Togo has always advocated recourse to fraternal dialogue and permanent consultation in seeking in peace just solutions for the tragic conflicts shaking our world” [2339th meeting, para. 63].

56. It is such a dialogue that my delegation once again invites all States concerned in the conflict now being considered by the Council to undertake. That dialogue would be proof that the Organization to which we all belong, and of which the Security Council is the peace-keeping organ, can preserve its *raison d'être* and deserve the gratitude of future generations.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

NOTES

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/37/1).*

² *Ibid.*, p. 1.

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