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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1365/Rev.1)	1
Statement by the President	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902);	} 6
Complaint of the representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security" (S/7907);	
Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910);	
Letter dated 9 June 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning an item entitled: "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israel forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as the result of an aggression" (S/7967);	
Letter dated 8 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8043);	
Letter dated 8 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8044)	

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held in New York on Saturday, 8 July 1967, at 6 p.m.

President: Mr. Endalkachew MAKONNEN (Ethiopia).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Mali, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1365/Rev.1)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902).
3. Complaint of the representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security" (S/7907).
4. Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910).
5. Letter dated 9 June 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning an item entitled: "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israel forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as the result of an aggression" (S/7967).

Statement by the President

1. The PRESIDENT: This morning at about 11 o'clock I received a telephone communication from the representative of the United Arab Republic informing me that he had received instructions from his Government to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council. At about 12 noon the representative of Israel called me on the telephone to inform me that his Government likewise had instructed him to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

2. This afternoon I received a letter from the representative of the United Arab Republic requesting an emergency meeting of the Council. This letter has now been

distributed in document S/8043. Shortly afterwards I received a letter from the representative of Israel requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council. That letter has been reproduced and circulated in document S/8044.

3. On receipt of that information I immediately undertook consultations with all the members of the Council in order to fix a time for the meeting. It is in accordance with the results of these consultations that I have convened this meeting.

Adoption of the Agenda

4. The PRESIDENT: The provisional agenda for this afternoon's meeting is before the Security Council in document S/Agenda/1365/Rev.1. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the agenda is adopted.

5. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, you have just told the Council that the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. El Kony, has addressed a letter to you [S/8043] requesting that an emergency session of the Council should be convened to consider the question of a violation by Israel forces of the cease-fire decision. In your consultations with members of the Security Council, including the Soviet delegation, you indicated that the intention was to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council, specifically in connexion with the request by the representative of the United Arab Republic.

6. May I remind you that in our conversation with you we gave our consent specifically in connexion with this request by the United Arab Republic, and agreed with you that an emergency meeting of the Security Council should be held at 6 p.m. today, as indeed has happened. But in spite of all this, the provisional agenda for the 1365th meeting of the Security Council—that is, document S/Agenda/1365/Rev.1, to which you have referred—contains every imaginable thing except the actual request by the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider a specific and definite question, namely, a violation by Israel forces of the cease-fire decision.

7. In this connexion, Mr. President, we should like to ask you a question. Why is a completely different agenda being submitted to us, and why is there no reference to the request by the United Arab Republic on the substance of the question which we have been convened to consider today?

8. As we see it, our agenda should be very simple. It should contain one item—letter dated 8 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council [S/8043], requesting a meeting to consider the question of a violation of the Security Council's cease-fire decision by Israel forces.

9. The PRESIDENT: I should like to draw the attention of the representative of the Soviet Union to the statement I made at the beginning of the meeting. In that statement I attempted to give a full description of and full information on the way in which requests were made for a meeting of the Security Council this evening. I said that I had done my very best to follow the traditions of the Council in contacting other members of the Council and getting their advice and views on the time of the meeting, and so on. I do not think I left anything out; I think that all the information on the point was contained in that statement.

10. With regard to the provisional agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1365/Rev.1, I should like to say this: I approved that agenda in accordance with rule 7 of the Security Council's provisional rules of procedure. That rule states, in part, that:

"The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council."

I approved the agenda in document S/Agenda/1365/Rev.1 for two main reasons. First, the items appearing on it are the items before the Council. It is, of course, for the Council to dispose of them as it wishes. However, so long as they are inscribed as items, they are before the Council. Secondly, the two communications—one from the delegation of the United Arab Republic [S/8043], and the other from the delegation of Israel [S/8044]—that have led to the meeting today arise out of the items already inscribed on the Council's agenda.

11. At the same time, I have taken very great care to inform the Security Council that those two communications are before it, in just the same way as the other items that have not yet been disposed of. Hence, in my view, these two items have the same standing as the other items and are inseparably related to the provisional agenda for this meeting, as prepared by the Secretary-General and approved by me.

12. I have said what I have only by way of explaining why the Secretary-General and I have presented the provisional agenda as it now stands. I wish to make it absolutely clear that the matter of approving the agenda is in the hands of the Council.

13. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Thank you, Mr. President, for the clarification you have given. But I should like to make some comments on this point.

14. First, you have referred to tradition. The idea of tradition is, if I may say so, very elastic. Tradition is related

to the history of a question and, if you are going to go into the history, you should have some reason for starting at a given point. We should, in fact, think of history in terms of periods. In other words, the question to which we have devoted many meetings has a long history; and, to be logical, one should trace this history back to a much earlier period than that which begins with item 2: "Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902)". You and I are well aware that the history of the matter does not by any means begin with this letter. This is only one of the episodes. So then, when speaking of tradition, one should also remember logic and the facts of history. This would take us very far afield, and I hardly think that we need to engage, here and now in the Security Council, in historical investigations. Accordingly, Mr. President, I should like to draw your attention to the fact that we have been convened today, as you have been kind enough to tell us, to consider a specific matter relating to a request which the United Arab Republic has made for a quite definite reason.

15. Secondly, as is well known, several meetings have been held already on the items listed in the provisional agenda. Draft resolutions of various kinds have been considered and put to the vote, and a situation has arisen which, if I may say so, has obliged us now to seek other ways of devising a more fruitful solution to the problem. It is hardly necessary for me to recount what happened when we left this table and moved to another conference room to discuss the problem at the General Assembly's fifth emergency special session.

16. Consequently, there is no reason now to revert to all these questions. It was not for this that the Council was convened today. We cannot now allow ourselves to be distracted by other problems. We must concentrate our attention on a specific matter—a violation of the Security Council's decision calling for a cease-fire.

17. Thirdly, as you will I hope have noted, the last part of Ambassador El Kony's letter of 8 July [S/8043] contains a sentence stating that "upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request that an emergency session of the Security Council be convened" on the very question referred to in his letter.

18. Consequently, Mr. President, we should like to say again that we do not see any reason, on the basis of what you have described as "tradition", to include in the agenda a whole list of questions which could be continued indefinitely. Our agenda should be drafted in accordance with the request by the United Arab Republic, and should mention the document to which we have been referring—the letter dated 8 July by the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic, Ambassador El Kony. This is, in fact, the subject we are to discuss at the Security Council's emergency or extraordinary meeting.

19. The PRESIDENT: The Soviet representative has referred to my use of the word "tradition". Perhaps he has not quite correctly understood the sense in which I used that word. I did not use it in connexion with any action that has to be taken in strict accordance with the rules of procedure.

Obviously, there are certain matters where the rules strictly apply; there are other matters such as the one to which I referred—namely, that of consulting members before a meeting takes place—where there is undoubtedly a tradition. Perhaps one should use some word other than “tradition”, but there is this practice of consulting members. This is only to try and determine the correct and appropriate conditions on the basis of which the Security Council can best conduct its business. When I used the word “tradition” I was referring only to the consultations earlier today.

20. As regards the provisional agenda that is before the Council, I have already drawn the attention of the Council to the first paragraph of rule 7 of the provisional rules of procedure, which clearly states that:

“The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council.”

21. I approved the provisional agenda as it stands for the two reasons that I stated before. I should like to state them again for the sake of clarification. First, the provisional agenda for today’s meeting is exactly the same as that of 14 June 1967, contained in document S/Agenda/1361. To my knowledge, the Council has not in any way disposed of these items that are before it on the same subject, namely, the crisis in the Middle East. Secondly, the two communications that were received by me this morning, and were circulated to members of the Council, arise out of the same problem and situation. That is the reason why I felt that a discussion of these two submissions within the context of the items on the agenda, which the Council has not disposed of, would be the best way of dealing with the matter.

22. But I have said before, and I repeat, that this matter should not be a cause for controversy between the President and members of the Council. This is in fact a matter in the hands of the Council. It is the Council’s right to decide which items it wishes to discuss at any meeting. Therefore, I leave it to the Council, as is its right, to change, add to or subtract from the items to be discussed at any meeting. The President did what he thought best in the light of his own understanding. But it is for the Council to decide upon its own agenda.

23. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): My delegation certainly supports the action of the Secretary-General in preparing the provisional agenda, and the action of the President in approving that provisional agenda. Several emergency meetings have been convened with an agenda prepared in a form identical to that of the provisional agenda in document S/Agenda/1365/Rev.1. Those emergency meetings have dealt with complaints similar to the complaints we now have before us from the representative of the United Arab Republic and the representative of Israel about violations of the cease-fire. We have dealt with them under the same provisional agenda, without any change. I do not know anything that has happened that has introduced any change into the previous situation.

24. I am sure, Mr. President, that furthest from your mind and from the mind of any member of the Council was any intention to prejudice anybody’s assertions about the necessity of convening an emergency special session of the General Assembly. We have all had our say about that, and it is not necessary to repeat that “say” here. The plain fact of the matter is that when we last adjourned the Security Council, several delegations, including the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. El Kony, pointed out specifically, and I quote him:

“I believe that we have a draft resolution submitted by the United Arab Republic on 31 May [S/7919]. For the time being, we are not going to insist upon having it put to the vote, but I should like to say it is still before the Security Council.” [1361st meeting, para. 136.]

Similar statements were made both by other representatives on the Council and by parties to the present problem.

25. Therefore, in our view, Mr. President, you have proceeded entirely in accordance with the rules. You have called to our attention two complaints about violations of the cease-fire, and two requests for an emergency meeting. You have consulted with all of us; we have agreed upon the time of a meeting to consider urgently the complaints about a violation of the cease-fire.

26. If we keep haggling over procedure, this meeting will not look very much like an emergency meeting.

27. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, I should like to thank you again for your explanation. But I must say that I am not convinced that the agenda has been prepared correctly. The matters listed in the agenda have already been the subject of discussion in the Security Council. And, who knows, sooner or later, they may receive attention from the Security Council again. We do not in the least exclude the possibility that we may at some time revert to one or another of the questions listed in this agenda.

28. But I ask you, Mr. President, why is there no reference in the agenda to the request made by the United Arab Republic in its letter of 8 July [S/8043]. Is it not for this that we are meeting today—to consider this appeal, this request? Is this not the cause and purpose of our meeting today? As I see it, there simply cannot be any disagreement between us on this point. It is precisely this which we are to discuss at the Security Council’s emergency meeting. In that case, where is the logic?

29. If we have been invited to today’s meeting of the Security Council to consider a quite specific question, why does it not appear on the agenda? Why does the provisional agenda contain other questions—the letters which are listed in the agenda—but not the question which we have been convened to consider today? Why is this so? I must say I find this absolutely unintelligible.

30. I would not wish at this stage to make digressions and to pass judgement on the person who prepared the agenda, and how it was done. This is not the question. I would not

wish to say, either, that we are over-concerned with the procedural aspect of the matter. Not at all. But this is a matter of substance, because it is precisely for this that we have come to the Security Council. We come here because of a request made by the United Arab Republic concerning a violation by Israel forces of the Security Council's cease-fire resolution and we find that this question does not appear on the agenda. What would your reaction be, Mr. President, if you or your country had addressed a similar request to the Security Council, and if you took your seat and discovered that the agenda contained no mention of the very request which you had addressed to the Security Council?

31. This is why we are asking you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council, why is it that the agenda does not include this item, the letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic?

32. The PRESIDENT: I believe I have already, at very great length, explained the President's understanding of the situation. As for the communications that have been received from the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel, through their accredited representatives here at the United Nations, it is obvious that these two communications are before the Council and have been distributed to the members. I have already said that they have been distributed, respectively in documents S/8043 and S/8044.

33. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*translated from French*): Mr. President, we are quite sure that when you approved the provisional agenda drafted by the Secretariat, you were indeed intending to include the discussion of the letter from the representative of the United Arab Republic which is the subject of this afternoon's meeting. But now that we have come to the meeting, we see that the item on which the United Arab Republic has requested a discussion does not appear on the provisional agenda prepared by the Secretariat.

34. It is quite clear, of course, that the Security Council, like all United Nations bodies, is master of its procedure and consequently of its agenda. It can alter the agenda with the co-operation of the President or on its own initiative. But, Mr. President, may I remind you that when you telephoned me early this afternoon, you told me that there was a letter from the United Arab Republic requesting an emergency meeting of the Security Council, and I think we agreed that the matter raised by the representative of the United Arab Republic, in the letter he sent you after his telephone call, was a violation of the cease-fire.

35. A few minutes ago we heard the representative of the United States telling us—and this is why I asked to speak—that he agreed with you and the Secretariat that the provisional agenda which the latter had prepared dealt precisely with the questions included in the letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic. Let me turn, then, to the letter sent this afternoon by the representative of the United Arab Republic. What does this letter say? It says that there has been a violation of the cease-fire. It says:

"This latest violation by Israel of the cease-fire is but one of a premeditated series of violations carried out

persistently since the Security Council adopted its resolutions 233 (1967), 234 (1967), 235 (1967) and 236 (1967) on the cease-fire." [S/8043.]

Thus, the United Arab Republic is asking for a discussion on a violation, one specific violation, of the cease-fire, as indeed my colleague from the Soviet Union pointed out a moment ago.

36. Now let us look at the provisional agenda which has been submitted to us today. Item 2 is a letter dated 23 May 1967 when, as you will remember, the aggression had not yet taken place. Item 3 is a letter dated 27 May 1967 from the representative of the United Arab Republic, entitled "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression"—there is no question of a violation—"threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security"; and the aptness of this title was subsequently confirmed by Israel's aggression. Item 4 is the letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security Council. At that time there was no question of a cease-fire, as the aggression had not yet taken place. Item 5, similarly, is a letter dated 9 June 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union, calling for a cessation of military action by Israel. There is no question here, either, of a violation of the cease-fire.

37. In short, in the provisional agenda prepared by the Secretariat and approved by you, Mr. President, there is no question of any violation of the cease-fire, and certainly no question of the particular violation committed this very day. But the United Arab Republic requested that the Council should be convened to consider the violation of the cease-fire which has been committed today. There might, of course, be some reference to other violations in the course of the discussion, but the question before us now is the violation committed today.

38. We note that the letter from the representative of Israel [S/8044] also requests that the question of the violation of the cease-fire should be discussed today.

39. I believe, therefore, that we should take the letter from the United Arab Republic into consideration in the discussion on Israel's violation of the cease-fire, or that this letter should at least be placed within the context of the discussion. But I repeat that, since this letter asks for a discussion on the question of the violation of the cease-fire (which has not hitherto been discussed by the Security Council as an item on its agenda, though it may of course have been discussed in statements by representatives here or in some other context) that is to say, the particular violation committed today which has not yet been discussed, I believe that the letter from the United Arab Republic should, contrary to the views expressed by certain speakers, appear on the agenda as the document requesting that the Security Council should be convened to consider the particular violation of the cease-fire which has been committed today, and even to consider violations of the cease-fire in general. I believe that this could be done quite easily by adding to the agenda a reference to the letter from the United Arab Republic, which has requested that this question should be discussed by the Security Council. I

believe that this could be done at once, and then we could continue our discussion on this question.

40. Mr. TABOR (Denmark): I am sorry that I have to ask for the floor on this procedural matter, Mr. President, but as you have clearly said, in accordance with rule 7 of the provisional rules of procedure you have approved the provisional agenda submitted to you by the Secretary-General, and you have submitted this provisional agenda to the Council for approval. In doing so you stressed that we should consider urgently the question of violation of the cease-fire. I agree that we should consider that urgently and I agree with the provisional agenda you have drawn up.

41. However, objection has been raised to this provisional agenda, in particular because no mention has been made of one of the letters before the Council concerning the violation of the cease-fire. I suppose that the decision of the Council would have to be taken on the basis of the provisional rules of procedure and on the basis of established practice. As far as the provisional rules of procedure are concerned, we read in rule 10:

“Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless the Security Council otherwise decides, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting.”

This is exactly what you have done, Mr. President.

42. As to the practice, I may perhaps draw your attention, Mr. President, and that of the members of the Council to the practice which we followed during the hectic month of June. It may be that I have set a bad precedent. If so, I apologize, but I take the responsibility, together with all the members of the Council.

43. During that month we took a decision calling for a cease-fire. Unfortunately, on several occasions that cease-fire was violated. The Council received several letters in which its attention was drawn to particular violations of the cease-fire, and emergency meetings were called to consider those particular violations. Never were the letters mentioned in the provisional agenda or in the agenda adopted by the Council. No objection was raised. I do not have all the examples before me, but I shall just take one example: a letter dated 10 June 1967 [S/7970] from the Permanent Representative of the USSR, in which he asked for an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the question of “the flagrant violation by Israel of the Security Council’s decisions calling for the cessation of military activities”. If I remember correctly, that letter was not included in the agenda. The agenda was identical with the one we have before us today. No objection was raised to it and we discussed, of course, the question of the violation of the cease-fire. I agree with the representative of the Soviet Union that we have to concentrate on that question, the violation of the cease-fire, as you, Mr. President, so rightly said in your introductory remarks.

44. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker on my list is the representative of the United States.

45. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I do not need to take the floor because the representative of Denmark has stated exactly what I had in mind to say.

46. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, both you and other speakers in their statements have referred to the Security Council’s rules of procedure. This is, of course, a sound practice—to be guided by the provisional rules of procedure in our Council. But, if such references are made, they should be complete and objective, and not partial and subjective.

47. One speaker who has just addressed the Council preferred to mention rule 10. Obviously, this rule is more in line with his own way of thinking. But for some reason he preferred to overlook the very rule to which you referred, Mr. President—namely rule 7. And, since you have referred to this rule, I in turn should like to draw your attention to the fact that the second paragraph of this rule reads as follows:

“Only items which have been brought to the attention of representatives on the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council has previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.”

48. So what is the picture now? The provisional agenda, as it has now been prepared, contains only items mentioned in the last part of the paragraph, the phrase in the last part beginning with the words “or matters which the Security Council has previously decided to defer”. But where are the items which have been brought to our attention? In this particular case, where is the item to which the United Arab Republic has drawn attention, and to which we are drawing attention? Where is this item?

49. If we are to follow the rules of procedure, we must comply strictly with these rules. You have preferred to prepare an agenda based on the last part of the paragraph. But this is not enough, Mr. President. Let us comply with the rules of procedure in their entirety and include the item which is being brought to the Council’s attention now. Accordingly we repeat that the letter dated 8 July [S/8043] from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic should be included in the agenda for the present meeting of the Security Council.

50. Now, Mr. President, with regard to certain references to the past, particularly those made by our colleague Ambassador Tabor, I should like to point out that, when we bring a matter to the attention of the Security Council, we decide which letter should be included in the agenda, and which does not need to be included. And the matter to which our colleague from Denmark is referring was entirely within the context of our meetings; and there was no special need, at least in our view, to include it in the agenda. So this is no reason for referring to earlier practices. It is no reason for transforming a past fact into some kind of precedent in order to support one’s own point of view. Let us decide ourselves when a given request or letter should be included, and when it should not. Each of us has a right to do this.

51. Mr. PARTHASARATHI (India): We have met here on an urgent basis, and it does not behove us to spend time on procedural matters. Procedure is important, and I agree with the representative of the Soviet Union that it sometimes touches the heart of the substance. Nevertheless, at this moment what we need to do urgently is to consider grave violations of the cease-fire imposed by this Council.

52. I would therefore suggest that documents S/8043 and S/8044 be added to our agenda. It is of course understood that we are not trying to move questions from the General Assembly to the Security Council. The Assembly is still discussing the item before it, and consideration here in the Council of violations of the cease-fire should not prejudice the competence of the Assembly.

53. The PRESIDENT: The representative of India has formally moved that the letters from the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Israel contained, respectively, in documents S/8043 and S/8044, should be included in the agenda. Is there any objection to that motion? There being no objection, I declare those two documents inscribed on the agenda.

The agenda, as revised, was adopted.

Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902);

Complaint of the representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security" (S/7907);

Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910);

Letter dated 9 June 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning an item entitled: "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israel forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as the result of an aggression" (S/7967);

Letter dated 8 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8043);

Letter dated 8 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8044)

54. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions previously taken by the Council, I shall now, with the consent of the Council, invite the representatives of Israel, the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan to take places at the Council table, and the

representatives of Lebanon, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Tunisia, Libya and Pakistan to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber in order to participate, without vote, in the Council's discussion.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. G. Rafael (Israel), Mr. M. A. El Kony (United Arab Republic), Mr. G. J. Tomeh (Syria) and Mr. M. H. El-Farra (Jordan) took places at the Council table, and Mr. G. Hakim (Lebanon), Mr. A. Pachachi (Iraq), Mr. A. T. Benhima (Morocco), Mr. J. M. Baroody (Saudi Arabia), Mr. R. Al-Rashid (Kuwait), Mr. M. Mestiri (Tunisia), Mr. W. El Bouri (Libya) and Mr. A. Shahi (Pakistan) took the places reserved for them.

55. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now resume its consideration of the items inscribed on its agenda. Before I call on the first speaker, I give the floor to the Secretary-General, who has expressed the wish to make a statement.

56. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: It is a matter of great regret to me that I am not in a position to provide the members of the Council with the needed information about the reports of a new outbreak of fighting today, 8 July 1967, between the armed forces of Israel and of the United Arab Republic in the Suez Canal sector, information which would be based on observations and investigations by United Nations observers. I was similarly unable to give the Council any information about the previously reported fighting in the Canal sector on 1 July as called to the attention of the Council in the letters asserting violations and breaches of the cease-fire presented by the Permanent Representatives of the United Arab Republic, in document S/8025, and of Israel, in document S/8026. The members of the Council will realize, of course, the reason for my inability to give them such information. As I reported to the Council on 4 July 1967 in document S/7930/Add.19, paragraph 3, no United Nations military observers are stationed in the Suez area, and therefore I receive no verified information about hostile activities there.

57. The Council's resolution adopted on 12 June 1967, resolution 236 (1967), relating exclusively to the cease-fire between Israel and Syria, in its paragraph 5 explicitly invoked the assistance of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and the UNTSO military observers in the implementation of the cease-fire it had demanded. The Council's resolution of 9 June 1967, resolution 235 (1967), also relating to the cease-fire between Israel and Syria, in its paragraph 3 invoked the assistance of the Secretary-General in achieving compliance of the parties with the cease-fire. Unlike those two resolutions, however, the Security Council's general cease-fire resolutions of 6 and 7 June 1967, resolutions 233 (1967) and 234 (1967), which are applicable to the cease-fire between Israel and the United Arab Republic, request the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed about the situation, but make no provision for any assistance with regard to implementation of the cease-fire.

58. Realizing that I could not discharge my reporting responsibility under these latter two resolutions without any means of obtaining reliable information, and, more important, that a cease-fire without any observation or

policing assistance in its implementation is inevitably vulnerable, I decided on 4 July to take an initiative towards a possible alleviation of this situation. On that date I undertook two exploratory talks. In an afternoon meeting with Mr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Deputy Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic, I inquired of him what the reaction of his Government would likely be to a suggestion from me that United Nations military observers might be stationed in the sector of the Suez Canal where there is now confrontation between the armed forces of the United Arab Republic and those of Israel. Such observers, of course, would have to be stationed on both sides, as has been done in the sector where the forces of Israel and Syria are in confrontation. This, I explained, would be especially necessary if the Secretary-General is to be enabled to fulfil his reporting responsibilities under Security Council resolutions 233 (1967) and 234 (1967) of 6 and 7 June 1967. Mr. Fawzi advised me that he would bring this idea to the attention of his Government and obtain their reaction to it. Immediately following the meeting with Mr. Fawzi I had a similar discussion with Foreign Minister Abba Eban of Israel and advanced the same suggestion to him. The Foreign Minister also assured me that he would seek his Government's reaction to this idea.

59. As of now, I have had no word about the reaction of either Government to this suggestion, which I consider to be constructive and helpful in the light of the prevailing circumstances and in the reporting context of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

60. If it should be agreed that United Nations observers should proceed to Sinai and the Suez sector, this could be quickly done, according to information from the Chief of Staff, General Bull, within his present observer strength, but it would be necessary to increase the number of observers available to him at a very early date thereafter.

61. The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank the Secretary-General for his statement. I now call upon the first speaker on my list, the representative of the United Arab Republic.

62. Mr. EL KONY (United Arab Republic): Mr. President, I would like to express to you, and to the members of the Security Council, my thanks for your prompt action in convening an urgent meeting of the Council to act upon the contents of the letter which I have already communicated to you regarding the latest aggression of Israel and its multiple violations of the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council.

63. Before proceeding any further, let me say that I owe you and my colleagues around the Council table an apology for disturbing your weekend; but, as is clear from the letter which I sent you this morning, a grave situation has developed as a result of a premeditated aggression by Israel forces against civilian-populated areas and against United Arab Republic forces on the banks of the Suez Canal.

64. In connexion with the suggestion of our Secretary-General, mentioned just now by him, may I refer the Council to the letter by which I requested this emergency

meeting. This morning, at 10.15, local time, Israel forces again attacked our forces in the southern part of Port Fouad with heavy artillery, and bombarded and destroyed control stations for navigation on the canal at El Tina, Ras El'Ish and El Kap. Moreover, the enemy has opened fire from the eastern bank of the canal on heavily populated areas on the western bank, all along the area between El Kantara and Ras El'Ish.

65. This additional wanton aggression by Israel is indicative in the sense that for the first time since the cease-fire orders of the Security Council, Israel air forces have taken part in the operation and indiscriminately bombarded heavily populated areas, causing human suffering and damage to property, without any provocation whatsoever. Because of the mere fact that the Israel air forces took part in this latest aggression, the Israel authorities can no longer deny that they have violated, as they have previously, the resolutions of the Security Council. Even the representative of Israel cannot this time deny, as he always has done, that they have planned and committed this unprovoked aggression, since his own sources have already freely admitted the participation of Israel Mirage planes in the bombardment of the areas I have mentioned.

66. It should be clear by now that by this action Israel is determined to escalate the military operations in the Middle East, thus increasing tension and contributing to the deterioration of a situation which is already fraught with all the symptoms of a threat to the peace and security of the whole world.

67. 'Basing oneself on the persistent behaviour of Israel, and the volume and scope of its latest violations of the cease-fire orders, one cannot but draw the inevitable conclusion that it is an over-all scheme supported and encouraged by certain Powers which would like to inflame the Middle East to such a point that nobody could really visualize its disastrous and far-reaching impact on international peace and security.

68. The Security Council, which is the principal organ, according to the Charter, responsible for the maintenance of peace and security, cannot condone such aggressive actions of a so-called Member State which claims that its security is imperilled while the truth of the matter is that the security not only of the countries in the Middle East, but even of all other nations as well, would be in real jeopardy if the Israel Government were allowed to continue to challenge this world Organization and to defy international public opinion by its continuous disregard of and disrespect for the various resolutions of this important body.

69. The purpose and intent of the Israel authorities' behaviour do not need, on my part, any elaboration or proof—especially if the members of the Council are cognizant of the policies of the Israel authorities, which are aimed at disturbing international peace. Mr. Eban stated in Tel Aviv: "We are still in the beginning of a struggle and tension must not be relaxed". I am sure that all of us cannot but draw the conclusion that Israel is still determined to carry out its aggressive designs.

70. Such a statement cannot be ignored or overlooked because it reflects the true aim of Israel. That statement is, in our opinion, not an isolated one, but should be taken in conjunction with similar statements and actions by the Israel authorities. They are sufficient to prove that Israel, bent on aggression and expansion and encouraged by certain Western Powers, is trying to implement a very-well-planned scheme for disturbing peace in the area.

71. No one can really suggest that Israel, which professes its peaceful intentions, could alone continue to commit all these aggressions, flouting international public opinion, disregarding the orders of the Security Council and coming out repeatedly and openly with such aggressive and provocative statements, unless there were an unprecedented collusion between Israel and certain Powers which hypocritically are trying to remain disguised. In this respect it is painful to recall the participation of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments in the infamous Israel aggression of 5 June.

72. It is not conceivable that Israel on various occasions could challenge world public opinion unless it was sure that it was acting in consonance with instructions from and in agreement with those same Powers which have acted, visibly and invisibly, in support of Israel during the military operations which started on 5 June 1967 and even after the adoption by the Security Council of the various resolutions on the cease-fire.

73. To illustrate this, it is germane to refresh the memories of the members of the Council by quoting the following statement of Mr. Eban: "If the General Assembly votes with a majority of 121, Israel will not heed world public opinion as represented in the Assembly".

74. In this connexion, no one can logically argue that Israel was not encouraged by the United States even to flout the unanimous decision of the General Assembly at its fifth emergency special session regarding Jerusalem. Not only that, but the Council may recall that, at that special session, even after the representative of Trinidad and Tobago, on behalf of the sponsors of the Latin-American draft resolution, had made it clear that Israel should withdraw promptly from all areas it occupied, including Gaza, Israel's Defence Minister reacted by declaring the annexation of the Gaza Strip to Israel.

75. All these acts, violations and provocations are real testimony as to the aggressive policies of Israel and its supporters which, since 1948, have been pampering Israel and encouraging it to impinge on the security and sovereignty of the Arab countries.

76. The recent violation by Israel is a new and serious act of aggression. The Security Council cannot and should not condone such violations of its decisions. The Security Council is duty bound to call upon the Israel authorities, who are continuously acting in the most provocative and unscrupulous way, to refrain from those unlawful acts. The Security Council and its members are under an obligation to see to it that Israel should not further disturb a peace which is already torn by the very action of a Government which claims it has peaceful intentions.

77. It may be that Israel has interpreted the most unfortunate inaction of the General Assembly in checking the aggression and condemning the aggressor as an open invitation for it to continue to disregard all ethics of international behaviour. It would be most unfortunate, indeed, if the United Nations, either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council, were not able to take serious and decisive action against the aggressor who, because of his ruthless behaviour and the support of certain Western Governments, above all the United States, is endangering the very existence of this world Organization as an effective instrument for establishing and maintaining international order.

78. For the preceding reasons, I feel that it is incumbent upon me to draw the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation resulting from the Israel aggression, with which we hope the Council will cope unhesitatingly, in condemning Israel and calling upon it to desist from further provocation and aggression.

79. The Council should not, in our opinion, adjourn before coming to a conclusive decision dealing once and for all with the repeated violations by Israel of the various resolutions of the Security Council on the cease-fire, and in particular Security Council resolutions 236 (1967).

80. It is abundantly clear that as long as Israel armed forces occupy the territories of Arab countries, there are bound to be such violations of the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council as have taken place in the last twenty-four hours and before. In this connexion, and by way of precaution, I ask leave to mention to the Council the not unprecedented possibility of Israel claiming that it was the United Arab Republic which perpetrated those actions. This, I beg to repeat, I am mentioning by way of precaution.

81. I am sure that members of the Council are all aware that time is passing and running short, and the situation in the Middle East cannot sustain any further disequilibrium resulting from further aggressions on the part of Israel and its supporters. I have no doubt that the world at large is watching the Security Council and is expecting prompt action against the aggressor, who has shown complete disregard for the Council, the Charter of the United Nations and world public opinion.

82. The PRESIDENT: I call on the next speaker on my list, the representative of Israel.

83. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel): May I first take the opportunity of expressing a word of sincere appreciation to Ambassador Tabor, last month's President, who carried such a heavy burden. He guided the discussions, in which my Government was vitally interested and concerned, with exemplary firmness and *souplesse*, and with impartiality and open-mindedness.

84. At the same time, I wish to extend the best wishes of my delegation to Ambassador Makonnen, this month's President, whose diplomatic experience, skill and distinction assure the best possible direction of our deliberations.

85. I wish to express my particular appreciation to you, Mr. President, for acting so expeditiously upon the request of my Government to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

86. A chain of incidents which have occurred along the Israel-Egyptian cease-fire line in the course of this week causes grave concern to my Government. More than forty Israel soldiers have been killed or wounded as a result of these incidents. These incidents also constitute a threat to the cease-fire established by the Security Council and agreed to by both Israel and the United Arab Republic.

87. Let me say at the outset that it is the policy of the Government of Israel not only to preserve the cease-fire but to do its best to see it reinforced. But from the repeated armed attacks carried out by the military forces of the United Arab Republic during the past week, it appears that the Government of the United Arab Republic, for reasons of its own, is set on eroding the cease-fire away. This seems to be another round in Egypt's old established policy of belligerency, adapted to the new circumstances. Accompanying these armed attacks there have been a number of strident and bellicose statements announcing that the hostilities are not terminated, but are to be continued.

88. The representative of the United Arab Republic referred to a statement made by Foreign Minister Eban. I want to set his mind at peace. Mr. Eban referred to the political struggle whose aim is to achieve a lasting peace. In this effort, we shall not relax.

89. Let me recall briefly the sequence of events of the last week. The incidents in this area started on 1 July 1967, when, at about midday, an Egyptian force of approximately company-strength was found to have crossed the Suez Canal near Ras El'Ish, approximately fifteen kilometres—ten miles—south of Port Said, and to have penetrated the Israel cease-fire positions in Sinai. The force was equipped with half-track armoured vehicles.

90. During the course of the afternoon of the same day, two boats, carrying reinforcements of troops and weapons, were seen crossing the canal at that point.

91. No Egyptian forces were in that area at the end of the fighting, when the cease-fire was accepted.

92. At approximately 1900 hours, the United Arab Republic unit opened mortar fire on Israel forces in the vicinity, which took action to defend themselves and to prevent any further penetration behind their positions. This incident was reported by me to the Security Council in my letter of the same day [S/8026]. The incident itself was concluded when, at midnight of the same day, the Egyptian force was driven back to the west bank of the canal, leaving behind five 82-mm mortars, a number of machine-guns, a recoilless gun, and communications equipment. As a result of that incident, seven Israel soldiers were wounded.

93. It was subsequently established that Commando Battalion No. 503 had crossed the Suez Canal on the night of 30 June-1 July and secured a bridgehead on the east bank of the canal in the area of Ras El'Ish.

94. On 2 July, the next day, the incidents in the same area were repeated. At 0455 hours local time, mortar and direct-trajectory fire was opened by United Arab Republic forces stationed on the west bank of the Suez at approximately one kilometre north of El Kantara. Fire was returned, and the Egyptian fire ceased.

95. At 1315 hours, Egyptian fire was resumed near El Kantara, when 120-mm mortars shelled the Israel forces. Fire continued for fifteen minutes until 1330 hours.

96. At 1400 hours, 120-mm mortar fire was resumed against Israel forces at El Kantara, and later, when Israel forces were in the area of Ras El'Ish, by mortars and by tanks. Fire was returned, and the Egyptian fire ceased at 1445 hours, local time.

97. On 3 July 1967, at 0535 hours, and again at 0730 hours, the Egyptian army opened fire with mortars and machine-guns on Israel forces north of El Kantara. In both incidents, fire was returned, and the exchange of fire continued for a short while.

98. Now, all was quiet along the Suez line for four days, until this morning, when Egyptian forces again abruptly broke the cease-fire. This is what happened this morning:

99. At approximately 0925 hours, local time this morning, fire was opened by United Arab Republic forces on Israel troops stationed in the area of Ras El'Ish, some fifteen kilometres south of Port Said. In addition to artillery shelling, other direct-trajectory weapons, mainly recoilless guns, were used from gun emplacements in the area of Port Said and Port Fouad. Fire was returned. The exchange of fire continued until 1130 hours.

100. At 1130 hours, the United Arab Republic forces directed fire on Israel troops at El Kantara, and thus extended the area of the incident.

101. Following that, a United Arab Republic armoured column moved from Port Said in a southerly direction on the west bank of the Suez Canal and opened fire on Israel troops on the east bank of the canal—mainly mortar fire. As a result, more heavy casualties were caused to the Israel forces, bringing the total at the end of the day to five killed and thirty-one wounded.

102. In order to repel these continuing attacks and to protect the safety of the Israel troops, a limited number of Israel planes took action against the Egyptian gun positions, which included naval guns outside Port Said from which fire had been directed against the Israel troops.

103. Egyptian fire continued intermittently, especially in the area of Ras El'Ish, until 1500 hours. At 1540 hours, Egyptian fire was resumed at Ras El'Ish; and, at 1545, at El Kantara. Fire ceased in the area of the incidents at approximately 1815 hours, local time.

104. The version of events which we have heard from the representative of the United Arab Republic is, to say the least, remote from the facts. On none of these occasions did Israel forces take any initiative to break the cease-fire. In no

instance were the Israel forces the first to open fire. The Israel forces went into action only in response to the armed attacks of the United Arab Republic forces and after their cease-fire positions were threatened, and when the safety of the Israel forces was endangered.

105. The topographical features of the area in which the Egyptian forces chose to launch their attacks are decisively advantageous to them. They permit them to concentrate heavy artillery fire against Israel forces, which are prevented by the general lay of the land from replying effectively with ground weapons.

106. After the Israel forces had been exposed to such an artillery barrage for many hours and had suffered heavy casualties, there was no alternative to sending aircraft against these gun positions. The few aircraft which carried out that mission were under the strictest orders to avoid all non-military targets and to limit their action to those specified gun positions from which fire was being directed against the Israel forces. These orders were fully complied with.

107. It seems clear that today's events had been carefully planned by the Egyptian authorities. The area had been quiet for several days and nothing whatsoever had occurred to prompt this violent Egyptian military action. It is significant that the Egyptian bombardments today were more intensive and concentrated than before. The fact that long-range guns stationed near Port Said were brought into action shows that today's action was planned on a more extensive scale. Today's action and the incidents which preceded it give us reason to believe that Egypt has not changed its policy of belligerency and is still carrying it out by initiating armed action despite its acceptance of the cease-fire. The continuation of this belligerent policy and practice has, of course, ominous implications.

108. As I said at the beginning of my statement, my Government is anxious to see the cease-fire faithfully maintained and strictly observed. We hope that the United Arab Republic has similar intentions. My Government shares the desire of the Council that the cease-fire instituted by the Security Council should be effective. I can assure the members of the Council that Israel will continue to co-operate with the Council to that end.

109. Mr. KEITA (Mali) (*translated from French*): After hearing the statements which have just been made, my delegation believes that it might be useful for the Council to suspend its debate for half an hour in order that we could consult one another as to how to proceed. Therefore, under rule 33 (1), of the provisional rules of procedure, I

would propose that the meeting be suspended for half an hour.

110. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Mali has proposed a suspension of this meeting for half an hour under rule 33 of the provisional rules of procedure. This rule, in its last paragraph, provides that "Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate". Since the Council appears to be agreeable to this proposal by the representative of Mali, the meeting is suspended until 8.45 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 8.15 p.m. and resumed at 9 p.m.

111. The PRESIDENT: Since I have no more speakers for tonight, and on the basis of the consultations that have been going on during the past half-hour, I should like to propose that we now adjourn this meeting until 4.30 tomorrow afternoon.

112. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): We have no intention of opposing your suggestion that the Security Council should continue its work tomorrow, Sunday, at 4.30 p.m. We merely wish, with all the respect, to draw your attention to the fact that we are not concluding our work now because there are no more representatives wishing to speak at the present time, but because you have been kind enough to hold consultations, and as a result of these consultations an understanding has been reached that we should conclude our work now and continue it tomorrow at 4.30 p.m.

113. The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank the representative of the Soviet Union for the clarification he has made. As a matter of fact, I said that there were no speakers for tonight; I did not say that there were no speakers at all. A number of speakers who had inscribed their names to speak tonight have agreed to speak when the Council meets again. I had thought that the expression I used that there were "no more speakers for tonight" would cover the point that the representative of the Soviet Union has sought to clarify, but I thank him, all the same, for the clarification he has made.

114. As I hear no objection to the proposal I have made for adjournment until tomorrow at 4.30 p.m., I shall take it that this is acceptable to the Council and adjourn this meeting accordingly.

The meeting rose at 9.5 p.m.