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**Plan for the implementation of relevant parts of section C
of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)**

Report of the Secretary-General**Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991. In paragraph 9 (b) of that resolution, the Council decided that the Secretary-General, within 45 days of the adoption of the resolution, should develop and submit to it for approval a plan calling for the completion of the tasks enumerated in paragraphs 9 (b) (i to iii) and 10.

2. For the purpose of developing this plan, consultations were held with appropriate Governments, as called for in paragraphs 9 (b) and 13 of the resolution, and, where appropriate, with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO). Furthermore, in order to assess the information submitted by the Government of Iraq and to assist in developing the plan for the implementation of the tasks enumerated in section C of the resolution, I set up a Special Commission as described in my report of 18 April 1991 to the Security Council (S/22508), which the Council accepted on 19 April.

3. I appointed 21 experts as members of the Special Commission. I have requested Ambassador Rolf Ekéus (Sweden) to serve as its Executive Chairman and Dr. Robert Gallucci (United States of America) to serve as its Deputy Executive Chairman. The other members of the Special Commission are as follows: Dr. Paal Aas (Norway), Lieutenant General (ret.) Ken Adachi (Japan), Professor B. N. C. Agu (Nigeria), Lieutenant Colonel Andrzej Badek (Poland), Professor Bryan C. Barraas (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Mr. Peter von Butler (Germany), Colonel Armando Caputo (Italy), Mr. Ronald Cleminaon (Canada), Dr. John Gee (Australia), Professor Helmut Hönig (Austria), Mr. B. A. Kuvshinnikov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Dr. A. J. J. Ooms (Netherlands), Dr. Marjatta Rautio (Finland),

Mr. Michel Saint Mieux (France), Mr. Roberto Sanchez (Venezuela), Lieutenant Colonel B. Simandjuntak (Indonesia), Dr. Miroslav Splino (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Emile Vanden Benden (Belgium), Dr. Yuan Renfeng (China).

4. In order to enable the Special Commission as well as IAEA to discharge their responsibilities properly, a number of technical arrangements are being made to facilitate their work. They include the establishment of a field operations office and a support office. After consultations with the Governments concerned, the Field Operations Office is being set up in Bahrain. The Office will become fully operational by the end of May 1991. The Support Office is being established at Baghdad, Iraq.

1. THE PLAN

5. The provisions of section C of resolution 687 (1991) lend themselves to a three-stage implementation procedure: gathering and assessment of information) disposal of weapons and facilities and all other items specified in paragraphs 8 and 12 of resolution 687 (1991); and monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance in the future.

A. Gathering and assessment of information

6. The first stage of the plan is of crucial importance for the success of the entire operation. It requires input from both the Iraqi Government and the Special Commission. Pursuant to paragraphs 9 (a) and 12, Iraq is responsible for the submission, within fifteen days of the adoption of the resolution, of information on the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraphs 8 and 12, which are to be destroyed, removed or rendered harmless. The Special Commission, pursuant to paragraphs 9 (b) (i) and 13, is responsible for designating any additional locations of these items in Iraq. In carrying out the immediate on-site inspections envisaged in paragraphs 9 (b) (i) and 13 of the resolution, the Special Commission and IAEA respectively must retain the right to choose the timing and locations of the inspection.

7. On 18 and 28 April and 4 May 1991, the Government of Iraq forwarded to the Secretary-General information relating to its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles. On 18 April, the Government of Iraq also forwarded to the Director General of IAEA information of relevance to the responsibilities entrusted to the Agency as stated in paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991). Further information was communicated to the Agency on 27 April. In communications both to the Secretary-General and the Director General, the Government of Iraq also conveyed its acceptance of on-site inspections as called for in paragraphs 9 (a) and 12. There has also been a continued exchange of communications between the Special Commission and the Government of Iraq with a view to obtaining additional information and clarifications.

8. Based on the information received so far from the Iraqi authorities, as well as taking into account additional locations designated by the Special Commission, the process of on-site inspections by the Special Commission and IAEA has been initiated. In the course of the inspections, the Special Commission will check the information that has been gathered earlier against the actual situation in the field (i.e. establishing a database); assess the magnitude of the task of disposal of weapons and facilities that it will perform in the second stage of the plan; and determine, with the advice of WHO, the requirements and modalities for carrying it out. The Special Commission is also rendering assistance and cooperation to the Director General of IAEA in connection with on-site inspections for which the Agency is responsible.

9. The on-site inspections to be carried out by both the Special Commission and IAEA cover a large number of sites with different numbers of facilities at each site. For the purpose of ensuring safe access to sites subject to the measures specified in paragraphs 9 (b), 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991), teams of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) experts, construction engineers and security personnel have been engaged to assist the Special Commission and IAEA in the process of carrying out the on-site inspections. The safety of all such personnel is a major consideration. Detailed arrangements covering these and related aspects and governing the precise modalities for carrying out the inspections are embodied in an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Iraq. The volume of work as well as the physical state of the various objects, installations and facilities subject to inspection, and the paramount concern regarding the safety of the inspection teams and the local population, make it difficult to establish, at the present stage, the exact time-frame within which the first stage can be concluded. Early assessments of the tasks involved make it possible, nevertheless, to outline the general framework of the second stage of the plan, which is described below.

B. Disposal of weapons and facilities

10. The main purpose of the second stage of the plan, as specified in paragraphs 8, 9 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991), is to dispose of weapons, facilities and all other items specified in paragraphs 8 and 12 of the resolution. Owing to the highly different nature of the weapons, material and facilities involved, separate procedures are envisaged for their actual disposal, with different teams of experts carrying them out.

11. Regarding chemical weapons and biological weapons-related items and facilities, technical modalities are being worked out with a view to ensuring the complete and safe yielding of possession by Iraq of all items referred to in paragraph 8 (a) of the resolution, for their subsequent destruction, removal or rendering them harmless. Regarding ballistic missiles, procedures

for the identification and securing of all items referred to in paragraph 8 (b) of the **resolution** are being developed with a view to ensuring the supervision of their complete destruction by Iraq. The Special Commission will further assist and cooperate with IAEA in carrying out inspections **and** in the destruction, ~~removal~~ or rendering **harmless** of all items referred to in paragraph 12 of the **resolution**.

12. **As far** as the disposal process itself is concerned, Iraq will destroy, under the supervision of the Special Commission, all its missile capabilities, including **launchers**, as specified under paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 687 (1991). The Special Commission and IAEA respectively, with appropriate Iraqi assistance, will dispose of all other items specified under paragraphs 8 (a) and 12 of the **same** resolution, including missile warheads fitted with **chemical** warfare agents. It should be noted that under the resolution **the** Special Commission has the authority to **conduct activities** related to inspection, yielding and disposal of the **items specified** in paragraph 8 (a) of the **resolution** and the inspection and disposal of the **items specified** in paragraph 8 (b) of the **resolution** after the expiration of the **45-day** period that **follows** the approval of this plan, if such activities have not been completed.

1. **Ballistic** missiles

13. The **disposal** of **ballistic** missiles and related **items** and facilities raises a relatively smaller number of **problems** as compared to other types of weapons and facilities. In principle, their **disposal** should not pose **any danger** to public safety as it involves a largely mechanical **operation**. Consequently, **the** disposal of **missiles** and related **major** parts including launchers will **be** carried out in **situ** and, if possible, it will be done concomitantly with **the** initial on-site inspection process. Those items not disposed of immediately will be secured, sealed and appropriately documented **for** later disposal. **Furthermore**, items such as warheads and fuel might **be** moved to a special destruction location or facility and disposed of **there**.

14. **As** regards repair and production facilities, **many of them** appear **no** longer **operational** as a **result** of the hostilities. The Special Commission will ascertain the extent to which **these** facilities are permanently affected, with a view to **determining** what **other** steps, if **any**, are necessary to **comply** with paragraph 9 (b) (ii) of the resolution.

15. In order to carry out **the responsibilities** regarding this category of weapons and **related** facilities, the Special Commission will require individuals **with** expertise in such fields as launching and guidance **systems**, **propellants** and warheads. Teams of experts will be needed to conduct both the on-site inspections **and** the supervision of **the** disposal process. The **number** of teams and **their exact** composition is **currently** under study.

2. Chemical weapons

16. **As regards chemical weapons**, in view of the practical problems inherent in their destruction, including possible **safety and environmental hazards**, the Special Commission, in consultation with WHO, **has focused its** attention on determining the best methods **for their disposal**. **Taking into account** the paramount importance of maintaining acceptable **safety standards for** the disposal teams and **for the** local population, the Special Commission will identify and evaluate safe destruction techniques that could be made operable within stringent time-frames.

17. Given **the** danger chemical weapons represent, **their** disposal will be initiated **only after** thorough on-site inspection and assessment of the conditions of **stocks** and facilities. In this connection, the Special Commission **has** requested the inspection teams to mark munitions and relevant facilities, to the extent possible, with **tamper-indicating** devices. In addition, the Special Commission foresees monitoring, between the time of the **inspections and the disposal process**, by inspectors at **relevant** locations.

18. The disposal methods will involve neutralisation and/or incineration. Movement of chemical weapons and agents will be minimised. **In this connection** the Special Commission is investigating the use of transportable or mobile destruction equipment. The Special Commission may also consider the possibility of the construction of a destruction facility which would **have** greater capacity than that offered by transportable or mobile equipment. In this and **other** options the question of costs will need to be kept under review.

19. **As regards** research, development, support and manufacturing facilities in connection with chemical weapons, information **available** to the Special Commission at present suggests that a number of them may have been destroyed as a result of the hostilities. Upon establishing firm data the Special **Commission** will determine its **requirements**, both in terms of equipment and human **resources**, for complying with **provisions** of paragraph 9 (b) of resolution 687 (1991).

3. Biological weapons

20. In the area of biological weapons, it is noted that, **in accordance with** paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq **has become a party** to the Convention **on** the Prohibition of the Development, **Production and** Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. **1/** The Government of Iraq deposited, on 8 April, its instrument of ratification in Moscow.

21. However, as required by the Security **Council** in its resolution 687 (1991), the Special Commission **is seeking** to determine whether Iraq possesses any biological weapons-related items that should **be** disposed of pursuant to the resolution and whether there remains in Iraq a capability to produce such weapons that would also be subject to **disposal**. **In this context**,

the Special Commission has brought to the attention of the Government of Iraq the report of the Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention held at Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987 and contained in document BWC/CONF.II/EX/2 of 21 April 1987 and has requested the information called for in section II of that report.

22. Biological warfare agents can be destroyed through either standard laboratory equipment or special mobile units.

4. Nuclear weapons-related items

23. In the area of nuclear-weapons-usable material and related items and facilities, the Special Commission will assist IAEA in the removal of weapons-usable material from Iraq and in the disposal of all other relevant items and facilities covered by resolution 687 (1991), by removal or destruction as appropriate.

24. An inspection team, composed of experts from IAEA and the Special Commission, is currently in Iraq to carry out a first inspection based on declarations by the Government of Iraq and the designation by the Special Commission of additional locations. Further inspections will follow prior to the disposal of weapons-usable-material and other items subject to paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991).

C. Monitoring and verification of compliance

25. The third stage of the plan represents a long-term operation. Its main purpose is to ensure ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 12 of resolution 687 (1991). A detailed plan as called for in paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991), will be submitted to the Security Council for its approval, subsequent to the establishment of a complete database. In developing the plan, the Special Commission will also take into account the provisions for permitted activities in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention and by the monitoring/verification methods under discussion in the context of a future Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. With the eventual entry into force of such a Convention, the inspectorate envisaged in it should at an appropriate time take over the function of monitoring and verification of compliance in the area of chemical weapons.

26. The verification will be conducted through full and effective on-site inspections including those on short notice. The inspections will cover, as appropriate, military bases, production facilities and storage, as well as research facilities and laboratories. The frequency of on-site inspections will vary considerably for each category of weapons, facilities and activities in question. It will be contingent on previous findings and also on Iraq's clear and continuous demonstration of compliance with resolution 687 (1991).

II. GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

27. The Special **Commission**, under the guidance of **its Executive** Chairman, will use a small staff at United Nations Headquarters **in** New York to prepare detailed plans for field operations in Iraq with regard to all **items** related to **chemical** and biological weapons and to ballistic missiles, and together with IAEA with regard **to** items related to nuclear weapons and **nuclear-weapons-usable** materials. The plans will describe the composition of **teams of** experts, drawn from **a number of countries**, and their movements and activities in Iraq - whether **survey**, inspection or disposal. The teams will assemble **for** briefing at the field office in **Bahrain** and move by dedicated aircraft **to** Baghdad or some other point-of-entry **in** Iraq. Vehicles or **rotary-winged aircraft** will be used to move the teams within Iraq to the sites concerned. Teams will leave the area via Bahrain following debriefing and initial analysis of **any** samples or data collected **in** Iraq.

Notes

1/ General **Assembly** resolution 2826 (XXVI).
