



## Security Council

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS  
INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

( for the period 25 July 1987-22 January 1988 )

Introduction

1. In its resolution 599 (1987) of 31 July 1987, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further interim period of six months, until 31 January 1988. The Council also reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; re-emphasized the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1976, approved by resolution 426 (1978), and called upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate; and reiterated that UNIFIL should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Council thereon.

2. On 5 October 1987, I submitted to the Security Council a special report following two grave incidents which resulted in the death of two members of the Nepalese contingent of UNIFIL (S/19175 and Corr.1). On 24 November, I wrote to the President of the Security Council in pursuance of a request that I provide information on the question of Israeli encroachment on the Israel-Lebanon border (S/19318).

Organization of the Force

3. As of January 1988, the composition of UNIFIL was as follows:

Military personnel

Fiji	HQ UNIFIL	7	
	Infantry battalion	625	
	Force mobile reserve	27	
	Military police	9	668

Finland	HQ UNIFIL	17	
	Infantry battalion	511	
	Force mobile reserve	15	
	Military police	<u>8</u>	551
France	HQ UNIFIL	26	
	Composite battalion		
	(maintenance company, defence company, armoured escort company)	469	
	Military police	<u>10</u>	505
Ghana	HQ UNIFIL	41	
	Infantry battalion	822	
	Force mobile reserve	21	
	Military police	<u>7</u>	891
Ireland	HQ UNIFIL	13	
	Infantry battalion	650	
	Force mobile reserve	17	
	HQ Camp Command	55	
	Military police	<u>12</u>	747
Italy	HQ UNIFIL	4	
	Helicopter unit	<u>47</u>	51
Nepal	HQ UNIFIL	19	
	Infantry battalion	797	
	Force mobile reserve	28	
	Military police	<u>5</u>	849
Norway	HQ UNIFIL	33	
	Infantry battalion	673	
	Force mobile reserve	27	
	Maintenance company	167	
	Military police	<u>15</u>	915
Sweden	HQ UNIFIL	16	
	Logistic battalion	605	
	Force mobile reserve	5	
	Military police	<u>8</u>	634
TOTAL UNIFIL			<u>5 811</u>

The deployment Of UNIFIL as of January 1988 is shown on the annexed map, which has been revised to reflect more accurately the situation in the UNIFIL area (it should be noted that areas under Israeli control north of the UNIFIL area are not shown).

4. In addition to the above personnel, UNIFIL was assisted by 79 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). They

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manned the five observation posts **along** the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line and a post at **Château de Beaufort**. They also operated eight mobile **teams in** the area of operation. These unarmed **officers are organized as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL)** and are under the operational control of the Commander of UNIFIL, Major-General Gustav **Hägglund**.

5. **The Lebanese army** unit serving with UNIFIL maintained a strength of 128 all **ranks**. The **bulk** of the unit **was** stationed at Tyre and small elements **Were** stationed at **Arzun, Al Yatun and Qana**.

6. Logistic support for UNIFIL was provided **by the Swedish logistic** battalion, elements of the French composite battalion, the Norwegian maintenance **company and the Italian helicopter unit, as well as** certain civilian sections (**notably those** responsible for **communications** and vehicle maintenance). The **Ghanaian engineer company was incorporated** in the **Ghanaian infantry battalion**. During the period covered by the present report, the **Government** of France carried **out** its decision (**see S/18990, para. 5**) to withdraw the **explosive** ordnance detachment which formed part of the French composite battalion and was responsible for **mine clearing** and defusing or destroying explosive devices **and ordnance**. Regrettably, my efforts to obtain a replacement for this important unit have so far not been successful. I **have** therefore asked the Governments **contributing** troops to the Force to strengthen the capacity of their units to deal with explosives, since mines, unexploded ammunition and other explosives continue to be a **danger** to UNIFIL personnel as well as to the civilian population in the **area**.

7. During the reporting period, UNIFIL continued to **give high** priority to the **programme** of security measures that **was** initiated in September 1986. Much of this effort was concentrated in the Nepalese battalion sector in order **to** improve the security of positions **that** came frequently under fire. The **Force Mobile Reserve, a composite mechanized company comprising** elements from seven **contingents** (Fiji, Finland, **Ghana**, Ireland, Nepal, Norway and Sweden) functioned effectively **as** an integrated unit and **was** deployed during periods of tension and used for special tasks. Efforts continue to arrange for **the** provision of **the** six remaining **armoured** vehicles required for the **unit**.

8. In July 1987, I reported that UNIFIL was having difficulty in obtaining the land and buildings it needed because payment of the rents, for which **the Lebanese authorities** are responsible, had not **been** made since 1984 (**see S/18990, para. 7**). In August, Lebanese officials surveyed the properties concerned to determine **the** level of remuneration. In **December**, the Lebanese **Chamber** of Deputies allocated funds **for** this purpose and it is hoped that **these** funds will be disbursed without further delay.

9. During the period under review, seven members of the **Force** lost their lives. These included two **Nepalese** soldiers killed **by** hostile firing (**see paras. 12 and 17** below) and two French, one Irish, one Nepalese and **one Swedish soldier** who died **as** a result of accidents or from other causes. In addition, an Australian military observer from **UNTSO** assigned to OGL was killed by a **mine and a** Canadian observer was severely injured in the same incident (**see para. 18** below). Furthermore, 11 soldiers were wounded by hostile action. Since the establishment of UNIFIL,

151 members of the Force have died, 60 of them as a result of firing and mine or bomb explosions, 63 in accidents and 28 from other causes. More than 200 have been wounded by firing and mine or bomb explosions.

#### Situation in the UNIFIL area

10. The situation in the UNIFIL area remained essentially unchanged. Israel continued to maintain in southern Lebanon its "security zone", which is manned by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and the so-called "South Lebanon Army" (SLA). The boundaries of the "security zone" have not been defined but are in effect determined by the forward positions of IDF and SLA. The "security zone" includes the area adjacent to the international border, parts of the Nepalese, Irish and Finnish battalion sectors, the entire Norwegian battalion sector and sizeable areas to the north of the UNIFIL area of operation. Within the UNIFIL area, IDF and SLA maintained a total of 57 positions, 15 of which were located within the battalion sectors. Of these, 14 were manned permanently. During the reporting period, three IDF/SLA positions were closed in the Nepalese battalion sector and one was closed in the Finnish battalion sector. Those IDF/SLA positions which lie within the area of operation are indicated on the annexed map.

11. Armed resistance groups continued to launch frequent operations against IDF and SLA using small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, rockets and mortars, as well as mines and roadside bombs. UNIFIL recorded 20 such operations in August, 10 in September, 12 in October, 5 in November, 13 in December 1987 and 9 in the first half of January 1988 against positions located within its area of deployment. Many more operations were reported from those parts of the "security zone" where UNIFIL is not deployed. In the UNIFIL area, most of the resistance operations remained limited in scope and involved mainly the use of mines or bombs and firing at IDF/SLA positions. However, in two cases, attacks were carried out by armed elements estimated to number up to 200 men (see paras. 12 and 14 below).

12. Until the middle of October, most of the resistance operations in the UNIFIL area were directed against two adjacent SLA positions on Tallet Hugban which overlook the villages of Kafra and Yatar in the Nepalese battalion sector. On numerous instances the personnel in those positions fired at civilian as well as UNIFIL targets within their range. During the second half of August, 13 women and children were injured by unprovoked firing from those positions. In some instances local armed elements retaliated, notably on 29 August when an estimated 200 armed elements infiltrated the area and attacked the positions on Tallet Hugban with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns. This attack followed the wounding of a woman and six children by unprovoked SLA fire in two separate incidents the previous day. IDF/SLA responded with artillery, tanks, heavy mortars and helicopter gunships, and the exchange of fire between both sides lasted several hours. On 4 October, a Nepalese soldier was killed by firing from Tallet Hugban (see S/19175, para. 3).

13. On 14 October, IDF/SLA evacuated the two positions on Tallet Hugban and UNIFIL occupied one of them. The other position, which had been heavily mined by IDF, was left vacant. For a few days there was tension between local groups as they tried

to gain control of that position. One group made an attempt to enter the position but failed. Since then, the sector has remained quiet and an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 persons have returned to their homes in Kafra and Yatar. UNIFIL assisted their return and helped to repair an electric power line and a large water reservoir serving 24 villages which had been damaged in the fighting.

14. After the departure of IDF/SLA from Tallet Huqban, the focus of the resistance attacks in the UNIFIL area shifted to the IDF/SLA positions in the Irish battalion sector. In the early hours of 4 November, an estimated 130 armed elements launched a co-ordinated attack on the SLA position south of Brashit and occupied it temporarily.

15. IDF/SLA continued to fire frequently from their positions or when on patrol. When attacked, they generally responded with heavy artillery, tank and mortar shelling; helicopter gunships were also employed. After the large attack mentioned in the preceding paragraph, such firing increased significantly in the Irish battalion sector, including firing into nearby villages, usually as retaliation to attacks by armed elements. At the same time, firing by IDF/SLA at or near UNIFIL positions increased also in that sector. In some cases, this happened when IDF/SLA were responding to attacks by armed elements, but the firing was also frequently unprovoked and, apparently, deliberate. During the period under review, UNIFIL protested about some 300 unprovoked firings to the Israeli military authorities.

16. The Norwegian battalion sector had in the past been generally quiet except for occasional friction between IDF/SLA and UNIFIL. The area offers few targets for attacks by armed resistance groups, since the four IDF positions in the sector are on its fringes, three of them on Mount Hermon close to the border between Lebanon and Syrian territory occupied by Israel. Although the sector is entirely within the "security zone", it was seldom patrolled by IDF, which furthermore did not challenge the UNIFIL policy of preventing independent SLA patrols. At the beginning of August, the situation changed: IDF asserted its intention to operate in the sector as elsewhere in the area under its control, and SLA personnel increasingly objected to the controls at UNIFIL checkpoints and started to harass UNIFIL positions. As a result, there were a number of incidents, including the shelling of a Norwegian patrol by an IDF tank on 3 August, and the forced entry into UNIFIL positions of SLA personnel on 28 and 29 August and on 19 November. The latter incident arose from an altercation at checkpoint 4-S during which the Norwegian sentries fired at a vehicle, slightly injuring one of the passengers. The incident was defused after contacts with IDF.

17. There were also a number of incidents between UNIFIL and armed elements. The most serious of these occurred on 25 August when a Nepalese soldier was killed and three others were wounded in an ambush by unidentified assailants west of Kafra (see S/19175, para. 2). On 32 occasions during the reporting period, unidentified armed elements fired at or close to UNIFIL positions.

18. Another serious incident occurred on 12 January 1988, when a vehicle occupied by two military observers of OGL on patrol west of the village of Shama, in the "security zone", hit a land mine. One of the observers, an Australian captain, was killed and the second member of the team, a Canadian major, was seriously injured.

19. As a result of the continuing decline of the Lebanese economy, there has been an increase in attempts to steal goods from UNIFIL. In several cases, UNIFIL sentries had to fire warning shots to repel persons trying to enter a position. On 4 September, a number of armed persons entered checkpoint 5-13. There was an exchange of fire, during which a Nepalese sentry was injured. The assailants managed to take a number of items which were, however, recovered by Amal and returned to UNIFIL.

20. UNIFIL continued to co-operate with the Lebanese authorities, United Nations agencies and programmes, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations in extending humanitarian assistance to the local population. In addition, troop-contributing Governments funded assistance to medical and welfare institutions and schools in the respective battalion sectors. As before, a large number of Lebanese civilians were treated at UNIFIL medical centres and some 3,000 were treated at the UNIFIL hospital at Naqoura, including more than 250 in-patients.

#### Financial aspects

21. By its resolution 42/223 of 12 December 1987, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNIFIL at a rate not to exceed \$11,765,000 gross (\$11,618,000 net) per month for the 12-month period beginning 1 February 1988, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the period of six months authorized under its resolution 599 (1987). Should the Council decide to extend UNIFIL beyond its current mandate period, the costs to the United Nations for maintaining the Force during the extension period will be within the commitment authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 42/223, assuming a maximum force strength of 5,850 and continuance of its existing responsibilities.

22. In paragraph 24 of my report of 24 July 1987 (S/18990), I drew to the Council's attention the serious financial situation faced by the Force. I regret to have to report that the situation has not changed and, in fact, has continued to deteriorate. UNIFIL has always encountered difficulty in meeting its expenses, particularly as regards the reimbursement of troop costs at the full rate set by the General Assembly. This has been due to a shortfall in the UNIFIL Special Account resulting from the non-payment of assessed contributions, in whole or in part, by certain Member States. As at 31 December 1987, outstanding contributions to the UNIFIL Special Account from various Member States totalling \$311.8 million remained unpaid. Consequently, reimbursement to the troop-contributing Governments has continued at the reduced rate of \$600 per person per month.

#### Observations

23. Once again, I have to report to the Security Council that, despite efforts at all levels, UNIFIL has been prevented from making further progress towards implementing fully the objectives of Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

24. As the Council is well aware, it **was in March 1978 that UNIFYL** was set UP by resolution 425 (1978) for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from **Lebanese territory , restoring international peace and security** and **assisting** the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective **authority in the area**. Ten years later, I regret to say that the **conditions** still do **not** exist for UNIFYL to perform **its functions** fully or fulfil its mandate **completely**. Al though the **c ircumstances** under **which** UNIFYL **was** established have changed and there **exists** today a more complex situation, the **objectives** set by the Security Council in **resolution 425 (1978)** remain valid. The Lebanese authorities **maintain the position** that **Israel should** withdraw completely and allow UNIFIL to deploy to the international border.

25. Israel continues to maintain in southern Lebanon a **"security zone"** with its own forces and those of **SLA**. The revised map attached to this report shows more clearly than before the extent of the "security zone" in **UNIFIL's** area. Accordity to **the Israeli authorities**, this is a temporary **arrangement**, governed by their security concern8 in the light of the **situation** existing in southern Lebanon and the rest **of** the country. **They** say that in the prevailing circumstances they cannot **allow** the deployment of **UNIFIL** to the border as there is no central government in **Beirut** able to exercise effective author ity throughout the **area**. In their view, UNIFIL as a peace-keeping force is not able under its present terms of reference to **assume** such **responsibility** . It bears repeating here that UNIFYL cannot implement **its** mandate successfully without the full co-operation of the **Israeli** authorities, whose **position** is thus **an** essential factor.

26. During the period **under review**, the level of violence in southern Lebanon has been limited to **some** extent, **particularly** I believe because of the presence of UNIFIL. Despite the **difficulties** it has had to **face**, UNIFIL has continued to try to consolidate its position. **The most signif icant and positive** development du ring this period has been the withdrawal of **IDF/SLA** from **Tallet Huqban** and the subsequent return of thousands of inhabitants to Yatar and **Kafra**. Since then, UNIFIL has been able, thanks to the co-operation of the local leaders and inhabitants, to maintain calm in **the area**. This shows, **in a limited** way, the **positive** role that UNIPIL can play in **restoring** peace and security, **provided** it has the **co-operation** of the parties. **As** I have stated in previous reports, although UNIFYL has not been able to implement **fully** the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council, there is no **doubt** in **my** mind that the Force is an extremely important **factor** in **whatever** peace and normalrty exists in southern Lebanon. It represents Lebanese legality in the area as well as the commitment of the United Nations to support the independence, sovereignty and terr itorial integrity of Lebanon. It also underlines the resolve of the international community to help to bring about the withdrawal of the Israeli **torces** from Lebanese territory as a step towards the restoration of international peace and security in the **area**.

27. I have received a letter from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/19440) conveying the **Lebanese** authorities' request **for** the extension of the mandate of UNIFIL **for a** turther period **ot** six months in the **following** terms:

"I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Lebanon has decided to request the Security Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which expires on 31 January 1988, for a further period of six months, on the basis of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 520 (1982) and of other relevant resolutions and decisions of the Security Council.

"The Government of Lebanon, while calling for the immediate implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions, would like to reaffirm the terms of the mandate of UNIFIL as laid down in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations contained in document S/12611 of 19 March 1978, the resolutions 501 (1982) and 509 (1982).

"I should like to assure you that my Government remains persuaded that, in spite of the difficult conditions in south Lebanon, the presence of UNIFIL in Lebanon continues to be highly necessary and constitutes an important factor of stability and an international commitment to the upholding of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon."

28. Although the state of affairs in which the Force finds itself 10 years after its establishment is very unsatisfactory and contrary to the expectations of the Council, I feel obliged to support this Lebanese request. UNIFIL is an important mechanism for conflict control in a very volatile situation which, without it, could quickly escalate into a wider conflict. I know that the Security Council is fully aware of the important role being played by UNIFIL. So are the troop-contributing countries which, in spite of the difficulties, risks and expense involved, have continued to make troops available.


29. I would like again to pay tribute here to the selflessness and dedication of the troop contributors who have continued to respond so generously to the Council's requests. Without their continuing support, it would not have been possible to maintain the Force in such difficult conditions. It remains a matter of great concern that, because of the non-payment of assessed contributions by certain member States, those Governments' contribution to UNIFIL should place so heavy a financial burden on them.

30. Finally, I pay tribute to Major-General Gustav Hägglund, the Force Commander, and to all the men and women under his command and control, both military and civilian, for the courage and determination with which they have faced a very difficult period. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.



**ЮЖНЫЙ ЛИВАН • LÍBANO MERIDIONAL**





وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان

اعتباراً من كانون الثاني/يناير ١٩٨٨

1988年1月联黎部队部署情况

UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF JANUARY 1988

DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL AU MOIS DE JANVIER 1988

ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ НА ЯНВАРЬ 1988 ГОДА

DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN ENERO DE 1988

6.20 ● مركز مراقبة

观察所  
Observation post  
Poste d'observation  
Наблюдательный пункт  
Puesto de observación

1.22 ✕ نقطة تفتيش

检查站  
Check point  
Point de contrôle  
Контрольный пункт  
Puesto de control

4.3 ● قاعدة

基地  
Base  
Base  
Base  
Base

④ موقع مؤقت

临时阵地  
Temporary position  
Position temporaire  
Временная позиция  
Posición provisional

حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان

联黎部队行动地区界限西边和北边  
UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North  
Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord  
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ, Запад и Север  
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte

الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان

联黎部队各营之间界限  
UNIFIL Inter Battalion boundaries  
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force  
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ  
Límites entre batallones de la Fuerza

● وحدة لبنانية

黎巴嫩单位  
Lebanese Unit  
Unité libanaise  
Ливанские подразделения  
Unidad libanesa

● مواقع لقوات الدفاع الاسرائيلية و/او "جيش جنوب لبنان"

以色列国防军和(或)“南黎巴嫩军”阵地  
Israeli Defence Forces and/or "South Lebanon Army" Position  
Position des Forces de défense israéliennes et/ou de "l'armée du Liban du Sud"  
Позиция израильских сил обороны и/или "южноливанской армии"  
Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel y/o del "Ejército del Líbano meridional"

المساحة التقريبية لما يقع تحت السيطرة الاسرائيلية من منطقة عمل

● ④ الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان  
联黎部队行动地区内在以色列控制下地区概况  
Approximate area under Israel control in UNIFIL area of operation  
Périmètre approximatif de la zone sous contrôle israélien dans la zone d'opérations de la FINUL  
Примерный район в зоне действия ВСООНЛ, находящийся под контролем Израиля  
Area aproximada bajo control israelí dentro de la zona de operaciones de la Fuerza

