

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 29 April 2019, at 10 a.m.

Temporary Chair: Mr. Gabriëlse (Netherlands)

Chair: Mr. Syed Hussin (Malaysia)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Opening of the session

1. **The Temporary Chair** declared open the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Election of the Chair

2. **The Temporary Chair** said that at its second session the Preparatory Committee had elected Mr. Yaakob (Malaysia) to serve as Chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee. Following his resignation, the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty had nominated Mr. Syed Hussin (Malaysia) to take his place. Information concerning the nomination had been circulated by the Secretariat to all States parties on 13 February 2019. No objection to the nomination had been received. He took it that the Committee wished to elect Mr. Syed Hussin as the Chair of its third session.

3. *Mr. Syed Hussin (Malaysia) was elected Chair by acclamation.*

4. *Mr. Syed Hussin (Malaysia) took the Chair.*

Statement by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

5. **Ms. Nakamitsu** (High Representative for Disarmament Affairs) said that the 2020 Review Conference would mark the fiftieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the twenty-fifth anniversary of its indefinite extension. The Conference would therefore be an ideal opportunity to celebrate the tremendous achievements made possible by the Treaty and to ensure that it remained fit for purpose and for addressing new challenges in the current context and in the future.

6. During the current session, the Preparatory Committee was responsible for laying the groundwork for the success in 2020. By completing its procedural tasks, the Committee would ensure that the Conference could proceed directly to matters of substance. Those tasks included the adoption of the draft agenda and the draft rules of procedure for the Conference, the allocation of items to the Main Committees and the nomination of the President-designate of the Conference.

7. As States had witnessed previously, when such procedural tasks had not been accomplished, it had led to acrimony and attention being diverted away from matters at the heart of the Treaty. The nomination of a

President-designate was also important to allow the President-designate as much time as possible to consult with all States parties and prepare to lead the Conference to success. She was confident that all States parties shared the view that those tasks were a priority and should be accomplished as expeditiously as possible.

8. Under the arrangements agreed in the context of the strengthened review process, during the current session, the Committee was expected to issue recommendations on substance to the 2020 Review Conference. States parties should strive to deliver consensus recommendations that were focused equally on the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and were drawn from areas of commonality and convergence.

9. External events weighed heavily on the Committee's proceedings, making it difficult to find common ground, especially if States parties assumed rigid and inflexible positions. Instead, they must pursue real dialogue and negotiation in good faith, guided by their common, strategic interest in the security benefits of the Treaty. Sadly, the kind of dialogue that promoted stability and confidence was an increasingly rare commodity.

10. On the occasion of the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace, States Members of the United Nations had discussed the multiple challenges facing the rules-based international order. Key among them was a trust deficit that undermined confidence, stifled progress and even threatened the gains already achieved. That deficit was especially apparent in efforts to achieve the collective goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Recent developments in the international security had threatened the web of instruments, agreements and arrangements established during and after the cold war. There was an increased emphasis on the value of nuclear weapons. Restraints on nuclear arsenals were weakening and, in some cases, collapsing. States were diverging even on previously agreed principles and objectives.

11. States parties should not allow those trends to seep into the Committee's proceedings. Instead, they should use the opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty, to its complete and balanced implementation, and to the fulfilment of all the obligations they had assumed under it as States parties. They should use the current session to begin to rebuild the trust and confidence that had forged so many of the landmark achievements of the past three decades. They should begin the process of restoring the habits of cooperation

that had led to the conclusion of the Treaty and to its entrenchment not only as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for nuclear disarmament, but as a pillar of international security. Doing so would require a spirit of compromise and flexibility, a strong degree of patience and, above all, a willingness to engage with one another on the substance of the Treaty without being distracted by issues that were not directly relevant to their deliberations.

12. States parties should make ensuring the strength and durability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty their aim and securing the collective benefits it provided to all States parties their goal.

Statement by the Chair

13. **The Chair** said that, following his nomination to the post of Chair of the Committee in February 2019, he had continued the work started by his predecessor, engaging in extensive consultations with States, international organizations and civil society. He would continue to perform his role in an open, impartial and transparent manner.

14. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs had given a sobering assessment of the situation facing States parties and their responsibilities. As the Committee addressed a number of procedural and substantive matters during the current session, it was important for the States parties to focus on the promises set out in the Treaty to promote the goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology and promote cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

15. The aim of the 2020 Review was to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty were being realized. As part of that process, the States parties must preserve the sanctity and integrity of the Treaty and of the review cycle. The participants should listen to one another and demonstrate understanding, sensitivity and respect. Collectively, all stakeholders needed to demonstrate support for the Treaty. He encouraged all parties to carry out the work of the Committee in a positive spirit so as to assure the success of the Review Conference.

Adoption of the agenda (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/7, NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/13 and NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/INF/3)

16. **The Chair** recalled that the agenda for all sessions of the Preparatory Committee had been adopted at its

first session in 2017 and was set out in document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/7](#) and also reproduced in paragraph 9 of the report of the second session of the Preparatory Committee contained in document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/13](#).

17. Drawing attention to the programme of work for the current session set out in document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/INF/3](#), he took it that the Committee wished to take note of that programme of work and proceed accordingly.

18. *It was so decided.*

Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee

(c) Methods of work

(ii) Participation

19. **The Chair** recalled that, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 2015 Review Conference, which were applied mutatis mutandis to the work of the Committee, representatives of the United Nations and of the International Atomic Energy Agency were entitled to attend the meetings of the Committee and to submit material, both orally and in writing. He further recalled that, at its first session, the Committee had adopted the following decision, based on the practice of the previous preparatory committees, the relevant rules of procedure of the 2015 Review Conference and the agreement reached at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference:

“1. Representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries’ nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Committee.

“2. Representatives of specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their organizations’ nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as documents of the Committee. Furthermore, the Committee decides, based on the agreement at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review

Conference, which would be applied *mutatis mutandis*, that specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations should be invited to make oral presentations to the Committee upon the decision of the Committee on a case-by-case basis.

“3. Representatives of non-governmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed, to be seated in the designated area, to receive documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee. The Committee shall also allocate a meeting to non-governmental organizations to address each session of the Committee.”

20. In that regard, he said that no States had requested to attend the session as observers.

21. The following specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations had requested to attend the session of the Preparatory Committee: the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the European Union, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, League of Arab States, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. In addition, the 96 non-governmental organizations listed in document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/INF.3](#) had submitted requests to attend. He took it that the Committee wished to take note of those requests.

22. *It was so decided.*

(iv) Records and documents
([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/INF/1](#))

23. The Chair said that during the previous sessions of the Preparatory Committee, summary records had been provided, at each session, for the Committee’s opening meeting, the general debate and the closing meeting. In addition, records had been kept of the decisions taken at other meetings. He took it that the Committee wished to proceed accordingly at the current session.

24. *It was so decided.*

25. **The Chair** drew attention to document [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/INF/1](#), in particular paragraph 11 thereof, relating to the guidelines of the General Assembly on the submission of documents and the deadline of 15 March 2019 for the submission of pre-session documentation to facilitate its translation

into the official languages and issuance before the start of the current session. Documentation submitted before or around that date had been issued in the six official languages, while translations of documents submitted within the previous week would be issued as they became available.

26. Given that the production of official documentation in six languages was one of the most expensive budget items and a major factor in escalating costs, delegations were requested not to resubmit working papers and proposals already submitted in the review cycle.

Organization of the 2020 Review Conference

27. **The Chair** said that at the current session, the Preparatory Committee would need to consider a number of procedural issues relating to the 2020 Review Conference, including the draft provisional agenda, the allocation of items to the Main Committees, the draft rules of procedure, the endorsement of the candidate for the presidency of the Conference, the financing of the Conference, including its Preparatory Committee, and the nomination of the official to serve as provisional Secretary-General of the Conference.

(e) Provisional agenda

28. **The Chair** drew attention to the draft provisional agenda of the 2020 Review Conference contained in conference room paper NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/CRP.1. It was his understanding that there was consensus on using a draft provisional agenda that was based on the agenda of the 2015 Review Conference, which contained only technical updates. He took it that the Committee wished to adopt the draft provisional agenda.

29. *It was so decided.*

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee

30. **Mr. Ashikbayev** (Kazakhstan), speaking on behalf of the States parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, said that those States had contributed to Treaty implementation, global disarmament efforts and non-proliferation processes and to the formation of a mechanism for regional security and cooperation. In addition, they had worked to create a zone free of nuclear weapons in Central Asia, voluntarily committing themselves to banning the production, acquisition and deployment on their territories of nuclear weapons and their components or other nuclear explosive devices. The idea for that zone had been conceived in September 1997 at

an international conference in Tashkent, and the treaty-signing ceremony had been held in 2006 in the city of Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan, which had formerly been one of the world's largest nuclear test sites.

31. The nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia was the first to be located entirely within the northern hemisphere and in a landlocked region between two nuclear powers. Furthermore, it was the only zone where nuclear weapons had been actively tested and deployed. The declaration of Central Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone significantly enhanced geopolitical security and stability, and it was the hope of the Central Asian States that one day the entire planet would be a single nuclear-weapon-free zone.

32. The Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia dealing with the provision of security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in Central Asian States had been ratified by four nuclear-weapon States, and he hoped that the United States would also ratify it in the near future. The establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones was a powerful way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and bolster the global disarmament process.

33. **Mr. Tsuji** (Japan) said that his country, the only one to have ever experienced atomic bombings, had a deep understanding of the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. Japan strived to advance nuclear disarmament while preserving security and taking humanitarian and security issues into account.

34. The world was currently witnessing the deterioration of the security environment, diverging views on disarmament and growing threats with respect to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, which demanded cooperation from both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. In addition, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as the cornerstone of international nuclear disarmament efforts and the non-proliferation regime, must be strengthened. In particular, States parties must fulfil their commitments under the Treaty.

35. In 2017, Japan had established the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, consisting of international experts from both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group had recently launched the Kyoto Appeal, in which it emphasized that a more stable, safe and prosperous world required cooperation and respectful discourse among States on nuclear arms control and threat reduction. Of the 13 recommendations contained in the Appeal, 3 in particular were worth noting. Firstly,

the Group recommended that all States should put aside their diverging views on nuclear disarmament and engage with each other in order to build trust. Secondly, it recommended that nuclear-weapon States should share information regarding their nuclear doctrines, deterrence policies, risk reduction measures and security assurances. Thirdly, it recommended that all States, including those that were not parties to the Treaty, should contribute to forums and processes to address nuclear threat reduction, confidence-building measures and nuclear disarmament verification.

36. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, which demonstrated the commitment of Japan to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would remain actively engaged in transparency-enhancing measures. Japan believed that the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and it called on the remaining Annex 2 States to sign and ratify it. IAEA safeguards were an essential part of the international non-proliferation regime. Universalization of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and its additional protocol was important in order to further strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

37. Japan reaffirmed its strong commitment to working with the international community towards complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Japan continued to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which strengthened the international non-proliferation regime and contributed to peace and stability in the Middle East. The steady implementation by Iran of the Plan of Action provided a foundation for further cooperation between that country and the international community.

38. Japan recognized the inalienable right of States parties to harness the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with their non-proliferation obligations. It had therefore supported the atoms for peace and development mandate of IAEA by contributing to the Peaceful Uses Initiative and co-chairing the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology, held in November 2018. Japan had decided to contribute an additional 300,000 euros to the Peaceful Uses Initiative for the Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories project.

39. Japan welcomed the Secretary-General's disarmament agenda, *Securing Our Common Future: an Agenda for Disarmament*, in which the Secretary-General stated that young people had tremendous force to bring about change in the world. By

strengthening partnerships with civil society, raising awareness and promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education, especially among young people, future generations could deepen their understanding of the security concerns and the risks associated with nuclear weapon detonations.

40. **Mr. Ashikbayev** (Kazakhstan), said that in the 25 years since it had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, his country had firmly supported its three pillars and had their equally effective and fair implementation. Kazakhstan was concerned about the growing distrust between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States over the effectiveness and unconditional binding character of the Treaty. However, even more dangerous was the lack of trust between nuclear powers, which could lead to a new nuclear arms race.

41. Nuclear-weapon States should not undermine the basic elements of international security and stability. The alarming situation with respect to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty) and the proposed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III) should be resolved by building upon previous efforts. In the light of the obvious lack of progress on disarmament and declining trust, more than 120 nations had developed and adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Kazakhstan, which had actively participated in that process and had supported the Treaty's early entry into force, had signed it in March 2018 and was in the process of completing internal ratification procedures.

42. In the light of its own path towards denuclearization, Kazakhstan was convinced that disarmament was the most effective confidence-building measure. Its 1991 decision to close the nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk had highlighted the need to ban nuclear testing globally. It was symbolic that the tenth International Day against Nuclear Tests would be celebrated on 29 August 2019, commemorating the closure of the Semipalatinsk test site. A voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing could not by itself serve as an alternative to a legally binding document such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, whose early entry into force was essential for the effective implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Kazakhstan urged the remaining Annex 2 States to ratify the Treaty without preconditions.

43. Kazakhstan currently served as a coordinator of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia and supported the creation of similar zones in the

Middle East, north-east Asia and Europe. In an effort to enhance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, Kazakhstan, in cooperation with the Office for Disarmament Affairs, planned to host a meeting of representatives of such zones in August 2019.

44. When developing nuclear energy for peaceful uses, States must avert the risks of nuclear proliferation for military purposes. Kazakhstan had taken care not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and had accepted all IAEA safeguards on all nuclear materials and facilities. Considering the nuclear renaissance, Kazakhstan, as the largest supplier of uranium products in the world, stood ready to support the peaceful use of uranium, including by opening the IAEA low enriched uranium bank on its territory in 2017. In January 2019, Kazakhstan had adopted the amendments to articles VI and XIV.A of the IAEA statute and hoped that they would assist in resolving regional group issues. Continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the core non-proliferation tool, was also important.

45. **Mr. Dehghani** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the sustainability and credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty rested on the "grand bargain", by which non-nuclear-weapon States pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons in return for guarantees that the nuclear-weapon States would pursue disarmament. Except for a few States in Europe that hosted nuclear weapons for the United States on their territory, the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon States continued to fulfil their non-proliferation obligations. Regrettably, however, the nuclear-weapon States had not kept their end of that "bargain" and had failed to pursue effective disarmament and to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Those States should acknowledge that selective or conditional compliance with their Treaty obligations was unacceptable. Reductions in nuclear arms should not be confused with effective nuclear disarmament, as, in most cases, they did not lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, such reductions, which were driven by cold war conceptions of the strategic balance of power, had been offset by the development of more advanced and more destructive nuclear weapons.

46. The ambitious and extensive nuclear arms modernization plan of the United States threatened to set off a new arms race and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which had once symbolized the end of the cold war, was on the verge of collapse as a result of that country's failure to comply with its obligations. The United States also intended to produce so-called usable nuclear weapons which it brazenly threatened to use

against non-nuclear-weapon States. In addition, its withdrawal from international instruments and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its reimposition of illegal and unilateral sanctions against Iran clearly attested to its disrespect for multilateralism, policies pursued despite repeated confirmations from IAEA that Iran fully complied with its commitments. Efforts by the United States to subvert the Plan of Action and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) threatened the stability and security of the Middle East and undermined the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran would adopt appropriate measures to protect its national interests.

47. The adoption of concrete decisions on nuclear disarmament, through negotiations on and the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, should be the first priority of the 2020 Review Conference, and any proposals that made nuclear disarmament subject to conditions must be categorically rejected. The second priority must be the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The Israeli regime, which possessed nuclear weapons that threatened the peace and security of the region and beyond, and which brazenly threatened others with nuclear annihilation, must be compelled to join the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon party and must subject all its nuclear facilities to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

48. **Mr. Feruta** (Chief Coordinator, Director General's Office for Coordination, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that IAEA, through its Technical Cooperation Programme, continued to help countries to reduce poverty and hunger, generate electricity, manage water resources, treat diseases and respond to climate change. Its high-quality technical training helped countries develop their own expertise so that they could train future generations of nuclear specialists. Since 1956, IAEA had supported nearly 50,000 fellowships for scientists from developing countries and contributed directly to the achievement of 9 of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. In November 2018, IAEA had held its first-ever ministerial-level conference on nuclear science and technology. In the declaration issued by the conference, the Ministers recognized the importance of science and technology for development and welcomed the modernization of the Agency's nuclear applications laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria, which would improve services to IAEA member States in the areas of food safety, pest control and cancer treatment. The Peaceful Uses Initiative provided additional funds for IAEA technical cooperation activities and had helped raise 140 million euros for some 300 projects in over 150 countries.

49. Nuclear power was indispensable for development. It could help to address the twin challenges of ensuring reliable energy supplies and curbing greenhouse gas emissions. While producing 10 per cent of the world's electricity, nuclear power accounted for almost one third of the global total of low-carbon electricity and would continue to play a key role in the world's low-carbon energy mix. However, without significant progress in harnessing the full potential of nuclear power, it would be difficult for the world to secure sufficient energy to achieve sustainable development and mitigate climate change. IAEA would help any countries that opted to use nuclear power to do so safely, securely and sustainably. A low enriched uranium bank storage facility had been inaugurated in August 2017 in Kazakhstan and IAEA expected the uranium delivered to the facility in 2019.

50. While its States were responsible for nuclear safety and security, IAEA played the central role in ensuring effective international cooperation. It continued to assess the effectiveness of its nuclear safety and security peer review and advisory services in order to better support States in their application of its safety standards and security guidance. IAEA also contributed to international security by helping to prevent nuclear and other radioactive material from falling into the hands of terrorists or other criminals.

51. IAEA faced challenges due to the steady increase in the amount of nuclear material and in the number of nuclear facilities under its safeguards, as well as continuing pressures on its budget. Currently, 182 States had safeguards agreements in force while 134 States had additional protocols in force. He encouraged States parties to the Treaty that did not have comprehensive safeguards agreements to bring such agreements into force and hoped that States that had not yet concluded additional protocols did so as soon as possible.

52. Since January 2016, IAEA had been verifying and monitoring the implementation by Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its inspectors had had access to all relevant sites and locations in the country. The Director General of IAEA had stated that Iran was implementing those commitments. IAEA continued to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by Iran under its safeguards agreement and to evaluate the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country. The implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement, the additional protocol and additional transparency measures comprised the most robust verification system in the world.

53. While IAEA inspectors had been required to leave the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in April 2009, the Agency continued to monitor its nuclear programme and evaluate all available safeguards-relevant information, including open-source information and satellite imagery. The country's nuclear programme had expanded significantly in the previous 10 years, and, over the past year, activities at some facilities had continued or had been developed further, while other facilities appeared not to be operating. Although the Director General reported regularly on such activities to the Board of Governors of IAEA, the Agency could not confirm the nature and purpose of those activities because of lack of access.

54. Although IAEA did not play a role in political negotiations among the countries concerned, any denuclearization agreement should be accompanied by an effective and sustainable verification mechanism. As the only international organization that could verify and monitor denuclearization in an impartial, independent and objective manner, IAEA would contribute to the denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. Since 2017, IAEA had been intensifying its efforts to monitor that country's nuclear programme and was enhancing its readiness to undertake verification and monitoring activities there. If a political agreement led to a request for the return of inspectors, the Agency could respond within weeks.

55. There had been no major developments in 2019 with respect to safeguards implementation in the Syrian Arab Republic. IAEA continued to urge Syria to cooperate fully in connection with all unresolved issues.

56. IAEA safeguards activities, which provided credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in countries, were a valuable international confidence-building measure. IAEA assisted States in creating nuclear-weapon-free zones, and, if requested by its member States, it could promote nuclear disarmament by sharing its experiences in the area of verification.

57. **Mr. Moncada** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that nuclear disarmament was the highest priority for the Movement, which remained extremely concerned by the threat to humanity posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing and essential for strengthening international peace and security. It was counterproductive and unsustainable to pursue non-proliferation while ignoring nuclear disarmament obligations. Proliferation

concerns were best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. He therefore welcomed multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and noted with satisfaction the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017. The negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, containing a phased programme for the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, were urgently needed.

58. The Movement stressed that reductions in deployments and in operational status were no substitute for the irreversible and total elimination of nuclear weapons, and that the nuclear-weapon States must abide by the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability in all measures related to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations. Full compliance by the nuclear-weapon States with their undertakings was imperative and would enhance confidence in the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Each article of the Treaty was binding on all States parties at all times and in all circumstances.

59. The continued existence of nuclear weapons, and the military doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that set out rationales for the use or threat of use of such weapons, posed the greatest threat to peace and security. Such doctrines could not be justified on any grounds.

60. The Movement noted with grave concern the current intensive investment by nuclear-weapon States in the development of newer, more effective nuclear forces, including low-yield nuclear warheads. The prominent role of those inhumane weapons in military doctrines lowered the threshold for their actual use. The Movement therefore urged the nuclear-weapon States to end the new nuclear arms race and to comply with their legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings to eliminate all their nuclear weapons without further delay, and called upon all States parties to comply with their legal obligations under article VI of the Treaty. The indefinite extension of the Treaty did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals. Any such assumption was incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty.

61. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the Movement called for the early commencement of negotiations on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances by all nuclear-weapon States with regard to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as a matter of high priority. Despite long-standing requests

by non-nuclear-weapon States to receive such legally binding universal assurances, no tangible progress had been achieved in that respect. The Review Conference should reaffirm that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

62. Non-proliferation policies should not undermine the inalienable rights of States to acquire, access, import or export nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. States also had an inalienable right to research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and to participate as fully as possible in the exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

63. IAEA was the sole competent authority for the verification of compliance by its member States with the obligations established under their respective safeguards agreements with the Agency, which was mandated under its statute to further global disarmament through safeguards. The Movement was confident of the Agency's impartiality and professionalism, and strongly rejected any attempts by States to politicize or interfere with its work.

64. The Movement underlined the importance of universal adherence to the Treaty, and called on all States that were not parties to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and to place all their nuclear facilities and activities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. All States parties should make every effort to achieve the universality of the Treaty and refrain from taking any action that could jeopardize that objective. Strict observance of comprehensive IAEA safeguards and adherence to the Treaty were preconditions for any cooperation in the area of nuclear energy. States parties to the Treaty must abstain from sharing nuclear technology and materials with States not parties to the Treaty.

65. The Movement regretted that the 2015 Review Conference had failed to reach consensus on a final document despite the efforts made by members of the Non-Aligned Movement. That failure should motivate States parties to work harder to achieve nuclear disarmament. Given that the upcoming Review Conference coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty's entry into force, every effort should be made by States to avoid another such failure. To a great extent, success would hinge on the genuine political will and flexibility of the nuclear-weapon States.

66. The 2020 Review Conference should reaffirm the validity of and the imperative to uphold the

nuclear disarmament- and non-proliferation-related commitments made at the three previous Review Conferences. Moreover, the Movement underscored the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones in achieving the objectives of the Treaty and supported the full implementation of instruments establishing such zones. In that connection, the Movement reiterated its support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and underlined the importance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. In that regard, it reiterated its serious concern over the protracted delay in the implementation of that resolution and called for its full implementation without further delay. The resolution's three sponsors should shoulder their particular responsibility and take action to that end.

67. It was especially disappointing that Israel had singlehandedly delayed the holding of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, despite the unanimous vote at the 2010 Review Conference in favour of holding the conference in 2012. Furthermore, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada had blocked a consensus on new measures to implement the 1995 resolution; failure to implement that resolution ultimately undermined the effectiveness and credibility of the Treaty and disrupted the delicate balance between its three pillars, particularly since the indefinite extension of the Treaty was linked to the implementation of the resolution.

68. Pending the establishment of such a zone, Israel must renounce any nuclear weapons it might possess, accede to the Treaty without preconditions and promptly place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The nuclear capability of Israel posed a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States. The Movement condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals and called for a total prohibition on transfers to Israel of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, and on assistance in nuclear-related scientific or technological fields.

69. The Movement welcomed General Assembly decision 73/546, entitled "Convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction"; supported the convening of such a conference in 2019, and urged all countries in the Middle East, without exception, to actively participate in the conference and conduct negotiations in good faith to bring to a conclusion a treaty establishing such a zone. The Movement stressed that the 1995 resolution and other decisions on the subject adopted within the context of

the Review Conferences remained valid until the objectives were achieved, and that decision 73/546 should be implemented without prejudice to their validity and should not also be construed as their replacement.

70. The Movement was ready to engage with its partners constructively in order to achieve a successful outcome to the 2020 review process and ensure a peaceful and secure world for present and future generations.

71. Speaking in his national capacity, he said that his Government condemned the resurgence of biased interpretations in the form of new so-called security doctrines that were giving rise to a new arms race. Using phony threats to justify the expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals placed all countries, especially non-nuclear-weapon States, at risk. In that regard, the alarming Nuclear Posture Review undertaken by the United States Government could pose a threat to human survival, given the systematic increase in the proportion of the defence budget of that country allocated to nuclear weapons.

72. **Mr. Bylica** (Observer for the European Union), speaking also on behalf of the candidate country Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia and Turkey; and, in addition, the Republic of Moldova, said that the actions and positions taken by the European Union during the current review cycle of the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained grounded in the conviction that a multilateral approach to security, including disarmament and non-proliferation, constituted the best way to maintain international peace and security. The European Union was therefore committed to upholding the integrity of the Treaty, to promoting its universality and to enhancing its implementation.

73. Ahead of the 2020 Review Conference, all States parties should reaffirm their unequivocal support for the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. States that had not yet done so should join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, and all States parties should fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and the commitments they had undertaken at previous Review Conferences.

74. Amidst increasing international strain on the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, it was more necessary than ever to implement the Treaty fully. To that end, all parties must contribute to improving the overall strategic context for disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, avoiding further erosion of the rules-based international system. The

European Union invited all States parties to engage constructively in efforts to identify common ground and achieve a successful outcome at the forthcoming Review Conference, which would mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty.

75. The European Union would contribute to the review process by providing dedicated funding for regional and thematic outreach activities by the leadership of the 2020 Review Conference, which would include three thematic seminars on disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of energy; up to four regional meetings to be held in Asia-Pacific, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and the Middle East; and two side events to be held during the upcoming session of the First Committee of the General Assembly and during the 2020 Review Conference.

76. Gender equality and the empowerment of women were priorities for the European Union, and the women and peace and security agenda continued to feature prominently in European Union external action. Women must be fully involved, through active and equal participation, in non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. The European Union also supported the further engagement of civil society and academia in addressing and discussing challenges related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

77. The European Union strongly supported the three pillars of the Treaty and would continue to promote comprehensive, balanced and full implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, which remained valid. The European Union was resolved to promoting international stability by creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in line with the goals of the Treaty. In that context, the European Union called for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security.

78. Noting with appreciation the Security Council's recent recognition of the enduring value of commitments undertaken pursuant to the Treaty, he emphasized that all States shared a responsibility to prevent the use of nuclear weapons.

79. The European Union remained committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. Concrete progress was needed in respect of the full implementation of that article, especially through an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, while taking into account the special responsibility of the States that possessed the largest nuclear arsenals. In that regard, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START

Treaty) made a crucial contribution to European and international security, limiting strategic competition and increasing strategic stability, predictability and mutual confidence between the two largest nuclear-weapon States. The European Union encouraged the two Governments to seek further reductions in their strategic and nonstrategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, and to pursue early and active dialogue on the future of the New START Treaty, including potential new arms control arrangements between the United States and the Russian Federation.

80. Over the previous 30 years, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty had led to the removal from European soil and verifiable destruction of nearly 3,000 missiles with nuclear and conventional warheads. The European Union urged the Russian Federation to address in a substantial and transparent manner the serious concerns about its compliance with the Treaty raised by its missile system. Full and verifiable compliance under that Treaty prior to the expiry of the six-month withdrawal process was of the essence.

81. The European Union called on all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without further delay. Pending the Treaty's entry into force, all States should uphold their moratoriums on nuclear-weapon-test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, and refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty.

82. The European Union remained committed to verifiable, treaty-based nuclear disarmament and arms control, and underlined the need to renew multilateral efforts and revitalize multilateral negotiating bodies. It called for the immediate negotiation, in the Conference on Disarmament, of a fissile material cut-off treaty. In the meantime, all States possessing nuclear weapons that had not yet done so should declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

83. In line with those commitments, the European Union had decided to support four actions on the Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament, including on promoting the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty and commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. It welcomed the consensus on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament Measures and supported work in such forums as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

84. He called on all nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm their existing security assurances, in line with relevant Security Council resolutions. As recommended by the

2010 Review Conference, the Conference on Disarmament should begin discussions with a view to elaborating recommendations on all aspects of the issue, without excluding the possibility of an international legally binding instrument.

85. In the hope of renewing the momentum of the diplomatic process involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the European Union urged the Government of that country to engage seriously in the negotiations with a view to abandoning its nuclear weapons programmes and delivery systems in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. It must also maintain its declared suspension of nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches; comply with its obligations under Security Council resolutions; return to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its comprehensive safeguards agreement and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea could not have the status of a nuclear-weapon State, in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

86. The European Union reaffirmed its support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture. As confirmed by various IAEA reports since its implementation began, the Plan of Action was delivering on its goal of guaranteeing the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and contributing to regional and international security. As long as the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to implement its nuclear-related commitments, the European Union would remain committed to the full and effective implementation of the Plan of Action. It deeply regretted the reimposition of sanctions by the United States following that country's withdrawal from the Plan of Action. Efforts to preserve economic and other benefits for the Islamic Republic of Iran were being intensified through the initiative by France, Germany and the United Kingdom to operationalize the special purpose vehicle that had been set up to generate a positive impact on trade and economic relations with Iran and on the lives of the Iranian people.

87. The European Union called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to refrain from ballistic missile launches, which were inconsistent with Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#); to play a constructive regional role and to comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly those related to arms transfers to State and non-State actors in the region.

88. **Ms. Osman** (Malaysia) said that amidst global tensions and nuclear risk, the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime was at a critical juncture and

under enormous strain. Ahead of the fiftieth anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it was incumbent upon States parties to fulfil their Treaty obligations and, in doing so, to demonstrate that the global disarmament architecture was resilient. Nuclear disarmament remained her country's highest priority, as only the complete and total elimination of nuclear weapons would guarantee their non-use or threat of use. Nuclear-weapon States had a duty to negotiate in good faith on effective measures to achieve verifiable, irreversible and transparent disarmament.

89. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing, as non-proliferation derived legitimacy from the larger objective of nuclear disarmament. Therefore, pursuing non-proliferation alone while ignoring disarmament obligations would be unsustainable and detrimental to the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

90. States with advanced nuclear expertise and technology had a duty to enable States without them to gain access to those benefits, given that such access was an inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty. Moreover, in order to gain the international community's trust regarding the peaceful nature of their nuclear programmes, States must subject those programmes to IAEA safeguards and comply fully with the Treaty.

91. Progress under the disarmament pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had slowed; Malaysia therefore supported efforts to explore ways of reducing the risk of a nuclear detonation. Due consideration must also be given to the humanitarian consequences of any nuclear explosion, a vital dimension of nuclear disarmament discourse.

92. There was no doubt that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, an effective legal measure under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, complemented the existing global disarmament regime. States opposed to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons should engage with the instrument and consider joining the overwhelming number of States in favour of it. Initiatives to work towards a nuclear-weapon-free world should not divert attention from past commitments or article VI obligations.

93. Malaysia called upon all Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without further delay. Noting with concern the suspension of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, she hoped that both the United States and the Russian Federation would engage in constructive dialogue and reaffirm their bilateral commitment to

arms-control measures, including the New START Treaty.

94. IAEA was the sole authority competent to verify the fulfilment of the safeguards obligations assumed by States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Agency was also the global focal point for technical cooperation on nuclear applications.

95. Nuclear-weapon-free zones strengthened peace and security by promoting greater transparency and dialogue among States at the regional level, thereby reducing the risk of regional tensions and conflicts. Nuclear-weapon States must provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States within such zones.

96. Malaysia was committed to the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and valued engagement as a means of resolving all outstanding issues. Nuclear-weapon States must also ratify the protocols to all treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, withdraw any reservations or interpretative declarations incompatible with the object and purpose of those treaties, and respect the denuclearization status of those zones.

97. Her delegation reaffirmed the significance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and welcomed the decision by the General Assembly on the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

98. States parties must be resolute in fulfilling their obligations, honouring their commitments and striving for progress at the current session. Malaysia stood ready to work closely with all other States parties in that endeavour, towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

99. **Mr. Ford** (United States of America) said that the Committee's most basic task at the current session was to decide on procedural matters in preparation for the 2020 Review Conference. The appointment of the full leadership team for the Conference and its President, enabling them to begin consultations right away, was a matter of utmost urgency, as it was essential to the Conference's success.

100. The 2020 Review Conference would be an occasion to review the progress made in living up to the ideals imbued in the Treaty, take stock of the current environment and find better ways of working together to meet future challenges. The States parties needed to reaffirm their shared commitment to the Treaty and to the broader non-proliferation regime, which had become a cornerstone of international peace and security. Both

needed to be preserved and strengthened to benefit future generations.

101. The Treaty had staved off the cascade of proliferation activities that many had feared before the Treaty had been negotiated, greatly reducing the likelihood of nuclear war. The non-proliferation assurances provided under the Treaty had enabled peaceful nuclear cooperation in areas ranging from electric power generation to applications in the areas of medicine, agriculture, health, science and industry, benefiting all States, but perhaps most profoundly the non-nuclear-weapon States, especially those in the developing world.

102. Rather than impede thriving peaceful nuclear programmes and the effective application of nuclear technology, non-proliferation was the path to nuclear cooperation. Assistance with safeguards, export controls, and nuclear safety and security was widely available to help States along that path. The Treaty also provided an essential foundation on which to build on the disarmament ideals set out in its preamble and in its article VI. Nuclear disarmament could only occur provided that reliable robust non-proliferation assurances were in place to keep newcomer States to nuclear energy from weaponizing nuclear technology and to keep those States that had eliminated their nuclear weapons from reconstituting their arsenals. Thus, non-proliferation, peaceful uses and disarmament were shared interests of all States parties. The Treaty's success would depend on their ability to focus on what united them in their reliance on the Treaty.

103. The States parties needed to rededicate themselves to helping meet the challenges that currently faced the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime. The crisis created by the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea needed to be resolved by ensuring the country's final and fully verified denuclearization. Diplomatic efforts were under way to secure the fulfilment by North Korea of its denuclearization promises and obligations. Efforts were also under way to block the pathways used by Iran to arm itself with nuclear weapons by ensuring that it could never again engage in weaponization work and could not position itself on the brink of rapidly breaking out of the Treaty. Syria needed to be jointly held accountable for its violations of the Treaty and the IAEA safeguards. States parties needed to acknowledge and voice their support for a resolution of those challenges for the Committee's efforts to be relevant.

104. In order to build confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear activity worldwide, existing safeguards needed to be strengthened by making the IAEA

additional protocol universal, and export controls should be strengthened by making the additional protocol a condition for nuclear exports. Withdrawal from the Treaty should be discouraged and any State that withdrew while in violation of the Treaty should be held to account.

105. All States parties could also rededicate themselves to the safe and effective sharing of nuclear technology and ensure that resources were allotted to the poorer States that those programmes had been designed to assist. Drawing attention to a working paper on peaceful uses submitted by his delegation, he stated his Government's intention to continue to support regional workshops and plans by the prospective President of the 2020 Review Conference to share information on the benefits of peaceful uses and how to expand them worldwide.

106. With respect to disarmament, the United States had cut its nuclear arsenal by 88 per cent following the relaxation of cold war rivalries, demonstrating that disarmament progress depended on easing tensions and building trust. His Government had undertaken the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament initiative, which was the subject of a related side event and a working paper submitted by his delegation, to overcome the challenges that impeded such progress. The aim of the initiative was to help all States parties live up to the ideals of the preamble and article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

107. **Mr. Fu Cong** (China) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a vital pillar of the international security architecture and an important legal instrument for global security governance. Uncertainty and instability were increasing in the international security arena, with contributing factors including unilateralism, competition among the major powers, geopolitical rivalry and the quest for absolute military advantage by a certain country. The international nuclear arms control regime and the Treaty were facing unprecedented challenges. States parties to the Treaty should uphold its objectives and principles, strictly adhere to multilateralism and strive for consensus in order to advance the review process.

108. Continued improvement of the international security situation was necessary. Nuclear war must never be fought; accordingly, nuclear-weapon States should abandon the policy of nuclear deterrence and diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their national security doctrines. Moreover, such States must not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free

zones and should negotiate and conclude an international legal instrument to that end.

109. Effective and pragmatic nuclear disarmament should continue to be pursued through a step-by-step approach, to maintain global strategic stability and undiminished security for all. Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should fulfil their responsibilities in that regard in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, safeguarding their bilateral nuclear disarmament treaties and significantly reducing their nuclear weapons stockpiles to advance the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.

110. Political and diplomatic solutions to nuclear non-proliferation issues should be strengthened. As such, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action should be fully implemented. Unilaterally withdrawing from that multilateral agreement and imposing unilateral sanctions and exercising “long-arm jurisdiction” in pursuit of an individual political agenda and in disregard of the shared aspirations of the international community undermined both the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and peace and stability in the Middle East. On the Korean Peninsula, the current climate of dialogue and détente was hard won; China was striving to maintain momentum in that regard. The parties concerned should play a constructive role by taking a patient but steadfast approach to denuclearization on the Peninsula and by establishing a peace mechanism. Promoting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was of great practical significance for maintaining peace and security in the region. China firmly supported the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. All parties should implement the General Assembly decision 73/546 on the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and facilitate the convening of such a conference, to create an environment conducive to a successful 2020 Review Conference.

111. During the current review cycle, the States parties should investigate more the enormous potential of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and devise cooperation initiatives for their collective benefit which should, nonetheless, not be politicized or used as a tool for competition by the major powers. All parties should ensure a balance between nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and take steps to provide developing countries with more resources.

112. The Treaty mechanism should be safeguarded and dialogue must be increased. The remaining countries

that had not acceded to the Treaty should be urged to accede to do so as non-nuclear-weapon States, without preconditions or further delay. The outcomes of the previous Review Conferences should be respected and the three pillars treated equally. IAEA should be supported in carrying out its work in an independent, impartial manner to avoid politicization.

113. China was committed to peaceful development and cooperative and sustainable security, as well as the preservation of the Treaty regime and the advancement of global nuclear governance. It had submitted its national report on the implementation of the Treaty, with comprehensive description of its achievements in that regard, reflecting unwavering political support for the Treaty. China had shown transparency regarding its nuclear strategy, exercised great restraint in nuclear development and taken caution in its policy on the use of nuclear weapons. It had adhered to a nuclear strategy of self-defence, keeping its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security. It was committed to the principle of not being the first to use nuclear weapons and not using or threatening to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

114. China would never participate in a nuclear arms race, had never deployed nuclear weapons in foreign territories and had never extended a nuclear umbrella to any country. The defensive, stable and coherent nature of its nuclear strategy and policy was a strategic choice in terms of national security and building a community for the shared future of mankind. China was strongly opposed to nuclear proliferation in all its forms and was working towards the political resolution of regional nuclear proliferation issues in a responsible manner, while implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and continuing to defend the rights of Chinese businesses. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy played a significant role in sustainable development. Accordingly, China supported relevant international cooperation and was committed to providing more resources to the international community, particularly developing countries.

115. In January 2019, China had hosted a formal conference in Beijing for the five permanent members of the Security Council to discuss major issues relating to multilateral arms control and the safeguarding of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. China would continue to work for broader consensus among those members. It reaffirmed its willingness to cooperate with other delegations for a positive outcome at the current session to lay the foundations for a successful 2020 Review Conference.

116. **Mr. Vieira** (Brazil), speaking on behalf of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), said that OPANAL, along with its 33 member States, had a special interest in the success of the current session of the Preparatory Committee and the 2020 Review Conference. In that spirit, it had submitted a working paper ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.32](#)) on essential elements for inclusion in the final document of the 2020 Review Conference. The use and threat of use of nuclear weapons was a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including international humanitarian law, and constituted a crime against humanity. Once in force, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the proscription of nuclear weapons would all contribute towards the total elimination of such weapons. All States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must fulfil the obligations under article VI of the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States must ensure that nuclear weapons played no part in their security doctrines and policies and non-nuclear-weapon States should seek alternatives to any nuclear deterrence policies under which they were covered by means of military alliances. The qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons must cease, as such actions ran counter to the objectives of nuclear disarmament and the Treaty.

117. Nuclear-weapon-free zones must be fully respected by all States. In light of the achievement that such zones represented, their establishment in new regions should be supported. To provide full security assurances to the States belonging to nuclear-weapon-free zones, solutions to the controversies that hindered the effectiveness of such zones must be sought. An international conference should be convened on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as agreed in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. Periodic conferences of States belonging to nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia served to strengthen such zones and could contribute to the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the Middle East. Such concepts must be reflected in the final document of the 2020 Review Conference.

118. **Ms. Gorely** (Australia), speaking on behalf of the Vienna Group of Ten, said that the overarching objective of the Group was to ensure that appropriate consideration and weight was given to what had traditionally been referred to as the “Vienna issues” and that it firmly believed that the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were equally important and mutually reinforcing. The Group held the ambition to ensure that the meetings of the current review cycle

worked to strengthen the Treaty. In that regard, it had produced a working paper that provided comprehensive, finely tuned recommendations relating to the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; compliance and verification; export controls; peaceful uses of nuclear energy; nuclear safety and security; and on discouraging withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

119. The Group recognized that safeguards played a critical role in maintaining confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear activities and therefore encouraged the Preparatory Committee to affirm that comprehensive safeguards agreements accompanied by additional protocols constituted the current verification standard. It also urged States parties that had not yet concluded and implemented additional protocols to do so. The Group was committed to achieving the entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and therefore urged all States that had not yet signed or ratified it to do so without delay, particularly the remaining Annex 2 States. At the current Preparatory Committee session, States parties should acknowledge the *de facto* international norm against nuclear testing underpinned by that Treaty. The aim of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a future fissile material cut-off treaty was to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, an objective that was shared by the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

120. The Non-Proliferation Treaty played a central role in fostering international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which contributed significantly to the advancement of sectors such as human and animal health, water management, agriculture, food safety and nutrition, energy and environmental protection. However, in order to harness the full benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, States must comply with safeguards and adhere to the highest standards of nuclear safety and security. It was also important to promote gender equality in activities relating to non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

121. The Group was keenly aware of the challenges faced by the Treaty, notably the limited progress towards the implementation of nuclear disarmament, non-compliance issues and lack of universality. However, such challenges should not overshadow the ongoing relevance of the Treaty, nor the gains made through the work of Vienna-based forums such as IAEA. In that regard, the working paper on the “Vienna issues” submitted by the Group was a tangible contribution by a diverse group of States committed to advancing the universalization of the Treaty, fostering international confidence and cooperation in the peaceful uses of

nuclear technology and strengthening the role of the Treaty in advancing international peace and security.

122. **Ms. Khyne** (Myanmar), speaking on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), said that ASEAN remained committed to upholding the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and that its collective efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation strongly supported the goal of maintaining a peaceful and prosperous world. ASEAN continued to recognize the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. All States parties to the Treaty should renew their commitment to fully complying with their existing obligations as a matter of urgency, particularly those under article VI. ASEAN was committed to the Treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology and to make progress towards achieving nuclear disarmament.

123. States had an inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly for their economic and social development. IAEA played a central role in nuclear non-proliferation and in the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. ASEAN looked forward to formalizing relations with IAEA to promote greater cooperation on issues relating to nuclear safety, security, safeguards and capacity-building.

124. ASEAN had always been in the vanguard of international efforts for nuclear non-proliferation and supported the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, which were important under the current global non-proliferation regime. ASEAN remained committed to maintaining its region as a zone free of all nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

125. The United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should continue their diplomatic endeavours to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a lasting peace regime and complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It was also important for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to gain universal adherence and for the remaining Annex 2 countries to ratify it.

126. ASEAN welcomed Security Council resolutions [255 \(1968\)](#) and [984 \(1995\)](#) and emphasized the important role of the Security Council, notably in the event that States were the victim of an act or threat of aggression involving nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, along with other nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, constituted a vital step towards global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

127. The States members of ASEAN reaffirmed their commitment to advancing the global non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. All States, particularly nuclear-weapon States, should cooperate in striving for a world without nuclear weapons. ASEAN hoped that the Preparatory Committee would address the issues relating to the 2020 Review Conference to produce a road map that would enable the enhanced implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

128. Speaking in her national capacity, she said that the continued existence and deployment of nuclear weapons was the most serious of security challenges and the only way to achieve a world free of such weapons was to aim for their total elimination, by pursuing the goals set out in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nuclear disarmament remained the highest priority on the disarmament agenda of Myanmar. Since 1995, Myanmar had annually tabled a draft resolution on nuclear disarmament at the General Assembly. However, it remained deeply concerned by the failure to reach agreement on a final document at the 2015 Review Conference.

129. Myanmar remained committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and called upon all parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to fully comply with their obligations under the Treaty as a matter of urgency. It hoped that the current session would help the 2020 Review Conference to make progress on the implementation of the Treaty.

130. **Mr. Patriota** (Brazil), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that the Coalition remained committed to contributing constructively to the review process. It was deeply concerned that the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons had not abated and that the risk of a nuclear detonation continued to grow. States parties must demonstrate their commitment to peace and security by fully implementing the Non-Proliferation Treaty and advancing towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control. As the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty's entry into force approached, all States parties should reiterate their commitment to it as the cornerstone of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

131. The nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments of States parties, as established in article VI of the Treaty and subsequently elaborated in the Treaty's Review Conference outcomes, were clear. The consensus agreements reached at previous Review Conferences, particularly the package of decisions and resolutions of 1995, the 13 steps and the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, were binding

commitments and represented common ground on which all States parties had agreed.

132. Throughout each review cycle and in the annual General Assembly resolution on the matter, the New Agenda Coalition had consistently called for the accelerated implementation of States parties' nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. Those included the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, the entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, a fissile material cut-off treaty, transparency measures, nuclear disarmament verification, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East, and the entry into force of the legally binding protocols to existing treaties, as well as the review of any related reservations.

133. Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments remained valid, were binding on all States parties and should not be subject to any form of reinterpretation. Their implementation was imperative, including through the establishment of voluntary benchmarks and timelines, and would advance international security and reinforce the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. The bargain between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States was at the core of the Treaty and must be fulfilled by both sides. Constructive dialogue on the implementation of obligations under the Treaty was welcome, however the imposition of any conditions for such obligations would undermine the goal for universalization and the credibility of the Treaty.

134. States' existing obligations and commitments were mutually reinforcing and reflected the common agreement of all States parties on measures to advance the implementation of article VI. There were differing views on a number of key issues, including on the approach to and pace of disarmament, the emphasis to be given to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon detonation and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. While such views should be acknowledged, they must not prevent all parties from working together to achieve progress. The Coalition had formulated proposals and recommendations in a working paper, which it would present during the thematic debate on nuclear disarmament.

135. States parties must identify new and creative ways of realizing the shared goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Upholding the Non-Proliferation Treaty required more than statements of good intentions; it required the concrete and unequivocal fulfilment of the disarmament obligations that underpinned the regime.

136. **Mr. Rosemberg** (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization)

said that while there was a temptation to give in to cynicism with respect to the nuclear non-proliferation architecture, there was in fact good news to share. The Non-Proliferation Treaty had succeeded in preventing a massive expansion of the nuclear capability of States over the previous fifty years, and, through norm-setting and evolving verification standards, tools and techniques, it had significantly reduced the risk of nuclear proliferation.

137. However, more must be done to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including delivering on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The links between the two treaties were strong: over the years, the Test-Ban Treaty had played a critical role in the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process and had been an integral part of the 1995 decision to extend it.

138. Confidence had grown with the development of the Test-Ban Treaty verification regime. Over 300 international monitoring system installations had been established around the world to send data to the International Data Centre in Vienna. The Preparatory Commission provided a level of nuclear test detection that few had thought possible when the Treaty had been negotiated. The verification regime ensured that no State could confidently carry out an undetected nuclear test explosion. After each of the six tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for example, accurate and timely data had been provided to States.

139. Currently, 184 parties had signed the Test-Ban Treaty and 168 of those had ratified it. Although the Treaty had yet to enter into force, its contribution to international peace and security was clear. The enduring nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula presented a unique opportunity for the international community to harness the extraordinary potential of the Preparatory Commission for Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Treaty itself. Notwithstanding the successes of the Preparatory Commission, the only way to secure all the potential benefits of the Treaty was to bring it into force. Given that Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification regime was effective and that there was a de facto global moratorium on nuclear tests, entry into force was the most effective disarmament measure at the disposal of the international community.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.