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Evaluation of rural development activities of the United Nations
system in three African least developed countries

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly and of the Economic and Social Council the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "Evaluation of rural development activities of the United Nations system in three African least developed countries" (JIU/REP/89/2).

EVALUATION OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
IN THREE AFRICAN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

(Burkina Faso, Burundi, United Republic of Tanzania)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Rural development activities have been a major concern of the United Nations system since the early 1960s. As of 1974 the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) has initiated an effort intended to lead to better coordinated and effective rural development assistance programmes, through the mechanism of the ACC Task Force on Rural Development. The Task Force held its first meeting in 1976 with the participation of all United Nations organizations concerned. At this meeting the Task Force gave particular attention to the importance of coordination at the country level in order to alleviate rural poverty. One of the main United Nations system policy guidelines on rural development is contained in the Declaration of Principles and Programmes of Action adopted by the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD) endorsed by General Assembly resolution 34/14 of 1979. This resolution calls upon the United Nations system to assist Governments in a broad range of activities for the benefit of rural people.

2. Different organizations have different definitions of rural development. For example, the definition agreed upon by the ACC Task Force is that "a poverty-oriented rural development activity is one which is aimed at benefiting the relatively less-advantaged segments of the population of rural areas". The UNDP in its Evaluation Study No.2 - Rural Development of June 1979, defined rural development "as a process of socio-economic change involving the transformation of agrarian society in order to reach a common set of development goals based on the capacities and needs of people". For the purpose of this report, "rural development activities" are understood as those United Nations system financed activities aimed at meeting the needs of either all the rural population or the specific basic needs of its poorest segments, i.e.: the landless labourers, sharecroppers, small-holders and the rural jobless, as well as special target groups such as women and youths. Broadly speaking, such activities at the grass-roots level comprise projects dealing with irrigation, assistance and credit for small farmers and cooperatives, livestock and forestry development, sanitation, nutrition improvement, basic education and primary health care, etc.

3. This report attempts to evaluate the relevance and coherence of United Nations system rural development efforts with the underlying aim of improving their effectiveness. In order to narrow the study to a manageable size three African least developed countries were selected: Burkina Faso, Burundi, and the United Republic of Tanzania, which are somewhat representative of three distinct cultural, linguistic and geographical areas. On the basis of information and documentation provided by UNDP and specialized agencies involved in rural development, it was felt that these three countries had both a sufficient number and an appropriate mix of ongoing and terminated rural development activities. Following a preliminary analysis, a sample of 25 projects implemented by certain organizations of the United Nations system was constructed. The findings of this report are based on the detailed analysis, through desk work and field visits, of the 25 sample projects (see Chapter II). Short project summaries for each of the 25 projects are issued separately as Annex I. In addition, the report attempts to put forward some more general thoughts on the mechanisms and limitations of the "project approach" to rural development (Chapter III). The Conclusions and Recommendations of the study are contained in Chapter IV.

4. Considerable amounts of resources have been channelled by the United Nations system aimed at improving the daily lives of hundreds of millions of people who live in poverty in the rural areas of the third world. Despite this flow of assistance over the last twenty five years, and the many

evaluation and other studies published, there is little hard information about the overall effectiveness at the grassroots **level** of United Nations system rural development projects. Already in 1977 the WCARRD conference recognized the need to focus "on institutional changes needed for rural development to get the people involved and to ensure their effective participation". Some **10** years later, there is a widespread feeling of discomfort about the role of United Nations system assistance and its effectiveness in this area.

5. The Inspectors were prompted to undertake this study because they felt there was some confusion and uncertainty as to who were the actual beneficiaries of rural development projects financed by the United Nations system. Accordingly, the report tries to examine to what extent the poorest segments of the rural population are being reached by the system's activities and to what extent they are actually involved in their implementation and in securing that such activities produce long term results. As will be seen the picture is rather mixed and suggestions for improvement and for changes in the traditional modus operandi of the system's operational organizations are made in Chapter **17**. These suggestions and recommendations should be seen as JIU's contribution to the overall ongoing debate on the relevance and effectiveness of the system's operational activities for development,

6. Despite obvious shortcomings the Inspectors are convinced that the United Nations system still has a lot to contribute. Its assistance has the comparative advantage of having no strings attached. Its potential, if properly streamlined remains intact.

7. This study would not have been possible without the assistance and patient explanation of a large number of individuals in the Headquarters of organizations of the system, in the capitals of the countries visited and last but not least at the project locations in the villages where rural **development** was actually taking place. Valuable discussions were held at all levels, including most stimulating on-the-spot discussions with beneficiaries or their representatives. The dedication and co-operation of all concerned is gratefully acknowledged.

IT. **ANALYSIS:** PROJECT PATTERNS, SUCCESSES AND CONSTRAINTS

1. **The sample**

8. The construction of the sample of projects to be visited and assessed went through several phases. Following visits to the main organizations involved in rural development activities (**UNDP**, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, **ILO**), basic data was gathered which led to the selection of the three African **LDCs**. The main criterion utilized was the availability of a sufficiently large number and varied mix of completed and **ongoing** rural development projects, including integrated rural development projects in each country. Burkina Faso, Burundi and Tanzania *were* identified and basic data on all rural development (**RD**) projects going as far back as 1975 were collected and analyzed. After further analysis and consultation with the organizations concerned, an ad hoc stratified sample of some 40 projects was constructed in which it was attempted to obtain a representative mix of projects - according to executing agency, funding source, size, duration, etc. A special effort was made to include projects which were "**old**" enough to have been evaluated. An **attempt** to exclude projects which were too recent was also made; this was not, however, always possible.

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9. After further study of the basic project documentation made available by the organizations the sample had to be reduced for logistic or practical reasons in order to make the field visits more manageable. In addition 3-3 projects had to be eliminated from the sample on the spot because it was felt that they were not "true" rural development projects or because their RD impact was too indirect (e.g. a rural development training institute).

10. The sample on which the analysis is based therefore has the following characteristics:

Country	FAO	IL0	WFP	UNICEF	UNIDO	UNESCO	Total
Burkina Faso	3	2	1	1	1		7
Burundi	4	1	1	1		1	8
Tanzania	6	1	1	1	1		10
Total projects	12	4	3	3	2	1	25

Technically the sample includes more than 25 "projects" because (a) sequences of projects (e.g. Phase I, Phase II) were considered as one project and (b) clusters of projects (e.g. an umbrella project with various components) were also considered likewise.

11. Breakdown by budget size (all phases and sources combined):

less than \$US 200,000 . 4
 \$100,000 - 1 million . 2
 \$1 million - 3 million . 8
 \$3 million . 11 (including 3 projects
 with total budgets of more than \$10 million and 1 at
 42 million)

17. Sources of financing:

UNDP 6
 Funds in trust 4
 Multiple (i.e. UNDP + funds in trust) 7
 UNICEF 3
 WFP 3
 Regular Budget funds 2

13. Project duration: eight projects had lasted (or if they were still active were scheduled to last) less than three years. Seventeen had a life span of more than three years. Several projects (nine projects with two phases, one project with three phases) had rather long implementation histories with two or even three phases. At the time of the JIU analysis, eight projects were completed and seventeen were ongoing. Most of these were sufficiently "old" for the assessment exercise to be meaningful (i.e. a sufficient number of years or phases had elapsed since inception and/or a formal evaluation report had been prepared). Three projects were in their first year or 18 months of implementation and it was consequently too early to make a full assessment of their implementation.

17. For details see the project summaries in the Annex I to this report.

14. Functional types: not surprisingly the overwhelming majority of projects had "direct support" as their primary function (20), followed by "institution building" (5). As for secondary functional type, institution building came first (8), followed by direct support (4), direct training (4) and pilot or experimental (2). The term "direct support" in fact covers a wide variety of projects ranging from large intensive labour or food for work schemes in which hundreds of labourers were involved to small-scale assistance to one or two village groups or cooperatives with a handful of beneficiaries.

2. Methodology for analysis

15. Prior to the field visits, the documentation concerning the 25 projects was thoroughly analyzed, a standardized project data sheet was prepared and open questionnaires for interviews were developed. The visits to the three countries were conducted by separate teams (one inspector and one research person) in July 1987 (Burkina Faso), February -March 1988 (Burundi) and March 1988 (Tanzania). Two to three weeks were spent in each country, gathering and reviewing additional data, visiting project sites and the corresponding ministerial offices, and discussing both project and more general issues with Government officials, United Nations system representatives, experts, counterparts, beneficiaries (when possible) and other multilateral or bilateral donor officials. All in all more than 100 interviews were held.

16. The final phase of the research involved the consolidation and analysis of the data gathered. A standard tabulation format was utilized to assess each project in terms of some 400 design, implementation, monitoring and review and impact variables. This permitted the identification of patterns of successes and constraints among projects.

17. Some caution should be exercised in interpreting what follows. Because of the diversity of projects included in the sample, the actual comparability of the assessments among projects is somewhat problematic. Projects differed considerably in size, scope, complexity, strategy, beneficiaries and duration. Comparing a small, successful, single-objective, \$200,000 project lasting one year to a \$40 million integrated, multi-purpose, multi-donor, RD scheme lasting ten years, which had run into problems, may not be altogether pertinent. In addition, essential analytic elements were often unavailable, inadequate or conflicting and/or were sometimes couched in different varieties of jargon resulting from the varied technical co-operation emphases, concepts, formats and reporting practices of the United Nations system organizations. The weighting and interpretation of the analytic elements is of course a matter of judgement and the biases or subjective inclinations of the observers must naturally be taken into account. Notwithstanding these limitations, the Inspectors feel that the following patterns - which are presented as broad findings rather than as a precise statistical analysis - provide a general picture of the successes and constraints of United Nations system RD efforts. The recurring nature of some of the planning, implementation and impact problems which are identified is worth noting and points to areas which require attention and perhaps even a reappraisal of the system's role in activities targeted at the grassroots level.

3. Project planning and design

18. Overall, the basic conception and design of the 25 projects in the JIU sample - at the time they were formulated - appears to be "reasonably" good. The design was considered to be "poor" only in five cases; about half of the

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projects were in the "fair" category and the design was "good" in seven cases ¹⁷. UNDP financed projects seemed to have better ratings than trust fund projects (where in most cases the project document is of a less detailed contract type). More recent projects also seem to have benefited considerably from United Nations system efforts to standardize project document presentation.

19. Events leading up to the preparation of the project document were difficult to assess. Formally, the original proposal for the project always comes from the recipient Government, but informally the prime mover can be suspected to be the executing agency either at headquarters or in the field (14 cases) or a combination of efforts which make it difficult to distinguish the origins of the project (10). No evidence was found that any of the projects had been initiated by a request of the direct beneficiaries at the local or grassroots level. Evidence that such beneficiaries had been consulted or informed before the project started was, however, found in seven cases. In a few cases (UNICEF in Tanzania, ILO in Burkina Faso) the consultation process appeared to have gone a step further in the sense that the regional and local authorities had been fully involved at the planning stage and that the village level beneficiaries participated in the process to some extent. But these are the exceptions that prove the rule: United Nations system RD activities are basically "top down" and the beneficiaries' point of view is either disregarded or very difficult to ascertain at the planning stage, given the rigidity of present planning procedures (it is no surprise that UNICEF which is by far the most "flexible" organization when it comes to planning - and re-planning - projects in the field is the most successful in involving the direct beneficiaries, at least to some extent).

20. All projects had a project document or equivalent (e.g. a contract for Funds in Trust, or subcontractor projects) and all project documents discussed the specific problem to be addressed reasonably well (four "fair", none "poor"). More general implications, i.e. how the specific problem relates to broader development issues were less thoroughly discussed (four "fair", four "poor").

21. All the project documents contained a statement of the immediate objectives of the project. With four exceptions, the results to be achieved by the project were clearly stated. However, five projects did not state their objectives in measurable terms and in four this was poorly done. Twenty-three project documents contained a specific completion date.

22. Although all the projects stated the higher level objectives to which the project was expected to contribute, the discussion of how the achievement of the immediate objectives would contribute to the broader ones was much more limited: in two cases there was no such discussion and in eight it was less than satisfactory. Most project documents established convincingly that the objectives were clearly related to high Government priorities (18) and that the project would fit well into a Government programme during implementation (17); but in only seven cases did they consider what would happen after completion.

¹⁷ A comparison with JIU findings (25 per cent "good", 40 per cent "fair", 35 per cent "poor") in its report on technical co-operation activities in Sri Lanka (JIU/REP/79/16, para. 38) would seem to show that United Nations system project design has improved considerably over the last ten to twelve years.

23. Most of the project documents provided a "good" or "fair" description of the specific nature and type of inputs to be provided and of the activities and tasks to be undertaken during implementation. The discussion of the implementation strategy - i.e. how the activities are to be linked together to achieve the expected results - was much weaker: this was found to be totally lacking in two cases and "poor" in eight.

24. Host project documents, if not all, were relatively precise in their description of the duties and responsibilities of the various parties involved, the number, nature and type of outputs to be produced, a specific work plan and targets to be achieved at various stages. All projects, save a handful, also identified progress indicators to measure progress and results.

25. Other desirable elements of good project design were found to be less prevalent:

- (a) Only 12 projects discussed the expected impact, i.e. the changes in the development situation to be produced by the project;
- (b) Only three project documents adequately discussed important constraints and assumptions which would affect the implementation process;
- (c) Only one project document mentioned that alternative strategies or possibilities for implementation were considered and why they were not found to be suitable;
- (d) More importantly, although all project documents except two discussed specific provisions for monitoring and evaluation, the overwhelming majority did not even mention specific issues relating to the "turnover" of project capability/results to the Government and/or other beneficiaries (20) or provisions for project follow-up(19). In the few cases in which this was done, it was poorly done.

26. Not surprisingly, the objectives of all the projects were related to rural development and/or to solving problems which affected the rural populations. In three cases the projects were, however, found to be only indirectly linked with RD, either because they provided support to a research function (URT/81/032) or because they were targeted primarily at the strengthening of Government administrative entities (BDI/78/003 and BKF/81/005).

27. An interesting finding was that United Nations system RD activities are not necessarily targeted towards the poorest segments of the rural population. Only in a handful of cases (6-7) did project documents establish convincingly that the direct beneficiaries of the activity would be the rural poor or the poorest of the poor. A significant number of projects (10) seemed to be targeted to the whole rural population rather than to a specific group. Six projects were aimed at such generally under-privileged groups (e.g. women, primary school children, plantation workers) and an equal number addressed the concerns of groups that it would be hard to define as under-privileged, e.g. farmers who possessed tractors or significant numbers of cattle, local or district level Government officials, etc.

28. A majority of project documents (20) specifically provided for the direct participation in implementation of the local or district level Government officials and/or the participation of other local authorities (e.g. elected officials, village chiefs). Fourteen projects provided for the direct

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participation of the final beneficiaries in implementation, but voluntary labour or self-help activities were mentioned only in eight cases.

29. The above findings would seem to indicate that although generally speaking project planning and design appear to be reasonably good a number of limitations remain, some of which warrant urgent attention:

- (a) involvement of beneficiaries in project identification and design is weak, if not non-existent; RD activities are therefore basically "top down" - a fact that is likely to affect implementation (see below);
- (b) the emphasis on project document preparation seems to be more on specific objectives, inputs and activities rather than on implementation strategies and on the contribution of outputs to the achievement of the broader or higher level objectives; little or no effort is made to discuss constraints affecting implementation or possible alternative strategies;
- (c) very little attention is given to what will happen after completion; turnover issues are not addressed; sustainability, (i.e. the need or not for continuing assistance) is glossed over, perhaps with the underlying assumption that such assistance will be forthcoming;
- (d) While in most cases beneficiaries are identified, project documents are often vague about social change issues, i.e. who will gain and who will lose from the project/activity. This sometimes gives the impression that project documents are drafted in a social vacuum.

4. Implementation

30. Practically all the projects in the sample experienced significant delays in implementation. While the importance of delays should not be overstated, in 13 cases project results and success were seriously affected by these delays. In only five projects did the delays not lead to significant problems in implementation. The major causes for delay in descending order of occurrence were (several Projects were affected by multiple delays):

Government provision of facilities, equipment or services (20);
administrative and technical problems (16);
assignment of counterpart or national project staff (15);
arrival of equipment (14);
selection and arrival of international staff (9);
shortage of building materials or of transport facilities (7);
political factors (5);
theft, deterioration or pilferage of project equipment or materials (4).

31. Delays were of course not the only factors which affected project implementation and led to changes in the original plans. The most common change was budgetary revisions (16) normally upwards (but also downwards in a few cases because of lack of essential inputs which impeded delivery), followed by activity revisions (14), changes in the sequence of implementation of project activities (12) and major personnel shuffles (12). Substantive revisions of project objectives and strategy were less frequent (6). The result of the above constraints is that the original time-frame was respected in less than half of the projects (8); 14 projects had to be extended and in the remaining four cases it was too early to tell whether or not the original time frame would be met.

32. The quality of administrative and technical backstopping to projects from field offices and agency headquarters was difficult to assess. Few complaints were recorded concerning backstopping provided by both UNDP and Agency field offices. Cases of poor performance both on administrative (10) and technical matters (8) were more often traced to agency headquarters. The particular case of the inability of various headquarters technical units to provide co-ordinated technical backstopping to integrated or multi-sectoral rural development projects was noted in several cases.

33. Another aspect of implementation considered was the relationship of sample projects with other projects. More than half of the projects were related or co-ordinated with other similar projects. In the majority of cases, however, the relationship was somewhat problematic and several constraints were noted: lack of exchanges of information, different financial or administrative practices which made co-ordination difficult, occasional conflicts of competence between implementing agencies. In several cases the co-ordination was more formal than substantial and real "bridges" across projects had not been built.

34. From the point of view of the methods or strategies of implementation most projects seemed to be rather traditional (i.e. experts + counterparts + equipment) and not particularly innovative in their approach. In 6-8 cases however new or non-traditional features were found. These included special and successful efforts of popular participation like the setting up of income generating women's groups and youth farms, flexible and non-centralized village level implementation approaches, use of labour intensive technology and self-help activities, etc. In a handful of cases, projects had been successfully executed at the local level without - or with minimal - expatriate presence.

35. Twenty projects involved international personnel whether United Nations system staff members (18) or sub-contracted staff (2). In seven projects the number of experts was less than three; nine projects had three to five experts and only four had more than six (this includes two sub-contracted projects, one of which involved some 20 expatriates).

36. Major problems with the qualifications and personality of internationally recruited staff were identified in six (out of 20) projects. By and large the experts seemed to be technically qualified for their work and capable of guiding and accomplishing project tasks. This was perhaps facilitated by the fact that nearly all were stationed permanently at the project site. The picture seemed slightly less positive regarding social/personal abilities in working with national staff and in transferring skills. A few comments on arrogant or ostentatious expert attitudes were also registered.

37. All projects involved national project staff or counterpart personnel. Given the "direct support" nature of many projects, large numbers of national staff were often concerned. More than 20 staff were involved in ten projects and more than 50 in five projects. This includes permanently hired labour but not occasional labourers/beneficiaries as in the ILO special works projects where up to 300 labourers could be employed at any given time.

38. Major counterpart problems were found in more than half the projects (16). In descending order of importance the main constraints affecting the work of counterpart staff were: lack of support, administrative or otherwise, from the Government (17), long delays in selection (15), problems caused by rapid turnover (15) and job retention after the departure of the expatriates or the end of the project (10). Despite these deficiencies, the majority of

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counterparts seemed to be making an overall effective contribution (15), they seemed relatively motivated and active in the project, and able to learn the desired skills in the majority of cases.

39. Nearly all projects also involved other Governmental inputs in addition to the national staff: funds, equipment, ~~se. vices~~, office space or buildings, administration. Although when available such inputs were always utilized, the major problem was their timeliness which was adequate only in three projects (with long delays found in 15 cases). Delayed arrival of equipment and facilities was the most frequently quoted problem. As for the quality of such inputs, the picture was mixed with roughly half "good" and half "poor".

40. In all projects except one, the United Nations system was providing equipment. In most cases this was both expendable and non-expendable equipment. In over half of the projects the equipment was basically acceptable in terms of quality, quickly installed, appropriate for local use and useful to the Government on a continuing basis. Serious problems were, however, encountered in the procurement and delivery of the equipment. Such problems seem to have affected nearly all projects to a lesser or greater extent. Constraints in the maintenance and in the availability of spare parts which lead to the immobilization of essential pieces of equipment were also noted in many cases.

41. Formal training was a component in 20 projects. This ranged from on-the-job training provided by the expatriates to formal educational institutions involving hundreds of trainees. The most frequent combination was training provided by experts and locally trained trainers (18). In the majority of cases the training components - which were relatively minor in the sample projects - were able to proceed as planned even if frequent problems in the timeliness and quality of supporting services and facilities were noted. In several projects difficulties in the identification of trainees or in training the prescribed numbers of trainees were apparent. Fellowships were provided for in only a small number of projects (7), and even in these projects their role was quite marginal compared to other project components. Apart from difficulties in selecting fellows and in ensuring their timely release from their jobs, no significant problems relating to fellowships were noted.

42. These findings highlight a number of recurring problems which affect project implementation. Many are familiar problems which are not specific to RD activities as such. The fact that they have been addressed many times ^{1/} in the past and that they seem to remain largely intractable is a finding in itself:

- (a) Reliable project scheduling is the exception rather than the rule; delays in the provision of inputs both from the Government, and the United Nations system are widespread. The Impression is that projects are expected to achieve too much too soon but then inevitably get bogged down in organizational and logistic problems. Perhaps a partial solution to this would be to allow for a "take off" or "lead" period at the beginning of the project during which all the essential elements would be "assembled" prior to full-speed implementation. When appropriate this could be done through the advance appointment of the CTA or project director or both.

1/ Inter alia in several JIU reports, in particular JIU/REP/79/16, para. 65.

- (b) The provision of Government inputs (staff, facilities, services, etc.) is a recurrent and particularly serious problem. The burden that this represents for the Government should be recognized, especially - as was the case in the three countries visited - when large numbers of TC projects from many different donors have to be taken care of and when the national absorption capacity is limited. Caution in scheduling and in imposing unnecessary burdens should be exercised. Decentralization of national project support and monitoring functions from the central to the regional level should be encouraged whenever possible.
- (c) The question of the frequent rapid turnover of counterpart staff should also be addressed. When projects are part of the normal Government (central, regional or local) administrative structure - rather than operated through ad hoc project management units (PMU) - the phenomenon appears to be easier to control. PMUs should also be discouraged because they are normally "run" by the expatriate team and often have a depressing effect on the motivation of counterparts and lead to sustainability problems.
- (d) Delays in procurement, delivery, customs clearance of project equipment are also still common. In RD projects, however, an additional problem arises or is more serious: maintenance and the availability of spare parts in locations which are often remote or difficult to reach by road. Instances of the obvious inadequacy of equipment were also noted. More care should be exercised in this respect - especially in trust fund projects, where the donor tends to exert leverage on procurement. This sometimes results in inappropriate technology being forced on projects.

5. Achievement of objectives and impact

43. Most project documents contained immediate objectives stated in measurable terms and those that did not developed such indicators as the project proceeded. The Inspectors did not however attempt to assess the achievement of project objectives in measurable or quantifiable terms. Because of the complexity of many of the projects which involved many objectives and activities and in which unquantifiable social forces were often at play, they had to rely on a more informal assessment based on a combination of field observations, analysis of documentation and discussions with project staff, participants and beneficiaries.

44. The information gathered indicates that in more than half the projects, outputs were produced as expected and that these outputs contributed to the desired results (even if the contribution of the outputs to results was only "poor" in eight cases). Generally speaking, the immediate objectives had been achieved (or were being achieved) very well or "fairly" in about half the projects (and poorly or not at all in nine projects).

45. As mentioned above, the JIU assessment was based on a combination of measurement data, physical observation, specific formal written, or less formal, assessments made by the parties involved (UNDP, Agency, Government, experts, counterparts, etc.). In two thirds of the cases these observations/assessments/opinions did not conflict with each other.

44. The extent to which the project activities and outputs contributed to higher-level or broader objectives was difficult to ascertain. In many cases (10) no indicators of such achievement were ever developed. In close to half

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the projects (13) it appeared that there had been little contribution. A reason for this that was quoted several times was the fact that project infrastructures or facilities were being poorly or insufficiently utilized.

47. Other assessment considerations were also analyzed:

- (a) The economy and efficiency of project operations was rather mixed: five projects came in under budget (in most of these as a result of slow implementation rate) and 8 came in over budget. Among the latter, cost overruns averaged over 100%, with one ranging up to 600%. The impression, however, was that despite delays and implementation constraints an efficient use was being made of United Nations system TC resources in the majority of cases. Nine instances of "inefficient" use were recorded and these, again, included cases of under-utilization of staff and/or facilities.
- (b) A significant finding was the extent to which, in retrospect, projects appeared to be too ambitious and unrealistic. Although the cases of confusion, conflicts or arguments among parties concerning project objectives appeared to be rather limited (6-8), objectives and overall design and strategy of projects were considered to be reasonable only in a minority of projects (8). The objectives and implementation strategy appeared - with the benefit of hindsight - to be unrealistic in a majority of projects (15). Design and strategy also appeared to be too complicated in 8 projects and too vague and inadequate in 5.

48. Other than the specifically planned results as expressed in the project documents, some positive (and a few negative) impacts were noted. The most frequently cited positive impact was the improvement of the economic conditions of beneficiaries (14), and self-reliance and managerial impacts (10 and 7). Positive changes in social relationships (3) and technological impacts (5) were more limited. On the negative side, one-third of the projects seemed to have created additional dependency and two had had a negative effect on social stratification.

49. All in all, the majority of projects (15) seemed to be still relevant to priority Government concerns. In most cases (18), beneficiaries were using project results; however, only a small number (10) had taken over specific responsibilities from the project and in close to half the projects it appeared that project results/impact would not continue or increase.

50. With respect to the level of technology utilized in the projects, this seemed to be reasonably well accepted and utilized in all projects except three. However, the impression in a significant number of cases (9) was that the choice of the technology had been dictated from above and that it was not properly mastered or internalized by participants/beneficiaries. On a related issue, it appeared that in about half the projects (12) there had been problems in integrating the technical and social aspects of the activities, i.e. the former had been taken care of reasonably smoothly but their acceptance by the participants or beneficiaries had been problematic.

51. This rather mixed picture is reinforced by the findings concerning the overall sustainability of projects. While, as we have seen, most projects appeared to be reasonably successful in the technical delivery of the goods or activities they were supposed to provide, in a significant majority of cases (15) beneficiaries did not seem to have sufficient capacities (e.g. skills, economic or other resources, leadership, incentives) to actively maintain

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project results on their own after the withdrawal of external support. The number of cases where such capacities existed was very limited ("very good" in only two projects and "fair" in 5). Conversely, sustainability was found to be very dependent (15), or fairly dependent (5), on continuing external assistance (whether from international, national or local institutional sources). Such support was required in particular for the maintenance of project equipment and for its eventual renewal. Instances where projects had been thought out in such a way that they would generate sufficient resources to cover these costs were really the exception (3) rather than the rule. The extent to which the external support forces or groups appeared to be actually committed to the continuation of project results was also quite unclear: commitment was "strong" or "fair" in six cases, "poor" in ten and difficult to discern in the remaining cases.

52. On a more positive note, sustainability in nearly all projects seemed to be fully compatible with the existing socio-cultural situation, value systems and traditional beliefs. Similarly, no instances of serious negative impact of projects on the local ecological equilibrium were identified. A few projects might have possible negative effects in the long-term (e.g. depletion of water table, or salinisation of lakes due to increased fertiliser use), but the majority of projects were having overall positive effects on the environment (e.g. afforestation, anti-erosion works, etc.).

53. Finally, in retrospect, it appeared that most projects (17) were really helping to meet an important Government priority need. However, from the point of view of the beneficiaries, the majority of projects (13) did not seem to be really helping to meet an important priority need of the poorest of the poor or of another under-privileged group. As already noted, this is partly due to the fact that many projects were targeted to the whole rural population rather than to specific under-privileged groups. Nonetheless, the fact that only a handful of projects was really "putting the last first" is a significant finding.

54. The picture that emerges from the above findings relating to achievement of objectives and impact is mixed to say the least. The general impression is that United Nations system organizations are proficient in setting in motion projects and activities, that the goods are delivered more or less on time at a cost which - despite obvious overruns - is, broadly speaking, acceptable. In short, United Nations organizations are relatively efficient in carrying out their rural development activities, but from the point of view of their effectiveness there are serious shortcomings and much remains to be done.

55. The following points in particular seem to require corrective action:

- (a) Far too many projects turn out to be too ambitious and unrealistic. Although inputs and outputs may have been delivered in an efficient manner, when it comes to the effects or overall impact of the project there is often little to show, or little left behind. This gives rise first to false expectations and then to a disillusionment which, one surmises, is not conducive to self-reliance but rather breeds dependency. There is no easy answer to this problem since there is a built-in incentive for all concerned to be overly optimistic in the planning stage (if not projects would not be approved). Perhaps more flexibility in planning and re-planning of project activities should be encouraged. Rural development is a delicate social process and often a painstakingly slow one in which haste in implementation can have deleterious effects. A flexible, unambitious, trial-and-error

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approach which starts **slowly** and picks up speed as and when local conditions authorize would **probably give better results than a rigid, top-down, pressure-to-spend approach**. Planning should **take place continuously** "as the horizon **lights up**" rather than **once and for all at the beginning of the activity**.

- (b) If a process of social development is to be successful the choice of the technology to be utilized **and its acceptance** by participants/beneficiaries **is of fundamental importance**. Here too, as we have seen, there are problems: technology is too often seen as something which **is imposed** from the **outside and is** therefore difficult to internalize. Here **again caution and realism** should be the watchwords. **More situation analyses** are necessary before activities are launched and there should be sufficient lead time during which the technical and social aspects of **projects** can be better taken into consideration.
- (c) The fact that only a small number of projects appeared to be sustainable can hardly **come** as a surprise **given the constraints** identified above. It would seem that United Nations system organizations fall into a kind of "fire and forget" **syndrome**. Aid agencies **seem** to be quite good at launching activities out very little attention seems to be given to what happens after the end of the assistance, whether **seeds** of self-reliance or of dependency have **been sown**. This is not a new finding, but perhaps the time has come to face this issue squarely **and** to consider what steps should be taken to reverse the situation.
- (d) Another issue that requires attention relates to the beneficiaries. **Who** are they and what are they getting out of **United Nations** system RD activities? **Such** activities are not systematically targeted to benefit the poorest segments of rural populations. **The** Inspectors are not suggesting that this should always be the case. There may be valid reasons for assisting middle-level farmers if this can have an overall positive socio-economic effect (e.g. on employment). Rather, they are concerned that RD activities are often rather loosely targeted in the project documents, which leads to **misunderstandings** and sometimes false expectation?. **United Nations** system **TC procedures** are in many cases too cumbersome and lack the flexibility required for activities that **really** benefit the poorest of the poor or **specific underprivileged rural groups**. This should **change**: there is **no** reason why more flexible procedures for **United Nations** system grassroots activities should not be developed. **As a minimum**, project documents should always specify the socio-economic situation of the beneficiaries, possible positive or negative effects on the direct beneficiaries and other groups, who will gain and who will lose, a specific **strategy** for the turnover of project **results/facilities** after the end of the **external assistance** and discuss the overall **sustainability** of the operation after the end of such assistance.

6. Review and evaluation

56. For practically all the **projects** there was documentary evidence of **monitoring** on a more or less regular basis to **ensure** that they were proceeding according to plan. Normally this **was** done through periodic reports. Tripartite reviews were also conducted for most **UNDP** financed projects and

some trust fund projects. These were mostly held once a year and although no clear pattern was discernible, there was evidence in some cases of poor preparation (i.e. the exercise was perfunctory) and/or lack of active Government participation in these reviews.

57. In addition, with one or two exceptions, the projects had been regularly visited by agency headquarters or field staff and by UNDP field staff. For two or three remote projects there were complaints of lack of visits and for another five the impression was that they were over-visited (either because they were conveniently located close to the capital city or because they were considered as "show pieces" by the Government or the executing agency).

58. An encouraging finding was the extent to which the projects had been evaluated and, indeed, the present study has utilized those evaluations extensively. Although 17 of the 25 sample projects were still on-going, evaluations had been made for 18 projects (17 during implementation and one after completion). Three projects had been evaluated more than once. In addition, most of the evaluations had been undertaken as scheduled parts of the projects (only three had been conducted on an ad hoc basis). Nearly all the evaluations had been made by special missions (typically, tripartite missions, i.e. Government, funding and executing agency, but several were multiple donor and multiple executing agency missions).

59. Another interesting finding was the overall frankness and openness of the evaluations. Nearly all were substantive, well-organized and result-oriented exercises. Perfunctory, cover-up jobs were the exception rather than the rule. It was, however, difficult to determine to what extent these evaluations actually lead to substantive changes in project implementation. In about half the cases some evidence of re-direction of the project strategy could be ascribed to the evaluation report; in a few cases despite clear and repeated indications that changes were necessary it did not prove possible to do much.

60. Final and terminal assessment reports were available only for less than half the projects. Although their quality appeared to be relatively good, they were found to be much less frank in discussing limitations and constraints than the evaluation reports.

61. The above would seem to indicate:

- (a) that the monitoring and reporting process for RD projects is basically adequate, even if tripartite reviews do not always seem to be effective decision-making mechanisms;
- (b) mid-term evaluations are widely used and are generally of more than acceptable quality. The extent to which evaluation results lead to significant changes in project implementation varies, but the impression gathered is that this is still a weak spot;
- (c) ex post evaluations are not normally conducted (for funding and other reasons). This means that United Nations system organizations do not feel that it is important to check on the sustainability of projects after completion. As mentioned elsewhere in this report aid organizations understandably tend to put the emphasis on planning, delivery of inputs and production of outputs rather than on effectiveness and long-term impact. The Inspectors are convinced that more ex post studies should be done especially if more is to be learnt about the overall sustainability of RD activities. **They**

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recognize that funding of ex-post evaluations may be a problem since there is no provision for such **evaluations** in project budgets. They would recommend that the inclusion of a provision for ex-post evaluations in project **documents** be systematically considered **for** large scale projects and/or, if funding constraints make this impossible, that greater allowances be made by funding agencies for thematic ax-post evaluations of clusters of similar projects. If lessons learned could lead to the avoidance of expensive mistakes, this would be a particularly cost-effective use of scarce United Nations system resources.

7. Some more general findings and implications

62. The field visits and the detailed and often very stimulating discussions with Government officials at the central, regional and even local village levels, as well as with country-based United Nations system officials and representatives of non United Nations-system donors provided a wealth of information. An attempt has been made to exploit this information systematically in the preceding sections of this Chapter, and on a project-by-project basis in the project summaries which appear in Annex I. The following paragraphs will focus on some more general recurring issues and constraints, which may not have been sufficiently brought out into the open in the project-specific analysis.

63. The objective of the JIU study was to look at a sample of United Nations system rural development projects to determine principally what type of activities were being undertaken and to what extent they were actually benefiting the less privileged sections of the rural population. *One* project (support to an Institute for **Rural** Development) had to be dropped from the sample because it was an institution-building project which had only very indirect impact on the rural population. Another, a study on improved charcoal stoves, though potentially promising, did not receive any follow-up and therefore had no impact. Apart from these two projects, all the remaining ones were targeted to and were having a direct impact (positive or negative) on the rural populations. The intended beneficiaries were not always the under-privileged or the poorest of the poor: e.g. the two small-holder dairy development projects, as anyone who has a cow in Tanzania is by definition not the poorest of the poor. ~~But~~ by and large the projects were either targeted to benefit all the population (~~all~~ the women and children in the ease of UNICEF) in a particular area or certain groups which could be reasonably considered as under-privileged (unemployed youths, small-holders, organized groups of women, semi-landless plantation workers, etc.).

64. Another objective of the study was to determine to what extent beneficiaries were involved in the identification, planning and implementation of the project/activity. Here the picture was mixed. Not surprisingly, nearly all the activities were "top down" rather than "bottom up". In fact, only one project was "mostly bottom up"; seven projects were "partly top-down and partly bottom-up" and the remaining 17 were entirely top down in **their** conception and implementation. In some cases the project had been discussed with the village-level authorities and/or local **groups but it was hard to tell** to what extent the **project** actually corresponded to the priorities of the **beneficiaries** or to what extent, for better or worse, it was imposed from above. No instances of outright refusal were recorded, but various hints at "passivity" or "lack of motivation" of beneficiaries were made. In one case (UNICEF Tanzania) a conscious effort to **take** the "strategic planning" of the proposed activity al i the ray down to the ~~district ward~~ and village levels was made; ~~the feed back received~~ resulted in ~~considerable~~ modification of the

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plan of operations and to high-levels of community participation. Apart from being a successful project it was also encouraging to note that it was being implemented practically without any external assistance directly at the local level.

65. The design of projects was found to be pretty accurate in terms of identifying objectives, activities and strategies for implementation but was often overly ambitious in the timing of expected results and impact. In particular, project documents seem to under-estimate the social and cultural complexity of the "take off" phase in an RD project especially if it is predicated on people's participation and/or mobilization of local resources. The field visits pointed clearly to the fact that mobilization for rural development is a long, difficult and delicate process where many unexpected things may happen. Carefully thought-out and slow starting activities bear more chances of success, especially if they are deeply rooted in the local reality rather than parachuted from above. Another factor of success seems to be the presence of recognized local leaders/organizers committed to project success, rather than reliance on "remote control" from above or on the grafting of an external "cell" (i.e. a project management unit) for implementation.

66. The traditional project concept (expert + counterparts + equipment) often provides too rigid a framework for the delicate processes of community development. There seems to be a pressure to spend, and to expect too much, too soon. On the other hand delays in the provision of essential project elements - experts, counterparts, equipment - can also have a dampening effect on popular participation. Grassroots activities require flexibility in implementation and frequent re-timing and re-programming. United Nations system agencies - except UNICEF - have considerable structural difficulties in coping with the unexpected

67. The technology issue in rural development projects is crucial. In the sample there were both "appropriate technology" as well as **labour** intensive projects, and projects relying heavily on the use of vehicles and heavy equipment. In one case, a "political bulldozer", not foreseen in the project document was imposed on a project to make it more "visible". ~~the~~ impression is that often the technology is not properly "internalized" neither by the beneficiaries nor by the local level project counterparts. In a number of cases this has had negative effects on implementation and sustainability (as in the case of two village co-operatives for dairy development relying solely on **pick-up** trucks for the marketing of their products. Clearly, neither external assistance nor the Government can provide pick-ups for all the dairy co-operatives that it is proposed to set up in the region, so what is the **replicability** of the project?). Other examples of inappropriate technology projects launched without taking into consideration its acceptability for the rural population can be noted. In Burundi, one UNDP and two trust fund projects linked to each other (BDI/81/026, GCP/BDI/019/AGF, GCP/BDI/021/NET), produced water tanks; containers for storing cereals and large wheel-barrow for transporting goods. None of these ever became functional: the tanks were too expensive for the peasants to buy; and the grain containers, in addition to being expensive, were nothing new for the villagers, since they already had traditional storage facilities which worked well, etc. Finally, the wheel barrows were technically unsuitable, too **large** for one person to push and too expensive for the farmers to buy. Similarly, in Burkina Faso, a machine for making clothing from local material was bought and installed, without taking into consideration the especially hot climate. The result was the machine broke down only a few months after arrival. The intended beneficiaries, which were women, never benefited from it. In several projects the technology

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chosen bred dependency. In others - the use of burnt bricks produced by the beneficiaries for construction work on a youth farm, use of animal traction and back-pack transport in a women's co-operative - no dependency was being induced.

68. This raises the more general issue of self-reliance. Are United Nations system RD activities encouraging self-reliance at the local level or increased dependency? Some of the United Nations system agency representatives were quite adamant in stating that external assistance is creating a dependency syndrome in many African LDCs. The very large technical co-operation programmes (e.g. Tanzania received \$US 260 million in 1987 either on a grant or a loan basis) create real absorption problems. Instances of institution⁸¹ de-structuration resulting from the difficulties of coping with so many projects were pointed out to the JIU teams. In many projects visited symptoms of this were visible: difficulties in assigning appropriate and stable counterparts, untimely provision of Government inputs or support, serious maintenance problems, etc. In addition, there is an obvious problem of competition among donors to attract the Government's attention to "good" projects. The United Nations system, having little leverage, is sometimes pushed to the sidelines, and its pleas for "appropriate" technology and popular participation not listened to when they compete with technology-dependent or prestige projects. Sometimes, one has the impression that the United Nations system is left with the residual functions.

69. Closely related to self-reliance is the issue of who should be executing the project. The question of Government execution has been on the United Nations system agenda for over a decade but the evidence from the JIU sample is that not much progress has been made (at least in the countries visited). Only five projects involved total Government execution. These were mainly WFP and UNICEF projects for which the appointment of expatriates as experts is the exception rather than the rule. An additional 12 projects were being partly implemented by the Government. But this mode of execution did not seem to give satisfactory results (it was "good" only in two cases and "poor" in eight).

70. While nearly all projects had a designated Government project manager and an expatriate CTA had been appointed only in half the projects, the inescapable impression was that the Government was really "running" the project in a very small number of cases (4). Project management and control were in the hands of the CTA or of an expert in more than half (14) of the projects and balanced between the nation⁸¹ and expatriate staff in the remainder.

71. The expert-counterpart relationship therefore often breeds dependency. In sever⁸¹ cases the project was being "run" by the expatriates through a project management unit not directly integrated into a Government structure, which did not augur well for the phasing out of external technical assistance and the enhancement of national or local capability. In other cases the outlook was more promising, either because the experts were acting as advisers to a pre-existing national structure, rather than as managers, or because they were making a conscious effort of working themselves out of their jobs, or because (as in the case of UNICEF and WFP) the activities were being fully executed through Government or local structures

72. Instances of do-mobilization or de-motivation resulting from too much assistance too soon or from the untimely ending of it were also recorded. Fortunately, the catalytic effect of United Nations assistance sometimes also came into the picture. In a number of cases a small input from the United

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Nations system - a \$US 300 loan to a youth farm (UNICEF), a one-week consultancy in cheese-making to a women's dairy group (FAO), a small loan to a women's group to buy equipment to make sunflower oil (UNICEF) - went a long way to enhance confidence, self-reliance and the production of essential goods and services. In these and other cases the initial input triggered off various other activities and had a visible demonstration effect on the wider community. Interestingly, the cases where the United Nations assistance provided small loans directly to beneficiaries or set up revolving funds rather than resorting to handouts were the most encouraging: maximum mobilization to repay and no induced dependency.

73. The mission came across two projects which had had a clear negative impact on the social stratification of the beneficiaries, i.e. the rich were getting richer and there was not much change for the poorest. The impression is that the technical agencies of the United Nations system (FAO, ILO) are sometimes not well-equipped to assess social issues resulting from the delicate processes of rural development. The target group United Nations organizations (UNICEF and to some extent WFP) seem to be better armed in this regard, perhaps because they can afford to spend time (and some money) on socio-cultural situation analyses before the projects are launched. (ILO was only able to do this when it had become apparent that an irrigation scheme it had funded had been partly diverted to the benefit of the larger landowners).

74. There were also instances of lack of bridges across projects, e.g. there was no cross-fertilization between the two FAO forestry projects in Tanzania only 60 km apart in space but with no contact in concept (in fact, the two teams only actually met because of the presence of the JIU mission and found they had much to communicate). Vertical linkages also seemed to be lacking, e.g. between the charcoal stove improvement project and the forestry projects. In addition, there seems to be a certain confusion in roles among United Nations agencies which leads to some friction: FAO and ILO are involved in irrigation, ILO and UNICEF in water supply, FAO, ILO and WFP are into forestry, UNICEF and FAO in nutrition. While the JIU teams did not come across outright complaints of agencies treading on each other's turf, there does seem to be a problem of communication and information.

75. The issues of sustainability and replicability have been partly touched upon in the analysis above. The United Nations system somehow encourages the expectation of all concerned that "there will be another phase" (this is substantiated by a recent survey of UNDP mid-term evaluation reports, 90% of which actually recommended a further phase). But other issues need also to be addressed, in particular maintenance and recurring project costs once the external assistance ends. The missions had the impression that much more could be done to mobilize local resources and initiative to ensure that where a project has been successful its impact continues durably after the end of external assistance. In a few instances this did seem to be the case - a local structure or framework had been set up and funds were available or, better still, being generated to make it function - but this was more the exception than the rule.

76. Finally, a word should be said about the Governments' perceptions of United Nations system rural development activities. In the course of extensive discussions with government officials at the central level - mainly in the ministries of Planning - a number of significant comments were made on the role and effectiveness of United Nations system RD activities:

the United Nations system tends to be slow and bureaucratic, some of the bilateral donors are very fast in responding. The UNDP and

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Agency offices are merely post offices. All important decisions are taken at headquarters. UNICEF is quick in reacting and in making situation assessments. More delegation of authority is needed. A specific problem is the long lead time for experts to arrive and for the project to start once the project document has been signed.

The quality of experts is of concern to the governments and also, sometimes, their ostentatious behaviour.

- The expert-counterpart relationship is often poor. Sometimes the transfer of knowledge is purposely discouraged because the experts want to perpetuate their role.

Counterparts should increasingly be given more project management responsibilities (including responsibility for the management of funds) ; experts should have an advisory role rather than a managerial one.

The governments often have a real problem in coping with the myriad technical co-operation projects which they have to monitor and report on. The strengthening of existing government institutions usually gives better results than the setting up of new ones. Several government officials made a strong case for a shift towards programme assistance (e.g. of the UNICEF and WFP types) rather than too much emphasis on relatively small technical co-operation projects, but donors, including the United Nations system, tend to prefer traditional-type TC projects.

III. POVERTY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROJECT AID

1. The Problem: United Nations development activities be targeted to the "poorest of the poor"?

77. The purpose of this chapter is to make some general comments on the effectiveness of United Nations system RD activities and, in particular, of activities which are designed to meet the real or perceived needs of the segments of the population in third world countries. On the basis of the analysis of the sample of 25 projects reviewed, it seemed advisable to look at the broader context of these projects. The Inspectors were of the opinion that the detailed project review should be followed by some considerations regarding the very nature of technical co-operation and the relationship between the various parties involved before formulating conclusions and recommendations designed to improve existing procedures and practices (chapter IV).

78. The question of the effectiveness of aid is not new. Recently, however, the debate has been taking a new and even somewhat alarming turn, both for the donors and executing agencies and for the recipients. This may be explained by the fact that the general attitude towards development aid has changed, both in multilateral and in national circles, and by the fact that the period of rapid growth of aid budgets is definitely over. Global resources are stagnating and the various internal control mechanisms within agencies are much more attentive than in the past to the way in which aid is being used. In addition, public opinion in the countries of the North - and soon, perhaps, in the South is displaying increased critical interest in the effectiveness of programmes.

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79. At a time when development assistance goals are being defined more explicitly and the major multilateral and bilateral agencies, as well as the medium-sized and smaller ones (NGOs), are placing more emphasis on social objectives than on macro-economic objectives, the task these agencies face is not only more ambitious, but also more difficult. In the past 10 years, either as a reaction to the ineffectiveness of earlier programmes or as a result of pressure from a better-informed public, aid agencies have been stating much more clearly than in the past that the main objective of aid is to change the living conditions of the most underprivileged population sectors in the developing countries 1/. The problem is, however, that it may be more difficult - and it is in any event less spectacular - to finance and implement small operations designed and carried out at the grass-roots level in third world villages and communities than to build dams, universities or turnkey factories .

80. **Moreover**, it is being realized - and this too is alarming - that, even when the goal of improving living conditions "at the grass-roots level" is clearly stated, it is actually very difficult to deliver aid directly to the poorest of the poor. Often, aid goes no further than the middlemen, the bogus poor and the more "organized" sectors. It is also being realized that aid programming, implementation and evaluation methods are inadequate to the task of improving social conditions "at the grass-roots level", so much so that it may be difficult to tell the difference between success and failure, particularly when the criterion for success has to be a real change in living conditions.

81. Again, the **very** concept of aid and the institutional structures and administrative practices that surround it are increasingly being called into question. In many aid agencies, including the multilateral organizations, it is being asked whether the task is not too difficult. A feeling of failure is very widely perceptible 2/.

1/ Within the United Nations system, this is reflected not only in increased funding of programmes for the least developed countries (LDCs), but also in the adoption of specific strategies to reach the most underprivileged, such as the "basic needs" strategy (ILO, World Bank); the UNICEF "basic health services" strategy; the restructuring of part of FAO's activities (and all of IFAD's activities) in favour of the poorest rural population sectors as a result of the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD); WFP's multi-purpose rural development programmes; establishment of special United Nations and UNDP programmes for African countries south of the Sahara (UNSO, UN-PAAERD) and for assistance to specific target groups such as women (UNIFEM) through studies designed to measure and better understand poverty in rural areas (by ILO, UNRISD and the World Bank, for example).

2/ See for example: J.H. Schultes, "The Effectiveness of Aid as a Problem of Bureaucratic Management", in Essays in Honour of Hans Singer, Sussex, 1987; World Food Council, Effectiveness of Aid in Support of Food Strategies, doc. WFC/1985/3; two recent reports of the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation (docs. A/41/350 and A/42/326). See also: 5. Lecomte, Project Aid - Limitations and Alternatives, OECD, 1986; Nordic Study on the Effectiveness of Technical Cooperation, 1988; R. Chambers, Rural Development, Putting the Last First, Longman, 1983.

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82. In one sense, it is **reassuring** that development aid agencies are **having** doubts about their effectiveness, but it would be a mistake to think that a **bureaucracy** could go very far along those lines, i.e. that **it could go so far** as to ask questions that might cast doubt on the very foundations of its operational methods. At best, as is often the case, these **agencies** pay closer attention to their approach, to their procedures, to their planning and evaluation methods, as well as to all sorts of other procedural details, but they will **not really ask** substantive questions about the nature of their activities and the political, administrative and structural **constraints** which prevent them from doing more for the most underprivileged and from **"putting the last first"**.

83. Let us try to take a closer look at the way the aid agencies operate, from the viewpoint of their actual ability to reach and **develop** the potential of the **poorest** of the poor. This is a difficult task, but we might start on the basis of the following hypothesis:

84. The development aid **system** "invented" by the various aid agencies, particularly technical co-operation based on small projects, **has thought out** the causes of poverty as a function of the remedies available to the international community. These remedies were capital, technology and the exports, who, as it were, personified them. The desire or pressure to use available means came before, and therefore complicated, the analysis and understanding of the problems to be solved. The paradoxical result of this emphasis on specifics is that there may be a considerable gap between knowledge and action. It is therefore not surprising that there is a high risk of **error**.

85. Let us look at the approach of the aid agencies that work in what is commonly known as "rural development". The practice is much the same in United Nations and other multilateral agencies, in bilateral programmes and even in most of the large international NGOs. Even when - but this is not always the case - the declared aim of programmes is to reach the poorest of the poor in rural areas in third world countries, the task is not an easy one, even with the best of intentions, for the following reasons,

86. In the first place, there is the question of situation analysis, which comes before programme or project formulation. On what scraps of knowledge is such an analysis to be based? On the preconceived ideas of officials in a hurry to start implementation in order to show how effective their agency - including they themselves - are? On knowledge that has filtered down from or been selectively provided by national counterparts? On information collected from the many middlemen in the long chain linking the funding and executing agency to the real or perceived beneficiaries of the project to be carried out? It is worth asking who controls knowledge and information and in whose interest it is to channel and manipulate it.

87. Unfortunately, the major aid agencies and even the institutionalized NGOs are in much too great a hurry to carry out in-depth situation analyses. They often do not have the time to do so. A kind of obsession with productivity compels them to spend their funds as rapidly as possible because their governing bodies are in a hurry to show that projects are under way and that funds are not being left idle. The focus on specific results (number of kilometers of roads built, number of persons trained, number of wells dug) masks the fact that little consideration is given to the project's real impact on the persons for whom it is intended, on social relations, on daily life, on the environment, etc.

2. The project and its context

88. Technical co-operation has inevitably served as a vehicle for Western development concepts and models. For decades, no one really ever questioned the content and relevance of these concepts or the real effectiveness of "top-down" initiatives stemming from external rationality and technicality. Because the industrialized countries were modern and had the know-how and development was synonymous with modernization, anything that was "modern" had to work. Since the Governments of developing countries were often attracted more by the "outward signs" of development and by prestige projects than in-depth social development processes - which create more conflict, are more difficult to identify and organize and respond less to the criteria of immediate economic profitability - technical co-operation led all too often to the establishment of institutions or pilot projects that produced small islands of modernity which interacted very little with society as a whole.

89. Admittedly, in the past few years closer attention has been paid to the adaptation of technologies: hence the debate on "appropriate" technologies and on technical co-operation among developing countries. But it is questionable whether the actual concept of a technical co-operation project lends itself to applications different from the ones that now prevail, namely an activity meeting criteria of technical, organizational and "top-down" budgetary rationality. The project is the last link in a long chain of intermediaries in which a wide variety of actors play a part, and projects intended for the poorest of the poor have the longest chains: the Member States which adopt the strategy; the experts who formulate the programmes and may well have thought up the project; the funding agency; the representatives and experts of the specialized agency and the funding agency in the country concerned; various national ministries; consultants in the case of some larger projects; national officials at the regional or provincial level; elected, customary or informal local authorities; various local interest groups which may be for or against the proposed activity (extension agencies, trade unions, social workers, political parties, large land-owners); and, at the end of the chain, the real or presumed beneficiaries i.e. the village, the community, the peasant group...

90. Each intermediary operates according to his own criteria of rationality, political convenience or economic interest, which may or may not be compatible with those of the other links in the chain. The specialized agencies and funding agencies have to prove to their intergovernmental bodies that they are efficient, i.e. that they manage to spend money, deliver equipment, place experts, receive periodic reports and plan evaluation missions according to agreed standards. This approach is logical and coherent from the point of view of the aid agency, but it tends to shape the next links in the chain in its own image and confine them in a straitjacket.

91. From the point of view of the Government, which has to negotiate, execute and organize the follow-up to many projects and take care not to offend the susceptibilities of so many multilateral, bilateral and private aid agencies, compliance with all their administrative instructions will seem like a constraint that is only relatively acceptable and sometimes hard to "swallow". In countries with a weak administration, these constraints may cause genuine institutional **destructuring**. In African LDCs, for example, there may often be more than 50 aid agencies working at any one time. It is easy to imagine what a burden it may be for the local administration, which is often under International Monetary Fund constraints concerning the size of the civil service, to have to negotiate, take part in countless meetings, prepare reports and evaluations, provide project counterpart staff, organize logistics

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and transport and find acceptable housing for expatriate staff. In the poorest countries, project aid may account for a large proportion of the Government's budget resources; in this case, technical co-operation directly "sucks up" large resources, thereby weakening the Government's capacity to allocate funds according to its own priorities.

92. In the meantime, what happens to the poor people in the village or community at the other end of the chain? The following three examples will explain this point:

(a) The fully top-down initiative, in which there is no participation, since the poor people concerned have not asked for anything: one day, lorries arrive and something is set up (an irrigation system, a school, a training **centre**). When the local groundwork has not been done, the project, even if technically a success, may be seen as an operation the community has been landed with, since it is based on a way of thinking that is different **from** the community's and is thus unlikely to mobilize local support. In addition, it involves the danger of encouraging "cargo cult" and dependency.

(b) The bottom-up/top-down dialectic: the villagers ask for something, such as hand-pumps for irrigated vegetable gardens. As their request goes through all the links in the chain, they lose control over it. If the **villagers** or their representatives have not been involved in the negotiations and if the lorries arrive, pressure from above may have changed the original request (to power pumps, for example) or have been brought to bear on behalf of persons who are outside the group that made the original request (such as officials in charge of **maintaining** the pump or the owner of the land where the pump is installed).

(c) The "pure" or "assisted" bottom-up initiative, in which the request reflects a level of mobilization and participation which is broader than the "project" itself and in which any outside inputs will be technically, culturally and politically dominated by the social group concerned, rather than the reverse, thus ruling out as far as possible any loss of control over the project.

3. The project and the improvement of living conditions at the grass-roots level

93. If we accept to consider the project as an initiative that is usually "top-down", decided in advance and therefore perceived as authoritarian by the presumed beneficiaries, then we must ask ourselves in what circumstances can the project-tool promote change for the most underprivileged population sectors and in what other circumstances does it constitute an obstacle?

94. Social development is a much more risky adventure for a poor rural or urban community than for an expert who proposes or a Government official who disposes : so much the better if a new crop-growing method, a co-operative or a community granary works, but what if it does not? So far as the poor are concerned, the game is not worth the candle unless there is a near-certain guarantee of success. Who will replace a lost crop or money that has been spent? There is no development insurance. The nature of poverty is such that **it** is more acceptable to put up with a situation offering a minimum of certainty than to embark on changes involving a maximum of risk.

95. However, even when the idea of change has begun to take shape, either from within or from without, and the will to work on it together does exist and a leader or small group capable of stimulating the community from within has been set up and accepted, obstacles, usually underestimated, still remain, not only because of the socio-political context and the balance of power, but because of all the factors that might lead to loss of control over the initiative. The project's formal and rigid nature and the growing number of intermediaries will not make it any easier, for example, to give effect to a request made by an illiterate or semi-literate rural community. A project obviously has to be in written form, but this may be an enormous handicap because the persons concerned have to tell their ideas to others and will not have any control over what is written down.

96. In the final analysis, the problem **that** aid agencies have to solve is how to reconcile the conflicting requirements of a bottom-up initiative, which is naturally based on the experience that the group has of its own situation and is often the result of a lengthy incubation period (discussion, experiments, trial and error), and top-down technocratic rationality that is authoritarian and in a hurry to start work and "deliver" its products.

4. Some possible directions for the future

97. Rural development - the struggle waged against poverty - also has a political side to it. Any outside intervention in this context, including a technical co-operation project, is a political act as well. It is important to emphasize this point, for contrary to the assertions often made inside the United Nations system and elsewhere, aid, even when it has no visible strings attached, as in the case of multilateral aid, is not entirely neutral. Naturally, a technical co-operation project does not always have direct political aims or ulterior motives. The political element is upstream inasmuch as it serves interests that have nothing to do with those of the presumed beneficiaries; for one thing, it serves to legitimize the funding organization, as well as the executing agency, and it is field activities that make the organizations' headquarters "tick over". At the same time, it is downstream inasmuch as the project is the convey belt for the dominant technocratic rationality.

98. What is more, as emphasized so often ^{1/}, development assistance strategies and structures are still based on the principle of the need to "develop" the underprivileged groups and communities by using outside "developers", as if the communities in question were incapable of seeing to things themselves. This paternal approach, together with a development strategy that is inclined to regard grass-roots communities as the objects of a project, an assistance programme or a national plan, rather than living subjects with a future of their own, are the chief reasons why rural development activities do not really take root in the "target groups" and are perceived as something parachuted from outside.

99. If these are the dimensions of problem, what are the possible alternatives? Can a sort of cultural revolution in the development assistance system be reasonably expected, one that would place priority on bottom-up initiatives as opposed to top-down approaches?

^{1/} Inside the United Nations system too cf. the article by M. Rahnema (UNDP), "The grass roots of the future", IFDA Dossier, No.43, 1984, or A. Ayazi et al. (FAO), "Simple, *souple, décentralisée* : des *critères d'évaluation pour les projets* de développement rural", CERES, No.66, 1978.

100. The explicit objectives of the rural development **activities** carried out by the **United Nations system** are all **designed, more or less directly**, to bring about socio-economic change in communities or villages (in other words, increased agricultural production, irrigation, **water**, training of extension workers, marketing of production, **easier communications, schooling, primary health care, and so on**). 'Yet **as** Peter Berger **says** 1/, "no social process can succeed unless it is illuminated from within". In other words, outside intervention (**a project, financial aid**) is meaningful only if the recipients (in most cases, **poor** rural or urban local communities or **organizations**) are ready to receive it and strong enough to incorporate this external input in their own strategy. For the **United Nations system**, this has major strategic and institutional consequences.

101. In regard to the **typology of intervention**, a distinction has to be drawn between activities **specifically aimed at grass-roots communities and populations** and other activities:

(a) As to development assistance at the macro-economic level (balance-of-payment assistance, food aid at the central level, major infrastructure projects, turnkey university or hospital construction, training or assistance in planning, etc.), traditional practices, including project aid and conventional technical co-operation projects, may well be as valid as ever. Quite **obviously, such aid** is still **indispensable**, although better account should be taken of its effects on the most underprivileged sectors. The organizations in the United Nations system will continue to play a role here, even though the present technical assistance programming machinery - more particularly **UNDP's** country programming - may need to be revised.

(b) As to the micro-economic side of the matter, recognition of the "social change" aspect of rural development could **raise serious** questions about present practices, and more particularly the use of "the project tool" to achieve that objective.

107. In regard to the programing of AD activities, there is an obvious contradiction between the rigidity of the budgetary planning and the work schedule of a "project" and the need to support the development of **grass-roots initiatives, which are, by definition, difficult to foresee and often convoluted**. The greater the precision in formulating a project's objectives, outputs and schedule of disbursements, the greater the **risk of paralysing bottom-up initiatives**, for the unexpected often lies at the core of the development process. All too often, **projects** suffer from too much forward planning that is ill-suited to the need to negotiate with the real actors at the time the action is taking place, in the light of the group's capabilities and constraints. It would thus be better to have flexible programming with, if necessary, funding that is provided bit by bit according to the pace at which people are mobilized, and planning of expenditures "as the horizon lights up", rather than for the entire duration of the project. In other words, the aid agency should not take the helm so much before it commits itself to activities, but it should be more exigent in negotiations conducted during implementation.

1/ Peter Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice, Political Ethics and Social Change, London, 1974, p. 262.

103. In regard to the approach, major changes would also be needed. If the United Nations system's development assistance agencies are genuinely interested in helping the poorest communities, the natural thing would be for them to adapt their techniques and their method of operation to the needs and the realities of those communities, rather than impose their own cumbersome and costly structures on them. It is questionable whether the project approach (expert/counterpart/equipment/training) is really suited to such needs. This approach, and particularly the virtually systematic use of the "expert/counterpart" pair has been increasingly criticized, for it leads to operations which are rigid, often too ambitious, too hasty to obtain results, do not foster the training of people and of managers, are all too often unaware of what happened "beforehand", and above all, what will happen "after" technical assistance, is withdrawn.

104. If current practices do not, therefore, make best use of the potentials of grass-roots communities and groupings, what are the alternatives?

(a) NGOs. If national and international agencies are not really suitable for organizing or encouraging rural development, more funds could be channelled through NGOs. Generally speaking, NGOs are more flexible and better suited to effective work in the field, and some organizations in the United Nations system have already used their services for 'tasks they themselves cannot perform (UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO and ILO, in particular). It is true that they often provide better value for money. One idea, therefore, would be to develop the NGO approach more systematically, taking care not to view it as a panacea, for there are NGOs and NGOs. Some incline to top-heavy bureaucracy, whereas others (or the same ones) are no different in their approach, which may also be "top-down", from multilateral or bilateral aid agencies. For example, on the basis of an agreement between the Government and the United Nations system agency concerned, NGOs could be assigned the task of carrying out activities or projects directly at grass-roots community or village level and the funding could be gradually increased in terms of the results achieved.

(b) The UNICEF/WFP approach. Both of these organizations manage "to carry out" some rural development and even grass-roots rural development activities, with very little technical co-operation in the usual sense of the term. WFP projects are mainly implemented by the Government, although WFP staff, once the project agreement is signed, play an important role in monitoring and evaluation. UNICEF's operational methods are more complex and diversified, but the features they share with those of WFP are decentralization and initiative left up to programme managers in the field, along with some flexibility in the programming and reprogramming of activities which are usually, but not always, designed to make the national and local authorities, and especially the beneficiaries themselves, increasingly responsible in implementation.

(c) United Nations system organizations could also make a more direct contribution to progressive support to grass-roots organizations or groupings. This would entail adjustments in present programming systems, essentially for greater flexibility and for the disbursement of funds not on the basis of projects rigidly designed in advance but on the basis of framework agreements, negotiated directly either with the organizations or groups of actual beneficiaries or with the established local authorities (district councils, elected village authorities, village co-operatives groups, and so on). The general philosophy underlying this approach would be maximum decentralization so as to cut the number of intermediaries down to a minimum, and the identification on the basis of the local conditions

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of the type of partner (for example, co-operative, peasant group or women's group) in the best position to profit from an outside input. These framework agreements with local groups should obviously stem from a general agreement between the Government concerned and the competent United Nations system organizations. This type of approach could be tested in two or three volunteer countries before bringing it into general use later. A "Rural Development Coordinating Committee" could be set up in each country, comprising government representatives, the main organizations of the United Nations system, bilateral donors and NGOs involved in RD. The Coordinating Committee would refine the procedures of such an approach, identify the areas and sectors in which it could be tried out and provide the follow-up. The Inspectors suggest that, at the field level, small operational interdisciplinary teams representing the main agencies concerned should be formed. Such teams should analyse and understand the situation before trying to change it, and identify dynamic groups and institutional, cultural and other bottlenecks. They should have flexible budgets which do not require them to disburse the money in accordance with too precise or too rapid a schedule but enable them to adjust interventions in terms of the ability of grass-roots communities or organizations to incorporate outside inputs into their own strategies.

105. These external inputs could, for example, take the form of flexible and at least partly repayable financial assistance (so as to reduce the deadening psychological effects of a "gift") to peasant groups, local NGOs, or co-operatives requesting assistance of this kind. In order to maximize the institutional strengthening of these local development organizations and to encourage responsible attitudes, and eventually financial autonomy, loans to individuals would be recovered by the village group, which would use them for other loans, loans made to the group would be recovered by the association of groups, and so on (cf. in this connection, the example of the "GS" association described in the work by B. Lecomte mentioned above). In order to mobilize such groups and make them aware of their responsibilities, assistance would be provided on a trial and error basis: the better the results of the initiative, the greater the possibility of gradually increasing the funding. As to the funding of these framework agreements, the Inspectors believe that the necessary amounts (initially very modest) could be found either within the operational reserves of UNDP country programmes, or through the agencies' regular budgets for small ad hoc (TCP-type) projects, or voluntary contributions by interested donors. After two or three years' experience and an in-depth evaluation, possibly by the ACC Task Force on Rural Development, appropriate financing machinery would have to be arranged if the approach proves viable.

106. In short, this approach would be based on three principles:

- The greatest possible decentralization in decision-making;
- Negotiation of a framework agreement on the type of activity to be undertaken, with flexible programming confined to achievable objectives;
- Activities designed on the basis of the rationality of the people concerned, rather than that of the aid agency.

107. It would be naive to believe that such an approach could be widely introduced overnight, for neither the organizations' secretariats nor the recipient States are ready for it, despite declarations about local self-reliance within the context of global self-reliance. Grass-roots development may indeed be regarded as "subversive", for it could be a direct threat to vested interests at the local, national and even international

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levels (the experts and their vast clientele) and it implicitly contains 8 type of social organization and lifestyles that conflict with the top-down rationality and with the power **structure** in many developing countries.

108. We nonetheless believe that, for various reasons, an approach of this type or one based on similar principles, does stand a chance over the medium-term:

International solidarity, **displayed** in connection with the famine and drought in Africa, has triggered a critical attitude towards the effectiveness of aid and increased distrust of large top-down operations;

Even among the Governments of developing countries, in particular the **LDCs**, whether from conviction or convenience, the need for a bottom-up/top-down dialectic is starting to gain ground; the **NGOs**, whose flexibility in taking action is already well proven, are fully established and recognized virtually everywhere and their role cannot fail to grow;

Lastly, without being too optimistic it can be assumed that a gradual spread of support for bottom-up initiatives could produce a kind of reverse demonstration effect that would lead to increased "demand" both among the grass-roots groups and among the various donor circuits.

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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Conclusion

109. The JIU report has attempted to **examine** to what extent United Nations system rural development activities were actually targeted to the poorest sections of the population in least developed countries and were actually fostering socio-economic change at the grassroots level. This has been done through the analysis of a sample of projects in three African **LDCs**, but hopefully the findings may be of a more general validity and the lessons learnt during the course of the study may be sufficient to contribute to the on-going process of reflection on the effectiveness of the United Nations system's operational activities for development in general and technical co-operation activities in particular.

110. The report has shown, not surprisingly, that rural development and socio-economic change at the grassroots level are painstakingly slow processes; the introduction of elements of change, which often modify delicate social situations or equilibria, is not without risk for all concerned: much can go wrong, whatever the good intentions of the parties involved.

111. The **finding** that inadequately thought out or improperly executed technical co-operation projects may have perverse effects and/or create additional dependency is not a new one. The several examples of such projects which are mentioned in the report simply reinforce similar findings reached by other recent and less recent studies. The main finding of this report may be more appropriately expressed in the form of a question: hasn't the time come to do something about this situation? Shouldn't some kind of a reform of the "project aid" mechanisms at the grassroots level be considered?

112. **More** precisely, given that a significant proportion of United Nations system rural development activities seem to go awry, a number of practical steps should be taken. A first step would be for United Nations organizations involved in rural development to determine with some precision who the beneficiaries of the rural development activities they support should be. These need not necessarily be in all cases the "poorest of the poor" or other under-privileged groups (there may be good reasons for helping the middle level farmers, e.g. for the sake of increased employment or export opportunities). But if it is the policy of an organization to devote a significant portion of its technical co-operation package to the grassroots **level**, some questioning of conventional wisdom seems to be required in order to determine to what extent this is actually taking place and to what extent assistance is being misdirected or siphoned off for the benefit of groups which may be efficient partners but not the most needy. A simple way of doing this would be to clearly state in all project documents who will win and who will lose from the proposed activity, not only in economic, but also in social terms and in terms of relationships between the main actors at the local level. Hopefully, this would at least reduce the risks of raising false expectations.

113. Secondly, if there is a strong policy commitment of United Nations **system** organizations to devoting at least some resources to meeting the needs of the poorest segment of the population, the institutional consequences of a firm policy in this direction need to be considered. The technical co-operation project may be a practical tool for "turnkey" activities or **institution** building projects, but the evidence in this report, and elsewhere, would seem to show that it is not suitable for fostering participation at the grassroots

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level. The traditional top-down project (expert t counterparts t equipment) rarely works effectively in this context. Various instances of technical co-operation projects not really suited for the grassroots level have been recorded in this report. Conversely, the few truly successful grassroots activities that were identified were not projects of the traditional mould. These were more like programmes or even "movements" in which local people and structures were being set in motion with little or no direct involvement of external expatriate expertise in implementation. It is no great discovery that projects or activities that are deeply rooted in local realities and that correspond to the values and aspirations of the beneficiaries - and are therefore "illuminated from within" - give better results, if not immediately certainly in the long-term, than projects parachuted from above. What is troubling is that, according to the evidence presented in this report, there are so few of such successful projects implemented under the auspices of the United Nations system. What is even more troubling is the fact that United Nations system organizations are not systematically advocating such projects, especially if it can be proven that in the long run they contribute more to local and national self-reliance than the traditional top-down approach.

114. It would appear, therefore, that the validity of the "project approach" for rural development activities aimed at the poorest of the poor or at the grassroots level needs to be seriously called into question. Resistance from interested parties both in the donor and recipient aid bureaucracies will in all likelihood be strong in any attempt to radically modify the present well-oiled machinery, but at least the recognition of the perverse effects of project aid, seen from the perspective of grassroots rural development should help in putting the problem on the table. In summary form, project aid:

- responds to a logic in which there is a pressure to "get things going" and consequently to spend too much too fast (and to expect too much too soon);
- encourages ambitious drafting of project documents, i.a. because of competition among donors for "good" projects; this in turn leads to unrealistic expectations;
- often leads to institutional **destructuring** at the receiving end, especially in **LDCs** where the absorption capacity of governments is weak and the number of projects and of competing donors is high;
- is likely to create dependency in many ways, not least because of the expert-counterpart relationship which does not necessarily encourage the "transfer of responsibility" even where the transfer of knowledge may take place;
- tends to concentrate on the provision of inputs and production of outputs and to neglect what will happen after the end of the project and does not put a bonus on building into new projects the lessons learnt from the mistakes of the past.

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2. Recommendations

The main **recommendations** of the report are listed below.

A. Recommendations for the long term

Recommendation 1

Policy. United Nations system organizations involved in rural development activities should **reconsider** whether **their** policy with respect to rural development requires clarification or modification. In particular they should **consider** whether the **beneficiaries** of their rural development activities should be better defined (i.e. **whether** more emphasis at the policy level should be put on **activities** targeted to the poorest of the poor or to specific underprivileged **groups**).

Recommendation 2

Policy. In recognition of the fact that helping the poor to help themselves entails a different philosophy and approach from habitual "top down" activities, rural **development activities** at the grassroots level **should** be clearly differentiated from normal or **traditional** technical co-operation **activities**. Special sets of policy directives and operational procedures applicable to rural **development** activities **should** be developed in **each agency** and through the **ACC task force on rural development**, bearing in mind the need to keep operational arrangements **as** decentralized, simple, and flexible **as** possible. **All concerned** organizations should also **consider** whether the project approach **is** still valid for **grassroots** rural **development** activities.

Recommendation 3

Alternatives to the **project approach** for rural development

Proposals are made in Chapter III (para. 104) on **possible** alternatives to the project approach,

(i) The general philosophy **is** to move progressively away from the top-down, **blueprint**, supply approach towards a **more** decentralized, flexible, participating, learning process, **demand approach**. Alternatives **(a)** and **(b)**, outlined in para. 104, **should** be applied where **possible** by United Nations system organizations; alternative **(c)** should be **tested** on an experimental basis in a number of developing countries. Such experiments **should** be carefully evaluated. The **ACC task force** on rural development **should undertake** a study to determine the scope for **generalization** of this **new** approach.

(ii) In order to **improve** co-ordination of rural development activities at the field level, the governments concerned and the organizations participating in RD should take the initiative of setting up a "Rural Development Co-ordinating Committee" in which the Government, the multilateral agencies, the main bi-lateral operational agencies and **NGOs** would be represented. The main tasks of this committee **would** be to review government and donor agency policies and priorities relating to rural development, decide on priority sectors and geographical areas for intervention, avoid overlap and **ensure** cross-fertilization of activities (para. 104).

Recommendation 4

The **grant element** in the project approach often has de-mobilizing effects for popular participation. It is therefore recommended that more experience be gained with rural development activities which involve at least a partial

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financial commitment of beneficiaries (e.g. loans, credit schemes, revolving funds) in addition to contributions in kind. Amounts accrued through such activities should be used as seed money for new activities (para. 104).

Recommendation 5

New professionals

The eventual implementation of Recommendations 3 and 4 would require probably less expatriate personnel but also a new type of professional with a multidisciplinary rather than compartmentalized technical specialization. Appropriate recruitment procedures and training packages will have to be defined.

B. Specific recommendations for immediate consideration

In addition to the many suggestions included in the text of Chapter II, the following recommendations are highlighted.

Recommendation 6

Project documents

(i) All project documents for rural development activities should contain specific information on beneficiaries and on who will gain and who will lose from the project. The possible effects of the project on local social stratification should also be assessed in the project document.

(ii) Project documents should clearly outline the turnover strategy i.e. what will happen at the end of the project, who will cover running and maintenance costs, whether funds will be generated locally from government sources or through continuing external assistance. The involvement of the beneficiary community in the turnover process - when possible through locally-generated funds or through contributions in kind - should specifically be provided for.

Recommendation 7

Project management units (PMUs) should be avoided; projects should be part of local level community-based or government structures. The creation of locally-based and controlled participating institutions (peasant groups, village cooperatives, youth farms, womens' production groups, etc.) should be more systematically encouraged (Chapter III, para. 104 (c)).

Recommendation 8

While it is recognized that, particularly in LDCs, specialized expatriate personnel continue to be necessary in some projects both for direct project implementation and on-the-job training, the Inspectors recommend that expatriates should become the exception rather than the rule in rural development projects. When they are employed they should be "advisers" rather than "directors". More emphasis to be placed on recruitment of more rural development multidisciplinary "generalists" rather than specialized technicians who may be less sensitive to the social aspects of rural development. Measures should be taken to avoid ostentatious behaviour by experts.

Recommendation 9

More attention should be given to the smooth integration of the technical and social aspects of projects in order to avoid the establishment of "islands of progress" separated from local realities. Prestige equipment should also be avoided.

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Recommendation 10

Realistic planning and implementation

In order to maximise the chances of success of rural development activities, the following measures should be introduced:

(i) The intended beneficiaries should be involved in the identification and planning stages. Their support to project objectives and strategy should be secured before the project is approved. Beneficiaries should be fully involved throughout the life of the project.

(ii) Planning and implementation procedures should be realistic, flexible and decentralized. Such procedures should allow for:

- more lead time at the beginning of projects to ensure smooth implementation and longer project life spans (in particular longer "phasing out" periods) (para. 42 (a));
- continuous re-planning of activities on the basis of successes and constraints and as "the horizon lights up". More decentralized budgetary autonomy should be given to local agency representatives;
- simplified reporting procedures focussing on results rather than on inputs and outputs.

(iii) In order to lighten the administrative burden of the recipient government, decentralization of national project support and monitoring functions from the central to the regional or district levels should be encouraged whenever possible (para. 42 (b)).

Recommendation 11

Evaluation

More ex-post evaluations should be conducted in order to learn more about the impact and sustainability of rural development projects. A provision for ex-post evaluation should be included in project budgets of all large-scale projects. If funding of individual ex-post project evaluations cannot be secured, more thematic evaluations of clusters of similar projects should be conducted (para. 61 (c)).

ANNEX

Annexed are the 25 sample projects on which the report's analysis, conclusions and recommendations are based. The titles of the projects are listed below,

	Page
I. <u>Burkina Faso</u>	
Assistance to the rural development project of the ORD (Regional Development Office) of the Best (Assistance au projet de developpement rural de l'ORD Office Régional de Développement de l'Est) BKF/81/005	37
Assistance to the planning and organization of a special pilot labour Intensive public works programme (Assistance à la planification et l'organisation d'un programme spécial pilote de travaux publics à haute intensité de main-d'oeuvre (PSTP/HIMO)) BKF/80/012	39
Promotion of women's handicrafts (Promotion de l'artisanat féminin) BKF/82/009	41
Village level water supply programme (Réalisation d'un programme d'hydraulique villageoise) BFK/82/002 (Phase I) BKF/85/002 (Phase II)	43
Strengthening of the maintenance and repair capability for agricultural tractors and other heavy and mobile machinery (Renforcement des capacités d'ontretien et de réparation pour le parc de tractoure agricoles et autree équipements mobiles et lourds) XA/BKF/86/615	45
Multi-purpose rural development (Développement rural à buts multiples) BKF/2239/Exp. I	4.
Rural development programme, Centro-Est region (Programme de developpement rural du département de Centro-Est) BKF/031/ITA	49

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XI. <u>Burundi</u>	
Community education for integrated rural development (Education communautaire pour un développement rural intégr) Phase II - BDI/77/010	51
Assistance to a special labour intensive public works programme (Assistance à un programme spécial élargi de travaux publics à haute intensité de main-d'oeuvre) BDI/81/016	53
Conservation and processing of food products (Conservation et transformation des produits vivriers) BDI/81/026	56
- Establishment of eight demonstration centres (Installation de 8 centres de démonstration) GCP/BDI/019/AGI	56
- Support to the demonstration centres for women (Appui aux centres de démonstration en faveur des femmes) GCP/BDI/021/NET	56
Tick prevention programme - Phase II (Lutte contre les tiques - Phase opérationnelle pilote) BDI/85/011	59
Forestry development and training (Développement forestier et formation) BDI/78/003	61
Intensification of cereal production in the Bututsi natural region TCP/BDI/4507	63
Road improvement and maintenance (Burundi/2286)	64
Rural water supply and sanitation programme	66

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 <u>III. United Republic of Tanzania</u>	
Forestry for rural energy - Hai Afforestation Scheme URT/084/JPN	68
Support development of dairy development training units (DDTUs) at selected co-operatives for milk collection, cooling and improved fodder production CCP/URT/091/DEN	69
Assistance to smallholder dairy development (Arusha and Kilimanjaro regions) URT/86/013	70
Assistance to intensify village afforestation efforts in the Kilimanjaro region GCP/URT/074/SWE	72
Village storage and training programme - Arusha and Dodoma regions GCP/URT/052/NET and GCP/URT/059/AGF (Phase I) Reduction of post-harvest losses through rural storage structures URT/86/016 (Ph.II)	74
Consultancy services, co-operation, popularization and use of non-conventional sources of energy URT/81/032	76
Rehabilitation of housing on sisal estates (IAN/2583)	77
Joint WHO/UNICEF support for the improvement of nutrition in the United Republic of Tanzania (Iringa region)	79
Development of Usangu Village Irrigation URT/80/011	82
Support to a special labour intensive works programme in the Arusha, Dodoma, Rukwa and Ruvuma regions URT/77/033 Phase I - URT/86/008 Phase II	84

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Project title: Assistance to the rural development project of the ORD (Regional Development Office) of the East (Assistance au projet de développement rural de l'ORD (Office Régional de Développement de l'Est) DKF/81/005

Functional type: Institution building, direct support, direct training

Executing agency: FAO

Start date: 1982

Finish date: 1986

Budget: \$US 29.9 million

Provided by:

UNDP \$ 2.2 m.

IFAD \$14.9 m.

CCCE \$ 9.2 m.

USAID \$ 2.0 m.

Govt. \$ 1.6 m.

Background: In November 1978, the Government of Burkina Faso submitted a request to IFAD for financial assistance for rural development activities of the Office of Research and Development (ORD), situated in the eastern part of the country. IFAD identified the project in 1979 and the project document was prepared by the Investment Centre of FAO in 1980. It was evaluated by the African Development Bank (ADB) on behalf of IFAD. The financial resources needed to execute the project were considerable, and required the participation of other donors. A request was made by the Government of Burkina Faso to Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique (CCCE), USAID and UNDP who accepted to co-finance the project with IFAD. UNDP's contribution for technical assistance amounted to \$2.2 million. The purpose of the project was to make the region self-sufficient in food and at the same time increase the income of the producers. The target group of the project constituted 8,000 peasant families (about 40,000 persons),

Objectives: The broader objective was to assist the Government to strengthen its structure for the ORD of the East in order to make it more efficient, so as to attain food self-sufficiency. The immediate objectives were: to assist the ORD of the East in organizing and restructuring its different departments and services; establish the work programme of the different departments and provide them with the necessary technical assistance for the execution of their programmes; provide the necessary technical assistance for the establishment and control of the budget of the ORD and train national officers, technically and professionally, for the different departments, and also contribute to the training of farmers.

Results: The project is running two years behind schedule (one of the two years was attributed to the difficulties encountered in setting up the technical assistance department). It was also handicapped by the late arrival of the expert, continuous changes of national counterpart, administrative problems related to the disbursement of IFAD funds, which were administered by ADH, lack of technical backstopping from FAO headquarters, and the absence of follow-up and evaluation reports, which should have been prepared by IFAD. The objectives did not include participation of the people. Apart from the technical assistance side of the project, financed by UNDP and which attained its objectives, the project fell far short of expectations.

Assessment: The project failed to achieve its purposes and had little impact. At the time of the JIU mission, the project had been completed and production was at a standstill. From the start there was confusion on the role of experts, between UNDP/FAO on the one side, and IFAD on the other, each having its own interpretation of tasks to be performed. IFAD wanted technical assistance involved at all levels of the project, while UNDP/FAO believed it should be limited to assisting the planning, organizing and conception level of programme activities. Execution of the project, according to UNDP/FAO, should be the task of the national officers trained by the project. The project had a number of basic problems. First, the project document was prepared before certain changes in Government had taken place, but executed during or after such changes. Its methods and approaches remained unchanged. Hence the administrative measures taken did not correspond to the new National Plan. Second, the population did not understand the aim of the project, in particular the credit system by which the farmers were supposed to borrow money from a national fund. Its procedures were too complicated for the peasants to understand. Third, the lack of technical backstopping by FAO, and fourth, the inappropriate administrative procedures of ADB, which was responsible for the distribution of IFAD's contribution, and which had a complicated administrative system. IFAD and ADB were not represented in Burkina Faso. A minimum of three to six months was needed for a file to be approved. The population was discouraged from waiting for a decision to be made by one or the other. The impact of the project on the population was rather disappointing. After three years, by 1985 when the population was motivated and had achieved about 30 per cent of the production target, the price of the different products, such as cereal, cotton, etc., went down. The villagers could not re-pay their debts and were not, therefore, entitled to a second credit. All these factors, added to national administrative problems, made the project unsuccessful and unpopular.

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Project title: Assistance to the planning and organization of a special pilot labour intensive public works programme (Assistance à la planification et l'organisation d'un programme special pilote de travaux publics à haute intensité de main-d'oeuvre (PSTP/HIMO)) BKF/80/012

Functional type: Institution building and direct support

Executing agency: ILO

Start date: 1981

Finish date: 1986
(extended to 1987
(intermediary phase)

Budget \$US 4,395,719

Provided by:

UNDP	\$ 1,018,740
Netherlands	\$ 3,085,507
Burkina Faso	\$ 291,472
	<u>\$ 4,395,719</u>
	=====

Background: The Government of Burkina Faso is faced with several critical development problems which consist of under-employment of the working force of the rural area during the non-agricultural production period, 15 June to 15 September; exodus of rural population to cities and other countries, resulting in increased unemployment in the cities, particularly in Ouagadougou, the capital. To tackle these problems, the Government, since 1984, has reoriented its efforts towards the rural area, and set up targets to be realized by the peasants, including creating maximum employment opportunities in the rural area to stop the exodus; fight against desertification and soil erosion; and increase overall agricultural productivity, with the aim of increasing the income of farmers. It is within this framework that the ILO, together with UNDP and the Netherlands, launched this project, which fitted well within the programme of the Ministry of Public Works and Manpower Training (PSTP-HIMO) of the Government.

Objectives: The long-term objectives were: to promote permanent employment in the rural areas; increase agricultural production with the object of achieving self-sufficiency in food; provide water and at the same time improve the working conditions of women; improve sanitary conditions and build schools; provide training for the rural population and increase their income. The short-term objectives were: to create employment in the sectors where PSTP/HIMO are involved and to set up rural infrastructure to be realized by the rural and urban population to be used for demonstration purposes.

Results: There are two ways of expressing the results of this project, As far as UNDP is concerned the project has not attained its objectives, but from the point of view of the Government the project has been very successful, apart from some administrative and personnel problems. The project has encountered several obstacles but the fundamental one was constitutional. The concept of the project was not understood by all concerned. According to UNDP it was supposed to be a pilot project to demonstrate how things should be done in different provinces in order to help create employment in the long-term. However, because of the vagueness of the project document it was easy to change it to a development and production project, which actually happened and brought tangible results for the rural population. Schools were built, dams were constructed, water wells were dug, plants were afforested,

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etc. However, despite the fact that the achievements of the project were considered important in the development of the country, they cannot be related with the original intention of the project. This is a good example of a project with vague objectives, sometimes creating misunderstandings between governments and the United Nations system.

Assessment: The project was fraught with constitutional, administrative and **personnel** problems from the beginning to the end. Serious delays were registered in the recruitment of experts and those recruited were either not qualified technically or did not have a good working relationship with their counterparts. This, coupled with the frequent redeployment of national staff, left the project in a precarious situation. During the JIU visit, the pilot project was completed and the Netherlands Government ceased financing payments at the end of 1986. UNDP financed the project during 1987 as an intermediary phase, which has been something of a training period. There have been several missions and discussions with the Government in order to convince it to revert to the original objective of a demonstration project. This caused a serious problem for the Government because it raised the expectations of the general population. The last tripartite meeting was held on 27 July 1987. The JIU mission and an expert from **ILO**, Geneva, were present. During the meeting, agreement was reached to divide the project into two components : demonstration and production. The UNDP will assist the Government in finding another source of funds for production of the project in order to retain momentum and will continue to finance demonstration of the project.

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Project title: Promotion of women's handicrafts
(Promotion de l'artisanat féminin) BKF/82/009

Functional type: Institution building and direct support

Executing agency: ILO

Start date: 1979
1982
1988

Finish date: 1982 (Phase I)
1984 (Phase II)
1990 (Phase III)

Budget: \$US 812,925

Provided by: Phase I
UNDP \$ 750,000
Government \$ 62,925

\$US 637,177

UNDP Phase II
Government \$ 637,177
not specified

\$US1,737,305

UNDP Phase III
Government \$1,575,450
161,855

Background: The Government of Burkina Faso has placed major emphasis on increasing rural development activities in the country where more than 80 per cent of the population are living. It has also recognized the pressing need to improve the living standards of women in the rural area who account for 52 per cent of the population. In recent years the economic situation of these women has worsened because of the world economic crisis, which always hits harder the most disadvantaged groups, such as rural women. There are several reasons for this, such as the rural exodus by men to cities, which leaves the whole family responsibility on the women; jobs that were traditionally performed by women, and brought some cash income, are now taken by men, and finally, their overall dependence on the economic and financial system in which they do not effectively participate. The project was launched from this background in the hope of improving the lot of rural women in Burkina Faso.

Objectives: The general development objective is to promote rural employment. The project has three specific objectives: to create employment for women living in the rural areas; to train future trainers in the field of traditional handicraft; and to stop migration to the cities. Emphasis was placed on training, production and marketing.

Results: From the outset, this project which has now completed two phases and was in the process of preparing a third at the time of the visit of the JIU team, seemed to have encountered serious difficulties. The three main objectives: training, production and marketing, have not been achieved. There appeared to be some substantive and administrative problems which included poor qualifications of the Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) during the first phase and poor relationship between experts and counterparts during the second. Other problems included the incorrect choice of locations for the workshops which discouraged women from attending the training courses, weak communication system, insufficient logistic support, delays in delivery of equipment, inappropriate equipment and total lack of management and training for the beneficiaries.

Assessment: The project has had one positive effect: it was well-established in a number of villages (thirteen). There were, however, certain constraints such as lack of organizing and motivating the beneficiaries to work together harmoniously, problems of marketing because of lack of public transport and lower purchasing power. Consequently, production was limited to clothes making. Even this activity faced difficulties from lack of transportation. The little that has been produced and has reached the market was highly commended for the quality of the product by the 'Office national pour la promotion de l'emploi - ONPE', the counterpart office of the Government responsible for the project. On the whole this project could be considered as having failed. The project would have gained considerably from the correction of errors committed during the first phase. This was not done and the second phase was launched with the same approaches. The objectives were meaningful and realistic. Had the project succeeded it would have been a self-reliant project with an assured continuation after the withdrawal of UNDP assistance. What seemed lacking most of all was good management, and the willingness and devotion by all concerned to make the project effective. Personal conflicts sapped time and energy. It is clear that involving the Government counterparts, and the population concerned, before the drafting of the project document would have prevented most of the problems. A project document has been prepared for the third phase but has not been finalized to date. A preparatory study financed by UNDP is being undertaken by a local organization to find out the market situation in the rural areas. The project document will then be adjusted based on the findings of the study. The objectives will be the same but the contents, such as training, will be adjusted.

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Project title: Village level water supply programme
(Réalisation d'un programme d'hydraulique villageoise,
BKF/82/002 (Phase I)
BKF/85/002 (Phase II)

Functional e : Direct support (primary)
Training (secondary)

Executing agency: UNICEF

Start date: 1983
1986 **Finish date:** 1986 (Phase I)
1990 (Phase II)

Budget:	\$US 5,626,000	Provided by:	Phase I
		Government	\$ 460,000
		UNDP	\$ 600,000
		UNICEF	\$ 1,630,000
		UNEDF	\$ 2,936,000
			\$ 5,626,000

	\$US 4,260,255		Phase II
		Government	\$ 285,000
		UNDP	\$ 364,000
		UNICEF	\$ 1,477,600
		UNPDF	\$ 2,133,655
			\$ 4,260,255

Background: The economy of Burkina Faso depends mainly on agriculture and livestock and development activities are centred on these two areas. Climate is an important factor in the country's development. Rainfall is irregular, limited to one season, and there are few water streams. Water supply for the major part of the country comes from stagnated water and dams, as well as from underground water obtained by means of drilling water wells. Water needed for agriculture, livestock and urban population could be met by the piping and treatment of surface water. The rural population depends on the exploitation of underground water and seasonal water accumulated in the reservoirs, which is unsuitable for human consumption. To alleviate this problem, the Government has developed a 10-year plan for Drinking Water Supply and for improving the sanitation in the country. To satisfy this need it is indispensable for the Government to have additional resources sufficient to train nationals to meet the objectives of the plan. Assistance has been requested from UNDP, UNICEF and UNEDF in the hope of ensuring success in this endeavour.

Objectives: To contribute to the Government's target to make water available for the population, i.e. ten litres per day per person by 1985 and 25 litres per day per person by 1990; to allow the rural population to have water throughout the year and also contribute to the improvement of health. The immediate objective during the first phase was to drill 530 wells, install hand pumps and decentralize the structure to all villages (one well per village or per 1,000 inhabitants). UNICEF has to provide the international technical staff to supervise the work of the two drilling brigades; UNEDF to provide construction material and equipment.

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Results: Close to three-quarters of the quantitative targets of the project were achieved. At the beginning, the project concentrated on building wells for schools. By 1983, 230 wells for schools and health centres had been built, which benefited 300 villages. By the end of 1986, 403 pumps were installed, information and mobilization meetings were held in 565 villages and 525 village water committees (of which 25 per cent of the participants are women) were set up, and 20 maintenance technicians were trained.

Assessment: The project is in its second phase. During this period the project staff has worked directly with the villagers. The mobilization of local beneficiaries seems to have been well stimulated. Wells and hand pumps are being effectively "taken over" by the village committees and used. Constraints were noted in the availability of spare parts. Training is given more emphasis so that technicians can maintain the pumps after the withdrawal of the UN system people. From discussions held with the chief project officer and project co-ordinator, it has been ascertained that the major constraints of the project were lack of qualified counterparts and their mobility (several were transferred elsewhere after having been trained by the project); a change of Government priority from water/health to agriculture, whereby water for consumption is diverted to agricultural production, thereby defeating the original objective of the project. There also appeared to be a lack of co-ordination between United Nations system projects, e.g. duplication of efforts in the area of well digging, both by UNICEF and ILO, as well as by NGOs and the Government itself which have also been involved in this field. Technically the project seems to be a success; however, its long-term sustainability, i.e. the Government's ability to continue the process with its own technicians, is still uncertain.

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Prtitle: _____ Strengthening of the maintenance and **repair** capability for agricultural **tractors** and other heavy and mobile machinery
(**Renforcement des capacités d'entretien et de réparation pour le parc de tracteurs agricoles et autres équipements mobiles et lourds**) XA/BKF/86/615

Function: _____ Institution building and **direct** training

Agency: _____ UNIDO

Start date: November 1986 **Finish date:** September 1987

Budget: **\$US** 647,500 **provided by:**
UNIDO **\$585,000**
Government **\$ 62,500**

Background: Lack of technical **skills** in maintaining **tractors** and other agricultural machinery **is a serious** constraint in Burkina Faso. There **are** 500 **tractors** in the country and 50 **per cent** of them are not **working** because of lack of **maintenance**. As far back **as 1979-80** the **Government** decided to establish a maintenance infrastructure for the whole country and requested external **assistance**. Several missions were **conducted** by different United Nations specialized **agencies** but with no concrete **result**. In 1982, UNIDO **agreed** to carry out a feasibility study on the possibility of **establishing** workshops in different **parts** of the country for maintaining **agricultural** tractors and other heavy agricultural machinery. The study identified the needs for **maintenance** and made a choice of **places where** the workshop should be installed. Four years later, in 1986, UNIDO submitted to the **Government** of Burkina Faso a **project proposal** for one year with a total budget of **\$US 884,178**. The **Government** **accepted** the proposal and prepared a **programme**. The project was due to start in **September 1986** but **was delayed** until November 1986 and the arrival of the **expert**. **Because** of financial **difficulties**, by the time the **expert** arrived the project **budget** had to be reduced by \$830,000. This reduction affected in particular the **training aspect**.

Objectives: The broader objective of the project was to **increase** agricultural production with the aim of making the country **self-sufficient** in food. The **immediate** objectives were to maintain and repair **tractors** and other agricultural equipment to allow their maximum utilization. Under the general supervision of the **Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock**, those workshops would be **responsible** for **preventive** services, maintenance and revision of **machines which** were not **being used**; for the acquisition and **distribution** of spare parts and for the **training** of **mechanics** in their respective **sectors**.

Results: The project faced several budgetary, technical and **administrative** problems from the start. This **seriously hampered** the realization of project activities **envisaged** in the project document. The **specific problems** encountered **were:** the **budget** cut by UNIDO; delays in the delivery of equipment and **supplies**; inadequate backstopping **from headquarters**; lack of documentation; spare **parts** took time to arrive **from abroad (six months)**, and there **was also a** lack of specialized local staff to be trained. With all the constraints, however, the project expert and the national **director**, with the assistance of the **Resident Representative**, managed to continue the plan of operation. By the end of the **first** phase, one out of the three workshops had become operational. At the time of the **mission visit** by JIU, the work

accomplished consisted of inventories of existing agricultural equipment; available spare parts, and identification of potential clients. Spare parts which could be manufactured locally have also been identified. A management system has been set up in one of the workshops, eventually to be extended to the other two garages.

Assessment: The Government of Burkina Faso attaches great importance to this project since its objective is to increase agricultural production through modern farming. Although its impact on the country's economy is hard to measure in precise terms, it is believed that once the three workshops become operational, it could be a good self-reliant project. The direct beneficiaries of this project are individual farmers who own agricultural tractors, co-operatives and mechanics receiving training. The indirect beneficiaries are perhaps consumers, people living in the community where workshops are to be installed, through increased food production and lower cost of food. For all its shortcomings, this project has established a good base during the first phase. It is a good example of a fruitful working relationship between the expert and the national director. The need for maintenance is still great and the Government's financial capacity is seriously limited. The sustainability of the project, therefore, depends greatly on external assistance. **UNIDO** has decided to extend the project to 1988/1989.

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Project title: Multi-purpose rural development
(Développement rural à buts multiples)
BKF/2239/Exp. I

Functional type: Direct support

Executing agency: WFP

Start date: Hay 1981 Finish date: December 1987
(extended)

Budget : \$US 33,293,000 Provided by: WFP
(in kind)

Background: Burkina Faso is classified as a Low income, food deficit and least developed country with \$US 200 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. The main factors contributing to this are irregular rainfalls, poor and shallow soils and a traditional farming system. Ninety per cent of the population live in the rural areas and only 25 per cent of the total population have access to safe drinking water. Agriculture, including livestock, forestry and fisheries contributed 41 per cent of the GDP and 90 per cent of the total export is mainly of a subsistence nature. For these reasons, the Government gives priority to agriculture and since 1967, when the first development plan was worked out, emphasis has been laid on rural development and infrastructure. Recently, one of the main targets of Burkina Faso's Five Year Plan was to boost agricultural development with the aim of achieving food self-sufficiency and food security; improving the living conditions of producers and their families and conservation of land resources. Since 1972, WFP has been helping the Government in its efforts to promote rural development and agricultural production. It started with two quick action projects which were followed by project 2239 'Multipurpose rural development' in 1976. Since 1982, through the expansion of this project (2239/Exp. I), it has provided support covering many sectors of agriculture, forestry and rural development valued at about \$US 30 million. Several projects have been launched to achieve this broader aim and WFP's contribution has made it possible for most of these projects to succeed.

Objectives: To assist the Government in providing food aid for workers, farmers, fishermen and trainees, either as payment for voluntary work or to provide support during training courses. Nine sub-projects have been identified to be completed during the project period 1981-1987: development of water resources and anti-erosion; inland fishery development; reforestation; road construction; settlement of farmers in the Volta River Valley; community development; agriculture; improvement of habitat, and agricultural training.

Results : According to WFP evaluation report prepared in 1985, although WFP assistance has acted as a strong incentive to attract voluntary labour, food distribution has been irregular during the first three years of project implementation owing to inadequate management, lack of involvement of technical ministries in administrative and logistic operations+ and the failure of the inter-ministerial committee to assure effective co-ordination. Inadequate reporting on food requirements hampered a regular and adequate allocation of food. During the first three years, the co-ordination of project activities, as well as the general administration of the project itself, has been left almost entirely to WFP staff in the

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country. Constant changes in WFP staff during these years further hampered adequate management. However, although delayed in achieving its overall objectives by July 1987, at the time of the JIU visit the project did eventually attain most of its objectives and some of the activities such as the anti-erosion and the settlement of farmers in the Volta River Valley had exceeded their targets. Attention has to be paid concerning the later sub-project, whereby some of the farmers who benefited from WFP assistance are not those who cultivate but those who exploit the newcomers, without resources, making the farmers pay part of their products as rent to owners. On the other hand, among the most significant achievements is the construction of 400 small dams and dykes throughout the country: irrigation of 1,300 hectares below the dams; the development of 5,000 hectares of lowlands; the planting of over 2,000 hectares of village wood-lots; the establishment of anti-erosion structures on 37,000 hectares and the construction and maintenance of over 4,000 kilometres of feeder roads. In addition, the direct beneficiaries of this project are seasonal or permanent workers and villagers participating in the implementation of different projects in 30 provinces. WFP also assists the Government's effort by providing food rations free of charge for trainees in the area of agriculture. However, despite the multi-purpose approach, the project did not obtain all the results expected, mainly because of its variety of activities, lack of personnel at the central administrative level of the Government and lack of continuity of WFP staff. The most important weakness of the project has been lack of professional training. Irregular reporting and lack of control of the activities by the technical ministries have also been noted. The evaluation mission conducted in March 1987 stressed the difficulty of making an adequate assessment of the overall performance of the project because of its variety of activities. It recommended that the project be split into two parts. One technical, directly linked to agriculture, and the second continuation of the multipurpose approach. This proposal was agreed by the Minister of Planning and Agriculture, and the project is to be extended into a third phase,

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Project title: Rural development programme, Centre-Est region
(Programme de développement rural du département
de Contra-Rot) **DKF/031/ITA**

Functional type: Direct support and institution building

Executing agency: Government of Burkina Faso/FAO

Start date: 1983 **Finish date:** 1989

Budget: \$US 42.3 million **Provided by:**
the Italian Government

Background: The origin of the project goes back to 1982 when the Italian Government made a commitment to assist the Sahelian regions in their efforts against drought and famine. Following a tripartite mission conducted by FAO, the Government of Italy and the Government of Burkina Faso, the Department of 'Centre-Est' was chosen as first zone of intervention in Burkina Faso. The main characteristics of this Department is that the northern part is highly populated while the vast majority of the remaining area is lightly inhabited or not inhabited at all. This lack of equilibrium has a negative effect on the agricultural production and the overall development of the region. The ORD, which used to be the office responsible for promoting rural development activities in the region, had limited human, financial and technical resources. The intervention of the Italian Government is, therefore, to assist the realization of the rural development programmes of the region in various social and economic sectors.

Objectives: The general objective is to assist Government institutions and departments in all their endeavours (human, financial and material), to enable them to set up and maintain basic and necessary rural development infrastructures. It is also to assist them by supporting the efforts being made by the village community to increase the level of production, in particular agricultural production, in order to improve the living conditions of the rural population.

Results: The project was delayed by one year for various reasons. For example, experts did not arrive on time, there was a lack of Government counterparts, infrastructure and no terms of reference. Despite these constraints, according to the discussions held with the CTA and the National Director, the project has achieved and in certain cases even surpassed objectives, to the satisfaction of the Government. About 80 per cent of the objectives have been achieved. In the area of building infrastructure the project has succeeded in building store houses for cereals, schools, cattle vaccination stations, and health centre units. Two hundred and eighteen units have been realized, 84 wells and 223 drillings have been terminated or are in the course of being realized; 60 kms of country roads have been improved; six centres for the support of ORD constructed and equipped; a 30 ha agricultural demonstration plot has been established; a study has been completed for 55 kms of road construction; 10 ha of land have been prepared for seed production; 2,000 ha anti-erosion works and three centres for producing seedbeds with a capacity of producing 650,000 tree plants per year have been rehabilitated. A laboratory for animal breeding has been constructed. In the field of agriculture and livestock, 275 villages have been formed and training continues to be given to trainers and young farmers

in 43 centres. Functional literacy has been given to group leaders of 64 centres. In the area of animal production and health, vaccination campaigns, training of village vaccinators and recycling of veterinary nurses has been done. Six new groupings of shepherds and trainees have been established, forming an association for the benefit of farmers. Units have been established for the promotion and follow-up of projects for villagers. Since the agricultural campaign in 1985, 130,000 tons of cereals have been produced and the surplus for commercialization was estimated at 15,000 tons. Upon the request of the Government, and approval by donors, a fund of \$US 1,000,000 has been provided for urgently buying part of the surplus. In the area of agricultural credit, \$ 531.493 has been put at the disposal of the villagers for 1986 agricultural campaigns. In the field of social activities, 10,843 homes have been constructed and 2,236 women assistants trained for equipping 515 villages with furniture for posts of primary health. Fellowships for five scholars were provided and contracts amounting to \$6 million awarded to contractors for construction and preparation of studies, etc.

Assessment: This project is different from the traditional type of project executed by the United Nations system agencies. It is not a project of the Italian Government nor of FAO, but rather direct support to a Government programme. The main executor of the project is the Government of Burkina Faso. Three quarters of the work is done by them. FAO's role is to provide technical assistance. A good base of social infrastructure and an economic development pattern has been established. The peasants have participated in the realization of most of the objectives, e.g. creating schools, in the fields of environment and health. These are the strong points of the project; it also has several weaknesses. The project is too ambitious and without any initiative for follow-up. The activities were not integrated, there was an unqualified expert in the area of agronomy, there appeared to be a lack of co-ordination between research services and lack of sensitization towards the population, all of which has resulted in low production. There were also difficulties in commercializing the products because of low prices and poor distribution of resources, to the detriment of activities. Certain materials, such as water pipes and motor-bicycles were of poor quality and last, but not least, the personnel turnover, in particular those of the CTAs and the National Directors, has disrupted the flow of work. It also seems that the project is moving without knowing where it is going. The problem of financing project activities, after completion of the phase, has not been seriously tackled. No cost benefit analysis has been done. After three years of the project's life, more than half of the budget, \$US 24.4 million, has been spent and from the total expenditure 23 per cent was accounted for by personnel expenses, e.g. salaries. The remaining \$15.5 million is far from adequate to complete the project. This creates doubts as to the sustainability of the project after withdrawal of donor assistance. All indications proved that the Government will be forced to find new sources of funds. Many things have been realized but the project has not yet become fully functional. The United Nations system organizations could also participate to maintain the pace of momentum of development work, e.g. by equipping schools, clinics, etc. If there is to be a second phase, it would be advisable to concentrate on production rather than building more infrastructure.

Project title: Community education for integrated rural development
(Education communautaire pour un développement rural
intégr )
Phase II - BDI/77/010

Functional type: Direct support (primary)
Institution building (secondary)

Executing agency: UNESCO

Start date: 1977 Finish date: 1983

Budget \$US 2,064,982 Provided by:
UNDP \$1,691,171
Government \$ 373,811

Background: In 1960 immediately after independence only 21 per cent of the population had basic education. The Government wished to extend education facilities to the disadvantaged areas, mainly the rural sector. But the Government was confronted with education programmes whose content and methods of teaching were inadequate to the development needs of the country. To solve this problem the Government prepared a study designed to reform the primary school system inherited from the colonial period, into a community school for integrated rural development. Within this framework, the first phase of the project started in 1974 for three years with the assistance of UNDP/UNESCO. In 1977, upon the request of the Government the second phase continued for seven years to the end of 1984.

Objectives: The general objectives were to adapt the educational system to the needs of the country and to train trainers. Immediate objectives were kirundisation, to use Kirundi, the national language of Burundi as a teaching language at all the primary school levels; to replace progressively the traditional primary schools with rural community schools which will be self-reliant, managed by co-operatives open to parents and representatives of public and private organizations. Rural ization, adaptation of the primary school teaching programmes to the rural area of establishing methods devoted largely to practical training (agriculture and livestock, family economy and technology). To train and recycle the teachers with the double purpose of raising their professional knowledge and to make them understand the new approach to community education. To set up progressively a structure which is rural oriented and permanent education on the basis of the development constituted by the community schools, and to produce and diffuse the necessary pedagogy materials.

Results: With regard to the development of Kirundi, the national language of Burundi, as a medium of instruction in primary schools the project was instrumental in the creation of a national language centre responsible in particular for producing a standardized vocabulary and spelling, including scientific vocabulary. The centre has developed techniques for using the national language in teaching calculation and studying the immediate environment. Developing the vocabulary and a grammar were however found to be objectives of a long-term nature. To complete the task a period beyond the duration of the UNDP/UNESCO-assisted project was required. Community involvement in education was promoted partly through the establishment of co-operatives of parents and students in several schools. The co-operatives contributed, in cash and in-kind, to the construction and equipping of

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classrooms. The concept of community school and strategies for developing such a school in the long-term were considered at a seminar organized by the project and attended by government representatives, teachers, doctors, agronomists, social workers and others. One of the key outcomes of the seminar was the creation of interdisciplinary schools. Overall, the development of a community school required more time than the duration of the project.

Assessment: It is recognized that reforms such as that which the project was intended to bring about normally require a longer time to achieve than the life span of a typical external assistance project. In the particular case of this project, popularizing the concept of community school required a **gradual** changing of attitudes and practices, the tangible results of which could more realistically be expected only in the post-project phase of the reform. The same can be said of the intention to develop a vocabulary, a grammar and a methodology for teaching the national language which hitherto was used mainly as an oral medium of communication. Thus it can be said that the immediate objectives of the project were over-ambitious. Given the kind of constraints that a nation-wide reform normally experiences, the project can be said to have contributed to the development of the capacity to plan and carry out the activities implied in the objectives - namely the national language centre. The seminar which brought together people from different professions and occupations was a beginning in the process of popularizing the concept of community school. A foundation has been laid for another project to follow the reform through step-by-step.

Project title: Assistance to a special labour intensive public works programme
(Assistance à un programme special élargi de travaux publics à haute intensité de main-d'oeuvre)
BDI/81/016

Functional type: Direct support

Executing agency: ILO

Start date: 1979
1982

Finish date: 1983 (phase I)
1985 (Phase II)
Extended to 1988

Budget: \$US2,067,074

<u>Provided by :</u>	<u>Phase I</u>
DANIDA	\$US 230,062
OPEP/UNDP	\$US 103,482
FRG	\$US 811,160
Netherlands	\$US 718,000
Government	\$US 205,000
	<u>\$US 2,067,704</u>
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	\$US6,085,427
<u>Provided by:</u>	<u>Phase II</u>
UNDP	\$US 2,225,727
Netherlands	\$US 674,706
FRG	\$US 212,572
Belgium	\$US 68,622
DANIDA	\$US 750,500
UNCDF/ILO	\$US 582,100
FED	\$US 1,571,200
Government	\$US 91,200
	<u>\$US 6,085,427</u>
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Background: The Government of Burundi has defined a development strategy to take into account, inter alia, demographic as well as social and economic factors. Another priority area of the Government is to expand the agricultural sector which provides about 90 per cent of the employment and almost 100 per cent of export earnings. Within this framework, the ILO programme is supposed to restore the soil, re-afforest plots, organize water meadows, curb water, set up road infrastructures, Plant and organize surfaces for inhabitants. The final result of the programme would consist of providing the population in the selected provinces, cultivable land sufficient for their consumption and eventually to allow them to move their agricultural surplus which will bring them cash revenue. The ILO labour intensive technology programme is a viable alternative for public works programmes and has positive effect on employment and sustainable development of the local population. The pilot phase of the programme, realized in the province of Muramuya, the second highly populated province (about 250 habitants/km²) had as its fundamental objective to increase the possibility of production in certain areas by using labour intensive methods. Based on the success of the pilot phase, the Government requested the continuation of the programme in the eastern part of the country.

Objectives: The development objectives were to increase the level of economic growth substantially, to provide employment possibilities to the disadvantaged groups of the population, to increase the level of investments, to give the Government a more active role in the mobilization of human and financial resources and in participation to the activities of mixed enterprises in the commercial and productive sectors. In addition, the project was supposed to encourage the decentralization of social and economic activities to the rural population by creating balanced development bases, regrouping of rural population in villages and migration of the highly populated regions to the less populated areas. It was intended to give special attention to food production and integrated rural development, mainly in the form of installing the peasants in the provinces situated at the east side of the country. The immediate objectives were: the identification, formulation, co-ordination and evaluation of labour intensive projects of manpower training as parts of a coherent programme; to assist in raising funds for the vast programme of labour intensive public works and manpower training, namely the selection and hiring of the workers, their training, conditions of payment and work to establish appropriate procedures during the execution of the programme. Assistance in organizing the work to increase the output of manpower labour by using tools, equipment and local materials was envisaged.

Results: During the first phase of the pilot project some fifty construction areas have employed 60 to 125 workers during 250 days per year, which brings the number of man-days used to about two million. Other accomplishments were afforestation of 2,400 ha; soil and water conservation (anti-erosion) of 3,750 ha; drainage of swamps 270 ha; terracing 19 ha; water supply three units; collective village infrastructure for 102 inhabitants; 56 kms of country roads and four units of warehouses. The second phase is the extension of the pilot project with the purpose of maintaining what has been done and starting new work in the province of Ruyigi in the area of agriculture and social infrastructure, hydraulic power, construction and afforestation. The project has proceeded satisfactorily during the second phase as well and has achieved most of its objectives, except the road of the province of Hubaragui which was delayed because of lack of funds in 1985. It has created employment opportunities, although on a short-term basis, to a considerable number of peasants in the rural areas. On-the-job training on use and maintenance of tools, group work, division and execution of the work, quality of the work, and prevention of accidents was also given. For the gang leaders, emphasis has been put on the organization and control of groups. Regarding the participation of women on the execution of the project, it is limited to tree planting which was done 100 per cent by young girls. The participation of women in re-afforestation increased from 12 per cent in 1986 to 26 per cent in 1987. According to the CTA, in general it is difficult to have more participation of women because of traditional values that married women cannot work outside of the house. Concerning the impact of the infrastructure created on the rural women, this is variable and depends on the nature of their work. The water supply part has facilitated their day to day work they used to spend about one hour fifteen minutes per day for fetching water. The afforestation realized has equally facilitated their work of fetching firewood.

Assessment: On the whole, the project has had a positive impact and its intent was met. The impact on the population in all the three main areas afforestation, water supply and road construction is positive. The aim of creating employment for the rural population has been attained. The population participates directly in the execution of the project in all the

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three areas. On-Lho-job training has been provided to workers and although limited, technicians and team leaders have also been trained. The water supply part of the project, which took the smallest portion of the budget, not only saves women from fetching water from long distances, but also contributes a great deal to the health of the population. Some observations, however, have been made on the road construction part of the project. Although in the long-term the road will benefit some merchants who transport their products to other areas, the immediate benefit of this portion of the project, which took the major part of the budget, is not clear as far as the majority of the local population is concerned. Gravelled roads have to be maintained at least once every two years, if not every year after the rainy season. At the present time, it seems clear that the project is too large and cumbersome and that the Government does not have the means to continue the process on its own. The inhabitants of Burundi are dispersed and anything that requires a collective effort immediately is difficult to achieve. Moreover, the direct beneficiaries were not consulted at the planning stages of the projects. There have also been delays in procuring equipment from headquarters. A limited amount of authority in particular in the area of purchasing, has to be decentralized to the field with a good reporting and control system. According to the CTA, since the major part of the problem is related to maintenance, the United Nations system organizations may wish to review their policies, and try to convince other donors, in order to reduce the amount of work to be realized and put aside part of the budget for maintenance by the Government after their departure.

Project title: Conservation and processing of food products
(Conservation et transformation des produits vivriers)
BDI/81/026

Functional type: Direct support

Executing agency: **FAO**

Start date: 1982

Finish date: 1985

Budget : **\$US 445,150**

Provided by:
UNDP **\$US 290,000**
Government **\$US 155,150**

Project title: Establishment of eight demonstration centres
(Installation de 8 centres de demonstration)
GCP/BDI/019/AGF

Functional type: Institution building

Executing agency: **FAO**

Start date: 1982

Finish date: 1984
(extended to 1985)

Budget : **\$US 690.000**

Provided by:
Arab Gulf

Project title: Support to the demonstration centres for women
(Appui aux centres de demonstration en faveur des femmes) **GCP/BDI/021/NET**

Functional type: Direct support (primary)
Training (secondary)

Executing agency: **FAO**

Start date: 1983

Finish date: 1986

Budget : **\$US 808.100**

Provided by:
The Netherlands

Background: In rural areas one of the most time consuming and physically tiring tasks for women is the preparation of food for the family, in particular those based on flour, such as maize, cassava, wheat, corn and sorghum. The processing of these grains into flour is done in a traditional way using two large stones. Improve.2 methods of processing flour by using small mills will facilitate the housework of women and will allow them more time to devote to development activities. At the different community meetings, the Union of Women of Burundi has identified this request on behalf of the rural women for whom available private grinding mills in the country were insufficient. In addition, because of poor conditions of storing agricultural products in the rural areas, depending on climate, between five and 60 per cent is lost. Lack of adequate storage facilities does not

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encourage producers to produce more than their immediate needs, while other regions which do not have sufficient food production could purchase an excess. To improve this situation, since 1978 several international organizations have brought their technical and financial assistance to develop appropriate technology in Burundi. In 1978 a project on appropriate technology financed by UNICEF executed by FAO was launched (PFL/BDI/001). The concept was to diffuse within the framework of an Integrated Rural Development project technology similar to that set up in Kenya with the assistance of UNICEF, for conservation and transformation of food products. By 1980/81, however, collaboration between UNICEF and FAO diminished and by 1982/84 there was minimum collaboration between the two organizations because of differences in the prices and types of articles proposed. In January 1982 the activities of the project (PFL/BDI/001) were taken over by project UNDP/FAO/BDI/026. 'Conservation et transformation des produits vivriers'. The purpose of the project is to introduce better techniques for conserving and transforming food products. There were two trust fund projects linked to it: GCP/019/AGF for installing eight demonstration centres; and GCP/BDI/021/NET initiated to give support to the demonstration centres through popularization.

Objectives: General objectives were to facilitate the every day tasks of women so that they could devote more time to development activities, and to reinforce the food security of the country. Immediate objectives of BDI/81/026 are to improve the methods of food conservation; install small units for processing food products; inform and sensitize the producers about the improved methods of conservation, and train technicians to ensure the continuation of the operation. The objectives of GCP/BDI/019/AGF were to diffuse in the rural areas, after the training of local artisans, simple technologies introduced by 81/026 for storing food products (store houses, drying rooms, etc.), hence to improve the living and working conditions in the rural areas (cisterns for storing water, latrines, wheelbarrows, etc.). GCP/BDI/021/NET is complementary to those of 81/026 and 019. It was to sensitize the rural population, in particular women around the demonstration centres in the province of Ruiyi with the aim of creating and organizing groups of vocational co-operatives.

Results*. The project BDI/81/026 has played the role of co-ordinator and catalyst of finance in the area of food security and the improvement of the conditions of life and work in the rural areas. For these reasons it has been requested to implement the two trust fund projects and other external projects which deal with appropriate technology. The project developed four things: demonstration centres; cisterns; reservoir for storing rainwater; storage for storing cereals for long periods of time; and large wheelbarrows for transporting goods. But none of them has become functional for the following reasons: the cisterns were too expensive for the peasants to buy; the grain storage, in addition to being expensive, did not yield anything new for the villagers. They already have a traditional storage which works well and within their means. Moreover, peasants living in the province where the grain storages are built (seven out of eight) in one province, do not keep their cereals more than three months. finally, the wheelbarrows were technically unsuitable: too large for one person to push and too expensive to buy.

Assessment: The principal objective to improve the living conditions of the rural population, in particular those of women, has not been met. The UNDP field office considers that the project results were inadequate and project objectives have not been achieved. However, FAO has a different view. The

programme officer seems to have been convinced that storage methods proposed and developed were perfectly appropriate and adequate. On paper the three projects may look successful in the sense that the expected results have been produced - demonstration centres have been set up, cisterns have been built, storages constructed, wheelbarrows developed and training provided. The field visit, however, revealed that the rationale of the project was questionable from the very start. At this point it is also worthwhile to mention the reasons for the rupture of the working relationship between UNICEF and FAO which was caused by differences in the choice of technique and strategies. UNICEF therefore decided to develop a separate programme of appropriate technology parallel to the UNDP/FAO project. The items produced by BDI/81/026 did not respond to the needs of the people. They are technologically inappropriate and too expensive for the peasants to buy. Inadequate attention paid to the socio-economic aspects of appropriate technology. The project activities did not involve the rural population sufficiently. No studies were made of the socio-economic situation. Project personnel did not engage in extension work and thus no feed back obtained as to the appropriateness of the articles being diffused. The project also suffered from lack of harmonized approaches between UNDP and FAO. UNDP knew very little of the operations by the two trust fund projects since they had no supervision of their activities. Lack of co-ordination in general was a major problem. There were essentially two parallel projects doing the same thing, one financed by UNICEF the other by UNDP/FAO, together with other trust fund projects each with their own objectives. A small section of the project, however, a grinding mill for different types of cereals, has succeeded. The beneficiaries, mainly women in the rural area, are satisfied with this part of the project and have requested that it should be decentralized to other regions. The expert, who left the project a year ago, and the associate expert, have established a manual which explains how the grinding mill works, as well as how to manage it. This seems to be a good piece of work produced by the project. The manual was prepared in the local language (Kirundi) and French. A number of beneficiaries have been trained on the use of the manual. This manual could also be used by other agencies who are doing similar projects, e.g. UNICEF. Another positive aspect of this part of the project is that it has assisted the villagers to be organized in co-operatives to manage the mills. The project has cost, up to the present, \$US 2.5 million and the plan is to re-orient it again for the fourth time. It seems that no appropriate consideration is being taken as to the basic weaknesses of the project which is still far from being resolved in that the project has been imported from Kenya without taking into consideration the needs of Burundi. The beneficiaries were not consulted at the beginning, which resulted in their being unable to use what seems to be inappropriate for the country. In conclusion it would be worthwhile to re-consider whether it is the right method of work to have trust fund projects under a UNDP financed project? The two trust fund projects were designed to back-up something which disappeared (026). When they began to function there was nothing to back.

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Projet le : Tick prevention programme - Phase II
(**Lutte contre les tiques**
Phase **opérationnelle pilote**) BDI/85/011

Functional type: Direct support (primary)
Training (secondary)

Executing agency: FAO

Start date: 1986 Finish date: 1989

Budget: \$US 975,330 Provided by: UNDP

Background: The Government of Burundi has initiated a development programme designed to increase meat and milk production throughout the country. The success of the programme depends to a certain extent on the need to fight against ticks and diseases transmitted by ticks. In certain parts of the country, 90-100 per cent of cattle deaths are attributed to the above cause. In 1979 the Government obtained assistance from UNDP to launch the programme. The first pilot project, which lasted seven years, was devoted to the identification of problems caused by ticks; the regions which are badly affected; the critical seasons and when to intervene. The second phase covering three years, 1986-1989, deals with how to decrease the number of ticks during the critical period. The project is experimental and if the result is positive there will be a national programme for Burundi, to be extended later to other African countries.

Objectives: General development objectives are: to improve the nutritional standard of the population, in particular the intake of protein and fat; increase the income of the rural population and their purchasing power by modernizing the methods of animal husbandry; increase the productivity of the national livestock through an improved sanitary system. The immediate objectives are: to set up a maintenance infrastructure of the strategic pilot programme; to establish 8 de-ticking committee within the different communities; to set up 8 training programme for the personnel and 8 system of recovering the cost of acaricides (chemical used for killing ticks).

Results: The second phase of the pilot project is still operational and it is too early to assess results. However, the project seems to be on the right track. The basic infrastructure of 30 dipping tanks has been built in the areas where cattle are most affected by ticks; committees in different regions responsible for the management of the dipping tanks have been set up. A large number of professionals and technicians have been trained: one chemist as counterpart to the expert; two veterinary doctors; two veterinary technicians and laboratory assistants; 25 dipping tank guards; 29 medical assistants and 11 veterinary technicians. Short study tours on the new strategies for tick control have been set up for three final year students of the 'Institut de techniques agricoles da Burundi', and two veterinary technicians from the 'Service de l'élevage du Rwanda', responsible for animal health. They attended a two-week seminar in the laboratory of 'Chimie des acaricides'.

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Assessment: The project is mainly a scientific research project on how to control cattle tick diseases and Seems to work without any major difficulties. There are two international staff (one peace corps and one associate expert) and two veterinary doctors as counterparts. In addition, there are seven technicians trained by the project working in different regions of the country. The work is well-organized; there is an efficient internal control system to record the number of animals receiving treatment every week. There is also a laboratory in Rujumbura used for analyzing the different tick diseases. Some minor problems, such as long delays in repairing dipping tanks used for treating cattle, because of FAO headquarters administrative procedures, have been brought to the attention of the JIU mission. The chemical used to prepare the solution for treatment is imported and expensive, which, in the long-term, will be a problem. There has also been concern as to the environmental hazards of dumping the used solution in open fields, particularly ill effects on the community. The project is still on-going, and what has been done up to the present can be considered as successful and fulfilling a real need. The main contributing factors have been the outstanding quality of the two experts and the motivation of the national staff. The project is accepted by the beneficiaries and they participate directly in its implementation. The project could be cited as a good example of popular involvement. The "sustainability" of management of the dipping tanks is feasible, but this would depend on the level and source of subsidies for the chemical, the cost of which is beyond the means of the community.

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Project title: Forestry development and training
(Développement forestier et formation) BDI/78/003

Functional type: Institution building (primary)
Direct support (secondary)

Executing agency: FAO

Start date: 1979
1982

Finish date: 1982 (Phase I)
1987 (Phase II)

Budget: \$US 815,670

Provided by: Phase I
UNDP \$ 727,348
Government \$ 88,322

\$US 2,012,708

Phase II
UNDP \$1,939,594
Government \$ 73,114

Background: With a density of 150 inhabitants per square kilometre and a population growth of 2.5 per cent, Burundi is a highly populated African country. The rural population, which consists of 3.9 million (or 92 per cent of the total population), depends for its activities only on resources offered by the rural space. The increasing need for cultivable land, the expansion of traditional livestock and the lack of wood for industry and personal use has increased pressure on the land. More than three-quarters of the natural forest has been destroyed. The remainder of the natural forest is continuously exposed to cutting by the population for its own use, and is menaced by fire. The recent inventory shows that 80 to 89 per cent of the forest plots in the country are in a state of degradation, and more than one-third has become almost non-productive because of soil erosion. In this situation, the base for producing wood is becoming inadequate and the different needs of the country are met at the detriment of the natural forest. This affects, in particular, soil conservation and water management. There is an acute shortage of qualified foresters and technicians in the country. Although there is an agricultural training school, the number of graduates, is not sufficient to meet needs. The purpose of this project is, therefore, to train professional foresters and technicians at the middle and higher levels. This is expected to allow the country to have competent personnel, conscious of the impact of ecology on the socio-economic development of the country.

Objectives: The general objective is to assist the Government in developing an appropriate forestry policy dealing with re-afforestation and rational use of natural forests with a view to satisfying the needs of the population and local industries in forestry products and to ensure the protection of the rural area. Immediate objectives: accelerated training of forestry technicians taking advantage of the existing infrastructure of the Institut Technique Agricole du Burundi (ITAB); install a progressively regular training cycle of foresters at the level of technicians in the establishment; use the level of foresters for training agronomists in the service of forest sectors, with the assistance of courses and seminars; ensure the complete training of foresters, at engineering level, of six young professionals, through fellowships; assume the diffusion of forestry knowledge by distributing the courses and seminars at different levels for rural training,

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Result: The project started in 1979 with the above broad objectives and it is in its second phase. Since 1979 it has given assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock for training, at different levels, of technicians in afforestation and agronomy. It gives training in the ITAB. Since inception, the project has trained 111 forestry technicians, 178 A2 agricultural engineers and 59 A3 forestry trainers. The different levels of courses are designed and taught by FAO experts, three of whom teach the scientific aspect, and by 18 professors from Burundi and the region teaching mathematics, history, geography, etc. The professors have produced teaching manuals for the different disciplines. The technicians trained by the project are renowned for their technical qualities, and are employed by several ministries and institutions within the country, and by organizations such as ILO, the World Bank, 'Cocporative Francaise', Belgium, FED, etc. Since 1980, the project has established an active training methodology, which is appropriate for the rural area in the province of Karuzi.

Assessment: This project has been successful and has attained all its principal objectives with only one problem: the training of counterparts. This is due to several factors. For the last six to seven years the project has trained only one expert engineer in agronomy, who was later sent to France for two years and is now working with the project. Since then, three engineers have been trained but none of them is working for the project. The few professionals trained by the project, in particular those trained abroad, are taken away either by the Government for a higher post in the Ministries or by the private sector which pays more. On the other hand, the success of the project is based on two factors: the expert (CTA) is highly competent. His work is much appreciated by the Government. The Government's commitment to the project is firm and continuous. Although the project is under the guidance of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, its direct counterpart is ITAB. The Director of ITAB, who has been trained in the Institute, is the national counterpart and participates actively in the project operation. There is a perfect co-operation between the ITAB Director and the CTA. The Institute has an important role in deciding how the project should be managed. It is not only running programmes at different levels but is also fully capable of planning and executing the project. It is probable that there will be a third phase financed by FAO. According to the FAO expert, the project could be managed by the national director but lack of resources may be a problem.

Project title : **Intensification of cereal production in the Bututsi natural region TCP/BDI/4507**

Functional type : **Direct support and training**

Executing agency : **FAO**

Start date : **March 1986** Finish date : **Feb. 1987**

Budget : **\$US 204,000** Provided by : **FAO**

Background: Wheat has been grown in the hills of the **Nilo-Zaire** crest in Burundi for over 40 years. Initially it was sent to the industrial mills in **Zaire**. After the end of the colonial period, production declined and wheat practically disappeared in some regions. Given the favourable agro-climatic conditions, the Government intends to intensify wheat and triticales (type of wheat) cultivation in the Bututsi region, which is a food deficit region. Increased cultivation would reduce the volume of imported cereals and increase the standard of living of smallholder families and the prospects of achieving overall food self-sufficiency in **Burundi**.

Objectives: The immediate objectives of the project are the dissemination of wheat and triticales cultivation in four pilot villages, the training of 1,000 farmers in improved cultivation practices, and the strengthening of the local agricultural extension services.

Results: This small project has achieved, and in some cases exceeded, its objectives. Despite the absence of a counterpart to the expatriate expert, trials of triticales and wheat were conducted as planned. The yields have been satisfactory and this has attracted considerable attention from the farmers.

Assessment: As a direct result of the project the number of farmers cultivating wheat/triticales has gone from 1,500 to 5,000 in the project area in the short time span of its duration. After the end of the project, and despite the fact that the planned second phase has not materialized, dissemination of wheat/triticales cultivation is continuing with increased momentum. The project has therefore been instrumental in setting in motion a process which is now being developed using basically local resources. The prospects of extension outside the immediate project areas are promising, given the fact that demand for seeds exceeds supply. The project's success - and its potential impact - is to a large extent attributable to the fact that it is based on the use of low levels of inputs, which create no dependence, and on a technology which can easily be mastered by the smallholders of the region,

Project title : Road improvement and maintenance (Burundi/2286)

Functional type: Direct support

Executing agency: WFP

Start date: January 1977 Finish date: June 1986

Budget \$US 4,025,408 Provided by:

WFP \$ 4,011,985

Approx. \$65 million provided by World Bank, Belgium, FRG, USA, France, Japan, etc., for the 10 yr. programme of road improvement and repair

Government \$ 13,423

Background: Road transportation plays a vital role in the economy of Burundi, as agricultural products both for internal consumption or export and the internal distribution of imported goods rely entirely on road transportation. At Independence the country inherited 5,500 kilometres of road network, which is one of the most dense in Africa. However, many of these roads are narrow, poorly maintained and often impassable during the rainy season. In 1977, there were only 120 kilometres of paved roads. The roads are little utilized which reflects the low level of economic activity, but also the poor conditions of the road, which, in turn, involves high transport costs and discourages production for the market. High internal transport costs thus impair the development of rural areas. The maintenance of the above network requires important financial and technical investments, especially in consideration of the country's geography and climate, i.e. heavy rainfall on mountainous surfaces. In spite of the Government's efforts to live up to such requirements, the road system has gradually deteriorated putting other development efforts in jeopardy.

Objectives: The purpose of the project is to contribute to improving the road network in Burundi. The specific role of food aid is to replace 50 per cent of the minimum cash wages of 2,000 daily road workers responsible for improvement and maintenance of the road network. The target number of workers was raised to 3,300 in 1980. Food assistance is intended to help solve problems of recruitment and absenteeism by offsetting the low level of remuneration which, because of the national budget situation, cannot be adjusted to the rate of inflation. It was anticipated that the Ministry of Public Works would distribute periodically, at least once a month, three daily individual rations to each road worker for every working day and for a maximum of 300 days per annum. The programme for the maintenance and improvement of the road network, with food aid, forms part of the ten-year plan for the construction and improvement of the road network, (1974-84) financed by various external sources.

Results.: Initially set at 1,400 km. the project objective as regards road maintenance was raised to 3,000 km., thus covering the whole classified road network in the country. Partly owing to the large technical and financial assistance made available to Burundi from several international and bilateral agencies the project was able to considerably extend its road maintenance and construction targets. In allowing the project to recruit train and retain an adequate and regular work force (which at times exceeded 3,000 labourers), WFP

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assistance has provided a complementary **and** successful contribution to the implementation of the overall externally financed programme. Apart from the direct impact **on the** country's road infrastructure, **WFP has** contributed to the creation of permanent and semi-permanent **employment** in the rural areas.

Assessment: As regards technical achievements, the project can be considered satisfactory; however, the presence of a team of experts provided by other international **assistance was no** small factor in this. The implementation of the WFP-assisted component of the programme was, however, fraught with very serious deficiencies **as regards the management of the project** by the Government unit responsible for it, the storage, transportation and **distribution** of the foodstuffs. Storage facilities in Bujumbura were totally inadequate; there was no effective accounting for stocks, leading to wastage and theft of commodities; food distribution was erratic and not properly **supervised**, in many cases beneficiaries received much less food than the amounts recorded; most of the progress reports required under the plan of operations were never submitted by the Government. WFP's office in **Burundi** was (and **is**) manned by two international staff who at the time of implementation were fully occupied with carrying out work which should have been undertaken by Government staff and without these exceptional efforts, implementation would have been further severely retarded. Despite the fact that these deficiencies were pointed out in the **1981** evaluation report, the project was extended twice to mid-1986. Although some improvements were **registered** in the **last** months of project execution, one wonders if - as had been recommended internally within WFP - the project should not have **been** terminated at an earlier date, given the extent of mismanagement and the obvious low level of priority by the Government to the improvement of project operations.

<u>Project title:</u>	Rural water supply and sanitation programme		
<u>Functional type:</u>	Direct support and institution building		
<u>Executing agency:</u>	UNICEF		
<u>Start date:</u>	1979 1988	<u>Finish date:</u>	1987 (Phase I) 1992 (Phase II)
<u>Budget</u>	\$US 5,764,000	<u>Provided by:</u>	<u>Phase</u> UNICEF \$4,364,000 (includes funds provided by UNCDF, CIDA and USAID) Government \$1,400,000
	\$US 7,710,000		<u>Phase II</u> UNICEF \$5,200,000 Government \$2,510,000

Background : Population density in the rural areas of Burundi is high (up to 380h/km 2). There are few villages and the population is mainly scattered on the hills close to the fields which provide their livelihood. The quantity of water available is not generally a problem, but the quality of the water of the rivers, lakes and natural springs is often mediocre. This has negative consequences on the health of a large proportion of the population; water borne diseases are prevalent (with cholera endemic in some of the lowlands). This situation has led the Government to request international assistance in order to provide clean water both to villages (where facilities, such as schools, dispensaries and markets are normally concentrated) and to the rural population.

Objectives: The development objective of the programme is to improve the living conditions of the rural population, especially women and children, by diminishing the prevalence of sanitation problems and water borne diseases, and by sensitizing the rural population to control and manage the process. The initial immediate objectives were the capping of 4,300 springs, to construct or rehabilitate 250 km of gravity schemes and to strengthen the technical and managerial capability of the central and local government units to devise, construct and maintain rural water supply infrastructures.

Results-: Generally speaking, the planning and implementation of the programme proceeded satisfactorily. The targets concerning spring capping were met and even exceeded (6.550 springs had been capped at the end of 1987). Work on the gravity schemes was initially below target. The training of fountain attendants and spring caretakers was also successful. This is particularly important for the long-term sustainability of the schemes which have been developed. The irregularity or unavailability of communal funds to pay the salaries of these attendants does, however, represent a constraint. The quality of the water provided by the springs and gravity schemes is considered to be good and this is starting to have a positive impact on health condition; even though the new infrastructures are often under utilized, mainly because about 40 per cent of the rural population still live at a distance of more than 500 m. from the nearest spring. At the central level, the impression is that the programme has considerably strengthened the capability of the hydrology department. The success of the overall programme can also be measured by the fact that it has been able to

attract additional funding from the **World Bank** and the European Development Fund, which has **enabled** it to increase its coverage. **Under the 1988-1992 phase, geographical coverage will be further increased** practically to the whole country.

Assessment: In technical and social terms, the programme is a **success**: the infrastructures are there, the population is **using them** and a **communally based institutional system for their maintenance**, requiring minimal outside support has been set up. From the overall **managerial** point of view the picture is somewhat less positive. The pace and expediency with which the infrastructures have been built is largely attributable to the fact that the **programme** was administratively under the **responsibility** of the two **UNICEF technicians working** in the central **government rural hydrology unit**. An attempt is currently being made to put the emphasis on advisory rather than executive functions in order to **strengthen the government managerial capability**, but at the time of the JLU visit the impression was that the programme is still being "run" by **UNICEF expatriates**.

Project title: Forestry for rural energy - Hai Afforestation Scheme
URT/084/JPN

Functional type: Direct support (primary)
Institution building (secondary)

Executing agency: FAO

Start date: May 1987 Finish date: May 1990

Budget SUS1,209,609 Provided by:
Japan \$ 1,200,000
Government \$ 9,609

Background: Adequate supply of wood to meet future energy requirements is an important component of Tanzania's socio-economic developments. Plans to secure that each district is adequately provided for in respect of fuel wood and construction supplies are part of the overall development strategy of the country. As the wood supply situation is not the same for every district nor for every division within a district, tree planting programmes have to be oriented towards priority districts/parts of districts where there is a greater shortage of fuel wood and a grave danger of environmental degradation. To meet demand in the Hai district and to allow for increases in population, at least 500 hectares would have to be afforested annually. If the afforestation programme were to be confined to homesteads, this could make a substantial demand on the area of land set aside for each homestead thus jeopardizing agricultural production and livestock rearing. To circumvent this constraint the establishment of block plantations each serving several villages at minimum distances from the villages involved is envisaged.

Objectives: The long-term objectives are to meet the increasing demand for wood and to avoid environmental degradation and to improve the living standards of the population. The project's immediate objectives are to draw up an action oriented programme for afforestation for a pilot group of villages in the district; to establish new nurseries; to establish pilot blocks of fuel wood plantations including village wood lots and school forests; to promote the use of shelter belts; to increase awareness of villagers through seminars, on-the-job training and contact with local councils and community groups.

Results: The project is still in its initial phases and is proceeding according to the work plan. No significant delays were noted, even though drought had retarded tree planting activities. The expatriate team seems to be well integrated into the local district council structure. This augurs well for the progressive "turning over" of the project to the national staff.

Assessment: It is too early to determine the impact of the project. The impression is that emphasis of the project is on production of seedlings and tree planting through hired labour. The only community development aspect is encouragement of planting of trees by individuals and awareness and the sensitizing of village councils and interested groups. While the prospects of improving the fuel wood situation in the Hai district may be good, it is yet unclear how the project will have any effect outside the immediate project area and in neighbouring districts. In addition, there does not seem to be any cross-fertilization with other donor-financed afforestation efforts (including the SIDA/FAO project, see p. 74, which is only 60 km. away).

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Project title: Support development of dairy development training units (DDTUs) at selected co-operatives for milk collection, cooling and improved fodder production CCP/URT/001/DEN

Functional type: Direct support

Executing agency: FAO

Start date: January 1 1987 **Finish date:** Dec. 1987

Budget: \$US 126,000 **Provided by:**
DANIDA
Government In-kind

Background: Interest in dairy development is currently high in Tanzania, and especially in the Arusha and Kilimanjaro regions where most of the smallholder dairies are located. Small scale milk producers are anxious to improve the performance levels of their cows, which can best be done by improved feeding, better artificial insemination services and better utilization of milk production inputs. These will be organized through the existing co-operatives by development of DDTUs in the region.

Objectives: The purpose of the project is to establish three demonstration DDTUs as focal points for organising and training small scale milk producers and to provide services and milk production inputs so that they will become economically viable and self-sustaining, self-creating units within three years from commencement of activity. The beneficiaries will be small-scale milk producers in the Arusha Kilimanjaro regions. An expert from the regional dairy development training project in Kenya will be outposted to the project and work in close co-operation with URT/86/013.

Results: After just one year of operation the project has already been able to set up one village dairy co-operative which provides an outlet for local milk production (previously milk had to be carried 10-12 km to be sold). The milk is sold in neighbouring towns, thanks to a pick-up truck provided by the project. The operation is not yet economically viable (milk collection would have to increase by a factor of 3). It is hoped that the introduction of a milk cooler would follow this. At the time of the visit the cooler had been delivered but was inadequate for the local power supply. The co-operative also provides agricultural inputs, a saving scheme and educational activities for its members. A small contribution (less than \$100) from the project to a women's group in another village was instrumental in the setting up of a cheese-making co-operative, which is now self-supporting.

Assessment: Although it is too early to determine the overall impact of the project, it is clear that for the time being its eventual success is predicated on the availability of outside funds and technology (i.e. pick-up trucks). Even if in the end the operation becomes viable, its long-term sustainability would still be dependent on the availability, or generation of funds to buy a new pick-up. Moreover, in terms of replicability, the impact is likely to be minimal, since the provision of pick-up trucks by external assistance to all the villages of the area is obviously out of the question. Had alternatives been considered - animal powered transport, the pooling of co-operatives to buy the hardware, or a credit scheme allowing co-operatives to borrow the equipment on a revolving fund basis - this might have been achieved given the potential for milk production and marketing in the area. As it is, the project is not likely to leave much behind.

Project title: Assistance to smallholder dairy development
(Arusha and Kilimanjaro regions) **URT/86/013**

Functional type: Institution building (primary)
Direct support (secondary)

Executing agency: **FAO**

Start date: April 1987 Finish date: April 1990

Budget : **\$US 1,542,638** Provided by:
UNDP \$ 1,439,000
Government \$ 103.638

Background: The urban market for milk in Tanzania is still largely dependent on imported supplies. Under the low yield traditional cattle raising **systems** milk surpluses are small and seasonal. The Government has a long-term objective of achieving self-sufficiency in dairy products. An increase in milk production by the smallholder in the project area - which contains 2/3rds of the national herd of dairy cattle - **would** contribute towards the achievement of this objective. The project was identified as a result of the drawing up of an integrated plan for smallholder dairy development in the area by an FAO mission in 1985. The basis of the plan is the provision of **many of** the goods and **services** required for dairying by the farmers themselves through their co-operative societies. Because of the scarcity of milk in the towns in the project area, demand is high and prices on the parallel market are up to twice the official price. Increases in milk production would therefore have a positive impact on rural income and employment - especially of women who are the main actors in cattle rearing and marketing of the milk.

Objectives: The broad objective of the project is **to assist the** Government in the co-ordination of the **various** inputs and; donors involved in the implementation of the smallholder development plan in the area. The immediate objectives relate to the strengthening of the regional and district extension services; to popularize the treatment of roughage with urea to improve its feeding value; to increase quality and quantity of the fodder grown by the farmers; to improve the services provided by co-operative societies; to provide **suitable** breeding bulls to the farmers, etc.

Results: The main activity of the project is the co-ordination of various sub-projects from different donors involved in dairy development. **Both** the expatriates were reassigned from previous **FAO** projects so there were no delays in initiating implementation. A "Dairy Development Co-ordinating Committee" has **been** set up to monitor implementation in the project area and to ensure smooth integration of the various donor inputs within the framework of national dairy development efforts. Field activities **seem to be** proceeding according to the work plan - this is **facilitated by the fact that some** project elements are carry-overs from previous **projects**.

Assessment: As the project is barely one year old it is difficult to assess its impact. Moreover, **because** of its very nature of "umbrella project", progress **may** be hard to assess in measurable terms. The impression, however, is **that the** potential for smallholder dairy development is good: cows are a valuable source of additional income for the local farmers who are **mostly** living on very small plots of land. If the project is able to introduce more rational methods which would ease **the** constraint on the availability of

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fodder, ~~its~~ catalytic ~~effects~~ would ~~be~~ considerable. It should be noted, ~~however, that~~ the project is targeted to benefit ~~smallholders~~ who own an average of one to ~~three cows~~; ~~these are~~ not necessarily the ~~poorest segments~~ of the population in the ~~area~~, ~~since~~ anyone who ~~owns~~ a cow ~~is~~ by definition not the poorest of ~~the~~ poor.

Project title: Assistance to intensify village afforestation efforts in the Kilimanjaro region GCP/URT/074/SWE

Functional type: Direct support (primary)
Experimental (secondary)

Executing agency: FAO

Start date: December 1984 Finish date: Dec. 1986

Budget: \$US 222,053 Provided by:
SIDA \$ 156,053
Government \$ 66,000

Background: Fuel wood, which was abundant in the past, is now becoming a scarce commodity in all regions of the country. Deforestation not only results in environmental damage - soil erosion by wind and water - but also reduces the potential for agricultural production. The problem is of such magnitude that a massive government and local level effort in tree planting and rational land use is required, but lack of funds, transport facilities, equipment and difficulties in sensitizing and mobilizing the population represent formidable constraints.

Objectives: The emphasis of the project is the promotion of effective village afforestation as a movement for rural development through integrated and co-operative efforts and with the involvement of the people. More specifically, the objectives related to participatory planning of tree planting in two districts, the establishment of two demonstration and training centres, a system for extension and inter-institutional co-operation and direct support to villagers in establishing nurseries. These activities were planned to serve as impact models/demonstration areas for participatory village afforestation and, hopefully, as a catalyst for a massive tree planting movement.

Results: The project, which was fully Government executed, was hampered by the late provision of inputs: disbursement of funds was delayed by over six months and has affected the establishment of nurseries; the late delivery of transport equipment - it arrived just six months before the end of the project and seriously curtailed the mobility of the project team. During implementation, because of the lack of a proper prior situation analysis, participation of the local population was poor. There was a poor perception of the project on the part of the villagers, since they had not been consulted or prepared beforehand and it was not possible to set up any village nursery operated directly by the villagers. The project team - the district level forestry authorities - therefore concentrated on nursery production and co-operation with schools and institutions (the local prison). Here the project was successful in setting up a number of nurseries, even if the optimistic seedling targets were far from achieved. Tree planting by individuals has also been boosted by the project (the demand is far greater than the supply). Training of project staff and local training of villagers have largely been neglected.

Assessment: The main conclusion is that the project has put more emphasis on seedling production than on the original objectives of developing participatory modes of co-operation and self-reliance of village afforestation efforts. In this sense the impact of the project is low and its

demonstration potential uncertain. In addition, the project has resulted in additional dependence in two ways: firstly because no steps have been taken in order to reduce dependence on external inputs (polythene tubes and manure) which have to be bought outside the project area, and secondly because the project is dependent on the availability of funds from outside no effort has been made to generate resources locally - and has indeed created the erroneous expectation that such external funds would be readily available. Alternatives, such as the approach of the UNICEF/JNSP forestry component in Iringa, which was much more successful in involving and motivating villages, were apparently not considered.

Project title: Village storage and training programme - Arusha and Dodoma regions
GCP/URT/052/NET and GCP/URT/059/AGF (Phase I)
Reduction of post-harvest losses through rural storage structures URT/86/016 (Ph.II)

Functional type: Direct support (primary function)
Institution building (secondary)

Executing agency: FAU

Start date: 1981
1987

Finish date: Har.1986 (Ph.I)
1991 (Phase II)

Budget \$US 1,591,400

Provided by: Phase I
Netherlands \$ 751,400
AG Fund \$ 840,000
Government not specified

\$US 3,296,852

Phase II
UNDP \$3,200,000
Government \$ 96,857

Background: Ninety to 95 per cent of the population of Tanzania live in rural areas and 90 per cent of these are engaged in agriculture. Although the overall national food grain production is considered sufficient, there are pronounced regional variations, which combined with an inefficient distribution system leads to recurrent regional food deficits. A contributing factor to this is the lack or inadequacy of storage facilities at the village level. Only a small proportion of villages have stores. In many villages food surplus is stored in outside stacks, often without any protection. This may result in substantial losses (estimated up to 30 or 40 per cent in some cases).

Objectives: The development objective of the various projects included in this programme is to increase farmers' incomes by reducing post harvest food crop losses. The immediate objectives of Phase I were the construction of 50 model village stores on a self-help basis in two regions, the training of villagers in store construction and storage management and the enhancement of the national capability to continue, and expand the process. The objectives of Phase II are to construct an additional 45 stores in three other regions while expanding the institution building process.

Results: The initial project was designed to construct 50 godowns in a two year period. This proved to be overly optimistic and the project was expanded several times (a separate project financed by the Arab Gulf covered the cost of 25 of the initial godowns!). At the end of Phase I, 46 village stores had been built. Implementation was constrained by several factors: the lack of a coherent Government policy on storage of food crops and a marketing and pricing system which at the time did not encourage smallholder agricultural production and commercialization; severe transportation difficulties and local unavailability of building materials (e.g. cement, steel rods), lack of motivation of regional authorities in choosing villages for store construction; difficulties in mobilizing the intended beneficiaries to participate in self-help work; wastage and pilferage of construction materials; insufficient counterpart staff; changes in composition of the expatriate team, etc. However, towards the end of Phase I two external

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factors **contributed to** greatly increasing the rate of implementation: a Government policy **shift** which liberalized the marketing of food crops which provided an **incentive** to **farmers** and a bumper crop in 1986-1987. As there was **considerable** food surplus to stock, village storage **construction** became a high Government and local level priority.

Assessment: In the final **analysis**, the projects which compose this **programme**, after a **slow** start, have achieved **some** durable effects. Phase I has demonstrated that it was **feasible** to construct village **godowns** on a self-help basis using the model design developed by the project and that this was cost-effective. **Where** the stores have been built they are of benefit, not only to the farmers who sell their surplus there but to all the rural population, since the stores normally include a small shop where not **only** grains but goods and implements are sold. **More** importantly, the project **is** instrumental in the current development of a Government storage policy. The **basic** technical specifications and self-help construction practices developed by the project have been adopted by the Government for country-wide dissemination (**as** in a recent crash **programme** for the construction of 75 **godowns** in one month). **This** has also encouraged other donors to finance **similar** projects. Finally, although during Phase I the projects were being implemented through a project management unit in which the CTA had the primary management and technical responsibilities, Phase II is more appropriately aimed at the setting up of a national technical and managerial **structure** capable of continuing the process after the gradual withdrawals of the expatriate team, thereby enhancing the potential for long-term sustainability,

Project title: Consultancy services, co-operation, popularization and use of non-conventional sources of energy
URT/81/032

Functional type: Direct support

Executing agency: UNIDO

Start date: Jan. 1983 Finish date: Mar. 1983
(3 months)

Budget : \$US 57,000 Provided by:
UNDP
Government In-kind

Background: Approximately 90 per cent of energy consumption in Tanzania is based on the non-commercial use of fuel wood. This is leading to a very dangerous deforestation situation (if the present trends continue, the last tree in Tanzania will be cut in 2015). The Government of Tanzania has given priority to the development of indigenous resources and energy conserving measures, and to the promotion and commercialization of non-conventional sources of energy, with emphasis on possible local manufacturing in order to meet the requirements of the rural population.

Objectives: The project consists of two 3-month consultancies sub-contracted to a specialized firm. The development objective is to assist Tanzania in achieving a co-ordinated development of renewable sources of energy and to promote its increased utilization in the rural areas. Specifically, the objectives to be achieved through the consultancies are: the formulation of short and long-term strategies on promotion of renewable sources of energy, the elaboration of an appropriate institutional set-up and the preparation of draft proposals for follow-up projects.

Results: The consultancies were carried out as planned. The consultants proposed an institutional structure for government co-ordination of energy conservation efforts and made a number of recommendations, in particular on the need to intensify energy conservation at the household level through the diffusion of energy efficient stoves. Eleven project proposals were also prepared by the consultants and subsequently discussed by the Government Inter-disciplinary Working Group on Co-ordination, Popularization and Use of Non-conventional Sources of Energy.

Assessment: Although the project reached its immediate objectives, it has not had any significant impact. Financing was sought from UNDP and other external sources, but none of the 11 proposed projects has as yet been financed. The project does not seem to have strengthened the Government set-up for non-conventional sources of energy or its capacity to generate its own projects. Cross-fertilization between efforts to introduce improved stoves and forest management or afforestation projects does not seem to have been pursued, despite the obvious linkage between the two activities. In short, the project has not left anything significant behind.

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Project title: Rehabilitation of housing on sisal estates (**TAN/2583**)
Functional type: Direct support
Executing agency: WFP
Start date: August 1982 **Finish date:** Sept. 1988
Budget: \$US 9,613,400 **Provided by:** WFP

Background: In the sixties Tanzania **was** the **world's** largest producer and exporter of sisal. Following independence sisal production declined sharply due to low world **prices**, disinvestment and management **problems** following nationalization of many of the estates. The sisal industry **still** remains the largest regular employer of **paid labour** in the rural areas, providing not only **wages** but also housing and basic services for thousands of families. The **rehabilitation** of the sisal industry **is** a priority for the Government - given the high potential for foreign exchange earnings it represents. The retention of sisal cutters and the recruitment of additional cutters and labourers **is** considered to be the most pressing **problem** facing the industry. Linked with this is the poor housing situation on many estates - it has been traditional practice to provide housing for all permanent workers on **sisal** estates - which is deterring workers from remaining on **their** jobs.

Objectives: The purpose of the project **is** to improve housing for workers on **sisal** estates in **order** to overcome the difficulties in recruiting and retaining **labour**, especially cutters. WFP assistance **is** to provide food rations to be sold at subsidized prices to workers on **sisal estates**. The funds thus generated will be **used** to finance the **construction** of new housing **units** on selected estates,

Results: It was planned to build 600 houses during the original three-year time frame of the project. **In** its **first** years of implementation the **project** ran into many problems, **which** were compounded by the continuing decline of the sisal industry. The overall management and supervision **were** weak, national **staff** turnover high, distribution of commodities to estates erratic, with little control as to whether they reached the intended beneficiaries. **These** constraints affected the housing **construction programme** which got off to a very slow start (since funds were being generated at a much slower pace than originally anticipated). **Despite** technical assistance from HABITAT, there **were considerable** problems in the planning, costing, supervision and overall quality of the construction work. The project had to be extended several times - from three to **six** years. At the end of 1987 only 200 houses had been completed and another 256 were in various stages of completion **against** the original target of 600. An expansion of the project for a further three year **period** has been **requested** and agreed to.

Assessment: The first phase of the project has coincided with the leanest **period** of Tanzania's sisal industry and the project undoubtedly **suffered** from **this general** decline. Several measures taken by the Government - **restructuring** of the **sisal industry**, devaluation of the Tanzanian **shilling** - and by the project - strengthening of the project management unit, appointment of an expatriate accountant and of an engineer (both **UNVs**) have, however, hopefully set the scene for an improvement. The housing **construction** targets have been woefully inadequate and **steps** have been taken, on the one hand, to reduce the high unit **costs** by adopting a simpler **house** design and increased

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reliance on locally produced materials and, on the other, to secure additional funding from other sources. The new WFP project also places some emphasis on rehabilitation of existing houses (the new targets are 1,500 new houses and the renovation of 2,500 existing ones). The basic question of maintenance of houses has not however been successfully tackled: the estate labourers are not involved in the construction and there is no incentive for proper up-keep of houses which belong to the state and are not perceived as theirs by the Inspectors. This may become a serious problem in the long run. Overall, the project has had a direct positive impact on two types of beneficiaries: the 17,000 workers on sisal estates who obtain access to food at subsidized prices, and the 456 families who have benefited or are soon to benefit from the allocation of a new house. This has helped in reducing turnover of workers in some estates. However, the fact remains that work on a sisal estate is basically unattractive for economical and social reasons (sisal cutting has a social stigma reminiscent of the colonial era). Food pricing and housing are only two facets of the wider problem of the rehabilitation of the sisal industry, the success of which is dependent on many other domestic and external factors.

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Project title: Joint WHO/UNICEF support for the improvement of nutrition in the **United Republic of Tanzania (Iringa region)**

Functional type: Institution **building** (primary)
Direct support (**secondary**)

Agency: UNICEF

Start date: 1983 **Finish date:** 1991

Budget: **\$US 5,804,000**
(for 1983-1988) **Provided by:**
Italy (through UNICEF)
Government: mainly in kind

Background : Tanzania was among the **first countries** to be selected for the Joint WHO/UNICEF Nutrition Support **Programme (JNSP)**. It was agreed that the **programme** should be concentrated in the **Iringa region** **because** baseline data on malnutrition - which was high was available and because the region includes a **range** of agro-economic and ecological **zones**, which are **also** found in many other **areas** of Tanzania. In order to **ensure** achievement of early visible impact it was decided to concentrate **programme** activities in **seven** divisions of the **region** (where about 25 per cent of the population of **Iringa** live). Malnutrition **is seen** as the end result of inter-dependent **social** processes, **Diseases** and inadequate food intake are the immediate **causes**. Inadequate provision of and access to essential **commodities** and services are the **underlying** causes, while the basic **causes** of the problem are to be found in the socio-economic, political and **cultural** aspects of the **situation**. Prior to the **launching** of the programme a detailed situation **analysis** and **strategy** were developed **using** a conceptual framework that reflects **these** different levels of the problem. An effort was made to identify **those disease** and dietary factors **that** have **most** influence in the nutrition situation, and then to identify the commodities and services (underlying **determinants**) most responsible for the **presence** of **those** factors. The analysis showed that there **are** a number of **causes** of malnutrition that **must** be attached **simultaneously** in order to achieve an impact. The **main** thrust of the programme, therefore, has been an attack on the immediate **causes**, **especially** the **disease** factors, by universal application of some cost effective **interventions** and at the **same** time a reduction of **those** underlying **causes** that most directly relate to the most important dietary and **disease** factors. The **whole programme**, with its **projects** and sub-projects, **is**, therefore, targeted both directly and indirectly towards a rapid and sustained reduction of the rates of malnutrition, infant and child mortality.

Objectives: The overall **objectives** are the following: reduction of infant and young child mortality and morbidity; better child growth and **development**; improved maternal health and nutrition; improvement of the capabilities at all **levels** of society to **assess** and to analyse nutrition problems and to design appropriate action. In order to reach these objectives a **programme** activities are grouped into ten main categories which include **several** sub-projects **ranging** from the **construction** and renovation of **village dispensaries**, **training** of Local village health **workers** in each village, training of trainers and Government extension workers, **immunization**, **monitoring** of child **growth**, **agro-forestry**, promotion of household food security, **income-generating** activities for mothers, etc.

Results: During the initial phases of the programme UNICEF provided technical assistance for the elaboration of the strategy and project implementation. This has now been progressively withdrawn and the JNSP is now fully integrated into the overall regional development structure, i.e. the regional, district, ward and village authorities are now executing the programme as part of their normal duties. The overall performance of the programme has been impressive. Starting as a "nutrition programme" the JNSP has not only been able to set up a working model for development activities at the local and regional level, which now functions with very limited technical assistance, but has also generated a surprisingly high level of commitment of national project staff and local Government offices, and considerable enthusiasm and expectation at the community level. A few examples will give an idea of the popular mobilization resulting from the project:

- Within the health sector, the training programme for village health workers (two persons in each of the 168 villages) has been completed, and a training programme to reach more than one thousand Traditional Birth Attendants and Healers in the programme area is underway. The system of monthly village "health days" has been well-established and will ensure a continued excellent coverage of immunization, growth monitoring and health education. The project has thus been able to establish and operate a health information and monitoring system at community level with the people's involvement.
- In the household food security sector, implementation is now accelerated in a number of areas including crop promotions, small animal husbandry and food processing/preparation. In addition, applied research has been initiated to better identify households with food problems and to find ways to assist such households. Ways to support women's and youth groups through existing co-operatives and rural credit schemes have also been explored. Several village level women's co-operatives for milling or food processing have been set up, as well as self-sufficient youth farms.
- Horizontal training through village-to-village visits is being implemented as the most effective way to disseminate programme achievements. Support to cultural groups and the programme newsletter with "village correspondents" fulfil the same purpose. Horizontal training/communication is also achieved by hosting a large number of visitors from other parts of Tanzania and other countries.

Assessment: The JNSP programme in Iringa is unquestionably a success; in quantitative terms the frequency of severe growth retardation in 1987 was only 30 per cent of that observed in the baseline survey; in qualitative terms the expertise developed at all levels, with particular emphasis on management and local responsibilities is a major contribution to national human resource development. In addition, the programme has acted as a potent catalyst for social participation: countless self-supporting local initiatives have been triggered off because the programme momentum was there. The programme's contribution to local self-reliance is obvious: even if the external assistance were to cease, one has the impression that much would still be going on in the field. The question of replicability is more delicate: it is clear that part of the project's success is attributable to the strong interest in UNICEF in making it a "show piece". Unlimited back-up support in logistics and management on behalf of the UNICEF staff has played an important

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role in the take-off, quick and very **flexible implementation** of the **programme**. The Government **has** recently decided to expand the **coverage** of the JNSP to **the** entire **Iringa region**; **this** will provide a **first** test of the **replicability** of the "Iringa model" and of the **ultimate sustainability** of the approach.

<u>Project title:</u>	Development of Usangu Village Irrigation URT/80/011		
<u>Functional type:</u>	Direct support		
<u>Executing agency:</u>	FAO		
<u>Start date:</u>	January 1984	<u>Finish date:</u>	July 1988
<u>Budget :</u>	\$US 4,730,088	<u>Provided, &:</u>	
		UNDP	\$3,369,280
		Government	\$1,360,808

Background: The development of rural areas through increased agricultural production is given high priority by the Government. Irrigation development is important so as to reduce dependence on rain fed agriculture. Al though the potential for irrigation is vast, because of the lack of a long-term strategy. effective institutions and capital, irrigation development is concentrated in a few high potential areas.

Objectives: The immediate objectives of the project are: the rehabilitation of the existing irrigation infrastructure (built by the smallholders using traditional methods some 50 years ago) servicing irrigated rice cultivation in nine villages in the Usangu plains; to increase crop yields through improved water management and crop varieties and to enhance the technical and managerial capability of the Mbeya Zonal Irrigation Unit (MZIU) for future village irrigation development. The relationship between the immediate objectives and the Government's development objective of irrigation development is not clear. The primary function of the project is direct support for the development of 200 ha of village irrigation per year; the secondary function is to build a unit capable of continuing the process.

Results: Despite considerable delays in its initial year caused by late arrival of international staff and essential equipment, and despite the initial unrealistic targets, the rate of implementation, in terms of physical work done (i.e. canals dug and hectares of reclaimed land) has been unusually good. The newly reclaimed land has been equitably allocated on the basis of criteria developed by the village authorities. Potential for increased yields and second crops is high. Water management is being achieved through grassroots village irrigation committees. The technical - but not the managerial - capability of the MZIU has been attained.

Assessment: Technically - as a direct support project - the project is unquestionably a success. But this success is to an overwhelming extent attributable to the competence and dynamism of the expatriate team which is actually "running" the project and to the technology (heavy equipment) utilized. From a wider development perspective, and certainly in terms of replicability and local self-reliance the picture is mixed: on the one hand the direct beneficiaries are, potentially at least, going to get much out of the project; on the other, because of the approach - the project is an isolated cell - and the technology utilized it seems doubtful that it would have any multiplier effects outside the immediate project area. Alternatives, such as the upgrading of the existing traditional irrigation schemes rather than building new infrastructures ex novo or the use of self-help rather than paid labour were apparently discarded in the interest of rapidly achieving visible results. The training and responsabilization of

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the counterpart staff were also neglected for the same reasons. Hence the need for an unforeseen second phase to start in July 1988 (for which the project has been more appropriately re-designed as "pilot" in order to enhance prospects of replicability).

Project title: Support to a special labour intensive works programme in the Arusha, Dodoma, Rukwa and Ruvuma regions
URT/77/033 Phase I
URT/86/008 Phase II

Functional type: Direct support (primary)
Institution building (secondary)

Executing agency: ILO

Start date: 1979
July 1987

Finish date: 1987 (Phase I)
Dec. 1991 (Ph. II)

Budget : \$US 2,365,976

Provided by: Phase I
UNDP \$ 2,365,976

\$US16,214,316

UNDP Phase II
\$ 3,727,450
Bilateral donors
(DANIDA, FRG,
Netherlands,
EEC) \$12,486,866

Background: General information on LIPWP programme: The Tanzania labour intensive public works programme (LIPWP) is one of several similar programmes jointly sponsored by UNDP/ILO and supported by donor countries. The UNDP/ILO component provides technical assistance, procurement, backstopping and evaluation services. The support from bilateral donors is limited to the funding of the actual work projects. The programme consists of ten works projects in irrigation, flood control, construction of feeder roads, housing, forestry and water supply. The UNDP/ILO project was aimed at supporting the programme by strengthening the national capacity for selecting, planning, implementing and evaluating works projects,

At the initial stage it was difficult to know what exactly was needed for the successful implementation of such a pilot programme which covers most of the important sectors of rural development and is at the same time scattered over four (subsequently five) regions of the country. As was pointed out in the evaluation report, a technical assistance project supporting such a pilot programme should have been very flexible. The objectives of the technical assistance project URT/77/033, however, were not flexible enough to be able to incorporate a number of issues that arose during the implementation of the programme. Consequently, the works projects encountered many technical, organizational and social problems and the limited assistance tended to be concentrated on technical aspects. Several of the medium and long-term implications were not sufficiently analyzed. The maintenance aspects of the infrastructures created under the programme, so essential for their effective use, were not included in the terms of reference of the technical assistance team. A more comprehensive approach would have called for the technical assistance team to be in a position to advise and assist the Government in setting up beneficiaries committees right at the start of any works project and would have secured a formal commitment vis-à-vis appropriate maintenance of these works. Further, proper arrangements were lacking for the preparation of new projects in order to ensure continuity of the programme.

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The small amount of technical assistance has meant that there has not been enough staff to provide all the support needed during the pilot phase of the programme. The existing project staff are often overworked. In addition, poor transport, bad communications between the various project sites and the project headquarters, and inadequate reporting, also make their work more difficult. There is a great shortage of technically qualified personnel in the Government departments concerned, which has forced the members of the technical assistance team to actually organize and implement the works projects rather than advising and training their counterparts as envisaged in the project document. With the expansion of the programme to five regions, each with a number of widely dispersed work sites, this tendency has been further exacerbated. The constraints that appeared during implementation made it clear that much more attention should have been devoted to the follow-up of each particular project, to adequate arrangements for maintenance, repair and care of the installations and to the strengthening of the Government's capability in identifying and setting up new works projects (which was the original objective of the T.A. project) rather than on actual organization and implementation of works by the small expatriate team. Indeed, a UNDP/ILO evaluation mission found that the objectives of the technical assistance project were basically unattainable, because:

- (a) there is a lack of downstream objectives in the project document, and
- (b) the technical assistance is disproportionally small in relation to the size of the programme.

The T.A. project has recently entered into a new phase (1987-1991). The project document recognizes that the first phase was essentially experimental and that its objectives were over ambitious. The results achieved so far have shown that labour-intensive techniques are viable, cost-effective and technologically sound, and the Government is keen to continue with them. This requires a much larger training effort, and the expanded project staff will be much more involved in training Government staff than was the case in the first phase. The emphasis for Phase II is on the training of Government officials at all levels in the planning and execution of LIPWP and to ensure the widespread adoption of labour intensive methods.

E&c&ground The Mto-wa-Mbu flood control and irrigation project

Given the vastness and dispersion of the LIPWP programme the JIU team focused its attention on the above-mentioned sub-component.

The Hto-wa-Hbu valley is one of the few growth poles in rural Tanzania, attracting migrants from elsewhere. The climate is dry but during the rainy season heavy rains cause floods. The valley is covered by three rivers and there is potential for irrigation. A small-scale irrigation scheme had been started by the Government in 1955. When the LIPWP project started in 1980, 500 ha were already irrigable and a basic flood control infrastructure existed but needed rehabilitation.

Objectives: The objectives of the project were to control floods in the area; reclaim 500 ha of swampy land and to facilitate the irrigation of an additional 2,500 ha of land. More generally, the project would reduce food losses due to flooding, increase agricultural production, employment and standards of living of the beneficiaries.

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Results: The total construction cost of the project was approximately **\$US 2.000.000** (provided by the Netherlands). The project generated **550,00** work days for unskilled **labour** and 7,700 work days of skilled **labour**. Although there were some delays, which required additional budgetary allocations, the project has considerably improved and extended the irrigation infrastructure. The entire valley is now protected against floods (although heavy rains in 1987 did result in some flooding and damage to the network); 400 ha of swamps have been drained and work to attain the 3,000 ha target of irrigated land is well underway. The **labour** intensive construction work has had a beneficial effect on employment (even though lately the minimum wages paid by the project are not sufficient to attract local **labour** any more, given the increased demand for agricultural **labour** or the newly reclaimed land) and the potential for agricultural production increases appears to be quite promising.

Assessment: Technically - i.e. the use of **labour** intensive techniques for **cost-effective** construction of an irrigation network - the project is a success. From the point of view of the project's social impact, the picture is mixed. **Labour** intensive maintenance is a major problem because of the extent of the canal network (85 kilometres of main canals). Contrary to the spirit of the LIPWP approach, farmers have **not** been included in decision-making. To date no Project Committee has been formed and this has resulted in their lack of interest in the project. The farmers feel it is not their project but the Government's or the **ILO's**. The large scale of the project has further aggravated these problems. These problems of popular participation have had a negative impact on follow-up activities such as maintenance, and water management. The organization of maintenance was started much too late, partly because of lack of resources and poor direction from the management. Little initiative has been taken so far to work out a proper water management system, mainly because the irrigation system is not yet fully completed, and essential maintenance tasks (clearing canals from weeds) are just not being done. This may jeopardize the long-term viability of the scheme. The **lack** of involvement of the beneficiaries in design and decision-making has had another negative effect. Unlike the **FAO** irrigation project (see page 82) where the water management committee had worked out criteria for the allocation of land which were acceptable to all concerned, in **Mto-wa-Mbu** the new land seems to have been "occupied" on a first come first served basis. This meant that the larger farmers - those with the wherewithal to till the land and employ hired **labour** - took over a large proportion of the new land. Even if increased employment opportunities for farm **labourers** are an obvious benefit for the poorest segments of the local population, overall the project can hardly be considered as "putting the last first".
