

United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SIXTEENTH SESSION

Official Records

SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 274th
MEETING

Tuesday, 31 October 1961,
at 3.20 p.m.



NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Agenda item 76:

The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of "apartheid" of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (continued). 69

Chairman: Mr. Yordan TCHOBANOV (Bulgaria).

AGENDA ITEM 76

The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of "apartheid" of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/4804 and Add.1-5; A/SPC/L.71) (continued)

1. Mr. CROWE (United Kingdom) said that the United Kingdom Government and people shared the growing frustration at the intractability of the problem of "apartheid", for probably no other country outside South Africa had as great an interest in seeing a solution to that country's racial problems which would ensure a full, prosperous and free life for all its peoples. The United Kingdom feared that the continued pursuit of the policy of "apartheid", which was the direct opposite of the policy it applied in the Territories for which it was responsible, would have disastrous consequences that would not only affect the peoples of South Africa but also reach far beyond its borders. In addition to being morally indefensible it was a policy which could not succeed in practice, for it ran contrary to the main trends of modern life. In a world whose peoples were rapidly being drawn closer together by all the resources of science and organization no people or peoples could live apart from each other or from the rest of humanity. No one who had lived in the United Kingdom would deny that there existed in that country a staunch belief in the dignity and worth of the individual, expressed in a long history of resistance to tyranny and oppression, whether internal or external. That belief was not compatible with acceptance of any kind of racial discrimination in any part of the world. The British people had not fought two World Wars and suffered heavy casualties, the disruption of their economy and the destruction of their cities, in order to defend a state of affairs in which doctrines of racial supremacy flourished. It was sheer nonsense to accuse the United Kingdom Government or its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of giving clandestine support to South Africa's racial policies. Indeed, the Prime Minister had spoken out against those policies in the Parliament of South Africa itself in February 1960 and his Government had used every available means to impress upon the South African authorities its disapproval of "apartheid".

2. Not all the white inhabitants of South Africa were supporters of "apartheid"; to lump them all together as devotees of that doctrine was to fall into the error of becoming "racialists in reverse". In the South African men and women of various races who were expressing their opposition to "apartheid" in the churches, universities and political life lay the best hope of bringing about a change and the United Nations should do nothing to discourage or drive them to despair, for that might lead to further bloodshed and perhaps chaos. His Government had deplored South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth, although inevitable in the circumstances; every step towards the further isolation of South Africa reduced the possibility of exercising influence for the better. The United Nations should therefore consider whether a proposed course of action might not deepen or perpetuate South Africa's isolation. The United Kingdom Government had no special influence but had done what it could to persuade the Government of South Africa.

3. It was understandable that many members of the Committee had grown impatient with the idea of persuasion and thought that the time had come to take stronger action. He feared, however, that the measures proposed in the draft resolution submitted by eleven African States (A/SPC/L.71) might have the opposite effect of what its sponsors intended. The expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations was likely only to confirm the Government in its determination to continue its policies and to discourage liberal opinion in the country. If it was the duty of the United Nations to exercise moral pressure, an expelled South Africa could be beyond the reach of the Organization.

4. There were other Members of the Organization whose policies or actions had been, or were, repugnant to certain of their fellow Members for one reason or another; their expulsion had not been sought, for if the weapon of expulsion was turned against any Member who offended a majority it would lead before long to the break-up of the United Nations. The countries most likely to suffer in that case would be the weaker ones which did not belong to any particular influential group of States, while those which were more powerful or could rely on the support of a geographical or ideological bloc would have nothing to fear. Finally, expulsion was an entirely negative course of action which would isolate fourteen million people and virtually remove the problem from the effective, if not the legal, competence of the United Nations; it would be tantamount to admitting that only the use of force could produce results. His Government could not support that position.

5. His delegation also questioned the wisdom of the measures proposed in operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution. Firstly, Chapter VII of the Charter envisaged the application of sanctions only in circum-

stances constituting a far more immediate threat to international peace and security than the situation under consideration. His delegation had voted for resolution 1598 (XV) 'because it had been convinced that the policy of "apartheid" had international repercussions which lifted the matter from the limitations of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. International repercussions were not, however, the same thing as a threat to international peace and security. That was one of the most solemn phrases in the Charter and should be invoked only in the most serious circumstances. Apart from the correct interpretation of the Charter, however, there was the question of the effect that such sanctions would be likely to have. His delegation feared that they would only stiffen the South African Government's resolve and rally liberal white opinion behind it, for nothing made a people close ranks around its Government more than an external threat.

6. Finally, the imposition of sanctions would harm the advocates of "apartheid", entrenched as they were in their isolation and self-sufficiency, less than it would those businessmen, intellectuals and churchmen whose links with the outside world constituted the best hope for the country's future. The greatest hardship would be suffered by the African inhabitants, who would lose their employment in order that the rest of the world could salve its conscience. They might be prepared to accept that hardship if they thought sanctions were likely to work within a reasonable time, but experience had shown that the application of sanctions, even against countries more vulnerable than South Africa, had been ineffective.

7. There was one other consideration which particularly affected his Government's views regarding operative paragraph 6. Its administration of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland with an African population of more than one and a quarter million, depended upon the maintenance of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and South Africa. The peoples of those Territories would be adversely affected by the curtailment of trade between South Africa and the outside world.

8. In its consideration of "apartheid" his Government had the same aim as other delegations but differed from some of them only in its views concerning the best method of achieving it. The United Kingdom believed that the desired changes in South Africa would be more likely to come about if the Assembly, in making its urgent and profound concern felt once again, continued to show patience and restraint. His delegation appealed to the Government of South Africa to give the Assembly ground for that belief.

9. Mr. BENABUD (Morocco) said that his delegation also had requested the inclusion of the question of "apartheid" in the agenda (A/4804 and Add.1-5). It was greatly concerned about the situation in South Africa where the white minority in its exploitation of some ten million Africans had made racial discrimination a law of the State. The indigenous people of South Africa had no say whatever in the conduct of their own affairs, and enjoyed no freedom of speech, belief, movement or association, nor the right to education, the ownership of property or the choice of an occupation. Their residence and movement was strictly controlled and determined by the labour needs of the white masters. In short, they were condemned by law to a permanently unequal status.

10. The International Commission of Jurists, after a full year of research, had published in December 1960 a report on South Africa and the Rule of Law^{1/} in which it was stated that the South African Government had established a system of legislation that denied the majority of the population the opportunities necessary for the realization of legitimate human aspirations.

11. The South African Government had frequently reaffirmed its determination to continue its racist policies, which were incompatible with all accepted notions of justice and were a flagrant violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That Government must open its eyes to the fact that the movement for emancipation which was sweeping across Africa was irreversible and sooner or later would triumph everywhere. That movement was essentially constructive; its objectives were the attainment of basic human rights and freedoms and the betterment of the social and economic status of the oppressed peoples of Africa. The policy of "apartheid" prevented the talents of the vast majority of the population from being utilized, and therefore stood in the way of the progress of the country as a whole. It was high time that the Government of South Africa realized that the country's real interests lay in the promotion of friendly relations between all its inhabitants.

12. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1960 to Chief Albert Luthuli for his work in mitigating the effects of racial discrimination in Africa was clear evidence of the new movement.

13. Morocco resolutely condemned the policies of "apartheid", which had created a dangerous situation in South Africa, and felt bound to join the other peace-loving nations in the struggle to put an end to those policies and to restore to the people of South Africa their human dignity and legitimate rights. The elimination of racial discrimination would contribute to the lessening of international tension and to the maintenance of peace in the world. The deliberate flaunting of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions by the South African Government, and its continued defiance of world public opinion, called for more positive measures against that Government's policies; only thus could South Africa be saved from an imminent catastrophe.

14. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) said that his Government, which had always held that the cause of progress was better served by reasoned argument than by displays of force, was obliged to confess its dismay that the South African authorities, despite the repeated appeals addressed to them, showed no inclination to discuss any changes in their racial policy that would satisfy or even temper the opposition of Africans, whites and Asians within the Republic, or allay outraged world opinion. Of all the international consequences of that Government's obstinate adherence to its racial policies, its withdrawal from the Commonwealth was the one which had most shocked the people of New Zealand, for they believed that the Commonwealth, which was the greatest existing association of free and equal peoples of different races, creeds and ways of life, constituted a powerful force for peace and unity in the world. It was, of course, clear that a Government which represented only about one-half of the white voters of South Africa

^{1/} International Commission of Jurists, South Africa and the Rule of Law (Geneva, 1960).

and none of the other thirteen million inhabitants was ill fitted to play a constructive role in the multiracial Commonwealth. Its withdrawal, however, had deprived the Commonwealth not only of a Government whose policies were an embarrassment, but also of the peoples of all three races who under wiser guidance could have made a significant contribution to its further development.

15. The New Zealand Prime Minister had accordingly made every effort at the Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London in March 1961 to persuade Mr. Verwoerd to consider the possibility of a change in his Government's racial policy. The New Zealand Prime Minister had told the people of New Zealand in a broadcast upon his return, that he had, at the Conference, made his country's abhorrence of "apartheid" quite clear and had urged the South African Government to modify its stand so that it might not be isolated from the rest of the Commonwealth; he had also urged that there should be no irrevocable break, particularly since there were in South Africa millions of politically unrepresented people and many persons of British descent who were deeply attached to the Commonwealth and had no sympathy for the policy of "apartheid". The fact that the Government was opposed by the non-white population was taken for granted but it should also be remembered that it had never commanded the votes of more than about half the white voters in general elections. Indeed, when the National Party had assumed office in 1948 it had been supported by less than half the white voters and under a system of unweighted voting would not have come to power. It was still solidly opposed by over one million people of British descent as well as by many Afrikaans-speaking citizens. The declaration by the Principal and members of the staff of the University of Cape Town to which the representative of Ghana had referred (269th meeting) was but one example of the protests against "apartheid" registered almost daily by the white citizens of South Africa.

16. His Government could fully understand that the new African States in particular should react with indignation to the degrading treatment accorded to their fellow Africans in that country and call for extreme measures to put an end to their sufferings. Several speakers had hinted that a violent solution was inevitable. Yet surely the United Nations must explore every possible path to a peaceful solution lest its own action should result in a disastrous civil war between black and white South Africans. It should also ensure that its concern for human rights was equally strong wherever they were violated, whether in Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia or any other part of the world. His Government had never favoured extreme sanctions as a means of influencing Governments of whose actions it disapproved. In the case of South Africa it could state that its position was an entirely disinterested one, for it had never had diplomatic relations with that country and trade between the two was negligible. It nevertheless had the greatest sympathy for the victims of the "apartheid" policies of the present South African Government and would continue to support those who were seeking to establish multiracial co-operation in that country as in the wider international community.

17. The main responsibility for ameliorating the intolerable situation prevailing in South Africa rested with its present Government and it was to that

Government that he wished to address his concluding remarks. He would ask if it really believed that it could continue to uphold a system detested by the majority of South Africans and condemned by every other Government in the United Nations except that of Portugal. If it was fear that drove it to follow that course it should say so, for then it might be possible to build a bridge across the chasm between it and the rest of the international community. If, on the other hand, it was not fear but arrogance which made it deaf to the voice of its own people and of the other nations of the world, then it was indeed doomed.

18. Mr. HASEGANU (Romania) said that the racist theories of the Government of South Africa were an integral part of its colonialist policy and that the system of "apartheid" was designed to divide South African society into white masters and black slaves. Needless to say, the ultra-reactionary racist theory of the South African Government that the black race was incapable of assimilating civilization and unfit to govern itself was entirely without scientific foundation. The South African Government's discriminatory policy was in fact an attempt to maintain the privileges of more than 300 years of colonialist exploitation.

19. The Foreign Minister of South Africa had admitted as much in his statement to the General Assembly on 11 October 1961 (1033rd plenary meeting) when he rejected the proposal that what had been built up over three centuries by successive generations of white South Africans should be placed under the control of the non-white majority. He had not mentioned the part played during those three centuries by the non-white population. In fact, millions of non-whites had been savagely exploited and most of the material wealth accumulated in South Africa was the fruit of their labour. The right of those millions to share in the Government of their own country could not be disputed, and no internal or external force could prevent them from one day seizing power and becoming their own masters, regardless of the repressive measures of the South African Government.

20. After a stormy debate, the fifteenth session of the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1598 (XV) on the race conflict in South Africa. The delegations which had proposed the resolution had argued that the South African Government should be given one more chance to appreciate the danger and short-sightedness of its racial policy. Apparently, the South African Government had interpreted that gesture as a sign of weakness rather than goodwill. Since that time, it had shown not the slightest sign of understanding or respect for the United Nations recommendations. The South African Foreign Minister had recently stated emphatically that his Government would continue its policy of white supremacy, and had claimed that the results of the general election were a victory of the ideal of "apartheid". The fact that 370,000 voters had been able to impose a policy that was detested by fifteen million Africans proved once more how inequitable and contrary to the principles of the Charter "apartheid" was.

21. A number of previous speakers had compared the racist policy of the South African Government to the theories of nazism. The Romanian delegation shared that view and noted that the colonialists' racist theories and brutal oppression were as dangerous to the peoples of the oppressed countries as to those of neighbouring countries.

22. For fourteen years the United Nations had been forced to consider the difficult situations caused by the South African Government. The Special Political Committee had itself been dealing for ten years with two of those problems. Throughout that period the colonialist Government of South Africa had defied all the appeals and protests of hundreds of world organizations, the resolutions of many international conferences and even the resolutions and recommendations of the United Nations itself. How could a small country, to use the South African Foreign Minister's own expression, afford to defy world public opinion, international conferences and even the United Nations in that way? The fact was that the South African Government based its attitude on the political and material support of certain powerful friends. Those friends could be identified through an analysis of the discussions which had taken place in the United Nations in the last ten years and, more particularly, of the voting on the various resolutions. They were in fact members of the NATO bloc or other military blocs allied to it. To take the vote of censure on the South African delegation on 11 October 1961 as an example (1034th meeting), it was highly significant that the countries which had refused to participate in the voting included the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Canada, all members of NATO. It was also noteworthy that at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, a number of the same delegations had abstained from voting on the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (resolution 1514 (XV)). It was no coincidence that the members of NATO had proved to be fervent supporters of the colonial system and the staunch friends of the South African Government.

23. The material support given to South Africa by the members of NATO was considerable. An analysis of the loans granted to, or funds invested in, South Africa in the last ten years, which had risen sharply, would show that most of them came again from NATO countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France and Belgium. South Africa's foreign trade showed the same rate of growth and the same geographical distribution; most of the country's imports and exports depended on the NATO countries. South Africa's chief exports to its NATO friends were radio-active minerals used in the atomic industry and strategic metals, and various categories of weapons were among its most important imports. The representative of Ghana had revealed in his speech (269th meeting) that the South African Government had recently imported from the NATO group some 90,000 rifles and a number of tanks and aircraft. The Government was obviously importing those weapons for use against the majority of its population, to massacre those who were fighting against racial discrimination and claiming their legitimate rights. The events of March 1960 were conclusive proof of its intentions.

24. The South African Government's policy of discrimination was not confined within its own frontiers. It was also applied to the people of South West Africa, which the South African Government had wrongfully annexed. It was also applied, in close co-operation with the Portuguese colonialist authorities, to the more than 100,000 black workers imported by the Government every year from Mozambique and Angola to work in conditions of semi-slavery in the uranium and copper mines. It was again reflected in the

activities of South African mercenaries in Katanga, who, in collaboration with the Belgian colonialists, were seeking to dismember the Congo and waging a war against its legal Government and against the forces of the United Nations. The South African Government had not only expressed support for those mercenaries but had taken a stand in the General Assembly against the United Nations efforts to preserve the unity of the Congo.

25. Attempts were being made to organize a federation of states in the southern part of Africa which would include South Africa, the United Kingdom colonies of Bechuanaland, Nyasaland and Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique and possibly the province of Katanga. Such a concentration of the most reactionary colonialist forces could not fail to have a racist bias, and would necessarily be directed against the indigenous African peoples.

26. It was clear from the facts that the racist Government of South Africa had become the strongest and most reactionary striking force of colonialism in Africa. It was also clear that the NATO countries were in fact supporting its activities, and that the South African Government's policy was thus endangering all the peoples of Africa and threatening the peace of the entire world. The Romanian delegation joined those which had already condemned the provocative and racist policy of the South African Government. It whole-heartedly supported the African States' proposals for steps to be taken against the South African Government contained in the draft resolution (A/SPC/L.71). The attitude of goodwill and understanding had obviously failed and it agreed with the Ghanaian delegation that the time had come to proceed to decisive action.

27. Mr. DIMECHKIE (Lebanon) said that it was apparent from the statement made by the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government was not concerned at the failure of its attempts to justify its racist policy. It had therefore become necessary to challenge not only the substance of that Government's allegations but also its sincerity in making such statements before the United Nations. As other delegates had replied at length to the various points raised by the Minister, he would limit himself to three arguments which his delegation thought it was particularly important to refute.

28. Firstly, the Minister's statement that the economic conditions prevailing among the non-white peoples of South Africa were better than those prevailing in the independent African States was not only untrue but was also an insult to the enormous efforts of those States to raise the level of living of their peoples. Furthermore it was irrelevant, for it was not a matter of relative degree of welfare but of human dignity and fundamental human rights, both of which were denied by the Government of South Africa to the majority of its peoples.

29. Secondly, the Minister had argued that racial discrimination existed in other countries. That was true; but it was equally true that with the exception of Israel, which practised discrimination of a more subtle variety, the Governments of the countries in question were seeking to eliminate it. Nowhere save in South Africa had racial discrimination been elevated to the level of official State doctrine and policy.

30. Thirdly, he challenged the South African Government's assertion that it had an obligation to pursue a policy of racial discrimination in order to protect its white citizens, for that policy, if continued, would ultimately jeopardize those rights. Other African countries which had recently emerged from their former colonial status had demonstrated a spirit of magnanimity and hospitality by guaranteeing the rights of white minorities. All would agree that the best guarantee of human rights was in the long run a policy of justice and equality. In no place on earth was there a greater need for the introduction of such a policy than in the Union of South Africa. His delegation would lend its wholehearted support to the search for a formula designed to bring about the implementation of the Assembly's resolutions concerning South Africa. In seeking to influence the minority which held power in that country, however, it should be sure that its actions did not have the effect of harming the vast majority which it wanted to assist.

31. Mr. ESHEL (Israel) said in reply to the Lebanese representative's remarks about his country that allegations of racial discrimination in Israel were baseless falsehoods and distortions which served only to incite to hatred and violence in the Middle East. The subject under discussion was the question of "apartheid" in the Republic of South Africa and not the achievements of Israel.

32. Mr. DIMECHKIE (Lebanon) said that, at the appropriate time, he would bring forward authoritative evidence, including quotations from Israeli sources, regarding the discrimination practised against the Arabs by Israel.

33. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan) said that Pakistan was one of the forty-six Member States which had proposed the inclusion of "apartheid" in the agenda of the sixteenth session. The question had first come before the General Assembly in 1952 at the request of thirteen Member States, of which Pakistan was one.^{2/} It was still unequivocally opposed to the discriminatory policies of the Government of South Africa.

34. The South African Government had consistently questioned the competence of the United Nations to deal with the issue, but every year since 1952 the General Assembly had inscribed the item on its agenda and passed resolutions on it. The fate of the non-white people of South Africa had become a matter of world-wide anxiety, and as the representative of the United States had pointed out, the United Nations must concern itself with national policies that flouted the Charter. The South African Government itself seemed to be shifting its attitude on the question of jurisdiction. Earlier, the South African delegation had withdrawn from the Assembly as a protest against the Assembly's assertion of its competence, but it had now come back. The South African Foreign Minister had said (267th meeting) that his delegation was only present to answer baseless charges against his Government but he had nevertheless been participating in the Committee's discussions.

35. The South African Foreign Minister had demanded that those who came to the court of the United Nations should come with clean hands. Pakistan could fairly claim to be free from discrimination of any

kind. There was no colour consciousness and no restrictive laws favouring one section of the community over another. Although Pakistan was an overwhelmingly Moslem nation, persons of all denominations were free to practise their religions, maintain separate schools and publicly celebrate their festivals. Yet, even if all the sponsors of the item could not claim as much, it would be no justification for the racial discrimination in South Africa. It was significant that while the South African Foreign Minister had accused other countries of contravening Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, he had not denied that South Africa had contravened them.

36. The speed with which Africa had developed in the last fifteen years and the fervour of its leaders and peoples made the question of "apartheid" extremely urgent, for the racial policies of the South African Government were a challenge to the self-respect of all Africans. The Africans had not forgotten their victories over the whites in their fight to defend the lands they had ultimately been deprived of. In the end they had been beaten by the superior weapons of the Europeans, but the memory of the wars survived as a part of present-day African tradition.

37. The General Assembly had passed resolutions on "apartheid" for the past nine years without making any impression on the Government of South Africa. Many speakers had urged that the sixteenth session of the General Assembly should adopt measures which would compel the South African Government to change its policy forthwith. It was felt that if the present situation was allowed to drift, the non-white peoples of South Africa would be led to take desperate steps, which the South African Government would counter by force of arms. The Ghanaian representative had given details regarding arms imports by the Government of South Africa which had not been denied by the South African representative or the representatives of countries from which the arms were alleged to have been imported. Clearly, the Government of South Africa was importing weapons because it expected trouble.

38. The suggestion had been made that South Africa should be expelled from the United Nations. There could be no doubt that on various grounds, including its defiance of the United Nations in regard to South West Africa, the Republic of South Africa deserved expulsion. It was doubtful, however, that expulsion would be useful for South Africa paid no heed to moral gestures. It had been expelled from the ILO^{3/} and forced to leave the Commonwealth but its policies were unchanged. The Pakistan delegation felt that South Africa should continue to be a Member of the United Nations and remain under pressure from it.

39. There had also been proposals that diplomatic relations with South Africa should be severed and economic sanctions imposed. Pakistan had already severed its diplomatic relations and there were other countries which had no diplomatic relations with South Africa, but South African policy remained unaffected. As far as economic sanctions were concerned, the Pakistan delegation would not oppose a resolution calling for them but it felt that the Committee must be realistic. Unless the resolution was carried out by all countries, and not merely by the African and Asian countries, it would be fruitless.

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, document A/2183.

^{3/} International Labour Organisation, Records of Proceedings, Forty-fifth Session, resolution I.

The key to the situation lay in the hands of such countries as the United States and the United Kingdom which must act in such a way that the issue of race relations did not become a part of the cold war. The United States representative had recently (268th meeting) made a strong speech on "apartheid" but he had given no indication of any action that the United States might be prepared to take in concert with the United Nations to put an end to it. The United States seemed to be prepared to wait indefinitely over South Africa. Yet it had been known to take action, even when its friends were involved, for example, in the Suez crisis.

40. The situation in South Africa, from the purely human point of view, was as deplorable as unprovoked aggression. The United States, which had fought a civil war to end slavery in its own territory, should surely come forward to end the conditions bordering on slavery which were the lot of fourteen million South Africans. The Pakistan delegation suggested that instead of multifarious sanctions involving shipping, air services and trade of every kind, which would cause wide-spread distress to black and white South Africans alike, besides being extremely difficult to organize and enforce, sanctions should concentrate on a single vital commodity. He drew the Committee's attention to paragraph 4 of the resolution adopted by the Second Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa in June 1960 concerning the denial of oil to South Africa.^{4/} The effect of such a denial would be swift and decisive. It would be interesting to know what steps had been taken by the Arab States in pursuance of that appeal. The co-operation of the European and American countries would be needed to achieve the objective of the resolution but the Arab countries were the world's greatest oil producers. If they were prepared to take the lead, Pakistan would be prepared to co-sponsor with them a draft resolution to the effect that Members of the United Nations producing or distributing oil should not sell any of it to the Republic of South Africa.

41. Mr. COLLET (Guinea) said that justice-loving countries had taken advantage of the principle of the equality of all races set forth in the Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to request the inclusion of the question of the race conflict in South Africa in the agenda of the General Assembly since 1952. The Organization's right to discuss the question of "apartheid" was no longer disputed, save by the representatives of the Union of South Africa. Racial discrimination was harmful to peaceful relations between peoples and States and a source of hatred leading to disorder and international conflict. Unfortunately, it existed in many countries, sometimes in the grossest form, despite constitutional provisions and government declarations opposing all forms of discrimination. That was the situation in New York, Headquarters of the United Nations. He drew the Committee's attention to a circular letter dated 25 September 1961 addressed to all the African delegations to the United Nations and signed by the Ku Klux Klan, one of the best known racist associations. He also recalled the applause which the South African Foreign Minister had received from the public gallery during his statement to the General Assembly.

^{4/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Special Political Committee, 233rd meeting, para. 25.

42. "Apartheid" was a doctrine of white supremacy which forced the peoples of African origin in the Republic of South Africa into an inferior status. They were deprived of all political, economic and social rights. They were the victims of arbitrary laws which constantly increased in number despite South Africa's obligations under the Charter. Under the Group Areas Act, for example, the vast majority of the population was forced to live in semi-desert areas while the fertile and economically developed parts of the country were the undisputed property of the white minority. In the recent general elections, only the white population had been entitled to vote. Based upon a philosophy of so-called "separate development", "apartheid" was in fact a system of exploitation which guaranteed a small white minority political, economic and social supremacy at the expense of 11 million Africans.

43. At the 1033rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the Foreign Minister of South Africa had stated that, since it was useless to try to govern black and white in the same system, the South African Government's policy was to keep them apart. But how could peoples living in one country, contributing together to its economic development, be separated in that way? Such a policy only aggravated racial problems; given goodwill, there was no reason why the whites of South Africa should not be able to live amicably with the coloured population, following the example of many countries with mixed population. In addition to separating blacks and whites, the South African Government was setting up a host of Governing Councils, with the aim of dividing the Bantu people into small and powerless groups. In a memorandum addressed to the Secretary-General during his recent visit to South Africa, a number of African organizations in that country had protested vigorously against its attitude with respect to the Bantu authorities by the Verwoerd Government. The South African Foreign Minister had also explained that a commissioner-general served as a link between each ethnic group and the Government, and that his post was analogous to that of an ambassador to another country. In other words, the Bantu were treated as foreigners in their own land.

44. During the past few years, the Government's policies had met with vigorous criticism within South Africa from parliamentarians and religious leaders, and in intellectual circles, where there was increasing anxiety about the consequences which would inevitably follow from the Government's policy. The indigenous leaders were urging a change in policy and proposed that a meeting should be convened representing the coloured races to decide on a policy which was in the interests of their country. At the time of the celebrations marking the proclamation of the Republic, the Pan-African National Council had called for a boycott of the celebrations with the object of bringing about peaceful negotiations. The Council had warned that if the Government persisted in replying to the complaints of the people by means of repression and bullets, retaliation would be inevitable and a great deal of bloodshed might result. The Council had also called for a three-day strike and had urged shopkeepers to close their shops and students not to attend classes. On its side, the Government had threatened to crush all demonstrations and turn the country into a police dictatorship.

45. Such were the conditions in which the coloured peoples of South Africa lived. At the beginning of

September 1961, to quote only one example, seventeen Africans had been killed in the central prison at Pretoria. They had been arrested for opposing police brutalities. In that way the active element in production was being destroyed "en masse" and the economic decline of the country would inevitably follow.

46. Outside South Africa, "apartheid" was almost universally recognized as a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That policy had been condemned at the Conferences held at Bandung, Accra, Monrovia, Conakry, Addis Ababa, Casablanca and Belgrade. Far from showing any positive response, however, the South African Government was intensifying its discriminatory and repressive measures, carrying out mass arrests, shooting and torturing Africans, and reorganizing its army and police, in addition to sending mercenaries to Katanga. In spite of those war preparations, the people of South Africa had embarked resolutely upon the struggle for liberation and for the rights of coloured peoples.

47. The South African Government was not ignorant of the repeated resolutions of the General Assembly condemning "apartheid" and affirming that policies designed to perpetuate or increase discrimination were incompatible with the pledges of Member States under Article 56 of the Charter. Resolution 1598 (XV) had requested all States to consider taking separate and collective action to bring about the abandonment of such policies, and the Security Council had also adopted a resolution on the subject.^{5/}

48. Since South Africa continued to defy the resolutions of the United Nations, it was for Member States to adopt measures which would ensure compliance with those resolutions. A resolution adopted by the Second Conference of Independent African States, held at Addis Ababa in 1960, called upon the members of that Conference to institute sanctions against South Africa.

49. Elsewhere all efforts had been in vain. It was particularly to be regretted that certain great Powers who declared themselves opposed to racial discrimination supported South Africa directly or indirectly and refrained from translating their declared opposition into action. At the previous session, one of the two draft resolutions on the subject approved by the Special Political Committee for submission to the General Assembly was withdrawn, because the operative paragraph providing for sanctions against South Africa had failed to obtain a two-thirds majority.^{6/} The delegations which had voted against that paragraph had included Portugal, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United States of America. Furthermore, the volume of foreign capital invested in South Africa made it easy to understand the readiness of the Government of that country to defy world public opinion, and to convert the country into a rallying point for all reactionary forces. It was to be noted that the great undertakings in South Africa were all in the hands of the racialists or of foreign companies, and that there was no possibility for Africans to participate in the ownership of those enterprises.

^{5/} Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1960, document S/4300.

^{6/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 72, document A/4728 and Corr.1, para. 9, resolution I.

50. Clearly, the foreign capitalists who had investments in South Africa were as interested as the white minority there in defending the policies of "apartheid". During the vote on the motion of censure at the 1034th plenary meeting against the speech of the South African representative in the General Assembly on 11 October 1961, the colonialists and their allies had refused to participate, which was tantamount to supporting the position of the racialists.

51. The downfall of the colonial empires was inevitable and South Africa would not escape the consequences of the struggle of African peoples for liberation and for human dignity. It was in the interests of the protagonists of "apartheid" to recognize their error before it was too late and undertake reforms in accordance with the demands of world opinion. The Africans were ready to forget the past and to co-operate sincerely with all peoples and all races.

52. As far as the General Assembly was concerned, there should be no further delay in the adoption of sanctions designed to bring the South African Government to reason. The "apartheid" question already constituted a threat to international peace and security, for the South African people, who followed with interest the progress of their neighbours and their liberation from the colonial yoke, would no longer accept policies based on racial supremacy. To maintain peace in South Africa, his delegation proposed a number of specific measures: the condemnation of the South African Government for its defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions; the re-establishment of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa; and abstention by Member States from supplying military aid or selling war material to South Africa until such time as the latter abandoned its racist policies. His delegation was also the co-sponsor of draft resolution A/SPC/L.71, which provided for the minimum measures required to put an end to the cruel repression of the Africans and of persons of Indian and Indo-Pakistan origin in South Africa. Guinea would also support any other effective measures which might be proposed to the Committee.

53. His delegation welcomed the initiative taken by the trade unions at the most recent session of the International Labour Organisation, resulting in the expulsion of South Africa from that organization.

54. Mr. PLIMPTON (United States of America) said that the Guinean representative had referred to an anonymous letter which had been received by some delegations, written in the name of an organization which had been outlawed by the United States Government and was now defunct. That representative perhaps should also have mentioned that he had received a letter from the United States delegation regretting that the United States mail should have included such a letter. In his country, as in every country, there were unbalanced fanatics of no influence who attacked the deeply held beliefs of the vast majority under the protection of anonymity, but he was sure that all delegations were aware that the United States Government, as well as the Governments of New York City and New York State, were completely and irrevocably opposed to racial discrimination wherever it occurred.