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CONTENTS

Agenda item 9:

Opening of the general debate

	Page
Speech by Mr. de Magalhães Pinto (Brazil)	1
Speech by Mr. Goldberg (United States of America)	3
Speech by Mr. Krag (Denmark)	7

President: Mr. Corneliu MANESCU (Romania).

AGENDA ITEM 9

Opening of the general debate

1. Mr. DE MAGALHÃES PINTO (Brazil):^{1/} Since it is customary for Brazil to open the general debate, the privilege and the honour fall upon me to be the first speaker to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your election. In so doing, may I express to you my most sincere wishes that your term of office will be a successful and fruitful one. This, I am certain, will be guaranteed by your outstanding qualifications and your great experience.

2. For more than twenty years we representatives of the States Members of the United Nations have been gathering here for the purpose of reviewing the international scene, combining our efforts to seek measures which will bring us peace, strengthen international security and promote the well-being of mankind.

3. During the last few months there have been increasing indications of better understanding between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, to the great satisfaction and renewed hope of all nations. It must be acknowledged however that, despite all efforts, the nuclear armaments race continues and no way has been found to solve the conflicts existing in areas that are highly sensitive from the standpoint of international security. Indeed, we see with alarm that they not only remain unsolved but tend to gain in intensity.

4. Moreover, we view with deep concern the fact that instead of diminishing, the gap between the highly industrialized countries and the developing nations is growing wider. This represents a serious threat to peace and a frustration of our common endeavours on behalf of universal well-being.

5. We must, therefore, do our utmost to encourage the now foreseeable slackening of international tension; we must commit ourselves to finding effective lasting solutions to the present conflicts; we must devise formulas to eliminate the poverty in which two-thirds of mankind lives.

^{1/} Mr. de Magalhães Pinto spoke in Portuguese. The English version of his statement was supplied by the delegation.

6. The maintenance of peace is not a task limited to the political and military fields. This task must inevitably be the outcome of a complex process set in motion by economic and social factors. Peace cannot be dissociated from development. Even an agreement among the most powerful nations would be meaningless if it operated only in areas in which their own specific interests happened to coincide. No civilization today is self-sufficient or isolated. The prosperity of each nation—I would even say its very survival—is dependent upon that of all the others.

7. It follows therefore that prosperity and peace are the responsibility of all nations, and that each nation must devote all the means at its disposal to the pursuit of those goals. The industrialized countries have special duties in the face of this gigantic undertaking.

8. It must be recognized, however, that the means at the disposal of the international community have not as yet been mobilized in the urgent, effective manner dictated by the grave needs of the time. When we proclaimed the United Nations Development Decade we all seemed to be convinced that if we wanted peace we had to reduce the economic and social imbalances besetting the world. Now that the decade is drawing to a close, it is apparent that our actions have not lived up to our expectations. Indeed, the results have been exactly the opposite of what we had hoped: the gulf between the developed and developing countries has never been as wide as at present. The developed countries have accelerated their growth, and the developing countries can barely free themselves from stagnation. The developing countries may not have done all they should, but co-operation from the wealthy countries has fallen far short in every respect of what had been expected. For example, the flow of financial assistance lags far behind the 1 percent of the gross national product recommended by the General Assembly. Negotiations such as the Kennedy Round give added impetus to trade among highly industrialized countries and only remotely benefit the others. Even in the meetings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) a sense of frustration is evident.

9. Primary commodities, exports of manufactured goods, general and non-discriminatory preferences and a larger participation in international services—all these aspirations of the less-developed countries are being dealt with on a make-shift basis, and the behaviour of the industrialized countries has not been inspired by a desire to create general prosperity which, after all, is the real and long-term interest of all nations.

10. The group of thirty-one developing countries members of the Trade and Development Board have dealt lucidly in a memorandum with the various

specific problems requiring immediate solution.^{2/} Brazil hopes that that fundamental document will serve as the basis for effective decisions and that the UNCTAD meeting to be held at New Delhi in 1968 will mark the beginning of its implementation.

11. It is urgent for us to find adequate solutions to the problems of international commodity trade on which the developing countries depend to such a large extent. It is urgent for us to adopt measures of international co-operation, so that the developing countries can expand their exports of manufactured goods, an indispensable requirement for their economic growth. And it is no less urgent for international financing to be made available in sufficient volume and under appropriate conditions in order to promote development, and not just to cover the servicing of previous loans.

12. In 1964, 120 countries met in Geneva^{3/} and agreed that the problems faced by the developing countries were well known and that only the determination to act was lacking for their solution. Yet here we stand, almost three years later, and the determination has still not materialized on the international level. If we wish to keep our faith in the solidarity of nations we cannot afford to subject it to further trials. It is indispensable that the political will to act be translated into effective measures instead of taking the form of renewed pious declarations of good intentions.

13. In the concerted action undertaken by UNCTAD there is no place for ideological motivation, which would vitiate its meaning. The seventy-seven nations, united by common interests, make up a group for the attainment of clearly defined and specific goals, exclusively linked to the promotion of economic development. It is strictly in this sense and in full awareness of our responsibilities that Brazil participates in the group.

14. The increase of wealth on the part of the industrialized nations is being partly diverted to the accumulation and improvement of military equipment. Many of the best brains in the world have been recruited to devise and perfect the techniques of those armaments and the art of their application. Ever more distant seems the arrival of the day on which those vast human and material resources can be released to serve the progress and well-being of the developing countries and the less favoured communities of those very Powers engaged in the arms race.

15. The United States of America and the Soviet Union have recently submitted two identical drafts of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons^{4/} to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. We read this as a sign of international détente. Brazil welcomes this important step in the hope that a better understanding between the two Powers may result in concrete measures leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Only in that context will the treaty achieve meaning and validity.

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session Supplement No. 15; part II, para. 42.

^{3/} United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, held at Geneva from 23 March to 16 June 1964.

^{4/} Documents ENDC/192 and ENDC/193.

16. We note with satisfaction that the two Powers, in contrast with the procedure adopted in the case of the Moscow test-ban Treaty, have chosen to submit their drafts to the Disarmament Committee, thus acknowledging that the proposed measure does fit into the framework of the efforts undertaken by the United Nations to achieve disarmament as one of its objectives.

17. Imbued as we are with the spirit of co-operation and objectivity we cannot but observe that those drafts do not imply any reduction of existing nuclear weapon stockpiles, nor do they even discourage the increase and development of nuclear weapons by those countries which already possess them. No resources are to be released to serve economic and peaceful ends. For all practical purposes, the drafts propose limitations only for those countries that do not possess nuclear weapons and they include restrictions which are not essential to the objectives of non-proliferation.

18. The adherence to the purposes of non-proliferation must not entail a renunciation by any country of the right to develop its own technology. On the contrary, Brazil, while supporting, as it always has, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, is convinced that the measures to this end should facilitate nuclearization for peaceful purposes. Such nuclearization for peaceful purposes should include the technology of nuclear explosives which might become indispensable for major engineering projects of significance for economic development.

19. As a matter of fact, Brazil has already undertaken the sovereign commitment to renounce nuclear weapons by signing the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, concluded at Mexico City on 14 February 1967. The manner whereby this Treaty draws a distinction between nuclear weapons, which it prohibits, and unlimited peaceful nuclearization, which it authorizes, seems to us quite appropriate for an agreement on a world-wide basis. The drafts presented in Geneva can and should benefit from the introduction of amendments improving them and ensuring a fair balance between the obligations and responsibilities of the contracting parties, thus making the drafts universally acceptable.

20. The scientific and technological gap between the Member States of this Organization is growing at an increasing pace to the detriment of the aims of the United Nations. As the President of my country has recently pointed out:

"We must realize that the planning of our development must take place within the context of the scientific and technological revolution which has ushered the world into the nuclear and space age. In this new era which we are entering, science and technology will increasingly condition not progress and the well-being of nations alone, but their very independence."

21. The fact that human resources of the highest calibre in science and technology are drawn from all parts of the world and are being concentrated in the already developed countries constitutes another serious problem. Some aspects of this situation were taken up by Secretary-General U Thant in his report to the Economic and Social Council on the development

and utilization of human resources in developing countries.^{5/}

22. It is my opinion that we should consider the possibility of collecting, co-ordinating and completing the studies undertaken under the aegis of the United Nations and the specialized agencies on the various aspects of this problem of the growing scientific and technological imbalance. A high level committee might be established for this purpose by the Secretary-General, expressly enjoined to give special attention to the study of the causes, effects and possible solutions of the problem of the constant brain drain of technicians and scientists by the more developed countries.

23. This brief outline of my country's position on current international problems would not be complete without a reference to some issues which are the concern of the United Nations and which deserve my Government's most careful attention.

24. The recent outbreak of hostilities between Arabs and Israelis with the resulting human and material losses imposes upon us the duty to find the way for realistic and objective negotiations towards a conciliatory settlement between the States concerned. During the fifth special emergency session I had the opportunity of stating the position of my country on this matter [1540th meeting]. On the one hand, we recognize the existence of the State of Israel with all the rights and prerogatives of a sovereign nation; on the other hand, as I pointed out on that occasion, we recognize the validity of many important claims of the Arab countries. What must be avoided is the continuance of a state of belligerency between Members of the Organization, punctuated by military clashes and bringing substantial damage to the economies both of Israel and of the Arab countries, as well as being a constant threat to world peace. We shall continue to co-operate in the spirit of friendship which binds us to both sides in the search for a just and lasting solution which will enable the peoples of the Middle East to concentrate their efforts on the rewarding pursuit of their development and prosperity.

25. Brazil reiterates its adherence to the principle of self-determination and its staunch support for the task of decolonization which the United Nations has been carrying out since its inception. There have been major accomplishments in this area, but we still have a long way to go. The consolidation of the objectives of decolonization will only be made effective in the global context of the economic and social development of the less-developed countries. This premise is essential if the process of decolonization is to be conducted in a peaceful and orderly way.

26. We are convinced that extreme inequalities both on the international and national levels are sources of insecurity, dissatisfaction and apprehension, thereby constituting, as much as the nuclear weapons race, a serious threat to peace. My country is determined to fulfil its destiny by creating wealth and distributing it fairly among our people, while preserving our multi-racial society bound together by deep-rooted Christian and non-discriminatory traditions.

27. We have overcome economic difficulties and faced serious financial problems. We are meeting the needs of our economic and social development with our own resources and with the limited assistance we receive from abroad. We do not for a moment doubt that our efforts will meet with success. Our goals, however, will be more readily attained as we succeed in translating into practical measures the common belief that peace and development, indissolubly linked, require universal conditions and a collective effort on an international scale.

28. This is the reason why we shall strive in all bodies of the United Nations to ensure that the principles of international co-operation in the economic field shall be used not merely for verbal formulations but as a guide for action on the part of all States. This is also the reason why we insist that this Organization must face, purposefully and with decision, the problem of the increasing scientific and technological gap which divides the highly industrialized Powers from the developing countries. And finally, this is the reason why we shall make every effort in order that disarmament be translated into measures which shall effectively ensure the security and the development of all nations.

29. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): Mr. President, today, as every year at this time, we open a new chapter in the history of the United Nations. We open on a hopeful note with your election as President, for you not only are known and respected by your colleagues throughout the world as an able and distinguished diplomat; you also have the distinction of being the first representative of a country of Eastern Europe to be elected to this high office. We of the United States welcome this development as one further sign of the evolution which has been taking place in the relations among the States of Eastern Europe and of other parts of the world. May all Members take this new step as a reminder of the truth which a modern Danish sage has compressed into these words: "Co-existence—or no existence."

30. We congratulate you, Mr. President, and pledge to you our co-operation in the discharge of your difficult and important office.

31. I take this occasion also to pay a tribute to your distinguished predecessor, the President of the Assembly, at its twenty-first session, Ambassador Pazhwak of Afghanistan. We share the admiration of all delegations for the resourcefulness and patience with which he guided us through more meetings of the General Assembly than have been presided over by any other man in the history of this Organization.

32. This annual general debate serves the important purpose of allowing each Member to lay before the entire Assembly, at the outset of our session, its major concerns in the international sphere. I shall not attempt to touch on all the issues on the agenda to which my country attaches importance. This statement will concentrate on certain issues which, in our view, are of transcendent significance to world peace.

33. First among these is the continued tragic conflict in Viet-Nam. For the entire community of nations, the search for peace in Viet-Nam remains a matter of the first priority, for peace in Viet-Nam must be and should be our major concern. Indeed, pursuant to its

^{5/} Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-third Session, Annexes, agenda item 8, document E/4353 and Add.1.

Charter, the United Nations has the most explicit right and duty to concern itself with this question, as it does with any breach of or threat to the peace anywhere in the world.

34. Holding this conviction as we do, my Government continues to seek the active participation of the United Nations in the quest for peace in Viet-Nam. Every Member and every organ of the United Nations, this Assembly included, shares the Charter obligation of lending its weight and influence to help resolve disputes and conflicts between nations by peaceful means. Today, despite past disappointments, I reiterate our appeal to all Members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to accept that obligation—to use their influence to help bring the Viet-Nam conflict to an end by peaceful means.

35. The representatives who participate in this debate will undoubtedly make observations and offer suggestions as to how this can be brought about. My delegation will listen to them with close attention and respect. As our contribution to the Assembly's discussion of this issue, let me state as precisely as possible the views, and ideas of my Government.

36. Our basic view is one which, I am sure, is shared by the great majority of this Assembly; that this conflict can and should be ended by a political solution at the earliest possible time. A military solution is not the answer. For our part, we do not seek to impose a military solution on North Viet-Nam or its adherents. By the same token, in fidelity to a political solution, we will not permit North Viet-Nam and its adherents to impose a military solution upon South Viet-Nam.

37. The question then naturally arises: By what procedure can a political solution be reached? One well-tested way is the conference table. We are prepared to follow this path at any time—to go to the conference table in Geneva or any other suitable place.

38. There is a second way to pursue a political settlement: through private negotiations or discussions. The United States stands ready to take this route also—and, in so doing, to give assurances that the confidence and privacy of such negotiations or discussions would be fully respected by our Government.

39. It may be that negotiations or discussions might be preceded or facilitated by mutual military restraint, by the scaling down of the conflict, by de-escalation, either with or without a formal cease-fire. This route, too, we are prepared to follow.

40. There is, on the other hand, the danger that the conflict may continue until one side finds the burdens of war too exhausting or too costly, and that the fighting will only gradually end, without negotiations and without an agreed settlement. Certainly this is a grim prospect, for it would mean prolonged conflict and tragedy. It is in essence a military solution, and it is not one we seek. We earnestly hope that it is not the course in which our adversaries will persist. In any event, there will be no slackening in our resolve to help South Viet-Nam, defend its right to determine its own future by peaceful means and free from external force.

41. Committed as we are to a political solution through discussions or negotiations, we regret that, despite many efforts, North Viet-Nam and its adherents have

not yet agreed to this objective. But we shall continue in our efforts; and we hope that what we say today may help to bring nearer the time when the two sides will sit down together.

42. It is said by some that Hanoi will agree to begin negotiations if the United States ceases the bombing of North Viet-Nam—that this bombing is the sole obstacle to negotiations. I would note that in its public statements Hanoi has merely indicated that there "could" be negotiations if the bombing stopped. True, some Governments—as well as our Secretary-General and other individuals—have expressed their belief or assumption that negotiations "would" begin, perhaps soon, if the bombings were stopped. We have given these expressions of belief our most careful attention. But no such third party—including those Governments which are among Hanoi's closest friends—has conveyed to us any authoritative message from Hanoi that there would in fact be negotiations if the bombings were stopped. We have sought such a message directly from Hanoi without success.

43. On its part, the United States would be glad to consider and discuss any proposal that would lead promptly to productive discussions that might bring peace to the area. We do not, however, conceive it to be unreasonable for us to seek enlightenment on this important question: does North Viet-Nam conceive that the cessation of bombing would or should lead to any other results than meaningful negotiations or discussions under circumstances which would not disadvantage either side?

44. Moreover, we believe that we also have a right to address ourselves to those Governments which support Hanoi's cause and which have stated to us their beliefs about Hanoi's intentions and to put this question to them: if the United States were to take the first step and order a prior cessation of the bombing, what would they do or refrain from doing, and how would they then use their influence and power, in order to move the Viet-Nam conflict promptly toward a peaceful resolution? Constructive answers to these questions would aid in the search for peace.

45. In the minds of some, there is a further necessity: namely, to articulate more precisely the principles of an honourable settlement. In the interest of meeting this viewpoint, let me set forth those principles which our Government contemplates in as precise a manner as is possible prior to negotiations—and without in any way pre-conditioning or prejudicing such negotiations.

46. It is widely accepted that the Geneva Agreement of 1954 and 1962^{6/} should constitute the basis for settlement. We agree. In our view, this entails the following:

(1) A complete cease-fire and disengagement by all armed personnel in both North and South Viet-Nam on a specified date. Such action was called for by the Geneva Agreements.

(2) No military forces, armed personnel or bases to be maintained in North or South Viet-Nam except those under control of the respective Governments.

^{6/} See Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China, signed on 20 July 1954, and the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and Protocol, signed on 23 July 1962.

This would mean withdrawing or demobilizing all other troops, withdrawing external military and related personnel introduced from outside South Viet-Nam, and the evacuation of military bases, as soon as possible under an agreed time schedule. This too was contemplated under the Geneva Agreements.

(3) Full respect for the international frontiers of the States bordering on North and South Viet-Nam, as well as for the demarcation line and demilitarized zone between North and South Viet-Nam. This too was called for by the Geneva Agreements.

(4) Peaceful settlement by the people in North and South Viet-Nam of the question of reunification, without foreign interference. This too was called for by the Geneva Agreements.

(5) Finally, supervision of all the foregoing by agreed upon international machinery. This too was called for by the Geneva Agreements.

47. In thus summarizing the central elements of the Geneva Agreements, I note that, as evidenced in the joint communiqué issued at the Manila Summit Conference last 25 October,^{7/} the Government of South Viet-Nam holds similar views.

48. We make this authoritative statement in the hope that a settlement can be reached by reaffirming the principles of the Geneva Agreements and by making use of the machinery created by those Agreements—including in particular a reconvened Geneva Conference in which all concerned parties can appropriately participate. And we suggest that a further question is in order: Does North Viet-Nam agree that the foregoing points are a correct interpretation of the Geneva Agreements to which it professedly subscribes?

49. To this question let me append this plain statement about the aims of the United States toward North Viet-Nam. The United States has no designs on the territory of North Viet-Nam: we do not seek to overthrow its government, whatever its ideology; and we are fully prepared to respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to enter into specific undertakings to that end. By the same token, it remains our view that the people of South Viet-Nam should have the right to work out their own political future by peaceful means, in accordance with the principles of self-determination, and without external interference; and that this right too should be respected by all.

50. It is our further view that all South Vietnamese who are willing to participate peacefully in the political life of South Viet-Nam should have an equal chance, as first-class citizens, with full rights in every sense. We do not conceive that any segment of the South Vietnamese people should be excluded from such peaceful participation. We would consider it altogether wise and proper, if this would remove an obstacle to peace, that appropriate assurances on this matter be considered in connexion with a political settlement.

51. It should be noted in this connexion that the Government of South Viet-Nam has stated that it has—and I quote the Government—"no desire to threaten or harm the people of the North"; that it seeks only to resolve its political problems without external interference; and that it is prepared for "reconciliation of

all elements in the society":^{8/} It is also noteworthy that the people of South Viet-Nam have just concluded a peaceful election under a new Constitution, and have made progress in the democratic process.

52. Let me add that my Government remains willing, and indeed has already begun, to make a major commitment of resources in a multilateral co-operative effort to accelerate in all of South-East Asia, the benefits of economic development so sorely needed there. When the conflict is ended and peace is restored, we would hope to see North Viet-Nam included in that effort.

53. In the interest of progress along this road to peace, we earnestly hope that constructive answers to the questions we have raised will soon be forthcoming. We are all too conscious that the present reality is one of grim and harsh conflict—already tragically and unduly prolonged. Surely, if there is any contribution that diplomacy, whether bilateral or multilateral, can make to hasten the end of this conflict, none in this Assembly can in good conscience spare any effort or any labour to make that contribution—no matter how frustrating past efforts may have been, or how many new beginnings may be required. We of the United States stand ready, as we have been, to make that effort and to persist in trying to overcome all obstacles to a settlement.

54. The President of the United States, speaking specifically of Viet-Nam, has said: "We Americans know the nature of a fair bargain; none need fear negotiating with us". In the flexible spirit of that statement, and speaking for our Government, I affirm without reservation the willingness of the United States to seek and find a political solution of the conflict in Viet-Nam.

55. I turn now to the Middle East, a second area of conflict, which is both tragic in itself and dangerous to the peace of the world. The views of the United States on the requirements of peace in the Middle East have been set forth by President Johnson, notably in his statement of 19 June which remains our policy. In that statement my Government appealed to all the parties to adopt no rigid view on the method of bringing peace to the area. Rather, we have emphasized throughout that there is something more basic than methods; the simple will to peace. There must be present on both sides an affirmative will to resolve the issues, not through the dictation of terms by either side, but through a process of mutual accommodation in which nobody's vital interests are injured. In short, both sides must have the will to work out a political solution; both must be committed to peace; and no appropriate method, such as good offices or mediation, should be excluded.

56. In candour it must be said that, as we all know, such a will to peace was not manifest in the recent fifth emergency special session of the Assembly. It is greatly to be hoped that, after sober reflection by all concerned, a new and better mood will emerge—a mood of reconciliation and magnanimity.

57. Surely the purposes of peace cannot be served if the right of a Member State to its national life is not accepted and respected by its neighbours; nor if mili-

^{7/} See The Department of State Bulletin, (Washington, D.C.), Vol. LV, No. 1429.

^{8/} *Ibid.*, No. 1429, p. 733.

tary success blinds a Member State to the fact that its neighbours have rights and interests of their own. In realism, it is perhaps not to be expected that reconciliation and magnanimity will appear overnight; but surely enmity must at least give way to tolerance and the will to live together in peace. Once that will is manifest, the terms of settlement can be evolved.

58. The principles which my Government believes can bring peace to the region are these. Each nation in the area must accept the right of others to live. The least that this requires is that all should renounce any state or claim of belligerency, which as long ago as 1951 was found by the Security Council to be inconsistent with peace. Troops must be withdrawn—and withdrawn in a context of peace. For some parties cannot be left free to assert the rights of war while others are called upon to abide by the rules of peace. There must be justice for the refugees. The nations of the area, with the help of the world community, must address themselves at last, with new energy and new determination to succeed, to the plight of those who have been rendered homeless or displaced by wars and conflicts of the past, both distant and recent. Free and innocent passage through international waterways must be assured for all nations. One of the lessons of the recent conflict is that maritime rights must be respected. The wasteful and destructive arms race in the region must be curbed, thereby making more resources available for economic development. The status of Jerusalem must not be decided unilaterally, but in consultation with all concerned and in recognition of the historic interest of the three great religions in the Holy Places. The political independence and territorial integrity of all States in the area must be respected. Boundaries must be accepted and other arrangements made, superseding temporary and often-violated armistice lines, so as to afford security to all parties against terror, destruction and war.

59. These are important general principles on which, we believe, rests the peace of the area. While the main responsibility rests with the parties, the United Nations and every Member State, including my own country, must help as best they can in the search for peace; for it is in the highest international interest as well as in the national interests of the parties, that peace should be achieved as soon as possible.

60. As for my own country, our most cherished wish for the Middle East has long been an age of peace in which we could enjoy good relations with every nation of that region. In such a climate of peace there is much that we could do, and would be very glad to do, in cooperation with other Members and with the gifted peoples of the region itself. Regional economic development; the full rehabilitation of the refugees, the desalting of water and the restoration of the desert for human use—these, and not war or armaments, are the works to which my country, and, I am sure, many both in and outside the Middle East, would prefer to devote our energies.

61. I turn now to a third momentous problem: the search for reliable programmes of international disarmament and arms control, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons. Step-by-step progress in this field, which seemed out of reach for so many years, has more recently become a reality. Significant limit-

ations regarding nuclear weapons have been accepted by the nuclear Powers in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, in the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty of 1963, and only last year in the Treaty on outer space [see resolution 2222 (XXI), annex].

62. These successive steps have encouraged us to tackle one of the most basic aspects of the nuclear dilemma: the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons to more and more nations. This poses one of the greatest dangers to peace and, indeed, to the survival of mankind. The longer this problem remains, the graver the danger becomes.

63. My Government has long been very much alive to this danger. In response to it we have given the highest priority in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the objective of a non-proliferation treaty. Last month this long effort culminated in the simultaneous tabling by the United States and the Soviet Union of identical drafts of a non-proliferation treaty, complete in all except its safeguard provisions. The texts of these drafts will be available in document form to all Members of the General Assembly.

64. I must frankly state that complex problems still remain. But we are hopeful that a complete treaty draft, including a generally acceptable safeguard provision, will be presented to this session in time to allow for consideration and action by the Assembly, under whose general direction and guidance this treaty is being negotiated.

65. But I should also say that the presentation of such a completed draft will, of course, not be the end of the process. There will remain the understandable desire of certain non-nuclear countries for assurances against nuclear blackmail. The Assembly, in addition to endorsing the treaty as we hope it will, can make a significant contribution to the treaty's objective of non-proliferation by helping to develop a solution to this related problem.

66. We fully understand that the drafts which have been tabled in Geneva are far too important to admit of hurried consideration by prospective signatories. But neither does this urgent matter admit of procrastination. All concerned Powers, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, should press forward with all practical speed to the conclusion of a final treaty. Indeed, the General Assembly itself spoke to all of us last year when it unanimously appealed to all States in resolution 2149 (XXI):

"To take all the necessary steps to facilitate and achieve at the earliest possible time the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons ...

"To refrain from any actions conducive to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."

67. Our preoccupation with the non-proliferation treaty has not diminished my Government's concern over other major problems in the arms-control field. High on the list of these problems is the growing arsenal of strategic offensive and defensive missiles. Some time ago we expressed to the Soviet Union our interest

in an understanding which would limit the deployment of such missiles.

68. In the interim, we in the United States have been obliged to review carefully our strategic position. Our conclusion from this review was that our security, including particularly security against the threat of a missile attack by mainland China, required us to embark upon the construction of a limited antiballistic missile system—and I emphasize the word "limited".

69. No nation, nuclear or non-nuclear, should feel that its security is endangered by this decision. On the contrary, to the extent that the United States will be better able to meet its international defensive responsibilities and to respond to appeals from States threatened by nuclear blackmail, the present safety of many other countries may in fact be enhanced.

70. However, we have no illusions that the construction and deployment of missiles of any kind is the preferred road to security. It is not. The events which led to our decision simply underscore the urgent importance of pursuing negotiations on a limitation of strategic offensive and defensive missiles. Despite our lack of success thus far, the United States remains ready to open talks on this subject at any time.

71. These developments, moreover, once again demonstrate the urgent need not only for a non-proliferation treaty, but for all the necessary steps toward general and complete disarmament. Let no one imagine that the building or acquisition of a nuclear bomb buys cheap security. True security for all Powers, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, lies in progress in the entire range of arms control and disarmament measures, including control of the strategic arms race, a verifiable comprehensive test-ban, and a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The sum of such acts will help to build a more secure world for all and perhaps ensure our very survival.

72. The fourth great problem I wish to discuss is that of assuring self-determination and full nationhood to all peoples who still, regrettably, live in colonial subjection. Our Assembly agenda reminds us that the work of ending the colonial age is far from finished. In fact, the hardest problems have remained until the last. That is true, above all, in the southern portion of the African continent, where white minorities have become deeply entrenched in their dominion over black majorities. In much of that area we see not one evil but two evils which, under one guise or another, go hand in hand: colonialism and that particularly cruel offence against human rights, racial discrimination.

73. The opposition of the United States to those twin evils draws strength from two of the deepest elements in our own national life: our historic stand, from our very origins, as an anti-colonial Power and our continuing struggle against racial injustice among our own people. My country, founded on the proposition that all men are created equal and have equal rights before the law—and currently engaged in a vigorous nation-wide programme to make that equality real for all its citizens—cannot, must not, and will not adopt a double standard on what is happening in the southern part of Africa.

74. And I should merely like to say this to the Members of the Assembly: to those who are impatient for

redress of grievances we shall show that we sympathize with them and support their objectives, even though we may not always agree on the specific, practical steps to be taken by the international community.

75. To those, on the other hand, who resist all change, we shall continue to insist that the way to preserve peace is not the submergence of legitimate grievances, but their timely redress. And we shall unceasingly bring home to them America's profound conviction that apartheid, like every other form of white supremacy, is, as my predecessor Adlai Stevenson said, "racist in its origins, arrogant in its implementation and, in its consequences, potentially dangerous for all".

76. In conclusion let me say this. During the coming three months the General Assembly will address itself not only to the questions we have discussed in this statement, but to a vast range of matters affecting the peace and welfare of mankind, both now and in the future. My delegation will seek to participate constructively in the Assembly's many concerns; and on a number of topics of particular interest we shall present proposals of our own.

77. The United States turns to these tasks in a mood of sober determination. Our Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization [A/6701/Add.1] has made clear his view that this has not been a good year for the United Nations; and we agree with that assessment. The fault—to paraphrase the great bard, Shakespeare—lies not in the Organization itself, but in ourselves, its Members; and it is to our own policies that we must all look if we desire a better future.

78. In serving the cause of a just and peaceful world we are not permitted the luxury of being easily discouraged. Indeed, the most forbidding obstacles are precisely those which should call forth our most persistent efforts. Nor should we look for any alternative to the United Nations, for there is none. Year in and year out, through all the difficulties that may arise, we must strive to be true, both in word and deed, to the permanent pledge of peace and justice which we, as Members, have made to the United Nations and to one another.

79. As this twenty-second session of the General Assembly opens, the United States once again solemnly reaffirms its devotion to that pledge.

80. Mr. KRAG (Denmark): Mr. President, I wish to congratulate you on your election to the Chair of the General Assembly at its twenty-second session. The constructive role which you have played as the representative of Romania in international affairs is well known to us all. Your high qualities as Foreign Minister and, indeed, as a statesman are a guarantee for the good conduct of the affairs of this General Assembly. I also wish to welcome you as the first representative from Eastern Europe to hold this high office. Your election is a sign of one of the most positive trends in today's international situation, the relaxation of tension between East and West.

81. Since the General Assembly last met in regular session the world has seen one of the most serious international crises in many years, the war in the Middle East in the month of June. The important role of the United Nations in the Middle East is obvious.

One of the starting points of the latest flare-up was a serious curtailment of the physical possibilities of the United Nations to exercise a moderating influence in that area. And when the fragile truce collapsed, when the weapons spoke their ominous language, and an entire world watched developments in fear of their frightful implications, all efforts to bring an end to hostilities were concentrated in the United Nations. Those efforts were successful in so far as a cease-fire was achieved within a few days of the outbreak of hostilities—indeed, a major achievement.

82. Unfortunately, the developments in the Middle East since then do not justify much optimism. There has been no substantial progress towards a solution of the underlying political problems. Israeli troops are still maintaining the positions they had reached when the cease-fire was established, and the Arab States have shown no readiness to recognize Israel's right to peace and existence. The Suez Canal is closed to all shipping, and nobody knows when it will be reopened. Thousands of new refugees are now suffering the same fate that others have known for so many years. In this situation it is a matter of course that the United Nations should seek solutions to these most burning questions; and what applies to the membership in general certainly applies to the great Powers in particular. But the parties to the conflict must themselves contribute to a solution. As Members of the United Nations they have pledged themselves to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours. In compliance with this solemn obligation they should seek a solution in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. In any case the best way for the parties to achieve real influence on such arrangements as are necessary for establishing normal conditions in the Middle East is to take an active part in making them.

83. The views of the Danish Government are based upon the following principles which we consider equally valid: first, territorial gains should not be based upon military action; second, all Member States have a fundamental right to peaceful existence and, third, the Security Council is the United Nations organ which carries the main responsibility for the preparation and implementation of a comprehensive solution to outstanding problems. In this respect the Danish Government agrees with the Secretary-General that it would be most helpful if he could receive appropriate authorization for the designation of a special representative to the Middle East. And we certainly also agree that such an appointee could serve as a sifter and harmonizer of ideas in the area.

84. The darkest aspect of the international situation is still the war in Viet-Nam. In my country public opinion looks upon developments there with ever growing concern. It is tragic that a political solution to this conflict is not in sight in spite of the general wish that the war should be ended as soon as possible within the framework and on the basis of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

85. I wish to reiterate the position of the Danish Government. We believe that the conflict in Viet-Nam can be solved by political means only, that only negotiation can lead to durable peace in South-East Asia and safeguard the rights of the Vietnamese people. But

without concessions there will be no solutions, and an initial move towards negotiations would be a halt in the bombing of North Viet-Nam followed by a reduction in the military activities by both sides. Participation in the negotiations must include all those involved in the conflict.

86. In spite of the dark circumstances it is not too early to consider what could be done to assist the sorely tried Viet-Nameese people in rebuilding their country when the war is over. We fully realize that the Viet-Nameese people prefer to solve their own problems, and we also recognize the fact that we cannot heal all the wounds of the war. But it is an important international obligation to help remedy the damage of war, in order to alleviate the sufferings of the Viet-Nameese people and create the conditions for stability in the area.

87. The Danish Government is ready to contribute to such endeavours. To this end we have initiated studies of local needs, and we have entered into co-operation with other Nordic countries. We hope that other countries, too, are giving thought to this question and will be prepared to join in international efforts in this matter.

88. I shall now turn to the question of disarmament. We welcome the progress achieved in Geneva through the tabling by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of identical texts of a treaty on non-proliferation. This has brought us much closer to a ban on the spread of nuclear weapons.

89. The Danish Government considers a treaty on non-proliferation to be of immense value in itself. Certain countries have voiced concern about one aspect or another of such a treaty. Even if we understand these concerns, non-proliferation is in our view a question of the survival of mankind, and the very conclusion of such a treaty must therefore take precedence over all other considerations. I therefore appeal to all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, to sign the treaty when a text has been agreed upon. The problems relating to a comprehensive test ban seem ripe for a solution now that technological progress is narrowing the scope of disagreement with respect to detection and verification.

90. There are other important problems in the armaments field. The Danish Government believes that an international agreement to limit the trade in conventional weapons would be highly beneficial. This goal cannot be reached in the near future, but a useful first step might be an agreement to exchange information through a United Nations organ on the international trade of conventional weapons. To this end the Secretary-General could make inquiries with all Member States and report their views to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly.

91. With regard to the question of the representation of China, it remains the position of the Danish Government that only the People's Republic of China is entitled to represent China in the United Nations.

92. The Danish Government attaches great importance to the peace-keeping activities of the United Nations. The possibilities of the United Nations in this field must be preserved and developed. However, we must not try to force through any apparent progress that is inconsistent with the political realities.

93. We have noted that a number of Member States—even some which have pledged to do so—have not yet made voluntary contributions to cover the deficit of the Organization. We hope that Member States which have not yet offered voluntary contributions will do so now, and especially the major Powers whose wishes were met in connexion with the understanding of September 1965.

94. In the southern part of Africa the problem is how to avert the dangers which threaten international peace and security. As to South West Africa the Danish Government supported the resolution of the twenty-first General Assembly by which the Mandate of South Africa over South West Africa was terminated [2145 (XXI)]. It has caused us great concern that the broad agreement of the twenty-first General Assembly did not pass the test to which it was put during the fifth special session, when general principles were to be spelt out in more concrete and practical terms. In our opinion unity and solidarity are absolutely necessary if real pressure is to be brought to bear upon South Africa.

95. In December of last year the Security Council determined [resolution 232 (1966)] that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security. To bring down the illegal régime in Salisbury the Council decided for the first time to invoke mandatory sanctions under the Charter. It is a matter for regret that certain Governments have declared that they are not prepared to participate in the sanctions. It is also regrettable that there is reason to suspect that the legislation and practices in certain other countries are not efficient enough to prevent individuals and companies from breaking the embargo. When adequate information is at hand Denmark will be prepared to support a move in the Security Council to extend and tighten up the sanctions.

96. The key to a durable solution of the problems in the southern part of Africa lies in South Africa. Denmark has repeatedly supported the resolutions by which the General Assembly has drawn the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the situation in South Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security, that action under Chapter VII of the Charter is essential in order to solve the problem of apartheid, and that universally applied mandatory economic sanctions are the only means of achieving a peaceful solution.

97. It is still the position of the Danish Government that the Security Council alone is competent to initiate action under Chapter VII of the Charter. We are also of the opinion that specific proposals for a solution

must be practicable and that resolutions about sanctions will be of no use as long as the major trading partners of South Africa will not implement them.

98. To sum up my views on southern Africa let me say this. The situation is a potential threat to international peace and security, also because in certain circumstances it could be used as a pawn in a wider political context. Furthermore it is a permanent threat to the unity in this Assembly, which is called upon to deal with so many difficult problems and to work for so many high goals. We should all keep this in mind, particularly those countries whose attitude in the last resort will decide the outcome.

99. The Danish Government will continue to support the work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in the field of economic and social development. The second session of the Conference on Trade and Development to be held in New Delhi in 1968 offers an opportunity for concerted practical action by the world community. We share the opinion of the Secretary-General of UNCTAD that the conference should concentrate on those questions which hold prospect of agreement and where concrete results appear to be within reach.

100. All member countries of the United Nations must participate in vigorous action to combat the hunger which threatens many parts of the world. However, there is a parallel need to control the increase of the world population. We are encouraged by the large contributions offered to the Secretary-General's Trust Fund for population activities. Population control furthermore is an increasingly important element in Danish bilateral development programmes.

101. Experience gained during the present development decade underscores the need for thorough and early planning for the next development decade. The Danish Parliament has recently adopted a plan according to which Denmark in a few years will reach the 1 percent target established by the United Nations.

102. In 1945 the United Nations took upon itself the task of creating a new world order based upon the rule of law, peace and justice and respect for fundamental human rights. It could only be expected that progress towards realizing a task of such magnitude would be slow, painful and exposed to set-backs. There is, however, only one way by which to reach our goal and that is by determined and patient efforts in recognition of the fact that basically the vital interests of all peoples are identical.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.