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Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

AGENDA ITEM 22

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/3366, A/3470, A/C.1/783, A/C.1/784, A/C.1/L.160, A/C.1/L.161, A/C.1/L.162) (*continued*)

1. Mr. NASE (Albania) considered it natural for his Government, which based its policy on the defence of peace, to attach the necessary importance to the disarmament problem. While not ignoring the delicate and complex nature of the problem, it was convinced that the lack of results during the previous ten years was attributable to the official circles of the Western Powers, which were directly interested in the arms race.

2. On several occasions the Soviet Union had accepted proposals emanating from the Western Powers in order to meet them half-way. But it was characteristic of the negotiations that, on each occasion, the Western Powers thereupon dropped their own proposals. In addition, they placed condition after condition on agreement, in connexion with both the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional armaments.

3. Recalling the special efforts exerted by the Soviet Union on behalf of the prohibition of nuclear weapons, he noted that the United States continued to maintain a negative attitude toward all such proposals, including those which would prohibit nuclear test explosions. In the opinion of the Albanian delegation, the draft resolution suggesting that prior notice and registration of nuclear tests should be required (A/C.1/L.162) merely served the purpose of evading the urgent demand of the peoples of the world for the prohibition of nuclear tests. The Albanian delegation, on the other hand, firmly supported the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union on that question (A/C.1/L.160) and considered that it was not necessary to set up special control machinery because it was already pos-

sible to register explosions of atomic bombs at whatever point on the globe they might occur.

4. The Government of the People's Republic of Albania also supported the declaration by the Soviet Union Government on 17 November 1956 (A/3366) as a good basis for negotiations on disarmament. By accepting the level of 2.5 million men for the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the United States and China and that of 750,000 for the forces of France and the United Kingdom, as a first step in the reduction of armed forces and armaments, the Soviet Union had created the possibility of reaching agreement in that field. It had also given proof of its good will and its desire to break the present deadlock by its willingness to consider the question of using aerial surveys in the zone of Europe covering 800 kilometres east and west of the demarcation line between the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and those of the Warsaw Treaty countries. Despite the importance of that new concession and the earlier Soviet proposals, for a comprehensive system of effective control and inspection, the United States and certain other Western Powers were again demanding the acceptance without discussion of the United States "open skies" plan.

5. Observing that the United States had refused to consider the recent Soviet proposal for the reduction of foreign troops stationed on the territory of Germany and the elimination of foreign military bases, he stated that those positions reflected the different policies carried out by those Powers in their international relations. The Albanian Government, supporting all constructive efforts for peace, had already made an effective contribution by reducing its armed forces by 9,000 men and its military expenditures for 1956 by 25 per cent as compared to 1955.

6. Finally, the Albanian delegation supported the Soviet Union's proposal for convoking a special session of the General Assembly to deal exclusively with the question of disarmament (A/C.1/L.161), and also supported the proposal to increase the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

7. Mr. MAHGOUB (Sudan) thought it might appear presumptuous on the part of a small disarmed country such as his to participate in the debate on disarmament. However, small nations were far more interested in disarmament than the great Powers, since their limited funds were needed for expanding social services.

8. Calling upon the Committee to examine in detail the Soviet and Western points of view, he stated that, if it were able to point out the differences and list them, it might then be possible to refer those differences to a special commission, with a view to finding a basis for agreement. The differences between them were mainly on the procedure for carrying out effective disarmament. That was clear from an analysis of the statements made by the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on 4 May 1956, the final day of the meetings of the Sub-Committee

of the Disarmament Commission. That situation was in itself a step forward and was a start for the Commission when it met in July 1956. There had been agreement on the levels of armed forces, thus further reducing the differences. Enumerating the objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union as defined in the First Committee (821st meeting), he regretted the attacks and counter-attacks which could not help to create the right atmosphere.

9. Without underrating the differences in any way, he reiterated that they were only procedural and seemed to centre on the question whether to begin with disarmament or with a solution of international problems. The remaining differences, such as inspection and control, aerial photography, conferences of Heads of Government and the membership of the Disarmament Commission, were not too difficult to solve.

10. In the opinion of the Sudanese delegation, a broad attack could be made concurrently on both disarmament and the solution of international problems. He reviewed the gains to be derived from disarmament, especially by smaller Powers. The advantages to be gained by the diversion to more useful and noble ends of even a part of the funds wasted on armaments were obvious. No effort should be spared in trying to achieve a final agreement, the obstacles to which seemed insignificant when compared to the horrible consequences of war.

11. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) asserted that mankind would not be delivered from the nightmare of a third world war until atomic and hydrogen weapons were prohibited and their manufacture ended, and until States eliminated those arms and destroyed existing stocks. Peaceful and constructive labour could not be carried out until the armed forces and armaments of all States had been gradually limited to the level required for the maintenance of internal order and security, and for frontier protection.

12. Observing that one of the basic obstacles to disarmament was the existence in certain countries of powerful financial groups interested in the production and trade of arms, he said that the merit of the Governments of those countries would be even greater if they could overcome the resistance of those groups and move the question of disarmament forward.

13. Citing the statement by the representative of Belgium (822nd meeting) as an example of the view that disarmament was inevitably linked to a satisfactory settlement of political questions, he concluded that if the United Nations followed that logic it would have to abandon for a long time any attempt to make progress in the problem of disarmament. If pending political questions must be settled favourably before progress could be made, did that mean that those questions must be settled in circumstances of full armament and, therefore, under the threat or use of force?

14. He noted that, in the opinion of the United States, a reduction greater than that provided for in the first stage would be impossible until more progress had been made in political settlements. But he questioned whether one could guarantee that there would not be further adventures of the kind launched against Egypt when the second stage of disarmament was reached. Obviously, the desire to achieve political settlements could be viewed as a desire to promote disarmament, and only complete disarmament could, in turn, assure a peaceful solution of all problems which were outstanding among the various countries.

15. Notwithstanding the difficulties and the divergent views, a certain amount of progress had been made towards settling those questions. One would have expected that those who had criticized the Soviet Union proposal of 27 March 1956 (DC/83, annex 5) for restricting itself to the field of conventional armaments would have approved of the Soviet Union declaration on 17 November 1956 (A/3366), which dealt with general disarmament. But again they accused the Soviet Union of adhering to an oversimplified concept of the prohibition of atomic weapons. While certain delegations preferred the registration of atomic tests, the peoples would be dissatisfied if the Soviet Union were to abandon its proposals to discontinue atomic and hydrogen tests, to prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons, to bring about the destruction of all atomic weapons and to reduce conventional armaments. The alternative would be to embark on the path of petty compromise, which would only create the illusion that something was being done in the field of disarmament.

16. The Disarmament Commission, especially its Sub-Committee, should consider all proposals relating to disarmament advanced during the present session, and all reasonable possibilities should be utilized to reach agreement. In that connexion, he considered the United States proposals (A/C.1/783) worthy of attention. With the exception of the question of the so-called earth satellite and intercontinental ballistic missiles, there appeared to be nothing new in them. However, the proposals were presented to the Committee in a more developed and concrete form. The United States had offered to stop the accumulation of fissionable material, not the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Experimental explosions designed for military purposes would not be discontinued; probably the fissionable materials already existing were sufficient to guarantee, not only the production of already tested weapons for some time to come, but even the production of new ones. That was not a very happy prospect. One might understand from those proposals that the United States was prepared to agree to a prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, but that it was prevented from doing so by the impossibility of establishing control over existing weapons. Yet the United States did not wish to stop further tests of new types of atomic and hydrogen weapons where control was quite possible. It was perfectly clear that tests of atomic weapons were not only harmful to the health of populations but were also dangerous, because a constant accumulation of ever new and ever more destructive types of weapons would lead to a situation in which they would speak for themselves.

17. The Bulgarian delegation considered that, instead of making ever new proposals which, with their added conditions, complicated matters even further, it would be useful to take the results already achieved as a basis and move on. It appeared now that all participants in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee agreed that it would be possible to begin a reduction of the forces of the Soviet Union, the United States and China to the level of 2.5 million men, and of those of the United Kingdom and France to the level of 750,000 men. That proposal had already been adopted by the United States delegation, though with certain conditions which made its implementation very problematical, and could serve as a basis for the development of the further work of the Commission and its Sub-Committee. With such armies it would be difficult to wage, and even more difficult to win, a modern war.

18. Recalling the statements made in the letters of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Bulganin pledging their countries not to use force for aggressive purposes, he suggested that those statements should be brought together in a single document. That would be a good beginning, since it would create favourable conditions for further progress in the field of disarmament. The declaration would emphasize that thermo-nuclear weapons could serve as a deterrent to aggression and would be used only for self-defence against atomic attack. Such a pledge could be made while the reduction of conventional armaments and that of armed forces to 2.5 million and 750,000 men were being co-ordinated.

19. In conclusion, he stated that it would be entirely unrealistic to expect people to think that disarmament was under serious consideration so long as the People's Republic of China was ignored. He also considered the proposals to increase the membership of the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee as reasonable and timely. In general, all initiatives, such as the convening of a special session of the General Assembly and a conference of the Heads of Government, should be studied by the Commission and its Sub-Committee.

20. Mr. TARAZI (Syria) said that the role which the small Powers could play in the question should be stressed. Certainly, small countries were seriously concerned with the progress that could and should be made in the field of disarmament. Therefore, he could not fail to express the regret of his delegation that no agreement had so far been arrived at on the question of the reduction of conventional weapons and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Since, once again, clouds seemed to be on the horizon, it was necessary to dissipate them and to re-establish the atmosphere of confidence which had existed after the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers at Geneva in July 1955.

21. After listening with care to the suggestions made by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union (821st meeting), one was left with the conviction that an agreement could be achieved only on the basis of all the useful suggestions made by the great Powers. So far as international control was concerned, the points of view, although different, now seemed to be moving closer to one another. That was of great importance.

22. The newly developed techniques of science should not be subject to the needs of war. Otherwise, the gulf which separated the under-developed from the industrialized countries would not disappear. Unfortunately, the great Powers were still devoting three-fourths of their resources to the development of their war potential. Force was still used as a means of obtaining political objectives. If the disarmament problem had been solved sooner, the security of Egypt and of all the other Arab countries would not have been threatened. The well-known attack on Egypt had been carried out by two Powers which had made proposals and counter-proposals on disarmament. How could one talk about disarmament when one read in the *New York Herald Tribune* of 17 January 1957 a statement by Mr. Anthony Nutting, a former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, that Syria must be eliminated as a political entity because its presence constituted a danger, or when an admiral of the French fleet, one of the heads of the armed expedition against Egypt, frankly admitted that he had sent reconnaissance aircraft over Syria in order to determine whether or not Soviet aircraft were to be found on Syrian soil?

23. The aim of disarmament was to ensure peace. But peace was threatened the moment there were forces which could carry out a surprise attack. For that reason, the people and Government of Syria were quite aware of the danger posed by forces stationed in Cyprus, which was only some twenty miles from the Syrian coast.

24. Disarmament could not, of course, be achieved without an atmosphere of confidence. In that respect, it would be wise to apply the five basic principles of international law which the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, had formulated and which were adopted by the African-Asian Conference, held at Bandung in April 1955. Those principles included non-aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. The mere fact that a country did not wish to participate in military alliances should make its contribution to the solution of the disarmament problem more important. The Syrian-Indian declaration of 21 January 1957 stated that military pacts and alliances prejudiced the peace and stability of the Middle East.

25. Another aspect of the disarmament problem concerned the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The Syrian delegation was happy to note that almost all members of the Committee supported the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. It had also been very much impressed by and shared the views of the representative of Japan (823rd meeting), who had carefully described the consequences of nuclear tests. Furthermore, in the spirit of the *communiqué* issued by the Bandung Conference, his Government believed that the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction should be completely prohibited.

26. Mr. JAMALI (Iraq) noted that, while the countries of the world wished to disarm in order to be relieved of the heavy burden of armaments and to channel much of the amounts spent for armaments into peaceful projects, the need for arms would still be present as long as fear, injustice, greed and the desire to dominate and exploit others remained in the world. The ideological "cold war" would, in fact, prevail as long as the great political problems of the day, such as the unification of Germany and Korea and the Palestine question, remained unsolved and as long as colonialism was kept alive. On the other hand, the more honesty, justice, freedom and unselfishness prevailed, the more easily disarmament would be made possible.

27. So far, the question of disarmament had justifiably been discussed mainly from the point of view of the great Powers and their gigantic war machines. However, the subject could also be treated from the point of view of the small Powers. In the Middle East, for instance, there were issues directly related to armaments. One of them was that which had been called the theory of equilibrium in arms between Israel and its Arab neighbours, a theory which, because of the Tripartite Agreement concluded between the United Kingdom, France and the United States on 25 May 1950, had been interpreted as meaning that Israel should have an arms power equal to that of all the neighbouring States combined. The result was that Israel had been strong enough in arms to invade the neighbouring States one after another.

28. Egypt, finding that Western sources were not making arms for self-defence readily available, had had to seek arms from Czechoslovakia, from which Israel had also secured arms in the past. That had started the chain of political events in the Middle East which had led to the present deadlock. The argument that there should be a balance between the Arab States and Israel

was untenable. A nation's armaments should be in accord with its own needs and responsibilities, and any control on armaments should be universal and just. If there was to be peace in the Middle East with arms control, Israel's arms should not be more than were justified by its size and population.

29. The second point which directly affected peace in the Middle East and which was also connected with the arms question was that of Communist infiltration and subversion. While harbouring no ill intentions as regards the people of the Soviet Union, Iraq was entitled, under Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter, to take part in the Baghdad Pact and to preserve peace by preparedness. What had happened in Korea, in Viet-Nam and in Eastern Europe was well known, and it could not be said that the USSR was not interested in the Middle East. For that reason, President Eisenhower's recently announced plan was to be welcomed. A stabilized Middle East would be a great contribution to disarmament.

30. While any progress made towards reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic warfare was to be welcomed, no disarmament should be effected unless and until full guarantees of a complete system of control and inspection existed. As a consequence, the Iraqi delegation supported all the measures outlined in the United States memorandum (A/C.1/783). His delegation would also accept the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.161), except that it did not see any need for calling a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament at the present stage. It also supported the draft resolution presented by Canada, Japan and Norway (A/C.1/L.162).

31. Mr. COMAY (Israel) reserved his delegation's right to reply to certain comments concerning the situation in the Middle East and concerning Israel which had been made in the speech delivered by the representative of Iraq.

32. Mr. HAMDANI (Pakistan) remarked that the successful handling of the Middle East crisis, where the Soviet Union and the United States were in agreement had shown how disarmament in all its aspects could be achieved only when the great Powers agreed among themselves on the subject. Unilateral reduction of armed forces could not be termed disarmament as envisaged in the United Nations. The United Nations aimed at a multilateral agreement for a balanced reduction of all armaments, for the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and for safeguarded control.

33. Many proposals had been made advocating control or the elimination of nuclear weapons. Emphasis seemed to have moved from atomic disarmament to a search for a method of guarding against surprise attacks. It also seemed to have moved to matters by which countries not yet producing nuclear weapons could be prevented from developing them. That, however, had not affected the stockpiles of the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR. Therefore, the voluntary transfer by the United States of fissionable material from its stockpile to the International Atomic Energy Agency for peaceful purposes was to be welcomed. It was also earnestly to be hoped that other great Powers in possession of stockpiles would follow that example, which was an effective way of reducing stockpiles.

34. For the same reason, the constructive objectives mentioned by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Committee's debate,

in particular, effective international control of future production of fissionable materials, were to be praised.

35. Once the future production of fissionable materials was controlled, nuclear test explosions could then ultimately be eliminated. There was, however, great force in the arguments made by the representative of Norway (824th meeting) that methods of limiting such nuclear tests, by means of advance notice and registration with the United Nations, should be worked out immediately. The same could be said of the proposal made by the representative of Sweden (824th meeting) who had asked for a moratorium on nuclear tests. Pakistan would support whichever proposal met with the unanimous approval of the Committee.

36. He noted with satisfaction that the great Powers were apparently in agreement on the first stage of reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces with adequate inspection. It was his hope that such a system of inspection could be established so as to lead to the first stage of reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

37. Mr. MAHMOUD (Egypt) expressed his Government's gratification over the increasing interest of the Members of the United Nations, and especially the small countries, in the issue of disarmament. Small countries, which were in the majority in the world, had every right to express their views on such a vital issue and to have them considered. The problem should not ultimately be referred back either to the Disarmament Commission or to its Sub-Committee, to be discussed behind closed doors. That procedure led to a vicious circle. The potentialities of the world in all directions and in all places should be used for the sake of peace and progress. That objective was more important than ever because of the unprecedented speed of the arms race, whether in atomic or conventional weapons. The prospect for disarmament was gloomy because, while the core of the disarmament question was the control and inspection system, it was equally true that any control system, to be effective, required an atmosphere of confidence between the great Powers. As a consequence, the United Nations should make every effort to bring the "cold war" to a stop as a matter of priority. The small Powers should appeal to and urge the great Powers to come to an agreement in order to achieve at least a certain amount of progress in the solution of the major political issues and related problems.

38. With regard to the question of control and inspection, it was the opinion of the Egyptian Government that any disarmament agreement should be based upon an effective system of control and inspection. Such a system, however, required experimentation, and the Egyptian delegation favoured an effective control system, applied for a limited time within a specific area as an experiment for further application on a wider and more durable basis. Only in the light of experience could a satisfactory system, including aerial inspection with ground control posts and other related proposals, be worked out.

39. So far as nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons were concerned, the position of the Egyptian Government was that adopted by the Bandung Conference. Further experiments with nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons should be stopped. It was therefore to be hoped that the appeal made by the representative of Japan (823rd meeting) for the cessation of such experiments would be heard. The great Powers should stop such experiments or at least agree to establish, as a preliminary step to be followed by more concrete ones, a sys-

tem of advance registration with the United Nations of tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

40. The Egyptian delegation was in favour of the trend to enlarge the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee and not to limit the Commission's membership to the members of the Security Council.

41. Finally, the Egyptian delegation hoped that the various positions, as embodied in the draft resolutions submitted to the Committee, could be brought closer together so that a unanimous agreement could be reached. Thus, the Disarmament Commission, in its new composition, could start a constructive approach to the whole issue.

42. Mr. AZNAR (Spain) noted that his delegation was taking part in the debate on disarmament for the first time. However, for many years in the League of Nations, the Spanish Government had shown a strong interest in the problem. The atmosphere in Geneva, in the days after the First World War, had been filled with eloquent statements and solemn declarations, but the Second World War had showed the dreadful failure of pacifism and revealed its fundamental insincerity. At Geneva, Spain had favoured a secure system of peaceful co-operation between all countries. Today, when the problem was more serious owing to the presence of nuclear weapons, the Spanish Government wished to repeat its intention to work for peace.

43. The basic truth, however, was that, in one way or another, the arms race continued because of certain poli-

tical problems and conflicts which divided men into irreconcilable groups. In that connexion, the Spanish delegation agreed with the views expressed by a number of delegations, such as that of Italy (824th meeting). It also agreed with the opinions expressed by the delegation of the United States (821st meeting), when it maintained that no effective disarmament was possible without the establishment of international control. If the Soviet Union honestly wished to contribute to the peace of the world, control was the means by which all its fears could be overcome. It would be a major achievement if the suggestions set out in the United States memorandum (A/C.1/783) could be crystallized. Upon achieving that agreement, the nations of the world would be at the stage of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes, which would open a new great period in the evolution of civilization. Many statements which had been made by the delegation of France, in that connexion, deserved praise. The statement by the representative of Norway (824th meeting) was also very timely and appropriate, and the Spanish delegation would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution submitted by Canada, Japan and Norway (A/C.1/L.162).

44. A repetition of the events which took place years ago must not be allowed. The desire of the world for happiness, justice and peace must be fulfilled. That desire had been expressed by the President of the United States in his second inaugural address in words that had once again given rise to hope in the minds of all men of good will.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.