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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685, A/C.1/751, A/C.1/752/Rev.1) (*continued*)

Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (*continued*)

1. Mr. RAMADAN (Egypt) (*translated from French*): The debate on disarmament, which began in the First Committee over a week ago, is proceeding in an atmosphere of calm broken by sudden squalls.
2. The debate centres on two or three draft resolutions embodying different methods and procedures that may make it possible to reconcile the opposing positions in regard to disarmament. At this stage of the debate my delegation wishes to make a number of comments, for no country, large or small, can or should stand aside from a discussion whose outcome may well determine the fate of the world.
3. In his first speech [688th meeting], the Australian representative referred to the part often played by the small and medium Powers. The French representative also spoke, in his short speech on 15 October [690th meeting], of the small and medium Powers that are important on account of their civilization. The importance of the role of the small and medium Powers in the present situation is enhanced by the fact they are outside the armaments race and can speak objectively.
4. First, let us remember that there are moments of world consciousness just as throughout history there have been, and still are, moments of national consciousness that determine the fortunes of men and of nations. The great debate that is proceeding in the First Committee is destined to answer the appeal of all mankind, either by calming its fears or by intensifying its apprehensions. The responsibility of the great Powers

is the heavier because the world's destiny will be decided by the decisions they are called upon to make.

5. Two roads are open to mankind. One leads to the total annihilation of the finest creations of human genius, the other opens up boundless prospects of an era of well-being and universal happiness.

6. The fate of the world wavers between these two roads. The time has come to choose. If the great Powers see that considerations of higher humanity prevail over the manifold factors that prevent agreement, a relieved world will be able to resume its advance towards progress and prosperity. If, on the contrary, the gap between the opposing viewpoints continues to widen, world opinion will face with dismay the eclipse of a great hope and the failure of a noble undertaking. The small and medium Powers refuse to believe that the great Powers will so abdicate their duty. The armaments race, which has become more intense since the Second World War, had already caused the small and medium Powers to work together to establish a united front based on their common peaceful interests. The darkening international horizon seemed at times to clear sufficiently to allow a few feeble rays of light to filter through. Numbed with fear, yet stirred by a vague hope, the world continued to scan the horizon. The long discussions in the Disarmament Commission dragged on without bringing the viewpoints of the East and West appreciably closer together. The menace that hangs over the world as a result of the discovery of atomic energy has confronted mankind with the spectre of the annihilation of civilization, which is one common patrimony. It is the crowning achievement of human toil and organization to which the small and medium Powers have contributed their share.

7. Thus the world has passed through alternating moods of fear, distrust and doubt. Distrust has welled up like water from an underground source to erode and gradually undermine the foundations of the marvellous structure of our civilization. In every age, change has caused disquiet. No generation has faced its uncertain future with such anxiety as ours.

8. Mankind has entered the atomic age haunted by the fear of catastrophe. At the last meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Sciences it was stated that two-thirds of the world might disappear if atomic weapons and the hydrogen bomb were ever used. It is becoming increasingly evident that mankind cannot progress so long as distrust persists and grows and fear continues to clutch at the hearts of the people.

9. The announcement as the present session began of a new Soviet proposal tending to bridge the gap between Eastern and Western views on disarmament raised hopes that are far from being extinguished.

10. My delegation has noted with satisfaction the obvious desire of the great Powers to try to find common ground with a view to reaching agreement, but at the same time it has not failed to notice that the calm

atmosphere in which the debate was proceeding has been abruptly clouded by discussions that show a certain hardening of the respective positions. Dawning hope can quickly be extinguished, but reawakened distrust will not easily be dispelled. If the door that is still ajar is slammed, bringing to nothing the hope that has been awakened, the responsibility of the great Powers will be all the heavier.

11. As long ago as 1919 it was said that man had learned that civilization was mortal. Will it be said that at a crucial moment of history our generation did everything it could to consummate the ruin of our civilization?

12. Yesterday afternoon as I listened to the Peruvian representative's moving speech [692nd meeting] I thought of the anxiety of the rising generation, which waits, hopeful and confident of the future, for us to open the way to a dazzling future, full of hope and light. We are running a race with fate. Although patience is the virtue of statesmen, the hour of choice is passing; inexorable fate may hurl our civilization, with all its art treasures and its boundless knowledge, into the abyss. Will it be said that this gleam of hope, glimpsed for a moment by a world in which the finest achievements of scientific genius are capable of fulfilling a long-cherished dream, was a brief mirage, seen and then lost from sight?

13. As I listened to the French representative speaking of the great Powers' desire for agreement I thought of the splendid page the great Powers would write in history if they succeeded in composing their differences and eliminated the germs of fear that poison the international atmosphere! It is the profound belief of us all that, with the sails of hope set and borne along by our common good will, the ship of civilization will reach a safe haven on the shores of peace, never more to be troubled by the echo of distant storms.

14. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): The general debate on disarmament has now gone on for over a week, and we think that the discussion has been extremely useful in clarifying a number of important matters. It has shown that the differences between the Soviet Union and the free world are almost, but not quite, as great as ever.

15. Since this is the political committee of the General Assembly, I think it might be appropriate to draw a political analogy to at least one part of the problem which we all face. The two sides in these controversies, and particularly one of them, are in the position of two political parties who are seeking to elect their slates in a given community. Both parties have put anti-crime planks in their platform. Both parties have proclaimed that they are against crime and wish to stamp it out. Both parties agree that we need policemen, or at least some sort of an enforcement or control agency. One party wants to have its policemen cover their whole beats and make arrests pursuant to law whenever they discover crime. But the other party says, "Oh no, the policeman should only stay on Main Street or certain other streets, and if he should observe a crime there, he can merely report the commission of the crime to the municipal council, which in due course will hold a meeting. The policeman cannot make the arrest". I think I might interpolate that implicit in such a stand is the possibility that if the potential criminal has a benevolent relative on the city council, he will never come up for trial.

16. However, in a more serious vein, it seems appropriate at this time to review the situation to see exactly where we stand. Before we go into the summary of the arguments so far adduced, I should like to stress one point which has not been discussed very freely. The greater part of the discussion in this Committee has been devoted to the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June [DC/53, annex 9] and to the Soviet Union proposals of 30 September [484th meeting], backed up by their draft resolution of 8 October [A/C.1/750]. This is entirely fitting, since the Franco-British memorandum is the instrument which has led to any narrowing of the gap that may have taken place. What I want to stress now is that, important as they are, neither the Franco-British memorandum nor the Soviet proposal, nor in fact the two combined, can be said to constitute a complete disarmament programme.

17. Over a period of years, general agreement has been reached in the Assembly on just what are the chief elements of such a programme. Last year these elements were set forth in the first preambular paragraph of General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII) of 28 November 1953, a paragraph which, may I remind the members of this Committee, received fifty-nine affirmative votes and no negative votes. These elements were: first, the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all non-atomic armaments; second, the elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction; third, the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only; and fourth, the carrying out of the whole programme under effective international control and in such a way that no State would have cause to fear that its security was in danger.

18. During the discussions in the Disarmament Commission and in the Sub-Committee in London this summer, it became apparent that there was a fifth element of a disarmament programme which was not completely covered by any of the four elements described in the General Assembly resolution to which I have referred: the fifth element was the relation of the other four elements, or, to put it in other words, the timing and phasing of the prohibitions and reductions and of the establishment of international controls.

19. The Franco-British memorandum [DC/53, annex 9] was written largely to deal with this fifth element. Since it covers the relationship of the other four elements, it naturally refers to them. As we see it, the Franco-British memorandum was, of course, never intended to be a complete disarmament programme. For example, it does not contain any formula for determining the levels to which armed forces and atomic armaments would be reduced. It does not attempt to go into any detail as to the type of international control machinery which would be set up or as to the powers and functions of an international control organ. It does not deal with numerous basic problems in connexion with the prohibition of atomic weapons, such as the type of installations which must be controlled, or the nature of the control. These latter problems are treated fully in the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy approved by previous sessions. The Soviet Union does not agree with the solution suggested in the United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy. But we feel sure that

the USSR will agree that any solution of the problem of atomic weapons must cover the subjects that are dealt with in the United Nations atomic energy plan.

20. In short, the Franco-British memorandum and the Soviet draft resolution, however different they may be in method, both deal with the same set of problems.

21. The three fundamental and basic differences that have emerged between the Soviet Union and the other members of the Disarmament Commission Sub-Committee are as follows — this is to summarize.

22. The first of these relates to the reduction of armed forces and non-atomic armaments. The position of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States is that we should first agree upon levels to which armed forces and armaments will be reduced. The amounts of reductions would be the difference between these agreed levels and the levels of 31 December 1953. These reductions would take place in two stages: fifty per cent in the first stage and fifty per cent in the second. The Soviet proposal goes along with the idea that the reductions should be made from the 31 December 1953 levels and that the reduction should take place in two stages: fifty per cent in each stage. Mr. Vyshinsky, however, has made it clear that the Soviet Union still favours a "proportional" reduction. In other words, it still favours an overall reduction of perhaps one-third, or some other fraction, applicable to all countries¹ the type of reduction which, we must be reminded, would perpetuate the present imbalance of armed forces and conventional armaments in favour of the Soviet Union. However, Mr. Vyshinsky says — and we cannot quarrel too strongly with this — that this is a matter that can be decided by the contemplated international convention.

23. The second major divergence relates to the powers and authority of the international control machinery — and this is a subject which has been debated at considerable length over the past week. Mr. Vyshinsky has gone back once again to the detailed Soviet Union proposals of 11 June 1947 concerning an international control organ.¹ These proposals when originally made, were made to the Atomic Energy Commission and related only to the control of atomic energy. They were discussed fully and exhaustively in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1947 and 1948.

24. At that time, a committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, consisting of Canada, China, France and the United Kingdom, prepared a working paper which concluded, among other things, the following: "that the Soviet Union proposals ignore the existing technical knowledge of the problem of atomic energy control, do not provide an adequate basis for the effective international control of atomic energy and the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons, and, therefore, do not conform to the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission".² This working paper was included as annex 4 of the third report of the Atomic Energy Commission, dated 17 May 1948, and was approved by the General Assembly at the time it adopted the United Nations atomic energy plan.

25. To go along further with our history of this case, the Soviet proposals then dropped out of sight, until suddenly the Soviet Union representative revived them in the Sub-Committee discussions in London last spring.

Why did they drop out of sight? It will be recalled, I am sure, that in 1952 Mr. Vyshinsky brought to the sixth session of the General Assembly some new proposals on international control [A/C.1/698], which he hailed — glorified in fact — as a great concession to the West. He conceded at that time that the international control organ shall have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis, but should not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of States. Since this was in contrast to the Soviet Union's previous insistence on periodic inspection, we all hoped that a door had been opened to agreement on a fundamental principle.

26. During the disarmament discussions in 1952, we strove without success to find out what the Soviet Union meant by the words "continuous inspection". Finally, in London last spring, the Soviet Union tried to put life into the ghost of 1947, with the definition of "inspection on a continuing basis". Mr. Vyshinsky thus succeeded only in demonstrating that the "continuous inspection" of 1952 was identical to the "periodic inspection" of 1947. And so the great concession of 1952 turned out to be no concession at all.

27. Now, since 30 September, the Soviet Union has talked about an international control organ with, as it has written it, "full powers of supervision, including the power of inspection on a continuing basis to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all States" [A/C.1/750]. At first glance, this looked good since, in theory at least, it could encompass the powers which this Assembly has decided already are essential.

28. On 15 October [690th meeting], Mr. Vyshinsky continued to assert that the Soviet Union favours a control organ capable of what he calls "powerful" and "effective" control. Exactly what powers would this mighty and powerful organ have? On 15 October, and again yesterday [692nd meeting], Mr. Vyshinsky answered this question by again calling up the ghost of 1947 and even reading to us from these 1947 proposals.

29. Furthermore, he referred to the United States working paper on the control organ [DC/53, annex 4], which was presented last summer by Mr. Patterson of the United States. He pointed out that the United States paper took the position that in cases of violation, the control commission can close plants and he said:

"... if there are people bold enough to agree to that, I must confess that we are not to be numbered with them. We consider it impossible to invest the control authority with such functions".

30. It is clear that on this all-important question of the powers of the control organ, there has been no fundamental change in the Soviet Union position. Once more Mr. Vyshinsky continues to insist, just as he did in 1947, that the really important powers in connexion with a disarmament programme must be exercised by the Security Council.

31. We fail to see why the Soviet Union objects to thorough and effective international control. If the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and all the rest of us, are willing to subject ourselves to it and bind ourselves by treaty, ratified by our own constitutional processes at home, what has the Soviet Union to fear? Are we to assume that it has something to hide — something that it does not want the world to see? How can any disarmament plan work if, as I said last week [687th meeting], the steps of the plan cannot be carried out in full sight of one another?

¹ See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Third Year, Special Supplement*, p. 22.

² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

32. The Soviet Union accuses the United States of preparing for another war; of outright aggression against Formosa and all kinds of other fantastic crimes and intentions. I may say this is hardly a splendid example of the way to lessen international tensions, but that is beside the point. We are being accused of such ideas, such intentions and such crimes. Speaking for the United States, I say this: how best can we display to the world that we are completely honest in our statements and completely straightforward in our intentions? We think it is by opening our doors and inviting a duly constituted international control body to come in freely and fully, to inspect our atomic installations, our munitions plants and, yes, even our button factories. What is more, we are prepared to accept corrective action on the part of the control organ, in the event a violation is found.
33. On the other hand, on the other side of the coin, it has been well known for some time that we in the United States suspect the Soviet Union of planning world conquest behind its façade of disarmament statements. Will it take the same steps to reassure the world that we are prepared to take? Mr. Vyshinsky answered "no", but he kept an ember burning. He suggested that this problem, too, should be worked out in the international convention. So much for the control organ and its powers.
34. The third fundamental difference between the Soviet position and that of the other States which participated in the London discussion relates to the timing and phasing of the most important elements of the disarmament programme. Mr. Lloyd got to the heart of this difference in the second question which he addressed to Mr. Vyshinsky. He asked, and I quote [*690th meeting*]:
- "Does he agree that the officials of the control organ should be in position and ready and able to function in the countries concerned before—and I repeat the word 'before'—those countries begin to carry out the disarmament programme, yes or no?"
35. There is nothing I can add to Mr. Lloyd's explanation of the fundamental significance and importance of this problem. If we interpret Mr. Vyshinsky's answer correctly, he did not say "yes" and he did not say "no". Once again he said: "This will be decided in the convention." Can we assume that the Soviet attitude will be any less rigid when we come to negotiate the convention? After all, the Soviet Union has never shown itself willing to discuss in detail any of the concrete proposals brought forward to date.
36. But, in his very last intervention on 15 October [*690th meeting*], Mr. Vyshinsky took pity on us and did answer Mr. Lloyd's question in a manner which, I fear, is all too clear. He referred to paragraph 5 of the Franco-British memorandum [*DC/53, annex 9*], and noted that Mr. Lloyd had stated that we diverged on this point. Then Mr. Vyshinsky said: "That is true, we are not agreed on methods." Now, what does the fifth paragraph of that memorandum say? It says:
- "5. After the constitution and positioning of the control organ, which shall be carried out within a specified time, and as soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into effect."
37. So it is clear that in substance Mr. Vyshinsky's answer to Mr. Lloyd's second question is strongly in the negative.
38. There are other differences between us, but the three which I have outlined are most important. As a result of the discussions in this Committee—which, I repeat, have been extremely useful and which, in my view, have come to better grips with the problem than any previous United Nations discussions—where do we stand and where do we go? Let us admit again that on one important point the differences have been narrowed. That is the point on the staging and the timing. The Soviet Union now admits that the disarmament programme can take place in stages and that fifty per cent of the reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments can take place before the prohibition of atomic weapons. But despite this concession, we are still some distance from the down-to-earth, detailed negotiations that will be necessary to work out a disarmament convention. Thus, whether it is based on proposals upon which we agree or not, it would not be very profitable right now to start discussing the number of aircraft carriers, the number of bombers, the number of ground forces that each State will be permitted under a disarmament programme until we have some agreement on how to work out those figures. Mr. Vyshinsky says that the Soviet Union has one view and that the other members of the Sub-Committee have a different view and that we will work this out in the convention.
39. Similarly, it would not be very profitable to work out the machinery, powers and functions of an international control organ, to find out that the control organ will never be in a position to exercise its powers. Here again Mr. Vyshinsky says: "This is a question of method. Let's leave it to the convention."
40. So this is where we stand today. Now where should we go? What course of action should we follow in this Committee?
41. On each of these fundamental problems there are divergent views. It would be theoretically possible for the Assembly to recommend that the Soviet Union should accept our view, yet we frankly doubt whether the General Assembly's approval of the Franco-British memorandum [*DC/53, annex 9*], or even of the United States working paper on a control organ [*DC/53, annex 4*], would advance by one day the achievement of an agreed disarmament programme unless the General Assembly decision had the support of the Soviet Union. Yesterday [*691st meeting*] the distinguished representative of Syria made this point most effectively.
42. We have had some success. This is not all a matter for discouragement. The success has been less than we had originally hoped on 30 September, but it seems to us that there is no alternative course but to go back to work and try again. The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission seems to be the machinery best suited to promote genuine negotiation. It would be naive to suppose that progress in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee will be as rapid as one would wish. Certain Soviet Union moves here in the United Nations are not calculated to reduce international tensions. None of us can wave a magic wand which will produce immediate agreement. We are not counselling delay; we do not welcome delay. We are merely pointing out that progress comes as a result of serious, deep thought and thorough preparation, all of which is time-consuming. It is possible that we may have to grope our way along another series of blind alleys before we find another street which leads closer

to agreement. But we know of no other course and we would wish for no other action.

43. In the meantime, the United States believes that the Canadian draft resolution [*A/C.1/752, Rev.1*], which we are co-sponsoring, affords the best hope of progress in the field of disarmament. The machinery provided in this resolution can move as fast as the Soviet Union will permit it to move. We are certainly anxious that it should move with the greatest possible speed consistent with the attainment of genuine agreement.

44. I should now like to address a brief remark to Sir Percy Spender. I attach the greatest significance to his suggestions with respect to the further progress of our discussions on disarmament at this session.

45. Nevertheless, I am sure he will agree that our debate to this point has very closely outlined the points of agreement and disagreement between the views of the Soviet Union and those of the other members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. I personally doubt if any further clarification can be obtained at this session, for the type of problem which Mr. Vyshinsky desires to be solved by the convention will not be solved in three weeks, or even six weeks.

46. I fully agree with Sir Percy's view as to the vital contribution which can be made by what he has termed the "middle" and "small" Powers. The distinguished representative of the Philippines has also brought out this point most ably [*689th meeting*]. We have had ample evidence of this already in the debate and I certainly hope that we shall have more before it is over. The United States certainly does not believe, and our co-sponsors of the Canadian draft resolution do not believe, that progress in this field can be made only by the so-called great Powers.

47. That is one reason why we support this draft resolution, which calls upon the Disarmament Commission to pursue its work. That Commission, with its twelve members and its availability to all other Member States, certainly enables other Powers to voice their views on a plane of complete equality with the great Powers. Then, too, the results of its work will again be reviewed by the General Assembly. In brief, I hope that when we shall have concluded our general debate in this Committee, all members of this body will have had ample opportunity to contribute fully to this vital task.

48. The representative of Syria spent a considerable part of his challenging and able presentation yesterday [*691st meeting*] in pointing out the seemingly irreconcilable attitudes of the United States and the USSR, in spite of the fact that we both apparently espouse the same general principles. I join with him in wondering whether the word "peace" means something in Russian that is wholly incompatible with what it means to us in English.

49. We are ready to demonstrate that the peace we want is worth real sacrifice; that it is a precious thing deserving of persistent and impartial protection; that it will flourish under proper safeguards in the broad light of day. And we must reaffirm our conviction that peace, as we mean it, cannot thrive on an exclusive diet of lip-service; that it will suffer seriously the drought of neglect; that it will wither and die in the dark dungeons of secrecy.

50. Yesterday Mr. Vyshinsky stated that he would much rather be offered advice than asked questions. I

have directed no questions to him today. However, much as I hesitate to offer advice, he has asked for it, and my advice is this: that his Government accept the same international controls that the rest of us are willing to accept.

51. Mr. Al JAMALI (Iraq): My delegation did not venture to take part in the early stages of the discussion of this item, preferring to take time to listen attentively to and profit by the important speeches made by several representatives, especially those whose countries were represented on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. We must express our gratitude especially to the representatives of the United Kingdom, France, the USSR, the United States and Canada for the statesmanlike speeches in which they frankly and clearly expressed their views and their points of agreement and disagreement.

52. We listened most carefully to all these statements and took time to deliberate over one of the most urgent and most vital questions directly affecting human destiny and occupying human thought and energy more than any other topic facing us today. It is only natural for humanity to dread the evils of war, especially now that it has attained undreamt-of means and techniques of mass destruction. Sanity would require that most of the effort and expenditure involved in armaments could and should be directed towards constructive endeavours to raise the standard of living of the masses all over the world and to harness natural resources for the welfare and happiness of mankind in every corner of the globe. Obviously, any efforts exerted towards disarmament must have this noble humanitarian objective in view.

53. Yet the question of disarmament is so directly connected with security that one must be cautious and not take a single step that might jeopardize the safety of peoples. For, while the prevalence of peaceful conditions that make heavy armaments unnecessary is the hope and desire of all of us here and forms our first objective, disarming on an insecure basis is most dangerous and jeopardizes the very existence of nations. If we cannot achieve disarmament under really peaceful conditions, the alternative is to maintain international peace through power and preparedness. As a matter of fact, mere preparation and the accumulation of the deadliest weapons of mass destruction might act as a deterrent to aggressors and guarantee that no one possessing these weapons would initiate war without incurring the curse of all humanity.

54. This is not to be construed as meaning that my delegation is not sincerely anxious to promote the cause of disarmament. Certainly we yearn for peace and security as much as any nation on earth. As a young nation, we wish to direct our thoughts and efforts towards development and construction. We wish to spend the greater bulk of our national revenue on such development and construction and in raising the standard of living of the masses rather than on armaments. But to do this we must feel secure and free from fear. We must be assured of the prevalence of peaceful conditions in the world. Our security must be guaranteed. We in Iraq fully realize that in any future war we might be among the first victims because of our strategic position as well as because of the oil reserves which we possess. Thus, the problem of defence and security becomes a paramount one for us, and it is with a feeling of deep concern that I wish to put the views of my delegation as clearly and as frankly as I can before this Committee.

55. The new approach of the Soviet Union as revealed in Mr. Vyshinsky's speech of 30 September before the General Assembly [484th meeting], and as expounded by him in this Committee on the question of disarmament, is a great step forward, the meaning and significance of which might be far-reaching. We sincerely hope that this move is a sign of a new Soviet Union policy, a policy representing a real and fundamental change that will pave the way to peaceful coexistence. We certainly do not wish to agree with those who consider it to be a tactical move designed to mobilize the partisans of peace and to give them new ammunition for propaganda; or that it is designed to encourage and strengthen the neutralists in the non-Communist world; or that it is intended to create difficulties for the rearmament of Western Germany and the arming of those Asian countries which feel that defensive armament must be their primary concern before real conditions of world peace and universal disarmament are achieved; or that the Soviet Union has grown so sure of the strength of Communism all over the world that it believes that its world mission could be achieved by local wars and upheavals without recourse to world wars, thus making disarmament a paying proposal. We hope that neither these nor other similar comments have any foundation in truth.

56. Let us hope that the meaning of the Soviet Union move is that the USSR is changing its policy as a result of a real change of heart and mind. The course of events will certainly convince the world about the true intentions of the USSR. Mr. Vyshinsky rightly speaks of forgetting the past and emphasizing points of agreement rather than differences. May we hope that the USSR will show the world its good intentions by deeds as well as by words? May we hope that this new change will be demonstrated by a final stoppage of the Cold War? May we see an end to subversive Communist activities in countries like my own? May we hope that this may mean the end of Cominform activity?

57. We wish to defer our sense of joy and optimism until events record a definite change of policy. If no such change is effected and future discussions and subsequent steps disappoint us, then the more cautious we are now the better. For, as I said earlier, "Peace through power" is a much more worthy object of our pursuit than committing suicide by a disarmament based on false grounds and false hopes. This does not mean that we should not do our utmost and look for points of agreement whenever the Soviet Union lends itself to agreement. Nothing is more welcome to the whole world than achieving real agreement based on unity of purpose and a common desire for coexistence based on freedom and mutual respect for the independence of all peoples. In general, speaking of unity of purpose while meaning something different, speaking of coexistence and at the same time undermining the other parties' social and political structure, speaking of freedom while subjugating and exploiting other peoples, and speaking of the independence of nations while keeping freedom-loving nations under the yoke is what the world must guard against. The great discrepancy between what we profess and what we practise is a fundamental weakness in the body politic of our times, and while this discrepancy must be especially guarded against in every aspect of life we must be particularly careful about it in the question of disarmament. We must be sure, when we use certain words, that they carry the same conno-

tations and that they are always checked by deeds to see whether they correspond to each other or not.

58. Until complete confidence is established universally we are in full agreement with all the points raised by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France and, today, by the representative of the United States. We do not mind whether these points are put in question form or otherwise, or whether Mr. Vyshinsky cares to elucidate his views on all or some of them before this Committee, for ultimately all these points must be dealt with and agreed upon before any serious steps can be taken in the way of effecting disarmament.

59. The complexity of some of the questions, such as agreed levels of conventional armaments, is so immense that one could not be over-optimistic about an immediate agreement. Yet every effort should be exerted to bring about an agreement that does not jeopardize security for all nations, big and small alike. We are glad that the USSR no longer insists on the immediate prohibition of atomic weapons before agreement on conventional armaments is reached. In our view, the question of disarmament must be looked into as a whole and not in parts and from one angle only. After formulating sound principles, "stages" or "phases" could be set for the realization of those principles.

60. We also believe that no plan of disarmament should be initiated before a strong control machinery is set up. This control machinery must have free access to all actual and potential sources of armament. It must also be authorized to take immediate measures in cases of violations of agreed levels of production. This brings us face to face with two problems the gravity of which cannot be minimized. The first is that of sovereignty. Are we all ready to relax our sovereignty to the degree of allowing the control authority to exercise its functions freely? The second is that of the veto. Are the permanent members of the Security Council willing to relax the practice of the veto so as not to let it thwart the handling of any breaches of disarmament agreements?

61. To be truly honest and frank, I wish to submit very humbly that the complexity of the problems of disarmament is so immense in the present world situation that most of our talks and efforts here will yield very little fruit unless some fundamental change takes place in our policies as well as in our ideologies. In the political field effective disarmament is not possible unless and until we revitalize the United Nations. The Security Council must be brought back to life—a normal and healthy life—acting as a guarantor of peace and security for the whole world, a peace and security based on the principles of the Charter and not on power politics. Are the Powers agreed that this should happen? If so, the use of the veto will hardly be required. An international force at the disposal of the United Nations, a force greater than any one Member of the United Nations could ever resist, could be established to guarantee peace and security for all nations great and small.

62. With such a United Nations, so strengthened and vitalized, the question of disarmament becomes a very simple one and the difficulty of control will be greatly reduced. If confidence and co-operation is not practised by the great Powers in the Security Council, how could it be effected in the disarmament control organ? Are we not going to have the same impasse in disarmament control as we have in the Security Council today? May

I submit that planning for a United Nations force to guarantee world peace and security should be thought of before disarmament, or at least simultaneously with disarmament, if our deliberations and plans for real disarmament are to be fruitful?

63. As for the ideological side, we need to effect two ideological changes before disarmament can be really effective and lasting. The first is that of ideological disarmament. By this I mean that the two opposing camps must stop attacking each other. They must stop the Cold War. They must create a mental atmosphere whereby constructive thinking might lead to genuine disarmament, for disarmament cannot be truly dealt with while one side is hurling abuse at the other. We know very well that Communism today amounts to a new militant materialistic religion. It has its crusaders, it has its missionaries and its martyrs all over the world. This new materialist religion denies all recognized spiritual, social and moral values of the non-Communist world. Before effecting real disarmament, we must inquire: Is Communism willing to disarm ideologically? Is it ready to stop its underground and overt propaganda, its infiltration and subversion? At one time in history, there were crusade wars between Christians and Moslems. Today the two religions can fraternize very well in most of their points of contact. Is Communism willing to abandon its crusading and to disarm ideologically? If so, we can speak of physical disarmament very safely; if not, the danger to security and world peace will persist and no disarmament agreement will be of any real or lasting value.

64. Along with achieving ideological disarmament, we must achieve moral rearmament. We must recognize that our problems and differences as nations cannot be resolved so long as we are selfish, so long as our political honesty and integrity is questioned, and so long as the principle of good neighbourliness — “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” — does not prevail. International problems and tensions, if dealt with in the spirit of moral rearmament, will be easily resolved. For we shall search our souls for our own motives and weaknesses, recognize our mistakes first, and then cultivate mutual brotherhood, confidence and faith in each other's integrity. Mankind will become one great family. Discrimination on the basis of ideology, religion, class, race, colour will disappear. Our effort to bring about physical disarmament will be effective and lasting. The question of controls will be resolved from within and with no great need for external observation and control.

65. Are the statesmen of the world ready for revitalizing the United Nations — and especially its Security Council, turning it into an organ for safeguarding international peace and collective security? Are we ready for ideological disarmament and at the same time for moral rearmament? If the answer is “yes”, then all our efforts and thoughts for a successful physical disarmament could be realized and the hydrogen bomb and atomic energy could very well be turned to peaceful uses. If not, humanity is doomed.

66. Mr. MUÑOZ (Argentina) (*translated from Spanish*): The First Committee unanimously decided to place the question of disarmament at the head of its agenda. This is the most logical decision it could have taken, since this problem vitally affects the very existence of the civilized world. We should not have been fully alive to our responsibilities if we had delayed the discussion of this item. World public opinion, which,

in view of the development of present-day military technology, is deeply concerned at the threat of a total war of appalling dimensions, would have suffered a further disappointment. It is this Assembly's duty to do everything in its power at the present session to find a satisfactory means of dispelling this grave threat which at present hangs over mankind.

67. It is therefore a source of satisfaction that, after some hesitation at the beginning of the debate, the Committee decided to spend on this item all the time needed for its consideration, thus permitting a full general debate without haste or short cuts.

68. While my delegation does not for a moment deny that the international importance of nations varies, on at least the material level, it feels compelled to reaffirm its unwavering support of the principle of the sovereign equality of all Members of the United Nations. Perhaps no other question involves the respect of that principle to such an extent, but this particular question affects the future and, indeed, the very existence of all nations.

69. Even if that legal principle did not exist, the small nations would still have a legitimate interest in the matter, since the danger of total destruction threatens all alike.

70. The contribution to the cause of disarmament made by those nations which might be called the Powers principally concerned has already been considered, and I need therefore devote no time to its analysis. In our opinion, the important thing at present is to take up the problem in the form in which it has been raised at this session of the General Assembly, namely on the basis of the synthesis of the French and United Kingdom proposals of 11 June 1954 [DC/53, annex 9] and of the recent declarations of the USSR delegation, which find concrete expression in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/750.

71. We have accordingly followed the debate that has developed in this Committee very closely and have reached the following conclusions.

72. In the first place, it is obvious from the exchanges of questions and answers that the Soviet Union's acceptance of the French and United Kingdom proposals as a basis for future negotiations is not considered by the representatives of those two countries or by the United States as a genuine *rapprochement* based on the mutual acceptance of the principles that, in their opinion, are the prerequisites of their disarmament plan. We consider that the debate in the First Committee has been and will continue to be very useful, but we doubt whether, in view of the nature of this question, we shall have done our duty if, on the conclusion of the general debate, we immediately pass on to consider the individual draft resolutions submitted. We would thus be refraining from any attempt to find a direct solution to this delicate and urgent problem.

73. In our opinion, therefore, we should give careful consideration to the Australian representative's suggestion [690th meeting] that it would be advisable to set up a sub-committee of this Committee with instructions to elucidate the precise nature of the existing differences and to report on proposals designed to bridge those differences. The objection raised to the Australian suggestion, namely that the functions proposed for the sub-committee would be better discharged by this Committee itself, we think overlooks the fact that the Australian suggestion was intended to apply in the event of this Committee's reaching the stage of voting

without having any conclusions regarding the nature of the differences, whether apparent or real.

74. No one questions the Disarmament Commission's right to use its own methods of finding an answer to the questions raised and to explore practical ways and means of reaching an agreement; but, by the same token, no one can question the right of the First Committee, as an organ of the General Assembly, to explore every means at its disposal in the attempt to bring this difficult problem closer to a solution.

75. The establishment of sub-committees has been a regular practice here and has proved to be a not altogether unsuccessful method of dealing with complex problems that have come before previous sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

76. For these reasons, my delegation supports the Australian suggestion, which it considers would make a valuable contribution to the clarification of this urgent problem.

77. If such a sub-committee is established, we feel that it should be sufficiently representative, its members being neither too numerous nor too few to reflect in some degree the views of all schools of thought represented in the General Assembly. We think a group of fifteen to eighteen members, in which all the Powers principally concerned would be represented, would be satisfactory.

78. So much for the suggestion to which we give our preference. I shall now turn to the Philippine proposal [A/C.1/751] to create a working group. In this connexion, I wish to state that my delegation fully appreciates the purpose of this proposal, which, in its opinion, is also met by the Australian proposal. As I have already said, our preference is for a sub-committee whose membership would not be restricted to the five members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. The Philippine draft resolution could, however, be amended to enlarge the membership of the working group by the inclusion of other countries. So amended, it would represent a combination of the Australian and Philippine proposals. It would be useful to hear the views of the delegations concerned on this suggestion in due course.

79. We have one further comment to make on the Philippine draft resolution, this time with reference to the time limit it proposes. In view of the urgency of the matter, it might perhaps be better to allow the working group whatever time it needs to complete its task, on the understanding that it would do so in any event in time to permit the present session of the General Assembly to take a final decision on the matter.

80. Where the draft resolutions — the ones submitted by the USSR [A/C.1/750] and Canada [A/C.1/752/Rev.1] — are concerned, I shall confine myself to general comments, postponing any detailed observations that my delegation may wish to make until those documents are under discussion. For the moment, I will merely point out that, whatever resolution this Assembly ultimately adopts, it must contain certain features that are at present lacking in the draft resolutions before us.

81. In the opinion of the Argentine delegation, it is particularly important for two of these features to figure in any resolution we adopt. In the first place, we think it necessary to refer to resolutions adopted by previous Assemblies that recognize that disarmament is not only essential to peace and international security, but is also

the most effective means of furthering the economic and social welfare of mankind, since it would enable a larger proportion of the world's existing resources to be devoted to development programmes designed to further the material and spiritual welfare of mankind. In the second place, we feel very strongly that the resolution adopted by the General Assembly should contain a ray of hope, however faint and flickering, that will give some reassurance to troubled minds, show that our discussions are not valueless, that our efforts are sincere, and produce at least relatively satisfactory results.

82. While, in view of the magnitude of the interests at stake, it does not depend on us to reconcile the differences between the great Powers, it is nevertheless surely our duty to take advantage of any points of *rapprochement*, if not harmony of agreement, in order to mitigate the pessimism of world public opinion, which, after several years of the Cold War, fears that atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons hold an even darker future in store for mankind.

83. As far back as the fourth session of the General Assembly, in 1949, the Argentine delegation submitted a draft resolution [A/AC.31/L.30], proposing that the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission should endeavour to conclude, within the shortest possible time, a provisional agreement that would provide at least for the renunciation of the use of atomic weapons for aggressive purposes.

84. The development of the debate on this draft resolution would make extremely instructive reading today; I will, however, merely recall that it was rejected by a narrow margin with a considerable number of abstentions, and that the vote was characterized by the opposition of the five members of the recent Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

85. The world has moved on since 1949, and we now are gratified to note that some of these five Powers have publicly announced that they will not use atomic or other weapons of mass destruction except to repel aggression. During the present debate in the First Committee, the representative of the United States of America himself has made two statements to this effect, thus doing credit to the moral standards of the great country he represents. The resolution ultimately adopted by the Assembly should provide for this renunciation of the use of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction except to repel aggression, leaving the question of the prohibition of such weapons to be dealt with in subsequent negotiations; a permanent solution of the disarmament problem would thus be facilitated.

86. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): It was not my original purpose to add further to this debate in the light of the draft resolution [A/C.1/751] that the Philippine delegation offered during the early stages of the deliberations of this Committee. However, following the good advice given by the Chairman of the United States delegation, I think that it is time now to assess our present position. We have to adopt, somehow, the prudence of a good mariner who, after having been thrown by the tempest far from his true course, avails himself of the first lull in the storm to find out where he is headed. The opinions expressed by the various delegations — the big Powers, as well as the middle and smaller States — have contributed immensely towards illuminating the problems and the differences that lie between the Western Powers and the Soviet

Union, and perhaps we can do something to clarify further the points of agreement and disagreement, because only in the clear delineation of such points of agreement and disagreement can we ever hope to narrow down the area of disagreement and ultimately find some kind of a solution.

87. In my first statement, I stated that for almost nine years the Western Powers and the Soviet Union had not seen eye to eye with regard to the various proposals presented by them. We have followed patiently, and at times with despair, the various proceedings from 1946 to the close of the London talks in 1954, but now, even through the thick clouds that hang over these proceedings, we can see a silver lining.

88. We have found out, for instance, that there has been a constant and persistent attempt by the Western Powers to meet the point of view of the Soviet Union in the various proposals for the reduction of conventional armaments and the ultimate elimination of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. From these persistent efforts of the Western Powers have emerged certain detailed proposals, both as to the scope of the disarmament treaty and the nature and extent of the functions and powers that should be vested in the control organ to be instituted to effectuate whatever agreement the parties may reach. For instance, we have seen emerging from these negotiations the detailed proposal of the United States delegation of 25 May 1954 [DC/53, annex 4], which contains a specific and detailed statement of what the international control organ should be and what functions and powers it should exercise.

89. Again, on 11 June 1954 we had the Franco-British proposal [DC/53, annex 9] designed once more to meet some possible points of objection which had developed in the course of the negotiations in London. We were heartened by these proposals, expecting that somehow the Soviet Union might find its way clear to see their merits. It was not until 30 September 1954 that we saw this ray of hope in the speech delivered by the Chairman of the Soviet Union delegation at a plenary meeting [484th] of the General Assembly, when he, for the first time in all the nine years, accepted the proposal of France and the United Kingdom of 11 June 1954 as the basis for further negotiations with a view to formulating a convention or a treaty, in which, in addition, he wished to embody the five or six fundamental principles he had laid down in his draft resolution [A/2742 and Corr.1].

90. Therefore, when this Committee first met in obedience to the mandate of the General Assembly, and after we had reshuffled the various items in order to give priority to the disarmament problem, we started the deliberations of this Committee in a spirit of hope and in a bright atmosphere. I am glad to say that up to the present that spirit has been sustained and all the speeches so far delivered have been both constructive and enlightening and have contributed immensely to a further advance towards the goal for which we are striving.

91. We have heard these proposals, we have heard the clarifications offered, and we have heard the advice given for reconciling the points of difference, and all I can do today is to state, briefly, where the Soviet Union and the Western Powers still do not see eye to eye with each other.

92. For example, when the Soviet delegation presented its draft resolution of 30 September 1954, embodying certain fundamental propositions, apart from the acceptance of the Anglo-French proposal of 11 June 1954 as a basis, it mentioned what it called "agreed standards" in relation to the existing levels of 31 December 1953 as a basis for the reduction of conventional armaments. Up to this stage of our debate, we have not any clear concept of what these "agreed standards" are, and I do not think the Western Powers and the Soviet Union have clarified their position in this regard. What do we mean by "agreed standards" in relation to the levels extant as of 31 December 1953 for the efficacy of the two types of reductions offered by the Soviet Union?

93. Again, we still do not see very clearly whether the Soviet Union is agreeable to a proportionate reduction of conventional armaments or whether it is still insisting on a basis of percentage reductions originally proposed by it. The speeches so far delivered have not brought any clarification on this doubtful and ambiguous point in the proposals.

94. Again, we do not as yet have any clear concept of the theory of simultaneity contained in the Soviet Union proposal of 30 September 1954. While some explanation has been offered by the representative of the Soviet Union of this theory of simultaneity and how it will actually operate in relation to the two stages of reductions of conventional armaments proposed and to some of the principles contained in his draft resolution, up to the present there has been no clear point of agreement or disagreement as to what simultaneity means.

95. We have noted, however, in the course of the debate that there is one fundamental point where both the Western Powers and the Soviet Union disagree openly and positively, and that is on the powers to be exercised by the international control organ and whether these powers are to be subject to the veto in the procedural requirement of the proceedings of the Security Council. The Western Powers insist that an international organ, to be effective, must be in a position to correct certain violations, not only to note, discover and verify but to correct those violations on the spot, and that the actions thus taken by the international organ should not be subject to the veto.

96. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, takes the positive position that the international organ can only report what it has found to the Security Council and that the Security Council is to act thereon, subject of course to the veto power of those permanent members. This is the main point of disagreement.

97. I have read with great care and with great interest the debates held yesterday on this point, the exchange of views between the Chairman of the Soviet Union delegation and the Chairman of the Peruvian delegation. All I can do now is to add something to it, without any pretension that mine is the correct view on the point. I believe that there has been some confusion in this regard. The confusion emanates from considering corrections of violations on the spot as a punitive action or an enforcement action within the meaning of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. The relation between the international organ and the Security Council in this regard may perhaps be perceived in the light of the enforcement agency in any existing government and the supreme body that is called upon to

determine the relative rights and duties of the parties in the final analysis. For example, if we have a law in any society to enforce, we naturally have to establish a police system to enforce this law. Whenever any violation exists, the policeman determines whether a violation of the law in fact exists, and then corresponding action can be taken by him right on the spot. But it does not follow from this that if the action taken by the policeman is improper the aggrieved party has no remedy.

98. It may well arise in the enforcement of the international control that the control agents placed in the different countries may have acted improperly or may have taken an action of correction when there is no cause for it. I suppose that the disarmament treaty will make provisions for eventualities of this character. But if we are to consider every action taken by the international organ as subject to the veto power of a permanent member of the Security Council, the result will be that the Security Council will become in itself the international organ of enforcement. In effect, we will be removing from the international organ its function as a controlling agency and relegate it to a mere subsidiary of the Security Council. It is true that the international organ, in accordance with resolution 502 (VI) of the General Assembly, is to be within the framework of the Security Council. But this simply means that whenever action is taken by the international organ and subsequently reported to the Security Council, it is the Security Council that will determine in the final analysis whether the violation committed by any party does or does not constitute a breach of the peace or a possible act of aggression and, on that basis, apply the corresponding provisions of the Charter wherein the veto power of any permanent member may be exercised.

99. It is only in this logical connexion that I suppose we can determine the relation between the international organ of control and the Security Council. I offer this, however, not with a view to being partial to one side or the other, because we shall continue to pursue the position that we have announced, namely that we shall in every respect try to seek a reconciliation of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union in this regard.

100. As we have already noted, there are two draft resolutions now before this Committee, the draft resolution of Canada and other countries [*A/C.1/752/Rev.1*] and the Philippine draft resolution [*A/C.1/751*] and what has been aptly called the "incipient" Australian draft resolution. We are all aware that the purpose of the Canadian draft resolution is to bring the discussion of the various proposals back to the Disarmament Commission with instructions that it reconvene its Sub-Committee to consider the proposals of the Soviet Union in connexion with the other proposals of the Western Powers.

101. We are also aware of the purpose of the proposed draft resolution that may be offered at some subsequent time by the Australian delegation, and that is to create a sub-committee the composition of which is to be left to this Committee, with a view to determining the points on which the big Powers agree or disagree and the proposals that may be offered to bridge the differences. I have announced that we are in perfect agreement with this function of the sub-committee. As this debate will have to end somehow and this Committee will have to take some positive action after the debate in order to facilitate any possible action that it may take,

I feel that there is a way of reconciling these three various proposals. The sub-committee may be composed of the members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission — or, if this Committee feels that the composition should be enlarged, I shall not insist on this point — and the sub-committee may be given instructions in the manner laid down by the Australian delegation: that is, to determine where the great Powers agree or disagree and to define the issues between them. After this sub-committee has thus performed its task, it will report to the First Committee, and on the basis of such a report this Committee could then refer the question to the Disarmament Commission for its appropriate action.

102. The purposes of both the Canadian and Australian delegations will be served thereby, and this Committee will have had the pleasure of accomplishing a definite, tangible thing before it ends its work on the disarmament question. The Committee will have helped to define the specific issues between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union before the question is returned to the Disarmament Commission for further discussion.

103. If this manner of compromising the three draft resolutions can find acceptance in this Committee, we hope that at some future date we may be able to present it in concrete form. The Philippine delegation would be very happy if the Australian and Canadian delegation would voice their opinion on this compromise proposal.

104. Mr. MENON (India): I am grateful to the Chairman for permitting me this opportunity of making a brief intervention. I am obliged to make it today. I feel it appropriate to make this intervention at this moment for two related reasons. The first is that, in the view of my delegation, the debate in this Committee at the present time is primarily based upon the report submitted by the Disarmament Sub-Committee on what has come to be known as the Franco-British proposals. The second reason is that one of the authors of this report, the United Kingdom, represented by Mr. Lloyd, has taken a considerable part in the discussion, and we are informed that Mr. Lloyd is leaving us soon. Therefore, I should like to address a few observations, not by way of interrogatories or by way of asking searching questions of examination, but by way of points on which he may or may not find it convenient, when he speaks tomorrow, to offer us some assistance.

105. Perhaps this is a convenient and an appropriate moment for me to say on behalf of my delegation that I am sure that all members of this Committee feel that when Mr. Lloyd leaves us tomorrow we shall feel his absence and feel grateful for the services that he has rendered to the United Nations during the last two or three years. I personally remember with gratitude his assistance and advice during all those days when this Committee was debating the Korean settlement. In the usual manner of our relationships here, I hope you will permit me to tender the felicitations of my delegation and expressions of our gratitude for the co-operation, friendship and fellowship that he has given to us.

106. Coming to the subject matter, I should like to ask Mr. Lloyd, when he speaks, whether it would be possible for him to enlighten us on some of these matters. So far as we are concerned, we assume

that sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of the Canadian draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.1] are intended to represent the substance of sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 2 of the Anglo-French memorandum [DC/53, annex 9]. There is a difference of wording in these things. Are we right in assuming that these two are intended to be the same and that the Canadian formulation is not a modification in substance? If our assumption is correct, then I think that some of the difficulties, doubts and contradictions of expression may help to be resolved.

107. Secondly, there is in the Canadian draft resolution the use of the words "regulation and limitation". Our assumption is that they are not intended to mean anything more than the content of sub-paragraph (b) of the Anglo-French memorandum. Again, if that assumption is correct, it may be assumed that these words "regulation and limitation" in that context have been introduced in order that the draft resolution may conform with previous resolutions of the Assembly.

108. Thirdly, there is the reference in the Canadian draft resolution to "a control organ" that should deal with matters appertaining to prohibition and reductions, and the same is contemplated in the Franco-British memorandum. The assumption we are making is that the formulation here is the same in substance as that which is contained in the Anglo-French memorandum, and does not refer to anything more.

109. Fourthly, these words "regulation, limitation, balanced reduction" etc., which have been the subject of so much controversy and appear in paragraph 1 (a) of the Canadian draft resolution, rather worries us. Sub-paragraph (a) reads, "The regulation, limitation and major balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments". That rather worries us because my delegation in the discussions for many years has taken the view that there cannot be any question of regulation or limitation or balanced reduction of atomic weapons. There is only one thing to do with atomic weapons, and that is to do away with them. Now, "all armed forces" must include atomic weapons. If that is so, if that be the unfortunate content of it, then we would be going back on the advances we have made in previous years. Therefore, we prefer to assume that this is probably not as precise a formulation and that what is meant is armaments and armed forces exclusive of nuclear and other weapons.

110. Fifthly, in the talks about all armed forces and armaments, is the reference to the armaments and armed forces of the world as a whole or does it mean armed forces and armaments of each separate State severally? Because, if that is so, then other problems arise, as there may be large States where reductions may not be possible at all, even for municipal purposes, if we all agree to major reductions. Therefore, we assume that when you speak about reduction, it is reduction of the total armed forces of the world under criteria to which I shall refer in a moment.

111. Finally, in the set of points on which we should like some explanation, what exactly does the word "balanced" mean? Our assumption of "balanced" is that it means "equitable"; that is to say, equitable taking into account the various factors. It may be that the Disarmament Sub-Committee may sometime have to produce a set of conclusions on what are the factors on the same lines as we did in regard to the non-self-governing territories. What are the factors that should govern in the process of reduction or adjustment of

quantums which are related to quality as well? The Sub-Committee is going to determine them by agreeing on the quantity of the armed forces and armaments required by each country, or each region or the world as a whole. But in all that, our assumption is that the word "balanced" means "equitable" on the basis of these various factors.

112. There is a second set of problems. If agreement is made easier in the Assembly on the first draft resolution, which is now sponsored by four of the main States concerned, by putting into it the same phraseology as appears in the Anglo-French memorandum—that is to say, in place of sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of the Canadian draft, sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 2 of the Anglo-French memorandum could be substituted—in view of the fact that that memorandum is now common ground, would there be any serious objection?

113. I come now to the problems that relate to the references to the control organ. In the draft resolution, as in the Anglo-French memorandum, there is a reference to "a control organ"—those are the words. In the Canadian draft resolution, it is called "a control organ" with the "c" and the "o" not in capitals. All the references in the past and up to the present time, including more particularly those in the United States working papers, the Soviet Union draft resolutions in the present and in the past, and the debates and resolutions in the Assembly, are either to control machinery or to organ or organs. Now, this is not just a question of splitting hairs. It bears a direct relation to the character of this authority and its relations to the United Nations.

114. Are we right in assuming that these words "control organ", used in this way without capitals, relate only to control machinery? Because organ must be an organ of the United Nations, and the organs of the United Nations, which are six, are already laid down by the Charter. They cannot be altered except by the amendment of the Charter. If it is an organ, it might be either a sub-organ or one of the main organs of the United Nations, or it relates to control machinery related to the various organs of the United Nations. I can quite imagine a situation where this control machinery could be related to more than one of the present organs of the United Nations.

115. Fourthly, is it in the minds of the authors of the Anglo-French memorandum that the control organ or organs—indeed, the whole functioning of disarmament—should be under machinery or institutions set up under the proposed world disarmament conference, or is it, as we assume, to be part of the United Nations? Disarmament agreements, of course, would derive their authority from the signatures of the parties affixed to the treaty. In the discussions which have gone on, as far as we could understand, the statements made were not precise—in fact, statements have been made which could bear either interpretation. This is not in any way to discount the importance or, indeed, the necessity of calling a world disarmament conference. But we are not talking about the permanent machinery.

116. There is another category of problems on which we should like some enlightenment. The Canadian draft resolution refers to "other proposals", other proposals which the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission would take into account. How would the Commission become seized of these "other proposals"? The representative of the United Kingdom will recall

that the Government of India submitted some proposals [DC/44 and Corr.1] on a previous occasion to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Disarmament Commission or its sub-committees for consideration, and while the Commission has been good enough to circulate these proposals, there is no note of their discussion of them. Possibly they were discussed on a day when no records were made, but we would like to enquire how any further proposals made by States which are not members of the Disarmament Commission would come under consideration, how would the Commission become seized of them? How would these other proposals be channelled to the Commission? We consider it of vital importance, as this business progresses—as we sincerely hope it will and we feel confident it will—that we should have the understanding co-operation, the constructive co-operation, of all the States of the world, which, at all stages, is a great contribution towards it. This is not a suggestion in regard to the constitution of any proposal, nor is it any criticism or suggestion regarding the composition of the Disarmament Commission, or anything of that character. We are only dealing with this particular question of “other proposals” and how they would reach the Commission.

117. Then, with regard to the question of control, it is the view of my delegation that there certainly is difficulty in understanding the situation, arising from different interpretations of the phraseology used. Therefore, for clarification, may we enquire, especially in regard to the observations made by the representative of the United Kingdom, whether, generally speaking, the idea of the United Kingdom as to control is analogous, although not exactly the same, to that exercised by factory inspectors under the Factories and Workshops Acts in his own country? I do not say that it would be on all fours, but there are statutory provisions and the limitation of authority, and also the limitation of the nature of the authority exercised, with regard to some sort of a pattern to go

upon in a municipal sphere. Would the degree of obedience and observance of law required of each factory be laid down in disarmament statutes, in the same way as analogous statutes in the municipal field?

118. We would like some ascertainment of the United Kingdom position on that part of the Canadian draft resolution which refers to reporting back to the Assembly. It says, “report back to the Security Council or the Assembly”. Does that proposal exclude the possibility of a special session of the Assembly, if circumstances require, being called? Is there any objection to this alternative being included in this draft resolution?

119. Finally, there is one other problem on which I would like the views of the representative of the United Kingdom with regard to all these proposals that have come from the British-French group—what is called the “memorandum” and all that goes behind it, not only in words but in the spirit of it. Our assumption is that all this is contemplated to be within the ambit, within the law and the terms of the Charter, that is to say, that there will be nothing inconsistent with the Charter; whatever the Charter provides would be the over-all law governing any institutions or any scope of discussion. If that assumption is correct, then I think a great many other things fall into their places, because any fundamental inroad into the Charter, or any fundamental improvement of the Charter, would require other methods than we are contemplating.

120. It may well be that between now and tomorrow when the representative of the United Kingdom speaks, my delegation may think up a few other things. If that is so, I hope we will be given the liberty of making this communication through the usual channels. I think it is only fair to say that the representative of the United Kingdom has a typed copy of all the things I have said, so that it will not be a strain on his prodigious memory.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.