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 Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 687th MEETING**

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**New York**

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**Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).**

**Records of the First Committee**

1. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I call upon the representative of Greece on a point of order.
2. Mr. KYROU (Greece): Yesterday Mr. Moch, the representative of France, was kind enough to have his extremely interesting statement circulated, but before he spoke we listened to a clear and comprehensive outline of the work of the Sub-Committee in London by Mr. Lloyd, and the speech made by Mr. Vyshinsky at the afternoon meeting was no less important. That is why I would request the Secretariat, through the Chairman, to give us, if possible, a record of yesterday's two meetings as soon as possible.
3. The SECRETARY: The records will be somewhat more detailed than is usual.
4. Mr. KYROU (Greece): I think that it would be of interest to all the delegations.
5. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): Before beginning my remarks, I might say that I understand that the verbatim text of what I am about to say is going to be distributed almost immediately, so that the representative of Greece, as well as others, will have a chance of making sure that they hear what they think they hear.
6. Mr. MENON (India): Before the representative of the United States continues with his statement, I should like to take this matter a little further than the representative of Greece has done. For a subject of this importance it is only proper that we should have

the verbatim texts of these speeches. They contain so much detail, and any kind of summarizing would not do justice to the people who made the speeches, nor would it enable us to understand them. I understood that the reports of the Committee were always available in this form, but I have tried to get a copy of Mr. Lloyd's speech and have not succeeded in doing so thus far.

7. The SECRETARY: I think, since it is the general desire of representatives to have verbatim records of the speeches, that it will be possible to make them available as an exception.

8. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): The verbatim records will be distributed in this case as an exception.

9. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Since the question of distributing records of the statements made in the First Committee has been raised, I should like to request that, also as an exception, the verbatim record should be distributed in Russian. This request is based on experience: the French text of our document originally contained a gross error implying that a supervisory organ was being set up to exercise influence, pressure on States and so forth. It appears, unfortunately, that all is not well with the translation of our documents; I refer to translation from Russian into other languages. There was a similar mistake in the English text. In order to prevent such mistakes from creeping into the summary records of our statements as well, and particularly into those of the Soviet representative's statements, I would ask—and indeed consider it essential—for the verbatim record to be issued also in Russian. I will undertake to supply by this evening the text of the statement I made yesterday in a form in which I think it could be distributed to representatives.

10. Mr. MENON (India): I understood the Secretary to state that these verbatim texts would be supplied "as an exception". Unless I am wrong, my understanding is that it was agreed last year or the year before that all proceedings of the First Committee would be distributed in the form of verbatim records. If this understanding is correct, I do not know where the question of an exception comes in. These are things which we are entitled to have, and, what is more, this is a subject of great importance and there should be no question of an exception. Incidentally, even the summary records have not been distributed yet.

11. The SECRETARY: In deference to Mr. Vyshinsky's request, and in view of the exceptional circumstances, the verbatim records will be distributed in Russian.

12. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): Mr. Menon's point is a different one. He is asking why there is any question of an exception. I think I can explain this. If I am in error, the Secretary of the

Committee will be kind enough to correct me. Verbatim records are normally made of the First Committee's debates; they are not, however, distributed, but are available for consultation by any representative wishing to do so. A summary record which is as comprehensive as possible is prepared, but this is not a verbatim record. In the present instance, to meet the request of some delegations, the Secretary of the Committee has offered to substitute the verbatim record for the summary record usually distributed.

13. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): I am in agreement with what has been said about the question of verbatim records. Might I ask, however, if we could have an indication of how soon they would be available. Thanks to the skill and knowledge of the Secretariat, I believe that the verbatim records of plenary meetings of the General Assembly are usually ready the following day, and I would hope that we would at least be able to attain that standard here. In a way, it is easier to produce a verbatim record than a summary, because the verbatim record has to be prepared first before the summary can be prepared. I should like to know if it is considered possible that we can have the verbatim reports of our meetings the following day.

14. The SECRETARY: I think it should be possible, in general, to have them the following day, but I shall have to consult the services concerned in order to ascertain whether there are any technical difficulties.

#### AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68

#### **Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685) (continued)**

#### **Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (continued)**

15. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): The First Committee of the General Assembly is entering its ninth year of activity and its ninth year of hard work on the stubborn problem of disarmament. All these years of discussion have not brought forth a single agreement to scrap one gun or tank or bomb or to discharge one soldier. People all over the world, who know little of world politics, know this disheartening fact, yet it is in response to their will to peace that we continue to seek a solution. Our failure in the past is due mainly, I think, to the unhappy fact that we have tackled the problem of armaments and disarmament in a period torn with conflict. The two sides locked in this conflict have not been disposed to trust one another. Least of all has it seemed wise to trust the side whose extreme secretiveness is a part of its way of life.

16. How can we establish the mutual trust on which disarmament should rest? We submit that we cannot establish trust on either side by demanding or repeating: "I promise; I pledge; you must trust me." Trust is a most delicate quality and it cannot be shouted into existence. In a matter as vital as armaments we can establish it only if both sides first agree on a fair plan of action, and then carry out each step of that plan on schedule and in plain sight of each other. It

is a most difficult task, but it is not impossible. If it is carried out in good faith one of its chief results will be the growth of the very quality of trust whose absence has paralysed our efforts up to now.

17. There are four basic ideas which have animated the United States from the very beginning of the disarmament discussions in the United Nations, which are now in their ninth year.

18. First, the United States wants disarmament. We were one of the countries which proposed Article 26 of the United Nations Charter calling for "the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources". We want disarmament that will disarm. We want more than a mere toast where States clink their glasses and drink to the health of disarmament. We want disarmament that will work.

19. Second, we have always believed that there is more than one path by which the world can progress towards disarmament. There is no one single way. Over the years we have marked out a number of paths on any or all of which we could make a start towards disarmament: controlling atomic energy; limiting the size of the armed forces of the great Powers; a system of disclosure of all armed forces and armaments with verification by an international organ, and so on. We have always recognized that it is impossible to solve this problem unless all the great Powers agree on the solution. That is why we have suggested many avenues of discussion in the hope that even if we could not reach full agreement with the Soviet Union, at least we could narrow the differences that separate us. That has been our approach in the past, and it is still our approach.

20. Third, we want to be rid of nuclear weapons. The world will not be rid of nuclear weapons by merely shouting from the roof tops that they are prohibited or that they will not be used. The United States is not going to use atomic weapons or any other weapons in violation of the United Nations Charter. The United States is not going to use atomic weapons or any other weapons except in defence against aggression. That is our pledge; incidentally, it is also the pledge of every Member of the United Nations, including the Soviet Union. But that pledge gives no security as long as one of the chief countries making the pledge has a curtain—an iron curtain perhaps—behind which it can prepare to violate the pledge without fear of detection.

21. Fourth, we want world peace. We know that another war would be a catastrophe. We recognize that in the past arms races have preceded armed attack by aggressor nations. At the same time, we cannot stop an arms race unless all the racers stop running, and we cannot know whether all the racers have stopped running if one of them insists upon running on a concealed track. For the free world to stop arming while the Soviet Union keeps on increasing its strength would be an invitation to the very war we seek to avoid and to the destruction of freedom.

22. These are the lessons of hard experience. We think of them as we continue our search for a disarmament that will give security to all. And, thinking of these lessons, we hold that secure disarmament in a world without trust requires two things above all. First, it must cover all armaments in a single plan, because bayonets and bullets are still deadly, even in

this atomic age. Second, it must contain safeguards so that each side actually disarms in plain sight of the other, with the firm certainty that all pledges are being carried out every step of the way.

23. We believe that all States will agree generally with these principles. Why is it that we have been unable to translate these principles into a workable disarmament programme? The record of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee reveals a great deal on this subject, and I should like to discuss it briefly. Yesterday [686th meeting] the representative of the Soviet Union urged that we should not disturb the shades of the past or dwell too long on past history. We agree with that thought, and I shall therefore devote far less time to it today than he did yesterday.

24. The disarmament resolution passed by the General Assembly at its eighth session [resolution 715 (VIII)] was notable for its paragraph 6, which suggested "that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of the representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution and report to the Disarmament Commission".

25. In April 1954, the Disarmament Commission, in conformity with this resolution, set up such a Sub-Committee [35th meeting], consisting of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, Canada and the United States. This Sub-Committee met in London, in private and, as we hoped, free from the temptations of propaganda. Then the Sub-Committee made a report to the Disarmament Commission [DC/53]. As a part of its report, the Sub-Committee made public the entire record of the London meetings. The world is now in a position to judge the progress or lack of progress at these private meetings and to determine the responsibility for their success or failure.

26. The plain motive of the General Assembly, at its eighth session, in suggesting once again private meetings of a few Powers, was to produce new approaches to disarmament, approaches which would have at least some hope of narrowing the differences that have separated the Soviet Union from the free world. Let us examine the record of the Sub-Committee to see to what extent these hopes were fulfilled.

27. At the very first meeting, the Soviet Union submitted a disarmament proposal [DC/53, annex 1], but it was not a new proposal. It was, word for word, the proposal which the Soviet Union had submitted to the eighth session of the General Assembly [A/2485/Rev.1] and which the Assembly had found unacceptable. This was certainly a discouraging start, and the same pattern prevailed throughout the discussions. The representative of New Zealand, speaking in the Disarmament Commission in July, when the Sub-Committee's report had been given to the Commission, aptly characterized the Soviet attitude as one of "stony immobility".

28. In contrast, the other members of the Sub-Committee tried to explore two avenues of approach to disarmament which had never before had any thorough treatment in the United Nations. The United States submitted a working paper on the establishment of an international control organ with appropriate rights, powers and functions [DC/53, annex 4]. I am very much indebted to the representative of the United Kingdom in that yesterday [685th meeting] he went into this paper of ours in some detail and thus made

it unnecessary for me to explain it to the Committee now.

29. In presenting this paper—and I think this is significant—the United States stressed that it was not putting forward a rigid position with the thought that all other States should either take it or leave it. The United States representative at the London meetings said at that time [9th meeting]:

"Let us think of this paper merely as one approach in an attempt to come to grips with basic issues of substance. From the discussions of specific problems raised, we hope to narrow the differences among us and perhaps to arrive at a position which all of us can approve."

Furthermore, we pointed out that the control organ, as we had drawn it up in the working paper, would be just as applicable to a programme based upon Soviet concepts sketched over the past several years as it was to the United States programme.

30. Despite our efforts, the Soviet Union representative refused all serious discussion of our paper. As a matter of fact, he never got any further than the first paragraph, which referred to General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952 which the Soviet Union had opposed.

31. The second new avenue of approach was contained in the British-French memorandum of 11 June 1954 [DC/53, annex 9] which has been so much in the news in recent weeks. This dealt with the "phasing" and timing of the chief elements of a disarmament programme. The representatives of the United Kingdom and France explained these proposals at length yesterday [685th meeting], and I shall not repeat what they have already said. The United States, as they indicated, supported and still supports those proposals.

32. In London, the Soviet Union representative refused to discuss the British-French proposals and, as in the case of the United States suggestion, never got beyond the first paragraph. This was one of the comments by the Soviet Union representative [17th meeting]:

"It is perfectly obvious that the proposal of the United Kingdom and France, supported by the United States, does not provide at all for the prohibition of atomic weapons but is designed to justify their use. The adoption of such a proposal would in no way contribute to a slackening of international tension or to the removal of the danger of an atomic war. What is more, it could lull the vigilance of the peoples towards this danger."

33. That is past history, and I shall not dwell unduly on the attitude of the Soviet Union in the London talks. But now, after all this time has gone by, the Soviet Union representative at this session of the General Assembly has introduced a draft resolution [A/2742 and Corr.1] suggesting that these proposals of France and the United Kingdom be used as a basis for an international disarmament treaty.

34. We are indeed gratified, as we said immediately after Mr. Vyshinsky's speech in the Assembly on 30 September [484th meeting], that the Soviet Union has apparently changed its view, at least to some extent, and now recognizes the genuine value of the British-French proposals as a fresh approach to this great problem. I merely remind the representatives here that this change in position—and we hope it is a change—

did not manifest itself until 30 September. The first faint ray of hope that we have received in many years from the Soviet Union came on that date—and even that ray was considerably dimmed, although not extinguished, by Mr. Vyshinsky's statement in this Committee yesterday [686th meeting]. We have studied the Soviet Union proposal carefully and, we believe, objectively—although we have not, of course, had a chance as yet to study Mr. Vyshinsky's speech of yesterday. What I am going to say now reflects our initial impressions of a proposal which at several key points has been and remains obscure in its meaning. Our impressions may readily be altered or perhaps changed completely as a result of the discussions in this Committee and, later on, in the Disarmament Commission.

35. First, we recognize that on one, and only one, important matter the Soviet Union has taken a clear and unambiguous stand which somewhat narrows the differences which have separated us heretofore. The Soviet Union now concedes that 50 per cent of the agreed reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments may take place before any action to prohibit nuclear weapons. This appears in part I, paragraph 2 (a), of the Soviet draft.

36. Secondly, in part I, paragraph 2 (c), the Soviet Union calls for inspection on a permanent basis "to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all States". This is one of the obscure points on which further debate is required; I believe that this was very clearly brought out by the discussion yesterday. It could be a great improvement over the 1952 Soviet Union formula [A/C.1/698] for an international control organ that "shall have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis; but it shall not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of States".

37. Any control organ with powers "to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention" must clearly have the full run of a country. Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out yesterday that during the war certain button factories in the Soviet Union manufactured munitions. This, I can assure him, is quite parallel to the history of United States industry during the war—and, indeed, that of most of the countries in the war. The international control commission must therefore, in our view, have the right to inspect button factories in order to determine whether or not they are manufacturing munitions. That is precisely what the Soviet Union representative denied to us during the London talks. We had hoped that the new draft resolution indicated a change of position. If, however, we correctly interpret Mr. Vyshinsky's statement yesterday, any country can frustrate the international inspection simply by posting on a munitions factory a sign reading: "Keep out. This factory is making buttons."

38. Thirdly, a commission with adequate powers would of necessity also have the authority to take effective action when it found a violation. We do not imply by this that the commission would have its own army which could be used to punish any violators. It would, however, and must have certain powers, some of which we enumerated in the paper which we submitted in London and which Mr. Lloyd described yesterday. These powers include the right to suspend allocations of fissionable materials to an offending country and, if necessary, to close down factories utilizing fissionable materials in that country.

39. In London, the Soviet Union representative stated categorically that the control commission could do nothing beyond referring the violations to the Security Council, where, of course, each of the permanent members is in a position to veto any action. We had hoped that the new Soviet proposals with their language about full powers might represent a change in the Soviet position. But yesterday Mr. Vyshinsky very thoroughly dispelled that hope. He made it clear that the control organ, where there is no veto, could do nothing to punish violations. Under the Soviet concept, no violations can be punished except with the consent of the Soviet Union, armed with its veto power.

40. Fourthly, there was one issue in London which perhaps received more extended discussion than any other: the issue of the relationship in time between the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the institution of international control. In London, the Soviet Union took its traditional line that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of controls should be simultaneous. "Simultaneous" is a pretty word, but, as we have pointed out on many occasions, in this context it is literally meaningless. The prohibition of atomic weapons is a single act. On the other hand, the institution of controls is a long series of acts. The real question, therefore, is this: at what point during the development of the control organ would prohibition of atomic weapons take place?

41. The United Kingdom, France, Canada and the United States all took the position in London which was set forth in the British-French memorandum; namely, that the prohibition of nuclear weapons would take place as soon as but no sooner than the time when the control organ was in a position to do its job. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, took the position that in fact the prohibition should take place as soon as there was agreement that there should be a control organ. I submit that that is something like saying, "Since we now agree to build a house, let us move in right away". An agreement of that sort, I am afraid, would not keep the rain out.

42. In his statement yesterday, Mr. Vyshinsky gave a somewhat new meaning to the word "simultaneous". He said that the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the institution of international control must be completed within the same period. In other words, we must simultaneously complete the building of the house and move into it. Of course, this is an improvement on moving in before the house is built, but it raises some questions. What if we agree to move in and the house does not get built at all? What if the time limit for building expires and the house is unfinished—do we have to move in anyway? Do we extend the time, and, if so, how? In short, just how much of an improvement the new position is depends upon the detailed schedules of building and moving in. Mr. Vyshinsky, as of yesterday, seems to have substituted for his old formula, which was impossible, a new formula, which is merely vague and requires further study.

43. Fifthly, another example of this need for study is part I, paragraph 1 (a), of the Soviet draft, which speaks of agreed levels and reduction of armaments from the levels of 31 December 1953. My delegation studied this provision carefully in the English and French translations and, frankly, it has no meaning whatever. I am not sure that I understood Mr. Vyshinsky's explanation of this paragraph yesterday. As I remember it from the interpretation of his remarks,

however, he pointed out that conditions were far from the optimum. If I understood correctly—and I am not at all sure that I did—it is now fairly apparent that the Soviet Union proposes that the reduction start from the levels of 31 December 1953 and take place in two stages—50 per cent of the reductions to be carried out in each stage, either of six months or a year. We are still unclear about where the process ends. How do we determine the levels to which the armed forces and armaments are to be reduced within that period of time? We are still not sure whether the Soviet Union continues to insist upon flat percentage reductions. Mr. Vyshinsky said that he was not pressing for percentage reductions at this time, but he did not indicate—and here he was very frank about the entire matter—that he had abandoned his previous request or that he was openly and completely accepting any alternative formula.

44. We are still hopeful that these Soviet proposals represent an important step in the direction of an agreed disarmament programme. As was brought out so well yesterday by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France, they must be clarified and elaborated. Answers must be given. We also feel constrained to point out that large segments of the disarmament programme are not touched upon at all in these proposals. That, too, was clearly pointed out yesterday. There is a tremendous amount of hard labour ahead of us before we can turn any of the proposals now before the General Assembly or the Disarmament Commission into a practical disarmament programme.

45. This is a technical subject. We do not believe that the General Assembly is the forum for going into the technical details. We believe that the very fact that the Soviet Union has seen fit to present these new proposals underscores the wisdom of the eighth session of the General Assembly in suggesting private discussions by the Powers principally involved. I say "new proposals" because they are new from the standpoint of the Soviet Union; they are not new from the standpoint of the general disarmament picture. We would support the reactivation of the Sub-Committee to deal with these Soviet proposals and other disarmament proposals which are before the Disarmament Commission. In short, we believe that the Soviet proposals should be studied in the hope that many of them will in some form be embodied in a disarmament treaty. We definitely do not reject them.

46. During the Sub-Committee meetings in London, and again during the disarmament discussions in New York, we pointed out that the Soviet approach to disarmament had three main features which not only prevented agreement but also destroyed the possibility of genuine negotiation. Let us review those features and consider to what extent they are applicable to the new Soviet proposals.

47. In the first place, the Soviet Union has in the past confined itself to proposals too vague to have any meaning. Mr. Patterson, representing the United States in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, aptly likened the Soviet proposals to a book with a table of contents followed by nothing but blank pages. We are sorry to say that the current Soviet proposals fit this description only too well. They will require such elaboration before they are really meaningful.

48. Secondly, the Soviet proposals in the past have been long on pledges and short on safeguards to ensure

that the Soviet Union would observe its pledges. The Soviet Union has refused any type of international control which would result in a genuine lifting of the Iron Curtain. The present proposals are presented in language sufficiently broad that it would be possible for the Soviet Union, under this draft resolution, to agree to genuine and effective safeguards. Whether it is in fact prepared to take such a step will be determined only after we get down to detailed discussions.

49. Thirdly, even if we assume full Soviet observance of the pledges, the past programme of the Soviet Union would have had as its result the disarmament of the free world without disarming the Soviet Union. Thus, under its previous plans, the most important elements of strength of the free world—its nuclear weapons and its bases—would be eliminated. On the other hand, the most important features of Soviet strength—its vast armies and its conventional weapons—would be merely reduced by one-third. From this standpoint, the present proposal is a distinct improvement on previous proposals. It is entirely possible that when it is elaborated it will be consistent with the security of other States. Again, we cannot tell this until we find out what it means.

50. If the Soviet Union has really abandoned its policy of disarming the free world without disarming the Soviet bloc, this indeed is a change in policy. The previous policy, as we pointed out in the Disarmament Commission, was far older than the Disarmament Commission, older even than the United Nations. In fact, it was a Communist policy even before there was a Soviet Union. We can find it in the writings of Lenin as early as 1916, when he said:

"Only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without destroying its world historical mission, to throw all armaments on the scrap heap. The proletariat will undoubtedly do this, but only when this condition has been fulfilled, certainly not before."

51. So, until the Soviet Union shows regard for the security of other States and looks on disarmament as a method of avoiding war and of improving the living conditions of mankind, rather than as a stepping-stone to strategic advantages for itself, there can be no progress towards disarmament.

52. The United States is willing and, indeed, eager, in the light of the developments of the past week, to engage in further talks and negotiations which may give promise of progress towards the goal of world peace. We hope that the world will view realistically any further negotiations and discussions and will not seek prematurely to paint a bright picture of progress which might turn out to be a mirage.

53. In conclusion, let me reaffirm our wish to explore all avenues where there is a genuine prospect of progress towards disarmament that will really disarm. The President of the United States, in his inaugural address, stated that there were certain fixed principles which would guide him in pleading our just cause before the bar of history and in pressing our labour for world peace. The very first of these principles contains the following language:

"We stand ready to engage with any and all others in joint effort to remove the causes of mutual fear and distrust among nations and so to make possible drastic reduction of armaments. The sole requisites

for undertaking such effort are that, in their purpose, they be aimed logically and honestly toward secure peace for all; and that, in their result, they provide methods by which every participating nation will prove good faith in carrying out its pledge."

54. The present Soviet proposals do appear to open an avenue for further discussion. It must be emphasized, however, that these proposals, like past Soviet proposals, are merely a beginning. There are many important parts of a disarmament programme which these proposals do not touch at all, and even where the Soviet proposals suggest a solution, in most instances that solution is so far too vague and ambiguous for the world to judge its merits. We hope there has been a real change in the Soviet outlook, a change that will make possible measurable progress towards the goal for which everyone must strive—a genuine and a lasting peace.

### **Records of the First Committee**

55. Mr. MENON (India): I wish to raise a point of order with regard to the verbatim records of the meetings of this Committee. I should like to draw attention to paragraph 5 of document A/BUR/139, which states:

"The Secretary-General wishes again to bring to the attention of the General Committee the decision of the General Assembly of 20 November 1947, at the time of the approval of the third annual budget of the United Nations, that the Secretary-General be authorized to provide"—not to make available—"verbatim records 'for one Main Committee at a time, a Committee which, in the opinion of the General Committee, has the most important items on its agenda.'"

Paragraph 6 of that document states:

"The General Committee is therefore required to decide for which of the Main Committees verbatim records shall be provided during the ninth regular session of the General Assembly. The Secretary-General suggests that the verbatim record services be assigned to the First Committee and that any verbatim records required by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee be provided from the sound recording of the Committee's proceedings."

56. Let us now turn to the summary record of the ninety-second meeting of the General Committee, where it is stated:

"The Committee decided to recommend that the General Assembly approve the suggestions contained in the memorandum by the Secretary-General on the organization of the ninth session of the General Assembly."

In the report of the General Committee [A/2733] it is stated:

"The General Committee, at its 92nd meeting held on 22 September 1954, considered the memorandum of the Secretary-General on the organization of the session (A/BUR/139) and began consideration of the provisional agenda (A/2667) and the supplementary list of items (A/2715) as contained in the memorandum of the Secretary-General relating to the adoption of the agenda and allocation of items to Committees (A/BUR/138). The consideration

of this latter memorandum was completed at the 93rd meeting..."

After pointing out that statements had been made with respect to the inclusion of various items, the report stated that "the remaining items were recommended for inclusion without discussion". That includes this item.

57. This report went to the General Assembly, where it was adopted. The President at the 476th meeting stated:

"I now submit for the consideration of the General Assembly the General Committee's report dealing with the adoption of the agenda, the allocation of items to Committees and the organization of the session. The report has been circulated as document A/2733, and it is divided into three main sections."

58. On the basis of these documents and the decisions made by the General Assembly and the Committee, I submit there is no question of the Secretariat making an exception. It is in duty bound to supply these verbatim records to this Main Committee.

59. The SECRETARY: The fact is that verbatim records have been made for the First Committee, as apart from summary records. These verbatim records have been made available in typed copies to those delegations desiring to consult them. The Secretary-General has decided, in this case, that for the discussion of this item it might be desirable that the verbatim records be made the records of the Committee. It is not possible at the present time to have verbatim records for all the items in the First Committee. It is not merely a question of making a verbatim record, but also a question of producing it and translating it. Therefore that question would have to be taken up at another time, presumably in the Fifth Committee.

60. Inasmuch as the item now before the First Committee is very complex in character, where a great deal of the discussion is in the form of questions and answers which must be rendered accurately, and inasmuch as the records of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in London were in verbatim form, it has been decided that the records of this Committee, as an exception for this item, be taken in verbatim form.

61. Mr. MENON (India): I have already pointed out that the record says "shall be provided". If this has to be altered, it requires a two-thirds majority of the Assembly to reverse this decision. The question involved here is whether the Secretariat will carry out the decisions of the General Assembly or whether it has the right to put a gloss on it. It is a matter of principle that the Committee should decide. I do not know if the Committee can decide it; let it go to the General Assembly. It does not say "shall be made available"; it says "shall be provided". It is our right to have the record provided to this Committee in verbatim copies.

62. Reference has been made to all the budgetary provisions in the documents. That was the intention of the Secretary-General. It was the Secretary-General's recommendation on his own initiative, and it is not an afterthought. Therefore I submit that we are entitled to have these records without any kind of suggestion that it is a favour that is being done for us.

63. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): Is there any other representative who wishes to speak on this point of order?

64. If the Committee agrees, I shall take up the matter with the Secretary-General personally in order to have it clarified; I shall also discuss the exact position with the Secretariat and report to the Committee at our next meeting.

#### AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68

**Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685) (continued)**

**Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (continued)**

65. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): It was my original plan to speak after the Canadian representative had spoken, out of courtesy to a big Power and an active participant in the numerous negotiations in the Disarmament Commission. I learned, however, an hour ago, that the Canadian representative would not be able to speak today but would do so tomorrow. So I have taken the liberty of proceeding with only one justification, and that is my desire for the expeditious dispatch of our business.

66. In November 1945, three months after the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada joined in a tripartite declaration proposing the establishment of a United Nations commission with the ultimate objective of eliminating atomic energy for destructive purposes and promoting instead its widest possible use for industrial and humanitarian ends. It was evidently in response to that beneficent proposal that the General Assembly, at its first session in January 1946, unanimously adopted a resolution creating the Atomic Energy Commission [*resolution 1 (I)*]. By an equally unanimous vote, the Assembly also adopted at the same session a resolution recognizing "the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces" [*resolution 41 (I)*] on the basis of which the Security Council created in February 1947 the Commission for Conventional Armaments, designed obviously as a complementary body to the Atomic Energy Commission. In 1952, the General Assembly created the Disarmament Commission [*resolution 502 (VI)*] replacing the two commissions just mentioned. On 28 November 1953, the General Assembly adopted a resolution [715 (VIII)] which, among other things, suggested that the Disarmament Commission "study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek a private an acceptable solution and report to the Disarmament Commission as soon as possible". This sub-committee was created as suggested.

67. From January 1946, which saw the birth of the Atomic Energy Commission, to 11 June 1954, which marked the last attempt in London to break the impasse between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on the question of reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons and others types of weapons of mass destruction — a period of eight and one-half years — the frantic search for an acceptable formula has proceeded un-

abated. The dramatic announcement of the last thermo-nuclear test conducted by the United States in 1952, which brought to mankind the horrible news of the dreadful possibilities of the hydrogen bomb, matched with the equally dramatic announcement that the Soviet Union was also in possession of atomic and hydrogen bombs, gave fresh impetus to the general efforts to achieve international agreement on the question of disarmament and on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

68. We are convened today to trace patiently, I hope, those efforts thus far exerted, to note where labours were in vain in the past or what promises such labours hold in the future, if any, in the further pursuit of our goal, to cut new pathways wherever we can, or mark at least the points of confluence where various proposals may merge and crystallize into a common agreement.

69. The Philippine delegation joins in the discussion of this all-important subject not for the technical knowledge it can contribute, but for the spirit of mutual amity it may help to encourage; not to take sides, but to assist in a spirit of friendly intervention; not to widen but to help bridge the gap that lies between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. Knowledge of nuclear energy and the possession of nuclear weapons are the privilege of a few big Powers, but the horrible destruction that it will bring is a dreadful fate that will descend upon every nation, the powerful and the powerless, the big and the small alike. This is the justification of my Government's contributing its humble share to the discussion of matters which, though of exclusive knowledge to the big Powers, are not their exclusive concern.

70. In the spirit in which I have announced the role of my Government in the discussions of this Committee, it is my hope and my prayer that our deliberations will be characterized by amity and good will, by open-mindedness and tolerance in a common effort to narrow down, as far as we can, the area of disagreement.

71. It may prove useful, perhaps, to this Committee if I trace very briefly the evolution of the various proposals for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and the prohibition and control of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination from the armaments of States.

72. The first concrete proposal was offered by the United States representative, Mr. Baruch, to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.<sup>1</sup> As it was subsequently developed, that plan provided for the establishment of an international authority which would hold all fissionable materials in trust for the nations of the world "from the time the source material is removed from its place of deposit in nature".<sup>2</sup> This international authority would operate and manage all plants and facilities handling such materials in dangerous quantities; and for nuclear operations of a less dangerous nature a licensing system was envisaged. It was also to be endowed with full power of inspection, unhampered by veto, to facilitate detection of clandestine activities. The system of control was to take effect by stages and, as soon as it reached full operation, the manufacture and use of atomic weapons

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, No. 1.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Second Year, *Special Supplement*, p. 36.

would be banned, existing stocks disposed of and all fissionable materials converted to peaceful uses.

73. The Soviet Union matched this proposal with one of its own,<sup>3</sup> by calling for an immediate convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons, and proposing the destruction of existing stocks with a control machinery to be set up later as might be agreed upon. That proposal was modified in 1947 by the Soviet Union<sup>4</sup> by making the prohibition of atomic weapons simultaneous with the institution of a system of control.

74. In the Commission for Conventional Armaments, the Western Powers proposed that any effective disarmament must be preceded by the disclosure of the existing military strength of all countries and the establishment of an effective system of verification and disclosure. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, proposed a flat reduction of existing armed forces and armaments by one-third, nothing being said of the necessity of previous disclosure of the size of armaments and armed forces.

75. On 19 November 1951, a draft resolution [*A/C.1/667*] was submitted to the First Committee providing for a Disarmament Commission to replace the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments and, which is important now, setting forth the principles which should guide the new commission in its work, namely: progressive disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic; verification to be based on effective international inspection; the United Nations plan to serve as the basis for the control of atomic energy, unless another effective system could be devised; and an adequate system of safeguards to ensure observance and detect violations with the least degree of interference with the internal affairs of each State.

76. On 12 January 1952, the Soviet Union made the following proposals [*A/C.1/698*]: prohibition of atomic weapons to take effect simultaneously with strict international control within the framework of the Security Council, the control organ to conduct inspection on a continuing basis but not to interfere with the domestic affairs of States; reduction by one-third of the armed forces of the five big Powers; complete data on the foreign bases of States; a draft convention by the Disarmament Commission before 1 June 1952 to provide measures to put into effect the prohibition of atomic weapons and the creation of a control system; and the holding of a world disarmament conference before 15 July 1952.

77. On 28 March 1952 [*8th meeting*], the Disarmament Commission adopted the French plan of work [*DC/5*]. It then set up two committees: Committee 1 to deal with the regulation of all armaments and armed forces and the elimination of atomic weapons, and Committee 2 to deal a system of disclosure and verification.

78. At the first meeting of Committee 2, the United States representative submitted a plan of disclosure and verification [*DC/C.2/1*] by five distinct and separate stages, proceeding from the least secret and culminating with the most secret. The philosophy of the United States plan was that each stage would constitute a test of the good faith of the parties as far as compliance was concerned, with the safeguard that if, in

any initial stage any party should act in bad faith, the other party, at least, would not have gambled unduly with its security by premature disclosure of its other weapons of protection. This proposal was rejected by the Soviet Union.

79. In Committee 1, the discussion centred, with apparently no satisfactory results, on the clarification of how the control system contained in the Soviet proposals of 12 January 1952 should function.

80. On 28 May 1952, the French, United Kingdom and United States representatives submitted a proposal for specific numerical limitations on all armed forces [*DC/10*], which later was supplemented by a more detailed proposal [*DC/12*]; neither of these proposals met with the approval of the Soviet representative.

81. On 4 September 1952, the United States representative submitted a three-point proposal for the elimination of bacteriological weapons [*DC/15*].

82. On 8 December 1953, President Eisenhower, for the first time, in an address before the General Assembly [*470th meeting*], proposed that the five big Powers should make joint contributions from their stockpile of fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency under the United Nations. The proposed agency would be given the responsibility of devising methods by which atomic energy might be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. This proposal was later elaborated upon by Secretary Dulles in his speech before the General Assembly on 23 September 1954 [*475th meeting*].

83. On 19 April 1954, the United Kingdom draft resolution calling for the creation of a Sub-Committee of the "Powers principally involved" was adopted [*DC/49*] and the said Sub-Committee thereafter held private meetings, first in New York on 23 April and later in London between 13 May and 22 June 1954. The Soviet Union representative, at one such private meeting, reiterated the Soviet proposal for the unconditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, followed by total prohibition and reduction by one-third of the armed forces and armaments of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the simultaneous establishment of a strict international control. On the other hand, Mr. Lloyd of the United Kingdom submitted a memorandum suggesting that the weapons to be covered by the disarmament treaty should be divided into two categories, namely, those to be prohibited, such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and those which should be limited and reduced [*DC/53, annex 3*]. To this effect, he gave a list of weapons based largely on the annexes to the peace treaties concluded at the end of the last World War. The Soviet Union representative refused to discuss the United Kingdom memorandum, insisting on agreement on principles before going into consideration of details.

84. On 25 May 1954, the United States representative submitted a very detailed proposal [*DC/53, annex 4*] on the organization and functions of the control body which again the Soviet Union representative refused to discuss on the same ground of objection as he had urged against the United Kingdom memorandum. On 11 June 1954, the French and United Kingdom representatives offered a compromise proposal [*DC/53, annex 9*] on the timing of the disarmament programme. With this proposal, the private talks in London closed.

85. On 30 September 1954, the Soviet Union representative, Mr. Vyshinsky, at the conclusion of his

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, First Year, No. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Second Year, No. 2.



speech before the General Assembly [484th meeting], submitted for the consideration of the Assembly a draft resolution [A/2742 and Corr.1] under which the United Nations Disarmament Commission would be called upon to prepare a convention or treaty prohibiting atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction, reducing substantially the armaments of States and instituting an international control, taking as basis the Anglo-French proposal of 11 June 1954. The convention or treaty would contain provisions for the simultaneous carrying out of the following measures: within six months or one year, a reduction of armaments, armed forces and military appropriations by 50 per cent from agreed standards, this reduction to be based on the level existing on 31 December 1953 and the creation of a temporary international commission, under the Security Council, to supervise the observance of the aforementioned reduction. Upon the completion of the foregoing, the following measures would be taken simultaneously: the reduction of the remaining 50 per cent of armaments, armed forces and military appropriations; the complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction, all existing atomic materials to be utilized for peaceful purposes only; and the institution of a permanent international organ to implement the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the Disarmament Commission would study the point raised in the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954 concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons except for purposes of defence against aggression, and would submit recommendations.

86. With the foregoing proposal by the Soviet Union, the Committee has a complete view of the efforts thus far exerted to bring about the reduction of conventional armaments, armed forces and military expenditures and the prohibition and ultimate elimination of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction. I have endeavoured to present to this Committee in a chronological narrative all the various proposals of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, in general but bold outlines, meticulously avoiding, as far as I could, any comment on the comparative merits and demerits of these proposals, because I feel that through such a method of approach this Committee and every member of it may be induced to a strictly objective attitude. Elimination of possible causes of friction, mistrust and misunderstanding is essential in any task involving the security of States. Good faith alone holds the key to the successful consummation of our labours.

87. We have heard the general lamentation that for almost nine years we have not advanced an inch towards the goal of disarmament. I do not share this pessimism. The way to great ends is necessarily long and arduous. There are no short-cuts to the age-old dream of a weaponless world. I dare to say that, in the more than eight and a half years of continuous labours towards our goal, we have accomplished three distinct results which give mankind every reason to hope that the approximation of our aims is well within sight. First, we have achieved a progressive crystallization of opposing proposals. From vague and general terms, we have advanced to specific and relatively concrete views. This is in itself remarkable progress. No intelligent and definite solution can be expected to materialize out of ambiguous and hardly understandable propositions. Second, we have demonstrated a common perseverance, the Western Powers and the Soviet Union

alike, to seek continually common grounds in the accomplishment of common ends. No wedlock is possible between two persons where one of them does not believe in matrimony. Third, from a hopelessly wide divergence of views, we were able to discover points in common and have reduced, accordingly, the area of disagreement. These three results alone are clear and unmistakable indications that, though we have initially chosen to travel through many roads, they may all eventually lead to the goal.

88. The speeches delivered by the representatives of the four big Powers in the first three meetings of this Committee are a happy augury of what the future holds for our labours towards disarmament. The lucid and logical presentation by Mr. Lloyd, the representative of the United Kingdom [685th meeting], of the concrete position of the Western Powers on the scope of the disarmament treaty, the nature and functions of the control organ, and the timing and "phasing" of the system of reduction and prohibition, will no doubt help immensely to avoid misapprehension of the various implications of the Western proposal.

89. On the other hand, the answers of Mr. Vyshinsky [686th meeting] to a number of important questions propounded by Mr. Moch [685th meeting] and his clarification of the Soviet draft resolution, will pave the way for the removal of misgivings and show that the Soviet and Western proposals are not, after all, too far apart. I dare to say that the speech of Mr. Vyshinsky constitutes a remarkable advance towards the desired goal. At long last an anxious world can feel a sense of relief that, barring untoward incidents which may cast clouds upon an atmosphere so bright, we are headed toward a common understanding and final agreement.

90. In the light of the past proposals and substantial clarification recently made in the speeches before this Committee, we may now fairly set forth the points upon which the Western Powers and the Soviet Union agree as of the present. First, they agree that a substantial reduction of armaments, armed forces and military expenditures and the prohibition and ultimate elimination of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction are necessary for the relaxation of world tension and the ultimate establishment of world peace. Second, they agree on the necessity of the institution of an international organ to supervise the effective observance of the aforementioned reductions and prohibition. Third, they agree that such reductions and prohibition should be provided for in a disarmament treaty. Fourth, they agree on the diversion of nuclear energy from warlike to peaceful purposes. Fifth, they agree on the calling of a world disarmament conference to effectuate universal adherence to a disarmament programme that may be decided upon. Sixth, they agree on a system of stages for the execution of the disarmament programme, a point on which they have heretofore differed. Seventh, they agree that any system of disarmament and prohibition of atomic weapons without any effective system of international control would be a mockery and a farce. The Western Powers and the Soviet Union have only to note where they disagree or where understanding is not too clear, and, with good faith characterizing their attitude and actions, the ultimate realization of a definite agreement is neither remote nor improbable.

91. To take full advantage of this happy trend of events and the momentum of good will generated by

the sobriety with which both parties have laid down and clarified their proposals, the Philippine delegation suggests specifically that at the opportune moment this Committee should designate a working group consisting of the five big Powers, with instructions to iron out their differences with a view to arriving at some definite agreement on any phase or phases of their proposals and report to this Committee not later than 15 November 1954. In the meantime until the report of the working group has been received, this Committee might proceed to other items on the agenda.

92. That like begets like is a well-known law of human nature. Recrimination invites recrimination. Ill will tears people apart but good will brings them together. If the Soviet Union and the Western Powers can, for the time being at least, be made to forget — if they cannot succeed in reconciling — their differences, and if they can put into definite shape the form and substance of matters where they do not differ, the spirit of good will generated by the partial harmony thus cemented is a strong psychological inducement to the enlargement of their sphere of agreement in the future. This is the philosophy upon which rests the proposal of the Philippine delegation which I have just offered.

93. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I did not think that I should have to speak again today after my statement of yesterday [*686th meeting*]. I wish, however, to make some comments, first on the United States representative's speech, and secondly on the speech of the Philippine representative which we have just heard. I consider it advisable to do so now, without any delay, in order to dispose of a number of assertions about the Soviet Union proposals which anyone who listened attentively to the United States representative knows are obviously wrong. I also wish to correct some of the misinterpretations we have heard of the explanations of the Soviet draft resolution which I gave yesterday.

94. It has been alleged that I said then that the Soviet Union no longer maintained the proposal for a one-third reduction of armaments and armed forces. This would seem to be wishful thinking on the part of the United States representative. I said nothing of the kind. I shall read the relevant part of yesterday's verbatim record, which I have not corrected, in the hope of making our position clear.

"We reintroduced the proposal for the reduction by one-third of conventional armaments at subsequent sessions. We did not raise the question this time and, as you have seen, our proposal does not mention it directly; but if I am asked whether our proposal provides for proportional reduction of armaments or whether we prefer some other arrangement, then I must point out that, so far, the only alternative arrangement has been the one first proposed on 28 May 1952, which recognizes the necessity of establishing ceilings on armaments. One of the documents submitted at the time [*DC/10*] said, with regard to armed forces, that 'there should be fixed numerical ceilings...'"

That meant that the basis was again to be the so-called "balance of power", and we then explained briefly that in our view that system was conducive to war.

95. That was all I said about a one-third reduction. I do not know where the representative of the United States gained the impression that we no longer insisted on the point. Wishes must not be mistaken for facts. We did not discuss the question and I thought there

was no need to discuss it. When we do discuss it, we shall see whether we then support a reduction of one-third, or one-sixth, or one-twenty-sixth, or what have you. I support the principle of a proportional reduction which is consistent with our proposal for a one-third reduction. I never said anything else. Why attribute to me words I never uttered? That is my first comment.

96. Secondly, it was said here that if the Soviet Union gives up its policy for disarming the Western world without disarming the Soviet world, then such and such consequences will ensue. I fail to see why it is assumed that our policy is to disarm the Western world without disarming the Soviet world — if such a term can be used. The Soviet Union has never followed any such policy. A scrutiny of any of our proposals concerning the reduction of armaments gives the lie to this contention. The representative of the Philippines has just spoken of the background of the subject, which was also referred to yesterday by Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Moch and, to the best of my ability, by myself. The representative of the Philippines, for his part, mentioned certain facts which make it quite impossible to maintain that we said: "You disarm, but we shall not". We have never said anything of the kind. Why did Mr. Wadsworth have to produce this allegation, which is wholly unjustified and can make no useful contribution to our difficult work? The representative of the Philippines was right when he said that we should avoid complicating the situation in any way; in particular, we must avoid complicating it by introducing fallacious, fanciful and trumped up arguments solely in order to discredit the position of the other party. Allegations such as Mr. Wadsworth made are clearly unfounded.

97. Thirdly, Mr. Wadsworth said that in London the Soviet Union representative had refused to discuss "our proposals"; he then went on to quote the statement made by my colleague Mr. Malik. But the fact that one objects to any given proposal, adduces arguments in support of one's own draft and demonstrates that the other party's proposal is ill founded can hardly be viewed or described as a refusal to discuss. That would be the ultimate in muddled thinking. The fact that I disagree with a given proposal does not mean that I refuse to discuss it. If I disagree, I endeavour to convince my opponents that it is impossible to agree to such a proposal. I may state my case poorly. It may be that my opponents are better prepared and consequently better able to convince their hearers. Representatives are probably well aware of the fact that I have sometimes taxed their patience with speeches, which were all directed to one purpose, namely, to convince, even though I disagree with some or many of the proposals I was dealing with.

98. Mr. Wadsworth has chosen a different type of polemic. I am not opposed to polemics as such. But I am in favour of friendly polemics, carried on in good faith and free from venom. There may be times when this weapon of verbal or ideological warfare is necessary. There are also times when it may be dispensed with, when better results may be achieved by other means, when better prospects are revealed — like that "ray of hope" for instance, to which Mr. Wadsworth referred, only to say that for some unknown reason it was already extinguished. According to him, it is already extinguished. This is only the second day of our discussion, yet Mr. Wadsworth

maintains that the ray of hope is already extinguished! Does that encourage us to believe that he really entertained a hope? No, if there is really a ray of hope in my heart, it cannot be extinguished so swiftly, perhaps not at all. In any event, we would first make every effort to show that it was a real ray of hope, that the hope was a reality and not a flight of fancy.

99. Mr. Wadsworth's logic would therefore appear to me to be inappropriate and strange, in fact, illogical. The fact that in London Mr. Y. Malik raised objections is taken to mean that he refused to engage in a discussion; the fact that he would not enter into a discussion means that the Soviet Union would not enter into a discussion; and if the Soviet Union so refused, it must obviously follow that we work only by ultimatum.

100. As I look upon some of my opponents, I recall the lengthy and interesting speeches they have made to try to refute my arguments. Mr. Belaúnde is eyeing me very attentively. I remember all the effort he has put into countering my arguments. But would he have done so if I had not been trying to convince him, if I had adduced no arguments whatsoever? And what about Mr. Charles Malik of Lebanon? How many times have we not crossed swords with him in this building! Could he have taken part in those jousts and given us his interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, of Marxist philosophy, ideology and so forth if I had not put forward certain well-founded arguments? I shall endeavour to show this today, by means of an example which should correct the statements of the gentleman who saw fit to quote a remark made by our great teacher Lenin.

101. I think it wrong to say: "If you object, that means that you are refusing to discuss." That never was true, it could never be true, and it is not true. If it were, it would mean that to defend one's own proposals or to disagree with the proposal of some other delegation was tantamount to refusing to discuss. It would mean that all discussion would be impossible. Such a position is untenable.

102. There has also been some mention here of the control organ. Mr. Wadsworth said — I am using the English text, and I think that I am translating correctly despite my poor knowledge of that language — that yesterday I had thoroughly dispelled all hope, since I had made it perfectly clear that a control organ where there was no veto could do nothing "to punish violations".

103. That is correct; the control organ would be unable, and in fact ought not, to take any action which might be construed as punitive. If you disagree with that point of view you are disagreeing with the Charter. May I remind you of Article 39, in Chapter VII, entitled "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression", which states:

"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42. . . ."

Here the reference is to Articles 41 and 42. Yesterday I mentioned also Articles 43, 44 and 45. If the control organ discovered a breach of the convention, or treaty, on atomic energy, a deliberate diversion of atomic

energy for the production of atomic weapons, there would be a threat to peace and to international security. The Security Council would then be bound to take steps in accordance with the Charter provisions. But when would it be able to decide on measures? When it had received a report from the control organ or commission. Therefore, the function of the control organ would not be to punish violations, to punish acts which contravened an accepted agreement and constituted a threat to the peace, but to advise the Security Council and to submit proposals to that body. It could not take punitive action on its own initiative. If it could, that would mean that we had set up a second Security Council in the form of a control organ. It would also mean that we were winding up the existing Security Council.

104. I must apologize for looking backwards — as I said yesterday, I believe that it is better not to call up the shades of the past — but have we not already witnessed similar endeavours, which have collapsed under the impact of life itself, to the point that they are now quite forgotten? Does anybody today recall the fate of the "Little Assembly"? Yet you will remember how we argued, when we were still at Flushing Meadows, as to whether or not the Little Assembly should be set up. Our contention then was that the Little Assembly, which originally was even described as existing for the purpose of "ensuring security" (that qualification was later dropped), would compete with the Security Council and perhaps even take its place. Our reason was that it was being proposed that the new organ should be vested with functions that would have directly conflicted with the Charter, especially with Chapter VII, according to which those functions belong solely to the Security Council. We were in the minority then. It was decided that the Little Assembly should be set up. But where is it now? We might as well ask, where are the snows of yester-year? Nobody has heard of it for years. And why? Because there is a Security Council, and although that body can be by-passed or disregarded, it cannot be abolished.

105. If it were our task to by-pass the Security Council and to terminate its functions, then the right course of action would be to vest those functions in the control organ and not the Security Council. But we consider that that would be impossible, for quite a number of reasons. I therefore think that when the representative of the United States said that we had a faulty conception of the functions of the control organ in objecting, in particular, to the provisions I have mentioned, the error was his. In any case, I mentioned two points from the proposals which Mr. Patterson, I believe, made in London, only as an example. I shall at any rate argue the point. But that does not mean that we refuse to consider the question. On the contrary, the fact that I agree to argue the matter means that I agree to consider and discuss it. I also think that, in every discussion, one should begin by respecting the opinions, and position of the other side. But in that case the facts must be presented as they really are and not as it would be convenient to see them.

106. As to "simultaneousness", I will not speak about it, as it seems to me that the United States representative was today in a somewhat jocular mood. He said that he was being asked, so to speak, to move into a house that was not yet built. But it would be easy enough to deal with such a suggestion; the obvious and

sensible thing would be not to move into a house which is not yet built. But if anybody is so intelligent that he moves into an unbuilt house, then surely we may expect him to give us a great deal more, and equally eloquent, testimony of his intelligence. There is no need to dwell upon this point.

107. I now wish to refer to the quotation which we heard today from Mr. Wadsworth; I do not know where he found the words or out of whose book he copied them, if he will pardon my saying so. He quoted Lenin as saying in 1916:

“Only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without destroying its world historical mission, to throw all armaments on the scrap heap. The proletariat will undoubtedly do this, but only when this condition has been fulfilled, certainly not before”.

This is a quotation from Lenin's pamphlet, “The War Programme of the Proletarian Revolution”, which he wrote at that time. But what was he actually referring to? What he was actually referring to is indicated in the preceding few lines, which must not be omitted, but must be quoted together with what follows. Lenin said:

“The arming of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat is one of the most imposing, basic and important factors of modern capitalist society”.

In other words, he was referring to the fact that the bourgeoisie was arming against the proletariat, while at the same time the revolutionary social democrats were being urged to demand disarmament. That would have been tantamount to a complete renunciation of the principle of the class struggle and to giving up any thought of a revolution.

108. Is the United States State Department still unaware that over one hundred years ago Marx and Engels in their Communist Manifesto laid down the basis for the theory of the inevitable existence in society, at a certain stage of its development, of class struggle between the bourgeoisie on the one hand and the proletariat on the other, each pursuing an opposite objective? The first side, that of modern capitalist society, wants to suppress all resistance on the part of the proletariat, whereas the proletariat wants to overcome the bourgeoisie and to free itself of bourgeois domination. This is the generally known basis of communist doctrine, which may be discussed or argued against, and, as we know, may even be fought against, but what can it possibly have to do with the question of the reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons with which we are now concerned? It is surely clear that what Lenin said bears no relation to the question of an agreement among equal and sovereign States concerning measures for the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons, and even general disarmament, as proposed by the Soviet Union in the international forum of the League of Nations in the twenties.

109. We must not forget that while struggles go on within States between different parties and different classes of society, another struggle goes on for certain principles in international life. What we have here is not only such a struggle to achieve certain principles, but also international co-operation. That has absolutely nothing to do with the question of internal political relations. The two can be taken to have anything in

common only by those who accept the stupid premise that revolution is an exportable commodity. The leaders of the communist movement, however, have always categorically denied this, simply because it is not true. There is nothing of the sort in communist doctrine and there could be nothing of the sort, because it is utter nonsense.

110. “The War Programme of the Proletarian Revolution” appears in the twenty-third volume of the fourth edition of Lenin's works, and I shall be glad to present it to any member of our Committee who may wish to study it carefully. I will specially order it from Moscow, provided that this subversive book is cleared by the United States customs, so that members may convince themselves that it really contains nothing resembling the assertions made here. I cannot let such an idiotic notion — pardon the expression — as that the proletarian revolution can be exported from the Soviet Union to various other countries, like the Philippines, Nicaragua or Peru, pass unchallenged.

111. Is this not laughable? I see that the representative of Thailand and many others find it laughable. Why should we stray into these fields? At the last session, the Australian representative, Mr. Casey, Minister of State for External Affairs, quoted something out of a little pamphlet published by some shady characters, which said something along the same lines. I immediately said that it was nonsense, that Lenin had never said anything of the kind. Later the newspapers said that the entire Australian Embassy was hunting for that quotation. For all I know, they may still be looking for it. If the Australian representative happens to know the answer, I should be glad to learn whether they ever found it. That happened at the beginning of the session; towards the end of the session, the representative of the United States, Mr. Lodge, also made a completely incredible statement, to the effect that Stalin had said: “Terror is the supreme argument of State power”. Stalin never said anything of the kind. Stalin was a man of genius; he could never have been guilty of such nonsense, which was whispered into the representative's ear by one of the secretaries who sit behind him and apparently cook up quotations. That particular piece of nonsense came from an Italian Fascist pamphlet — neo-Fascist or old Fascist, they are all alike. I immediately asked Mr. Lodge to mention the book and page number, as I usually do when I quote. If I quote Baruch, or anyone else, I quote chapter and verse and take the responsibility for what I say. Mr. Lodge was unable to do so. He may have had some trouble; but that is his delegation's own internal business, in which I do not interfere.

112. Nevertheless, if anyone else wishes to quote Lenin, Stalin, Malenkov or Molotov, I would beg him to quote them in the proper context. These quotations will then be entirely unlike those now used for the sole purpose of making us out to be a group of conspirators against peace or, possibly, a business firm exporting proletarian revolutions. Some deal in bananas, others in other wares, while we, it seems, specialize in the export of proletarian revolutions. This is nonsense, and I will not dwell on it, but I wanted to make sure that I would not have to give similar explanations in the future.

113. I must say that the speech made by the Philippines representative today seems to me far more constructive, although the Philippines did not take part in the work carried out in London and in other cities, than

the speeches of those of my colleagues who did take part in that work. That gives me hope that, if other representatives put their oar in as well, we may achieve real success. In this connexion, I would like to say once more that we are whole-heartedly desirous of such success.

114. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): I should like to make a brief statement on the rather remarkable statement which we have just heard from the representative of the Soviet Union. He started out by talking about inaccuracies in my statement and wound up by talking about a great many things concerning which I have never had anything to say. However, I think that all through my prepared remarks the representative of the Soviet Union will find that, due to the shortness of time since he completed his speech of yesterday, I said: "Perhaps I misjudged him"; "Perhaps I misunderstood him"; "If I understood him correctly". In those places where he has actually corrected me, I think that I should thank him. The interpretations, however, which one places upon the English language as it comes through the earphones is one thing, as opposed to the corrected verbatim report which he will, of course, get later on.

115. However, there are one or two points made by Mr. Vyshinsky which, I feel, might be worthy of very brief comment, because I believe that we should not keep the Committee sitting too long over this sort of altercation.

116. In the first place, in attempting to deny some of the things which I said, Mr. Vyshinsky did confirm two of my statements. First, he confirmed my statement that any action to deal with violations of a disarmament plan must be subject to the Security Council and its veto and, secondly, he confirmed my contention that he had not completely abandoned his previous demands for a flat percentage reduction. Perhaps the interpretation to which Mr. Vyshinsky was listening when I was talking on this particular point may have been subject to misconstruction, but my recollection is that I said that he was not pressing for his reduction plan at that time; and I think that was an accurate statement.

117. I would also agree very thoroughly with the representative of the Soviet Union that there is a vast difference between opposition and discussion, on the one hand, and rejection on the other. I stand, however, by my statement in my prepared remarks, and I would ask representatives to read the record of the London meetings, at which Mr. Malik of the Soviet Union did, in fact, nearly categorically reject the points that were made by the United States in its working paper on a control organ and by the Franco-British proposal.

118. Finally, I believe with Mr. Vyshinsky that it might be of considerable value to all the members of this Committee to read the entire text of Lenin's article on disarmament from which I quoted. At least I have avoided the accusation that the quotation was incorrect. According to Mr. Vyshinsky, it was taken out of context, but at the same time I feel it is a revealing quotation and something which has been held fast to by the Soviet Union in disarmament talks throughout most of the past several years. Again, I believe that colloquies of this type are extremely valuable to members of the Committee. It is, of course, possible to attempt to confuse and befog the issue by

talking of matters having nothing to do with the point at issue. However, at the same time, that also reveals the weakness of the argument of the person doing it.

119. Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand): On a point of personal explanation, I should like to utter a word of caution to the Committee. I should like to warn that it is dangerous to interpret my smiles because I always smile.

120. Mr. BELAÜNDE (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): I should like to know whether, in view of the importance which the United States representative so rightly attaches to conversations, I could make a brief statement today on a specific point which is the apple of discord, the bone of contention, the crux of the discussion, without relinquishing my right to make a more detailed statement later. I believe that these observations may be of value, and so I am going to ask leave to take up the Committee's time during the few minutes we have left to outline certain ideas, to which I shall return at greater length some other time.

121. For the moment I want to take advantage of the interpretation of the functions of the Council and of the Charter just given so lucidly by Mr. Vyshinsky to deal with what seems to me the essential point about disarmament: the effectiveness of control.

122. We concur in the idea that there must be a control organ, and that it must be set up as part of the United Nations machinery. That organ would naturally be subject to the jurisdiction of the Security Council, which is a political body but not, let me emphasize, a judicial body. Now let us suppose that a team of inspectors of the control organ found a breach of the disarmament convention, or treaty, in a given country. It matters little whether we call the instrument a treaty or a convention; it would be an international treaty, must therefore be complied with in good faith and be subject both to interpretation and application. Let us suppose, further, that a dispute then arises between the inspectors and the State concerned, which says in defence of its sovereignty: "I will not accept this order", or "I will not allow this inspection", or "I will not close down this factory", or "I refuse to give this information". The inspectors would, of course, have to report this to the supervisory body, the control organ. And the control organ, according to Mr. Vyshinsky, would have to refer the matter immediately to the Security Council.

123. But a doubt arises in my mind; and I mention it today as a doubt and no more. We are dealing with the interpretation of a treaty, that is, with a point of law. For in refusing to permit some supervisory action, the State concerned is invoking a right proclaimed in the text of the convention. But how can we accept the idea that a political body such as the Security Council, which is doubly political—by virtue of its composition and by virtue of the veto—should have the final say in the execution of a treaty? As I see it, the only real solution would be for the parties to agree to submit to a legal ruling on the legal problem entailed by a dispute between the inspector and the State.

124. I fully realize that the step I am proposing is a highly radical one. I am well aware of that. Nevertheless, I do not lose hope; and it is more than a glimmer or a ray of hope. We are on the eve of a complete

transformation of international law. All the peoples of the world—and I venture to think that that includes the people of the Soviet Union and Communist China—have laid upon us the responsibility for establishing a new code of law which will make war, and the destruction of mankind, impossible. The problem is therefore arduous. Every transformation in the system of law has always entailed a struggle.

125. I do not advocate an amendment of the Charter; there Mr. Vyshinsky is right. All that may be hoped for so far as the veto is concerned is the voluntary renunciation by the Soviet Union of its use. I am not going to ask him why the Soviet Union does not desist from exercising this right in favour of a moral principle and voluntarily renounce the use of the veto in this matter. That would be one solution.

126. But there is another solution, a simpler and more juridical one. If a State invokes a right of sovereignty, or claims that the treaty has been misapplied, or calls for an interpretation of the treaty, then I ask myself, and I ask Mr. Vyshinsky, as an eminent jurist familiar with the Soviet tradition, with the Latin tradition (for I am well aware that he knows Roman law and our Latin tradition) and with Anglo-Saxon law, the following question: when a dispute of this kind arises between two States, or between a State and an international organ, which amounts to the same thing, how is it to be settled—politically or juridically?

127. The solution of recourse to the Security Council is a political one, and has a twofold disadvantage: the political composition of the Council and the veto, the effect of which is to paralyse the Council. On the other hand, what disadvantage is there in the juridical settlement of a dispute between the State concerned and the international organ, a settlement within the terms of the Charter itself, since we have an International Court of Justice recognized by the Charter and universally recognized as the juridical organ of the United Nations?

128. I am venturing to ask Mr. Vyshinsky these questions most respectfully, with all the consideration which he deserves, and which he, on his side, so kindly shows to me. I am not raising any objection; I have no intention of engaging in controversy or polemics. I wish, rather, to proceed by way of Socratic dialogues and in that spirit of co-operation with which all of us should be imbued, with which all of us are imbued, with a view to the final settlement of the disarmament problem. If Mr. Vyshinsky wishes to answer me now, I shall be very glad; if not, let him reply when he thinks fit. At any rate, I hope that he, and the Committee too, will forgive me for asking these questions.

129. But I must in all frankness say that a control organ would be absolutely powerless *vis-à-vis* a State if that State could refuse to comply with its orders and could appeal to the Security Council, where that refusal might be upheld by a permanent member. If this is so, we had better be frank and admit that even though we say in the treaty that this control is effective, it will not really be so. We cannot hoodwink anyone. We cannot hoodwink mankind.

130. The time is ripe. The conscience of mankind has been aroused. For whatever reason—whether because of war propaganda, against which I always take a stand, or because of speeches and news published every day or because of the ill-timed or evil-intentioned books brought out—whatever it may be, the fact is

that all this is bringing home to everyone the feeling that we are standing at a crossroads of history. The conscience of mankind demands of us a supreme effort to establish a new code of law. I cannot resign myself to the prospect that the ninth session of the General Assembly may end either in failure or in an admission that the Assembly is powerless to establish a new code of law, capable of preserving the interests, the life and the honour of mankind.

131. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I should like to reply to Mr. Belaúnde at once, although I fear that the problem he has raised cannot be exhausted either by his question or by my answer.

132. I am not inclined to think—I am now formulating my position as cautiously as Mr. Belaúnde has done, and we may thus count on being able to dispose of this question promptly—that the Security Council can be defined solely in terms of its political functions. Is the Security Council indeed a purely political organ? Can it be said that it has nothing to do with legal questions and that it has no judicial function to perform in the consideration of certain questions? I can hardly agree with such contentions. In other words, we must first of all come to an agreement on the question: what is the Security Council? Is it a purely political organ, an exclusively political organ, or is it both a political and a legal organ?

133. I am grateful to Mr. Belaúnde for his tribute to my knowledge of, say, questions of Soviet law. But I must recall that a basic premise in our Soviet theory of law is that law is an expression of policy, and we cannot, therefore, erect an impenetrable barrier or dig an impassable abyss between law and policy. I am ready to discuss this question with Mr. Belaúnde, but this is hardly the time for details. I am merely noting a fact. That being so, I naturally cannot agree that the Security Council is not competent to consider a political question which is at the same time a legal question.

134. The question of international treaties is, of course, a legal question, but it is equally and possibly even more a political question. International treaties are legal instruments only in form. There are legal instruments which provide definite sanctions for violations, but that does not mean that an international treaty is only a legal instrument. If we were to take that view, we would have to refer all these matters to the Sixth Committee, which, however, itself often declares that it finds it difficult to decide a matter because there are more lawyers than politicians among its members (and that is the Sixth Committee's misfortune). They find themselves in a difficult position whenever they take too formalistic a view of legal questions.

135. I have great respect for the science of law and for the legal profession, to which I belong, but I cannot but recall a sharp comment made by Karl Marx, who is not a contemporary of ours and who had nothing to do either with the October Revolution or with the present policy of the Soviet Government, who used to say: "*juristisch also falsch*" ["legal, hence untrue"]. This is applicable in the present case to the extent that political questions have been approached in too formal a manner. Political questions should rather be brought into harmony with legal principles, just as legal principles must be brought into harmony with political principles.

136. That is my first point, and now I come to my second. I must remind Mr. Belaúnde that we are not really discussing these matters now. What we are discussing is whether the control organ can punish. That was the very word Mr. Wadsworth used: "punish". May the control organ punish or not? If Mr. Belaúnde's reply is: "Yes, the control organ may punish violations", he is putting the control organ in the place of the Security Council. For what other organ under the Charter has the right to punish? I know that Mr. Belaúnde is a brilliant lawyer, and I am sure that intellectually he agrees with me. Yes, the point is that the right of punishment does belong to the Security Council.

137. I may be misinterpreting the proposal [DC/53, annex 4] which Mr. Wadsworth defended. If I am mistaken, I shall correct my mistake, for I want to be quite fair in this matter too. I see that paragraph 41 of the United States proposal states:

"The Authority should be empowered to take action as appropriate short of the imposition of sanctions as provided in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to remedy any violations or infractions in connexion with the enforcement of the provisions of the treaty establishing the system for the control of atomic energy. Such action would include:

...

"(b) Bringing about the suspension of the supply of nuclear materials to the offending State".

Is that a sanction? It is. Is that punishment? It is. Does the control organ enjoy such rights? No. Why not? Because we have a Security Council, which under Article 39 holds the right to take such action, the right to adopt such measures.

138. Further, sub-paragraph (c) speaks of "closing of plants utilizing nuclear materials in the offending State". That is a very serious punishment, and it is proposed in this document that the control organ should be given the right to impose it. I am opposed to that. I may be told that this is a legal question. My answer is that it is a political question, put in a legal form. Who is competent to decide it? The Security Council and the Security Council alone.

139. I do not believe that this friendly little skirmish of ours will settle the matter. We may still have differences of opinion. I have always felt that lawyers, if they are lawyers in fact and not in name only, generally find it easier to reach agreement than diplomats, because lawyers are inclined to base themselves primarily on the solid ground of established legal principles, whereas diplomats are guided not so much by the standards of international law as by other interests for the benefit of which these standards frequently have to be even altered or to which they have to be subordinated.

140. That is my preliminary reply to Mr. Belaúnde's remarks. I fully agree with him that this is an important question, a basic question where the control system is concerned. But surely it was settled by the statement which the present Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Molotov, made in 1946, and which I quoted yesterday. I would urge Mr. Belaúnde and others to read that statement. Mr. Molotov said that the control commission was not the Security Council, and that there was therefore no ground for saying that any Power, by using the right of veto, would be able

to hinder the effectiveness of control. The whole question is: will this control organ be autonomous in carrying out control measures? The answer is yes. That is the question, and there can be no other.

141. I am grateful to Prince Wan Waithayakon for his word of caution regarding smiles. I know that smiles can indeed be perfidious and dangerous. I shall heed his warning.

142. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): I must trespass upon the patience of the Chairman, the Committee and Mr. Vyshinsky, because the point is a most important one. Mr. Vyshinsky has given me an answer which is a masterpiece of jurisprudence and diplomacy. Indeed, in answering me he has shown that jurisprudence and diplomacy often go hand in hand. Jurisprudence represents justice and diplomacy represents prudence; and as a Schoolman of long experience I must say that prudence is the root of all the virtues, since even if a man has just instincts, if he is imprudent he runs the risk of being unjust.

143. But although I admit that Mr. Vyshinsky has said many things which are true — he will have noted from the way I nodded that I do not maintain that the Security Council is solely a political body — I do assert that it is mainly a political body and that clearly the Security Council and the Assembly itself should refer any matter which is mainly juridical to a court of justice. Mr. Vyshinsky answered me by using tactics which have nothing in common with diplomacy or jurisprudence, but rather with high polemics — indeed almost military tactics; he answers a question with a counter-question. Answering one question with another is very clever, but it amounts to evading an answer to the first question.

144. There is no reason why I should answer Mr. Vyshinsky about the functions which the United States proposal [DC/53, annex 4] has conferred on the control organ. I have not yet given my views on that subject. But it is obvious, and I frankly admit it, that punitive action on the part of the control organ presupposes a situation in international law which mankind has not yet reached, one which it will probably reach only by stages. I chose a specific instance which might well occur. Let us suppose that there is disagreement between the inspectors, upheld by the international supervisory organ, and a State invoking its sovereign rights. Why does this disagreement arise? Because there is a treaty on disarmament and the regulation of armaments which can be interpreted in two different ways, or misinterpreted, or because the articles are ambiguous, or because the treaty, while being mandatory, contains no explicit article on the matter, in which case there has to be what we might call a supplementary interpretation. At any rate, for some reason or other, there is a dispute between the inspector, upheld by the international supervisory organ, and a State. Why should this dispute, of an essentially legal character, being a matter of interpreting the treaty, go to the Council?

145. But I asked another question to which Mr. Vyshinsky gave no reply. I do not insist on an answer, but I bring it forward as one of the serious aspects of this problem. For the sake of the peace and harmony of mankind, could the Soviet Union not voluntarily renounce the right of veto? That is a matter of high politics; I am not now speaking of jurisprudence. I quite realize that we cannot dispense with the Security

Council; I am assuming a case in which a special court set up under the treaty, or the International Court of Justice, finds for the inspector against the State concerned. How will the decision be executed if the State is contumacious? The only way would be through the Security Council. So that we are not going to dispense with the Security Council. But obviously the Security Council is in a more difficult position when there is a veto against a decision which affirms a right than when it is dealing with a political question. One thing, however, must be borne in mind: if the case goes straight to the Security Council, the Council will deal with it along political lines, because no country represented on the Council would fail to uphold its government's standpoint in a dispute with the international organ.

146. Under the procedure which I suggest, namely, that the question should be submitted to juridical settlement, the country concerned could refuse to comply with the court ruling. A veto might be cast in the Security Council against the execution of the decision; but the responsibility would then be quite clear. A veto or a non-concurring vote, cast to frustrate the will of the majority with regard to a decision, would paralyse the Council. But that would not be at all the same thing as recalcitrance on the part of the Council against a court decision, or its stated refusal to comply with one.

147. In conclusion, I must state that I am not actuated by any wish to stir up controversy. What I wish is that instead, on the one hand, of bringing up past memories — memories of the past bring one advantage, experience, but also a disadvantage, recrimination, and the recollection of recriminations always breeds bad feeling; and instead, on the other hand, of indulging in unduly optimistic divagations, we should take the bull by the horns, as the saying goes. And the bull's horns are, as I see it, the powers of the international control organ, and the basic problem a dispute between a State and the international control organ. How are we going to solve that problem? Can we solve it now?

148. The situation is so critical that the representative of a small or medium-sized country, like Peru, a humble professor of cultural history and international law, may venture to say he appreciates the very great political and national difficulties for both sides, in the way of taking such a step. But I believe that I have done my duty in submitting this great problem to the Committee, without any introductory statement but in the specific and precise form of a discussion between two members. The Committee, in its wisdom, will do its duty by solving it.

149. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I must apologize for speaking once again, but Mr. Belaúnde has obliged me to do so by saying that I failed to reply to his question. I must therefore do so now.

150. I prefer to consider such questions in a concrete and not in an abstract form. Mr. Belaúnde's question just now, for instance, concerning the possibility of conflict between a State and the control organ, was couched in very abstract terms. How would such a situation arise in practice? Here you have three parties—the State which has signed the international agreement, the inspectors, and the control organ to which they are responsible—and, as a fourth party, the Security Council. But whether the Security Council could deal with such a matter and, if it could, whether

the effectiveness of control would not be undermined by the use of the veto by the interested party—that question, it seems to me, can be considered only in the form of a concrete example: such and such a violation has taken place; it concerns such and such an article of the agreement; such and such a proposal has been made, and so on. Then we could give a complete answer.

151. But I think our position is sufficiently clear from what we have said: there can be no veto in the control commission itself. However, if the question comes before the Security Council for its consideration, the Council would be guided by the statement in the Charter that decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters are to be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, while decisions on all other matters are to be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the five permanent members. No one, including the United States, would think of giving up the right of veto, as Mr. Dulles made clear in his book, *War or Peace*, published in 1950. There he states bluntly, in connexion with the Panama Canal, that the United States would not think of renouncing such a right. And it is only just that the right should be maintained.

152. It is therefore very difficult to answer this question in the abstract and not in concrete terms, to answer without knowing exactly what we are talking about. I find myself in great difficulties in trying to answer Mr. Belaúnde's question. Give me a specific example and then we can argue it out. We shall both, I trust, in spite of our advanced age, go on living on this earth for some time yet and we may still have time to discuss and argue and, it may be, others will join in.

153. I do believe, however, that we should not lose sight of the Charter. Paragraph 3 of Article 27 limits the participation in a vote of a State which possesses the right of veto or is temporarily a member of the Security Council, when disputes between that State and any other States are being considered. It says:

“Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”

It is therefore clear that if such a question were to come before the Security Council and if it involved a country which was a member of the Council, that country could not vote; and if it were one of the permanent members enjoying the right of veto, then it could not exercise that right. That is a very important safeguard.

154. Those are all the preliminary remarks I wished to make. I am grateful for having been afforded the opportunity to speak so often.

155. Mr. BELAÜNDE (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): I should like to say just one further word. Obviously, under the provisions of Article 27, such a Power could not vote; but the Power concerned would most probably be one defending a bloc. The violation might well be committed by a State which is allied or united with this Power—we know very well exactly how armaments are distributed throughout the world. Therefore violations might not actually occur within



the territory of the Power concerned, and Article 27 would not be applicable.

156. In any event, it seems to me that abstention by the Council, the express renunciation of the veto or intervention by a judicial body are the only methods which can at present be envisaged of making international control effective.

157. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) (*translated from French*): I should like to ask the Chairman what he has in mind for the next meeting. Does he intend to give the floor to the speakers on his list or to submit the proposal just made by the Philippine representative for the Committee's consideration? I think that the idea behind this proposal is that we should interrupt the debate and set up a sub-committee as a first step. I have something to say on this point, but I shall not do so until I know what the Chairman's plans are.

158. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): I was just coming to that point. The Philippine proposal has not yet been submitted to us in writing. In his statement this morning, the Philippine representative made his proposal in the following terms:

"The Philippine delegation suggests specifically that at the opportune moment this Committee should designate a working group consisting of the five big Powers, with instructions to iron out their differences with a view to arriving at some definite agreement on any phase or phases of their proposals and report to this Committee not later than 15 November 1954".

The representative of the Philippines said that he would submit a formal proposal after the meeting. We should therefore postpone a decision until our meeting tomorrow. If the Philippine proposal is simply for the establishment of a sub-committee, it does not involve the interruption of the general debate; we would have to wait until the end of the general debate before putting it to the vote. It is very difficult to take a decision until we have received this proposal in writing.

159. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) (*translated from French*): I should like to point out that "the opportune moment" will not come very quickly. In the circumstances, I venture to make an observation which I hope the Philippine representative will be good enough to consider; I think that it may facilitate our work when

we come to discuss the proposal. My suggestion relates to the membership of the working group. I draw the Philippine representative's attention to paragraph 6 of the operative part of General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII), which reads as follows:

"Suggests that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved..."

160. The General Assembly's choice of this wording was not fortuitous. The Assembly wished by this means to avoid a long and extremely difficult debate. The Disarmament Commission interpreted the sense of the words "the Powers principally involved" by setting up a sub-committee composed of five Powers. Perhaps the Philippine representative could consider the possibility of drafting his proposal along the same lines; otherwise, instead of facilitating our work—and it is certainly his intention to avoid lengthy debates—I am afraid that his proposal may involve us in a rather difficult situation. I am speaking in parables, but I hope that the Committee will understand my meaning.

161. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): Tomorrow, after we have received the text of the Philippine proposal in writing, every delegation will be able to speak not only on the substantive question but also on this proposal, since we are still engaged in the general debate and the question will not be decided until the general debate is concluded.

162. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): Upon the presentation of the formal proposal tomorrow morning by the Philippine delegation, a statement will be made in elucidation of the proposal and of the reasons for its submission.

163. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): As the proposal which the Philippine representative made orally today is to be submitted tomorrow in writing, I should like to support the statement made by the representative of Iran, Mr. Entezam, urging the Philippine representative to reconsider whether it might not be possible to adopt the course suggested by the Iranian representative, since that would help us to solve this problem.

*The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.*