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Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 29

Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (concluded) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.384/Rev.1)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (concluded) (A/C.1/L.384/REV.1)

1. The CHAIRMAN called first on representatives who wished to explain their votes before the voting.

2. Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that he would be unable to support draft resolution A/C.1/L.384/Rev.1 and would therefore abstain in the vote on it.

3. In 1961 Canada had voted against resolution 1653 (XVI) because it did not consider that declarations by the nuclear Powers that they would not use nuclear weapons were of any practical value. Today his delegation was still unable to concur with the opinion expressed in the fourth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.384/Rev.1. It was far more important that attention should be focused on negotiations for nuclear arms control through cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons, allocation to peaceful purposes of fissionable material thereby released, a freeze on the production of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and a reduction in the stocks of delivery vehicles. He doubted very much that negotiations on a convention to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons would improve the prospect of getting agreement on more specific measures of nuclear arms control.

4. Although his delegation had voted for the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference, it considered that the proposal to include the question of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in its agenda was inopportune.

5. Mr. BRENNAN (Ireland) said that he too was unable to support the draft resolution and would abstain in the vote on it.

6. His delegation had taken careful note of the statement made by the representative of Ethiopia and the analogy that had been drawn between the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the prohibition, under international law, of the use in war of deleterious gases and bacteriological weapons. However, it felt that in the absence of an effective system of world law the proposed convention was unlikely to be implemented. A nuclear Power whose survival was at stake would use nuclear weapons. Indeed, threats to use nuclear weapons had been made even in cases not involving the nuclear Power's survival. In the circumstances, no firm and reliable renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons could be obtained from all the nuclear Powers. Consequently, in the absence of effective machinery for enforcement, the mere signing of a convention could not be an effective method of preventing the use of nuclear weapons.

7. Furthermore, such a convention could add nothing to the clear obligations imposed by the United Nations Charter on all Member States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against any State and to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression.

8. The proposed convention would encourage a false sense of security and, in the absence of a non-dissemination agreement, it might lead to a relaxation of the necessary efforts to ensure the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons in the hands of individual Powers and to establish effective international machinery for the maintenance of international peace and security.

9. Mr. PASHA (Pakistan) said that experience of the disarmament negotiations had shown that no effective measures could be taken without the active support and co-operation of all the nuclear Powers, including the People's Republic of China. That was why his delegation, like many others, had been pressing for the participation of the People's Republic of China in the disarmament negotiations. At the twentieth session his delegation had lent its whole-hearted support to resolution 2030 (XX), and wished the

proposed world disarmament conference to consider the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in the wider context of general and complete disarmament. He would vote for draft resolution A/C.1/L.384/Rev.1.

10. Mr. TINE (France) said that at the twentieth session his delegation had abstained in the vote on resolution 2030 (XX) because it felt that the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference was untimely.

11. France accepted the principles contained in resolutions 1653 (XVI) and 1801 (XVII) and considered that their provisions could be usefully applied at some stage of disarmament, particularly nuclear and thermonuclear disarmament, but not before the disarmament process had actually begun. It was essential that the prohibition of nuclear weapons should be part of an effectively controlled disarmament process containing adequate guarantees. He would not vote for draft resolution A/C.1/L.384/Rev.1.

12. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.384/Rev.1.

The draft resolution was adopted by 58 votes to none, with 22 abstentions.

13. Mr. GAUCI (Malta), speaking on a point of order, recalled that at the 1450th meeting, his delegation had asked the Chairman whether, in the event of the world disarmament conference to which resolution 2030 (XX) referred not being convened, the resolution would lapse and a new one be required for the purpose of convening the conference at a later date.

14. The CHAIRMAN, after reading out the operative part of resolution 2030 (XX), said that neither the Secretariat nor any other organ of the United Nations had been entrusted with the task of establishing the preparatory committee mentioned therein, and he was therefore unable to give any information about it. His view was that, under the resolution, which had been adopted under a specific item of the agenda of the twentieth session, the conference would have to be convened before the end of 1967.

AGENDA ITEM 98

Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America (*continued*)
A/6399, A/C.1/L.369)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

15. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary) said that there was a widespread desire among all peoples to eliminate war, to ease international tension and to improve international relations, and with that end in view consideration was being given to collateral measures of disarmament, such as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the reduction of military expenditures. In that context, it was natural and logical to consider the question of the elimination of foreign military bases. The socialist countries' views on the subject should not be dismissed as communist propaganda. Colonialism and foreign military bases were both highly controversial questions. Views were sharply divided between the imperialist Powers on the one hand and the rest of the world, including the socialist countries, on the other. Opposition to foreign military

bases was not exclusively communist. It could not be claimed that most of the countries which had voted for the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)) were of communist ideology.

16. The military bases maintained by the Western Powers in foreign territories were instruments of their aggressive foreign policy. Some had been established in the period of colonial domination, and the United States had established others after the Second World War in accordance with its strategic conceptions. The bases had one thing in common: they were directed against the just aspirations of the newly independent countries and the peoples who were struggling for their independence.

17. The views of the African and Asian countries on the question of foreign military bases were set forth in the Declaration of the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964. Paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) specifically requested the colonial Powers to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial territories and to refrain from establishing new ones. It was disturbing to note the reluctance of the United States and the United Kingdom to execute the relevant General Assembly resolutions. Those powers, far from abandoning policies based on force, were creating even more effective means of extending them. In the Assembly's general debate the representative of Syria had said that the establishment of new British military bases in Muscat and other Sheikdoms on the Arabian Gulf proved that the United Kingdom Government was flouting the resolutions of the United Nations (1446th plenary meeting, para. 14); and the representative of Iraq had said that foreign military bases in the Arab countries had been, and were still being, used to prevent parts of the Arab homeland from attaining freedom and to protect positions of influence (1440th plenary meeting, paras. 80-81). World public opinion was deeply concerned over the installation of new military bases by the United States, the United Kingdom and South Africa in different parts of the world, such as Aden, Thailand, South Viet-Nam, Mauritius, the Seychelles, St. Helena and South West Africa, and over the annexation of Guam for a United States military base. There were indications that the United States and its NATO allies were preparing to establish new military bases in certain African countries.

18. The danger of military bases could be judged from a communiqué from the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, stating that in October 1966 its frontier had been violated thirty times by United States armed forces stationed at military bases in South Korea. Such provocations, if continued, could lead to a new war in Korea, presumably still under the cover of the United Nations. United States military bases in South Viet-Nam, Thailand, Okinawa and the Pacific Ocean were being used for a genocidal war against the people of Viet-Nam; operating from those bases and from Guam, United States aircraft dropped explosive and napalm bombs and crop-destroying chemicals on the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia and even, according to recent reports,

Thailand. Not only were the military operations conducted from those bases likely to violate the sovereignty of some countries but they involved the risk of a thermonuclear war. The United States maintained military bases in Latin America in order to threaten the Republic of Cuba. The People's Republic of Hungary firmly supported the Cuban demand that the United States should liquidate its Guantánamo military base, withdraw its troops and restore Guantánamo to the Cuban people.

19. The United States and its NATO allies claimed that military bases were a necessary protection against so-called communist aggression. The newly independent countries and those striving for their independence, however, regarded the Soviet Union and the socialist countries as their most faithful allies. There was no justification for the United States military bases established around the People's Republic of China since the latter had no military units stationed on the territory of other countries.

20. The existence of foreign military bases prevented co-operation among States in all parts of the world, including Europe. Despite the fact that the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles had made military bases abroad of no use to the defence of the United States and its allies, the United States maintained its bases in Europe for the sake of the so-called balance of military strength.

21. It was the duty of the United Nations to help countries to get rid of the military bases imposed upon them through economic and political pressure and under unequal treaties with imperialist Powers. It would be easier first to eliminate such bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America, where the security of the United States and of the United Kingdom was not in danger. Indeed, the security of the two Powers would be increased since elimination of their military bases would reduce the possibilities of military and even nuclear conflict.

22. His delegation would support the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.369) and hoped that a majority of the First Committee would do likewise.

23. Mr. FAHMY (United Arab Republic) said it was a historical fact that foreign military bases were synonymous with colonialism. All territories under colonial rule had in fact been bases for the colonial Powers, which had usurped the attributes of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and freedom of peoples under their yoke. In recent times many peoples had gained their independence. But, as a price for granting independence, the same colonial Powers were retaining their former bases or establishing new ones in the newly independent States, with the same colonialist objectives in view. As his country knew from experience, bases in any form were a source of interference in the domestic affairs of States. They created tension and ill-feeling between neighbouring countries and jeopardized peace and security.

24. The establishment and maintenance of military bases in the territories of other countries had been condemned at the Asian-African Conference, held at Bandung in 1955, at the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned countries held at Belgrade in September 1961, and at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-

aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964. In the Declaration issued at the end of the Cairo Conference, it had been specifically stated that parts of territories taken away by occupying Powers or converted into autonomous bases for their own benefit at the time of independence must be given back. That statement should be given serious consideration. It had not been included for propaganda purposes, but was based on the historical experience of countries represented at the Conference.

25. In the preceding discussion, a number of representatives had argued that it was justifiable to retain military bases in other countries under freely negotiated mutual defence arrangements. But mutual defence treaties between colonial Powers and newly-independent States were never freely negotiated. They were imposed by the colonial Powers on unequal and helpless nations, which were eager to rid themselves of colonial domination at any price. In some cases, the major Powers brought political, economic and other pressures to bear even on States with a long history of independence in order to induce them to accept military bases on their territories. It could not be realistically argued that countries which were forced to accept foreign military bases on their territory would ever do so if they were able to exercise free will.

26. There was a close relationship between the establishment of foreign military bases and the efforts of the major Powers to induce smaller countries to join military pacts and alliances. The countries of the Middle East had had some experience of such pacts, which all had one purpose, namely, to convert the member countries into military bases for foreign Powers against the will of the people. The Baghdad Pact and other similar pacts had been and were being rejected because they were futile and gave rise to tension. Even in Europe, military bases were gradually being dismantled, and countries were becoming more independent in their actions.

27. The only parts of the world where international tension was acute were areas where there were still foreign military bases and where foreign military intervention continued. Events in South West Africa, Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea, Aden and the Protectorates were only some examples of the dangers of maintaining military bases in the territories of other countries on indefensible legal pretexts. He welcomed the United Kingdom representative's statement that the United Kingdom Government was not intending to transfer the existing installations at its Aden base to Bahrain. But the Committee had not been told where in fact the installations were to be transferred.

28. The argument that the establishment of foreign military bases was permissible under the United Nations Charter was quite untenable. Chapter VIII of the Charter referred only to genuine regional defence arrangements, which were designed to maintain peace and security, and not to military alliances, which divided the world into opposing camps. The elimination of foreign military bases was highly relevant to the question of disarmament. It was fruitless, for instance, to discuss the denuclearization

of Latin America or Africa until all foreign military bases on those continents had been dismantled.

29. The United Arab Republic was determined to resist all efforts to lure it into spheres of influence. It had not hesitated to oppose aggression by two of the world's great Powers in collusion with Israel. It believed that foreign military bases in any form whatsoever should be eliminated once and for all. The most effective way of achieving that objective would be for the General Assembly to adopt a resolution drawing attention, in the light of the experience of some of the smaller countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, to the dangers inherent in the policy of establishing and maintaining military bases on the territories of other States.

30. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America) wished first to exercise his right of reply in connexion with a statement made at the 1463rd meeting by the Soviet representative, who had claimed to present the Committee with a series of incontrovertible facts. But he had, in truth, mentioned only some of the relevant facts, and had attempted to pass off his misinterpretation of other facts as facts in themselves. Moreover the Soviet representative attempted to give the question of military bases a righteously anti-colonial, anti-imperialist flavour, and his effort to exploit the feelings and sensibilities that genuinely and legitimately moved many delegations must be rejected. In particular, the Soviet representative had identified the United States Government's policy in regard to military bases with certain actions and policies of other Governments regarding certain regions of Africa—actions and policies which were known to be strongly disapproved. The General Assembly had spent a considerable part of the current session discussing action to be taken in regard to South West Africa, and the United States delegation was glad to have played a constructive and positive role in the Assembly's final decision.

31. For nearly twenty years the Soviet Union had been trying to secure a condemnation of foreign military bases in order to weaken the collective security of the free world. In general, its efforts had been rebuffed. As long ago as 1946, the General Assembly had unanimously recommended the withdrawal of armed forces stationed on the territories of other Members States "without their consent freely, and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements" (resolution 41 (I)). In other words, it had specifically sanctioned a right of nations which the Soviet Union was continually trying to question.

32. The last time the Soviet delegation had submitted a draft resolution on the elimination of foreign military bases had been in the Disarmament Commission in May 1965.^{1/} On that occasion, the Soviet delegation had decided not to press its proposal to a vote, as it realized that the draft resolution had little chance of being adopted. But, in submitting the new draft resolution to the First Committee, the Soviet representative had repeated—with a few minor

changes—all the arguments used by the Soviet delegation in 1965 and had not advanced any new or different arguments.

33. The United States did have military facilities in various parts of the world. Some of them were bases in the operational sense, some were supply depots, and others were, as the Soviet representative had correctly noted, communications or radar stations. All the facilities, and their nature, were known to the host Governments. Their purpose, as part of arrangements for collective defence, supply, or communications with other facilities, was equally well known. The status of United States overseas military facilities was governed by agreements in all cases freely negotiated with the host Governments, and not imposed on them. It was not flattering to the countries where the United States had military facilities to allege, as the Soviet representative had done, that those countries were not free to exercise their sovereign right to enter into an agreement with another Government if they chose to do so in order to safeguard their independence. It could be argued more logically that countries which asserted that other States did not have the sovereign right to permit the establishment of a military base on their territories were in fact intervening in the internal affairs of those States.

34. The United States had acquired its rights with regard to the naval station at Guantánamo under a treaty concluded with Cuba in 1934,^{2/} which confirmed previous lease arrangements. The arrangements could not be abrogated without the consent of both parties. In present and foreseeable circumstances, the Guantánamo base was important for the military security not only of the United States, but of the Western hemisphere. In the recent past, the Soviet Government itself had tried to convert Cuba into an offensive base armed with Soviet nuclear-capable missiles and staffed by Soviet technicians. If courage and wisdom had not then prevailed in bringing about the withdrawal of those missiles, would the Soviet Union now be advocating with equal vigour the dismantling of foreign bases?

35. Since a draft resolution of the kind submitted was not in itself likely to result in the elimination of military bases, it was clear that the Soviet delegation was exploiting the problem merely for propaganda purposes. In many countries, foreign military bases existed as part of collective defence arrangements to which the host country itself subscribed and contributed. But, as certain African, Asian and Latin American countries would know from their own experience, the really dangerous foreign military bases were the hidden and illicit bases of subversion. Such bases might traffic in ideas as well as arms, and were aimed not at defending the integrity of a country but at subverting it or its neighbours. They were being used to subvert régimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Soviet Union had expressed support for the decisions of the Tricontinental Conference at Havana^{3/} which had sought to create means for intervention

^{1/} See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission*, 89th meeting, para. 11 (document DC/218).

^{2/} Treaty concerning the Relations between the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba, signed at Washington on 29 May 1934 (*League of Nations, Treaty Series*, vol. CL, 1934, No. 3656).

^{3/} First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, held at Havana from 3 to 15 January 1966.

in the domestic affairs of States in the Western hemisphere.

36. The Soviet representative had no legitimate grounds, either, for complaining of the existence of United States military facilities in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement the United States as Administering Authority was entitled to establish naval, military and air bases and to station and employ armed forces in the Trust Territory.

37. It was pointless, too, to consider the question of foreign military bases in the abstract, without reference to the facts which had led to their establishment. In order to understand why certain countries had sought collective security arrangements with the United States, it was essential to remember that United States troops had been stationed abroad, and certain bases established, in direct response to earlier Soviet and continuing Chinese Communist threats and actions. The threats had been made after the United States had, unilaterally, disarmed itself almost entirely at the end of the Second World War. As certain aggressive actions had been checked, some bases had been eliminated. Others had been maintained or created, again in direct response to continuing Chinese Communist threats and to the policy of the Soviet Union and its allies of promoting and supporting what they described as "wars of national liberation". At the present moment, Communist China was openly supporting such a war in Viet-Nam.

38. More would certainly be said about the so-called "peace-loving" intentions of the Soviet Union and its allies during the debate on agenda item 92 in the General Assembly and on agenda item 96 in the First Committee. His own country had learned by bitter experience that a "war of national liberation" was the term applied to any communist effort to overthrow by force a Government selected for destruction.

39. The Soviet representative had claimed that his Government's proposal was another move in the struggle against colonialism. But the post-war policy of the United States in regard to colonialism compared most favourably with that of the Soviet Union. The States which the Soviet Union was prone to label as "colonialist" or "imperialist"—and which, like the United States, also maintained military bases abroad—were precisely those which had granted freedom and independence to more than fifty new nations since the end of the Second World War. All those facts should be borne in mind in considering the Soviet proposal for the elimination of foreign military bases. Moreover, the Soviet Union itself occupied an enormous, centrally-located land mass in close proximity to many small and militarily weak States. Contiguous to it was the enormous land mass of Communist China. The lessons of the period following the Second World War could not be forgotten so soon. To carry out the Soviet proposal in present circumstances would be to threaten the vital security of many countries, and would result in a redeployment of forces to the obvious military advantage of the Soviet Union and Communist China. It would not produce an atmosphere of trust or security and it would not alter the circumstances which had led to the estab-

lishment of foreign military bases. It would, in fact, amount to an endorsement of the very policies against which countries had reacted by co-operating in their common defence. It would impair the right of individual and collective self-defence, as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

40. In considering the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.369), the Committee should also bear in mind the policies and actions of those who were instigating, supporting or directing armed attacks and every kind of subversion against established Governments. It should remember how those actions had increased international tension and greatly complicated the task of disarmament.

41. As to the draft resolution itself, the statement in the first preambular paragraph that foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America were used for direct intervention in the internal affairs of peoples, for suppression of their struggle for independence and for dangerous activities which threatened world peace, was entirely false. The assertion in the second preambular paragraph was also unacceptable, in that agreements negotiated with sovereign States permitted and governed the existence of foreign military bases. It was also incompatible with the terms of the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Operative paragraph 2 showed clearly that the Soviet proposal had been reintroduced purely for propaganda purposes. How could the Soviet Union seriously ask the Secretary-General to "supervise the fulfilment of the terms of this resolution"?

42. In short, his delegation thought that it was important to reject the Soviet proposal once again. It would vote against the draft resolution.

43. Mr. SHEVCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the existence of foreign military bases was unquestionably one of the sources of present-day international tension. The socialist States had always considered their existence incompatible with normal relations between States. His delegation therefore fully endorsed the Soviet draft resolution concerning the elimination of foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Adoption of the draft resolution would strengthen and develop the recommendation made by the General Assembly, in its resolution 2105 (XX), on military bases in colonial Territories; those bases, originally established to support the former colonial empires, were now used as a means of provocation and aggression by the neo-colonialists who sought to dominate the young independent States.

44. Many other bases established comparatively recently were being used by the imperialist Powers for the same purpose. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter prohibited the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Yet in almost every act of aggression or intervention in the internal affairs of other States, the imperialists and colonialists had used and were still using their military bases, most of them held by the United States. The United States was carrying out its

aggression in Viet-Nam, including the barbarous bombing of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and many acts of aggression and subversion against Cambodia, from its bases in South Viet-Nam, Thailand, Okinawa and elsewhere. The construction of huge port facilities, airfields and oil storage installations in South Viet-Nam showed that the United States intended to entrench itself in South-East Asia for a long time.

45. Since the end of the Second World War the United States and the United Kingdom had established a large network of military bases covering dozens of States of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Under the United Kingdom's current "east of Suez" strategic plans, new bases and installations would be built in the area of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Negotiations were in progress between the United States and the United Kingdom for the building of a base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago, and similar bases were to be established in the Seychelles Islands, Mauritius and elsewhere.

46. The peoples of the Near East and Africa were seriously concerned at the continued existence of the United Kingdom military base at Aden, which directly threatened the national liberation movement of the people of southern Arabia and the independent States of the region. In its resolution 1949 (XVIII), the General Assembly had stated that the removal of the Aden base was desirable. Although the United Kingdom had undertaken to close the Aden base, it had been reported soon thereafter that it would be transferred to Bahrain. At the 1464th meeting the United Kingdom delegation had categorically denied any intention to transfer the Aden base to Bahrain; he wondered, however, whether it could give an equally categorical assurance that no new bases were planned in the Persian Gulf area or on the islands in the Indian Ocean.

47. The bloody events in the Congo, the Dominican Republic and Cyprus had shown what foreign military bases meant to peoples struggling for their independence and sovereignty. One of the reasons for tension in the Caribbean area was the existence of the United States base at Guantánamo, which the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964, had called a violation of Cuba's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Ukrainian SSR and all other peace-loving States resolutely supported Cuba's demand for the immediate dismantling of the Guantánamo base.

48. The struggle for the elimination of foreign military bases had already achieved considerable success; troops of the imperialist Powers had been withdrawn from almost forty countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Demands for the elimination of foreign military bases were contained in the decisions adopted by the Summit Conference of Independent African States, held at Addis Ababa in May 1963, and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first session, held at Cairo in July 1964, and its second session, held at Accra in October 1965, as well as the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. A number of delegations, including those of Guinea and the Congo (Brazzaville), had taken a similar position at the current session of the General

Assembly. The Guinean representative had pointed out (1451st meeting) that the existence of foreign military bases was synonymous with interference or armed intervention in the internal affairs of States and was therefore contrary to General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX).

49. The United States representative had denied that the question of foreign military bases was related to the problem of colonialism and had labelled any discussion of the question as propaganda, but his words could not cast doubt on the truth of the facts presented by the Soviet and other delegations. The Ukrainian delegation was convinced that adoption of the draft resolution before the Committee would help to ease international tension, strengthen the national independence and sovereignty of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and solve problems involved in the liquidation of colonialism.

50. Mr. ZAND FARD (Iran) said that the representative of the United Arab Republic had made certain unfounded allegations about the motives of the States parties to the Baghdad Pact. If that representative believed that those allegations were also valid in the case of the Central Treaty Organization, it must be stated that Iran had joined CENTO of its own free will and for purely defensive purposes. Those considerations still constituted the sole basis for Iran's association with CENTO, and any other interpretation of its membership was wholly erroneous.

51. Mr. ALARCON DE QUESADA (Cuba) said that the United States representative had given a misleading account of the origin of the United States naval base at Guantánamo in referring only to the Treaty of 1934 and saying that it had confirmed an earlier agreement.

52. The earlier agreement had been concluded on 23 February 1903, at the beginning of Cuba's life as a republic. It had been based on the Platt Amendment, which the United States occupying forces had imposed upon Cuba as a prerequisite for Cuban independence. The Platt Amendment had stipulated not only that the future Republic of Cuba must grant areas of land and territorial waters to the United States Government for the establishment of military and naval bases, but also that the United States would be entitled to intervene in Cuba's internal affairs whenever it saw fit.

53. That document had been the basis for the existence of the Guantánamo naval base, which was intended solely for aggression against Cuba. The base had now become a haven for spies, saboteurs, terrorists, counter-revolutionaries and fugitives from Cuban justice and posed a constant threat to Cuban security and independence.

54. Among the many incidents reported to the United Nations in the past by his delegation, he wished to mention at present only the murder of a Cuban soldier, Luis Ramfrez López, by United States marines of the Guantánamo base in May 1966. That incident had been used as a pretext for accusing Cuba of having attacked the base. The implications of the accusation were no doubt clear to every representative.

55. Maintenance of the Guantánamo base for subversive purposes was a flagrant threat to international

peace and security, especially since it had been established by a hostile Power in the territory of a country whose Government and people rejected the existence of the base and demanded its removal. The Revolutionary Government of Cuba firmly intended to demand the return of Guantánamo at the proper time.

56. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) said that Israel had no foreign military bases on its soil and was free from foreign commitments and entanglements. The United Arab Republic's views on the question of foreign bases would be received with greater confidence if it had not maintained an expeditionary corps in a country far from its own territory for the past three years and transformed the country into a battlefield. The withdrawal of forces of the United Arab Republic from foreign soil, promised by the Government of the United Arab Republic on various occasions, would constitute a greater contribution to the cause of peace, self-determination and the elimination of foreign military bases than any preaching about virtue.

57. Mr. FAHMY (United Arab Republic) explained that he had not said that there were bases in Israel, but that Israel itself, in its entirety, was a base of aggression in the Middle East. The latest aggression against Jordan and the Security Council's unprecedented condemnation of Israel bore out his statement. Moreover, Israel was providing arms to racist régimes in Africa for use against the heroic African nationalists.

58. With regard to Yemen, the Committee and the whole world knew that the United Arab Republic had declared its readiness to withdraw its forces as soon as the continuous intervention from bases and foreign elements surrounding Yemen ceased.

59. Although he had made no reference to Iran, his Government's views on the Baghdad Pact were still valid and were equally valid with regard to the Central Treaty Organization.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.