

United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 1436th
MEETING

Monday, 31 October 1966,
at 10.30 a.m.

NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENÍTES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 97

Renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (continued) (A/6398, A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. PUYAT (Philippines) said that the shift in emphasis from the general to particular aspects of the arms problem, which had begun at the previous session, had made it possible for the Committee to concentrate its efforts on the more urgent measures and on those which were most feasible technically but on which there was a minimum of political differences.

2. The problem of nuclear proliferation was of the utmost importance. The recent test explosions in the Pacific and in mainland China had brought home the harsh reality of the nuclear arms race and the danger not only from pollution, but, even more, from the aggressive pressure exerted by an expansionist China. The problem would be magnified as China increased the destructive power of its nuclear weapons and developed an effective delivery system. The latest Chinese nuclear test was the gravest set-back to the good purposes of the draft resolution under consideration (A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3) and a rejection of the appeal to all States to refrain from any action conducive to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

3. The task entrusted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was both complex and delicate. Since fundamental interests were involved, it was understandable that proposals to achieve the ends sought by General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) would be hard to formulate. It was gratifying to note that the areas of disagreement had diminished and the areas of agreement had increased. It was to be hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would be able to formulate specific proposals at its next series of meetings.

4. As many delegations had pointed out, if an early agreement on non-proliferation was not reached, the result might be a situation in which some problems

became almost insoluble. The ultimate objective was general and complete disarmament, but in order to achieve that, agreement must first be reached on non-proliferation. There were three main issues still to be solved. First, there must be a reconciliation of the different interpretations of what arrangements for the control of nuclear weapons among nuclear and non-nuclear members of a military alliance constituted proliferation. On that point, the principle stated in paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 2028 (XX) was unequivocal. Secondly, there was the question of the form of guarantee against nuclear attack and blackmail to be given to non-nuclear States. In the case of his own country, which already had mutual defence arrangements with a nuclear Power, a specific nuclear guarantee could only add to the firmness of its existing defence commitments, but to the non-aligned countries the guarantee was of the greatest importance. The guarantee should not be merely a general declaration of support in case of nuclear attack, but should consist of definite treaty obligations, ideally under the authority of the United Nations. Thirdly, there was the issue of the safeguards to guarantee compliance with the obligations signatory States assumed. He was confident that the provision in the United States draft treaty^{1/} calling for co-operation in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities would receive international acceptance.

5. At the annual meetings of the Boards of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of the International Monetary Fund, held at Washington in September 1966, it had been observed that less than 1 per cent of the increased resources of the developed countries had been directed to the development programmes of the developing countries during the previous year. It would be interesting to compare that figure with the enormous increase in expenditure on nuclear weapons and defence establishments during the same period.

6. His country had neither the economic resources nor the scientific knowledge to engage in the manufacture of nuclear weapons and would be most interested in a discussion of the ability of the nuclear and non-nuclear countries, especially the developing countries, to derive maximum benefit from the peaceful utilization of the atom.

7. His delegation fully supported the draft resolution under consideration. He hoped, however, that it might be possible for States which were not members of the

^{1/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. A; and *ibid.* Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex I, sect. K.

Eighteen-Nation Committee to become fully acquainted with the considerations leading to the decisions to be taken. It would be better to obtain the unanimous support of the General Assembly before formal agreements were reached.

8. Mr. TRIVEDI (India) thought that two factors were mainly responsible for the constructive atmosphere in the Committee's discussions. The first was that negotiations in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had been devoted principally to non-proliferation during 1966. The eight non-aligned members of the Committee had submitted a memorandum, on 19 August 1966,^{2/} analysing the problems involved and reiterating their conviction that a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should pay full attention to the principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). The second factor was the determination of the United States and the USSR to strive for mutual accommodation on the question of dissemination of nuclear weapons. A serious attempt was now being made to solve that problem and it was to be hoped that agreement would be reached in the near future. "Dissemination" was the giving or receiving of weapons and weapon technology, and "proliferation" included dissemination of nuclear weapons by one country to another or the receipt of such weapons by one country from another. An adequate treaty should prevent all such transfers, without any loop-hole.

9. A comprehensive treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should also deal with the manufacture of the weapons, or proliferation in the classical sense of the term. In accordance with paragraph 2 (b) of resolution 2028 (XX), an acceptable treaty should embody the responsibilities as well as the obligations of both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers.

10. The principles set out in resolution 2028 (XX) had been based on a memorandum submitted by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 15 September 1965,^{3/} and was the latest in a series of efforts by the international community to define proliferation and the measures to prevent it.

11. The problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons was not merely that of the dissemination of nuclear weapons by or from one country to another, nor merely that of the independent manufacture of nuclear weapons by a hitherto non-nuclear State. It also included the problem of the continued manufacture of nuclear weapons by the present nuclear Powers. Dissemination widened the geography of the nuclear arms race and could lead to an increase in international instability when additional countries acquired the ability to wage nuclear war. There was a similar increase in international instability when a new nation embarked on an independent nuclear programme. Those dangers were overshadowed, however, by the calamitous dangers of the arms race which was developing as a result of the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers themselves. For years the super-Powers had been capable of destroying the entire world and yet both they and the other nuclear Powers were continuing

to test and perfect their nuclear weapons and missiles. Only a few days before, the People's Republic of China had conducted yet another weapons test.

12. The problem should therefore be dealt with in a comprehensive manner. The proliferation of nuclear weapons had taken place, and was taking place, only among the members of military alliances and for reasons of prestige and security. The only effective way to deal with the consequences was to deal with the cause. Resolution 2028 (XX) had therefore stipulated that there should be an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. Although all five principles stated in paragraph 2 of the resolution were connected, they dealt with different facets of the problem, and principles (b) and (c) should not be confused. A treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was not an end in itself but a means to an end, namely, general and complete disarmament, more particularly nuclear disarmament, and measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should be accompanied or followed by measures to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. His delegation urged the nuclear Powers to take positive steps to reduce and eliminate their stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, and would be happy if such steps could be accompanied by measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it agreed with the other non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee that various steps to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons could be embodied in the treaty as part of its provisions or as a declaration of intention.

13. His delegation's position was clear and unambiguous. As far as the question of manufacture and dissemination of nuclear weapons was concerned, the treaty must embody balanced provisions which would impose mutual obligations and responsibilities on both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers not to proliferate. Therefore, on dissemination of nuclear weapons, a balanced provision would require that no country would give nuclear weapons to another country or receive nuclear weapons from another country, and, on the question of production, a balanced provision would require that no country, neither nuclear nor non-nuclear, would produce nuclear weapons. In any acceptable treaty, those obligations would have to be assumed by the nuclear Powers as well as the non-nuclear Powers. Measures to reduce and eliminate stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery could be accompanied by or follow the measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

14. Some peripheral issues, such as control, had been raised in the context of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. India had always believed that control and disarmament must go together. Control should be considered in an objective and non-discriminatory manner and should be exercised universally and on all aspects of proliferation, not only on peaceful utilization of nuclear energy but also on non-peaceful utilization.

15. The question of prohibiting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes such as canal or harbour projects in the developing countries was at present

^{2/} Ibid., Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex I, sect. P.

^{3/} Ibid., Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. E.

one of principle, not of practice. There was full justification for preventing proliferation in weapons, but it had never before been suggested that there should be non-proliferation in science and technology. Technology in itself was not evil. Knowledge and learning, science and technology must be disseminated. The three International Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy had provided effective opportunities for the dissemination of scientific information on the application of atomic energy to peaceful purposes. The present age was the age of technology, and the future of the world, particularly of the developing world, would be decided by the extent to which the emerging nations were able to absorb and use modern technological developments. They could not afford to remain mere producers of raw material to be exported to the industrialized nations. The United States Government had recognized as early as 1946 that no nation could long maintain or morally defend a monopoly of the peaceful benefits of atomic energy.

16. His delegation agreed unreservedly that nuclear energy must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Any arrangement for the control of production of fissile material in an objective, comprehensive and non-discriminatory manner had its full support. His country agreed with the conclusion reached in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, dated 19 August 1966, that it was urgent to negotiate a treaty which reflected the mandate given by the General Assembly in resolution 2028 (XX) and which was acceptable to all concerned.

17. Mr. HSUEH (China) was glad to note that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had made substantial progress during the past year, particularly on the question of non-proliferation. The fact that it had not reached specific agreement on any of the unresolved issues relating to disarmament was surely no cause for disappointment or despair. No other international problem was of greater magnitude or more complex. Time was required to disarm a world which had lived with armaments for thousands of years.

18. The progress made on the question of non-proliferation had been confirmed by the statements of the first two speakers in the current debate (1431st meeting). Both statements appeared to reflect the common will of all delegations, and the relatively propitious atmosphere in which the Committee's work had begun was encouraging. Like previous speakers, he hoped that a treaty on non-proliferation based on the principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) would soon be concluded. A treaty banning the transfer of nuclear weapons to the non-nuclear Powers, and the manufacture of nuclear weapons by them, would be an important step forward towards the final goal of disarmament. The urgent need for a treaty on non-proliferation had been demonstrated once again by the fact that the Chinese Communists had carried out yet another nuclear explosion in the atmosphere on 27 October. The Peiping régime, indifferent to world public opinion and the suffering of the mainland Chinese, was determined to acquire nuclear weapons in order to pursue its policy of war and world domination, and

was resolutely opposed to peace and disarmament and even to the nuclear test ban. Those who had helped the Peiping régime with technical knowledge and equipment in the early stages of its nuclear development programme might now regret that they had done so; and that tragic state of affairs might have been averted if agreement on non-proliferation had been reached ten years earlier.

19. In the circumstances, it was not surprising that earlier speakers had expressed greater concern than ever before about the national security of the non-nuclear States. The Committee should consider what steps the nuclear States were prepared to take to reduce the threat created by the very existence of nuclear weapons, and what security guarantees the non-nuclear States could expect when they undertook to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. The problem of the Federal Republic of Germany in regard to non-proliferation was mainly a European problem; but even delegations from non-European countries could appreciate that the position of the Federal Republic was uncomfortable. Seven hundred medium-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads were located, ready for action, not far from its eastern border; and although they were aimed at the whole of Western Europe, they were geographically closest to the Federal Republic. Unless they were dismantled and removed—or, better still, destroyed—the Federal Republic could not be blamed for its anxiety.

20. In Asia, the problem of security was even graver. Nuclear weapons in the hands of aggressive fanatics were a serious menace to every nation; and recent events had confirmed that there was not the slightest chance of those weapons being given up as a result of peaceful negotiations. No doubt, the elimination or considerable reduction of nuclear stockpiles would make the world safer and would be most desirable; but, in the circumstances, the most that could realistically be hoped for was a mutual arrangement by some of the nuclear Powers to reduce their stockpiles. The destruction under supervision of certain types of nuclear weapons, a verified freeze and possible reduction in the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems and the conversion of fissionable materials to peaceful uses would be useful practical measures, as would the much-discussed comprehensive nuclear test ban. If agreement on those measures could be reached soon, important progress would have been made.

21. In short, at a time when prospects for the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation were brighter, more attention should be given to the problem of the security of the non-nuclear Powers. One solution was the establishment of mutual defence arrangements within an alliance, as in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany. Such arrangements, within the framework of non-proliferation, should not be opposed for other political reasons, and should not be regarded as action hampering the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. They would, rather, help to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Another solution was the so-called "nuclear umbrella". He hoped that the United States "nuclear umbrella", to which the head of his delegation had referred in a statement at the General Assembly's twentieth session (1354th plenary meeting) would never be used; but an arrange-

ment of that kind should be studied to ensure that the "umbrella" was always at hand when a crisis arose. A third possible solution had been suggested in a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.371) submitted under agenda item 26, by which the General Assembly would, inter alia, request the nuclear Powers to give an assurance that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. Such an assurance was also most desirable, though further studies would perhaps be required to determine the form in which adequate guarantees should be given.

22. The draft treaties submitted by the United States^{4/} and the Soviet Union^{5/} both contained provisions prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons from nuclear to non-nuclear Powers and the manufacture of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear Powers, but neither contained a provision banning the transfer of nuclear weapons from one nuclear Power to another. Some existing nuclear weapons were highly sophisticated, some less sophisticated, and some merely rudimentary; and although in the present international situation there was little likelihood that a more advanced nuclear Power would help a less advanced nuclear Power with its nuclear development, international relations might change unexpectedly; it might be worth while to give some attention to the question of non-proliferation among the nuclear Powers themselves.

23. The Eighteen-Nation Committee had made substantial progress on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests during the past two years. Nearly all members of the First Committee, too, were agreed on the urgent need to extend the test ban treaty to underground nuclear tests and hoped that a comprehensive test ban treaty could be concluded without further delay. But the question whether man-made underground disturbances could be identified without on-site inspection, and whether accordingly a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was enforceable without arrangements for on-site inspection, was a technical question which could not be settled by debate. Since the States which claimed to possess scientific equipment capable of identifying—as well as detecting—underground disturbances still regarded their equipment as secret, it was futile for those who did not possess the necessary scientific information to press for the conclusion of a treaty which might be unenforceable. Accordingly, his delegation maintained the proposal it had advanced at the twentieth session in the First Committee (1384th meeting) for a programme of joint scientific experiments on reliable methods of identification, which would obviate the need to divulge any country's national secrets. The Eighteen-Nation Committee had already helped to clarify many such issues and was the most competent body to undertake the study. His delegation hoped that the Committee would continue its useful efforts in that direction and would have another year of work fruitful for the progress of disarmament in general.

24. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) found it distressing that, in spite of profound world-wide aspirations for

disarmament, the political and technological obstacles to the elimination of armaments had not yet been overcome. The smaller and poorer nations of the world felt great concern at the ever-accelerating arms race, both because it increased the danger of war and because it wasted enormous resources which were badly needed for food, shelter, clothing, medical care and education for millions of people throughout the world.

25. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had adjourned its 1966 series of meetings without achieving any concrete results either on nuclear disarmament or on other arms control measures. The United States and the Soviet Union had each made separate proposals for specific limited disarmament measures, but since neither side would agree to any modification of its own position, no progress had been made.

26. If prompt measures were not undertaken to achieve an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on other measures of arms control, the world might soon degenerate into nuclear anarchy. There was a pressing need for the nuclear Powers to overcome procedural difficulties and agree on the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. Statements made in the First Committee by the United States and Soviet Union representatives indicated that their Governments recognized the urgent need for such a treaty and that they had made some progress towards agreement on the subject. She hoped that by the time the twenty-second session of the General Assembly began, complete agreement would have been reached and that a treaty on non-proliferation would be near, if not already concluded.

27. The disagreements between the Eastern and Western Powers on arrangements for nuclear weapons within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and on the question of inspection had been cited in some quarters as reasons for the failure to agree on a treaty; frank discussion and goodwill could go far towards settling those disagreements. The nuclear Powers should agree not to transfer the control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries, and the latter should agree not to acquire nuclear weapons by any means. However, measures must also be undertaken by the nuclear Powers to guarantee the safety of non-nuclear nations signing a treaty on non-proliferation.

28. The chances of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be enhanced through a comprehensive test ban treaty, which need not wait until the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation and to which France and the People's Republic of China should become parties. Her delegation also favoured the creation of nuclear-free zones in more areas of the world.

29. Liberia joined Japan in endorsing the Secretary-General's suggestion to the effect that an appropriate United Nations body should undertake a comprehensive study of the consequences of the invention of nuclear weapons.

30. The nuclear Powers should give consideration to a decision to desist, pending the conclusion of a disarmament agreement, from the manufacture of

^{4/} See footnote 1.

^{5/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 106, document A/5976.

more nuclear weapons for destructive purposes and to undertake measures to ensure that nuclear explosions were set off for peaceful purposes only.

31. Lastly, only an effective measure of international control would allay the fears of all States, nuclear or non-nuclear, about the armaments race. It might be useful to consider securing the services of a broadly based panel of experts, including persons from States not Members of the United Nations, to study the whole range of disarmament possibilities, particularly the question of international arms control.

32. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that non-proliferation was one of the most important steps in the direction of general and complete disarmament. In the General Assembly itself and in representative gatherings such as the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in 1964, it had been generally recognized that a further spread of nuclear weapons would threaten the security of all States and hamper the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Proposals to establish nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world were further evidence of the general condemnation of proliferation.

33. In recent months there had been certain changes for the better in the attitude of the United States. In the First Committee, the United States representative had given assurances that his country was categorically opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, that it would not take any action conducive to proliferation and that it was intending to make every effort to reach agreement on the terms of a treaty on non-proliferation as soon as possible. He hoped that the United States Government would follow up those assurances with practical steps. While noting some positive trends in the solution of the problem of proliferation, he felt obliged to draw attention to certain unfavourable circumstances which were hampering the conclusion of an agreement. In the Assembly's general debate, his delegation had already drawn attention (1440th plenary meeting) to the threat which might be created if the Federal Republic of Germany were to obtain access to nuclear weapons. In the interests of all peoples it was essential to ensure that the Federal Republic could not obtain access to nuclear weapons in any way, either within the NATO multilateral nuclear force or under other bilateral or multilateral agreements. But it was clear from statements in the Press that the Government of the Federal Republic was still clamouring for nuclear weapons and that the United States was indulging the wishes of the West German revanchists. On the previous day, for instance, The New York Times had reported that the Bonn Government was fully confident that the United States position on nuclear sharing had not changed, that Washington would keep its promises, and that the United States would continue to insist on a "European clause" in the non-proliferation treaty which "would leave the door open for a European nuclear decision-making entity to include West Germany".

34. Reports of that kind shed light on certain aspects of the United States representative's statement at the 1431st meeting—for instance, his remark that at the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee held during

1966 there had been a growing awareness that collective nuclear defence arrangements did not necessarily lead to proliferation. That remark was completely at variance both with the instructions which the General Assembly had given to the Eighteen-Nation Committee in resolution 2028 (XX) and with the views expressed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee itself. From the report of the Committee and the verbatim records of its meetings, it was quite clear that the majority of its members believed that all loop-holes for the further proliferation of nuclear weapons should be closed.

35. The emergence of new nuclear Powers was dangerous for large and small States alike, as it increased still further the risk of a world thermo-nuclear catastrophe. As The Observer had pointed out, the number of nuclear Powers had risen over the past seventeen years from one to five, and in the next seventeen years it might increase to ten or fifteen. If people who survived the first nuclear war were to write history, they might say that the catastrophe which had overtaken them could have been averted in 1966.

36. The question of a treaty on non-proliferation should not be linked with the solution of other disarmament problems. In its resolution 2028 (XX) the General Assembly had considered a treaty on non-proliferation as a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. It had not said that the treaty should be conditional upon agreement on other problems; proposals to link non-proliferation with other problems would not facilitate the early conclusion of a treaty.

37. Several speakers had referred to the need to provide non-nuclear Powers with guarantees against nuclear attack; but that question could easily be solved by adopting the Soviet proposal for including in the treaty a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which had no nuclear weapons in their territory.

38. The most satisfactory solution would be to adopt a treaty on non-proliferation based on the principles set forth in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). That solution was wholly within the realm of possibility. But in the meantime, pending the conclusion and entry into force of the treaty, priority should be given to the Soviet proposal that all States should refrain from any actions conducive to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on non-proliferation. By adopting draft resolution A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3, which was now sponsored by countries from all parts of the world, the General Assembly would help considerably to reduce international tension, strengthen confidence between States and facilitate agreement on non-proliferation and other problems of general and complete disarmament. Agreement on those problems would, indeed, be easier to achieve if the international situation were more favourable; but the situation was at present being aggravated by the continued United States aggression in Viet-Nam. Adoption of the draft resolution would also confound the plans of those who were

still trying to use loop-holes of one kind or another for nuclear proliferation.

39. Apart from the question of proliferation, his delegation was resolved to work for agreed decisions on other disarmament measures as well.

40. Mr. HAKIM (Lebanon) said that the prevention of proliferation, in the sense of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons from nuclear to non-nuclear Powers, was an important way of limiting the terrible dangers of nuclear conflict. The Soviet representative had quite rightly described it (1431st meeting) as one of the most urgent problems of disarmament which required immediate solution; and the general agreement of the First Committee on the basic elements of the problem had been reflected in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).

41. His own delegation's views could be expressed in the form of certain basic propositions which were widely accepted by other delegations. In the first place, proliferation of nuclear weapons would greatly endanger international peace and security, and the increase in the risk of nuclear war would be proportionately greater than the increase in the number of nuclear States. With twenty or more nuclear States, there would be a serious danger not only of local or regional nuclear conflicts, but also of a world nuclear war. Even at present, there was a grave risk that limited conventional wars might escalate into a worldwide nuclear conflict.

42. Non-proliferation was in the interests of all nations, great and small, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. He agreed with the United States representative's observation that a non-nuclear State could not promote its long-range security today by acquiring nuclear weapons, but not with the same representative's assertion that the increased danger would be felt more by the non-nuclear States than by States with nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons anywhere—and by any Power, small or great—was likely to lead to a world nuclear war, in which the great Powers would suffer the greatest devastation. While the small countries would have small bombs with a correspondingly smaller power of devastation, the most destructive nuclear bombs in an all-out nuclear war would be launched against areas and bases where the largest quantities of nuclear weapons were concentrated—that is, against the territories of the major nuclear Powers.

43. Non-proliferation was not an end in itself but an essential step on the road to general and complete disarmament. Before that ultimate goal was reached, one of mankind's foremost aims should be the destruction of all nuclear armaments in order to banish the threat of nuclear war once and for all. While it was extremely urgent to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which did not at present possess them, it was equally important to stop the accumulation of nuclear weapons by countries which did possess them. The constant accumulation of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear Powers and the development of increasingly refined weapons with greater destructive powers might in the long run be much more dangerous to mankind than the spread of nuclear weapons to the smaller Powers. Priority should, of course, be given

to a treaty on non-proliferation. Once that first step had been taken, the accumulation of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear Powers should be stopped, and then existing stockpiles should be reduced and ultimately destroyed.

44. The urgency of a treaty on non-proliferation was due mainly to the fact that, as more countries acquired nuclear weapons, it would become increasingly difficult to prevent others from following suit for reasons of national security. The United Kingdom representative had stated (1432nd meeting)—and he believed him—that if the United Kingdom were not already in possession of nuclear weapons, it would not now seek to acquire them; but that was because the United Kingdom's national security was not guaranteed by its possession of nuclear weapons, but by the alliance to which it belonged. If another country with no "nuclear umbrella" to protect it were to find that a potential enemy had acquired nuclear weapons, considerations of national security would induce it to acquire nuclear weapons at all costs. It was the same fear of nuclear attack which had led the five great Powers to develop their nuclear armaments.

45. The time was now propitious for the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. If the opportunity were missed now, it might soon be lost. His delegation was encouraged by the statements of the United States and Soviet representatives that their Governments were determined to make every effort to reach agreement on a treaty.

46. Furthermore, the non-nuclear Powers which undertook not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons should be given some guarantees in return. Their Governments had a duty to safeguard their peoples against nuclear attacks and they were therefore entitled to demand assurances that they would be safe from nuclear attack if they forswore nuclear weapons.

47. He wished to give his delegation's views on certain problems involved in the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. First, the treaty must at all costs be universal. All the nuclear Powers should become parties to it since, if even one of them did not accede, the danger of proliferation would remain. They should all, therefore, be invited to participate in the negotiations. The contracting parties should also include all the non-nuclear Powers since, if some non-nuclear States stood aside from it and decided to produce nuclear weapons on their own, their neighbours would fear that their national security was endangered and would hesitate to accede to the treaty. His delegation attached particular importance to the principle of universality, because of the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons to the Middle East.

48. Secondly, apart from undertaking not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, the nuclear Powers should refrain from exercising political or any other pressure on the non-nuclear Powers to persuade them to follow certain policies or participate in certain agreements or alliances. The non-nuclear countries, including his own, wished to maintain their policy of non-alignment in the interests of world peace, which would not be served by dividing countries into groups under the leadership of rival nuclear Powers. The existing nuclear Powers should also offer collective and

multilateral guarantees to a non-nuclear country which was threatened with nuclear attack after forswearing the use of nuclear weapons. Such guarantees would be in keeping with the United Nations Charter, which prohibited the threat or use of force, and with the higher responsibility of the nuclear Powers for the maintenance of international peace. The conditions on which such guarantees should be given were not easy to define, but some appropriate solution would have to be found.

49. Thirdly, the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy should be made available to all countries, and steps should be taken to ensure that facilities designed for peaceful purposes could not be diverted to the production of nuclear bombs. Consideration should be given to the inclusion in the treaty on non-proliferation of provisions requiring non-nuclear countries to submit their nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). His delegation particularly commended the Polish-Czech proposal to that effect.

50. Finally, the policy of establishing nuclear-free zones wherever feasible should be encouraged and expanded. Whatever precautions the nuclear Powers might take to prevent their weapons from falling into unauthorized hands, or from causing harm to people in areas where they were located, arrangements limiting the territorial dissemination of nuclear weapons were in the interests of world peace and security.

51. None of the problems to which he had referred was insurmountable. On the contrary, the advantages of a non-proliferation treaty to all countries were so clear that there should be no further delay in reaching agreement. In the meantime, the proposal made in the draft resolution before the Committee was very wise and useful, and his delegation was glad to support it.

52. Mr. MAJID (Afghanistan) said that the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons had increased during the past year. Some nations had conducted nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, others had conducted underground tests, and a number of nations were now considered potentially nuclear Powers. There was a serious risk that nuclear weapons would begin to escape the control of responsible centres and threaten the whole world with the danger of annihilation. It was perhaps for that reason that the Committee had given priority to the debate on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

53. At the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva and at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in 1964, a number of nations had expressed their desire for progress on the question of disarmament in general and for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the cessation of underground tests in particular. The United States and the Soviet Union had proposed separate draft treaties on non-proliferation, but had failed, after

long negotiation, to reach agreement on a single treaty. It was the essential role of the General Assembly to work out an acceptable treaty on non-proliferation based on the principles embodied in its resolution 2028 (XX). Since the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing posed dangers to all States, treaties aimed at averting those dangers were the concern of all States. That was why Afghanistan, a non-aligned and non-nuclear nation, had joined in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.371, submitted under agenda item 26.

54. It was to be hoped that any treaty on non-proliferation that was finally signed would, as the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had recommended, "embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers" ^{6/} In particular, Afghanistan favoured a declaration prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear nation.

55. Afghanistan viewed with deep concern the continuance of nuclear weapon tests. His delegation hoped not only that the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow in 1963, would be universally observed but that it would be followed by a comprehensive test ban, covering tests in all environments.

56. Agreement should also be sought on the important question of the conversion and safeguarding of fissionable material. The International Atomic Energy Agency could play an important role in inspecting nuclear power plants in order to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses.

57. His delegation subscribed whole-heartedly to the principle of establishing regional nuclear-free zones for the protection of States that did not possess nuclear weapons. Denuclearization of Latin America and Africa as recommended by the countries of those continents would constitute an advance toward the general aim of non-proliferation and disarmament.

58. He hoped that a world disarmament conference, such as had been endorsed by the General Assembly in 1965 (resolution 2030 (XX)), would be held as soon as possible and would follow the principle of universality, with the active participation of all countries.

59. Afghanistan was also greatly concerned over the continued acquisition and dissemination of conventional weapons and hoped that the disarmament conference would take steps to safeguard the world against any imbalance or proliferation of such weapons. An imbalance in a particular region could endanger the peace and security of the world. Moreover, the resources devoted to the arms race, particularly by small and developing countries, were preventing social and economic advancement and the improvement of standards of living.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

^{6/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. P.