

United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

TWENTIETH SESSION

Official Records



FIRST COMMITTEE, 1363rd
MEETING

Tuesday, 26 October 1965,
at 10.45 a.m.

NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 106

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*)
(A/5976, A/5986-DC/227)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. TRIVEDI (India) said that since the early sessions of the General Assembly the Indian delegation had been urging upon the international community the imperative need to halt, reduce and eliminate the nuclear weapon menace. India had requested the inclusion of the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the agenda of the Assembly's nineteenth session, and was glad that the Soviet Union had taken the initiative in placing it on the agenda of the current session.

2. The Indian position, in brief, was that the only practical approach to the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons was that both the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers should undertake simultaneous obligations through an international instrument. Accordingly, it was essential that, while the non-nuclear Powers renounced the production, acquisition and control of, and access to, nuclear weapons, the nuclear Powers should simultaneously refrain from the further production of those weapons and their delivery vehicles and reach agreement on a reduction of existing stockpiles. The central fact of the situation was that further proliferation had already taken place, and that the problem could not be solved effectively by accepting that fait accompli. The Indian approach, therefore, was that a treaty on non-proliferation should deal with the problem of present proliferation as well as future proliferation.

3. India considered this to be the rational approach for an effective, balanced and non-discriminatory international treaty. At the same time, as far as the national decision—as distinguished from the components of an international instrument—was concerned, India had refrained from manufacturing nuclear weapons although it had had the capacity for quite some time of doing so. India had large uranium deposits and the greatest resources of thorium-rich minerals in the world; the Asian country which now wished to be described as a nuclear Power had admitted a

few years ago that India was fifteen years ahead of it in nuclear technology. India had a chemical separation plant. Despite all this, India's position on the manufacture of nuclear weapons had not changed.

4. On the question of an adequate and appropriate international treaty, the Indian position coincided with the basic approach envisaged in the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned Powers participating in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.^{1/} From the exhaustive debates which had taken place on that subject three broad trends had emerged.

5. Firstly, there was the non-aligned, non-nuclear approach; that had been enunciated broadly at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964: namely, that the great Powers should abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among States which did not at present possess them, and that all States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, should for that purpose conclude agreements on non-dissemination and agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation of existing stockpiles. As part of those efforts the Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries had declared their own readiness not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons, and had called on all countries, including those which had not subscribed to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, to enter into a similar undertaking. In that connexion, the distinction between non-dissemination and non-proliferation made by the representative of Malta was worthy of note. He had defined "dissemination" as the creation by a nuclear Power of a new nuclear entity or Power, either directly, by the provision of weapons or technology, or indirectly, by permitting control of nuclear weapons by a hitherto non-nuclear entity or Power. Thus, the present nuclear Powers could immediately agree on a treaty on non-dissemination, whereas a treaty on non-proliferation would need to provide not only for a freeze in the production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles by the present nuclear Powers but also for a substantial and agreed measure of nuclear disarmament. The approach favoured by the non-aligned and non-nuclear countries was also reflected in the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965;^{2/} it was also envisaged in the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee,^{1/} and had been lucidly outlined to the First Committee by

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. E.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, document DC/225.

the representative of Liberia. While there were some differences in nuance, the delegations which maintained that approach were in general agreement that an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not isolate the issues of future proliferation and present proliferation. The Indian delegation's view was that the former was a consequence of the latter, and that there could be no effective attack on the consequence without dealing with the cause.

6. The second approach had been explained by the Italian representative at the 1357th meeting. It recognized the validity of the non-nuclear, non-aligned countries' position, but sought to obtain a moratorium on future proliferation for a short agreed period of time, during which the nuclear Powers, in exchange for a unilateral renunciation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear countries, would agree to cease all further production and embark on a programme of reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Some countries had suggested that the moratorium should be linked with other measures; for example, Denmark and Sweden had suggested that it should be combined with a moratorium on underground tests, while the Indian delegation had suggested that it should be dovetailed into a general scheme of non-proliferation.

7. The third approach was that of the nuclear Powers, their partners in military alliances and other countries which felt that their security was safeguarded by the existing nuclear Powers. It sought to deal only with the problem of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries which had not yet exploded a nuclear weapon device; it did not deal with the extremely urgent problem of countries which had exploded nuclear devices, whether or not they had a nuclear weapons stockpile or a delivery system. That omission was equivalent to inviting proliferation. Nevertheless, the Indian delegation fully recognized the sincerity of those who took that approach and the genuineness of the objectives underlying the draft treaties they had submitted on that basis. An international instrument had, however, to be examined objectively on the basis of its implications and results, not of what its authors intended it to be. The partial test ban treaty, as was known, had been drafted to reduce the arms race and limit the nuclear menace; but its denial by one country had in fact led to proliferation. It was necessary, therefore, to learn by experience.

8. The Indian delegation took a flexible position on the various attempts at a solution of the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons; but it was convinced that an adequate treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would have to deal simultaneously with the problems of future and present proliferation, and that the drafts before the First Committee would therefore have to be enlarged so as to embrace the essential features of the approach taken by the non-aligned and non-nuclear countries. Only then would it be possible to obtain a balanced and non-discriminatory treaty, and only then would real and effective non-proliferation be feasible.

9. Apart from the fact that the draft treaties submitted by the nuclear Powers lacked provisions deal-

ing with the problem of ensuring that a would-be nuclear Power did not build up a stockpile and develop a nuclear weapon delivery system while other countries subscribed to an international treaty committing them not to do so, there was another lacuna, arising from the fact that they were based on the presumption that security was provided by military alliances. That approach did not take into account the security of the non-aligned, non-nuclear countries, which did not believe in military alliances, since they were convinced that the existence of military blocs, great-Power alliances and pacts arising from them accentuated the cold war. As the representative of Poland had said in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, members and non-members of military alliances must be treated equally, and the non-nuclear NATO countries must not be given special treatment as compared with the other non-nuclear countries. That observation applied equally to the draft treaties submitted by the nuclear Powers, in that they did not take into account the security of non-aligned, non-nuclear States which believed that their security lay not in guarantees or military alliances but in concrete steps towards disarmament. No rational or balanced treaty should permit any country which wished to call itself a nuclear Power, and which would assume no obligations under the treaty, to commence manufacturing nuclear weapons, build up stockpiles, perfect delivery systems and "proliferate".

10. Commenting on the central content of the two draft treaties, as reflected in article I, he said that all doors through which the nuclear Powers might be able to provide other countries with access to nuclear weapons in any form should be closed. India hoped that it would be possible to agree on a draft treaty incorporating the position of the non-aligned, non-nuclear countries on the question, and embodying an article I which offered no loop-holes whatsoever. When it resumed its negotiations, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should be in a position to reach a synthesis which could receive the support of the international community.

11. Mr. LACHS (Poland) recalled that for several years Poland had been working to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Its plans for a nuclear-free zone and its scheme for a nuclear freeze in Central Europe were aimed at arresting the dangerous trend towards dissemination, at least geographically. Poland fully supported the draft treaty on non-dissemination submitted by the Soviet Union (A/5976), which seemed to it an excellent basis for the conclusion of a treaty.

12. It was necessary to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons as a matter of the utmost urgency because of the growing capacity of a number of States to manufacture nuclear weapons and the possibility that some nuclear Powers would make those weapons accessible to States which did not possess them. If that trend continued, many States which had so far shown restraint might find themselves drawn into the arms race. The risks of war would be multiplied, it would become ever more difficult to solve political controversies by peaceful means, many conflicts would arise, tensions would grow, and the prospect of disarmament would become

even more remote. On the other hand, if nuclear dispersion were contained within its present limits, that would constitute a step towards further disarmament measures—for, of course, it was only one of the measures to be taken in the process leading to disarmament. In that respect his delegation shared the view expressed by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in their joint memorandum. Far from reconciling itself to living in the shadow of the atomic bomb, his delegation felt that it was necessary to continue the efforts to make the bomb disappear, and at least, as a preliminary step to its ultimate destruction, to confine it to those in whose hands it was at present.

13. Non-dissemination therefore had many advantages. True, it imposed an obligation on some not to transfer nuclear weapons and on others not to manufacture or acquire them in any other way, but in exchange the world would obtain an assurance that no nuclear State would gain an advantage in that field with regard to other nuclear States and that no non-nuclear State would find itself at a disadvantage with regard to other non-nuclear States. That was why Poland was prepared to accept such an agreement. However, it considered that to make non-dissemination conditional on other measures would only render agreement on the subject more difficult.

14. Although the need for the speedy conclusion of a treaty on non-dissemination was recognized by all, delegations seemed to differ on what it should contain. The draft treaty submitted by the United States^{3/} prohibited the manufacture of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear States, the transfer of nuclear weapons into the national control of any State that did not have them, and the receipt of such transfer. That was highly inadequate and therefore not acceptable. The possibilities for the dissemination of nuclear weapons by means other than what was called national control were endless. They could, for example, be disseminated by all sorts of collective arrangements which might transform non-nuclear States into nuclear States or at least give them a special status vis-à-vis nuclear weapons, thus creating a new category of States, situated as it were between nuclear and non-nuclear States, which would enjoy a sort of *status mixtus*. But, just as there could be no middle term between war and peace, the creation of a new category of States would contradict the whole concept on which a non-dissemination treaty must be based. It was in fact very probable that States which had acquired such a status would claim further rights which would elevate them to the rank of nuclear States rather than give up the rights they had already acquired. Thus they would acquire access to nuclear weapons through the back door. Even if the military arsenals remained the same, any new State sharing them would become a party to the arms race, which would then be extended—whether the sharing was called "nuclear collaboration" or "nuclear integration".

15. One could hardly speak of normal or natural arrangements within the framework of military alliances, as some had done, or claim equality for all the members of such an association. The idea

of equality could not enter into the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear States. It was an undeniable fact that the Powers already possessing nuclear weapons had a special status and that the criterion of equality would inevitably imply equalization upwards and not downwards. It should not be forgotten that the ultimate goal was the total elimination of nuclear weapons and not their accumulation under one form or another. If the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear States within military alliances was not clearly established the very idea of non-dissemination would be destroyed. How could a legitimate claim then be advanced to maintain that distinction with regard to non-aligned countries? those considerations applied to any military alliance, but in the case of the draft treaty submitted by the United States it happened that the alliance was NATO. NATO meant Europe, and, more particularly, the Federal Republic of Germany.

16. For some time the Federal Republic of Germany had been stretching out its hands for nuclear weapons. But he did not see why it should be accorded a special status under the treaty on non-dissemination, especially when German imperialism had not been exorcized. Instead of accepting the constructive proposals of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic claimed territories extending to the Vistula; moreover, in the name of equality within NATO it was asking for bigger and more powerful armaments; it continued to follow a policy of expansion and tension. The West German militarists were becoming ever more aggressive. Any arrangement or partnership concerning nuclear weapons which would include the Federal Republic of Germany would only encourage them. It was not Poland's security alone that was at stake; by accepting the extravagant demands of one State the chances for a world-wide agreement on non-dissemination would be jeopardized. In the particular case of Europe, history had proved not only that armaments made political solutions more difficult but that they constituted a political problem in themselves. The best way to secure lasting peace for Europe, which had known 187 wars in five centuries, was to further a spirit of détente by the reduction of existing arsenals and by co-operation in a spirit of mutual security. The security of Europe was a prior condition to the solution of all other European problems; it would also have an impact on other parts of the world and vice versa.

17. An effective bar to dissemination must apply equally to all States, whether or not they belonged to alliances. For their part, the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization had no intention of imposing on the NATO countries obligations which they were not themselves prepared to assume. Poland had always fought against the dissemination of atomic weapons, and there could be no doubt of its good faith in insisting that no non-nuclear State should share decision-making power with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. Had its proposals been accepted in the past, many of the dangers of today could have been avoided. It was therefore essential to oppose the dangerous trend and to break the opposition of those who advocated a policy of strength and the arms race.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, document DC/227, annex 1, sect. A.

18. A treaty without loop-holes or ambiguities should be concluded without delay, and every effort should be made to reach a substantive decision at the current session. It would be useful, meanwhile, for all countries to undertake to take no action and make no arrangement which would constitute a *fait accompli* and make agreement more difficult, if not impossible. Little progress had been made in the twenty years since the signers of the United Nations Charter had pledged themselves, in Article 26, to "the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources" and in the six years since the decision had been taken to work for general and complete disarmament. But a non-dissemination treaty would be a step in the right direction. It would be regrettable if the First Committee were to miss one more opportunity and thus expose itself to the charge of guilt by default.

19. Mr. VAKIL (Iran) said that his delegation appreciated the initiative taken by the USSR in requesting the inclusion of the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Assembly's agenda. That had given the First Committee the opportunity to emphasize the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons and the necessity for reaching an agreement. Close to twenty countries would soon be in a position, technically and economically, to manufacture nuclear weapons. Would they evaluate the questions of security and national prestige in the same light as India and would they be able to resist the temptation to develop their own atomic arsenals? It must be emphasized, however, that the best way to halt proliferation was to give the non-nuclear countries, whose security needs were real, assurances which would offset their apprehensions. It had already been said repeatedly that if additional States were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would be even more difficult, if not impossible, to arrest or reverse the dangerous trend.

20. It was gratifying to note that on one point at least the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers were in agreement: that a treaty on non-proliferation must be concluded as soon as possible. The representatives of the United States and the USSR had said (1355th meeting) that they were prepared to work for such a treaty. It could therefore be assumed that the time was ripe, psychologically, for its conclusion. The two draft treaties before the Committee provided a basis for negotiation. The members of the Committee were by now aware of the basic divergencies between those texts and the special consideration which had led to their formulation. His delegation considered that instead of embarking on a detailed analysis of their provisions at the present stage, it would be better to emphasize the similarities between the two texts. The Assembly should maintain the pressure on all concerned and call both for restraint in the arms race and for prompt negotiation to hammer out a generally acceptable agreement. The method which had brought a limited test ban treaty in 1963 might again prove useful. An international agreement for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons would have the further effect of bringing out the most significant related issues, such as the security of non-nuclear countries and the time-table for great-Power disarmament.

21. The draft unilateral declaration proposed by Italy^{4/} might be very useful as a less ambitious plan and as a prelude to the conclusion of a treaty. His delegation associated itself also with the ideas expressed in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, which underlined the urgency of the question of non-proliferation and the need to accompany any treaty, viewed as a means and not as an end in itself, by tangible additional measures. In that connexion, the United States proposal for the destruction of a certain quantity of atomic weapons should be given serious consideration.

22. Frequent references had been made to the inter-relationship of a non-proliferation treaty and a treaty prohibiting underground testing and to the fact that the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty would help to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. His delegation shared that view. He expressed the hope that the Committee would remove the remaining obstacles to the extension of the partial test ban treaty to cover underground tests. His Government would support any system of detection that the United Nations might recommend and was particularly interested in the United States offer of technical assistance in that regard.

23. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he felt it necessary to speak again at that point in the consideration of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons because certain statements had to be clarified and replied to. First and foremost, his delegation was gratified to note the virtual unanimity which had so far emerged regarding the importance of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Many representatives had acknowledged the urgent need for a solution to that problem and for the speedy conclusion of a treaty. His delegation was also happy to note the general recognition of the fact that the dissemination of nuclear weapons was a threat to the security of all States, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. It must be stressed once again that the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be separated from the other problems and that all efforts must be concentrated on settling that question promptly. The Soviet Union, of course, was not seeking to perpetuate the present situation. An agreement on non-proliferation was not an end in itself: it was an essential step towards the total prohibition of nuclear weapons and towards disarmament. His delegation expressed its gratitude to all those who shared its view and had supported the Soviet proposals on non-proliferation.

24. His delegation felt compelled to reply to the attempts made to distort the Soviet Union's objectives and to pervert the substance of the draft treaty it had submitted. It also felt bound to bring out the entire inconsistency of the arguments advanced by those who were attempting to justify their plans for the dissemination of nuclear weapons and had come to the defence of the militarists of West Germany.

25. It had been stated in the Committee that the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, or

^{4/} *Ibid.*, sect. D.

any other form of access by the German militarists to nuclear weapons, did not conflict with the principle of non-proliferation. It had been argued that within the framework of a NATO nuclear force the Federal Republic of Germany and the other non-nuclear Powers would be able to keep their fingers only on the safety catch, and not on the trigger. It was plain, however, that all those arguments served merely to sow confusion and justify the policy of the United States. In the matter of nuclear weapons, there were only two distinct courses that could be followed: either that of prohibiting outright the dissemination of such weapons and, consequently, refusing to transfer them to other States, in any form whatever; or that of facilitating access to nuclear weapons, in which case the form of transfer was of little importance. There was no middle course, no room for compromise.

26. Regardless of who pressed the trigger and who kept his finger on the safety catch, it was obvious that the implementation of the plans for a NATO multilateral or other nuclear force would represent a step towards the transfer of nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany. It should be added that the politicians of the Federal Republic themselves revealed the diplomatic manoeuvres of their transatlantic allies. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic, for instance, had stated unequivocally that what was at issue was participation by his country not only in strategic planning—which by itself would be contrary to non-dissemination—but also in the system of nuclear weapons. The German militarists considered it possible to claim nuclear weapons for the Federal Republic of Germany immediately. The twenty-one atomic reactors in West Germany were not intended for peaceful purposes only. It was symptomatic, moreover, that the Federal Republic was beginning once again to talk of "independent" European nuclear forces. The Vice-President of the United States had declared at the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference that it was essential to ensure that under the Atlantic nuclear agreements the Atlantic countries would be assured an effective alternative to national systems of deterrence. It was clear that, for Bonn, that "effective alternative" consisted in having access to nuclear weapons.

27. It was claimed that the plans to place atomic weapons at the Federal Republic's disposal were a lesser evil and that it was better to make a trifling concession to that country in return for its promise not to create its own nuclear forces. It must be observed, however, that by their acts and statements the Bonn leaders left no doubt as to their true intentions. Participation by the Federal Republic in the multilateral nuclear force was merely a stage in what was being called the "atomic escalation" of Bonn. Those who proposed that the Bonn revanchists should share in the control of nuclear weapons and at the same time endeavoured to give the impression that they were opposed to the Federal Republic's having access to those weapons were merely deceiving the peoples. It was impossible to speak of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons while simultaneously legalizing their dissemination. History had shown more than once that indulgence alone would not curb the appetite of the German militarists.

28. The United States representative had tried to show that the Soviet Union was raising certain unreasonable and unnecessary "pre-conditions" and was placing its political interests in Europe above the conclusion of an agreement on non-proliferation. Those assertions were entirely false. The Soviet Union maintained that in order to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons, all loop-holes for such dissemination must be closed. Otherwise, an agreement on non-proliferation would lose all meaning. If any country was impeding the solution of that problem, it was the United States itself. It was, in fact, advancing a political condition—namely, access by the Federal Republic of Germany to nuclear weapons. If the United States was really thinking of solving the problem, it would long since have renounced the plan to give West Germany access to nuclear weapons; actually, however, it was on the initiative of the United States that the talks on the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force were proceeding. There were indications that intensive negotiations would take place in the very near future with a view to implementing the plans for the creation of a NATO multilateral or other nuclear force, so as to enable the Federal Republic of Germany to gain access, in one form or another, to nuclear weapons.

29. Some representatives had alleged that the Soviet Union was endeavouring to prohibit certain military measures within the framework of NATO, in violation of the principle that in the field of disarmament measures no attempt must be made to obtain military advantages. In fact, the question should be discussed on a different plane: if there really was a desire to discuss the question of non-proliferation, it was essential to speak of methods of halting proliferation through all military alliances and not merely within NATO.

30. The Western Powers should not play a double game and should frankly state whether they wanted a real agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or whether their main concern was the interests of the NATO military bloc. The United Kingdom representative had emphasized in that connexion that his Government was determined to safeguard the cohesion and the strength of the Western alliance and that the West was not prepared to negotiate on the internal arrangements of NATO. But what should be done if the internal arrangements of NATO were leading to the spread of nuclear weapons, and in the most dangerous form, namely the transfer of such weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany? Furthermore, the United Kingdom representative had referred with great displeasure to Mr. Brezhnev's observation that two items submitted by the USSR delegation for inclusion in the agenda of the twentieth session of the General Assembly, namely "The inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty" and "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", had an "anti-imperialist cutting edge". Nobody could deny that those two items did indeed have an anti-imperialist edge but it should be pointed out that no names had been mentioned. If the United Kingdom representative was so sensitive to any reference to imperialism, he should know why, and it should be remembered

that the USSR was not the only country to mention imperialism: one need only refer, for instance, to the Declaration adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Cairo in October 1964.

31. The USSR delegation opposed the view that it would be desirable to close the discussion in the First Committee and refer the matter back to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It did not think that the urgent problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be postponed indefinitely. Characteristically, the United States representative had declared that his Government would like the next report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to include a concerted draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; it could thus be seen that the United States was already planning to postpone the solution of the problem for a whole year. In a year's time the same thing could happen again, and the vicious circle would continue. But what point was there then in discussing the matter in the General Assembly and the First Committee? Did not such tendencies turn the present discussion into something purely mechanical? Was it not the task of the First Committee to unite the efforts of all the Members of the United Nations in order to achieve progress? His delegation was convinced of the necessity to take a decision immediately, in the Committee, on the prompt conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the main principles of such a treaty. It would, of course, be even more desirable to work out an agreed treaty text forthwith and submit it to States for signature. An agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could only contribute effectively to the cause of peace if it constituted a real obstacle to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear States. His delegation appealed to the United States and to all other countries to examine the Soviet draft treaty in a constructive spirit.

32. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that after the marked regression in international co-operation in the past two years, some hopeful signs had recently appeared, and the time had come to seek a solution to the disarmament problem and related matters. More than two years had elapsed since the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty; techniques for identifying and verifying underground tests had been improved, yet no agreement had been reached to bring such tests to a halt. As long as the tests were permitted, they encouraged countries which were not parties to the partial test ban treaty to carry out tests in the atmosphere, on the pretext that they lacked the technical or financial means to carry out underground tests. The conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty was therefore urgently needed. Failure to reach an agreement on that issue could not but have an adverse effect on the whole effort to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

33. A distinction should be made between proliferation through the independent production of nuclear weapons by previously non-nuclear States without the assistance of the present nuclear Powers, and dissemination through the transfer of nuclear weapons or the transmission of information on their produc-

tion from nuclear to non-nuclear Powers. With regard to the first category, there were a growing number of countries with a nuclear capability, in spite of the obstacle set up by the partial test ban treaty and the financial sacrifice that such an effort entailed; an undertaking by non-nuclear countries to desist from manufacturing or acquiring possession or control of nuclear weapons was therefore essential in order to prevent such proliferation. With regard to the second category the primary need was for the nuclear Powers to undertake among themselves not to disseminate nuclear weapons by the direct or indirect transfer of information to non-nuclear States or groups of States. The draft treaties before the Committee combined both aspects. The texts were in many respects similar; the United States text included provisions for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities as well as a clause requiring notice to be given to the Security Council by any party wishing to withdraw from the treaty; the Soviet text did not include those provisions. The main difference between the two texts, however, lay in the provision in article I of the United States draft which seemed to sanction certain arrangements whereby the non-nuclear Powers could participate in a multilateral nuclear force, which could lead to some form of proliferation. The resulting complexities might delay agreement on a treaty on non-proliferation, and his delegation hoped that a formula could be found that would be satisfactory to all and that would ensure that there was no loop-hole for the dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form.

34. A further difficulty lay in the fact that the non-nuclear Powers possessing nuclear potential required tangible assurance that the nuclear Powers intended to work towards nuclear disarmament. Since such an assurance was a perfectly legitimate requirement, his delegation hoped that any compromise draft would take it into account and would commit the signatory nuclear Powers to adopting early substantial disarmament measures; they could agree to a comprehensive test ban treaty and to a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons, or even to a reduction of their nuclear stockpiles, which already had an excessive destructive capacity compared to what was a logical level for deterrence. No risks would therefore be incurred by such a reduction, since an adequate deterrent force would still exist. Such a limitation on nuclear capacity could also open the way to a compromise solution of the problem of multilateral forces.

35. There had been discussion of the question whether the treaty should be simple or related to a more complex whole, and whether it should contain some kind of security guarantee. With regard to the first point, a comprehensive test ban treaty, along with certain other disarmament measures, and a treaty on non-proliferation were certainly interdependent, but a treaty on non-proliferation was too complex an undertaking for it to be tied to other measures which might delay its conclusion. His delegation was nevertheless of the opinion that concurrent agreements on the other related measures were equally urgent. On the question of guarantees, it seemed logical that the agreement by the non-

nuclear Powers to desist from acquiring nuclear weapons should have a quid pro quo, but the question arose of the modalities of the proposed guarantee, particularly against the possibility of nuclear blackmail. It was not possible to expect a reasonably early definition of nuclear blackmail, when a definition of aggression had not yet been achieved. His delegation was in full sympathy with the aims of a nuclear guarantee, but it feared that the procedure involved might entail long delays.

36. Another means of stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons was the creation of nuclear-free zones; two such zones existed at present: outer space and Antarctica, which were both as yet uninhabited areas. Other such zones should be created on the populated continents. The Latin American States should be congratulated on the technical progress they had made in devising the procedure for creating a nuclear-free zone in their area; their work could certainly become a useful precedent for other regions, particularly Africa. The establishment of such a zone in Africa could perhaps be facilitated by the creation of a parallel nuclear-free zone in the Eastern Mediter-

anean. In that connexion, Cyprus, though far from being a country with a nuclear potential, nevertheless wished to affirm its resolve never to accept or receive any form of strategic or tactical nuclear weapons.

37. In conclusion, on behalf of his delegation he welcomed the proposal to hold a world disarmament conference in the near future; the presence of certain nations at the discussions would constitute an assurance that any agreements that might result from them would be universally binding. The problem of war and peace, whether it took the form of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or any other aspect of the disarmament effort, was in the last analysis a moral problem: both the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers would have to exercise self-restraint. Such restraint fell within the province of international law and world order and should be systematically developed. In that sense, the need to strengthen the United Nations in order to make it an instrument of world order, justice and peace, by developing its peace-keeping and peace-making functions, should always be of paramount concern.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.