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Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN  
(Netherlands).

## AGENDA ITEM 29

The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/5512 and Corr.1, A/5512/Add.1, A/C.1/887, A/C.1/889, A/C.1/892, A/C.1/893, A/C.1/894, A/C.1/L.335) (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that, in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Committee at its 1347th meeting (A/C.1/895), he would invite the representative of the Republic of Korea to take a place at the Committee table.

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Kim Yong Shik, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Committee table.*

2. Mr. BAYKAN (United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea), recalling that the Korean question had been on the agenda of the General Assembly since 1947, said that on the basis of the specific principles embodied in the various resolutions adopted by the United Nations, UNCURK and its predecessors, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and the United Nations Commission on Korea, had been given terms of reference and facilities fully adequate to bring about an equitable settlement of the Korean question. While, however, the Government of the Republic of Korea had consistently adhered to the principles laid down by the United Nations, the North Korean authorities had no less consistently refused to accept them and to recognize the authority of the United Nations. Were it not for that intransigence, the aims of the United Nations in Korea could have been accomplished long since.

3. In that connexion, he wished to place on record the fact that the people of the Republic of Korea demonstrated unswerving loyalty to the United Nations, on whose continuing support they relied, and that together with their Government they had warmly welcomed General Assembly resolution 1855 (XVII) and the resolution adopted by the First Committee at its 1299th meeting<sup>1/</sup> taking note of the attitude of the North Korean authorities.

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 28, document A/C.1/885.

4. He wished to draw attention to some of the salient points emphasized in the report of UNCURK (A/5512 and Corr.1). On the question of the unification of Korea, to which it had continued to devote close attention, UNCURK had been obliged to report that a settlement was still being obstructed by the negative attitude of the North Korean authorities towards the principles laid down by the United Nations. It had noted that its continued presence in Korea — unfortunately only in the territory under the Republic of Korea — acted as a deterrent to renewed conflict in a troubled area where, under the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953,<sup>2/</sup> which had still not been superseded by a more permanent settlement, United Nations forces were still responsible for maintaining peace. Prominent government figures and leaders of political parties in the Republic of Korea had given repeated assurances in public speeches and statements to members of UNCURK of their continuing allegiance to the United Nations principles for Korean unification, and had stressed the fervent desire of their people for admission to membership in the Organization.

5. The report noted that the expansion of the Republic's relations with the specialized agencies and other international bodies and with other countries had been more rapid than in the previous year. The Republic of Korea had now effected diplomatic exchanges with fifty-three countries — nearly double the number recorded for 1962 and four times the number prior to 1961 — and fourteen more countries would shortly be added to the list. It had been recognized by the United Nations since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 195 (III), and was currently a member of twelve specialized agencies and other international bodies. All those facts lent weight to its claim to membership in the United Nations.

6. One of UNCURK's main tasks was to be available for observation and consultation with regard to the development of representative government and to report its findings to the General Assembly. During the preceding two years, its functions in that respect had been limited to observing political developments and preparations for a return to civilian government; now that elections had been held, however, it would be able to observe the direct operation of a Government representing the freely expressed wishes of the people. In carrying out its duties in that regard, duties which it had been careful to perform objectively and with due respect for the sovereign independence of the Republic, it had received the fullest co-operation from official quarters. Previous Administrations had extended various facilities to it and the present Government had in addition, for the first time, invited it to observe the 1962 referendum on constitutional amendments and the elections held in 1963.

<sup>2/</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.

7. The report covered not only political but also economic developments in the Republic of Korea. He wished to recapitulate briefly the economic progress that had been made, which was the more impressive because most of Korea's industry had been situated in the North and the Republic had had to start from scratch in 1946 and to contend with the difficulties caused by the Korean war. The statistics testified to the emergence of an entirely new and stable economy, which would serve as a springboard for accelerated growth in the future. Taking the 1946 figures as a base, the production of rice had increased by 58 per cent, that of summer grains by 80 per cent and that of potatoes by over 100 per cent, and the output of marine products by 47 per cent. In industry, electric power production had increased by 700 per cent and coal output by nearly 15,000 per cent. Production of cement had increased 73 times, of iron ore 9,414 times, of gold 88 times, and of tungsten 15 times, while copper ore production had risen 73 per cent.

8. With its current annual report, UNCURK had submitted two addenda (A/5512/Add.1) covering, *inter alia*, the presidential elections and the National Assembly elections held on 15 October and 26 November 1963 respectively. In observing the former, the Committee's nine teams had covered both the pre-election and the post-election periods as extensively as possible, as well as the actual balloting, and had witnessed no real irregularities. Proceedings had in general been proper and in accordance with the law, and the few minor breaches that had been noted had not been deliberate. The second addendum, relating to the elections to the National Assembly, likewise showed that the Commission had observed no significant irregularities in the voting or vote-counting procedures and that in its opinion the elections had been carried out in a peaceful, orderly and fair manner.

9. Aside from the elections, two important developments had occurred since the submission of UNCURK's report. In the first place, Mr. Park Chung Hee, the President-elect, had given a public pledge that political prisoners other than those who had been charged with aiding the North Korean authorities would be freed and the ban on certain politicians lifted with the establishment of the Third Republic on 17 December 1963. Secondly, the President-elect, in a speech made on United Nations Day, had described the successful accomplishment of the presidential elections as a prelude to the restoration of civilian government, had warmly acknowledged the assistance rendered by the United Nations to the Republic of Korea in preserving its democracy and national sovereignty, had said that the Republic's international position could not be conceived apart from the United Nations, and had once again confirmed his country's adherence to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and its recognition of the Organization's authority to deal with the question of the reunification of Korea.

10. In conclusion, he wished to say that he remained at the Committee's disposal for any further information or comments desired, and to reiterate his profound hope that UNCURK's services as an observer and consultant would in future be welcomed and made use of not only south of the demarcation line but in North Korea as well, so that the United Nations goal, the peaceful and democratic unification of Korea, might be achieved as soon as possible.

11. Mr. KIM (Republic of Korea) said that while the Republic of Korea and an overwhelming majority of

the States Members of the United Nations had unreservedly accepted the Organization's competence and authority to solve the Korean problem, the North Korean régime continued to defy the United Nations and to reject the resolutions on the unification of Korea which had been adopted at every session of the General Assembly since 1947. The Republic of Korea had been created through genuinely free elections observed by a United Nations Commission, and its Government had been recognized by the United Nations as the only lawful Government in Korea. By contrast, the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been installed by the Soviet occupation forces in 1948 and had launched an unprovoked attack against the Republic of Korea in June 1950, whereupon United Nations forces had come to the defence of the Republic of Korea in pursuance of Security Council resolutions; the Chinese Communists, who had then intervened in the Korean conflict, had been condemned as aggressors by the United Nations. The Korean Political Conference convened at Geneva in 1954 following the 1953 Armistice Agreement had ended in failure because of the refusal of the Soviet Union, Communist China and the North Korean Communists to agree to United Nations supervision of free elections based on proportional representation of the Korean population as the means of unifying the country.

12. The North Korean Communists had violated the Armistice Agreement by vastly increasing their military strength and bringing in combat aircraft and other military equipment. In recent months, North Korean attacks on United Nations forces south of the demilitarized zone had resulted in the death of three United Nations soldiers and a Republic of Korea policeman. In its report (A/5512 and Corr.1), UNCURK had stated that whereas the Government of the Republic of Korea continued to adhere to the United Nations stand on unification, the Communist authorities in the North had maintained their negative attitude, thereby further delaying a Korean settlement. The General Assembly had continued to uphold the principle that the Korean people should be granted the right of self-determination through free elections held under United Nations supervision. He hoped that at the current session the First Committee would once again reaffirm that principle.

13. Although the Korean people's right to national freedom and independence had been recognized during the Second World War in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, the country remained artificially divided with resulting personal tragedy and economic disruption. The Korean war had caused two million casualties and had left millions homeless. The continued division of Korea was damaging not only to the interests of the Korean people but also to the cause of international peace and justice.

14. The task of UNCURK had been defined by various General Assembly resolutions as that of bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea. The Commission had done outstanding work in spite of the North Korean Communists' refusal to co-operate, and the Republic of Korea hoped that it would continue its efforts until the unification of Korea was achieved.

15. The Communists charged that the United Nations forces were the chief obstacle to Korean unification and demanded their withdrawal. In fact, however, those forces were the chief obstacle to further Communist aggression. The North Korean Communists not only

had built up their military strength but were supported by huge numbers of foreign Communist troops across the Yalu River, and they had concluded formal military alliances with the Soviet Union and the Peking régime in 1961. They sought the withdrawal of the United Nations forces so that they could take over all of Korea through force and subversion. His people and Government wished the United Nations forces to remain in Korea until the objectives of the United Nations were achieved.

16. With regard to internal conditions in Korea, it should be noted that the Communists continued to prevent UNCURK from observing conditions in the North, whereas the Republic of Korea authorities, as the Commission stated in its report, had given the fullest co-operation. The present Administration had taken over the Government two years earlier for the purpose of restoring national morale and, in particular, combating Communist infiltration, agitation, sabotage and espionage. It was now making good its pledge to turn over the administration of the country to civilians. On 15 October 1963, Mr. Park Chung Hee, the Chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, had been elected President, and elections to the National Assembly had been held on 26 November. The United Nations Commission had reported that the elections had been carried out in a fair and orderly manner. The Democratic Republican Party had gained a majority of the Assembly seats, and four opposition parties had also won seats.

17. During the financial year 1962, the first year of its five-year economic development plan, the Republic of Korea had achieved spectacular production increases in every sector of the economy except agriculture, which had been adversely affected by droughts and floods.

18. The Republic of Korea belonged to twelve specialized agencies and was affiliated with many of the important subsidiary organs of the United Nations; despite a shortage of foreign exchange, it had purchased a \$400,000 United Nations bond. The Republic of Korea maintained diplomatic relations with 55 countries, was a party to 177 international treaties and conventions, and had taken part in 117 international conferences between June 1962 and September 1963. It had recently signed the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

19. He regretted that, although the General Assembly had affirmed at its fourth, eleventh and twelfth sessions that the Republic of Korea was fully qualified for United Nations membership, it had been denied that membership solely because of the Soviet Union's veto. The Republic of Korea would continue to support the objectives and principles of the United Nations and hoped that the members of the First Committee would help it to win membership in the Organization. He appealed to the General Assembly to impress upon those Members which were opposing Korean unification that they were violating the United Nations Charter.

20. Mr. NUGROHO (Indonesia) contrasted the progress made on disarmament with the continuing deadlock on the Korean question. In the first instance, the two main Powers had been compelled by new factors in the arms race to modify their positions, and the non-aligned nations had been able to play an increasingly influential role in disarmament negotiations. In the second, on the contrary, no new factor had been introduced since the Korean Political Conference held at Geneva in 1954, the positions of the two Powers

remained unaltered and unyielding, and the non-aligned nations had all but withdrawn from participation in the search for a solution. As a result, the First Committee's debates had each year taken the same fruitless course and had each year ended in the adoption of the same ineffectual resolutions. However understandable, such a situation was inadmissible in view of the human misery caused by the deadlock and the constant threat it represented to international peace and security.

21. The problem confronting the United Nations was how to reunite a divided country where the two Governments concerned, each backed by one of the two main opposing Powers in the cold war, had sharply divergent views on how reunification was to be accomplished. The Government of the Republic of Korea, established in 1948 as a result of elections supervised by the United Nations, regarded itself as the only lawfully constituted Government in Korea and sought reunification by means of nation-wide elections to be held under United Nations supervision on the basis of proportional representation, with roughly one-third of the seats going to representatives of the North. It accepted and desired the continued presence of United Nations troops until unification had been achieved, removing all threat of future aggression. Conversely, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had rejected United Nations supervision of the 1948 elections and with the aid of Chinese volunteers had fought the United Nations troops in the Korean war, opposed the presence of those troops in South Korea and refused to consider reunification until they had been withdrawn. It advocated direct negotiations between the two Korean Governments, and refused to accept either United Nations mediation through UNCURK or the methods of unification laid down in the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

22. In the circumstances, the United Nations was unable to take effective action. By laying down explicit conditions under which it would agree to mediate the differences between the two Korean Governments, with a view to achieving its stated objectives, the United Nations had become a party to the dispute. It had been caught in a conflict of legal principle involving the role of the Organization.

23. While Indonesia still believed that the United Nations had been justified in entering the Korean war and supported the Organization's aims in seeking the reunification of the country, it agreed with other non-aligned countries that it was futile to continue to press for objectives which apparently could not be realized, and that the United Nations should now seek a solution acceptable to the two parties directly concerned. It would be a major step in that direction if it were to allow the North Korean Government as well as the Government of the Republic of Korea to participate in the debate in the General Assembly. The reasons given in successive resolutions for refusing to allow North Korea to participate were unjust and foolish: obviously, if the North Korean Government were to agree in advance to accept the competence and authority of the United Nations, there would be virtually no conflict left to resolve. As a mediator, the United Nations could not properly demand that one of the parties should first agree to accept the other party's terms before inviting it to take part in negotiations. It was precisely because the aims of the mediator had become identified with those of one of the main parties to the dispute that such an untenable situation had arisen. The United Nations would be taking a further

step towards easing the situation if it expanded the membership of UNCURK to reflect the vastly increased membership of the Organization and accorded the non-aligned countries greater representation on that body.

24. In the final analysis, however, the best chance for a solution now rested with the two Korean Governments themselves; it was for the Korean people to take the initiative. With a little goodwill on both sides, the current thaw in at least some aspects of the "cold war" might be extended to include an unfreezing of big-Power attitudes on the Korean issue; that in turn would encourage the two Korean Governments to make tentative overtures with a view to entering into direct negotiation. Direct contacts had recently taken place between them in connexion with the question of sending a single team to represent Korea at the forthcoming Olympic Games in Tokyo. The General Assembly should encourage such contacts, for they implied that both sides recognized the validity of the principle of direct negotiation and might be willing to apply it to the basic issues now preventing reunification. It might well be that the two Korean Governments — possibly, if they desired, assisted by the good offices of the non-aligned countries — could themselves work out the fundamentals of an agreed unification plan. It would then be the task of the United Nations to help to give such a plan official form in a lasting unification settlement.

25. It was encouraging to note from the report of UNCURK that in a statement made in June 1963 General Park had announced his Government's intention of pressing on the United Nations "a practical and flexible solution to the problem of national unification" (A/5512 and Corr.1, para. 30). For its part, the United Nations should recognize and endorse whatever steps might be taken towards such a solution by the two Korean Governments on their own initiative. At a later stage, it should review those steps in order to determine whether they fulfilled the basic conditions for a lasting peace and therefore justified troop withdrawals by the Governments concerned. Once the remaining troops were removed, the two Korean régimes could negotiate on equal terms.

26. Of course, that course of action might entail abandoning the explicit conditions for a Korean settlement laid down in General Assembly resolutions; but it seemed pointless to sacrifice the goal of unification for objectives which were after all only means to an end. After ten years of deadlock, the Indonesian delegation was less confident than in the past that a Korean settlement could be found solely within the framework of the United Nations. Obviously, it could not be achieved without the co-operation of the Democratic People's Republic, and since the latter was not prepared to co-operate on the terms laid down by the United Nations, there was no alternative but to allow the two régimes to work out a solution themselves with whatever assistance they might desire from the non-aligned countries. It would not be the first time a difficult problem had been resolved outside the United Nations. Indonesia and the Netherlands had succeeded in settling the question of West Irian outside the Organization, with some prodding from the Secretary-General. Similarly, the conclusion of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water had been achieved through direct negotiations between the three nuclear Powers outside the United Nations. His delegation would welcome a draft resolution noting that direct

contacts had taken place between the two Korean Governments and encouraging further contacts with the object of broadening the scope of negotiations between them until mutual trust had been established.

27. Mr. HSUEH (China) said that the Korean question had been before the United Nations for too many years, and everyone desired an early solution. In recent years it had been suggested during the Committee's debates that times and circumstances had changed, and that the United Nations should take a new and more realistic approach to the question and should adopt a bolder attitude with a view to achieving a speedy solution, rather than just the adoption of another resolution. It should be asked, however, whether there was really any possibility of another approach which would expedite a just and lasting settlement of the question.

28. It had been said that the United Nations must face realities and must not ignore the existence of the Communist régime in North Korea. But the existence of that régime had never been ignored by the people of Korea or by the United Nations, and had in fact given rise to the Korean question itself. In 1950, after United States troops had been withdrawn from Korea, the North Korean régime had prepared and perpetrated a large-scale invasion of the South, involving the United Nations in the Korean war. That aggression had been repelled with the aid of United Nations forces contributed by sixteen Member States, in a collective action described in the UNCURK report as "a precedent and reminder against aggression in Korea or elsewhere" (A/5512 and Corr.1, para. 25). After the signing of the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953, the United Nations had continued patiently to call upon the North Korean régime to accept the United Nations objective in Korea, namely, unification by peaceful means. The Communist régime, for its part, had committed many acts of provocation and many violations of the Armistice Agreement. The security and stability of the area were still in danger, so that United Nations forces, while greatly reduced in strength, had to be kept in Korea.

29. The Communist régime had been imposed on the Korean people with no regard to their wishes. No true election had taken place in North Korea; after the last so-called election, in October 1962, the Communist régime had made the farcical announcement that 100 per cent of the eligible voters had cast their ballots and had elected 383 out of 383 candidates. It was clear that the Korean people of the North had had no part in the so-called elections, and it was also clear that when the Korean Communists talked about "a free general election throughout the North and South on a democratic basis", that was the kind of election they had in mind.

30. In paragraph 17 of its report, UNCURK stated that, whereas the Government of the Republic of Korea still adhered to the United Nations stand on unification, the Communist authorities to the North had maintained their negative attitude towards that stand, thereby further delaying a proper and definitive settlement in Korea. The Korean Communist régime had ignored all appeals contained in the General Assembly's resolutions and had indeed asserted in its statements of 25 September 1963 (A/C.1/889) and 22 November 1963 (A/C.1/893) that the discussion of the Korean question in the United Nations was illegal.

31. He was sure that those who had advised against ignoring the North Korean régime were not seriously



thinking of a permanent partition of Korea. The United Nations supported the national aspiration of the Korean people to see their country unified. The States Members of the United Nations could not allow the northern provinces of Korea to secede from Korea simply because that was what the Communists wanted. If the principle of territorial integrity was sacrificed in the name of compromise or détente, the desire for unification would eventually generate such pressure among the people of divided Korea that a dangerous situation would be bound to arise; any such compromise would only complicate the question and make it more difficult to solve.

32. The application of the Republic of Korea for membership in the United Nations had been rejected because of the Soviet Union's veto, despite General Assembly resolutions repeatedly affirming that the Republic of Korea was fully qualified for and should be admitted to membership in the Organization. The best new approach to the solution of the Korean question would be to redouble efforts to surmount the difficulties and admit the Republic of Korea to membership without further delay.

33. It had also been suggested that the United Nations should stop supporting one side against the other and should seek to bring both sides to a negotiating table. In fact, however, the single purpose of the United Nations in Korea was the application of the principle of self-determination; and that purpose was embodied in the established United Nations objective of bringing about, by peaceful means, the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government. The principle of self-determination, which had been applied with increasing vigour and enthusiasm in Africa and elsewhere in Asia, was surely equally applicable in Korea. The United Nations was bound to support any side or any group in Korea which accepted the principle of self-determination and adhered to the United Nations objectives in Korea; if the Korean Communist régime rejected the United Nations objectives and denied to the people under its rule the exercise of the right of self-determination, the blame should not be placed on the United Nations. To urge the Korean people and their Government to compromise or to abandon the United Nations objectives and the principle of self-determination would be tantamount to encouraging those who did not accept that principle to persist in their inflexibility and wait for the United Nations to capitulate. The impact of such a course would be felt not only in Korea but also elsewhere in Asia and in Africa. It was the Korean Communist régime, rather than the United Nations, that should be advised to relax its terms. The freedom of the Korean or any other people was not negotiable.

34. The Government of the Republic of Korea had been legally constituted by the people through elections, freely observed by UNCURK, which in the addenda to its report (A/5512/Add.1), had given its opinion, on the basis of its own observation, that the recent presidential elections and National Assembly elections had been carried out in a free atmosphere and in a peaceful, orderly and fair manner. The Government of the Republic of Korea therefore spoke for the Korean people. North of the artificial line of the 38th parallel, on the other hand, control was held by a régime which had been imposed on the people by force and did not represent their wishes.

35. Their demand for the withdrawal of United Nations troops and the dissolution of the United Nations Com-

mission made it clear that the North Korean Communists wanted to restore the same conditions that had obtained in 1950, so that another armed invasion of the South could be launched if necessary. Their talk of economic and cultural exchanges and free travel between North and South was clearly aimed at the infiltration of an increasing number of communist agents and saboteurs into the South to create unrest and chaos in preparation for a communist take-over. He wondered how, in the circumstances, the United Nations could agree to negotiations between the so-called "two sides" or, in particular, equate the Government of the Republic of Korea with the Communist régime in the North. The fact that the Korean Government had had to negotiate with the Communists for a military armistice agreement did not give the Korean Communist régime a political status entitling it to negotiate as an equal with the Korean Government on matters of unification; such negotiations would have to wait until the Korean Communist régime accepted the established United Nations objectives in Korea and gave the people under its rule the right of self-determination. Meanwhile the United Nations owed it to the people of Korea to continue its help by reaffirming its objectives in Korea, continuing the mandate and the good work of the Commission and maintaining the peace and stability of the country.

36. Mr. COOK (United States of America) said that the process of restoring representative civilian government in the Republic of Korea was now almost complete. On 15 October 1963, Acting President Park Chung Hee had been elected President by a margin of about 150,000 votes out of 11 million cast, while in the National Assembly elections held on 26 November the Democratic Republican Party had won 110 seats and the opposition parties a total of 65. UNCURK had stated in the addenda to its report (A/5512/Add.1) that the elections had been carried out in a fair and orderly manner. The local elections held in North Korea on 3 December and the national elections held there in 1962 had contrasted sharply with the recent elections in the Republic of Korea. In both cases, there had been only one slate of candidates, which, according to the North Korean régime, had been supported by every eligible voter. It was not surprising that the North Korean régime, which conducted farcical elections of that nature, refused to recognize the competence of the United Nations to supervise free elections as a means of achieving the unification of Korea.

37. With regard to the North Korean régime's lengthy memorandum of 25 July 1963 — distributed under cover of document A/C.1/887 — on alleged violations of the Armistice Agreement by the United Nations Command, it should be noted that the North Koreans had violated the Armistice Agreement from the outset by bringing in large quantities of military equipment and, in particular, establishing a strong air force. As far as the specific North Korean allegations were concerned, the United Nations Command had acknowledged a number of unintentional violations of the demarcation line. During the past year, however, the North Koreans had committed various acts of an aggressive and provocative nature. They continued to hold prisoner two officers of the United Nations Command, whose families had not even been permitted to communicate with them, and they had killed three members of the United Nations forces in recent months.

38. His Government had joined in sponsoring a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.335) by which the General Assembly would reaffirm the objectives of the United Nations

in Korea, i.e. "to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area", call upon the North Korean authorities to accept those established United Nations objectives, and urge continuing efforts to achieve them. The draft resolution also called for the continuance of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which had operated effectively in the Republic of Korea.

39. His Government, which still believed that the approach adopted by the United Nations offered the best hope of achieving the unification of Korea and of furthering international peace and the welfare of all the Korean people, urged the First Committee to adopt the draft resolution.

40. Mr. DEMETROPOULOS (Greece) said that the Korean question was not a matter of concern to the Korean people alone, but a problem involving international peace and security. The report of UNCURK (A/5512 and Corr. 1) stated that reunification continued to be delayed by the negative attitude of the Communist authorities in North Korea, which continued to call for the withdrawal of United Nations troops from the Republic of Korea as a prerequisite for negotiations.

41. The memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 25 July 1963 attached to document A/C.1/887 contained a series of preposterous charges against the United Nations and the United States and asserted that the United Nations resolution under which the Organization was dealing with the question of Korea was unlawful. The spirit pervading that document suggested that UNCURK was not likely to have much success in the immediate future. Moreover, at a time when all the Members of the United Nations were cultivating and acting in the new spirit that had originated with the partial test ban treaty, the North Korean régime was among the very few which had denounced that agreement; in a joint statement made public during an official visit to mainland China in June 1963, the Head of State of the North Korean régime had condemned the very idea of peaceful co-existence.

42. The charges set out in the North Korean memorandum and the various incidents that had occurred along the 38th parallel in 1963 should be viewed in the light of the North Korean régime's unreasonable and hostile attitude and its identification with the bellicose posture of the Chinese mainland authorities, whose "volunteers" had fought against the United Nations forces in 1950-1953. The North Korean régime's memorandum, like its previous communications, was full of wilful distortions and fabrications, such as the stale charge about the use of chemical and bacteriological warfare by the United Nations during its collective action in Korea, and showed a morbid malevolence toward the Organization and world society in general. In the concluding sentence of the memorandum the North Korean authorities promised to adhere strictly to the Armistice Agreement "in the future, too"—which suggested that they intended to display the same flagrant disregard of that Agreement as they had shown in the past.

43. The Government of the Republic of Korea, in contrast, had done its best to abide by the terms of the Armistice Agreement. It had lived up to its promise

to restore a representative form of government and to improve the economic situation. A new constitution had been adopted in December 1962 through a referendum conducted, according to the UNCURK report, in a free atmosphere and in a calm and orderly manner. The constitution clearly stated the rights and duties of citizens and guaranteed a free system of political parties, and presidential and National Assembly elections had been held recently. Viewed against the background of tension caused by the artificial division of a nation that desperately desired unity, and considering the immediate proximity of a totalitarian régime that exhibited aggressive traits and openly espoused the most extremist manifestation of a militant ideology, the re-establishment of representative institutions in the Republic of Korea was an act of courage and high statesmanship which deserved the General Assembly's high commendation.

44. It had been asserted that the reason for the fact that no progress had been made towards the reunification of Korea was the absence from the Committee's debates of a representative of the North Korean régime. As long, however, as the North Korean authorities chose to disregard the reasons why the United Nations had become involved in Korea and to deny the Organization any interest or responsibility in the matter, their participation in the debates would serve no useful purpose; the preceding day's vote had shown that that view was widely shared in the Committee. He hoped that some day reason would prevail in North Korea and that the North Korean régime would abandon its attacks on UNCURK and enter into constructive co-operation with it. In the light of those considerations, his delegation had joined in sponsoring a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.335) under which the General Assembly would again confirm the status and the terms of reference of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

45. Mr. ANUMAN RAJADHON (Thailand) said that the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea and the report of UNCURK (A/5512 and Corr.1 and Add.1) gave an encouraging picture of the progress made in the Republic of Korea in the preceding year and confirmed Thailand in its conviction that the Republic of Korea was fully qualified to become a Member of the United Nations, as he trusted would soon be possible.

46. His delegation was one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.335. All the relevant developments in the Korean question since 1947 were summed up in that draft resolution and in the various General Assembly resolutions to which it referred, and since the members of the Committee were fully informed on the issues involved, he would not expatiate on them or attempt to refute the distorted interpretation of them that was propagated in some quarters. In recommending the draft resolution to the Committee, he merely wished to recall a few relevant facts relating to the United Nations forces in Korea and to UNCURK, in view of the attacks that had been made on them by some representatives. The United Nations forces in Korea, which had been made up of soldiers from sixteen Member States, including Thailand, had fought and died in Korea not for gain or glory, but to uphold the purposes and principles of the United Nations; they had died so that the United Nations might live. By adopting the draft resolution, the members of the Committee would be re-dedicating themselves to the

same cause and ensuring that those gallant men had not died in vain.

47. The presence in the Committee of the representative of UNCURK was a reminder that the United Nations was still represented in Korea. It was gratifying to learn that the Commission had carried out its mandate so conscientiously and effectively. He congratulated the representative of UNCURK on his enlightening statement, and requested him to convey to all the members of the Commission his delegation's appreciation for their report and for their unstinting services to the United Nations.

48. By adopting draft resolution A/C.1/L.335, the Committee would be ensuring the continuance of the Commission, whose work was in the best interests of the United Nations and indispensable for the realization of the Organization's objectives in Korea, and would be urging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea once again to co-operate so that all the Korean people might live united and in peace.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.