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Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL
(Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 28

The Korean question (continued):

- (a) *Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and rehabilitation of Korea (A/5213 and Add.1, A/C.1/877, A/C.1/882, A/C.1/883, A/C.1/L.322);*
- (b) *The withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea (A/5140, A/C.1/869, A/C.1/877, A/C.1/882, A/C.1/883, A/C.1/884 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.322, A/C.1/L.323)*

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. CHOI (Republic of Korea) said that the unification of Korea was a matter of vital concern to all Koreans. The division of the country and its devastation by war were no fault of the Koreans themselves; they were the direct result of Communist machinations and aggression. The United Nations had been trying for fifteen years to reunify Korea and had received full co-operation from the Republic of Korea. The North Korean authorities, on the other hand, had persistently refused to have anything to do with the United Nations; the only unification they were willing to accept was one that would enable them to extend Communism to the whole of Korea.

2. Even worse than the political and economic effects of the division of Korea were its effects on the feelings of the Korean people. Four million refugees had fled to the Republic of Korea to escape North Korean tyranny, and thousands of leading Korean citizens had been forcibly taken north during the Korean war; thus families in both parts of the country had been separated.

3. The United Nations had helped to establish the Republic of Korea, which had been recognized as the only lawful Government in Korea. The overwhelming majority of the Korean people, both in the North and in the South, profoundly desired the reunification of Korea in accordance with United Nations resolutions. Moreover, any attempt to perpetuate the division of Korea ran counter to the Charter of the United Na-

tions. He was therefore confident that the Committee would support draft resolution A/C.1/L.332.

4. He assured the Committee that significant progress in national reconstruction and political institutions would be made in the Republic of Korea in 1963. On 17 December 1962, a nation-wide referendum had been held on amendments to the constitutions of the Republic of Korea. According to the latest available information, 85 per cent of the electorate had voted and 78.7 per cent had supported the amendments. The current Chairman of UNCURK had announced to the world Press that a "free atmosphere" had been found to exist in every polling place visited by members of UNCURK.

5. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Committee's debate had shown how right the Soviet Union had been to raise the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea. The speakers in the debate had fallen into two groups: those who were genuinely concerned to preserve international peace and security and therefore favoured the withdrawal of the troops in question, and those who, out of self-interest or solidarity with their allies, opposed it. The evidence presented by the Soviet and other delegations, and by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the documents it had submitted, had demonstrated beyond question the disastrous effects of foreign occupation on the economic, political and cultural life of South Korea. The fact that the supporters of foreign occupation had confined themselves largely to their interpretation of the history of the "Korean question", showed that they wished to avoid discussing the present situation. Their arguments, in any case, were unconvincing.

6. It was claimed, first of all, that the presence of foreign troops in South Korea was legal because they were United Nations troops, sent there as a result of decisions adopted by the Organization. But the resolutions adopted on the Korean question by the Security Council in 1950 had been voted in the absence of the representative of the Soviet Union and thus in violation of Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter. They therefore had no legal force. Their only purpose had been to provide some basis for the aggressive activities of the United States in Korea. General MacArthur, the former commander-in-chief of United States forces in Korea, had admitted that his command had had nothing to do with the United Nations during the war. In August 1953, moreover, the United States had concluded, independently of the United Nations, a Mutual Defense Treaty with the puppet régime of Syngman Rhee. Under that treaty the United States had received the right to station land, sea and air forces in the Republic of Korea and adjacent areas. The Pentagon was planning to conclude a further agreement on the status of United States troops in South Korea, which would be another step towards making their occupation permanent. Those troops were under United States

command and took orders from no other source. Their leaders were appointed by and responsible to the United States alone, and the full costs of the occupation were borne by the United States Government; thus, any attempt to represent the United States troops as agents of the United Nations was obviously absurd. Those who sought to do so were engaging in a political manoeuvre to prevent a solution of the question, thereby also preventing the reunification of Korea and the reduction of international tension in the Far East.

7. Another argument that had been put forward was that if the United States withdrew its troops from Korea another military conflict might ensue. Apart from the fact that the occupying forces were anything but guardians of the peace, there was no justification for allegations of a Communist threat to South Korea. In its memorandum of 24 November 1962 (A/C.1/884), the government of the Democratic People's Republic stated that there was not and never had been any such threat; it had no intention of attacking the South or of seeking to reunite the country by force. No evidence had been adduced to the contrary. Even the French bourgeois newspaper *Le Monde* had stated, on 18 July 1961, that the South Korean military junta had a tendency, if not to exaggerate the danger, at least to distort its nature. What the United States was really afraid of, as Professor Wagner of Harvard University had shown in an article in the October 1961 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, was not an attack from the North, but the subversive effects of an unfavourable comparison between life in South and in North Korea. Since conditions in the South were so much worse, the people inevitably looked to the North with longing.

8. It had also been argued that the troops still in South Korea were a purely "symbolic" force and did not threaten anyone. However, it could scarcely be said that an army of 60,000 equipped with nuclear weapons was "symbolic" in nature. The United States had recently, in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, described such weapons as aggressive and as constituting a threat to United States territory; it was hard to see why it regarded the nuclear weapons now in South Korea as entirely innocent.

9. It had been contended that United States troops should be kept in South Korea because their presence furthered the cause of Korean unification. Surely, however, it was not possible to hold free elections throughout Korea while foreign troops—and foreign troops which moreover, had fought in the Korean war—remained in that country. Those who argued that foreign troops must not be withdrawn from South Korea until the country had been reunited were attempting to prevent both withdrawal and unification.

10. The United States representative had said that his Government could not withdraw its troops from South Korea because the People's Republic of China was situated just across the border from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. However, the Chinese People's Volunteers had been withdrawn from North Korea in 1958. They had, of course, been withdrawn across the border into China, but the fact that Korea or any other country was situated closer to China than to the United States did not entitle the latter to maintain troops there.

11. The representatives of the United States and some of its allies had contended that it was impossible to know what was happening in the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea since they were not admitted to its territory. Had they really wished to obtain information on the Democratic People's Republic, however, they would have been willing to invite its representatives to present their views in the First Committee. Those who, like the Japanese representative, had voted against such an invitation and then reviled the North Korean Government were obviously trying to prevent a reconciliation between the two parts of Korea. The Japanese representative should be well aware of the true situation in North and South Korea, since most of the Korean immigrants in Japan, many of whom were natives of South Korea, wished to go to the Democratic People's Republic.

12. Although the representatives of the Western Powers had been forced to admit that all was not in order in South Korea, they could not bring themselves to state openly that a military fascist dictatorship had been established there. They could not face the fact that had it not been for the presence of foreign troops, the people of South Korea would long since have driven out their oppressive rulers and elected truly representative ones.

13. It was gratifying to note that many delegations had appealed for a realistic approach, i.e., for recognition of the existence of two Koreas and of the position taken by the Democratic People's Republic. No good had come of past General Assembly resolutions demanding unification on United States terms. The people of the Democratic People's Republic could not be expected to give up all their political, economic and social achievements and place themselves in bondage to South Korean landlords and capitalists, behind whom stood United States monopolies. Even the United States did not really expect them to. The purpose of such resolutions was merely to maintain a source of potential conflict in Korea. It was regrettable that the United Nations had allowed itself to be drawn into the affair, but it could at least put an end to a policy which merely led to hostility between the two parts of Korea.

14. The representative of the United Kingdom had accused the Soviet Union of adopting a cold-war approach to the Korean question. But it was not the Soviet Union that had introduced an element of unjustified discrimination into the matter of inviting Korean representatives. Despite its disapproval of the South Korean régime, it had proposed that invitations should be sent to representatives of both North and South, whereas the United States and the United Kingdom had tried to ignore the Democratic People's Republic. It was not the Soviet Union that was creating tension by constructing nuclear rocket bases in South Korea. It was not the Soviet Union that stood out against appealing to the two Korean Governments to establish economic, cultural and other ties in order to bring about a rapprochement. On the contrary, it had included a provision to that effect in its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.323), and had indeed been guided throughout by the desire to safeguard peace and security and to contribute to the peaceful and democratic unification of Korea without foreign interference and without the imposition of discriminatory conditions. That could only be achieved if foreign troops were withdrawn from South Korea.

15. As for the so-called United Nations Commission for the Rehabilitation and Unification of Korea, other delegations had dealt with that body at length and he would therefore confine himself to one example of its

inglorious conduct. In paragraph 27 of its report to the Assembly at its sixteenth session,^{1/} it had stated, with reference to the elections of 29 July 1960, that the arrangements for and the conduct of those elections "were very satisfactory". Yet in its latest report (A/5213, annex IV, B) it reproduced without comment the criteria for political clearance announced by the South Korean régime, according to which those who were not to be given clearance included persons responsible for the "rigging" of the 29 July 1960 elections and their collaborators. How could the Commission one year assert, moreover, that elections were satisfactory and then the very next year accept the dissolution of Parliament and the arrest of the Government without a word? Obviously it could only behave like that if it were taking orders from outside the United Nations. Such a body was a disgrace to the United Nations and should be done away with at once.

16. Mr. ALLOTT (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, said he thought it astonishing that the Communist countries, which had a long record of expansionism and suppression of self-government, should accuse the United States of using United Nations assistance to South Korea as a means of occupying that area for purposes of imperialist expansion. The members of the Committee were well aware of the circumstances under which the United States and other countries had sent troops into South Korea. The Soviet Union could easily bring about the withdrawal of those troops by permitting a settlement of the Korean question through the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Korean people.

17. The reason for the emphasis placed by Soviet-bloc speakers on alleged friction between the people of South Korea and the United Nations forces was obvious: having failed to gain control of all Korea through direct aggression, the Communists now hoped to achieve their aim by putting an end to United Nations assistance to the Republic of Korea. However, the United Nations forces now in South Korea had gone in response to an appeal for help in repelling Communist aggression, and they would remain there so long as South Korea felt the need of protection against a possible renewal of that aggression.

18. The Communist speakers had had a great deal to say about the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea. However, the latter was not democratic, nor did it represent the people; it represented the Communist party and, indeed, appeared to be dominated by Chinese and Soviet rather than Korean Communists. The North Korean régime's 100 per cent elections and its refusal to co-operate with the United Nations in seeking the reunification of the country showed that it feared genuine elections and observation by the outside world.

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.1/L.322, A/C.1/L.323)

19. Mr. QUAISON-SACKY (Ghana) said that since the Committee's debates on the Korean question had thus far served only to intensify the cold war rather than to promote a settlement, it was clearly necessary to adopt a new approach based on the realities of the situation and on the legitimate desires of the Korean people. Inasmuch as two régimes existed in Korea at the present time, the United Nations could not

possibly bring about the reunification of Korea if it listened to only one side and, indeed, supported one side against the other; his delegation therefore thought it unfortunate that the Committee had decided not to extend an unconditional invitation to representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in the discussion. The United Nations should in the future place greater stress on its task of establishing a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government than on its task of maintaining peace and security in the area. Specifically, it should reconstitute UNCURK in a manner acceptable to both sides and entrust the reconstituted Commission with the task of bringing the two sides together in negotiations. His delegation felt that if a number of non-aligned countries were included in the Commission, there might be a change of attitude towards the United Nations.

20. Several factors in the situation suggested that the approach he had just outlined might have some prospect of success. In the first place, the North Korean authorities were prepared to enter into negotiations with a view to unification, although they insisted that foreign troops must first be withdrawn from South Korea; in that connexion, his delegation felt that the use in Korea of troops from non-aligned countries might make it possible, for a start, to establish a more acceptable and effective United Nations presence in the country. The South Korean authorities, for their part, advocated the peaceful unification of Korea through the holding of nation-wide elections under United Nations supervision.

21. Secondly, the Chinese People's Volunteers had been withdrawn from North Korea and the United Nations forces in South Korea had been substantially reduced. While his delegation sympathized with the desire of the North Korean authorities that the remaining United Nations forces should be withdrawn in order to facilitate a political solution, it recognized that steps must be taken at the same time to allay South Korean fears of aggression. However, that could be accomplished by strengthening the truce machinery and need not entail the continued presence of United Nations forces.

22. Although both the draft resolutions before the Committee contained positive elements, neither of them conformed to the approach he had just suggested. His delegation would therefore abstain on both if they were put to the vote in their present form.

23. Mr. SEYDOUX (France) said that the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.322) reaffirmed the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, called on the Pyongyang authorities once more to accept those objectives and requested UNCURK to continue its work. The North Korean authorities had stubbornly continued to deny the competence of the United Nations, to reject its objectives and to hamper its activities. Accordingly, it was the Assembly's duty to reaffirm the Organization's determination to help to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea. The matter was one of fundamental principle, involving the hopes of an entire people.

24. UNCURK had played and was still playing a useful role in Korea. Its presence symbolized for the Korean people the continued interest of the United Nations in their country. Its latest report was a valuable source of information gathered by unquestionably impartial observers throughout the part of Korea to which the Commission had been allowed access. He

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 13.

expressed his delegation's gratitude to the members of the Commission; all delegations which were concerned about the Korean situation should join in calling for the continuance of the Commission's work.

25. The Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.323) was tendentious even in its title, since the expression "foreign troops" was used despite the fact that the troops involved were those of the United Nations and were stationed in the Republic of Korea with the full consent of its Government. The preamble of the Soviet draft resolution declared that the unification of Korea on peaceful and democratic foundations—which was the objective of the United Nations—would be prevented by the presence of United Nations forces; that was pushing paradox too far. Operative paragraph 1 would boldly urge the withdrawal of those forces, which would restore the situation existing before 25 June 1950 and expose the people of the Republic of Korea to the

danger of new aggression. Operative paragraph 2 would call for the establishment and development of ties between the North and the South. Seen in its context and in the light of the explanations offered by its supporters and, particularly, of the memorandum submitted by the North Korean authorities, that seemingly harmless paragraph was clearly designed to remove the Korean question from the jurisdiction of the United Nations, to establish the Pyongyang régime as the only authority which could negotiate with the Republic of Korea, to reinforce the weak international position of that régime and to replace the goal of the genuine reunification of Korea by that of a bogus confederation which would simply perpetuate the division of Korea. For that reason, his delegation would vote against draft resolution A/C.1/L.323 and, if they were voted on separately, against each of its paragraphs.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.